The arte of logick Plainely taught in the English tongue, according to the best approued authors. Very necessary for all students in any profession, how to defend any argument against all subtill sophisters, and cauelling schismatikes, and how to confute their false syllogismes, and captious arguments. By M. Blundevile.

THE ART OF LOGICKE.

THE FIRST BOOKE.

CHAP. I.

Of the Art of Logicke, and of the parts and offices thereof.

WHat is Logicke?

Logicke is an Art, which teacheth vs to dispute probably on both sides of any matter that is propounded.

Of what and how many parts doth it consist?

Of two: that is, Inuention and Iudge∣ment.

Whereto serue these parts?

Inuention findeth out meet matter to proue the thing that yee intend: and Iudgement examineth the matter, whether it bee good, or not; and then frameth, disposeth, and reduceth the same into due forme of argument.

What is the chiefe end or office of Logicke?

The chiefe end or office of Logicke is twofold: The one to discusse truth from falshood in any manner of speech; the other is to teach a compendious way to attaine to any Art or Science.

And therefore it is defined of some, to be the Art of Arts, and Science of Sciences; not for that it teacheth the principles of eue∣rie Art or Science, (for those are to be learned of the Professors of such Arts or Sciences) but because it sheweth the method, that is to say, the true order and right way that is to be obserued in seeking to come to the perfect knowledge of any Art or Science. Of which methodicall part, mine old friend, M. Iacomo Acontio Tridentino hath written in the Latine tongue a very proper and profitable Treatise. And therefore I minde here to deale onely with the first office, which is to discusse and to discerne truth from falshood in any speech or question that is propounded.

How is that to be done?

By three speciall instruments: that is, by Definition, Diuision, and Argumentation: whereof wee shall speake hereafter in their proper places. In the meane time, because questions are the mat∣ter wherein Logicke is chiefly occupied, wee will speake first of a question.

CHAP. II.

Of a question, and of certaine diuisions of words.

WHat is a question?

A question is a speech where of some doubt is made and vttered with some interrogatorie: as, How, What, or Whether: and such question is either simple, or compound.

Which call you simple, and which compound?

It is called simple, when the question consisteth onely of one word; as when I aske what Iustice is, or what Fortitude is, and such like; and is to be discussed by defining and diuiding the same. It is called compound, when it consisteth of many words ioined together by rules of Grammar, to make some perfect sen∣tence; as when I aske whether it be lawfull for the Christians to make warre vpon the Turkes, or not: and such like questions, which are to be discussed by arguing and reasoning on both sides: for Definition, Diuision, and Argumentation, as I said be∣fore, are the three especiall instruments whereby Logicke fin∣deth out the truth in any doubtfull matter.

Of what parts doth a compound question consist?

Of two, that is, the subiect and the predicate.

What meane you by these words, subiect and predicate?

The subiect is the word or sentence, whereof another word or sentence, called the predicate, is spoken: as when I say, Man is a sensible body; here this word Man is the subiect, and sensible body is the predicate: or each of them may contain many words, as this, To be learned in the Law require•…•…h a long studie; here To be learned in the Law is the subiect, and all the rest is the pre∣dicate.

How shall I know in long speeches, and specially being preposterously set, which is the Subiect, and which is the predicate?

By asking this question, Who, or What: for that which answe∣reth to this question, is alwaies the Subiect, as in this example: It were meet to learne my Grammar perfectly, before I entred into my Logicke: here if you aske, What is meet, you shall finde that to learne my Grammar perfectly is the Subiect, and all the rest to be the predicate. And note that these two words, Subiect and Predicate, are said to be the terms, limits, or extreme bounds of a Proposition, whereof we shall speake hereafter.

Sith euery question doth consist of words, me thinks it were necessary to shew how words are diuided.

Of words the Schoolemen make diuers and manifold diuisi∣ons, of which I minde here to recite but three onely, whereof the first is this: Of words some be simple, which they call Incomplexa; and some be compound, which they call Complexa. Simple or sin∣gle words, are such as are sole or seuered one from another, not making any sentence, as man, horse, wolfe. The compound are words ioined orderly together by rules of Grammar, to make some perfect sentence, as, Man is a sensible body. And hereof the questions are said to be either simple or compound, as hath been said before.

What is the second diuision of words?

Of words some, be of the first Intention, and some of the se∣cond.

Which are they?

Words of the first Intention are those, whereby any thing is

signified or named by the purpose and meaning of the first author or inuentor thereof, in any speech or language whatsoeuer it be: as the beast whereon we commonly ride, is called in English a Horse, in Latine Equus, in Italian Cauallo, in French Cheual. Words of the second Intention are termes of Art▪ as a Noune, Pronoune, Ve•…•…be, or Participle, are termes of Grammar: like∣wise Genus, Species, Proprium, and such like, are termes of Lo∣gicke.

What is the third diuision of words?

Of words, some be called Indiuidua, that is to say, particular, or rather singular; and some be called Vniuersalia, that is to say, vniuersall, common or generall.

CHAP. III.

Of singular and most particular words, called Indiuidua.

WHat is Indiuiduum?

Indiuiduum is that which signifieth but one thing only, and can be applied but to one thing only; as this name, Iohn, or Robert, signifieth but one certaine man, and not many.

How many kindes of Indiuiduums be there?

Foure, that is, Indiuiduum determinatum, Indiuiduum demon∣stratiuum, Indiuiduum vagum, and Indiuiduum ex hypothesi.

What is Indiuiduum determinatum?

Indiuiduum determinatum, that is to say, certaine or determi∣ned, is the proper name of some one certaine thing, whatsoeuer it be, as Iohn or Thomas is the proper name of some or one man: againe, Bucephalus is the proper name of great Alexander his horse: and London is the proper name of the chiefest Citie in En∣gland.

What is Indiuiduum demonstratiuum?

Indiuiduum demonstratiuum, which is as much to say, as shew∣ing or pointing, is a common word or name ioined with a Pro∣noune demonstratiue, to signifie some one certaine thing onely, as when we say, this man, or that horse: and Indiuiduums demon∣stratiue be more ready to signifie particular things, as well in acci∣dents▪

as in substances, then are Indiuidua determinata: for This, or That, and such like Pronounes, doe point out a thing, as it were with the finger, when proper names oftentimes doe faile: yea the Pronoune demonstratiue is of such force, as being ioined to the most generall word that is, maketh it Indiuiduum, as well as when it is ioined to the most especiall: for, this substance or this body is Indiuiduum, as well as this man or that horse.

What is Indiuiduum vagum?

Indiuiduum vagum, that is to say, wandering or vncertaine, is a word betokening some one certaine thing, but not certainly: as when I say, There was a certaine man here to seeke you; by this speech is meant but one man, and yet vncertaine who it was: and therefore, to make the thing more certaine, wee vse to adde some token or marke; as wee reade in the Acts of the Apostles, There was a certaine man which was halt and lame from his mothers wombe, whom they laid daily before the gate of the Temple, &c. And note, that like as we doe vse indiuidua, demonstratiua, & deter∣minata, in declaring things either present, or certainly knowne: so in speaking of things absent, or vncertainly knowne, wee ex∣presse our mindes oftentimes by indiuidua vaga.

What is Indiuiduum ex hypothesi?

Indiuiduum ex hypothesi, that is to say, by supposition, is a word which of his owne naturall signification being common and vni∣uersall is made notwithstanding by supposition a singular word, and to signifie but one thing onely: as for example, this word, The Sonne of Marie, is a common terme, and yet by supposition is made to signifie none but Christ only: likewise when we say, The Greeke Poet, we meane none but Homer.

CHAP. IV.

Of words vniuersall or generall.

WHat words are said to be vniuersall or generall?

Those words are said to be vniuersall, which are spoken of many things, that is to say, which may be applied to many things, or comprehend many things, as this word▪ Animal (which is as

much to say as a sensible body) comprehendeth both man, bruit beast, fish, fowle, bird, and euery thing else that hath feeling and mouing.

How are such words diuided?

Into Predicables and Predicaments.

Of the fiue Predicables.

WHat call you Predicables?

Predicables are certaine degrees, or rather petigrees of words that be of one affinitie, shewing which comprehend more, and which comprehend lesse.

How many such be there?

There be fiue, that is to say, Genus, Species, Differentia, Propri∣um, & Accidens: which may be Englished thus, Generall kinde, Speciall kind, Difference, Propertie, and Accident. But we thinke it best to begin first with Species, because it is next to Indiuiduum.

Of the speciall kinde, called in Latine Species.

WHat is Species?

Species is a speciall kinde, which is spoken of many things, that is to say, it comprehendeth many things differing only in number, in asking the question, what the thing is: as when I aske, What is Iohn? it is rightly answered, to say, A man: for this word man is an vniuersall word, comprehending both Iohn, Thomas, Robert, and all other singular men.

How manifold is Species?

Twofold, that is, Infima and Subalterna. Infima, that is to say, the lowest or most especiall kinde, is that which comprehendeth many things differing only in number, and therefore cannot be a generall kinde, as man, horse, and such like speciall kindes. Spe∣cies subalterna, is that which comprehendeth many things diffe∣ring in kinde, and in diuers respects may be both genus and spe∣cies, as these words, animal or sensible body, bird, fish: for this word bird, in that it comprehendeth diuers kindes of birds, as a Blackbird, a Mauys, a Goldfinch, and many other kinds of birds, it is a generall kinde: but in respect of these words, substance, body, or animal, it is but species.

How is species called of the Greekes?

It is called Idea, which is as much to say, as a common shape conceiued in the minde, through some knowledge had before of one or two Indiuiduums hauing that shape: so as after wee haue seene one wolfe, or two, we beare the shape thereof continually in our mindes, and thereby are able to know a wolfe whensoeuer we finde him, or (if need be) to paint him. But genus extendeth too farre, and comprehendeth too many speciall kindes to bee so easily painted. And note that such shapes or Ideae are said also to be perpetuall.

Why are they said to be perpetuall?

Because they continue in the minde, though the things them∣selues cease to haue any being: as the shape of a Rose continueth in our mindes in the cold heart of Winter, when there is no Rose indeed. And this is the true meaning of Plato touching Ideae, that is, to be perpetuall in the minde, not separate from mans intelli∣gence, as some men faine: for vniuersalities are alwaies to bee comprehended in mans mind, but not Indiuidua: which, because they are infinite, there can be had of them no certaine science or knowledge.

Of the generall kinde, called Genus.

WHat is Genus?

Genus is a generall kinde which may bee spoken of many things differing in speciall kinde, in asking the question, what the thing is: as if I aske, What is man, or horse? It is rightly answered, to say, Animal: for this word Animal comprehendeth both man, horse, lion, and many other speciall kinds of beasts.

How is it diuided?

Into two, that is, Genus most generall, and Genus subalternate.

What is genus most generall?

It is that which in no respect can be species, as these, Substance, Quantitie, Qualitie, and all the rest of the ten Predicaments, which be the highest kindes, comprehending all other kindes, and are comprehended of none.

What is that which you call subalternate?

It is that which in diuers respects may be both genus and spe∣cies,

as these, animal or sensible body, stone, tree, fish, bird: which being compared to their superiours, as to substance or body, be speciall kindes: but if to their inferiours, as this word sensible bo∣die being compared to man or horse, or this word stone to a flint or Diamond, or this word tree to an Apple-tree or Peare-tree, or this word fish to a Salmon or Pickerell, or this word bird to a Mauys or Goldfinch, and such like, then they be generall kindes. The order of all which kindes, as well generall as subalternate, as also most especiall, you may see here in the Table following, ta∣ken out of the predicament of substance: in which Table, Sub∣stance is the highest or most generall kinde, vnder which are pla∣ced the lesse generall or speciall kindes, according as they bee in degrees high or low, nigh or farre from substance. Moreouer, on each side of the generall kindes are set downe in this Table the differences whereby the said generall kindes are diuided euery one into those inferiour kindes which it comprehendeth. And the like Table may be made of all the rest of the Predicaments.

A Table shewing the order and degrees of generall kindes and especiall kindes, taken out of the predicament of Substance.

Differences,	Generall and speciall kinds	Differences,	Examples.
With bodie,	Substance is either	Or without body, as	An Angell, A Spirit, The soule of a man separated from the bodie.
Compound of the foure elements, as all na∣turall bo∣dies and vnnatural	If with body, it is either	Or simple, as	The 11. heauens, The 4. elements.

Liuing,	Body com∣pound is ei∣ther	Or vnliuing, as	Stones, Metals, Liquors.
Sensible,	Againe, the liuing body is either	Or vnsensi∣ble, as	Tree, Herbe, Shrubbe.
Reasonable, as man:	The sensible body, called in Latine Animal, is either	Or vnreaso∣nable, as	Fourefooted beasts Creeping beasts, Fish, Fowle, or Bird.
	The reasona∣ble bodie is man, called in Latine Homo, which is a most especi∣all kinde:	As	Socrates, Plato, and euery other singular man.

Of Difference, called of the Latines, Differentia.

WHat is difference?

Difference is that whereby things doe differ one from another, or any thing from it selfe.

How many kindes of differences be there?

According to Porphyrius, there be three kindes, that is to say, common, proper, and most proper or especiall, called of the La∣tines, Differentia specifica.

What call you a common difference?

A common difference is some separable accident, whereby one thing differeth from another, or from it selfe: as a hot man from a cold, or a man standing from himselfe sitting.

What is proper difference?

A proper difference is some inseparable accident, whereby one thing differeth from another, or from it selfe: as the Swanne by whitenesse differeth from the Crow, the gray-eied man from another man that hath blacke eies, or from himselfe, as hauing now an vnmoueable scarre in his face, whereas before hee had none.

What is the most proper difference?

The most proper difference, only receiued and allowed of the Logicians, is that which is spoken of many things differing in kinde or number, in asking the question what manner of thing any thing is, as this word reasonable or vnreasonable: for if I aske the question, what manner of thing this man or that man is, as Iohn, Thomas, or Richard, &c. it is rightly answered, to say, A reasonable body. Likewise if I aske what manner of thing a horse is, it is truly answered, to say, An vnreasonable body: for these be the most proper and especial differences, whereby men and bruit beasts doe differ one from another.

How manifold is the office of a Logicall difference?

Twofold: the one to diuide the generall kinde into his especi∣all kindes, and the other to constitute or make the selfe-same spe∣ciall kindes. Wherfore such differences are said in diuers respects to be sometimes diuisiue, and sometimes constitutiue, yea and sometimes both; as these differences, corporate and vncorpo∣rate, liuing and vnliuing, sensible and vnsensible, reasonable and vnreasonable; which in that they doe diuide some generall kinde into other kindes, either more speciall, or not so generall, they may be called differences diuisiue: but in that they constitute or make any speciall kinde, as this difference reasonable being ad∣ded to a sensible body, maketh the speciall kinde, man; such dif∣ference may be well called a difference constitutiue, or rather spe∣cificatiue, as the former Table of generall kindes and differences doth plainly shew.

What other diuision doe the Schoolemen make of this Logicall difference?

They say, that of these differences some do extend further then some, for some may be applied to many speciall kinds, as liuing,

and vnliuing, sensible and vnsensible, and also the difference vn∣reasonable, but the difference reasonable can be applied but to one speciall kinde onely, which is man.

Of Property, called in Latine, Proprium.

WHat is propertie?

It is a naturall inclination or property incident to one especiall kinde, which is to be vnderstood foure manner of waies.

Shew how.

First, it is called Proprium, which is proper to one onely kind, but not to the whole kind, as to be a Poet or Musitian, is proper to man, but not to euery man: Secondly, it is called proper that belongeth to al the kind, but not to that kind alone: as to be two∣footed, belongeth to al mankind, but not to that kind alone: for •…•…l flying foules are also two footed: Thirdly, it is said to be proper, when it belongeth to one only kind and to all that kind, but yet not alwaies: as to be hore-headed or bald, is proper to man in old age, but yet not alwaies: Fourthly, it is said to be proper, or rather most proper, which is incident to one kinde alone, to all that kinde and alwaies, as to haue a naturall aptnes to laugh or to speake is proper to man onely, to euery man, and alwaies, and therefore this kind of property is said to be conuertible, with the kinde whereunto it belongeth, as whatsoeuer hath naturally power to speak or laugh, the same is man, and whatsoeuer is man, the same hath power to speake or laugh.

Of an accident, called in Latine, Accidens.

WHat is an accident?

An accident is a voice or word signifying things ca∣suall, cleauing to substances or subiects, without which subiects they haue no beeing at all, and it is thus defined. An accident is that which may be absent or present without corruption of the subiect whereto it cleaueth, because it is no substantiall part of the subiect, and of such accidents some be called separable, and some vnseparable.

What is a separable accident?

A separable accident is that which may bee easily separated

from the subiect, as outward heat or cold from a mans body, whitenesse or blacknesse from a wall.

What is an vnseparable accident?

An vnseparable accident is that which cannot be separated from his subiect in deed, but only in thought or imagination, as heat from the fire, heauinesse from lead. And such accidents bee either incident to certaine subiects, or substances in particular, as some men to be gray-eied, or red-headed; or else to some whole kinde in generall, as to all Rauens to be blacke, and all Swannes to be white.

Of the manifold vses of the aforesaid fiue Predicables.

TO how many vses doe the Predicables serue?

To these foure necessarie vses: First, they shew which words doe comprehend more, or extend furthest, and which comprehend lesse or least, and what affinitie is betwixt word and word, so as in making any definition, a man may easily perceiue how euery word ought to be expoūded one by another, that is to say, the lesse common by that which is more common; as if you would define a Spaniell, you must say that he is a dogge: for this word dogge is a more common word then Spaniell, because it comprehendeth both Spaniell, Gr•…•…yhound, Hound, Curre, Ma∣stiffe, and euery other kinde of dogge. Secondly, they shew the nature of propositions, which be necessarie, and which be casuall or accidentall.

Which call you necessarie, and which casuall?

That proposition is said to be necessarie, wherof the predicate is either a generall kinde, a speciall kinde, a speciall difference, or propertie, and is necessarily coupled to his subiect; as when I say, Iohn is a sensible body, Iohn is a man, Iohn is reasonable, Iohn is apt to speake.

When is a proposition said to be accidentall?

When the predicate is an accident, as when I say, Iohn is lear∣ned or vnlearned, white or blacke. Thirdly, they yeeld matter meet to make definitions and diuisions: for Logicall definitions be made of the nighest generall kinds ioined together, with their true differences or properties: as in defining a man, wee say that

man is a sensible body endued with reason; and in making diui∣sions, we either diuide the generall kindes into their especiall kindes, as a sensible body into man and bruit beasts, o•…•… the spe∣ciall kindes into their Indiuiduums, as man into Iohn, Thomas, &c. or else we diuide subiects into their accidents, as of men, some be free, and some be bound, and such like. Fourthly, they helpe much towards the inuention of arguments: for arguments bee fetched from the common places, as from the generall kinde, the speciall kinde, the difference, the propertie, and from other like places of inuention, as shall bee taught hereafter in his proper place. And note, that of these predicables doe spring certaine predications, whereof we come now to speake.

CHAP. V.

Of Predication, and of the diuers kindes thereof.

WHat is predication?

Predication is a certaine kinde or phrase of speech, whereby one word is spoken of another, and aptly applied to another, as when we say, Iohn is a man; for this word man is a generall word, and is spoken of Iohn, Thomas, Richard, and euery other singular man.

How many kindes of predications be there?

Two, that is, essentiall and accidentall.

What is essentiall predication?

It is a naturall and vsuall kinde of speech, whereby one thing is naturally, and properly spoken of another, or as the Logicians say, when words superiour are spoken of their inseriours being of one selfe affinitie, as when the generall kinde is spoken of any his speciall kindes, or the speciall kinde of any his Indiuiduums, or when the difference or propertie is spoken of their speciall kindes, or of any of the Indiuiduums comprehended vnder the said speciall kindes; as when we say, Man is a sensible body, or that Iohn is a man, or, Iohn is reasonable, or, Iohn is apt to speake, or such like: for such speeches are both naturall, and of necessitie, because the predicate is aptly applied to his subiect. To this

kinde of predication some men doe also referre two other kindes of speeches.

Which be they?

Predication, Identicall and vnusuall.

What is Identicall predication?

It is a kinde of speech, whereby one selfe thing is spoken of it selfe, as when we say, Iohn is Iohn, which though it be essentiall, yet because nothing is expounded thereby, it is not allowed of the Logicians.

What is vnusuall predication?

It is a kinde of speech seldome vsed, as when wee reade in the holy Scriptures, God is man, The word was made flesh; for these be most essentiall and necessarie speeches, though not vsuall in any other science then in Diuinitie.

What is predication accidentall?

Predication accidentall is when an accident is spoken of his subiect, as, Wine is sweet, or, Wine is sowre, Socrates walketh; for this is a casuall kinde of speech, imploying no necessitie, as doe the other essentiall or naturall speeches before recited. To this also may be referred predications by way of similitude, as when we say, One man is a God or Deuill to another, A Tyrant is a Wolfe or Fox, that is to say, like a Wolfe or Fox, which are otherwise called figuratiue or metaphorical speeches. But whilest we talke here of accidentall predications, it shall not be amisse to shew you that the Schoolemen, the more distinctly to expresse the nature of accidents, doe vse two termes, Abstractum and Concretum. Abstractum is the bare shape of any subiect separa∣ted by imagination from the same, as the whitenesse or black∣nesse of a wall, or any other thing that is either white or blacke, which abstract cannot be properly spoken of his subiect; for it were no proper speech, to say, that this wall is whitenesse: where∣fore wee must vse the adiectiue called Concretum, signifying the shape, together with the subiect, as when wee say, This wall is white.

CHAP. VI.

Of Predicaments.

WHat are Predicaments?

Predicaments are certaine Titles or Tables containing all things that be in the world: for euery thing, whatsoeuer it be, is either a sub∣stance, or accident: and if it be a substance, it is found in the Table of substance hereafter following: if it bee an accident, it belongeth either to quantitie, qualitie, relation, acti∣on, passion, time, place, to be scited, or to haue: for these be the Tables of accidents, in one of the which euery accident is easie to be found. So that in all there be ten Predicaments or Tables, one of substance, and nine of accidents, and these be called the high∣est and most generall kindes, albeit there be others indeed high∣er then they, called of the Schoolemen, Transcendentia, that is to say, surpassing, as these, Res, ens, vnum, aliquid, verum, bonum: which may be Englished thus; a thing, a being, one, somewhat, true, good. But forsomuch as these be not spoken of the other higher kindes according to one selfe signification, but may be di∣uersly applied, they are excluded from the order of predicaments.

What other words are excluded from the order of Predicaments?

All compound words, called of the Schoolemen Complexa, as Goodman, Plato disputeth: and all doubtfull words hauing di∣uers significations, otherwise called Equiuokes, and also termes of Art, as a Noune, a Pronoune, a Verbe, which be termes of Grammar, and as genus, species, differentia, which bee termes of Logicke, and such like: which termes of Art are called of the Schoolemen, names of the second intention, as hath beene said before. Notwithstanding, differences constituting especial kinds, doe belong to the predicament of the same speciall kindes, and the parts of any whole thing doe belong to the predicament wherein the whole is contained: and first, principles doe belong to the predicament or table of those things whereof they bee principles, as a point or pricke belongeth to the predicament of quantitie, all which shall be plainly declared vnto you, immedi∣ately.

after that we haue somewhat talked of those things which the Schoolemen call Antepredicamenta, that is to say, forepredi∣caments.

CHAP. VII.

Of Forepredicaments.

WHat meane you by forepredicaments?

Forepredicaments be certaine definitions, di∣uisions, and rules taught by Aristotle before the predicaments, for the better vnderstanding of the same, and therefore are called Antepredica∣menta, that is to say, For predicaments.

What, and how many things defineth he?

Three, that is, Equiuokes, Vniuokes, and Denominatiues.

What call you Equiuokes?

Equiuokes be such things as haue one self•…•… name, and yet bee diuers in substance or definition; as a naturall dogge, and a cer∣taine starre in the firmament, are both called by one name in La∣tine, Canis, yet they be nothing like in substance, kinde, or na∣ture. And note that the Schoolemen doe call the word or name it selfe Equiuocum Equiuocans, and the thing signified by the word Equiuocum Equiuocatum. They make also two kindes of Equiuokes, that is, Equiuokes by chance, and Equiuokes of pur∣pose. The first is, when one selfe name is giuen to many things by chance, and not for any likenesse that is betwixt them, as in English this word Hart signifieth as well the Hart of a man or beast, as a certaine beast called a Hart in the Forest. The second is, when one selfe name is giuen to diuers things of purpose, for some likenesse that is betwixt them, as a painted man is called man as well as the liuing man; for wee will commonly say, Here is King Henry the Eighth, when indeed it is but his pi∣cture. But ye must note, that all Equiuokes being generally pro∣nounced without addition, ought to be vnderstood according to their chiefe and most principall signification, as this word man being generally spoken, ought to be taken for a liuing man, and not for a painted man: but no Equiuokes ought to bee placed in any predicament, neither can it be defined, vnlesse it bee first

brought to one certaine signification; and therefore all Equi∣uokes are vtterly barred from all manner of Discipline.

What call you Vniuokes?

Vniuokes bee those things that haue one common name, which is spoken of them essentially, or really, as a man, a horse, a lion, whose common name is animal, or sensible body; for in asking what either of them is, it is rightly answered, to say, ani∣mal. And I say here really, because it is not enough for Vniuokes to haue a common name, vnlesse the same be also reall or essen∣tiall, whereby are excluded all common names or vnderstandings that be accidentall: for though white or blacke, swift or slow, or such like, is a common name, and is commonly applied both to man and beast, yet that is accidentally, and not really or substan∣tially. Moreouer, the Schoolemen doe call the common word it selfe Vniuocum Vniuocans, and the thing signified by the word Vni∣uocum Vniuocatum.

What call you Denominatiues?

Denominatiues are those accidents that be of like name, and differ only in case, or finall termination; as humble, humilitie; proud, proudnesse: for of humilitie, a man is said to be humble; and of pride, to be proud: and according to the Schoolemen, that word whereof the name doth spring, is called Denominator, and the name it selfe Denominatiue, and the thing or person so called, the Denominated; as if I should say of valiantnesse, Peter is said to be valiant; here valiantnesse is the Denominator, valiant the Denominatiue, and Peter the Denominated: for Peter is the sub∣iect whereunto the Denominator doth cleaue. The Grammari∣ans doe call the Denominator Abstractum, that is, a substantiue, and the Denominatiue Concretum, that is, an Adiectiue.

To what end doth Aristotle chiefly vse th•…•…se definitions?

To shew the differences of predications or kindes of speeches, which are to be allowed, and which not: againe, to know which be predications essentiall, and which be accidentall: for accor∣ding to the three definitions before rehear•…•…ed, there bee three Predications, that is to say, Predication Equiuocall, Vniuocall, and Denominatiue.

What is Predication Equiuocall?

Predication Equiuocall, is when the equiuoke is spoken of any of the things that it signifieth, as to say▪ His Letter was a Letter of the matter, meaning perhaps a hinderer of the matter: but such kinde of speeches ought to be reiected from all good discipline, as hath beene said before.

What is Predication Vniuocall?

It is when the generall kinde is spoken of his especiall kindes, or the especiall kinde of her inferiours, or the speciall difference of that speciall kinde which it maketh, or of the Indiuiduums contained vnder the same speciall kinde, as when wee say, Man is a sensible body, Man hath reason, or, Iohn is a man.

What is Predication Denominatiue?

It is when some accident is spoken of his subiect, as when wee say, Peter is proud, humble, or valiant.

What, and how many diuisions be there?

Two: The first diuision is touching words simple and com∣pound, whereof though wee haue said somewhat before, yet it shall not grieue vs, here againe to set it downe in such order as the Logicians vse.

Shew how.

Of words, some be simple, called in Latine, Incomplexa, and some be compound, called Complexa. Simple words bee distinct and seuerall words, not set together by any rule of Grammar, to make any perfect sentence, as, good, iust, a man a horse, to stand, to goe. Compound words be words significatiue, which are ioi∣ned together by rules of Grammar to make some perfect sen∣tence, as, Iohn is learned.

What is the second diuision?

The second diuision is fourefold, as followeth: First, of things that be, some be spoken of a subiect, and yet be in no subiect, as, man, horse, and such like vniuersall natures or substances: for they be no accidents. Secondly, some be in a subiect, and yet be not spoken of any subiect, as all particular accidents, as this or that colour, for these be Indiuiduums, and therefore not predi∣cable. Thirdly, some be in a subiect, and also be spoken of a sub∣iect, as all vniuersall accidents, as Science, Grammar, Logi ke, and such like: for of these some be generall, and some be speciall

kindes, and therfore are said to be predicable accidents. Fourthly, some be neither in a subiect, nor spoken of a subiect, as Iohn, Tho∣mas, this man, or that man, this horse, or that horse; for these be first natures or substances, and therefore are subiects themselues not predicable.

Whereto serueth this diuision?

By this diuision ye may learne the diuersitie of these two spee∣ches, to be spoken of a subiect, and to be in a subiect: for to be spoken of a subiect, is to be spoken really or essentially of some thing that is part thereof, as this word animal, or sensible body, is really spoken of man, horse, and of euery other thing that hath life and seeling; for they bee substantiall parts of that generall kinde: for if it be demanded what a man or horse is, it is rightly answered, that he is a sensible body. But to bee in a subiect, is to be spoken of another thing accidentally, and not essentially, as this word white or blacke is spoken accidentally of man, or of any other subiect, and not essentially; for neither is man any es∣sentiall part of white, nor white any essentiall part of man, and therefore cannot be in man, or in any other subiect, but acciden∣tally: and for that cause it is spoken of his subiect accidentally, and not really.

Now tell how many, and what those rules bee, whereof you spake before▪

There be two rules. The first is thus: When one thing is spo∣ken of another essentially, as of his subiect▪ then whatso•…•…uer may be spoken of that predicate, must needs bee also really spoken of the same subiect: for as this wo•…•…d sensible body is spoken of man or horse essentially, as when we say that man is a sensible body; so this word liuing body, being spoken essentially of a sensible body, as when we say that euery sensible body is a liuing body, is also as really spoken of the foresaid subiect, man, in saying that man is a liuing body; for this word, liuing body, is a more ge∣nerall kinde then sensible body is.

What is the second rule?

The second rule is thus: Diuers generall kindes not contained one of another, nor both of a third, haue diuers speciall differen∣ces, which doe make diuers speciall kindes, as a sensible body and

science: for the speciall differences of a sensible body are these, reasonable and vnreasonable, making both man and bruit beast: but the differences of science be these, contemplatiue and dispu∣tatiue, and such like, whereby are made speciall kindes of know∣ledge: for the difference contemplatiue maketh naturall Philo∣sophie, and the difference disputatiue maketh Logicke.

To what end serue these rules?

To the end it might be easily knowne what words are of affi∣nitie, and which be of one selfe predicament, and which not. Thus farre as touching forepredicaments. Now to the predica∣ments themselues. And first we will speake of substance.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Substance.

WHat is substance? and how many kindes of substan∣ces be there?

Substance is a thing consisting of it selfe, and needeth no helpe to sustaine the being thereof: and yet it is clad with accidents; for otherwise we could not discerne with our outward senses, whether it were a substance, or not: for we cannot see the substance of any thing with our bodily eies, but only with the eies of our minde and vn∣derstanding; but we may see the shape, the quantitie, the colour, and such like accidents cleauing to the substance, without the which those accidents haue no being at all: and therefore in see∣ing such accidents, we may assure our selues that there is a sub∣stance sustaining those accidents, which doth alwaies remaine, though the accidents doe faile or change neuer so often. As for example: Wee see in water, that though it be sometime hot, and sometime cold, now of one colour, and now of another, yet the substance of water doth still remaine, so as we may perceiue those accidents to be one thing, and the substance of water to be ano∣ther. Now as touching the kindes of substance, according to Aristotle, there be two, that is, first and second.

What call you first substances?

First substances be those substances which the Logicians call

Indiuidua, as Iohn, Thomas, this man, or that man, this horse, or that horse, and by reason of their accidents are to bee discerned with outward senses.

Which call you second substances?

Second substances are those which they call speciall kindes, and generall kindes, as man, a sensible body, a liuing body, and such like, which are to be comprehended only by mans reason, and be not subiect to our outward senses, as first substances bee. And these second substances are otherwise called of the Schoole∣men, vniuersall natures.

How many properties doe belong to substance?

These three: First, substance is contained in no subiect, as an accident is: for though the parts of a mans body be contained in the whole, yet euery such part is a peculiar body or substance, and hath his proper being of it selfe so well as the whole, whereas accidents without substance haue no being at all. Secondly, sub∣stances are said to be diuers, but not contrary one to another: for neither is fire, as touching his substance, contrary to water, nor the Wolfe contrary to the Lambe, but onely in respect of their qualitie, whereunto contrarietie doth properly belong. Thirdly, of substances, one cannot be more or lesse then another; for the greatest Giant, as touching substance, is no more a man then the least Dwarfe that is; neither is a man full growne, more a man, then a childe newly borne: for more or lesse appertaineth pro∣perly to quantitie, and not to substance. But if you will vnder∣stand how farre the predicament of substance doth extend, and what it comprehendeth, consider well this Table following, whereby you may learne how to define any kinde of substance, whatsoeuer it be: for there you shall finde all the kindes, both generall and speciall, together with their differences, most plainly set forth.

The Table of Substance.

• Substance is either
• ...
  • without body, as
  • ...
    • An Angell, as Gabriel, Michael, &c.
    • A spirit or soule separate from the body, as the spirit or soule of this or that dead man.
  • Or with body: if it bee with body, it is either
  • ...
    • Simple, if it be sim∣ple, it is either
    • ...
      • Celestiall, as the eleuen heauens, and all the starres and planets.
      • Or elementall, as fire, aire, water, earth.
    • Or com∣pound, if it bee com∣pound, it is either
    • ...
      • liuing, if it be liuing, it is ei∣ther
      • ...
        • Sensible, if it be a sen∣sible body, called in Latine, animal, it is either
        • ...
          • Reason∣able, as man, as
          • ...
            • Socrates,
            • Plato,
            • Virgil,
          • Or vn∣reaso∣nable, as
          • ...
            • A bird or fowle, as a Larke, &c.
            • A 4. footed beast as a horse.
            • A fish, as a salmo a creeping beast as a worme, a snake, a viper.
        • Or vnsen∣sible, as a plāt, which is either
        • ...
          • A tree, as an Oke, an Ap∣ple-tree, &c.
          • A shrubbe, as briers, broome, &c.
          • Or hearbe, as Thyme, Isope, Margerum.
    • or vn∣liuing, if it be vnli∣uing, it is ei∣ther
    • ...
      • Perfect, if it be per∣fect, it is either
      • ...
        • Metall, as gold and sil∣uer, &c.
        • Or stone, which is either
        • ...
          • Naturall, as a precious stone, a flint.
          • Or artificiall, as a tile or bricke.
        • Or liquor, as wine, hony, &c.
      • or vnper∣fect, as
      • ...
        • Firie impressions, as thun∣der, lightning.
        • Or watrie impressions, as raine, ha•…•…le, snow, &c.

CHAP. IX.

Of Quantitie.

WHat is quantitie, and how is it diuided?

Quantitie is that which comprehendeth the greatnesse and number or multitude of things, and is diuided into two kindes, that is, whole and broken.

What is whole quantitie?

Whole quantitie, called in Latine, quantitas continua, is that whose parts are ioined together with some common bound or limit, which is the ending of one part, and the beginning of ano∣ther, as the parts of the line here set downe in the margent, mar∣ked with the letters a. c. are coupled together with the middle* 1.1 point b. which point is the ending of a. b. and the beginning of b. c.

How many kindes of whole quantitie be there?

Of whole quantitie there be three kindes, that is, linea, superfi∣cies, and corpus.

Shew how they are defined and diuided.

Linea (in English, a line) is a length without either bredth or thicknesse, which is either right, or crooked; •…•…ight, as a yard, an ell, or pole; crooked, as a hoope, or circle.

Superficies (which wee may properly interprete to be the vp∣per face of any thing) is a length and bredth without depth or thicknesse; and that is either plaine, or bowing; plaine, as a plaine or smooth floore; bowing or compassing, as a vault or ouen, whereof the outward side is called conu•…•…x, and the inward side concaue or hollow.

Corpus (which is as much to say as a body) is that which hath both length, bredth, and depth, and that is either round, or with angles; round, as a bowle or ball; with a•…•…gles or co•…•…ners, as a square die, or such like thing. All which three kindes of quantitie are to be considered onely with the minde mathematically. as things abstract, and separated from all k•…•…nde of matter, t•…•…at is to say as things that haue no being •…•…t al, but imaginatiuely▪ and yet so nec•…•…ssarily inuented by man, as nothing can be measured with∣out

them. To these three kindes of whole quantitie may be also added two other kindes, that is to say, mouing, and time, being taken for the measure, space, or distance of place or time wherein any thing is moued.

How many kindes of this mouing be there, and which be they?

Of this mouing there be three kindes, that is, right, circular, and mixt. The right belongeth to the foure elements, and to bo∣dies without life: for their natuall mouing is either right vpward, or else right downeward, as the fire, whose proper mouing is al∣waies to ascend right vp, and the mouing of a stone, or such like heauie thing, is to fall right downeward: for (according to the rules of philosophie) all light things doe moue vpward, and all heauie things downeward. Circular, or round mouing, belongeth to the heauens, and celestiall bodies, which doe turne round like a Cart wheele. The mixt mouing (that is to say, partly right, and partly round) belongeth to all liuing beasts, that goe sometime forward, sometime backward, or sidelong, sometime vpward, and sometime downeward.

How is time diuided?

Time is diuided into three kindes, that is, into time past, time present, and time to come: and vnder time are comprehended yeares, moneths, weekes, daies, houres, and all other words sig∣nifying distance or difference of time.

What is broken quantitie?

Broken quantitie, called of the Latines, quantitas discreta, is that, whose parts are not ioined with any common bound or li∣mit, but be loose and seuerall one from another; which quantitie is diuided into two kindes, that is, number and speech.

What is number, and how is it diuided?

Number is a multitude or summe of vnities or ones gathered together: and such number is either simple, respectiue, or figura∣tiue: Simple, as, two, three, foure, fiue, &c. Respectiue, as halfe, double, treble, quadruble, and such like: Figuratiue, as a three∣square or foure-square number, like to these here figured ∴ :: and such like.

What things are comprehended vnder broken quantitie?

All names of measures, whereby we measure any thing, either

drie or liquid, as gallon, quart; pint, bushell, pecke, pound, dram, scruple, graine, &c.

How is speech here taken?

Speech is taken here for the measure or quantitie of syllables, whereof some be long, and some be short: and such quantitie is to be considered either in harmonie, in rythme, or verse; of which things, the generall and speciall kindes, together with the rest that haue beene said touching quantitie, are orderly set forth in the Table of quantitie here following.

What, and how many properties doe belong to quantitie?

To quantitie belong three properties: First, to haue no con∣trarietie; for great and small be not of themselues contrarie, but only by way of comparison. Secondly, to be greater or lesser, but not more or lesse, spoken aduerbially; for a little quantitie is a quantitie as well as the greatest quantitie of all. The third and chiefest propertie of quantitie, is, to be equall or vnequall.

The Table of Quantitie.

• Quantitie is either
• ...
  • Whole, if it bee whole, it is either
  • ...
    • permanent, if it be per∣manent, it is either
    • ...
      • A line, which is either
      • ...
        • Right, as a yard, an ell. Or crooked, as a hoope, or bow, &c.
      • A superficies, which is either
      • ...
        • Plaine, as a smooth floore, &c.
        • Or bowing, as a vault, or ouen, &c.
      • Or a body, which is ei∣ther
      • ...
        • Round, as a bowle or ball.
        • Or with corners, as a square die, &c.
    • Or mouea∣ble, if it bee moueable, it is either
    • ...
      • Motion, which is either
      • ...
        • Right,
        • Circular,
        • Or Mixt.
      • Or time, and that is either
      • ...
        • Time past,
        • Time present,
        • Or time to come.
  • Or broken: if it be bro∣ken quanti∣tie, it is ei∣ther
  • ...
    • Number, which is either
    • ...
      • Simple, as euen or odde, &c.
      • Respectiu•…•…, as double, treble, &c.
      • Or figuratiue, as three-cornered, foure-cornered, &c.
    • Or measure of speech, which consisteth either
    • ...
      • In composition of syllables, as Dactilus, Spon∣de•…•…s, &c.
      • In harmonie, as a third, a fist, &c.
      • In rythme, as charme, harme.
      • Or in verse, as hexamiter, pen∣tami•…•…er, Iam∣bicke.

CHAP. X.

Of Qualitie.

WHat is qualitie?

Qualitie is an affection, shape, or forme of the minde or bodie, wherof the thing so affected or formed taketh his name: as of wisdome a man is said to be wise, and of iustice hee is called iust.

How many kindes of qualitie be there?

Of qualitie there be foure kindes, that is, habit and disposition, naturall power and impotencie, passion and passible qualitie, fi∣gure and forme.

What is habit, and how is it diuided?

Habit is a constant and absolute perfection in any thing, not giuen by nature, but gotten by long vse and exercise; and it is twosold, that is, of the minde, and of the body: againe, habit of the minde is twofold, whereof the one is called intellectuall, be∣longing to the reason and vnderstanding of man, and the other morall, belonging to the will of man. Of intellectuall habits, ac∣cording to Aristotle, there be fiue, that is, Intelligence, Science, Prudence, Art, and Sapience.

• 1 Intelligence is the knowledge of speculatiue principles, as 2. and 2. make 4. the whole is more then his part; take equall from equall, and equall remaine, and such like.
• 2 Science is the knowledge of true conclusions, consisting of most certaine and infallible propositions; as, Man is a sensible body, Man is apt to learne: and vnder Science are comprehended the sciences rationall, as Grammar, Rhetoricke, and Logicke; also the sciences Mathematicall, as Arithmeticke, Geometrie, Musicke, and Astronomie, which are otherwise called Quadri∣uials, that is to say, the foure waies or kindes of mathematicall discipline; and finally, the science physicall, that is to say, natu∣rall, as the naturall philosophie of Aristotle, or of any other Wri∣ter treating of the secrets of nature.
• 3 Prudence is an habit working with true iudgement, and according to right reason in all things appertaining to man, bee they good or euill. Prudence may be diuided into prudence mo∣nasticall,

• domesticall, and politicall. Monasticall teacheth to go∣uerne one sole person: domesticall, to gouerne a houshold or fa∣milie; and politicall, to gouerne a common-wealth.
• 4 Art is an habit of knowledge consisting of assured and cer∣taine rules, tried and approued by experience, and learned by ex∣ercise, teaching to doe or to make something that is profitable to mans behoofe: and Art comprel end•…•…th all Arts, both liberall and mechanicall, that is to say, handie crafts. 5. Sapience, con∣sisting both of intelligence, and of science, is the head and chiefe of those knowledges that be most honourable in nature, compre∣hending two notable Sciences, that is, the Christian Diuinitie, and the Philosophers Diuinitie, otherwise called Metaphysicall, that is, supernaturall. And all these intellectuall habits are con∣tained vnder a certaine and most sure knowledge, which is al∣waies true: for vncertaine knowledge is sometimes true, and sometimes false: whereto belongeth opinion, suspition, conie∣cture, and such like. Thus much of habit intellectuall.

What is morall habit, and how is it dinided?

It is a qualitie of the minde, gotten by custome and doctrine, teaching and inuiting mans will to worke, either well or euill; and is twofold, that is, either good, or euill: to the good belong all kinde of vertues, as iustice, liberalitie, fortitude, temperance, &c. to the euill al kinde of vices, as pride, couetousnesse, coward∣linesse, and such like. And note, that of vertues, some bee called morall, and some theologicall, that is to say, diuine.

Which call you theologicall or diuine?

Those that be not gotten by custome, or mans industrie, but are the meere gifts of God, as faith, hope, and perfect charitie, and all other gifts of the holy Ghost, as the gifts of the tongues, of prophecying, of healing, and such like: which some doe attri∣bute to habit infused, making a difference betwixt habit infused, & habit acquired or gottē, as you may see in the Table following,

What is habit of the bodie?

Habit of the body is a certaine aptnesse & agilitie of doing any thing with the body, not giuen by nature, but gotten by custome & exercise, as to ride well, to run, to leape, to daunce, to wrestle, to shoot, to fence, to dart, to swim, to write, to paint, and such like.

The Table of Habit.

• Habit is either
• ...
  • Of the body, as
  • ...
    • To fence,
    • To dart,
    • To shoot,
    • To wrestle.
  • Or of the mind, if it be of the mind, it is ei∣ther
  • ...
    • Infu∣sed, as
    • ...
      • Faith,
      • Hope,
      • Charitie.
    • Or ac∣qui∣red, if it bee acqui∣red, it is ei∣ther
    • ...
      • Intel∣lectu∣all, in∣telle∣ctuall copre∣hen deth both
      • ...
        • Knowledge certaine, if it be cer∣taine, it containeth the 5. intel∣lectuall ha∣bits before defined, that is,
        • ...
          • Intelligence,
          • Science, which is
          • ...
            • Ratio∣nall, as
            • ...
              • Grammar,
              • Logicke,
              • Rhetoricke.
            • Ma∣thema ticall, as
            • ...
              • Arithmeticke,
              • Geometrie,
              • Musicke,
              • Astronomie.
            • Physi∣call, as
            • ...
              • Knowledge of the secrets of Nature and of the Soule.
          • Prudence is ei∣ther
          • ...
            • Monasticall,
            • Domesticall,
            • Political, which are before defined▪
          • Art is either
          • ...
            • Libe∣rall, as
            • ...
              • Husbandrie,
              • Architecture,
            • or me∣chani∣call, as
            • ...
              • Tailors craft,
              • Shoomakers craft,
              • Carpenters craft.
          • And Sapience, which contai∣neth both
          • ...
            • Christian Diuinitie, & also Philosophers Diui∣nitie, otherwise called Metaphysicall and su∣pernaturall wisdome.
        • And knowledge vncertaine, as
        • ...
          • Opinion,
          • Suspition,
          • Coniecture.
      • Or Morall, which com∣prehendeth both
      • ...
        • Vertue, as
        • ...
          • Iustice,
          • Fortitude,
          • Temperance, &c.
        • And vice, which is either
        • ...
          • By excesse, as
          • ...
            • Rash boldnesse,
            • Prodigalitie,
          • By defect, as
          • ...
            • Cowardl•…•…nesse,
            • 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪

What is disposition, and how is it diuided?

Disposition is an habit begun, but not perfected; and it is ei∣ther of the body, or of the minde: for to disposition may be refer∣red whatsoeuer was before attributed to habit (perfection in the thing only excepted) in which they differ for lacke of continu∣ance, by reason whereof, disposition is said to be easily remoued, but habit not so, because it is thorowly grounded: as for exam∣ple, of the disposition that a man hath to learning, he is said to be studious: but of perfect habit, gotten by continuall studie in learning, he is said to be learned, which importeth a perfection, which is more then a disposition.

Of naturall power and impotencie, the second kinde of Qualitie.

WHat is naturall power?

It is a naturall abilitie to doe, to suffer, or to resist, not gotten by exercise, but giuen by nature to the minde or body: to the minde, as to haue a good wit or memorie, to be apt to lear∣ning, and such like: to the body, as to bee healthfull, nimble, strong, and such like.

What is naturall impotencie?

It is a naturall weaknesse either of the minde or body: of the minde, as to be dull of wit, to be forgetfull, or vnapt to be taught, and such like: of the body, as to be sickly, to be weake and feeble, and vnapt to suffer any thing that an able body can doe or suffer.

What is comprehended vnder this second kinde of qualitie?

To this kinde may be referred all the naturall powers and im∣potencies of the soule vegetatiue, sensitiue, and intellectiue: also all naturall powers or vertues of hearbes and stones, and the natu∣rall influences of the heauens, starres, elements, and of all the su∣periour or vpper bodies. All which things you may see plainly set forth in this Table following.

Naturall power is either

• Of the body, as
• ...
  • Health,
  • Hardinesse,
  • Nimblenesse,
  • Strength.
• or of the minde, if it bee of the minde, it is ei∣ther
• ...
  • Power vegeta∣tiue is either
  • ...
    • Principall, as
    • ...
      • Nutritiue,
      • Augmentatiue,
      • Generatiue.
    • Or adiuuant, as
    • ...
      • Attractiue,
      • Immutatiue,
      • Retentiue,
      • Expulsiue.
  • Power sensitiue is either
  • ...
    • Comprehen∣siue, which is either
    • ...
      • Interior, as
      • ...
        • Common sense,
        • Phantasie,
        • Memorie.
      • Exterior, as
      • ...
        • Sight,
        • Hearing,
        • Smelling,
        • Tasting,
        • Feeling.
    • Or motiue, which is either
    • ...
      • Appetitiue, which is either
      • ...
        • Concupiscible or irascible, whereof spring all the per∣turbations and pas∣sions of the minde, as loue, hate, wrath
      • Progressiue, as
      • ...
        • To goe,
        • To flie,
        • To swimme▪
  • Or power intel∣lectiue, which is either
  • ...
    • Speculatiue, as
    • ...
      • To contemplate,
      • To vnderstand.
    • Or practiue, as
    • ...
      • To will,
      • To nill,
      • To command,
      • To chuse.

Naturall impotencie is either

• Of the bodie, as
• ...
  • To be sicke,
  • To be weake,
  • To be feeble.
• Or of the mind,
• ...
  • To be forgetfull,
  • To be vnapt to be taught.

Of passion and passible qualitie, the third kinde of qualitie.

WHat doth the third kinde of qualitie comprehend?

Passion and passible qualitie.

What is passion?

It is a sudden motion of the minde or body, that endureth not long, and therefore easie to be remoued. Passion of the minde is a sudden feare or ioy conceiued of some euill or good that is offe∣red: and of the body, as palenesse of colour, blushing, or trem∣bling of the flesh.

What is passible qualitie?

It is an inueterate affection or motion of the minde or body, not easie to be remoued: of the minde, as madnesse growne of some continuall sorrow or melancholie: of the body, as black∣nesse of the face by continuall boiling heat of the bloud, or pale∣nesse by continuall sicknesse of the body: and therefore passible qualitie is compared and likened to habit, and sudden passion to disposition.

What is comprehended vnder passible qualitie?

All the obiects of the fiue outward senses, as colours, light, brightnesse, which be the obiects of the sight; sounds, voices, and noises, the obiects of hearing; sauours, the obiects of tasting; odours and smels, the obiects of smelling; tangible qualities, which be the obiects of feeling: of which tangible qualities some are said to be first, and some second: the first be these heat, cold∣nesse, moistnesse, drinesse: the second be hardnesse, softnesse, hea∣uinesse, lightnesse, roughnesse, smoothnesse, and such like.

Which be the chiefe passions or affections of the minde?

The chiefe affections be these foure, ioy, lust, sorrow, feare.

How is ioy defined, and what good or euill branches doe spring thereof?

Ioy is a sweet and delectable motion of the heart, wherewith it is stirted and delighted, whilest it enioieth some good that is present, or (at the least) seemeth good: and hereof springeth de∣light, boasting maleuolence, reioicing at other mens euill.

What is lust, and what affections doe spring thereof?

Lust is a motion of the minde, stirred vp by thinking of some

good indeed, or seeming good, that is absent, whereof doe spring these affections, hope, desire, loue, anger, wrath and hatred.

What is sorrow, and what affections doe arise thereof?

It is a greeuous motion of the heart, causing it to shrinke to∣gether, whilest it flieth some present euill, that is euill indeed, or seemeth euill: and hereof spring these affections, enuie, slan∣dering, mercie, agonie, lamenting, calamitie, carefulnesse, griefe and desperation.

What is feare, and what affections doe rise thereof?

Feare is a greeuous motion, causing the heart to shrinke toge∣ther, whilest it flieth some euill that is to come: and hereof spring these affections, hea•…•…nesse, shame, terrour, sownding, and such like: all which things you may see briefly set forth in the Table next following.

The Table of passion and passible qualitie.

• Passion is either
• ...
  • Of the minde, as
  • ...
    • Ioy,
    • Lust,
    • Sorrow,
    • Feare.
  • or of the body, as
  • ...
    • Sudden palenesse,
    • Sudden blushing,
    • Or
    • Trembling of the flesh.
• Passible qualitie containeth
• ...
  • All the inueterate passions both of minde and body before set downe.
  • And also all the obiects of the fiue Senses, as
  • ...
    • Colours,
    • Sounds,
    • Odours,
    • Sauours,
    • Tangible qua∣lities,
  • ...
    The obiects
    • Of the sight,
    • Of hearing,
    • Of smelling,
    • Of tasting,
    • Of touching,
    • Or feeling.

Why are these obiects of the senses called passible qualities?

Because they make the senses to suffer, as the colour of any thing, by striking into the eie, maketh the sight to suffer, and

causeth either pleasure or griefe to the sight: so likewise the sweetnesse of hony in striking the taste, delighteth it: and contra∣riwise, the bitternesse of gall, or such like thing, endued with a bitter sauour, offendeth the taste.

Of figure and forme, the fourth kinde of qualitie.

WHat difference is betwixt figure and forme?

Figure, according to some, is that which is enclosed with one bound or limit, or with many, as a circle enuironed with one round line, called the circumference, or as a triangle or foure-square figure, whereof the one is enclosed with three lines, and the other with foure, and such like: but forme is the drawing or describing of the said figure. Againe, according to the opinion of some, figure is compared to an image representing some liuely thing: and forme is said to be the due proportion and feature of the same. Some againe doe attribute figure to things without life, and forme to things, that haue life, briefly set downe in this verse following:

Formam viuentis, picti dic esse Figuram:

Englished thus:

The shapes of painted things they Figures call: But liuing things (they say) are formed all.

What doth this fourth kinde of qualitie comprehend?

It comprehendeth the accidentall figures and formes, as well of naturall, as artificiall things: of naturall, as the shape of man, beast, or fowle: or artificiall, as the shape or figure of a house, temple, ship, or such like: also it comprehendeth all Geometri∣call figures, as well perfect as vnperfect.

Which call you perfect?

Those that are enclosed within such bounds as nothing can be added or taken away from them, without marring or altering the same, as a circle, a triangle, a square, and such like: whereof some are plaine, enclosed only with lines, as circles, triangles, squares, and such like: and some are solid or whole bodies, enclosed with vpper faces, either one or many, as round spheres, sharpe pina∣cles, cubes, as a die, and round pillers.

Which call you vnperfect?

Those which are not so enclosed with their bounds, but that some one thing may bee added or taken away from the same, without changing or altering of the figure, as the rightnesse, roundnesse, concauitie, or conuexitie of vnperfect figures, may be lengthned or shortned, and yet the former shape thereof shall still remaine, and not be altered, but only in quantitie.

A Table of figure and forme.

• Figure and forme is either
• ...
  • Perfect is either
  • ...
    • Plaine, as
    • ...
      • A perfect circle.
      • A triangle, whereof there be six kindes:
      • ...
        • Isopleurus,
        • Isosceles,
        • Scalenon,
        • Ambligouius,
        • Oxigonius,
        • Orthogonius.
      • A quadrangle, as
      • ...
        • A perfect square,
        • A long square,
        • A square like to a Thorne-backe, cal∣led Rhombus.
      • Or hauing many angles, as
      • ...
        • A figure of 5. 6. or 7. angles, or more.
    • Or solid, which is either
    • ...
      • Sphericall,
      • Pyramidicall,
      • Cubicke, or Piller-like.
  • Or vnperfect, which is either
  • ...
    • Right,
    • Circular,
    • Conuex,
    • or
    • Concaue.

But the true descriptions of all the figures contained in this Table, are to be learned of the Geometricians, and not of the Lo∣gicians.

Of the properties of qualitie.

HOw many properties doe belong to Qualitie?

Three: First, to bee contrarie, as vertue is contrarie to vice, heat to cold, white to blacke: yet such contrarietie belon∣geth not to euery kinde of Qualitie; for Triangles be not contra∣rie to Squares, nor round pillers to sharpe pinacles.

What is the second propertie?

To be more or lesse: for one man may bee more vertuous, or lesse vertuous; more learned, or lesse learned; more healthfull, or lesse healthfull; more or lesse, hot or cold. Yet this propertie belongeth not to euery kinde of qualitie; for one triangle is no more a triangle then another. The like may bee said of the rest of the perfect Figures, as well plaine as solid.

What is the third propertie?

To be like or vnlike: and this is the chiefest propertie belong∣ing to euery kinde of qualitie: as, two Grammarians be like one to another in their profession, two healthfull or vnhealthfull, two white or two blacke, two triangles or two squares are said to be like or vnlike one to another.

How define you likenesse or vnlikenesse?

Likenesse, according to Boetius, is when diuers things haue one selfe qualitie. Vnlikenesse is, when they haue diuers qualities.

CHAP. XI.

Of Relation.

WHat is Relation?

It is the referring, comparing, or applying of one thing vnto another, for some respect of •…•…ffi∣nitie or likenesse, wherewith they are kn•…•…t so to∣gether, as the one cannot bee well vnderstood without the other: and therefore the things so compared are called Relatiues, or rather Correlatiues; for of things, some are said to be absolute, and some respectiue or relatiue.

Which call you absolute?

Absolute are those which may be vnderstood by themselues,

without being applied to any other thing, as substance, quanti∣tie, qualitie.

Which are said to be relatiue or respectiue?

Those that cannot be well vnderstood of themselues, without hauing relation to some other thing, as the Father and the Sonne, the Lord and the Bondman, the Master and the Scholar, &c. Here note, that of the Schoolemen the thing from which the ap∣plication is made, is called in Latine, Fundamentum, in English, The foundation; and the thing whereunto the relation or applica∣tion is made, is called in Latine, Terminus, in English, the bound, end, or terme, as in th•…•…se Correlatiues, the Father and the Sonne, the Lord and the Bondman, the Schoolemaster and the Scholar. Here, the Father, the Lord, and Schoolemaster, are called, euery of them, Fundamentum; but the Sonne, the Bondman, and Scho∣lar, euery of them is called, terminus, that is, the end or terme; and the application of the one to the other is called relation.

How many kindes of Relatiues be there?

Two: Relatiues secundum esse, that is, indeed, and Relatiues secundum dici, which we may call, Relatiues in name.

Which call you Relatiues indeed?

Those which according to their principall signification haue relation to some other thing, without which they cannot be vn∣derstood: as a Father is not to be vnderstood, without there be a Sonne, nor a Sonne, vnlesse there be a Father. The like may bee said of a Tutor and Pupill, the Master and his Scholar, and such like.

What call you Relatiues in name?

Those that according to their principall signification may bee vnderstood, without hauing relation to any other thing; and yet, because in some respect they haue relation to some other thing, they are called Relatiues, but not properly, for they differ not from the abso•…•…e things before defined, as vertue, vice, habit, disposition &c.

What other diuision is there of Relatiues?

Of Relatiues, some are said to be of one selfe name, and some of diuers: of one selfe name, as like, vnlike, equall, vnequall, schoole-follow, neighbour, and such like: of diuers names, as the

Father, the Sonne, the Lord and Bondman, &c. And of such, some be more worthy, and some be lesse worthy, as the Father is more worthy, the Sonne lesse worthy; the Master more worthy, the Scholer lesse worthy: which diuisions this Table doth shew.

The Table of Relation.

• Relation is either
• ...
  • In deede, if in deede, it is either
  • ...
    • Of one selfe name, as
    • ...
      • A Schoole-fellow,
      • Like,
      • Vnlike,
      • Equall,
      • Vnequall,
      • Kinsman,
      • Neighbour.
    • Or of diuers names, whereof some be
    • ...
      • More worthie, as
      • ...
        • The Master,
        • The Father,
        • The double,
        • The cause,
        • The whole,
        • The Captaine.
      • And some bee lesse worthie, as
      • ...
        • The Scholer,
        • The Sonne,
        • The one halfe,
        • The effect,
        • The part,
        • The Souldier.
  • Or in name, as
  • ...
    • Substance,
    • Quantitie,
    • Qualitie,
    • ...
      • and such like absolutes.

Of the properties of Relation.

HOw many properties doe belong to Relation?

Fiue: First, to haue contrarietie, as vertue and vice, sci∣ence and ignorance. But this propertie belongeth not to all: for double and the one halfe hath no contrarietie, nor the Father and the Sonne.

What is the second propertie?

The second is to be more or lesse, as to bee more like, or lesse like; or more equall, or lesse equall. Yet this belongeth not to all: for double hath neither more or lesse, nor one Father is said to be more or lesse then another.

What is the third propertie?

The third is, that all Relatiues (which are Relatiues indeed) are conuertible: for he is a Father, that hath a Sonne, and hee is a Sonne, that hath a Father, &c.

What is the fourth propertie?

The fourth is, that one Correlatiue is not before another, but are both together: as the father is called no father, vntill he hath begotten a childe, and a childe is called no sonne, before he be be∣gotten of the father. For this is a generall rule of Correlatiues: If the one be, the other must needs be: If the one be taken away, the other must also be taken away.

What is the fift propertie?

The fift is, that whosoeuer assuredly knoweth the one Correla∣tiue, must needs know the other: for whosoeuer certainly know∣eth that I am a father, must needs also certainly know that I haue a childe. The like may be said of all that be Correlatiues indeed, to whom this propertie only belongeth, as Aristotle saith.

CHAP. XII.

Of Action.

WHat is action?

Action is some accidentall forme or shape, whereby any thing is said to doe or to worke vp∣on his subiect.

What meane you here by this word subiect?

The thing that suffereth, as the water is the subiect whereon the fire induceth the shape of heating: for here the water is said to be passiue, and the fire actiue.

How is action diuided?

Into actions of the soule, and of the body. The actions of the soule, are those which the soule doth: for, according to his power

vegetatiue, his actions are to nourish, to increase, and to engen∣der; and according to his power sensitiue, to see, to heare, to smell, to taste, to feel•…•…; and according to his power intellectiue, to vnderstand, to will, •…•…o nill, and such like.

The actions of the body are those that do immediately belong to some body or corporall accident, as to cut, to strike, to heat, to coole, to moisten, to drie, to make white, to make blacke, and such like.

Is there no other diuision of action?

Yes diuers, but such as doe rather belong to naturall Philo∣sophers, and to Diuines, then to Logicians: and therefore wee leaue to speake any further of them.

What doth this predicament comprehend?

All Nounes and Verbes of the actiue signification: as these Nounes, generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, al∣teration, mouing from place to place, and such like: also all Verbes actiue, as, to engender, to corrupt, to increase, to dimi∣nish, to alter or change▪ and to moue from place to place, and such like Verbes of the actiue signification.

How many properties doe belong to action?

Two: First, to admit contrarietie, not simply, but per accidens, as to kindle, and to extinguish: secondly, to be more or lesse, and yet accidentally, as one fire to burne more, and another lesse, one water to coole more, and another lesse.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Passion.

WHat is passion?

It is the relation or application of the patient to the agent: as for example, whilest the water suffereth to be heated by the fire, this sufferance is called passion.

What doth this predicament comprehend?

All Verbes of the passiue signification, as to be engendred, cor∣rupted, increased, diminished, or altered, and such like.

What properties doe belong to passion?

The same that haue beene said before to belong vnto action.

CHAP. XIIII.

Of the Predicament Where, called in Latine, Vbi.

HOw define you the Predicament Vbi?

Ubi is to be in some place, as when a body is inclosed within a place, and therefore is defined of some, to bee the description of the place wherein any thing is said to be, or to be done or made, as in the heauens, in the earth, in the tem∣ple, in the house, and such like.

How is this predicament diuided?

Into Vbi simplex, and Vbi compositum, that is to say, simple and compound.

When is it said to be simple?

When a thing indiuisible is in some indiuisible place, as an An∣gell in Puncto; or when a thing indiuisible is in a place diuisible, as an Angell in the Temple; for the Temple may be diuided into many parts, though the Angell cannot.

When is it said to be compound?

When some diuisible body is contained in a place diuisible, as the being of things corporall in the water, or in the aire; for cor∣porall things be so diuisibly placed in their places, as euery part of the thing placed, is answerable to euery part of the place wherein they are contained; and so contrarily, as to the parts of a mans body enuironed with the aire, one part of that aire is an∣swerable to the head, another to the feet, and so consequently of all the rest: and therefore the Schoolemen say, that Ubi composi∣tum, is to be in a place circumscriptiuely, but Ubi simplex, is to be in a place definitiuely, that is to say, in some certaine place, though not according to the position or order of placing the parts. But when a thing is said to be in a place circumscriptiuely, then such place and thing may be both diuided according to the parts of position or placing, as this part here, and the other part there, whereof spring these differences, aboue, beneath, be∣fore, beh•…•…nde, on the right side, on the left side, and such like. And finally, this predicament comprehendeth whatsoeuer answereth to this question, where any thing is said to be or to be done.

What properties doe belong to the predicament, Where?

Three: First, to admit no contrarietie; for though to be aboue and beneath seeme to be contrarie, yet that is to be vnderstood physically, and not dialectically: secondly, it admitteth neither more nor lesse; for to be in the Temple, is no more to be in place, then to be in the market, or in any house: but the third and chie∣fest propertie of Vbi is to containe.

CHAP. XV.

Of the predicament When, called in Latine, Quando.

HOw define you this predicament?

This is said to be a relation or application of a thing measured by time, vnto time it selfe, and containeth the differences of times, whereby any thing is said to be, to haue beene, or shall be, to doe, or to suffer: and to speake briefly, it compre∣hendeth all words that answere to this question When, as yester∣day, to morrow, the next day, and such like.

How is Quando diuided?

Two manner of waies; for sometime it is said to be definite, that is, certaine, as in this or that houre, day, or yeare, which is certaine; and sometime ind•…•…finite, that is, vncertaine, as to haue beene, without any limitation of time, which is vncertaine. Se∣condly. Quando may be diuided into his parts of succession, as in∣to time past, present, and to come.

What properties doe belong to this predicament?

First, to haue no contrarietie: Secondly, to admit neither more or losse: Thirdly, to be alwaies flitting or fluxible, and ne∣uer permanent, which propertie it hath by reason of time which continually passeth away.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the predicament, to be situated, called in Latine, Situm esse.

WHat is Situm esse?

Quintilian saith, that Situm esse is as much to say, as to be situated, ordered, or placed some manner of way; and it is a generall word, com∣prehending all names that doe expresse the site or ordering of the body and parts thereof, as to stand, to sit, to lie either groueling, or right vp, or on the one side: and finally, it comprehendeth all those words which answere to this question, how any thing is situated, as when it is required how Norwich standeth from London, either Northward, Southward, Westward, or Eastward.

How is site diuided of the Schoolemen?

Into site naturall and casuall.

Which call you naturall site?

That whereby euery part of the body hath his naturall place; as in mans body, the head to stand aboue, the bellie in the midst, and the feet beneath; and so in a tree, the root to belowest, the body in the midst, and the boughes or branches to be highest.

What call you site casuall?

That whereby the position or ordering of the parts is altered any way by accident, as, now to stand vpright, now to stoope, now to sit, or to lie downe, this way, or that way.

What descriptions are to be fetched from this predicament?

The descriptions of places.

What properties doe belong to this predicament?

Two: First, to admit no contrarietie; for though vpward see∣meth to be contrarie to downward, yet that is vnderstood physi∣cally, and not dialectically. Secondly, it hath neither more, nor lesse; for to stand is no more a site, then to sit, nor sitting more then standing.

Which things doe alter their situation, and which not?

All things without life and feeling, doe keepe their site, if by

violence they be not changed: but all things hauing life and fee∣ling, doe alter their site, when and as often as it pleaseth them, as a beast to stand vp, or to lie downe, and so forth.

The Table of Site.

• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is either
• ...
  • Naturall, as
  • ...
    • The head to stand aboue,
    • The bellie to be in the midst,
    • And the feet beneath.
  • Or casuall, as
  • ...
    • Going,
    • Standing,
    • Lying groueling, or
    • With the fa•…•…e vpward.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the predicament, To haue, called in Latine, Habere.

WHat doth this word to haue signifie?

It hath three speciall significations: First, to be clad with garments, armour, or ornament: se∣condly, to possesse any thing, as to possesse wife, lands, or goods: thirdly, to containe any thing, as a vessell to containe either liquid or drie matter that is powred therein: and therefore this predicament comprehendeth all such words as are deriued of the names of garments, as to be gowned, cloaked, or coated: also of armour, as well defensiue as offen∣siue; defensiue, as to be armed with a Corselet, Iacke, or shirt of male, and such like: offensiue, as to be armed with a sword, dag∣ger, caliuer, halbert, or pike. Also beasts and fishes are said to be armed with nailes, hornes, tallons, beakes, scales, finnes, and such like. Also it comprehendeth words of ornament, as to bee decked with Chaines, Iewels, and Tablets: also words of pos∣session, as to haue lands or goods: also words of containing, as to be full of wine, oile, or hony, as you may see in the Table fol∣lowing.

The Table of the predicament To haue.

• To haue is three∣fold, that is,
• ...
  • To be 〈◊〉〈◊〉
  • ...
    • With garments, as to be gowned or cloaked.
    • With armour, 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
    • Or with ornaments, as with ta•…•…let 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
    • To possesse, as to possesse lands or goods.
    • To containe, as a vessell to be full of liquor, &c.

What properties doe belong to this predicament?

Two: First, to admit more and lesse: for a man at armes is said to be more armed then a light horseman, and a P•…•…keman more then a Caliuer or Harquebuzier. Againe, he that is clad with two coats, is more clad then he that weareth but one. Secondly, this predicament admitteth in some sort contrarietie: for to be armed and vnarmed, clad and naked, are contraries by priuation, but not otherwise.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the vse of the Predicaments.

TO what vse or end doe these predicaments ser•…•…e?

To many good vses. First, if you will define any thing, you shall be sure in some of these predica∣ments to finde out the generall kinde thereof, to∣gether with all the differences (for the most part) belonging to the same: which if they bee not set downe, then they are to be gathered out of the proper accidents incident to the thing which you would define. Secondly, if you would diuide any thing, here you shall finde both the generall kindes, speciall kindes, yea and diuers examples of the Indiuidu∣ums comprehended vnder the same kindes. Thirdly, out of these predicaments you may gather matter apt to proue any question, either generall or particular.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Post-predicaments.

WHat meane you by Post-predicaments?

They be interpretations of certaine words more plainly expounded after the predicaments, for the better vnderstanding of certaine of the said predi∣caments.

Which are they?

These fiue, Oppositio, prius & posterius, simul, motus, & habere, that is to say in English, Opposition, before and after, together, mo∣uing, and to haue: euery one whereof may be taken and interpre∣ted diuers waies.

What is opposition?

Opposition is the repugnancie or contrarietie of two extremes which are contrary one to another, in such sort as none of them is in like manner repugnant to any other thing: as for example, white and blacke being two extremes, are more contrary one to another, then either of them is to any other colour, as to red, yel∣low, russet, or blew.

Sith some things are said to be agreeable one to another, and some contrary one to another, and some diuers one from another; it were not amisse, first here to tell how, and when things are said to be agreeable, diuers, or repugnant one to another.

Things are said to be agreeable one to another three manner of waies: First, when they agree in generall kinde, as those which are subiect to one next generall kinde, as man and horse do agree in generall kinde, because this word animal, or sensible body, is the next generall kinde to them both. Secondly, things are said to agree in speciall kinde, as Edward and Iohn are both compre∣hended vnder this word man. Thirdly, things are said to agree in number, as words hauing one selfe signification, called in Greeke Synonyma, as a blade, a rapier, a curtilas or stucke, signi∣fying a sword: also things of like substance or definition, as man, and a sensible body endued with reason. And by these three waies things are said also to differ one from another; for they

may differ one from another in generall kinde, in speciall kinde, and in number: in generall kinde, as a sensible body, and a tree; in speciall kinde, as a horse, and an as•…•…e: againe, they may differ in number, as the Indiuiduums that be comprehended vnder one speciall kinde, as Iohn and Edward, doe differ only in number.

Is it all one, to be diuers, and contrarie?

No: for those things are said to be diuers, which differ any of the waies aboue said, or by any other difference, be it common, proper; or most proper. Yet few or none of these things are con∣trarie one to another: for no substance admitteth contrarietie, nor yet many accidents, vnlesse it be by reason of qualitie, where∣unto contrarietie doth properly belong.

How many waies are things said to be contrarie one to another?

Foure manner of waies, that is, relatiue, contrarie, priuatiue, and contradictorie, that is to say, by relation, by contrarietie, by priuation, and by contradiction.

Which things are said to be opposite or contrarie by relation?

Those things are opposite by relation, which according to their owne significations, haue mutuall relation one to another, neither can they be both verified of one selfe thing in one selfe re∣spect, as the father and the sonne, the Lord and the bondman: for one man cannot be both a father and a sonne in one respect, but in diuers respects he may: for euery man that hath a sonne, is notwithstanding a sonne to his owne father, and a father to his owne sonne.

Which things are said to be opposite by contrarietie?

Those things are said to be contrarie, which being compre∣hended vnder one selfe kinde, doe most differ one from another, and yet both may be one after another in one selfe subiect meet to receiue the same, because the one giueth place to the other, vn∣lesse it be such a thing as is naturally incident to the said subiect: as heat and cold, being contained vnder qualitie, are most con∣trarie one to another, and yet may be one after another in mans body, or any other subiect apt to receiue the same: for many times heat driueth out cold, and cold heat. Yet in fire it is not so: for heat is alwaies naturally incident to fi•…•…e; and will neuer giue place to cold, so long as it is fire, and not extinct.

How are contraries diuided?

Of contraries, some haue a meane, called of the Schoolemen, Contraria mediata, and some haue no meane, called, Contraria immediata.

When are they said to haue a meane?

When the two contraries are such, as neither of them is of meere necessitie, in any subiect meet to receiue the same, as white & blacke: for that subiect which is apt to receiue them both, may be yellow or russet, and so the subiect is neither white nor blacke.

When are they said to haue no meane?

When the one of the two contraries may be alwaies truly af∣firmed of any subiect apt to receiue the same, as sicknesse and health▪ for man or beast is truly said to be either sicke, or whole. Also vice and vertue haue no meane: for a man is said to be either good, or euill: yet some make good and euill to haue a meane▪ called a thing indifferent. Likewise, hot and cold to haue a meane, that is to say▪ luke-warme. And betwixt health and sick∣nesse Galen maketh a meane estate, that is to say, neither whole nor sicke, but betwixt both.

Which are opposites by priuation?

Opposites by priuation are two contraries belonging to one selfe subiect apt to receiue the same, in the which subiect, when the one is wanting at such time as nature doth appoint, the other must needs be, as sight and blindnesse in the eie, hearing and deaf∣nesse in the eare, light and darknesse in the skie, or in any other thing meet to receiue both.

Wherefore doe you adde this clause, at such time as nature doth ap∣point?

Because it is not needfull that one of these opposites be in the subiect in all times: as for example, the whelpe which is not nine daies old, though as yet hee seeth not, yet is hee not said to bee blinde, because Nature hath appointed him no sooner to see.

Which be opposite by contradiction?

They be two contraries, hauing no meane, and doe consist in contradiction, that is to say, in denying the one the other: and such contradiction consisteth either in propositions, or else in simple or single termes.

Giue examples of both.

In propositions thus: Iohn is honest, Iohn is not honest: Plato disputeth, Plato disputeth not: in which kinde of propositions, there is no meane of truth or falshood; for of necessitie the one of them must alwaies be either true or false, in such sort, as both can∣not be true together, nor both false together. In simple termes thus: a man, no man: to know, not to know: to be, and not to be: and therefore opposites by contradiction be most contrarie, and doe differ from all the rest; for in all the other opposites, it is easie to finde out some meane subiect, whereof neither of them can be truly spoken or affirmed.

CHAP. XX.

Of before and after, called in Latine, Prius & Posterius.

HOw many waies is a thing said to be before and af∣ter?

Fiue manner of waies, that is, by time, nature, order, honour, and cause, contained in these two Latine verses:

Tempore natura, prius ordine dic & honore: Et causa effectis dicitur esse prior.

Giue examples of euery one.

First, by time, Cicero is said to be before Quintilian, and So∣crates before Aristotle, and such like. Secondly, by nature, that thing is said to be first, or before, from which the consequent cannot returne backward: by which way all generall kindes are said to be before their speciall kindes, and speciall kindes before their Indiuiduums: for if man be, then sensible body (which is the generall kinde) must needs be, but not contrarily: so likewise, if Iohn be, man must needs be, but not contrarily; for it followeth not of necessitie, Because it is a sensible body, Ergo it is a man, or because it is a man, Ergo it is Iohn. Thirdly, by order one thing is said to be before another, as one before two, and two before three, letters before syllables, and syllables before words, and words before speech. To this also appertaineth that which is said

to be before by situation, as in going from Norwich to London, Thetford is before Newmarket, and Newmarket before Ware, and so forth. Fourthly, by honour or dignitie, an Emperour is said to be before a King, a King before a Duke, a Duke before an Earle, an Earle before a Baron, &c. Fiftly, the cause is said to be before his effect, as the rising of the Sunne is said to be before day; so the difference is said to be before his speciall kinde, and the spe∣ciall kinde before his propertie. And these be conuertible: for if it be day, the Sunne must needs be vp: and if the speciall diffe∣rence be, the speciall kinde must needs be, and so contrarily.

To what end serueth this manifold way of before and after?

To the intent that wee may the better vnderstand what hath beene said before touching opposites by relation, that is to say, that Relatiues are alwaies together by order of nature, and not one before another, but only by their fourth way, that is to say, by honour or worthinesse, which way, as Aristotle saith, of all the other waies, is most vnproper, and least to the purpose.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the word Together, called in Latine, Simul.

HOw many waies are things said to be together?

Two waies, that is, by order of time, and by order of nature. First, by order of time, the heat and shining of the Sunne are said to bee in the Sunne together, that is, at one time: also the An∣gels were created all together, and at one time. Secondly, those things are said to be together by order of nature, which haue naturall relation one to another, and be conuertible, neither is the one cause of the other, as the father and the sonne, single and double, and such like: and many doe adde hereunto diuers speciall kindes and differences subiect to one selfe gene∣rall kinde, as man and bruit beast, reasonable and vnreasonable, are subiect to the generall kinde, sensible body, or animal.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mouing or Motion, called in Latine, Motus, and of the kindes thereof.

WHerefore is mention made here of mouing?

For the better vnderstanding of the Predica∣ment Action, whereunto Mouing belongeth.

How many kindes of motion or mouing be there?

Six, briefly touched before in the predicament of Action, that is to say, generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration, and mouing from place to place.

Define these kindes.

• 1 Generation is a proceeding from the not being of a sub∣stance, to the being of the same, as from an Acorne to an Oke.
• 2 Corruption (contrariwise) is a proceeding from a being to a not being, as from an Oke to chips or ashes.
• 3 Augmentation is the increasing of a greater quantitie in the whole: as from a childe to a man.
• 4 Diminution is contrariwise a decreasing or diminishing of quantitie in the whole, as a body that consumeth or pineth by disease or otherwise.
• 5 Alteration is a proceeding or changing from one qualitie into another, as from hot to cold.
• 6 Mouing from place to place, is, as the mouing of the sunne out of the East into the West.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the word Habere, that is, to haue, and how many waies it is to be vnderstood.

HOw many significations hath this word, to haue? Eight.

• 1 First, to haue a qualitie, as science, vice, or vertue.
• 2 To haue a quantitie, as to be six, seuen, or eight footlong.
• 3 To be clad, as to haue a cloke or coat.
• ...

• 4 To haue some part of the body clad or decked with some thing, as the finger with a ring, the necke with a chaine.
• 5 To haue a part, or member, as a hand, a head, or foot.
• 6 To containe, as a hogshead that hath therein beere or wine.
• 7 To possesse, as to haue lands, tenements, or goods.
• 8 To haue a wife, which (according to Aristotle) is vnpro∣perly said, because nothing can be properly said to haue, which is had it selfe of the same: for the wife hath the man, as well as the man the wife; and therefore this way of hauing serueth to little purpose.

Here endeth the first Booke.

THE ART OF LOGICKE. THE SECOND BOOKE.

CHAP. I.

Of Definition.

HAuing hitherto sufficiently spoken of the Predicables and Predicaments, and of all things belonging vnto them, with∣out the knowledge whereof, no true definition, nor good diuision, can bee well made; mee thinkes it were meet now to treat of definition and diuision.

What is Definition, and how manifold is it?

Definition is a speech, whereby either some name or thing is declated: and it is twofold, that is, of a name, and of a thing.

What is definition of a name, and how manifold is it?

Definition of a name, is a speech whereby the signification of some word is declared: and it is ten-fold.

• 1 Definition verball, as when a word lesse knowne is decla∣red by a word more knowne, as thus, To imitate, is as much to say, as to follow, or to counterfet: againe, to accomplish, is to fulfill.
• ...

• 2 Definition by difference; as, He is a King, which ruleth by Law; but he that ruleth by force, is a Tyrant.
• 3 Definition metaphoricall, or by figure; as, Adolescencie is the flower of mans age: Good Preachers are the salt of the earth▪
• 4 Definition by contrarie; as, Vertue is, to flee vice.
• 5 Definition by circumlocution; as, The writer of the Troian warre, that is to say, Homer.
• 6 Definition by example, as to say, that this word reasonable or vnreasonable is a speciall difference.
• 7 Definition by want, or desect; as, That is three quarters, which lacketh a quarrer of a yard, or any such like thing.
• 8 Definition by praise, or dispraise: by praise, as, Logicke is an Art of Arts, and Science of Sciences: Iustice is the Queene of all vertues. By dispraise, as, Idlenesse is the corruption or destru∣ction of youth.
• 9 Definition by similitude; as, The Sunne is the eie of the world; A Citie without a Magistrate, is as a ship without a Go∣uernour.
• 10 Definition by Etymologie; as, He is rightly called good∣man, because he is a good man indeed, and full of good workes.

When is definition of the name needfull to be vsed?

When some doubtfull word is cause of the controuersie.

Of the definition of a thing.

WHat is the definition of a thing?

It is a speech, which declareth briefly, plainly, and aptly, the very nature and substance of the thing which is de∣fined.

How is the definition of a thing diuided?

Into these six kindes, that is to say, into definition essentiall, causall, by the Relatiue, by the effects and offices, by numbering vp of the parts, and by heaping vp of accidents.

What is definition essentiall?

It is that which consisteth of the next generall kinde, ioined with some speciall difference or propertie belonging to the same kinde; as when I define a man to be a sensible body, endued with reason, or apt to speake: and this is the Logicall definition most

sure of all others, but not easie to be made of euery thing, for lacke of speciall differences and naturall properties.

When is it said to be a causall definition?

When it is made of the generall kinde, and of the proper cau∣ses of the thing defined.

How many chiefe kindes of causes be there?

Foure, that is, matter, forme, cause efficient, and end.

How define you matter?

Matter is that whereof any thing is made, as cloth is the mat∣ter whereof a cloake or coat is made, and wooll is the matter of cloth.

What is Forme?

Forme is the shape whereof any thing taketh both his being and his name: and therefore the Schoolemen doe define forme to be that which giueth a being to any thing, be it naturall or artifi∣ciall, as in the examples before recited, the coat or cloake hath both his being and name of the shape which it hath, and not of the matter.

What is the cause efficient?

That which maketh or worketh any thing, and is the authour thereof, as the Carpenter is the cause efficient of the house, and Shipwright of the ship.

What is the end, or finall cause▪

It is that for whose sake any thing is done, as the end of warre is to haue peace, the end of studie is to get learning and know∣ledge.

Giue examples of definitions made of euery one of these causes.

Of matter let this bee your example: Beere is a drinke made of mault, water, and hops. Of forme thus: Man is a sensible bodie, endued with a soule intellectiue or reasonable, which is the true shape of man. Of the cause efficient thus: That is a Decree of the Senate, which the Senate commandeth and ordaineth; for the Senate is the cause efficient of the Decree. Anger or wrath is the boiling of the bloud about the heart, through the stirring vp of choler. Of the end thus: A house is a building made to defend our bodies from the iniuries of the aire and weather.

May not a good definition be made of many of these causes ioined together?

Yes indeed.

Giue example.

Loe here the example of Demosthenes, in defining what Law is. Law (saith he) is the inuention and gift of God, and the decree of wise men, the correction of crimes, either rashly or aduisedly committed, and a common couenant or consent of the Citie, ac∣cording to the which all men ought to liue. In this definition, the first and chiefest cause efficient is God, the second cause effi∣cient is the common couenant or consent of the Citie: the mat∣ter is the decree of the wise: the end is the correction of crimes, and the keeping of the Citizens in good order of life.

When is a definition said to be made by the Relatiue?

When one Relatiue is interpreted by another; as thus, He is a father, which hath a sonne; and he is a master, which hath a ser∣uant.

When is a definition said to be made by the effects, vertues, or offi∣ces of the thing defined?

When the nature of the thing is plainly declared by shewing the said effects or offices, as thus: An adamant stone is that which being laid nigh to iron or steele, draweth the steele vnto him: Iustice is a vertue which giueth euery man his right.

When is a definition said to be made by numbering vp of the parts?

When it containeth either the chiefe, or all the parts of some whole thing, or else all the speciall kindes of some generall kinde.

Giue examples of both these waies.

Of the first thus: A house is a building, hauing a foundation, walles, and couering. Of the second way thus: A sensible body is that which comprehendeth both man and bruit beast.

When is a definition said to be made by heaping vp of accidents?

When a thing is rather described, then defined, by such com∣mon and proper accidents as doe belong to the same, as fire is an element that is hot and drie, and exceedeth all other elements in lightnesse: and therefore this last kinde of definition ought rather to be called a description then a definition, which is vsuall to the

Poets, Orators, and Historiographers, in describing either per∣son, fact, or thing: also to the Physicians, in describing their sim∣ples, as roots, plants, herbes, and such like.

CHAP. II.

Of the precepts to be obserued in Definition.

HOw many precepts are to be obserued in making a true definition?

These three: First, that it briefly expresse the whole power and nature of the thing defined: Secondly, that there be nothing therein super∣fluous, nor any thing wanting: Thirdly, that the definition be not common to many things, but proper to that thing only which is defined, so as it may make it to differ from all other things.

What order is to be obserued in making a dialecticall definition?

First, you must know in what predicament the thing is contai∣ned which you would define, to the intent that in descending from the most generall kinde, downe towards the most sp•…•…ciall kinde of the same predicament, ye may finde out by the way that which is next generall kinde to the thing that is to be defined: which next generall kinde being found out, yee must then seeke out the speciall difference or propertie, the proper cause, effect, or common accidents belonging to the same: as for example, if ye would define what vertue is, ye must resort to the predicament of qualitie, wherein vertue is contained: then in descending from qualitie, proceed to habit, from habit to habit of the minde, which is twofold, that is to say, intellectuall and morall, and not finding it vnder habit intellectuall, proceed to habit morall, for that is the next generall kinde to vertue: that done, seeke out the difference or propertie, true cause or effect: the difference is to be good, wherein it differeth from vice, for vice is also a morall habit as well as vertue: the effect of vertue is to incline mans will to doe alwaies according to right reason or true iudgement, so shall you make a true definition of vertue, in saying that vertue is a good morall habit, inclining mans will to doe alwaies according to

true iudgement. And after this sort yee may learne to define any other thing.

CHAP. III.

Of Diuision.

WHat is Diuision?

Diuision is the parting or diuiding of a word or thing that is more generall, vnto other words or things lesse generall: for Diuision is twofold, that is, of a name, and of a thing.

When is it said to be the diuision of a name?

When some Equinoke or doubtfull word is diuided into his manifold significations, as this word Wolfe, into a man hauing that name▪ into a foure-footed beast, into an vlcerous sore, and into a certaine fish, each one called by the name of Wolfe: which kinde of distinction or diuision is very necessar•…•…e, to auoid ambi∣guitie of speech, which ambiguitie causeth many times great er∣rour.

How manifold is the diuision of a thing?

It is threefold, that is, substantiall, partible, and accidentall.

When is it properly said to be substantiall?

When any generall kinde is diuided by his speciall differences into his proper speciall kindes: as thus; of sensible bodies, one is reasonable, as man, and another is vnreasonable, as a bruit beast.

When is this kinde of diuision to be vsed?

When the speciall kindes lacke proper names, as most com∣monly the speciall kindes subalternate doe, which may be diui∣ded againe as generall kindes into more speciall kindes: as for example, of vnreasonable beasts some be terrestriall, some bee aquaticall, and some aierie: againe, euery one of these may bee diuided into their speciall kindes, euen vntill ye come to the low∣est of all, and vnto the Indiuiduums comprehended vnder the same; and that not only of things contained in the predicament of substance, but also in any other predicaments of accidents, as of magnitudes, one is long, as a line; another is broad, as a super∣ficies, and another is thicke as a body. This diuision, though it

•…•…e of accidents contained in the predicament of quantitie, yet it is called a substantiall diuision, because the generall kinde here is diuided by his speciall difference into his proper speciall kindes.

What call you a partible diuision?

I call that a partible diuision, which diuideth some whole thing into his par•…•…s, which is called of the Latines, partitio; as if yee would diuide the Romane Common-wealth into Senators, Knights, and Commons. You may also diuide a house into his principall parts, as into the foundation, walles, and roofe thereof. But the better to vnderstand this kinde of diuision, it shall not be amisse to shew you here what kindes of whole, and what kindes of parts there be: for there is whole substantiall, and whole inte∣grall: againe, of parts, some are called substantiall, and some in∣tegrall; and of parts integrall, some are called similar or like, and some dissimilar or vnlike: againe, of the dissimilar, some are cal∣led principall, and some not principall: of all which things I minde here briefly to speake.

First, I pray you tell what you meane by whole substantiall, and whole integrall.

Whole substantiall, is that which consisteth of substantiall parts cleauing wholly together, and not seuerally distinct in number, as whole man, consisting of soule and body: but whole integrall is that which consisteth of integrall parts, which though they cleaue together, yet they are distinct and seuerall in num∣ber, as mans body, consisting of head, brest, bellie, legs, &c.

How define you substantiall parts?

Substantiall parts are the first and chiefe parts whereof any thing is compounded, of which parts if any bee wanting, the whole must needs perish, and loseth his name, as the matter and forme of any compound thing, be it naturall or artificiall, as the body and soule are the first and chiefe parts of man; the metall and fashion of a siluer cup are the first and chiefe parts of the cup, whereof neither can be wanting: for the soule without the bodie is a spirit, and not man; and the body without the soule is but a dead carcase: againe, the cup without matter or shape, is no cup at all.

Which be called integrall parts?

Certaine secondarie parts, which being all gathered together, do make the whole perfect, as the head, brest, bellie, armes, hands, thighes, legges, and feet, are the integrall parts of mans bodie: and of these integrall parts, some are called similar, and some dis∣similar, that is to say, like and vnlike.

Which are similar, and which dissimilar?

Similar, or like, are these that be of one kinde, and of one selfe name; and being diuided into parts, euery such part, be it neuer so small, beareth also the name of the whole, as flesh, bone, sinew, skin, and such like: for euery little part of the flesh is called flesh, and euery part of bone is called bone; and so of all the rest. Hi∣therto also may be referred water, fire, gold, iron, or any other simple metall, wine, wood, stone, and such like: for euery drop of water is called water, and so of the rest.

Which call you dissimilar or vnlike?

Those parts that differ both in kinde and name, as the head, brest▪ bellie, armes, and legges, are the parts dissimilar of a mans body: likewise a house, a ship, and many other things, haue also such parts, of any one of which parts the whole cannot be spo∣ken: for you cannot say, Because here is the head of a man, Ergo here is a man. Againe, of these dissimilar parts, some are called principall, whereof if any be wanting, the whole must needs pe∣rish; as without the head, bellie, heart, liuer, or guts, mans body cannot be. The not principall, are those parts without the which the body may be: for though those parts be wanting, yet the bo∣dy is counted a whole thing, though not perfect in euery point, as without arm•…•…s, hands, legges, or feet, the body may liue: that building also that hath a foundation, walles, and roofe, is coun∣ted to be a whole house, though it hath neither doores nor win∣dowes, yet not perfect in euery respect.

Wherein doth partition and diuision differ?

In diuers points: for in diuision any generall kinde may bee rightly spoken of euery speciall kinde contained vnder the same; as this word, sensible body, which is spoken both of man and beast. But in partition, the whole cannot be spoken of euery part: for you cannot say that the soule or body of man is whole man, nor that the head or foot is his whole body. Againe, diuision diuideth

vniuersall things into their particulars, and partition diuideth particulars into their parts, and most commonly followeth diui∣sion, helping to make subdiuisions: as for example, when diuision hath diuided a sensible body into man and beast, then followeth partition, and diuideth man into soule and body, and the body into his integrall parts, as head, brest, bellie, legs, and such like.

How manifold is diuision accident all?

Threefold: for by that wee either diuide some subiect into his accidents, or some accident into his subiect, or some accident in∣to his accidents.

Giue examples of all these three waies.

Of the first let this be your example: Of men, some be free, and some be bond; some be vertuous, and some be vicious: and after this sort you may diuide the predicament of substance into as many accidents as you will, running thorowout all the nine predicaments of accidents. Of the second way thus: Of goods, some are said to be of the minde, some of the body, and some of fortune. Of the third thus: Of good things, some are said to bee honest, some profitable, and some pleasant or del•…•…ctable: which kinde of diuision is much vsed of the Orators. To this also may be referred the common order of diuiding any speech or oration in∣to his parts, which the Orators call partition or distribution, whereby is set downe in what order euery thing shall be vttered and declared, which first, and which last, and so forth.

CHAP. IIII.

Of the precepts to be obserued in Diuision.

HOw many precepts are to be obserued in making a true diuision?

Three: First, that the generall kinde be diui∣ded into his next speciall kindes, by such speciall differences as are meerely repugnant one to ano∣ther, and doe comprehend the whole nature of the thing diuided: as thus; Of sensible bodies, some be reasona∣ble, and some be vnreasonable: for it were no good diuision, to say▪ of sensible bodies, one is reasonable, & another is two-footed.

What is the second precept?

That the parts, being ioined together, may bee equall to the whole, and may comprehend neither more nor lesse then the thing which is diuided, as reasonable soule, and carnall bodie, being the chiefe parts of man, doe comprehend neither more nor lesse then whole man.

What is the third precept?

That no part or speciall kinde be vsed as a generall kinde, nor the generall kinde as a part or speciall kinde: as in this diuision which Cicero reproueth, I will shew that through the concupi∣scence, boldnesse, and couetousnesse of our aduer•…•…aries, all mis∣chiefes haue chanced to the Common-wealth: here couetous∣nesse is mingled with concupiscence, whereof it is a part: for con∣cupiscence is the generall kinde of all lusts or desires. But this precept seemeth rather to appertaine to a Rhetoricall partition, then a Dialecticall diuision.

To what end serueth Diuision?

To diuers good ends. First, as Cicero saith, it helpeth great•…•…y to teach plainly to define, and to make things that be compound, intricate, or confused, to appeare simple, plaine, and certaine: Secondly, by diuiding things orderly into their parts, it greatly helpeth memorie: and thirdly, it helpeth to amplifie any kinde of speech, and to make it more copious.

CHAP. V.

Of Method.

HAuing hitherto sufficiently spoken of words, both singular and vniuersall, and also of Definition and Diuision, which are the two chiefe instruments whereby all simple questions are discussed, I minde here to shew with what order or method euery such question is to be handled.

What is Method?

Method is a compendious way of learning or teaching any thing: and it is three-fold, that is to say, Compositiue, Resolu∣tiue, and Diuisiue or definitiue.

What is method compositiue?

It is that whereby wee compound the whole of his parts, be∣ginning at the smallest, and so proceed from greater to greater, vntill we come to the chiefe end whereto we tend, which kinde of order or method we obserue here in writing this Logicke: for first we treat of words or termes, then of a proposition, and last of all of a Syllogisme. So likewise he that will teach the nighest way from Norwich to London by order compositiue, will bid him first go to Windham, from Windham to Atleborough, from Atleborough to Thetford, from Thetford to Newmarket, from Newmarket to Barkway, from Barkway to Ware, from Ware to London.

What is method resolutiue?

It is that whereby any whole thing is resolued into his parts: or when wee proceed from the end to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from that to the next cause of that, and so from one to another, vntill we come to the first cause of all, and most remote and furthest off: as when we resolue a Syllogisme into his Propositions, and a proposition into his vttermost bounds or termes, which are the subiect and the predicate: and this way is vnlike to the other before recited, because it goeth backward, as in the former example. If ye will teach the way from Norwich to London by method resolutiue, ye must say that there is a Towne called Ware, twentie miles from London: next to that is a Towne called Barkway, and so till yee come to that which was first in method compositiue. To these two methods Galen addeth the third method, that is, method diuisiue or definitiue.

What is that method?

It is, when in defining and diuiding we descend orderly from a most generall kinde to all the speciall kindes contained vnder the same, and so to the lowest of all: as hauing to speake of qualitie, we define it, and diuide it into his foure speciall kindes, and euery such speciall kinde into his parts and members, euen till we come to the lowest of all, as you see in the Table of qualitie before de∣scribed. Which kinde of method is more fully handled by my friend Accontio, in his little Treatise which he wrote in Latine, de methodo: the effect of which booke I thinke it not out of purpose to set downe euen here▪

The effect of Accontius his booke, de methodo, which he affirmeth to be the second part or office of Logicke.

FOr the first office of Logicke teacheth how to finde out the truth in any speech: but method teacheth how to attaine to the Art or knowledge of any thing. In which method, three things (as he saith) are to be considered: First, what method is: Secondly, what is the effect or vttermost end thereof: Thirdly, what be the causes of that end or effect.

Method is a certaine right way, whereby wee may search out the knowledge of any thing; and hauing attained it, how to teach the same commodiously to any other, without examining whe∣ther it be true or false; for that belongeth to the first part of Lo∣gicke.

The effect or vttermost end of method, is the knowledge of anything.

The causes of that end are these three, forme, matter, and cause efficient.

Forme here seemeth to be that which is knowne by all the parts of such knowledge, being gathered together (as it were) into one selfe body: which parts are these; first, what the thing is; secondly, what be the causes thereof, and also what be the causes of those causes, euen to the last or vttermost cause: thirdly, what be the effects, and also what be the effects of those effects, as well when the thing is taken generally, as for some whole thing, or as when the whole is diuided into all his parts, euen vnto the parts indiuisible.

Matter here is generally taken, and not for the matter of any determinate or certaine kinde: vnto which matter doe appertaine all things that be finite, perpetuall, and immutable, that is to say, all vniuersals.

The causes efficient are partly those things that are more knowne, as first, to know what the thing is by definition consi∣sting of the generall kinde, and of the differences thereto belon∣ging: secondly, what is the effect or end of the thing, as in those things which doe not depend vpon our will: and thirdly, what

be the causes of that end or effect, the consideration of which end belongeth to those things which doe depend vpon our will, and partly the cause efficient is the right applying or ordering of the more knowne things, which order containeth two parts: for first wee must proceed alwaies from the most generall kindes to the next generall kindes, as hauing to begin with the definition of the thing which you seeke to know, when need requireth, you must proceed from the most generall kinde of all, that is to say, from the highest generall kinde, and so descend downward, vn∣till you come to the thing that is to be defined: but if you haue to begin from the vttermost end of the thing, then next of al con∣sider that, from whence the end doth immediately spring, and what doth follow next to that, and so proceed from one to ano∣ther, till you come to the first cause of all. Finally, if you haue to begin from the first causes, then you must orderly proceed from that which is first vnto the second, and so to the third, and so forth vntill you come to the vttermost effect or last end.

Now as touching the second part of applying or ordering the more knowne things, you must haue consideration of euery whole thing, and of all his parts: wherefore if you haue to define any thing, Art, or science, whereof you treat, you must define the whole, and then euery part thereof, vntill you come to the lowest part thereof, and yet euery one in his proper place. And if you cannot comprehend in one definition all those things that are to be referred to one head, then vse diuision in diuiding the whole into his parts, and define euery such part in order. But if all the parts which the thing containeth, haue not one selfe end, but di∣uers, then diuide it by such differences as euery part may haue his proper end.

Moreouer, if the forme, matter, or cause efficient haue diuers respects and considerations, then (according to that diuersitie) make diuers diuisions, and first declare what is common to all the parts in generall▪ and what is proper to euery one in particular.

Finally, if some one whole thing lieth hidden, then it is to bee found out by looking into some of the particular parts thereof. And these are al the chiefest points contained in the Latine Trea∣tise which my friend A•…•…ontius wrote de methodo. And though

that Petrus Ramus maketh but one kinde of method, that is to say, to proceed from the first principles or elements: yet I am sure he will not denie, but that to goe forward and backward, be two diuers things, though not contrarie, as doth well appeare by the compositiue and resolutiue method before defined.

I doe not yet perfectly vnderstand by all this, with what method a simple question is to be handled: therefore I pray you shew the true way and order thereof.

The method or way in handling a simple question, dependeth vpon these 9. Interrogatiues, that is to say, 1. First, what signifi∣cations the name or word hath, whereof the question is made, and how it is to be taken. 2. Secondly, whether there bee any such thing, or not. 3. Thirdly, what it is. 4. Fourthly, what be the parts or speciall kindes thereof. 5. Fiftly, what be the cau∣ses. 6. Sixtly, what be the effects. 7. Seuenthly, what things be incident or appurtenant vnto it. 8. Eightly, what things are like vnto it. 9. And ninthly, what things bee contrarie to it. All which questions Aristotle reduceth into these foure, that is to say, Whether it be? What it is? What manner of thing it is? and, Why it is?

Giue example of a simple question handled according to the nine questions before recited.

As for example: If we haue to treat of vertue, first, wee must shew the diuers significations of vertue; for vertue signifieth sometime power and abilitie, as when we say, vertue attractiue, vertue digestiue, or vertue expulsiue: but here vertue is to be ta∣ken for a morall habit, bringing forth good and commendable actions. Secondly, whether vertue be, or not, it plainly appeareth by the diuers doings of men, whereof some bee good, some bee bad. Thirdly, what vertue is, we know by the definition thereof, in saying, that vertue is a morall habit, inclining mans will to doe that which is alwaies good, and agreeable to true iudgement. Fourthly, the kindes of vertue be diuers, as Prudence, Iustice, Temperance, Fortitude, Modestie▪ and such like. Fiftly, the causes of vertue be also diuers; for the cause efficient thereof is good, and mans will obedient to true reason, and to true judgement: the matter or subiect of vertue is the minde or heart of man: the

finall cause is blessednesse. Sixtly, the effect of vertue is tranquil∣litie of the minde, and many prosperous successes, and also pub∣like vtilitie and peace. Seuenthly, things incident to vertue are these, the honour, praise, and commendation of good men. Eightly, things of affinitie or like to vertue, be all good inclina∣tions, dispositions, or good naturall affections, as to be louing, kinde, and mercifull. Ninthly, things contrarie to vertue, bee all manner of vices, as pride, couetousnesse, hypocrisie, dissimu∣lation, &c.

What method is to be obserned in handling a compound question?

A compound question is to be handled by arguing and reaso∣ning on both sides, whereof wee shall treat hereafter. In the meane time we haue to speake of a Proposition, without the which no argument can be made: for all arguments doe consist of pro∣positions.

Here endeth the second Booke.

THE ART OF LOGICKE. THE THIRD BOOKE.

CHAP. I.

Of a Proposition.

WHat is a Proposition?

It is a perfect speech whereby some∣thing is manifestly declared to be true or false.

Whereof is such speech specially com∣pounded?

Of Noune and Verbe, which Noune would be of the Nominatiue case, and the Verbe of the Indicatiue Mood, as when I say, Man is a sensible body; for the Logicians do seldome allow any such speeches as are either of the Optatiue, Imperatiue, Interrogatiue, or Vocatiue Mood, as, I would to God I had a good horse: this speech is not accounted to be so true or certaine, as to say, I haue a good horse.

Of how many parts doth a Proposition consist?

Of three, that is to say, the Subiect, Predicat, and Copulat.

What is the Copulat?

It is the Verbe Substantiue, called in Latine, Sum, es, fui, that is, to be, which doth couple or ioine the Predicat with his Sub∣iect,

as when we say, Man is a sensible body: here in this propo∣sition, the word man is the subiect, and the word sensible body is the predicat, and the Verbe is is the copulat: which copulat is not alwaies incident to euery proposition, and specially when the predicat is some other Verbe, and not the Verbe substantiue; as, Plato disputeth, Socrates walketh; which is as much to say, as Plato is disputing, Socrates is walking.

How many waies is a proposition diuided?

Three manner of waies, that is, according to substance, quali∣tie, and quantitie. According to substance thus: Of propositions, some are said to be categoricall, that is, simple, and some hypo∣theticall, that is, compound, of which compound propositions we minde not to speake, before we haue treated of all things be∣longing to a categoricall and simple proposition, which is two∣fold that is to say, absolute and modall.

What is an absolute categoricall proposition?

It is a speech which affirmeth or denieth something absolute∣ly, without any respect; as when we say, God is true, or, Euery man is a lier: and this is otherwise called of the Logicians, Propo∣sitio categorica de inesse.

How is a simple proposition diuided according to qualitie?

Into an affirmatiue and negatiue proposition.

When is it said to be affirmatiue, and when negatiue?

It is said to be affirmatiue, when the predicat is affirmed of the subiect; as when I say, that Iohn is learned: and that is negatiue, when the predicat is denied of the subiect; as, Iohn is not learned. And note, that in such kinde of speech, the negatiue is alwaies ioined to the Verbo.

How many waies is a simple proposition diuided according to quan∣titie?

Foure manner of waies, that is to say, into an vniuersall, parti∣cular, indefinite, and singular proposition.

When is it said to be vniuersall?

When some vniuersall signe is added to the subiect.

Which words are said to be vniuersall signes?

These: all, euery, whatsoeuer, whosoeuer, none, no body, not one, none at all, euery where, no where, and such like; as, Euery man is a lier, No man is true.

When is it said to be a particular proposition?

When some particular signe is added to the subiect▪

Which call you particular signes?

These: some, any, many, few, and such like; as, Some man is wise, Few are wise.

When is it said to be indefinite?

When the subiect is a common word, hauing neither vniuer∣sall nor particular signe added vnto it; as when wee say, Men in these daies be giuen to great sollies.

When is it said to be singular?

When the subiect is some Indiuiduum, as when wee say, that Cicero is eloquent.

What, and how many questions doe rise of these three diuisions?

These three: that is, of what kinde? of what qualitie? of what quantitie? in Latine thus, quae? qualis? & quanta? for if it bee asked what kinde of proposition it is, then you must answere, that it is either categoricall, or hypotheticall, that is, simple or compound: and if it be demanded of what qualitie it be, then you must answere, that it is either affirmatiue, or negatiue: if it be asked of what quantitie, then you must answere, that it is ei∣ther vniuersall, particular, indefinite, or singular.

CHAP. II.

Of the three properties belonging to a simple proposition.

WHich are those?

These: Opposition, Equiualencie, and Con∣uersion.

What is Opposition?

It is the repugnancie of two simple propositi∣ons, hauing one selfe subiect, and one selfe predicat.

How many kindes of opposite propositions be there?

Foure: Contrarie, Subcontrarie, Contradictorie, and Subal∣ternat.

Which are said to be Contrarie?

An vniuersall affirmatiue, and an vniuersall negatiue; as, Euery man is iust, No man is iust.

Which are said to be Subcontrarie?

A particular affirmatiue, and a particular negatiue; as, Some man is iust, Some man is not iust.

Which are said to be Contradictorie?

Either an vniuersall affirmatiue, and a particular negatiue, or else an vniuersall negatiue, and a particular affirmatiue; as, Euery man is iust, and, Some man is not iust: or, No man is iust, Some man is iust.

Which are said to be Subalternat?

Either an vniuersall affirmatiue, and a particular affirmatiue, or else an vniuersall negatiue, and a particular negatiue: as, Euery man is iust, and, Some man is iust: No man is iust, and, Some man is not iust.

All which kinde of opposites you may the better remember, by considering with what order they are placed in this Figure fol∣lowing.

[illustration]

CHAP. III.

Of the Lawes and conditions belonging to these foure kindes of oppo∣sites before recited: and of the diuers matter of a Proposition.

FOr the better vnderstanding of the lawes belon∣ging to the opposites, it shall bee necessarie to speake somewhat of the matter of a proposition, whereupon the said lawes doe partly depend.

How manifold is that matter?

Threefold, that is to say, naturall, casuall, and remote or vnnaturall.

When is a proposition said to consist of matter naturall?

When the predicat agreeth with his subiect essentially, or at the least necessarily: as when the generall kinde is spoken of his speciall kinde, and the speciall kinde of his Indiuiduums, or the difference of his speciall kinde, or the propertie of his subiect: as, Euery man is a sensible body, Iohn is a man, Euery man is rea∣sonable, Euery man is apt to speake.

When is a proposition said to consist of matter contingent?

When the predicat agreeth with his subiect accidentally, so as it may either be, or not be; as, Iohn is learned.

When is a proposition said to consist of matter remote or vnnaturall?

When the predicat agreeth no manner of way with the sub∣iect; as, A man is a horse, A man is a stone, &c.

What are the lawes of contrarie propositions?

Contrarie propositions can be true no way both together; as, Euery man is a sensible body, No man is a sensible body: but they may be both false, and specially consisting of matter contin∣gent; as when I say, Euery man is iust, No man is iust, which are both false.

What are the lawes of subcontrarie propositions?

Subcontrarie propositions, consisting of matter naturall, can∣not be both false at once; as, Some man is a sensible body, Some man is not a sensible body: but consisting of matter contingent▪ both may be sometime true; as, Some man is iust, Some man is not iust.

What be the lawes of contradictorie propositions?

Those can neither be true nor false b•…•…th at once: for if one bee true, the other must needs be false, whether the matter be natu∣rall, or contingent; as, Euery man is iust; Some m•…•…n is not iust: No man is iust; Some man is iust.

What be the lawes of sub alternat propositions?

If the vniuersall be true, the particular must needs be true; as, Euery man is iust, Ergo some man is iust; but not contrarily. Againe, if the particular be false, the vniuersall also must needs be false; as, Some man is a stone, Euery man is a stone.

What good is to be reaped by the knowledge of these opposites?

It teacheth to know what speeches be repugnant one to ano∣ther, and thereby to discerne truth from falshood.

CHAP. IIII.

Of the equiualencie of simple propositions.

WHat is equiualencie?

It is the reconciling or agreeing of two pro∣positions, hauing one selfe subiect, and one selfe predicate, in such sort, that though they be di∣uers in words, yet they are made to bee all one in signification.

How is such reconciliation made?

By the helpe of signes, either vniuersall or particular, that are of like value, and equall one to another, and thereby make the speeches equall.

Giue example.

As thus: Who knoweth not this to be true? Euery man know∣eth this to be true: There is none but that knoweth this to bee true. All these are of like value, and doe signifie one selfe thing. Againe, Some men are wise, Few men are wise, All men are not wise, Not many are wise, are also equiualent speeches. The Schoolemen doe giue diuers rules touching the equiualencie of speeches; but such as, in mine opinion, are neither necessarie, no•…•… profitable, for that they cause many times barbarous, vnusu∣all, and intricate speeches. And therefore I thinke good hereto passe them ouer with silence, wishing all men to iudge the equi∣ualencie of speeches, rather by the eare, and by custome of spea∣king,

and by vsuall manner of taking the same in euery seuerall tongue or language, then by any rules, which perhaps will serue in one tongue, but not in another.

CHAP. V.

Of conuersion of simple propositions.

WHat is conuersion?

It is the changing or turning of the subiect and predicate, the one into the others place.

How manifold is such conuersion?

It is threefold, that is, simple, by accident, and by contraposition.

What is simple conuersion?

It is that whereby the termes are onely changed the one into the others place, the selfe same quantitie and qualitie being still reserued.

What propositions are conuerted by this manner of conuersion?

An vniuersall negatiue, and particular affirmatiue.

Giue examples of both.

Of the first thus: No vertue is discommendable, Ergo no dis∣commendable thing is vertue. Of the second thus: Some man is a Philosopher, and some Philosopher is a man. And by this way sometime vniuersall affirmatiues may be also conuerted, as those whose termes are conuertible, as the speciall kinde and his diffe∣rence or propertie; as, Euery man is reasonable, and euery reaso∣nable thing is man: or, Euery man is apt to speake, and euery thing that is apt to speake, is man.

What is conuersion by accident?

It is that whereby the termes are changed, and also the quan∣titie of the propositions, but not the qualitie.

What propositions are conuerted this way?

An vniuersall affirmatiue into a particular affirmatiue, and an vniuersall negatiue into a particular negatiue.

Giue examples.

Euery patience is fortitude: Ergo some fortitude is patience. Againe: No vertue is vice: Ergo some vice is not vertue.

What is conuersion by contraposition?

It is that whereby neither quantitie nor qualitie is changed,

but only termes finite into termes infinite, that is to say, termes limited into termes vnlimited.

Which call you termes infinite?

All Nounes hauing a negatiue set before them, as, not man, not beast.

What propositions are conuerted this manner of way?

An vniuersall affirmatiue into an vniuersall affirmatiue, and a particular negatiue into a particular negatiue.

Giue examples.

Of the first thus: Euery man is a sensible body, and euery thing that is not a sensible body, is not man. Of the second thus: Some vertue is not Iustice: Ergo, some thing that is not Iustice, is not vertue. These speeches in English haue some sauour; but to be spoken in Latine, after the Schoole manner, are very barbarous, or rather monstrous, as Ualerius termeth them, as to say, Quae∣dam non Iustitia non est non virtus.

CHAP. VI.

Of a Modall Proposition.

WHat is a modall proposition?

It is that which affirmeth or denieth some∣thing, not absolutely, but in a certaine respect, sort, or mood, which mood is commonly the predicat in this kinde of proposition, and all the rest of the subiect called of the Logicians, Dictum.

What is a mood?

Mood is a word determining and limiting the signification of some other word whereunto it is ioined, as a wise man, a white horse: for here this word wise being added to man, doth limit and restraine the generall signification of the word man, which otherwise of it selfe comprehendeth both wise and foolish. And the like is to be said of any other generall word, whereunto any such addition is put: but of moods making modall propositions, there are but these foure, that is, Possible, Contingent, Impossi∣ble, and Necessarie.

How manifold is a modall proposition?

Twofold, that is, Coniunct and Disiunct.

When is it said to be Coniunct?

When the mood is placed either in the beginning or ending of a proposition; as, It is impossible that Iohn is sicke: or thus; That Iohn is sicke it is possible.

When is it said to be Disiunct?

When the mood is placed so, as it diuideth the one part of the subiect from the other; as, for Iohn it is possible to be sicke: and the Disiunct is said many times to be true, when the Coniunct is false, being both made of selfe termes: as for example, the Logi∣cians affirme this to be true, A white man it is possible to bee blacke: but this other, A white man to be blacke it is possible, they affirme to be false.

What maketh them so to doe, sith by construction these two speeches in sense doe seeme to be all one?

Because the mood is the Disiunct, which by parting and seue∣ring the Subiect, maketh the Proposition to seeme spoken in di∣uers respects, as man to be white in one respect, and blacke in another, and so the speech to be true.

CHAP. VII.

Of the proposition, equiualencie, and conuersion of modall propositions.

WE told you before, that of modall propositions, some were called coniunct, and some disiunct: and as for the modals disiunct, they differ but lit∣tle from absolute propositions before declared. And therefore we haue here chiefly to deale with opposition, equiualencie, and conuersion belonging to modall coniunct, the matter whereof being not altogether so necessarie as some men affirme, I minde to make no long speech thereof. But for the better vnderstanding of opposition, equiualencie▪ and conuersion thereof, it is needfull first to declare the quantitie and qualitie of a modall proposition: of both which things, though Aristotle maketh no mention, but only a little of qualitie; yet the latter Writers doe necessarily suppose modall propositions to bee indued with quantitie and qualitie: for they say that the mood necessarie is much like to a signe vniuersall affirmatiue; the mood impossible, to a signe vniuersall negatiue; the moods possible and contingent, which are both of one value, are like to signes particu∣lar

affirmatiue. Now as touching the qualitie, which is to be ei∣ther affirmatiue or negatiue, like as the negatiue in absolute pro∣positions is wont to bee added to the verbe, euen so in modall propositions it is added to the mood, as by the examples set down in the figure of opposition hereafter following ye may easily per∣ceiue.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the opposition of Modals.

HOw many waies are modall propositions said to be op∣posite?

They are said to be opposite foure manner of waies, euen as absolute propositions are, tha is to say, contrarily, subcontrarily, contradictoriy, and subalternately, as you see in this figure fol∣lowing, wherin the mood is set before in the place of the subiect, the better to shew the quantitie & qualitie of euery proposition.

[illustration]

CHAP. IX.

Of the equiualencie and conuersion of modall propositions.

THe Schoolemen doe affirme, that modall propo∣sitions are easily made equiualent, by reason that they may be vttered foure manner of waies, that is to say, two manner of waies affirmatiuely, and two manner of waies negatiuely. The first way af∣firmatiuely, is, when no negatiue is added either to the subiect, or to the mood; as, for a man to be iust, it is pos∣sible, contingent, impossible, or necessarie. The second way af∣firmatiuely, is, when the negatiue is added to the verbe of the subiect, the mood remaining still affirmatiue; as, for a man not to be iust, it is possible, contingent, &c. The first way negatiuely, is, when the negatiue is only added to the mood; as, a man to be iust, it is not possible, contingent, &c. The second way negatiuely, is, when the negatiue is both added to the verbe of the subiect, and also to the mood; as, a man not to be iust, it is not possible, contingent, &c. which is all one and equiualent to this affirma∣tiue proposition, saying, that for a man to be iust, it is possible, contingent, &c. for two negatiues, as well in the Latine tongue, as in ours, do alwaies make an affirmatiue. Again, as touching the cōuersion of modal propositions, they say, that the disiunct being like to an absolute or simple proposition, may be conuerted both simply and per accidens; but the coniunct suffereth no conuersion: & though the Schoolemen do set down diuers & manifold rules, and haue inuented these 4. words of Art, that is, PURPUREA, ILIACE, AM ABIMUS, EDENTULI, attributing as wel to the vowels, as to the consonants thereof, certaine significations, for the better vnderstanding & bearing in memorie the equiua∣lencies & conuersions of the said modal propositions: yet because in mine opinion they are more meet to breed preposterous, intri∣cate & barbarous speeches, then to serue to any other good pur∣pose, I thinke it better to passe them ouer with silence, then to trouble your memorie therwith: wherfore leauing them as things superfluous, I minde now to treat of an hypotheticall or cōpound proposition, & of al the necessarie accidents therunto belonging.

CHAP. X.

Of a compound or hypotheticall proposition.

WHat is a compound proposition?

It is that which consisteth of two or more sim∣ple propositions, coupled together with some coniunction.

How manifold is it?

Threefold, Conditionall, Copulatiue, and Disiunctiue.

When is it said to be conditionall?

When the coniunction If is set before any simple proposition, as thus: If it be a man, it is a sensible body.

When is it said to be copulatiue?

When two simple propositions are ioined together with a con∣iunction copulatiue, as, God is true, and man is a lier.

When is it said to be disiunctiue?

When two simple propositions are ioined together with a coniunction disiunctiue, as thus; Either it is day, or night.

Of how many parts doth a compound proposition consist?

Of two, that is, of the antecedent, and of the consequent?

Which call you the antecedent?

That which followeth next after the coniunction, as thus: If it be iustice, it is a vertue: here this speech, If it be iustice, is the an∣tecedent, and the rest of the speech, that is to say, it is a vertue, is the consequent: and so it should be, though the words were con∣trarily placed, as thus: It is a vertue, if it be iustice.

What things are to be considered in hypotheticall propositions?

These: First, whether they haue any quantitie, or qualitie: then, whether any opposition, equiualence, or conuersion doe belong to them, or not: thirdly, how to know the truth or fals∣hood of euery such proposition, be it conditionall, copulatiue, or disiunctiue. And first, as touching quantitie, they haue none at all: for quantitie is to be measured by signes vniuersall, or parti∣cular, which are only incident to the subiects of categoricall pro∣positions: but qualitie they haue, in that they affirme or denie some thing, by reason whereof there may be contradiction in

hypotheticall propositions, but it cannot bee properly said, that they be either contrarie, subcontrarie, or subalternat, for that they are without quantitie; for want whereof they nei∣ther doe aptly admit opposition, equiualence, or conuersion, but onely contradiction.

How is that Contradiction to be vnderstood?

By reason of affirmation, or negation; which, as in simple propositions is to be taken on the behalfe of the verbe copula∣tiue, and not of the subiect or predicate: so in compound propositions, it is to be taken on the behalfe of the coniuncti∣on, hauing a negatiue set before it; and yet not of euery con∣iunction, but onely of that coniunction conditionall, If: whereof I cannot aptly giue you any example in our natiue tongue, because it is contrarie to our naturall and vsuall speech, to put a negatiue before the coniunction, If; and therefore I leaue to speake thereof any further: and to say the truth, it ma∣keth but a strange kinde of speech in the Latine tongue, and I beleeue is seldome vsed in any disputation: as to say thus, Non si animal est, homo est: or, Non si lux est, dies est: both which are said to be negatiue speeches, according to the rule before giuen, because the negatiue is set before the coniuncti∣on si, and by vertue thereof (as the Schoolemen say) maketh the whole proposition to be negatiue.

CHAP. XI.

Of the truth and falshood of Hypotheticall propositions, and first, of the Conditionall.

WHat is to be considered, to know the truth or falshood of Conditionall Propositions?

First, whether they be affirmatiue or nega∣tiue: for in the affirmatiues it sufficeth, that the one part doth necessarily follow of the o∣ther, as thus: If it be a man, it is a sensible body: and it ma∣keth no matter, though the parts seuerally taken, be both false, so as the Cousequent be good: as, If a tree be a man, a tree is a sensible bodie: for though both these parts be false, yet the

Consequent conditionally is true: for a conditionall Proposi∣tion hath no regard to the truth of the parts, but onely that the Consequent may necessarily follow of the Antecedent.

How is the truth of the negatiue Proposition to be knowne?

By the Consequent: for if the Consequent bee not rightly inferred of the antecedent, then the negatiue is true, as thus: it followeth not that because a Lyon is a sensible body, that therefore a Lyon is a man.

Of the truth and falshood of propositions copulatiue.

WHen is a copulatiue Proposition said to be true or false?

It is said to be true, when both the parts bee true, as when I say, God is true, and man is a lyar: againe it is said to be false, when either one part or both parts be false: as when I say, man is a sensible bodie, and God is not a Spirit. Here be∣cause the first part is true, and the second part false, the whole Proposition is said to be false. It is said also to be false, when both parts are false, as thus; Man is true, and God is a lyar. Heere both parts be false.

What kinde of propositions are wont to bee referred to this co∣pulatiue?

Those which they call Temporall, Locall, by similitude and causall: as of time thus, When a penitent sinner pray∣eth, then God heareth him. Of place thus, Where two or three are gathered together in the Name of the Lord, he is in the midst of them. By similitude thus, As a man dealeth with his neighbour, so will God deale with him. Of the cause thus, Because the Sunne shineth, it is day. And therefore certaine Aduerbes as these, When, Where, Vntill, so long as, as, so as, for, therefore, because and such like, haue the signification sometime of the Coniunction (And) and sometime of the Con∣iunction (If).

Of the truth and falshoode of disiunctiues.

WHat belongeth properly to disiunctiue Propositions?

To consist of repugnant parts, according to the

signification of Coniunctions disiunctiue, such as these bee, vel or eyther, or else, and such like: as eyther it is day, or it is night, whereof the one destroyeth the other: for if the one be, the other can not be: and therefore they can not bee both true: but they may be both false, if there be any mean betwixt the two contraries: as when wee say, This woman is eyther white or blacke, both these are false, if she be browne, which is a meane colour betwixt white and blacke. But the later writers affirme the disiunctiue to bee true, if any one or both of the parts bee true, as thus, Eyther a man is a sensible body, or else a tree is a Substance: and to bee false when both parts bee false, as Eyther a man is true, or God is a lyar.

The end of the third Booke of Logicke.

THE ART OF LOGICKE. THE FOVRTH BOOKE.

CHAP. I.

Of Places.

THough immediately after the Treatise of a Proposition, the old men are wont to deale with the order of reasoning, called Argu∣mentation, and with the formes thereof: yet sith by order of Nature it is meete to finde out matter, before wee goe about to forme, frame or order the same, and that the mat∣ter of prouing any Question is to be fetched from certaine common Places, I thought it best to treat first of those Places, and then to shew the order of reasoning.

What is a place?

A Place is a marke or token, shewing from whence any Argument apt to proue the Question propounded, is to bee taken.

What difference is betwixt Argument and Argumentation?

Argument is the bare proofe or meane terme which is in∣uented by him that disputeth, to proue the truth of the Questi∣on: but Argumentation is the whole reasoning it selfe, of what

forme so euer it be, comprehending both the Question, and al∣so the proofe thereof: whereof we shall speake hereafter in his proper place, and giue you examples of both.

How manifold is Place?

Two-fold, the one of persons, the other of things: the or∣der and distribution of both which, you may plainly see in the Table following.

To what end serueth this manifold diuision?

That the disputers may the more perfectly know the pow∣er and proper nature of euery Argument, according to the great or little force of the Place, from whence such Arguments are fetched.

How is Place diuided according to the Schoolemen?

Into two kindes, the one called Maxim, and the other diffe∣rence of Maxim.

What is Maxim?

It is a generall rule approued and receiued of all Logicians, in such sort as no man will deny the same, as of contrarie things there must needs bee contrarie consequents. Againe, Whatsoeuer agreeth with the thing defined, agreeth also with the Definition of the same: and such like.

What is the difference of Maxims?

It is the proper name of euery Place whereby one Maxim is known from another, and to what place euery Maxim belong∣eth, as from the Contrary, from the Definition, from the thing defined: for by these names and such like, wee know to what Place euery Maxim belongeth.

To what end serueth this diuision?

The Maxims serue as shoote-ankers, and as places of refuge, when the aduersarie shall deny our Conclusion: againe the differences being few in number, doe cause the multitude of Maxims to be the more easily kept in memory.

The Table of Places.

• Of Places, some be
• ...
  • Of Persons, as
  • ...
    • Name, stocke, birth, nation, sex, or kinde, age, education, habite of the body, affections of the mind, state, calling, or condition of life, diet, study, or exercise, acts done, death, wonders chancing before death, or after death, monu∣ments left of things done, or written, and kinde of Fune∣rals shewing how well or euill the person was beloued.
  • and some be of things, which be, either
  • ...
    • Artificiall Places are either
    • ...
      • Inward Places be either
      • ...
        • Of the substance it selfe, which be these.
        • ...
          • The Definition, and the things defined,
          • The Description, & the thing described.
          • The Interpretation, and the thing in∣terpreted.
          • The Matter, and the thing made.
          • The Forme, and the thing formed:
          • The general kind, & his speciall kinde.
          • The Difference and his propertie.
          • The whole, and his parts Integrall.
          • Principall, and not principall.
        • Or, of things accompanying Sub∣stance, as these
        • ...
          • Generation, and the thing ingendred.
          • Corruption, and the thing corrupted.
          • Vse, Abuse.
          • Subiects.
          • Adiacents, and actions.
          • Apposition.
          • Common Accidents.
          • Signes and circumstances, as time, place, and meane, &c.
        • The Cause Efficient, and his effect.
        • The End, and the thing ended▪
        • The foure Opposites, as
        • ...
          • Relatiues.
          • Contraries.
          • Priuatiues.
          • Contradictoric•…•….
        • Things diuers in kind, called in Latine, Disparata.
        • Comparison, as more or lesse▪
        • Like, or vnlike.
        • Example and Comparison.
        • Also to Comparison may be added these places.
        • Proportion.
        • Changed proportion.
        • Disproportion.
        • Changed Disproportion.
        • Translation or Figuratiue speech.
        • ...
          • From the Comparatiue to the Super∣latiue.
          • From the Positiue to the Cōparatiue.
          • From two Positiues to two Compara∣tiues.
          • From two Positiues to two Superla∣tiues, and contrariwise.
      • Outward Places bee these
      • Or meane places bee these three
      • ...
        • Coniugates.
        • Cases.
        • Diuision.
    • or Inartificiall places, which be these sixe
    • ...
      • Fore-iudgements.
      • Rumors.
      • •…•…ormentes.
      • Writings▪
      • Oath.
      • Witnesses.
    • ...All which six places are comprehended vnder the place of Authoritie, as you may see in the Table of Authoritie hereafter following, in which Table are set downe the said inartificiall places, together with the definitions and vses thereof.

CHAP. II.

Of the Places of Persons.

Glue examples of all the Places of persons.

Though the Places of persons may bee very wel applyed to the place of common Accidents hereafter following, because they eyther goe before, accompany, or follow the subiects wherevnto they doe belong: yet because there is a difference betwixt persons and things, and that the Places before mentioned in the Table of persons, doe more properly belong to Persons, then to things, I thought it best to giue you examples of euery Place belonging to the person, before I come to treate of the Places of things, and first of the name, then of the stocke and family, and so forth.

Of the name.

Of this Place you may reason eyther in praise or dispraise more probably then truely, as to say thus: his name is Good∣man: Ergo he ought to be a good man, for that name impor∣teth good. I did once see an euill woman executed at Ty∣borne, whose name was Sweepestake, which name was answer∣able to her propertie, which was to sweepe all her louers pur∣ses so cleane as she could. Cicero did not let to scoffe in like manner with Uerres the Roman extortioner, against whom he made so many inueyghing Orations, saying many times, that he had not his name for nought: for Uerres was as much to say as a sweeping thiefe, deriued of the verbe verro, which in Eng∣lish is to sweepe.

Of the stocke or birth.

Of this Place you may reason thus: Hee had strong parents: Ergo he is strong. Hee came of an euill race: Ergo it is no mar∣uell though he be euill disposed.

Of the nation.

He is of the Iland of Crete or Candy: Ergo he is a lyar. Hee is a Flemming, Ergo a drunkard. He is an Englishman: Ergo a glutton. He is an Italian: Ergo a dissembler.

Of the sex or kinde.

It is the promise of a woman, Ergo not to be performed or trusted.

Of the age.

He is but an Infant, Ergo not malicious. He is young of age, and therefore to be pardoned.

Of education.

He was euill brought vp, and therefore can not be good.

Of the habit of the body.

He is bigge set, Ergo he is strong. He is red headed, Ergo e∣uill conditioned.

Of the affections of the minde.

He is giuen to excesse and ryot, Ergo he is not temperate or modest: to this place may be referred all manner of vertues and vices.

Of the state, calling, or condition of life.

He is a bond man: Ergo he can neither sue nor be sued.

Of dyet.

He loueth to fare delicately, and to lie soft: Ergo hee is las∣ciuious.

Of studie or exercise.

He is very studious and applyeth his booke: Ergo no volup∣tuous man.

Of things done.

Pompey hath had many prosperous and noble victories: Ergo he is most meete to be sent as General of the war against My∣thridates.

Of death.

The death of Scipio was much lamented of the Romans, Ergo he was dearely beloued of the Romans. Such a one suffered death most constantly for Christs sake, Ergo hee was a good Christian.

Of things chancing after death.

Honourable Monuments were set vp by the people of Rome in the honour of Iulius Caesar after his death, ergo he was hono∣red and beloued of all the people of Rome in his life time. There were great earthquakes, and dead bodies did arise immediatly

after the death of Christ, ergo hee was the Sonne of God, and was vniustly condemned.

CHAP. III.

Of the Places of things, and first of artificiall Places.

〈1 line〉〈1 line〉

_〈1 paragraph〉〈1 paragraph〉

〈1 line〉〈1 line〉

Inward 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 which veeld Arguments either ap∣pertaining 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 nature and substance of the matter in questi∣on, or else to such things as doe accompany the substance and nature of the thing.

Which be the Places of Substance?

These, Definition and the thing defined, together with the rest rehearsed before in the Table.

Of Definition and the thing defined.

WHat is Definition?

It is that which briefely, plainely and properly de∣clareth the nature of any thing, by shewing the substantiall parts thereof.

How m•…•…y a man reason from this place?

Both 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and negatiuely, aswell from the Subiect as the Predicate of the Question. Affirmatiuely thus, Euery reasonable body is apt to learne letters, Ergo man is apt to learne letters. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thus, No vnreasonable body is apt to learne letters, Ergo no brute beast is apt to learn▪ let∣ters.

What be the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or generall rules of this Place?

The 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉, Whatsoeuer agreeth with the •…•…∣tion, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thing defined: and contrariwise what∣soeuer

agreeth not with the definition, agreeth not with the thing defined.

What is the thing defined?

That, whose nature and propertie is declared in the defini∣tion.

How may a man reason from this place?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely, as Peter is a man: Ergo he is a reasonable body. Negatiuely, as an Ape is no man: Ergo an Ape is no reasonable body.

What be the Maxims of this Place?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the thing defined, agreeth also with the definition thereof: and whatsoeuer agreeth not with the thing defined, agreeth not with the definition of the same.

Of Description, and the thing described.

WHat is Description?

It is a speech declaring what a thing is, by shewing the properties and accidents whereby it differeth from other things.

How may a man reason from this Place?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, Eue∣rie laudable habite adorneth his possessor: Ergo vertue ador∣neth his possessor: negatiuely thus, no laudable habite shameth his owner or possessor: Ergo no vertue shameth his owner or possessor.

What is the thing described?

It is that, whose properties either naturall or accidentall are declared in the description.

How are arguments to be fetched from this Place?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, This beast is foure footed, hauing long eares and whole feet: ergo it is an Asse: negatiuely thus; This foure footed beast hath no long eares nor whole feete: Ergo it is no Asse.

When are arguments to be confuted, being fetohed frō these places?

When the definition or description is not true or proper to the thing defined or described.

Of Interpretation and the thing interpreted.

WHat is Interpretation?

It is the declaring of a name lesse knowne by ano∣ther that is more knowne, as thus, Iesus is as much to say as a Sauiour, a Philosopher is a louer of wisedome.

What is the thing interpreted?

That which is declared by the Interpretation, as this word Iesus to be a Sauiour, or this word Philosopher to bee a louer of wisedome.

How may a man reason from this place?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, if the tearmes bee con∣uertible. Affirmatiuely thus: He is a louer of wisedome: Ergo a Philosopher. Negatiuely thus: He is no louer of Wisdome: Ergo no Philosopher.

What be the maxims of these two places?

The Maxims of these Places are like, for whatsoeuer agree∣eth with the one, agreeth with the other, and contrariwise.

Of the Place of Matter, and of the thing made.

WHat is Matter?

That whereof any thing is made, as Siluer is the mat∣ter of a Siluer Cup, and the Cup is the thing made, called of the Logicians materiatum.

How is Matter diuided?

Into Matter permanent, and Matter transient.

What is Matter permanent?

It is that which remaineth in the thing made, retaining still both nature and name, as stone and timber is the matter of an house.

What is Matter transient?

It is that which being changed, doth not returne againe in∣to his first nature: as flower and water being made bread, will neuer be flower and water againe.

How are arguments to be fetched from Matter permanent?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, Here is timber, lime and stone: Ergo here may be an house: negatiue∣ly

thus, Here is neither timber, lime not s•…•…one: Ergo here is no house.

How are arguments to be fetched from Matter transient?

Affirmatiuely, but not negatiuely, as heere is water and meale: Ergo here may be bread: but you can not say, here is no meale: Ergo here is no bread: for the matter permanent being taken away, the effect thereof is also taken away: but this Maxime taketh no place in matter transient, vnlesse the Argu∣ment be made by the preterperfect Tense or time past, as thus: Here was no meale: Ergo here is no bread.

What be the Maxims of this Place?

The matter being set downe, the effect also may bee accor∣ding to the difference of the matter.

How may we reason from the thing made to the matter?

In matter permanent you may reason from the present Tense to the present Tense, thus: Heere are iron weapons: Ergo heere is iron. But in matter transient wee must reason from the pre∣sent time to the time past, thus; here is bread: Ergo heere hath been meale.

What be the Maxims of this Place?

The thing made of matter permanent being set downe, the matter also must needs be: and the thing made of matter transi∣ent being set downe, the matter therof must needs haue been.

How may you else reason from these two Places?

By adding these two adiectiues (good or euill) as thus: The house is good: Ergo the timber and stone was good: for the goodnes or defect of the matter permanent, sheweth the pre∣sent goodnesse or defect of the thing made: and any good or euill thing made of Matter transient, proueth the Matter to haue been good or euill.

Of the Places of Forme and shape.

WHat is Forme?

Forme is that which giueth shape and being to the thing formed, whereof also the thing taketh his name, as the soule of man is the forme, and man is the thing formed.

How is Forme diuided?

Into

• Forme substantiall, which is the first being or shape of any thing, and that is either
• ...
  • Mortall, as the soule of a bruite beast.
  • Or immortall, as the soule of man.
• And into Forme accidentall, which is a meere ac∣cident, called of the Logicians Abstractum, as whitenesse or blacknesse.

How are arguments to be fetched from the Forme and the thing formed?

Two waies, affirmatiuely from the substantiall forme, thus: Here is the soule of a beast: Ergo here is a beast: from the ac∣cidentall forme thus: Heere is whitenesse: Ergo here is some white thing: from the substantiall thing formed thus: The beast is here: Ergo his soule is heere: of the accidentall thing formed thus: Here is some white thing: Ergo heere is white∣nesse: Negatiuely from the substantiall forme thus: Here is no soule of a beast: Ergo here is no beast: of the accidentall forme thus: Heere is no whitenes: Ergo heere is no white thing: of the substantiall thing formed thus: The beast is not here: Er∣go his soule is not here: of the accidentall thing formed thus: Here is no white thing: Ergo here is no whitenes.

Rehearse the Maxims whereupon these arguments are grounded.

The Maxims bee these, where Forme is either present or wanting, the thing formed also must needs be either present or wanting, and contrariwise. Yet this Maxim faileth in the sorme of man, for the soule intellectiue may bee, and yet no man, vnlesse you reason from the inbeing of the Forme in the Subiect, as, In the body is a reasonable soule: Ergo it is a man: for euerie Subiect hath his name and being in his shape or forme, as hath been said before.

Of the generall kinde.

WHat is generall kinde?

It is that which comprehendeth many things diffe∣ring

in speciall kinde, as hath beene said before.

How are Arguments to be fetched from the generall kinde to the speciall kinde?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, Euery vertue is to be desired: Ergo Iustice is to be desired. Negatiue∣ly thus, No vice is to be praised: Ergo drunkennes is not to be praised.

Rehearse the Maxims belonging to the generall kinde?

To what kinde soeuer agreeth the generall kind being vni∣uersally taken (that is to say) pronounced with some vniuersall signe, a•…•… All, Euery or None, to the same the speciall kind doth also agree: and whatsoeuer agreeth not with the generall kinde 〈◊〉〈◊〉 taken, agreeth not with the speciall kind: sor if no vniuersall signe be added to the generall kinde, you can∣not reason affirmatiuely, but onely negatiuely, thus: It is no sensible body: Ergo it is no man: but you cannot reason so affir∣matiuely, as to say thus, It is a sensible body: Ergo it is a man: because the vniuersal signe All, or Euery, is wanting.

How many Places doth this Place of generall kinde comprehend?

Foure, (that is to say) All or euery in quantitie, All or euery in respect, All or euery in place, All or euery in time.

What is All or euery in quantitie?

It is when an vniuersall signe is added to the generall kind, as euery plant liueth, therefore euery tree liueth.

When is it all or euery 〈◊〉〈◊〉 respect?

When any generall kind is vnderstood in some respect, and that the generall signification thereof is restrained by some word added vnto it, or by some secret meaning limiting the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as a white beast, a good man: for this word white restrai∣neth the general signification of beast, and this word good the g•…•…nerall signification of man.

Giue examples of this place.

God gaue his holy spirit to all faithfull men: Ergo to his A∣postles.

What is all or euery in place?

It is when the generall kinde is an aduerbe of place, sig∣nifying euery where or no where, as Iustice is no where

truly executed: Ergo neither in Frauce nor in England.

What is all or euery in time?

It is when the generall kinde is an aduerbe of time, signify∣ing euer or neuer, as God is alwaies with vs: Ergo now at this present.

What maxims doe belong to these places?

The same that doe belong to the generall kinde vniuersally taken before mentioned, by vertue whereof you may reason both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as I said before.

Of the speciall kind.

HOw are arguments to be fetched from the speciall kinde to the generall kinde?

Affirmatiuely, but negatiuely thus; It is a man: Ergo it is a sensible body. But now you cannot say, it it no man: Ergo it is no sensible body: for it may be a horse, or some other sensi∣ble thing.

What be the maximes belonging to the speciall kinde?

Where the speciall kind is, there the generall kinde must al∣so needs be: againe, all the speciall kinds being taken away, the generall kinde is also taken away.

Of the place of Difference.

THis place is comprehended vnder the place of definition, for dif∣ference is a good part of the definition, and yet for order sake I haue thought good to place it next to the generall kinde and speciall kinde before taught.

How may a man reason from this place?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as an Oyster hath fee∣ling: Ergo it is a sensible body, a horse hath no reason: Ergo he is no man.

What be the maximes in this place?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the speciall difference, agreeth with the thing that hath that difference, and whatsoeuer disa∣greeth with the speciall difference, disagreeth with the thing that hath that difference, for they be conuertible.

Of the place of Propertie.

HOw may a man reason from this place?

This place is contained vnder the place of Description before shewed. And from hence you may reason both affirma∣tiuely and negatiuely, as thus; He is apt to speake: Ergo hee is a man; He is not apt to speake: Ergo he is no man.

What be the maxims of this place?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the propertie, agreeth also with the thing that hath that propertie. And whatsoeuer disagreeth with the property, disagreeth also with the thing whereto such propertie belongeth, for they be conuertible.

Of the place of whole Integrall.

WHat is whole Integrall?

That which consisteth of parts hauing quantitie.

How may we reason from the whole to euery particular part?

Affirmatiuely, but not negatiuely, thus; It is a house: Ergo it hath foundation, walles and roofe: but you cannot reason so negatiuely from the whole to euery particular part, as to say thus; Here is an House: Ergo here is no foundation or walles.

What be the maxims of this place?

If the whole be, euery principall part must needs be: but if the whole be wanting, some principal part must needs be wan∣ting, though not all: for the house might be wanting, and yet the walles and foundation may still remaine.

Of the place of Integrall parts.

WHat is an Integrall part, and how is it diuided?

It is that which certaine other parts make vp the whole, and such Integrall part is either principall, or not prin∣cipall.

Define these two parts?

The principall is that without the which the whole cannot be, as the head or belly of a liuing body, or as the foundation,

walles, or couering of an house. The part not principall is that without the which the whole may stand, as a house without dores or windowes: or the body may liue without hands or feete.

How may we reason from the principall part to the whole?

Negatiuely thus; Heere is no foundation or walles: Ergo here is no house: but you cannot reason so of the part not principall, but onely in hauing respect to the perfection of the whole, as thus; Heere is neither dores nor windowes: Ergo the house is not perfect.

What be the maxims of this place?

If any principall part be wanting, the whole cannot bee. If any part not principall be wanting, the whole is vnperfect.

Of the places of things accompanying Substance.

WHat is the place of things accompanying Substance?

It is that which comprehendeth such arguments as are not fetched from the substance of the thing it selfe, but from that which accompanieth the substance thereof.

Which be those places?

These: Generation, the thing ingendred: Corruption, the thing corrupted: Vse, Subiect, Adiacents, Actions, Opposition, common Accidents, and Circumstances and such like.

Of the place of Generation, and of the thing engendred.

WHat is Generation?

It is the first being or springing of any thing.

How are arguments to be fetched from Generation to the thing engendred?

Affirmatiuely thus: It was good that Christ was borne: Er∣go Christ was good; It was euill for Rome that Catiline was borne: Ergo, Catiline was euill to Rome.

What be the Maxims of this place?

Those things whose generation is good, must needs bee good, and those things whose generation is euill, must needes be euill.

How may we reason from the thing engendred to the Generation?

Affirmatiuely thus: Catiline was euill to Rome: Ergo, the birth of Catiline was euill to Rome.

What be the maxims of this place?

If the thing engendred be either good or euill, the generati∣on thereof must needes be also either good or euill.

Of Corruption, and the thing Corrupted.

WHat is Corruption?

Corruption is contrary to Generation, and is the de∣struction of the thing engendred, and the thing destroyed is said to be corrupted.

How may we reason from Corruption, to the thing Corrupted?

Thus: To execute theeues and murtherers, is profitable to the Common-wealth: Ergo, theeues and murtherers are hurt∣full to the Common-wealth. The death of Uirgil was a great losse to learning: Ergo, Vir. was a great furtherance to learning.

How may we reason from the thing Corrupted, to the Corruption?

Affirmatiuely thus: Uirgil was a great furtherance to lear∣ning: Ergo, the death of Virgil was a great losse to learning.

What be the maxims of these two places?

Those things whereof the end and destruction is laudable, must needs of themselues be pernitious and hurtfull. And con∣trariwise, those things whose ende and destruction is hurtfull, must needs of themselues be good and profitable. Againe, of good things, the losse is euill, and of euill things, the losse is good: but in reasoning from these places, you must take heede that as well the Corruption, as the thing corrupted, bee abso∣lutely good, or euill of it selfe, and not by Accident: for it were no good argument to reason thus; The death of Christ was good: Ergo, Christ was euill: for his death was good by acci∣dent for our saluation, and not for any crime that was in him. Moreouer, you must beware that you vse not one self predicate both in your antecedent, & in your consequent: for if good be the predicate in the antecedēt, euill must be the predicate in the consequent, and if euil be the predicate in the antecedent, good

must be the predicate in the consequent: for this kinde of rea∣soning consisteth of contraries.

Of Vse.

WHat is vse?

Vse is the apt applying of euery thing to his proper ende, as the vse of wine to comfort the stomack, and to reioyce the heart of man.

How may we reason from this place?

Affirmatiuely thus: the vse of wine is good: Ergo, wine is good: the vse of art Magick is euill: Ergo, the art it selfe is euill.

What be the maxims of this place?

That thing is good or euill, whereof the vse is good or euill.

What is to be obserued in this kind of reasoning?

Two things: first, that the thing whereof wee speake, haue some good or euill vse of it selfe absolutely, and not by acci∣dent: secondly, that we take not the abuse in stead of the right vse, as to say, Wine will make men drunke: Ergo, wine is not good.

Whereto serue most chiefly these three places last mentioned (that is to say) the place of Generation, of Corruption, and of Use?

They chiefly serue to proue the naturall goodnesse or euil∣nesse of any thing.

Of the Subiect.

HOw is this word Subiect here taken?

For that whereunto accidents and actions do belong: and hauing to speake here of common accidents, I thought it good to speake first of the Subiects, because all manner of Ac∣cidents must needes cleaue to one Subiect or other.

How may we reason from this place?

Affirmatiuely, and Negatiuely: Affirmatiuely thus; It is fire: Ergo, it is hot and apt to burne. He is a man: Ergo, apt to laugh or to weepe. Negatiuely thus, Dead men haue no being at all: Ergo, dead men are not miserable. He hath no gall: Ergo, hee

cannot be angrie. There be no Pigmeans: Ergo, they fight not with Cranes.

Which be the Maxims of this place?

If the Subiect be, the naturall accidents and actions belon∣ging to the Subiect must also needs be: and the Subiect being taken away, all the accidents and actions thereof must also be taken away.

How may such arguments as are fetched out of this place be con∣futed;

When the Accidents doe not of necessity belong to the Sub∣iect, as thus, He is a man: Ergo, he is a good Poet, for this ac∣cident belongeth not of necessitie to euery man.

Of Adiacents and Actions.

FOr so much as Adiacents, otherwise called perpetuall Accidents, and also naturall and proper Actions belonging to any Subiect be either contained vnder the place of Propertie, of Difference, or else of common Accidents, and haue like kind of reasoning, I thought good therefore to referre you to those places, whereof some are taught be∣fore, and some doe follow hereafter.

Of Apposition.

WHat is Apposition?

Apposition is, when a thing sheweth what his owne qualitie or operation is, by being put or added to another thing, as, white Chalke being put to a wall, will make the wall white, and thereby Chalke sheweth it selfe to bee white: so likewise Inke being put to paper, or such like thing, will make it black.

How may a man reason from this place?

Affirmatiuely thus: Chalke being put to a wall, will make it white: Ergo, Chalke is white. Fire being put vnder a Caul∣dron of water, will make the water hot: Ergo, fire is hot. By this place also a man may prooue conuersation or company with others to be good or euill in this sort. This young man

keeping company with that old man is made vertuous: Ergo, the old man is vertuous. Hee is become a theefe by keeping company with such a person: Ergo, that person is a theefe. And therefore the Scripture saith, cum bonis bonuser•…•…s, & cum peruer∣sis peruerteris (that is to say) with the good thou shalt be good, and with the froward thou shalt learne frowardnesse.

What bee the Maxims of this place?

If one thing being put to another, endueth the same with any quality, that thing must needes haue the same qualitie it selfe. I doe place this place next to action, because it seemeth to me that it appertaineth to action.

Of common Accidents.

WHat cast yee common Accidents?

I call those common Accidents, such things as are ei∣ther alwaies, or for the most part so knit together, as the one goeth before or after the other, or els accompany each one the other: whereof some are necessarie, and some probable.

How may we reason from the Necessarie?

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, and first affirmatiuely, by the latter part thus. This Appletree hath flowers: Ergo, it hath budded. It hath fruit: Ergo, it hath both budded and flowred. This woman is brought to bed of a childe: Ergo, she hath conceiued. Negatiuely by the former part thus. This woman neuer conceiued: Ergo, she can bring forth no childe. This man neuer studied: Ergo he is not learned.

What be the maxims of this place?

If the latter be, the former must needs goe before, and if the former were not, the latter cannot be.

Of Probable Accidents, Coniectures, Presumptions, Signes, and Circumstances.

HOw may we reason from Probable Accidents?

From Probable Accidents you may reason Affirma∣tiuely thus: The feast of Bacehus is this day celebrated: Ergo,

there will bee many drunken this day. The generall Sessions are holden this day: Ergo, there will be some hanged.

What be the maxims of this place?

If the latter be, it is likely that the former went before, and if the former bee, it is like enough the latter may sollow: but you must beware in reasoning from this place, that you fetch not your argument from such Accidents as chance but sel∣dome, or be indifferent, for such be neither necessarie nor pro∣bable, but sophisticall and fallible, as to reason thus. Shee is a faire woman: Ergo, she is vnchast.

Whereto serueth the place of common Accidents?

In the Iudiciall kinde it helpeth greatly to proue the fact. In the Demonstratiue kinde to praise or dispraise. In the Delibe∣ratiue kinde to perswade or disswade, and to gather together all Coniectures meete for the purpose and therefore this place is much vsed of natural Philosophers to proue things by natu∣rall signes, or by Physiognomie: also of Astrologers •…•…o proue dearth, mortalitie, and such like, by wonders, and monsters, as by blazing starres, and such like impressions. Also it is much vsed of Chiromancers, Southsayers, and such as vse to iudge by Coniectures, and therefore this place extendeth very farre, and serueth to many vses. Hitherto also are referred the places of circumstances, and chiefely of time and place, from whence good arguments may be fetched.

Of Time.

HOw are arguments fetched from time?

Negatiuely thus: Pythag was not borne in Numa Pom∣pilius time: Ergo, Numa was not Pythagoras scholler. The ce∣remoniall lawes of Moses were made for a certaine time: Er∣go, after that time they doe not bind.

What be the Maxims of this place?

Nothing can bee without time, for if time bee taken away, the thing also must needs faile.

Of Place.

HOw are arguments fetched from place?

Negatiuely thus: Cicero was not at Rome, when Iulius Caesar was slaine: Ergo, Cicero slew him not.

What is the maxime of this place?

No certain body or thing is without a place, neither is one bodie at one time in diuers places: and thus much touching inward places.

Of outward Places, and first of Causes.

WHich be outward Places?

Outward places bee those which appertaine to the thing, and yet doe not cleaue thereunto: of which places the first is of Causes and Effects.

What is a Cause?

A Cause is that by vertue wherof another thing followeth.

How many chiefe kindes of Causes be there?

Foure, (that is to say) the Cause Efficient, the end, matter, and shape, of the two last whereof we haue spoken before, be∣cause they be inward places, and doe belong to the Substance of the thing, and therefore we haue to deale onely here, with the cause Efficient and end.

Of the Cause Efficient.

WHat is that cause Efficient, and how is it deuided?

Cause Efficient is that from whence proceedeth the first beginning of any thing that is made or done, and is the maker thereof. As for example, the Carpenter is the Cause Ef∣ficient of the house which he maketh, and so is euery Artificer of his owne worke. Causes Efficient are deuided into two kinds (that is to say) Cause Absolute, and Cause Adiuuant. Cause Absolute worketh by his owne force and vertue, as the fire that burneth. Cause Adiuuant worketh not by himselfe, but is a helper, and such cause is sometime principall, as ver∣tue

is a Principall Cause of blessed life, and sometime not Principal, as the gifts of the body and of fortune be helpers to the happy life: but not Principall Causes thereof. Againe of Causes, some are of Necessitie, without which the thing can∣not be made, as the Instrument or matter, and some are said not to be of Necessitie, as when we say, The speaking of truth causeth hatred, and yet not of Necessitie. Also of Causes Effi∣cient, some be Vniuersall, and some Particular, as the Eclipse or euill Coniunction of certaine Planets is the Vniuersal cause of Pestilence: but the corruption of humours in mans body is the particular cause thereof. Againe, of causes some bee called of the Latins Propinquae (that is to say) nigh vnto the Effect, as the father and mother be the nighest Causes of Generation of Children. And some be called Remotae, (that is to say) re∣moued causes, which be further of, as the Grands•…•…rs, and Gran∣dames of the said children. Moreouer of Causes Efficient some work by a certaine naturall Necessity, as those that lack choise and iudgement, as fire that burneth, and the Sun that shineth, and all other naturall things that doe work by their own force and vertue. Some againe do work by counsell, reason, and free∣will, as men, Angels, and most chiefely God himselfe.

How may we reason from the Efficient Cause to the Effect?

From the necessarie Efficient Cause you may reason both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely. Affirmatiuely thus: The Sun is lately gone downe: Ergo, it is twilight. Negatiuely thus: The Sunne was not vp when Troy was destroyed: Ergo, Troy was not destroyed in the day time: but from the Efficient not Necessarie, you can reason but onely Affirmatiuely thus: He is slaine: Ergo, he is dead: but you cannot say; he is not slaine: Ergo, he is not dead.

What be the maxims of this Place?

The Necessarie Cause Efficient not letted, the Effect must needs follow: as if he hath drunken poison, he must needs die. But if such Cause faileth, the effect also must needs faile: as the Sunne is not vp: Ergo, it is not day. He neuer studied: Ergo, he is not learned, to which place may be referred the places of occasion, Instrument, Meane, and Generation.

How may we reason from the Effect, to the Cause Efficient?

From the Necessarie Effect, both Affirmatiuely and Nega∣tiuely thus, it is day: Ergo, the Sun is vp, it is not day: Ergo, the Sunne is not vp. From the Effect not Necessarie you may only reason Negatiuely, thus: He is not dead: Ergo, He is not slaine, but you cannot reason so Affirmatiuely, as to say, He is dead: Ergo, He is slaine.

What be the Maximes of this place?

The Effect being put, the necessary Cause must needes be, and the Effect being taken away, the necessary Cause is also taken away.

When doe Arguments fetched from this place faile?

When the Cause is not necessary or proper.

Of the End.

WHat is End, and how is it diuided?

The End is that for whose sake any thing is done, and of ends some be chiefe and last, and some not chiefe, but helping: The chiefe is that which is desired for it selfe sake, and such is the best state of euery thing in his kinde, as blessed life to Man: courage and fiercenesse to a Horse of seruice: heate and drynesse to Fire: coldnesse and moistnesse to Wa∣ter, &c. The helping end is that which is desired not for it selfe sake, but for that it helpeth to attayne the chiefest end, and of such helping ends one may be better then another, as when we desire money to buy a house, and the house to dwell in, &c.

How may we reason from this place?

Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, affirmatiuely thus, Ver∣tue is good, because blessed Life is good: negatiuely thus, If Adulterie be not good to allure another mans wife, To breake wedlock is not good.

What be the Maximes of this place?

That thing whereof the end is good or euill, is also of it selfe good or euill.

Tell the vse of these places of Causes, and whereto they serue?

The vse thereof is diuers and manifold: for sith that in the

Deliberatiue kinde two principall questions are to be discus∣sed; first, whether the thing be profitable; and secondly, whether it may be possible and conueniently done or not. Ar∣guments to proue the first, are to be fetched out of the End and Effect. And to proue the second out of the Cause Effici∣ent. Also in the kinde Demonstratiue to praise or dispraise. Arguments are to be fetched out of the End and Effect. Third∣ly, in the Iudiciall kinde, wherein doubt riseth of the fact, and will of the doer. Arguments are to be fetched from the End, to proue or disproue the same. Finally, these places, together with the other two Causes, Matter and Forme before taught, doe serue to make those kindes of Definitions which we cal Causall.

Of Opposites.

WHat be Opposites?

Things contrary one to another.

How many kindes of Opposites be there?

Foure (that is to say) Relatiues, Contraries, Priuatiues, and Contradictories.

And first of Relatiues.

WHen are things said to be Opposites by Relation?

When according to their owne significations they haue mutuall Relation one to another, as the Father and the Sonne.

How may we reason from this place?

You may reason from the Affirmation of the one to the de∣nyall of the other, thus Augustus was Octa•…•…s his sonne: Ergo, He was not his Father.

What be the Maximes of this place?

Sith Relatiues be alwayes together by nature, if the one be, the other must needes be, and if the one be taken away, the o∣ther is also taken away.

What is to be obserued in fetching Arguments from this place?

You must beware that you haue one selfe respect, and not diuers, for to reason thus is no good Consequent, This man is

a Father: Ergo, He is no Sonne: or thus, This man is his Su∣perior: Ergo, Not his Inferior, for in diuers respects he may be both a Father and a Sonne; a Superior and Inferior; a Supe∣rior in one respect, and Inferior in another.

Of Contraries.

WHat be Contraries, and how are they diuided?

They be two Extremes Repugnant one to another, whereof some are called Mediate (that is to say) hauing a meane, and some Immediate hauing no meane at all.

How may we reason from these two kindes?

From the first kinde you may conclude negatiuely, thus, He is prodigall: Ergo, He is not couetous: from the second kinde you may reason both Affirmatiuely & Negatiuely, thus, This man is whole: Ergo, He is not sicke; This man is not whole: Ergo, He is sicke.

What be the Maximes of this place?

The Maxime of the Affirmatiue to the Negatiue is the ge∣nerall Maxime to all Opposites, thus: Whatsoeuer agreeth with the one Opposite, must needes disagree with the other Opposite: but the Maxime of the Immediate is thus: If one of the Contraries Immediate be not, the other must needes be, as the former examples doe plainely shew.

Of Priuatiues.

WHat be Priuatiues?

Priuatiues are two Contraries, belonging to one selfe Subiect, apt to receiue the same, in the which Subiect, when the one is wanting (at such time as Nature doth appoint) the other must needes be.

How may we reason from this place?

Two wayes: first, from Affirmation of the one to the deny∣all of the other, which is common to all Opposites, as thus, He is blind: Ergo, He seeth not. Secondly, you may reason from the denyall of the one to the affirmation of the other, thus: He cannot speake: Ergo, He is dumbe. But this kinde of Ar∣gument is not strong, vnlesse the thing required be applyed to

his proper Subiect, and in such time as nature hath appointed, for it were no good argument to say thus: a sucking child can∣not speake: Ergo, he is dumbe; or thus, a whelpe of two daies old cannot see: Ergo, he is blinde: for nature commonly suf∣fereth not the childe to speake before it be two yeeres old, nor the whelpe to see before it be nine daies olde.

What be the maxims of this place?

If the one bee not in the Subiect apt to receiue the same at such time as nature hath appointed, the other must needs be.

Of Contradictories.

WHat be Contradictories?

They be Contraries hauing no meane, whereof the one denieth the other.

How may we reason from this place?

Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely thus: he is wife: Ergo, he is no foole: he is a foole: Ergo, he is not wise.

What is the Maxime of this place?

If the one be, the other cannot be: for two Contradictories cannot be together at one selfe time, in one selfe Subiect, and in one selfe respect.

Of things differing in kinde, called of the La∣tines Disparata.

WHat be they?

They are those things that doe differ in nature and kinde, as a Man, a Horse, a Stone, a Tree, whereof euery one differeth from another in kinde and nature.

How may we reason from this place?

From the Affirmation of the one, to the Deniall of the o∣ther, as thus: Peter is a Man, Ergo, he is no Horse.

What be the Maximes of this place?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the one, agreeth not with the o∣ther.

What is to be obserued in reasoning from all these kindes of Op∣posites?

That the Repugnancy consist in the Predicat, and not in the

Subiect: for it were no good Consequent to say thus: what∣soeuer seeth is a sensible bodie: Ergo, that which is blinde is no sensible bodie: for heere the Contrarietie consisteth in the Subiect, and not in the Predicate.

Of Comparison.

HOw may we reason from the place of Comparison?

Three manner of wayes, that is, eyther from the More to the Lesse, or from the Lesse to the More, or from Like to Like.

Of the More.

THese two words, More or lesse, how are they to be taken?

We vnderstand heere by More, that which hath more probabilitie, and by the Lesse, that which hath lesse probabi∣litie.

How may we reason from the More to the Lesse?

Onely Negatiuely, and that three manner of wayes: first, from the Subiect, as thus: Cicero was not able to defend this cause, much lesse any other common Orator: secondly, from the Predicate thus: If this man be not able to beare one hun∣dred weight, much lesse two hundred weight: thirdly, from the Subiect, and Predicate both together thus: A strong man is not able to beare a hundred weight: Ergo, much lesse a weake childe is able to beare two hundred weight.

What is the Maxime of this place?

If it preuaileth not in the More, it cannot preuaile in the Lesse.

Of the Lesse.

HOw may we reason from the Lesse to the More?

Affirmatiuely, three manner of wayes, as before from the Subiect thus: A little childe was able to beare ten pound weight: Ergo, much more a strong man: From the Predicate thus: If Martyrs were readie to lose their liues for Christs sake, much more their temporall goods: From the Subiect, and the Predicate both together thus: Christ suffered most

grieuous torments for our sakes: Ergo, wee ought to suffer a little paine for his sake.

What is the Maxime of this place?

If the Lesse preuaile, the More must needs auaile.

What is to be obserued in reasoning from these two places?

You must beware that you take not the More for the Lesse, nor the Lesse for the More, for many times that which seemeth to be the More in number or quantitie, is the Lesse in purpose, and contrariwise, as for example: to beare a hundred weight, is more in quantitie, then to beare halfe a hundred weight, and yet in purpose it is lesse, for it is lesse probable, and lesse likely to beare a hundred weight, then to beare halfe a hundred weight.

Of Like and Unlike.

HOw may we reason from Like to Like?

When the thing which we bring to proue, is like or e∣quall to the thing that is to be proued: from which place wee may reason both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, thus: Peter is mortall: Ergo, Paul is mortall. The day Labourer is wor∣thy of his hyre: Ergo, the Preacher or Teacher: A man ought to be drowned in the sea for killing his Father: Ergo, he ought to be executed with the like death for killing his Mother.

What is the Maxime of this place?

Of things like, like iudgement is to be made: but note that this kinde of reasoning of Like, is more apt to teach and to print in the hearers minde a liuely representation of the thing, then to vrge him by any necessitie of due proofe to beleeue the same, because it is vnpossible, that the two things which are to be compared can be like in all points, and therefore this is the weakest kinde of argument that is, and yet necessarie to such end as is before declared, and specially for Lawyers, to proue one ruled case, or for iudgement by another Like. To this place also is referred the place of Example.

Of Example.

How may we reason from this place?

Affirmatiuely thus: Peter slew Ananias for lying: Ergo, with∣out all doubt God will punish those that vse to lye: the Maxime whereof is all one, with that of like before set downe.

Of Unlike.

HOw may we reason from this place?

Negatiuely thus: God is not as man is, for man is a lyer: Ergo, God is true and no lyer.

What is the Maxime of this place?

Of things Vnlike, vnlike iudgement is to be made.

Of the degrees of Comparison.

TO the place of Comparison, me thinkes it were not amisse to re∣ferre all those places which Aristotle reciteth, and are taken out of the three degrees of Comparison, which children learne in their Accidents, (that is to say) the Positiue, the Comparatiue, and the Superlatiue.

From the Comparatiue to the Positiues.

HOw may we reason from the Comparatiue to the Positiue?

Affirmatiuely thus: Uirgil was a more learned Poet then Horace: Ergo, Virgil was a learned Poet: Honey is swee∣ter then Milke: Ergo, Honey is sweete.

What is the Maxime of this place?

If the Comparatiue degree be truly and properly applyed to any thing: the Positiue must needes be also rightly applyed to the same. I say, heere properly to auoid Ambiguitie, for it were no good Consequent to say thus: the sea of Caspia is more sweete then any other sea: Ergo, it is sweete and not salt: for this word Sweet hath not in this speech his proper significati∣on, but is rather taken, for that which is lesse bitter or salt.

From the Positiue to the Comparatiue.

HOw may we reason from the Positiue to the Comparatiue?

Onely Negatiuely thus: Zoilus was no learned Poet: Er∣go, he was not better learned then Homer.

What is the Maxime of this place?

If the Positiue be denied, the Comparatiue also must needs be denied.

From two Positiues to two Comparatiues and two Superlatiues.

HOw may we reason from two Positiues, to two Comparatiues, and to two Superlatiues at once, and contrarily?

In this manner: that which is good, deserueth iustly to bee beloued: Ergo, that which is better, ought more iustly to bee beloued, and that which is best, ought most iustly to be be∣loued. And much after this manner you may reason from a double Comparatiue, to a double Positiue thus: that which is more honest; is more laudable: Ergo, that which is honest is laudable.

What is to be obserued in reasoning from these degrees of Compa∣rison?

You must take heed that the Predicate bee spoken of the Subiect naturally and necessarily, and not by Accident, for it were no good Consequent to reason thus: he that is learned, is honest, therefore he that is more learned, is more honest: for a man may haue much learning, and yet small honestie.

Of Proportion.

WHen are we said to reason from the place of Proportion?

When two like Propositions being compared toge∣ther, we conclude in this or such like manner: looke what pro∣portion is betwixt 6. and 4. the same proportion is betwixt 12. and 8. but betwixt 6. and 4. is Proportio Sesquialtera: Ergo, betwixt 12. and 8. the like proportion is: for when one num∣ber or measure doth comprehend another once, and one halfe thereof, that is called proportio sesquialtera, as 12. and 8. and if it containe it once, and one third part thereof, then it is called proportio sesquitertia, as 8. and 6. for 8. containeth 6. once and two ouer, which is the third part of 6.

What is the Maxime of this place?

Of things hauing like proportion, like iudgement is to be made.

Whereto serueth this place?

This place is necessary for Iudges and Magistrates that haue to consider of equitie in cases of Iustice, and in rewarding vertue, or in punishing vice, in which the Geometricall pro∣portion would be alwayes vsed. Some doe giue such exam∣ples of this place, as in my opinion doe rather belong to the place of Like then to this place, for the arguments of this place ought properly to be fetched out of the Predicament of quantitie, and not out of qualitie, or out of any other Predi∣cament.

Of Changed Proportion.

WHat is changed Proportion?

Changed Proportion is when the Foundations, and Termes of two like Proportions are answerable in proportion aswell amongst themselues, as one to another.

What meane you by these two words, Foundation and Termes?

The Foundation is that from whence the Comparison first proceedeth, as the Father, and the Terme, Bound or end is that whereunto the said Comparison is applyed, and endeth in the same, as the Sonne and therefore the Son is called the Terme, Bound or end: whereof wee haue spoken before in the Predi∣cament of Relation.

Giue Examples of reasoning from this place.

Looke as 8. is to 4. so is 12. to 6. (that is to say) in double proportion one to the other: Ergo, as 12. is to 8. so is 6. to 4. for each other containeth the other once and a halfe, which is called proportio sesquialtera. The manifest Demonstration wher∣of you may see in this Figure heere following.

[illustration]

Why is this Proportion said to be changed or transposed?

Because the order of numbers that are compared, is altered in the conclusion: for in the Antecedent the first is compared to the second, and the third to the fourth: but in the Con∣clusion the third is compared to the first, and the fourth to the second.

Of Disproportion.

HOw may we reason from this place?

Negatiuely thus: 12. is not to 6. as 8. to 6. but 12. to 6. is double in proportion: Ergo, 8. to 6. is not double in proportion.

What is the Maxime of this place?

Of things hauing vnlike proportion, vnlike iudgement is to be made.

From Disproportion changed or transposed.

HOw may we reason from this place?

Negatiuely thus: 12. is not to 6. as 4. to 3. for be∣twixt the two first is a double proportion, and betwixt the two last Sesquitertia: Ergo, 12. is not to 4. as 6. to 3. for the

one is a tripla, and the other double.

What be the Maximes of this place?

If the first bee not to the second, as the third to the fourth, then the first shall not be to the third, as the second is to the fourth.

To whom are these places most familiar?

To those that are exercised in the Mathematicall Sciences.

Of Translation.

WHat is Translation?

Translation, otherwise called a Metaphor, is a figure of speech, whereby the proper signification of a word is chan∣ged into another vnproper, for some likenesse that is betwixt the thing signified, and being generally taken, it is rather a Trope, or Figure of Rhetorick, more meete to adorne speech, then to proue any thing thereby: notwithstanding being ta∣ken heere as a place of Logick, you may reason both Affirma∣tiuely and Negatiuely, in this sort: A roring Lion that seeketh to deuoure, is to be feared: Ergo, the Diuell is to be feared: Loue is blinde: Ergo, they that be in loue, are not able rightly to iudge.

What be the Maximes of this place?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the Metaphoricall name, agreeth also with the proper name, and contrariwise.

Of Meane places.

WHat be meane Places?

Meane Places are those from whence such Argu∣ments are to be fetched, as doe partly agree with the nature of the things to be proued, and doe partly differ from the same.

How are Meane Places diuided?

Into Coniugates, Cases, and Diuision.

And first of Coniugates and Cases.

WHat be Coniugates or Cases?

Coniugates or Cases, be like words deriued all of one selfe word, differing onely in termination or end, as wis∣dome, wise, and wisely: notwithstanding some vse Coniugates and Cases as seuerall places.

Why, wherein doe they differ?

Their Difference is very small, sauing that in Arguments fetched from Coniugates, the Abstract is mentioned, but not in those that are fetched from Cases.

How may we reason from these two places?

Both affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, from the Coniugates thus: A iust man is to be praised, ergo Iustice is to be praised: a vicious man is not to be praised, ergo viciousnesse is not to be praised. From cases thus: He doth all things wisely, ergo he is wise: He doth nothing wisely, ergo he is not wise: for in these two last examples the abstract which is wisedome, is not once mentioned: what abstract is, looke before in the Chapter of predication lib. 1. cap. 5. but you must beware in reasoning from this place, that your phrase of speach be natural and pro∣per, and not vnproper: for it were no good argument to say thus: white is sweete: Ergo, whitenesse is sweetnesse.

What is the maxim of these two places?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with one of the Coniugates or cases, must needes also agree with the other.

Of Diuision.

WHat is Diuision?

What Diuision is, and how many kindes there be, and what is to be obserued in euery kinde hath been declared before, lib. 2. cap. 4. when we shewed the order of defining and diuiding.

How may we reason from diuision?

Two manner of wayes: first, from the denying of one part or more of the diuision, to affirme another part therof, as thus: Euery sensible body is whole or sicke, but Peter is a sensible body and not sicke: Ergo, hee is whole: or thus. Of sensible bodies there be some whole, some sicke. Peter is a sensible bo∣die and not sicke: Ergo, he is whole. In these two kindes of examples the diuision consisteth onely of two parts, wherein it sufficeth to denie the one for affirming the other. But if the di∣uision consist of many parts, then you must denie all the parts sauing that which you would affirme, as in this example fol∣lowing:

Plato disputeth, is a proposition, but it is neither vni∣uersall, particular, nor indefinite: Ergo, it is a singular proposi∣tion: in which kind of reasoning if you leaue out or omit any part that is to be denied, then the conclusion is naught, for it is no good consequent to say thus: this proposition Plato dis∣puteth, is neither vniuersal nor particular: Ergo, it is indefinite. Notwithstanding, if you ioyne the part omitted in your Ante∣cedent with a coniunction disiunctiue, the argument may be made good; as to say thus: this proposition Plato disputeth, is neither vniuersall nor particular: Ergo, it is either indefinite or singular.

What is the Maxim of this first way of reasoning?

The Maxim is thus: whatsouer agreeth with the thing di∣uided, must needs agree with some one of the parts thereof.

What is the second way of reasoning from Diuision?

The second way is to proceede from the affirming of one of the parts to the denying of the other, if it consist but of two, or to the denying of all the rest, if it consist of many. Of two parts let this bee your example: Of sensible bodies some bee whole, some sicke, but this sensible body is whole: Ergo, he is not sicke. Of many parts thus: of propositions one is vniuer∣sall, another particular; one indefinite, another singular: but this proposition Plato disputeth▪ is singular: Ergo, it is neither vniuersall, particular, nor indefinite.

What is the Maxim of this way of reasoning?

Whatsoeuer agreeth with one of the parts, must needs dis∣agree with all the rest, for euery good diuision would be made of parts meere repugnant, or at the least diuers in kinde one from another: for it is a principall condition requisite to diui∣sion, whereupon the second way of reasoning is grounded euen as the first way is grounded vpon another good conditi∣on belonging also to diuision, which is that the thing diuided may not containe more or lesse then his proper parts.

Of inartisiciall places.

HAuing sufficiently spoken of places, inward, outward, and meane, which as I said before are places artificiall, it

is meet now that we speake of the places inartificiall, which according to Quintilian be these sixe; Foreiudgements, Ru∣mors, Torture, Writings or Euidences, Oath, and Witnesses: All which are briefly and plainely set forth in the Table of Au∣thoritie here following, because they are all contained vnder the place of Authority.

Of Authoritie.

HOw is Authority here to be taken?

Authoritie is here to be taken for any testimony worthy of credite.

How may we reason from this place?

Affirmatiuely thus: the learned Philosophers say that there bee foure elements, whereof all other things are mixt and compounded: Ergo, it is true. Christ saith that whosoeuer is baptized, and beleeueth in him, shall be saued: Ergo, it is true.

What be the Maxims of this place?

Whatsoeuer is allowed by the most part of the wise and learned, is to bee beleeued as a thing probable, neither ought we rashly to discent from their opinion and iudgement. A∣gaine, euery man is to be beleeued in his owne Art: but for so much as Authority is two-fold (that is to say) diuine and hu∣mane, and that all arguments fetched from this place be not of like value, for some be true and infallible, some probable, and some Sophisticall: this Table therefore here following shall plainely set foorth euery kinde by it selfe, whereby you shall easily discerne the one from the other.

The Table of Authority here following.

• ...
  • Authoritie is two-fold,
  • ...
    • Diuine which is twofold:
    • ...
      • Written,
      • ...
        • Of the written which we cal holy Scriptures, sound arguments are made, so long as the words are truly expounded according to the meaning if the holy Ghost. But they be weake and càptious if the au∣thority be corrupted either by addition, subtracti∣on, or alteration of any word, sillable, or letter, or by wresling the senseotherwise then the holy Ghost meant it.
      • or vnwrit∣ten tradi∣tion:
      • ...
        • As for tradition or vnwritten verity of what va∣lue it is & what credit it hath, I leaue to the iudge∣ment of the learned Diuines, amongst whom is no small strife and contention in these dayes for the same. The Painims were wont to referre to diuine Authority the Oracles and answeres of their false Gods, Priests, Prophets, and Southsayers, which true Christians ought vtterly to reiect, and to ab∣horre: notwithstanding Lactantius letteth not to proue the birth, death and passion of Christ against the Painims by Sybils prophesies, because he knew they would giue more credit to them then to the holy Scriptures.
      • or Humane which is three-fold:
      • ...
        • Writings, as
        • ...
          • Histories, Lawes, Statutes, Decrees, Iudgements, ruled Cases, Maxim•…•…, Prouerbs, generall Rules, Patents, Warrants, Lycenses, Commissions from the Prince, Charters, Deedes, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Court∣Rolles, Extents, Accounts, Obligations, Indent•…•…es, Wills and Testaments, and such like.
        • Things vt∣tered by mouth.
        • ...
          • If it be by mouth, it is either free and voluntary, as voluntary Confession, or Testimony, Rumor, Opini∣on, and the speach of the Wise.
          • Or else forced by Oath or Torture.
        • And the third kinde of Humane Authority, is that which is allew∣ed by vse and custome of the people.

As for such Arguments as are fetched from humane Autho∣ritie, the lawes doe teach 〈◊〉〈◊〉 large, which bee sound, and which bee weake: notwithstanding, for so much as Quintilian affir∣meth, that the inartificial places, are the six places aboue-men∣tioned, I haue thought good to set downe according to Vale∣rius, the definition of euery place, and briefly to shew how e∣uery such place may be confirmed or impugned.

And first of Fore-iudgements or Ruled Cases.

VVHat call you Fore-iudgements or Ruled Cases?

They be Iudgments or sentences heretofore pro∣nounced, whereby Iudges take example to giue like iudge∣ment in like Cases.

How may a man confirme or impugne Fore-iudgements?

You shall confirme them by aggrauating the authoritie of those that first pronounced them, and by the likenesse of the Cases: but you shal impugne or confute them by extenuating or diminishing the authority of the first pronouncers, and by the vnlikenes of the Cases.

Of Rumor and Fame.

VVHat difference is betwixt Rumor and Fame?

Rumor is a particular assertion or affirmation proceeding of some suspition, without any certaine Author. But Fame is a common affirmation, hauing some certaine Au∣thor: either of which whosoeuer will impugne, must call it an vncertaine brute or clamor, taking his beginning first of ma∣lice, and his increase through credulitie and lightnesse of be∣leefe, and that the same may chance to the most innocent man, that is, through the Fraud of his enemies, publishing a∣broad false surmises against him. Contrarily, he that will de∣fend Fame or Rumor, must say that it riseth not of nought, nor is spred abroad without some iust cause, and that it is ac∣counted as a publike Testimony, according to the old Pro∣uerbe; which saith; vox populi, vex Dei, the voyce of the people is the voice of God.

Of Torture.

VVHat is Torture?

Torture is a painefull kind of punishment, inuen∣ted for the inquisition of trueth, and violently to wrest or wring the same out of such as would not otherwise confesse it.

How is this place to be confirmed or impugned?

It is to be confirmed by aggrauating the necessary vse of tor∣ture for the finding out of the truth; but whoso will impugne it, must say, that such Torture causeth many times more lies then true tales to be told: for those that be strong and able to endure paine, and of a resolute minde, will neuer yeeld for any torment to say otherwise then they list themselues. Againe, if they be weake and not able to suffer paine, it maketh them to say whatsoeuer you will haue them, be it neuer so false.

Of Writings and Euidences.

VVHat is meant by Writings?

Deedes, Indentures, Releases, Obligations, and such like other Euidences before rehearsed.

How is this place to be impugned?

You may impugne Euidences or Writings, if ye can prooue them to be vnperfect any maner of way, as to be forged, to bee made by some collusion or fraude, or to bee extorted by force from some that was put in feare, and such like.

Of Oathes.

VVHat is an Oath?

It is a religious affirming or denying some thing, by calling God to witnesse, which is the strongest bond that may be, to binde mans faith and conscience.

How is this place to be confirmed or impugned?

He that will proue by this place, must aggrauate the inte∣gritie, honesty and holinesse of the parties that are sworne, say∣ing, that the Oath of an honest, holy, and religious man is of great importance: And hee that will impugne it, must doe cleane contrary, saying, That they are naughty men that are

sworne, and common Iurors, which by reason of wicked cu∣stome of swearing will easily bee forsworne: or hee must say that the partie sweareth for feare, loue, hatred, for hope of gaine, reward, and such like.

Of Witnesses.

VVHat be Witnesses?

Witnesses be proofes of things done or not done, whose office is to speake what they haue heard or knowne: the confirmation or confutation of which proofe dependeth vpon the goodnesse or euilnesse of the persons.

To what end serueth the knowledge of places?

He that wil write or speake of any matter probably, wisely, or copiously: or will vnderstand the effect, tenor, arguments, and proofes of other mens speaches, and writings, hath as much need to be practised in these places, as a Huntsman is in knowing the haunts of his game which hee hunteth, for with∣out that, he shall wander long time in vaine, and hardly find that which he seeketh: neither is it enough to know the pla∣ces, vnlesse you can aptly applie them and vse them when oc∣casion shall serue, in disputations made either by mouth or pen, which requireth a continuall exerciso of such as will be perfect therein. And therefore to the intent you might the better learne how to exercise your selfe in the foresaid places, I haue thought good here to giue you at the least one example set downe by Hunneus in his Logicke: the Theame of which example is thus: Man ought to embrace vertue: which Theam hee doth not onely handle after the Logicall manner with short speach, but also after the Rhetoricall manner with co∣pious speach, vsing therein this threefold order: For first, hee bringeth in such proofes as are to be gathered in respect of the subiect of the Theame. Secondly, those that are to be gathe∣red in respect of the Predicate of the same: and thirdly, those that are to be had in respect of both.

The Theame or Proposition.* 1.2

MAn ought to embrace vertue.

What arguments are to be gathered on the behalfe of the subiect of this Proposition?

These that follow, and first, from the definition thus: Sith of all sensible creatures man is the most noble and most worthy creature, for that he is endued with reason and coun∣sell, and was created like to the image of God: it is most meete therefore that such a creature should bee like his Creator, in life adorned with such vertue and goodnesse as is answerable to true iudgement, which the Logicians would briefly ex∣presse in this maner: it becommeth euery sensible body en∣dued with reason to loue vertue: Ergo, euery man ought to loue vertue.

From the Etymologie.

IT becommeth euery creature that is made of the slime of the earth, to be void of all arrogancie and pride, to bee lowly, humble, and obedient to his Creator, and to imbrace vertue in obseruing the Law of God deuoutly and religiously, where∣fore man called in Latine homo, of this word humo, (that is to say) earth, or rather slime of the earth, taking his original from so base and vile a thing, ought to bee humble and voyd of all pride and arrogancie, and to loue vertue aboue all things, be∣ing alwayes obedient to God his Creator, and ready to do his most holy precepts and commandements.

Logically thus:

Euery sensible creature that is created of the slime of earth, ought to bee obedient to his Creator and to imbrace vertue, therefore man ought to bee obedient to his Creator, and to imbrace vertue.

From the Matter.

MAn is made of the selfe same Matter of which all other vnliuing, dumbe & vnsen•…•…ble creatures are made, (that is to say) of the foure elements, whereby he is subiect to alte∣ration and corruption: wherefore man ought not to be proud or arrogant, but modest, humble, lowly, and obedient, shew∣ing in all the actions of his life, that he is not vnmindfull of his

base estate and condition, nor ignorant from whence he came, and what he is, euen no better then earth and dust.

Logically thus.

Man is made of a base matter, as all other things are, there∣fore Man ought not to be proud, but to loue the vertue of hu∣militie and obedience.

From the forme or shape of Man.

IT hath been alwaies most firmely, and with one whole con∣sent agreed and beleeued, euen from the beginning of the world, that the true shape of Man is a reasonable Soule, im∣mortall, and capable of euerlasting blessednesse, which Soule God of his goodnesse did breathe into man, to the intent that he should continually serue, honor, and obey him during this mortall life, and after death enioy eternall life: what great madnesse were it then to thinke, that Man hauing obtained at Gods hands so noble a shape, ought not to embrace all noble vertues, and to gouerne all his actions in such godly and vertu∣ous manner, as he may at length attaine to the euerlasting ioy whereunto he was first created and formed?

Logically thus:

Man consisteth of a Soule capable of eternall felicitie: Er∣go, Man ought to loue vertue, whereby he may attaine to that felicitie.

From the generall kinde.

SIth it is giuen by nature to euery sensible Body to seeke his owne safety, and to be best affected (that is) to haue his full perfection according to his Kind: the loue of vertue there∣fore, whereby Man is made not onely perfect in this life, but also attaineth thereby euerlasting ioy in the life to come, must needs be to him most naturall.

Logically thus:

Euery sensible body willingly desireth that which is agree∣able to his nature and kinde, therefore Man must needs loue vertue, as a thing most fit for his kinde.

From the speciall kinde.

BOth Men and Women, Rich and Poore, Yong and Old, of what state or calling soeuer they be, if they intend to leade a good and godly life, haue need of vertue: wherefore all Men that will liue well, ought to embrace vertue.

Logically thus:

Both Rich and Poore, Yong and Old ought to loue vertue: Ergo, euery Man ought to loue vertue.

From the common Accidents.

EVery Man, after that hee hath ended this short course of life, must appeare at the last day before the terrible iudge∣ment seat of God, there to render account of all his deeds and words both good and bad, whereas euery man that hath done well, shal receiue for his good deedes a most glorious reward, euen life euerlasting: but the wicked for his euill deeds shall be condemned to hell fire, that neuer shall be quenched, a iust re∣ward for his deserts: wherefore all men ought in this life to fly vice, and to embrace vertue, from whence all good actions doe spring.

Logically thus:

Euery man shall render account at the last day, of all his deeds both good and bad, and shall receiue a iust reward ac∣cording to the same: Ergo, Euery man whilest he liueth in this world, ought to fly vice, and to embrace vertue.

From the cause efficient.

SIth Man was created by God the Creator of all things, and Author of all goodnesse, excellencie, and vertue, and was formed according to the very Image and likenesse of God: it behoueth man therefore to imitate his Creator, and by leading a godly and vertuous life, to shew that hee is somewhat like him, though not able in all things to attaine to the perfection of so perfect a patterne.

Logically thus:

God the cause efficient is good, therefore Man being the effect, ought to be good.

From the End.

THe Prophets and Apostles inspired with the Holy Ghost▪ Author of all Truth, by many their writings doe testifie, that the greatnesse and excellencie of that blessednesse wher∣unto Man is created, is such as no man is able to expresse with tongue, nor in his heart or minde to conceiue the same: wher∣fore sith Man is created to such exceeding great blessednesse, it behoueth him to embrace vertue, which is the very meane and way to bring him to that blessednesse.

Logically thus:

Sith most glorious blessednes is the end of Man, Man ther∣fore ought to embrace vertue, that he may attaine to that end.

What arguments are to be gathered on the behalfe of the Predi∣cate, and from what places?

These that follow, and such like, and first from the definiti∣on thus:

From the Definition of the Predicate.

SIth Vertue is a morall habite, whereby Mans will and all his actions are alwayes directed to God, and gouerned ac∣cording to true iudgement, and thereby are made most accep∣table both to God and Man: Man therefore ought to embrace Vertue, from whence such noble fruits doe spring.

Logically thus:

Man ought to loue that habite from whence all honest acti∣ons doe spring: therefore man ought to loue Vertue.

From the Description.

MAn ought with all endeuour to follow that thing wher∣by he may attaine not a vaine and transitorie glory, but a true and euerlasting glory, and thereby to be made accepta∣ble both to God and Man: Wherefore Man ought to embrace Vertue, from whence such glory springeth.

Logically thus:

That thing is worthy to be beloued of Man, which getteth him euerlasting glory: Therefore Vertue is worthy to be be∣loued.

From the Etymologie.

SIth Vertue, if you diligently consider and weigh the signi∣fication of the word, is none other thing but a Noble affe∣ction of the minde, of great excellencie, and most meete for Man: it is not to be doubted, but that those (which leauing so precious a thing, doe set their whole delight in seeking after worldly riches and bodily pleasure) are much deceiued, and doe greatly offend.

Logically thus:

Such excellencie as is most meet for Man, becommeth Man best: Therefore Vertue becommeth him best.

From the generall Kinde.

SIth it is well knowne that Man ought with all diligence to seeke after those habites, whereby humane nature is best adorned, and made most perfect: And that Vertue amongst such habites is the chiese: because that thereby the minde of Man is taught to know what truth is, and his will thereby is alwayes inclined to honest and laudable actions: Man there∣fore ought with al his power and endeuor to embrace Vertue.

Logically thus:

Man ought chiefely to loue those habites, whereby his na∣ture is made perfect: Therefore man ought to loue Vertue.

From the speciall Kinde.

IT is most meete, yea most necessarie for all men to loue for∣titude and temperance: for by temperance Mans wil is brid∣led, and kept from all euill lusts and affections, and by forti∣tude he is made free from feare of death: and as without tem∣perance mans life cannot be honest, so without fortitude his death cannot be commendable: wherefore it plainly appeareth how necessary a thing it is for a man to embrace Vertue, as that which chiefely maketh his life honest and laudable, and his death glorious and honorable.

Logically thus:

A man ought to loue fortitude and temperance: Ergo, He ought to loue Vertue.

From the corruption of the Subiect.

THe destruction of Vertue is the cause of most grieuous euils, for the light of Vertue being extinct, the minde is immediately wrapped in such darkenesse, as it cannot see nor discerne what is honest, what is profitable, or what is hurtfull, by meanes whereof man falleth into most filthie vices, which doe so infect and corrupt the life of man, as it becommeth most detestable both to God and Man: whereby it plainely appea∣reth how noble a thing Vertue is, and with what loue and dili∣gence it ought to be embraced of all men.

Logically thus:

The destruction of Vertue is euill: therefore Vertue is good and worthy to be beloued.

From the vse of the Subiect.

THe vse of Vertue maketh mans life commendable, holy, glorious, and acceptable both to God and Man: then which nothing can bee in this world more to bee desired of man: wherefore it manifestly appeareth, that Vertue is so no∣ble a thing, as all men ought to bestow all their studie, labour and care in obtaining the same.

Logically thus:

The vse of Vertue is good: Therefore Vertue is good.

From common Accidents.

SIth all men doe greatly desire to haue their consciences quieted, and their mindes free from all euill lustes, affects, and passions, which with continuall strife doe molest the same: and thereby doe cause Man to lead a miserable life: Man ther∣fore ought to refuse no paine nor labour, so as he may attaine to Vertue, which is alwaies accompanied with that tranquilli∣tie of minde and conscience that is so much desired.

Logically thus:

The tranquillitie of the minde and conscience is to be desi∣red: Ergo, Vertue which is alwaies accompanied with that tranquillitie is to be desired.

From the cause Efficient.

SIth true Vertue is not to be gotten by any mans labour, ex∣ercise, or industrie, without the great grace of God, who is chiefe Authour and Giuer of all good gifts: it well ap∣peareth that Vertue is a most excellent thing, and most wor∣thie to be had in admiration, and therefore with feruent loue and diligence to be embraced of all men.

Logically thus:

God the chiefe Author of all good, is the cause Efficient of Vertue: therefore Vertue proceeding of so worthy a cause, must needs be an excellent thing, and worthy of all men to be embraced.

From the Effect.

TRue honor and glory hath beene alwaies had amongst all men in great admiration: because it seemeth not only by mans iudgement, but also by the diuine iudgement of God, to be alwaies attributed to vertue: wherefore sith Vertue doth yeeld such noble fruits and effects, Vertue must needs be a no∣ble thing it selfe, and worthy of all men to be embraced.

Logically thus:

The Effect of Vertue, which is true honor and glory, is good, and to be desired.

From the End.

SIth euerlasting blessednesse is of such excellencie, as neither tongue is able to expresse the ioyes thereof, nor minde to conceiue the same, and therefore ought to be desired aboue all things, as the iust reward of all goodnesse, and finall end of all euill, and that Vertue is the onely meane to bring man to that blessed End: who then will once thinke that Vertue is not to be esteemed aboue all things, and worthy of all men to bee embraced?

Logically thus:

The end of Vertue, which is euerlasting felicitie, is to bee desired: Ergo, Vertue is to be desired.

Hitherto you haue shewed how the aforesaid Theme is to be pro∣ued with Arguments fetched aswell from the Subiect as the Predi∣cate: now shew what Arguments are to be fetched from both ioyned together?

These that follow and such like, and first by Comparison, from the Lesse to the More.

From the Lesse to the More.

IF men will not let to bestow any paine, labour or cost to preserue their bodies from death, sickenesse, or any other hurt: how much more then ought they to endeuour themselues to obtaine Vertue, which will preserue their soules from all corrupt affections and euill vices, and thereby deliuer them from death euerlasting?

Logically thus:

Man ought to be carefull of his bodily health: Ergo, Much more of his soules health, which is chiefely preserued by Vertue.

From Similitude or Likenesse.

AS the beautie of the bodie is pleasant to mans eyes: euen so the beautie of the minde or soule is as acceptable to God: and therefore as man will be diligent and careful in dec∣king and adorning his body to please the eyes of men: euen so he ought to be most carefull to decke his soule and mind, with such Vertues, as doe make the same in Gods sight most accep∣table.

Logically thus:

As the decking of the bodie is pleasant to mens eyes: so the decking of the Soule is pleasing to God.

From Authoritie.

DAuid the Prophet in the 34. Psalme saith thus: Turne from euill, and doe that which is good. The Prophet Micheas also agreeth hereunto in saying thus: Deale iustly with all men, loue mercie, and walke diligently in the way of God. By which words these two godly Prophets doe teach no

other thing, then that Man forsaking all kinde of vice, should with all diligence embrace Vertue.

Logically thus:

God teacheth by his Prophet Dauid, and also by Micheas, that Man should fly Vice, and loue Vertue: Ergo, Man ought to loue Vertue. By daily exercising your selfe in such exam∣ples as this is, you shall in short time learne the right vse of the places, and bee able thereby readily to apply them to euery good purpose.

Heere endeth the fourth Booke of Logick.

THE FIFT BOOKE OF LOGICKE.

CHAP. I.

Of Argumentation, and of the foure kindes thereof in gene∣rall, and also of the first Principles of a Syllogisme.

HAuing hitherto sufficiently spoken of words both simple and compound, whereof all que∣stions doe consist, also of definition and di∣uision, of Method, of Propositions, and of the places: It resteth now that I declare vnto you the formes and kinds of reasoning called Argumentatiō, which be the means whereby in all compound questions the trueth may bee discerned from falshood, wherein consisteth the chiefest fruit of Logicke: and therefore you shal vnderstand that there be foure principal kinds or formes of Ar∣gumentation, (that is) a Syllogisme, an Induction, an Ethymeme, and Example, I say here principall, because there be diuers other formes which though they be not so necessary, yet I will briesly treat of them hereafter: But for so much as the Syllogisme is the chiefest, whereunto all others are reserred as things vnperfect, vnto a thing perfect, I wil first speake of a Syllogisme, and of all the parts thereof: but yet before I define or diuide a Syllogisme, I thinke it very ne∣cessary to declare vnto you the first Principles aswell Materiall, as Regular, of a simple Syllogisme consisting of simple Propositions.

Which call you Materiall Principles?

Materiall Principles are three simple Propositions, and three termes, (that is to say) the Subiect, the Predicate, and the meane terme hereafter defined, whereof the Subiect and the Predicate are said to be the outermost limits or bounds of any simple Proposition.

Why are they called Termes or limits?

Because they limite a Proposition, euen as Dole-stones or Meares doe limite a piece of ground in the field, and be the vt∣termost parts or bounds whereunto any Proposition is to bee resolued, as for example in this Proposition, euery man is a sensible body: these two words, man, and sensible body, are the termes, limits, or bounds, whereof as the said Proposition is compounded, so into the same it is to be resolued, as into his vttermost parts that haue any signification: for letters and sillables of themselues be without signification, and therefore can limite no speach, so that the termes of Propositions must be either Nounes, or Verbes, which be onely voices significa∣tiue, as haue been said before.

Which be the Principles regulatiue?

The Principles regulatiue of a Syllogisme bee these two phrases of speach, to bee spoken of all, and to bee spoken of none.

What is to be spoken of all?

That is, when the predicate being truly spoken of the Sub∣iect, must needs be also spoken of all that is comprehended vn∣der the said subiect: as when I say euery man is a sensible body: here this word sensible body, is not only spoken of man in ge∣nerall, but also of Peter and Iohn, and of euery other man in particular, comprehended vnder the foresaid Subiect, man.

What is to be spoken of none?

It is when the Predicate being denied to be spoken of the Subiect, is denied also to bee spoken of any thing contained in the Subiect: as when I say no man is a stone, here like as this word stone is denied to be spoken of man, so it is also denied to be spoken of Peter and Iohn, & of euery other singular man: out of which Definitions are gathered two necessary rules.

Which be they?

The first rule is, whatsoeuer is truely affirmed of his naturall and proper Subiect, is also affirmed of all those things which are contained vnder the said Subiect: the second rule is thus, whatsoeuer is denied to bee spoken of any Subiect, is also de∣nied to bee spoken of euery thing contained vnder the said Subiect.

Whereto serue these rules?

The first rule confirmeth all Syllogismes affirmatiue, and the second confirmeth all Syllogismes negatiue.

CHAP. II.

Of a Syllogisme, what it is, how it is diuided; and of what parts it consisteth.

WHat is a Syllogisme?

A Syllogisme is a kind of argument contai∣ning three Propositions, whereof the two first, commonly called the premisses, being disposed according to moode, and figure, and granted, the third Propositiō, otherwise called the conclusion, differing from the other two, followeth of necessitie, by vertue of the premisses: how these three Propositions are called, and what moode and figure is, shall be declared hereafter; In the meane time marke wel the two other points touching this Definition: first, that the Conclusion must not be all one, but differing from the premisses: secondly, that the said Conclusion bee necessa∣rily inferred of the premisses, as in this example: euery sensible body is a substance: euery man is a sensible bodie: Ergo, eue∣ry man is a substance: for if the Conclusion were thus: Ergo, euery sensible body is a substance, or euery man is a sensible bodie, the argument should not be good, because the Con∣clusion should be all one with one of the premisses: the reason why the Conclusion must needes be inferred of the premisses, and so consequently follow of the same, shalbe declared vnto you hereafter.

How is a Syllogisme diuided according to the Schoolemen?

First, they diuide it according to the diuersity of the Propo∣sitions wherofit consisteth, into two kinds, viz. Categoricall, and Hypotheticall, (that is to say) simple and compound, cal∣ling that simple, which is made of simple Propositions, and that compound, which is made of compound Propositions: what simple and compound Propositions are, hath beene be∣fore* 1.3 defined. Againe, they diuide the simple Syllogisme three maner of wayes, first according to the diuersitie of the termes into a common and into a singular Syllogisme, for if the terms whereof the Syllogisme consisteth, bee common, or generall, and specially the meane terme, or proofe, then that Syllogisme is called a common Syllogisme: but if the meane terme or proofe be Indiuiduum, then that Syllogisme is said to be a sin∣gular Syllogisme, called of them, Syllogismus expositorius, wher∣of we shall speake hereafter: Secondly, they diuide a simple Syllogisme, according to the diuersitie of the figure, into a perfect, and vnperfect Syllogisme.

When is it said to be perfect?

When it needeth not to be altered any maner of way, other∣wise then it is, that the consequent may manifestly appeare.

When is it said to be vnperfect?

When the Consequent doth not manifestly appeare, vnlesse the Syllogisme be altered either by conuersion, or transposing of the premisses, whereof we shall speake hereafter: Thirdly, they diuide a simple Syllogisme, according to the matter of the Propositions whereof it is made, into three kindes, that is, into a Syllogisme Demonstratiue, Dialecticall, and Sophisti∣call: of which three kindes wee shall speake hereafter, and in their proper places; so as in all, the Schoolemen make foure seuerall diuisions of a Syllogisme, the first according to the di∣uersitie of the Propositions, the second according to the di∣uersity of the Termes, the third according to the diuersitie of the figure, and the fourth according to the diuersitie of the matter of the Propositions whereof wee haue spoken before, and shewed how manifold such matter is: but in the meane time wee will shew you of what parts a simple common Syllo∣gisme consisteth.

Of how many parts doth a simple Syllogisme consist?

Of two; that is, Matter, and Forme.

CHAP. III.

Of the Matter and Forme of a simple com∣mon Syllogisme.

WHat things are said to bee the Matter of a Syllo∣gisme?

The Matter whereof a Syllogisme is made, are three terms, and three Propositions, which we called before Materiall principles, and the Forme consisteth of figure and moode, whereof we shall speak in the next Chapter.

Define what these three Termes be?

The one is called the Maior terme, or Maior extremitie, which is the Predicate of the question that is to be prooued, the other is called the Minor terme, or minor extremity, which is the subiect of the question, and these two Termes are knit together in the Conclusion, and made to agree by helpe of a third Terme, called the Meane terme or proofe.

What is the Meane terme?

It is the proofe of the question which is twice repeated be∣fore the Conclusion, and not once mentioned in the same.

How is such proofe to be found out?

Foure manner of wayes, (that is to say) by experience, by quicknesse of witte, by erudition, and by searching the com∣mon places.

Giue examples of all these foure wayes.

1 By experience, as when we affirme that intemperance is to be fled, because we know by experience, that it consumeth both body and goods in vain pleasures. 2 By wit, as to proue that the couetousnesse of wicked men is infinite: because wit and reason teacheth vs, that if couetous men did either care for the Law of God, or for reason, they would not exceed so farre the bounds thereof. 3 By erudition, as to prooue that riches are not to be desired ouer-greedily, but to serue necessitie: be∣cause

it appeareth by the doctrine of S. Paul, that such as gree∣dily seeke to be rich, doe fall into temptation, and into the snares of the Deuill. 4 By searching the common places: as when the proofe of any question is fetched from any of the common places before taught, as from the generall kinde, from the speciall kinde, from the difference, or property, and such like, whereof you haue had examples before.

Which be the three Propositions whereof a Syllogisme doth con∣sist?

These three: The Maior, the Minor, and the Conclusion.

Which call you the Maior?

That which consisteth of the Predicate of the question, o∣therwise called the Maior terme, and of the Meane, or Proofe, being both ioyned together in one selfe Proposition; which Proposition is the whole strength of the Syllogisme, for it is the cause and proofe of the Conclusion.

Which call you the Minor?

That which consisteth of the Subiect of the question called the Minor terme, and of the Meane or proofe ioined together, which two Propositions are called by one generall name, pre∣misses, because they goe before the Conclusion.

What is the Conclusion?

It is that which consisteth of the Predicate, and of the Sub∣iect, and is the question it selfe concluded.

Giue example.

For example, let this bee your question: whether man be a substance or not, here you haue two extremes or termes, wher∣of substance being the Predicate, is the Maior terme, and man being here the subiect, is the minor terme: now to prooue that this word Substance, is properly and naturally spoken of man, as of his Subiect, and that you may truely knit these two ex∣tremes, or termes together, you must seeke out some cause or proofe, otherwise called the Meane terme, which being once found out, the Syllogisme is soone made: let the Meane terme therefore bee this word, Sensible body, for euery sensi∣ble body is a Substance, which proofe is fetched from the ge∣nerall kinde, then forme your Syllogisme thus: euery sen∣sible

bodie is a substance: but man is a sensible bodie: Ergo, man is a substance. Here you see that the Meane terme or proofe is twice repeated before the Conclusion: (that is to say) in the Maior Proposition, together with the Predicate of the question, called the Maior terme; and also in the Minor Proposition together with the subiect of the question called the Minor terme, and not once mentioned in the Conclusion. Thus much touching the Matter whereof a Syllogisme con∣sisteth: now of the Forme thereof.

CHAP. IIII.

Of the Forme of a Syllogisme.

YOu sayd before, that the Forme of a Syllogisme com∣prehended Figure, and Moode, now therefore tell what Figure and Moode is, and how many of them there bee.

Figure is no other thing, but the diuers pla∣cing or disposing of the meane terme in the premisses: which figure is three-fold; that is, First, Second, and Third: for if the meane terme be the Subiect in the Maior Proposition, and Predicate in the Minor, as in the example aboue, then it ma∣keth a Syllogisme of the first figure, and if it chance to be Pre∣dicate in both Propositions, then it maketh a Syllogisme of the second figure, as thus: no stone is a sensible body: but man is a sensible body: Ergo, no man is a stone: for here the meane terme, Sensible body, is Predicate in both Propositions: but if the meane be subiect in both Propositions, then it maketh a Syllogisme of the third figure, as thus: euery man is a sub∣stance: euery man is a sensible body: Ergo, some sensible bo∣dy is a substance: for here the meane terme, that is, Man, is sub∣iect in both the first Propositions, and to these three figures do belong certaine moodes.

What is ameode?

A moode, called in Latine modus, amongst the Logicians, is none other but the true ordering aswell of the premisses, as of the conclusion in a Syllogisme, according to due quantitie,

and quality: what the quantitie and quality of a Proposition is, hath been taught before, lib. 3. cap. 1.

How many moodes doe belong to the first figure?

To the first figure doe belong 9. moodes, thus named:

• Barbara: Celarent: Darij: Ferio: Baralipton:
• Celantes: Dabitis: Fapesmo: Frisesomorum.

Whereof the first foure, because they conclude directly, are called perfect moodes, making perfect Syllogismes: and the other fiue, because they conclude vndirectly, are called vn∣perfect moodes, making vnperfect Syllogismes.

What is to conclude directly or indirectly?

That moode is sayd to conclude directly, when the Maior terme is made the Predicate, and the Minor terme the subiect in the conclusion. But if in the conclusion the Minor terme be the Predicate, and the Maior terme the subiect, then that moode is said to conclude directly: as for example: Euery sensible bodie is a substance: Man is a sensible body: Ergo, man is a substance. This Syllogisme concludeth directly, be∣cause the Maior terme, substance, is the Predicate in the con∣clusion: but if the conclusion were thus: Ergo, some substance is a man, then it should conclude indirectly: because this word man which was the subiect of the question in this conclusion, is made the Predicate.

How many moodes doe belong to the second figure?

These foure: Caesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco.

How many moodes doe belong to the third Figure?

These sixe: Darapti, Felapton, D•…•…samis, Da•…•…isi, Bocardo, and Feriso•…•…: which words beeing otherwise called Termes of Arte, and euery one consisting of three sillables, were pur∣posely inuented by the Schoolemen, to signifie the quanti∣tie and qualitie of euery Proposition contayned in a Syllo∣gisme, and are briefly set downe in these foure verses fol∣lowing.

• Barbara, Celarent, Darij, Ferio, Baralipton:
• Celantes, Da•…•…itis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum:
• Caesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, Darapti:
• Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.

It seemeth to me that these names doe not eauenly consist each one of three Syllables, for in the two first verses there be two Moods or names, whereof the one called Baralipton, containeth foure Sylla∣bles, and the other called Frisesomorum, containeth fiue Syllables.

You say true, but these Syllables are no part of these two Moods, but serue only to fill vp the verse: for this Syllable ton, is no part of the Mood Baralip: nor the two Syllables morum, are any part of the Mood Friseso.

What is to be considered in these words of Art or Moods?

Two things, (that is to say) the Vowels and the Conso∣nants contained in euery Mood, and what they signifie.

Which are those Vowels, and what doe they signifie?

The Vowels be these foure, a. e. i. o. whereof a. signifieth an vniuersall Affirmatiue, •…•…. an vniuersall Negatiue, i. a particu∣lar Affirmatiue, o. a particular Negatiue: of all which you shall haue examples in the sixt Chapter of this Booke here fol∣lowing.

Which be the Consonants, and what doe they signifie?

Wee shall haue cause to speake of them hereafter in a fitter place.

In the meane time, then giue examples of the Moods belonging to all the Figures?

Before we giue examples, it shall not be amisse to set down certaine rules requisite to all the three Figures, as well in ge∣nerall, as in particular.

CHAP. V.

Of certaine Rules, as well Generall, as Speciall, belonging to the three Figures.

HOw many Generall Rules be there, which are com∣mon to all the three Figures?

Foure: two of quantitie, and two of qua∣litie.

Which is the first of those that belong to quātity?

In euery Syllogisme it behoueth eyther one or both of the premisses to be vniuersall.

Why so?

Because that of two meere particular Propositions, nothing by order of Logick can consequently follow: As for example, This Syllogisme is not good: Some sensible body is a Man, but some Horse is a sensible body: Ergo, a Horse is a Man. The like reason is also to be vnderstood, when the premisses are in∣definit Propositions, yea or singular Propositions, if the meane terme be not likewise singular, for then it maketh a Syllogisme expositorie, whereof we shall speake hereafter.

Which is the second Rule that belongeth to quantitie?

If any of the premisses be particular, then the conclusion also must be particular.

Why so?

Because the conclusion being implyed of the premisses, ought alwayes to follow the weaker part of the same premis∣ses, but the particular is alwayes accounted weaker then the vniuersall, and the Negatiue weaker then the Affirmatiue.

What is the first Rule belonging to qualitie?

In euery Syllogisme it behoueth either one or both of the premisses to be affirmatiue.

Why so?

Because that of two pure Negatiue Propositions nothing can bee orderly concluded, as in this example: No man is a tree, but no Peare tree is a man: Ergo, No Peare tree is a tree: which Syllogisme cannot be good, for the premisses are both true, and the conclusion is false.

Which is the second Rule belonging to qualitie?

If any of the premisses be Negatiue, then the conclusion must also be Negatiue.

Why so?

Because (as it hath beene said before) the conclusion must follow the weaker part.

Which be the speciall Rules belonging to the three Figures?

In the first foure Moods of the first Figure directly conclu∣ding the Minor, may not be a Negatiue, nor the Maior parti∣cular, but vniuersall.

In the second Figure, the Maior must not bee particular,

and one of the premisses must bee a Negatiue.

In the third Figure, the Minor must not be a Negatiue, nor the conclusion vniuersall: but as for the quantitie and qualitie of euery Proposition in euery kinde of Syllogisme, of what Figure soeuer it be, it shall plainly appeare by the Vowels, or rather Syllables of the Moods, otherwise called words of Art, annexed to the examples hereafter following.

First giue examples of Syllogismes of the first Figure, and of his foure perfect Moods directly concluding.

CHAP. VI.

Examples of the foure perfect Moods belonging to the first Figure.

THe first Mood of the first Figure, is when three termes being giuen, a Syllogisme is made of two vniuersall Affirmatiues directly conclu∣ding an vniuersall Affirmatiue, as this Syllo∣gisme heere following: the termes whereof be these, Sensible bodie, Substance, and Man placed in this sort.

• Bar- Euery sensible body is a substance,
• ba- But euery man is a sensible bodie:
• ra. Ergo, Euery man is a substance.

The name of this Mood is called Barbara, diuided into three Syllables, placed in the margent right against the Syllogisme, to shew the quantitie and qualitie of euery Proposition, ac∣cording to the significations of the Vowels contained in eue∣ry Syllable: and so are all the other names of the Moods here∣after following.

The second Mood is, when three termes being giuen, a Syl∣logisme is made of an vniuersall Negatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding an vniuer∣sall Negatiue: As for example, let the termes be these: Sensi∣ble Body, a Man, a Stone, and the Syllogisme thus:

• C•…•…- No sensible body is a stone,
• la- But euery man is a sensible bodie:
• rent. Ergo, No man is a stone.

The name of this Mood is Celarent.

The third Mood is, when three termes being giuen, a Syl∣logisme is made of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Maior, and of a particular Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particu∣lar Affirmatiue: As for example, let these be the termes: Sen∣sible Body, Substance, and Man, and the Syllogisme thus:

• Da- Euery sensible body is a substance,
• ri- But some man is a sensible body:
• j. Ergo, Some man is a substance.

The name of this Mood is Darij.

The fourth Mood is, when three termes being giuen, a Syl∣logisme is made of an vniuersall Negatiue Maior, and a parti∣cular Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Ne∣gatiue: As for example, let these be the termes: Sensible Bo∣die, Man, and Stone: and the Syllogisme thus:

• Fe- No sensible body is a stone,
• ri- But some man is a sensible body:
• o. Ergo, Some man is a stone.

The name of this Mood is Ferio.

CHAP. VII.

Examples of the fiue vnperfect Moods of the first Figure.

Glue examples of the fiue Moods of the first Fi∣gure directly concluding.

The first Imperfect Moode of the first Fi∣gure indirectly concluding, is when the Ma∣ior and Minor, being both vniuersall Affirma∣tiues, doe conclude indirectly a particular Af∣firmatiue, as thus:

• Ba- Euery sensible body is a substance,
• ra- Euery man is a sensible body:
• lip. Ergo, Some substance is a man.

The name of this Mood is Baralipton, whereof the last syl∣lable, ton, is only to fill vp the verse, as hath beene said before.

The second Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Negatiue Maior, and an vniuersall Affirmatiue Minor, indirectly concluding an vniuersall Negatiue, as thus:

• Ce- No sensible body is a tree,
• lan- Euery man is a sensible bodie:
• tis. Ergo, No tree is a man.

The name of this Mood is Celantis.

The third Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Maior, and of a particular Affirma∣tiue Minor, indirectly concluding a particular Affirmatiue, as thus:

• Da- Euery sensible bodie is a substance,
• bi- Some man is a sensible bodie:
• tis. Ergo, Some substance is a man▪

The name of this Mood is Dabitis.

The fourth Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Ne∣gatiue Minor, indirectly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus:

• Fa- Euery sensible bodie is a substance,
• pes- No tree is a sensible bodie:
• mo. Ergo, Some substance is not a tree.

The name of this Mood is Fapesmo.

The fift Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of a particular Affirmatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Negatiue Minor, indirectly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus:

• Fri- Some sensible bodie is a substance,
• se- But no tree is a sensible bodie:
• so. Ergo, Some substance is not a tree.

The name of this Mood is Frisesomorum, whereof the two last syllables (as hath beene said before) are only put to make vp the verse.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the foure Moods belonging to the se∣cond Figure.

GIue examples of the foure Moodes belonging to the second Figure.

The first Mood of the second Figure, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Negatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding an vniuersall Negatiue, thus:

• Ce- No stone is a sensible bodie,
• sa- Euery man is a sensible bodie:
• re. Ergo, No man is a stone.

The name of this Mood is Caesare.

The second Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vni∣uersall Affirmatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Mi∣nor, directly concluding an vniuersall Negatiue, as thus:

• Ca- Euery man is a sensible bodie,
• mes- But no stone is a sensible bodie:
• tres. Ergo, No stone is a man.

The name of this Mood is Camestres.

The third Mood is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuer∣sall Negatiue Maior, and of a particular Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus:

• Fes- No stone is a sensible bodie,
• ti- But some man is a sensible bodie
• no. Ergo, Some man is not a stone.

The name of this Mood is Festino.

The fourth Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vni∣uersall

Affirmatiue Maior, and of a particular Minor, directly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus:

• Ba- Euery man is a sensible bodie,
• ro- But some stone is not a sensible bodie:
• co. Ergo, Some stone is not a man.

The name of this Mood is Baroco.

CHAP. IX.

Of the sixe Moods belonging to the third Figure.

GIue examples of the sixe Moodes belonging to the third Figure.

The first is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Maior, and of an vniuer∣sall Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Affirmatiue, as thus:

• Da- Euery man is a substance,
• rap- But euery man is a sensible bodie:
• ti. Ergo, Some sensible bodie is a substance.

The name of this Mood is Darapti.

The second Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vni∣uersall Negatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Mi∣nor, directly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus:

• Fe- No Man is a stone,
• lap- But euery man is a substance:
• ton. Ergo, Some substance is not a stone.

The name of this Mood is Felapton.

The third Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of a particu∣lar Affirmatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Affirmatiue, as thus:

• Di- Some man is a substance,
• sa- But euery man is a sensible bodie:
• mis. Ergo, Some sensible bodie is a substance.

The name of this Mood is Disamis.

The fourth Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vni∣uersall Affirmatiue Maior, and of a particular Affirmatiue Mi∣nor, concluding a particular Affirmatiue, as thus:

• Da- Euery man is a substance,
• ti- But some man is a sensible bodie:
• si. Ergo, Some sensible bodie is a substance.

The name of this Mood is Datisi.

The fift Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of a particu∣lar Negatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus.

• Bo- Some man is not a stone,
• car- But euery man is a sensible bodie:
• do. Ergo, Some sensible bodie is not a stone

The name of this Mood is Bocardo.

The sixt Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuer∣sall Negatiue Maior, and of a particular Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus:

• Fe- No man is a stone,
• ri- But some man is a sensible bodie:
• son. Ergo, Some sensible bodie is not a stone.

The name of this Mood is Ferison.

Thus you haue all the three Figures, together with their Moods, plainly set forth with examples.

CHAP. X.

Of a Syllogisme expositorie.

ANd now because a Syllogisme expository is said to be a Syllogisme of the third Figure: I thinke it most meete to giue you an example there of euen here: sor I haue already defined the same before.

Yea, I remember yee said it was expositorie, when the proofe or meane terme is an Indiuiduum: but if yee giue exam∣ple, I shall the better vnderstand it.

Let this then be your example, to prooue some men to bee both Orators and Philosophers, by a Syllogisme expositorie thus: Cicero was an Orator: but Cicero was a Philosopher: Ergo, some men are both Orators and Philosophers: againe, to prooue that some rich men are not wise, thus: Crassus was not wise, but Crassus was rich: Ergo, some rich men are not wise, thus you see that this kind of Syllogisme serueth to proue both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as it were by way of example.

CHAP. XI.

An obiection concerning the three Figures, and Moodes belonging to the same.

TO what purpose serue so many figures and moodes, sith the first figure, and the foure first moodes be∣longing to the same are onely perfect, yea, and so perfect indeed, as the Mathematicians in seeking out the truth of any probleme, will vse none other, because the first figure alone doth suffice to con∣clude all kindes of problemes whatsoeuer they be, whereby it should seeme, that the two other figures, with their moodes, be superfluous?

They be not altogether superfluous; for as the first figure serueth chiefly and onely to conclude an vniuersal affirmatiue, so the second figure serueth to conclude an vniuersal negatiue, and the third figure to conclude both a particular affirmatiue, and also a particular negatiue, as you may perceiue very well by the examples before rehearsed; neither be the fifteen vnper∣fect moodes so vnperfect, but that they may easily be reduced vnto the foure perfect, by one of these wayes heere following, (that is to say) either by conuersion, or by transposing of the premisses: or else by a Syllogisme leading to impossibilitie, of which three wayes of Reduction we come now to speake: by which things it doth plainely appeare what difference there is betwixt a perfect and vnperfect Syllogisme; for the perfect Syllogisme hath no need of these helpes to make the Conclu∣sion manifest, as hath been said before.

CHAP. XII.

Of Reduction, and of the kindes thereof, and also of the signi∣fication of certaine consonants in the words of Art seruing to Reduction.

WHat is Reduction?

Reduction here is none other thing, but a declaration, prouing or shewing the goodnes of an vnperfect Syllogisme, by a Syllogisme of a perfect moode.

How manfold is such Reduction?

Two-fold; for it is either offensiue, or else by impossibility.

What is Reduction offensiue?

Reduction offensiue is, when a Syllogisme is reduced to his perfection, either by conuersion, or by transposing the premis∣ses, or else by both at once.

What meane yee by transposing of the premisses, for as touching conuersion ye haue spoken thereof before, lib. 3. cap. 6.

The premisses are said to be transposed, when the Maior is put in the Minors place; or contrariwise the Minor into the Maiors place.

What is Reduction by impossibilitie?

Reduction by impossibility is, when the goodnesse of the Syllogisme is so proued, as the aduersary denying the same, must needs be brought to some absurditie, as to confesse two Contradictories to be both true at once, or some proposition to be false, which he hath confessed before to be true, or is ma∣nifestly true of it selfe. But first we wil speake of Reduction of∣fensiue, and then of Reduction by impossibility; and because that Reduction offensiue is done sometime by conuersion, and sometime by transposition, and sometime by both at once: and againe, that sometime one of the premisses, somtime both, and sometime no more but the Conclusion onely is conuerted, and that sometime by simple conuersion, and sometime by conuer∣sion per accidens: the Schoolemen for •…•…asement of the memo∣rie, haue made eight of the Consonants, besides the Vowels in the words of Art before mentioned, to be significatiue, and to

declare how euery proposition ought to be reduced.

For first, these foure Consonants, b. c. d. f. (with one of the which euery vnperfect moode doth begin) doe shew that such vnperfect moodes ought to bee reduced into those perfect moodes, which doe begin with the like letter, as,

• Baralipton, Baroco, Bocardo, into Barbara,
• C•…•…lantes, Caesare, Camestres, into Celarent,
• Dabitis, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, into Darij,
• Fapesmo, Frisesomorum, Felapton, Ferison, Festino, into Darij

Which be the other foure Consonants, and what doe they signifie?

The other foure Consonants put betwixt the Vowels, bee these, s. p. m. c. where of s. signifieth simple conuersion, (that is to say) that the Vowell, which next before this Consonant, is to be simply conuerted, p. signifieth conuersion per accidens, m. betokeneth transposition of the premisses, c. in the latter end or midst of the moode, betokeneth Reduction by impossibilitie as in Baroco, and Bocardo.

Giue examples, and shew how such Reduction is to be made.

First, as touching reduction by conuersion, Cesare is redu∣ced into Celarent by simple conuersion of the Maior: as this Syllogisme in Cesare.

• Ce- No tree is a sensible body, which is reduced in∣to Celarent, thus:
• sa- But euery man is a sensible body: which is reduced in∣to Celarent, thus:
• re. Ergo, no man is a tree. which is reduced in∣to Celarent, thus:

• Ce- No sensible body is a tree,
• la- But euery man is a sensible bodie:
• rent. Ergo, no man is a tree.

And Camestres is reduced into Celarent by simple conuer∣ting the Conclusion, and also by transposing the premisses, as this Syllogisme in Camestres.

• Ca- Euery man is a sensible body, which is reduced in∣to Celarent, thus:
• mes- But no tree is a sensible body: which is reduced in∣to Celarent, thus:
• tres. Ergo, no tree is a man. which is reduced in∣to Celarent, thus:

• Ce- No sensible body is a tree,
• la- But euery man is a sensible bodie:
• rent. Ergo, No man is a tree.

Festino is reduced into Ferio, by simply conuerting the Maior, as in this Syllogisme in Festino.

• Fes- No stone is a sensible body, which is reduced in∣to Ferio thus.
• ti- But some man is a sensible body: which is reduced in∣to Ferio thus.
• no. Ergo, Some man is not a stone. which is reduced in∣to Ferio thus.

• Fe- No sensible body is a stone,
• ri- But some man is a sensible body:
• o. Ergo, Some man is not a stone.

Darapti is reduced from Darij by conuerting the minor per accidens, as this Syllogisme in Darapti.

• Da- Euery man is a substance, which is reduced into Darij thus.
• rap- But euery man is a sensible body: which is reduced into Darij thus.
• ti. Ergo, some sensible body is a substance. which is reduced into Darij thus.

• Da- Euery man is a substance,
• ri- But some sensible body is a man:
• j. Ergo, Some sensible body is a substance.

Ferison is reduced into Ferio, by simple conuersion of the mi∣nor, as this Syllogisme in Ferison.

• Fe- No man is a stone. which is reduced into Ferio thus.
• ri- But some man is a sensible body: which is reduced into Ferio thus.
• son. Ergo, some sensible body is not a stone which is reduced into Ferio thus.

• Fe- No man is a stone,
• ri- But some sensible body is a man:
• son. Ergo, some sensible body is not a stone.

And so forth in all the rest, according as the significatiue Consonants doe direct you.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Reduction by Impossiblitie.

HOw is Reduction by impossibilitie made?

By ioyning the Contradictorie of the conclu∣on to one of the premisses, and to dispose the same according to some one of the perfect moodes of the first figure, in such sort as you may thereby make your Conclusion contradictory to the pre∣misse which you left out, and was granted by your aduersary, whereby your aduersary is brought into an absurditie, to con fesse two contradictories, to be true both at once.

Giue examples.

As for example, if your aduersarie would denie this Syllo∣gisme in Baroco, euery man is a sensible body: but some tree is not a sensible bodie: Ergo, some tree is not a man: then you may reduce it to the first Moode of the first figure, which is Barbara, by making the contradictorie of your Conclusion to be the Minor of your Syllogisme in this sort, euery man is a sensible body: but euery tree is a man: Ergo, euery tree is a sensible body, which argument he cannot denie, because hee hath granted the Minor to be true: for if this Proposition, some tree is not a man, be false, then this proposition, euery tree is a man, must needes be true, for two Contradictories cannot bee both true at once, and two true premisses must needes inferre a true Conclusion; and note that according to the diuersitie of the figures, the Contradictory of the Conclusion is diuersly disposed (that is to say) made either Maior or Minor accor∣dingly; for in all the Moodes of the second figure it must bee made the Minor, the former Maior being still reserued; and in the third figure it must be the Maior, the former Minor being still reserued.

To which of the perfect Moodes is euery vnperfect Moode to bee reduced by imp•…•…ssibilitie?

To know this, it shall be needfull to learne, first the vse of certaine words compounded of diuers sillables, and inuented by the Schoolemen for this purpose.

Which be those words?

The words be these contained in this verse following, nesci∣ebatis: odiebam: letare Romanis: whereof the first nesciebatis, containing fiue sillables, representeth the fiue vnperfect moods of the first figure: odiebam hauing foure sillables, betokeneth the foure vnperfect moodes of the second figure: letare Roma∣nis, containing sixe sillables, signifieth the sixe vnperfect moods of the third figure: in all which words the foure vowels, a. e. i. o. doe stil retaine their old significations before taught, seruing here chiefly to shew the quantity and qualitie of euery Con∣clusion, for euery vnperfect moode must bee reduced to that perfect moode of the first figure, which hath such Conclusion as that vowel of the sillable representing that vnperfect mood doth signifie: as for example in this word nesciebatis, here you see, that in the sillable nes. representing the first vnperfect moode called before Baralipton, the vowel e. signifying an vni∣uersall negatiue, doth shew that this moode is to be reduced into Celarent, whose conclusion is an vniuersall negatiue, so as the order of the sillables in the word nesciebatis, together with the signification of the vowels contained in the said sillables, you may plainely perceiue that Baralipton is to be reduced in∣to Celarent: Celantes into Darij, Dabitis into Celarent, Fapes∣mo into Barbara, Friselon into Darij. The like obseruation and consideration is to be had in the other words, representing the rest of the imperfect moodes of the second and third figure: for odiebam appointeth Cesare to be reduced into Ferio, Camestres to Darij, Festino to Celarent, Baroco to Barbara: againe letare Romanis appointeth Darapti to Celarent, Felapton to Barbara, Disamis to Celarent, Datisi to Ferio, Bocardo to Barbara, and Ferison to Darij, whereof I giue you no examples, because I would haue you to exercise your selfe in examining the former examples of the three figures, and to see how you can reduce each vnperfect moode, to his perfect moode by impossibilitie, according to these short rules here set downe.

The Schoolemen after they haue taught the vse of the moodes, and of reduction, doe immediatly treat of a syllo∣gisme, made in oblique cases, and also of the sixe habilities,

and three defects of a Syllogisme: all which I willingly passe ouer with silence, as things more curious then profitable, for truely I know not whereto the Syllogisme made in oblique Cases, doth serue more then for variety sake.

CHAP. XIIII.

Of Syllogismes made in oblique Cases, and of the sixe Habili∣ties, and three defects of a Syllogisme.

WHat meane you by oblique Cases?

You learned in your Accidents, that euery Noune hath sixe Cases, (that is to say) the No∣minatiue, the Genitiue, the Datiue, the Accusa∣tiue the Vocatiue, and the Ablatiue, wherof the Nominatiue is onely right, and all the rest are called oblique: as this is a Syllogisme made in oblique Cases: euery drawing beast belongeth to man, or is the beast of man: but an oxe is a drawing beast: Ergo, an oxe belongeth to man, or is the beast of man, and as for the sixe habilities called sex potestates Syllo∣gismi, they are but meanes to proue the goodnesse of one Syl∣logisme by another, or to shew which is more vniuersall, or comprehendeth more then another, or to conclude a trueth of false premisses, which God wot is a sillie kinde of conclusion, the best parts of which habilities are more easily learned by the rules and examples before giuen, then by those that they set downe in their treatises touching the same. Likewise the three defects, are none other but Elenches, or Fallaxes, wher∣of there bee thirteene kindes set downe by Aristotle himselfe, whereof we shall speake hereafter, in their place, so as they might say that there are thirteene defects as well as three, and therefore leauing to trouble you with these things, I minde here to treate of a compound Syllogisme.

CHAP. XV.

Of a compound Syllogisme, and of the diuers kindes thereof.

WHat is a compound Syllogisme, and how many kinds thereof bee there?

A compound Syllogisme is that which is made of compound Propositions, whereof as there be three sorts, so they make three kindes of compound Syllogismes, (that is to say) conditionall, dis∣iunctiue, and copulatiue.

Of how many parts doth a compound Syllogisme consist?

Of three, as well as a simple Syllogisme, that is, of the Ma∣ior, containing two simple Propositions, and of the Minor, re∣peating the one part of the Maior, and of the Conclusion, con∣cluding the other part of the Maior, as in this example: if this woman hath had a childe, she hath laine with a man: but shee hath had a childe: Ergo, she hath laine with a man.

How is the trueth of a compound Syllogisme to be sound out?

By reducing the same into a simple Syllogisme thus; euery woman that hath had a childe, hath laine with a man: but this woman hath had a childe: Ergo, she hath laine with a man.

Are there no other kindes of compound Syllogismes?

No, if you consider the order of concluding, there be but three kindes or wayes, (that is to say) conditionall, disiunctiue and copulatiue; but if you consider the varietie in vttering such Syllogismes, you may make seuen sorts or wayes, where∣of three appertaine to the conditionall, two to the disiunctiue, and two to the copulatiue.

Which is the first way?

The first way is of the antecedent, which being granted, the consequent must needs follow, both affirmatiuely, and nega∣tiuely: Affirmatiuely thus: if he be godly, he is blessed: he is godly, therefore blessed: negatiuely thus, if he be not godly, he shall not be blessed, but hee is not godly: Ergo, hee is not blessed.

Which is the secondway?

The second way is of the Consequent, which failing, the Antecedent must also needs faile, as thus: If he be wise, he is sree; but he is not free: Ergo, not wise.

Which is the third way?

The third way, is when by granting the Antecedent, the Consequent faileth, as thus: If he be not wise, he is wretched; but he is wise: Ergo, not wretched.

Which is the fourth way?

The fourth way, is when the former part of the maior Pro∣position disiunctiue being put, the latter part is cleane taken away, as thus: He is either good or euill; but he is good: Er∣go, not euill.

Which is the fift way?

The fift way, is when the former part of the Disiunctiue be∣ing taken away, the latter part must needs stand, as thus: He is either good or euill; but he is not good: Ergo, hee is euill; for all Syllogismes Disiunctiue, are made for the most part of parts repugnant, whereof there can be no more, but one true part.

Which is the sixt way?

The sixt way, is by putting a Negatiue before the Coniun∣ction copulatiue, so as it maketh the Antecedent to stand, and taketh away the Consequent, as thus: He is not both wise and wretched; but he is wise: Ergo, not wretched.

Which is the seuenth way?

The seuenth way, is when the Negatiue is placed in like manner before the Coniunction copulatiue, but yet so as the Antecedent being taken away, the Consequent doth stand, as thus: He is not both wise and wretched; but he is not wise: Ergo, wretched.

CHAP. XVI.

Of a Consequent, and by what meanes and rules the good∣nesse thereof is to be knowne.

BVt sith the goodnesse of an Hypotheticall Syl∣logisme dependeth vpon the goodnesse of the Consequent: it shall not bee amisse to treate heere of a Consequent, and first to define what it is, and to shew how it is diuided.

What is a Consequent?

A Consequent, is a speech consisting of such parts as doe follow one another, and are ioyned together with some ratio∣nall, (that is to say) an inferring or imploying Coniunction, as Ergo, then, therefore, and such like.

How many parts are requisite in a Consequent?

Three, that is, the Antecedent, the Consequent, and the in∣ferring Signe or Note, for of these three parts euery Conse∣quent consisteth.

How is it diuided?

Into two, that is, Good and Euill: againe, the good is di∣uided into two, that is, Formall and Materiall.

When is it said to be Formall?

When the Antecedent being true, the Consequent doth ne∣cessarily follow thereof, as when I say: This woman hath had a child, Ergo, shee hath laine with a man.

When is it said to be Materiall?

When the Consequent doth not of necessitie, but casually follow, the Antecedent being true: as Socrates walketh abroad: Ergo, it is faire weather.

Whereupon doth the goodnesse of a Consequent chiefely de∣pend?

It dependeth not so much of the truth of the Antecedent, and of the Consequent, as of the necessarie connexion, or knit∣ting of them together: and if the same be in forme of a Syllo∣gisme, it requireth also the precepts of Mood and Figure be∣fore taught to be obserued.

How else shall a man know whether a Consequent bee good or not?

By examining the same with the Maximes or generall rules of the places: whereof some doe yeeld proofes or causes ne∣cessarie, some probable, and some only coniecturall.

What rules doe the Schoole-men set downe to know a good Conse∣quent?

They set downe some more, some lesse, but Caesarius only re∣citeth two, which are these: The first is, if a Consequent doth necessarily follow of his Antecedent, then the contrary of the Antecedent must needs necessarily follow the contrary of the Consequent: As for example, because this is a good Cōsequent to say, it is a man: Ergo, it is a sensible body: it is a good Con∣quent to say, it is no sensible body: Ergo, it is no man: the rea∣son thereof is, because the contrary of the Consequent and the Antecedent cannot bee both true together, but one of them must needs be false. The second rule is, that whatsoeuer follow∣eth vpon a good Consequent, must needs also follow vpon the Antecedent therof: As for example, if it be a good Consequent to say, it is a man: Ergo, it is a sensible body: ye may aswel say, if it be a sensible body: Ergo, it is a substance: and sith that a sensi∣ble body is a substance, you may therefore aswel conclude that a man is a substāce. To these rules you may adde also the third, which is, that of true things, nothing can follow but truth: but of false things, sometime that which is false, and sometime that which is true, as hath bin said before: and yet such truth fol∣loweth not by vertue of the false premises, but because the cō∣clusion or Consequent is a true Proposition of it selfe: As in this example. Euery sensible body is a tree, but euery Peare∣tree is a sensible body: Ergo, euery Peare-tree is a tree.

CHAP. XVII.

Of a Syllogisme Demonstratiue.

HItherto we haue treated of a Syllogisme, accor∣ding to the first three of the foure diuisions thereof, before mentioned: for if yee remem∣ber well, we said that according to the first di∣uision, a Syllogisme is either Categoricall or Hypotheticall, according to the second diuision, eyther com∣mon or expository, according to the third diuision, eyther per∣fect or vnperfect, and according to the fourth diuision, ey∣ther Demonstratiue, Dialecticall, or Sophisticall, whereof we come now to speake, and first of a Syllogisme demonstra∣tiue.

What is a Syllogisme Demonstratiue?

A Syllogisme Demonstratiue is that which is made of ne∣cessarie, immediate, true, certaine, and infallible Propositi∣ons, being first and so knowne, as they neede none other proofe.

What meane yee by necessary and immediate Propositions?

Necessarie Propositions be those which cannot bee other∣wise, as those which doe consist of the generall kinde, of the speciall kinde, of the difference, or of the propertie, as hath beene said before: and therefore Aristotle maketh a difference betwixt a Demonstratiue and a Dialecticall Proposition, for a Demonstratiue Proposition consisting of matter naturall, is ne∣cessarily true, and cannot be otherwise, but a Dialecticall Pro∣position, consisting of matter contingent, or casuall, is onely probable, and may be otherwise.

What be immediate Propositions?

Immediate Propositions are those which are first, and haue none before them, whereby they can be proned: as euery sen∣sible bodie endued with reason is apt to learne. Aristotle al∣so setteth downe three properties or conditions belonging to the Subiect and Predicate of a Demonstratiue Proposition.

Which be those Properties?

These, to be spoken of all, by it selfe, and vniuersally.

What is to be spoken of all?

It is when the Predicate is knowne to be altogether and al∣waies in the Subiect, eyther as a part of the substance thereof, as when it is a generall kinde, the speciall kind, the difference, or the propertie, as some inseparable accident alwaies incident to the said subiect, as when I say: Euery man is a sensible bo∣die: or euery man is endued with reason: or euery man is apt to speake: or euery Swanne is white: or euery fire is hot.

What is to be spoken by it selfe?

That is, when the Predicate is eyther the definition of the Subiect, as a man is a sensible bodie endued with reason: or else some part of the Definition, as man is a sensible bodie, or man is endued with reason.

What is to be spoken vniuersally?

It is when the Predicate is in the Subiect, and in euery such Subiect by it selfe; and first, as when I say, a man is a sensible bodie endued with reason: heere this Predicate sensible bodie endued with reason, is not onely spoken of man, but of euery man in generall by it selfe: and first: for if yee should say, Pe∣ter or Socrates is a sensible bodie endued with reason: heere the Predicate is not spoken of any of these, as first, but in the second place, because they are comprehended vnder the word man. For generall kinds are said to be before speciall kindes, and special kinds before Indiuiduums, as hath bin said before.

How doth Aristotle define Demonstration?

In this sort: Demonstration is a Syllogisme made of such Propositions as are true: first immediat, and manifestly known, and be the causes of the conclusion: first and immediate here is all one, signifying such Propositions as need not to be pro∣ued or made more euident by any other former Propositions. Againe, the premises must be more knowne then the conclu∣sion, for otherwise it should neyther be Demonstration, nor yet good Syllogisme. Finally, the Premises must render the very cause of the conclusion: and therefore Aristotle in ano∣ther place saith, that Demonstration is a Syllogisme causing knowledge and science.

What is Science?

It is a firme and assured knowledge of any thing.

What is to know?

We are said to know a thing, when we know the true cau∣ses thereof, and that it cannot be otherwise: for to make a per∣fect Demonstration, we must not only shew that there is such a thing as we goe about to proue, but also we must shew the cause why it is so: for (as Aristotle saith) euery discipline and doctrine intellectiue dependeth vpon a former knowledge, which is two-fold, whereof the one is to know that the prin∣ciples (that is to say) the premises of the Demonstration bee true, and the other is to know the true signification of the Sub∣iect and Predicate of the question: for vnlesse a man know what the name of the Subiect signifieth, whereof the question riseth, and also the proper qualities of the same, how shall hee be able to iudge, whether the proofe which is brought in to proue the question withall be to the purpose or not? Againe, vnlesse he know the premises to be true, the Demonstration shall breed no certaine knowledge in him.

Giue example of a Syllogisme Demonstratiue.

Let this be your example: Euery sensible bodie endued with reason, is apt to learne: but euery man is a sensible body en∣dued with reason: Ergo, euery man is apt to learne. Heere you see that in this Syllogisme the premises being true and first, doe render the cause of the conclusion: and thereby doe imply a most true Consequent: for whoso would goe about to demonstrate any of the premises by some other former, or more knowne Propositions, should lose his labour, sith there is none before them more certaine, nor more knowne to proue this conclusion withall then they: for to vnderstand the truth of these premises, it sufficeth onely to know the signification of the termes, and to haue some experience of the thing called Man: and therefore this kinde of Demonstration is called of the Schoole-men, Syllogismus Scientificus, because it yeeldeth the perfect knowledge and Science of the thing in question.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the certaintie of Mans knowledge.

WHereof dependeth the certaintie of Mans know∣ledge?

Of three things, that is, of vniuersall expe∣rience, of principles, and of naturall know∣ledge that a man hath in iudging of Conse∣quents: for these be three infallible rules of certitude or truth in all kindes of doctrine.

What is vniuersall experience?

Vniuersall experience is the common iudgement of men, in such things as are to be perceiued and knowne by the outward sences: as Fire to be hot, the Heauens to turne round about, Wine and Pepper to bee hotte in operation, Women to bring forth children, and not Men: which things all men (vnlesse they be madde, and out of their wittes) must needs confesse to be true.

What be Principles?

Principles bee certaine generall conceptions and naturall knowledges grafted in mans minde of God, to the intent that by the helpe thereof, he might inuent such Arts as are necessa∣rie in this life for mans behoofe; for by the naturall knowledge of the minde we vnderstand, Number, Order, Proportion, and all other necessarie Artes and Sciences.

How doth Aristotle define Principles?

In this manner: Principles be true Propositions, hauing credit of themselues, and need no other proofe.

How many Diuisions doe the Schoole-men make Principles?

Diuers.

Rehearse those Diuisions.

The first is, of Principles, some be called Speculatiue, and some Practiue: The speculatiue be those naturall knowledges or Propositions, whereof Naturall Philosophie or the Mathe∣maticall Sciences be grounded, as these: The whole is more then his part: Those things which are equall to a third, are

equall among themselues: of one simple body, there is but one naturall mouing, and such like. The Principles Practiue, bee those naturall knowledges, whereby mens manners are gouer∣ned: for by this naturall light we know the difference betwixt good and euill: As for example: these be Principles Practiue: God is to be honored and obeyed: Iustice is to be embraced: ciuill societie is to be maintained, and the disturbers thereof to be punished: these and such like Propositions are naturally receiued of all men as infallible verities. Againe, of Principles, some be called Generall, and some Proper. The Generall, be those that may be applied to many Sciences, as these: the whole is more then any of his parts, if equall be taken from equall, e∣quall doe remaine and such like. The proper Principles bee those, that are properly belonging to some one certaine Sci∣ence, as a line to be a length without breadth, is a principle of Geometrie: Againe, this proposition, euery thing is, or is not, is a principle of Logick: and to be short, euery Science hath his proper principles: of which some bee called dignities or Maximes, and some Positions.

Wherefore are they called Dignities or Maximes?

For that they are worthy to be credited for their selfe sake, for so soone as we heare them in such speech as we vnderstand, wee naturally know them to bee true without any further proofe, as these. Take equall from equall, and equall will re∣maine: the whole is more then any of his parts, &c.

What be Positions?

Positions be those principles, which although they need no other proofe, yet they be not so easily vnderstood of all men at the first vttering, as Maximes bee: for in these, besides the knowledge of the termes, it is needfull to haue also some ex∣perience, as in these Principles. Euery thing that is compoun∣ded of matter and forme is moueable: whatsoeuer is heauie, tendeth naturally downeward, and whatsoeuer is light, ten∣deth vpwards. Againe, of Positions, some are called Defini∣tions, and some Suppositions, and of Suppositions, some are called Petitions, called in Latine Postulata, and some Supposi∣tions assumpted.

Define these kindes.

• 1 Definition sheweth what the thing is.
• 2 Supposition is that which supposeth a thing to be, or not to be, as the Geometricians do suppose that there is Punctum, (that is to say) a pricke, or a thing indiuisible, hauing nei∣ther length, bredth, nor depth.
• 3 Petition is a Proposition asked and granted to be true: as this is a petition in Geometry, that a man may draw a right line from one point to another.
• 4 Supposition assumpted is, when a manifest supposition is assumpted to proue another thing withall, as to proue that de∣monstration consisteth of true Propositions, the disputer will assumpt this assertion, which saith, that of false things there is no certaine knowledge: and trueth is not knowne but of true things.

What is the third thing wherof the certaintie of mans knowledge dependeth?

It is the knowledge that man hath in iudging of conse∣quents, which is not altogether artificiall, but partly naturall, for God thought it not sufficient for mans behoofe to know simple Propositions, as principles or common conceptions gotten by experience, vnlesse hee could also compare them together, and ioyne things like, and agreeable together, and seuer things vnlike, and disagreeing one from ano∣ther, and by such comparison and composition to finde out things before not knowne: and to the intent wee should not erre or wander out of the right way, God hath shewed vs an order, and prescribed certain bounds and limits of necessi∣tie to be obserued in such composition, which bounds are Syl∣logismes rightly made: for so do the Consequents plainly ap∣peare: And because that proportions are knowne by nature, it shall not be amisse to giue you an example in numbers: for three knowne numbers being placed in true order of a Syllo∣gisme, a fourth number vnknowne, of necessitie doth follow, as in this question: If one pound of waxe be worth a groat, what is tenne pound of waxe worth? Marrie ten groates, which is prooued by a Syllogisme in this manner: Euery pound of

waxe is worth a groat, but here is ten pound of waxe: Ergo, they are worth ten groats: and like as in these kindes of Syl∣logismes Arithmeticall, the proportion which is to be iudged by mans naturall knowledge, doth shewe the Consequent to be infallible, euen so the Consequents in other Syllogismes are shewed to be infallible, by such demonstrations as are not farre fetched, or doubtfull, but are manifest, plaine and eui∣dent.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the two kindes of Demonstration.

HOw doe the Schoolemen diuide Demonstration?

Into two; that is, perfect and vnperfect: and they call the perfect, demonstratio propter quid: and the vnperfect, demonstratio quia est.

It is perfect, when it proceedeth from the proper cause to the effect, called of the Schoolemen, à priore: for in that demonstration the Antecedent containeth the pro∣per and true cause of the consequent; as when we say, the Sun is vp: Ergo, it is day.

What is to be obserued in a perfect Demonstration?

That the Predicate of the Conclusion, which is also Predi∣cate in the Maior, be first, properly, alwayes, and that really and accidentally, incident to the subiect of the Maior, and to euery thing contained vnder the same, which subiect must bee some generall kind, and the very meane or proofe of your con∣clusion: As for example, if you would prooue a Cocke to be a feathered fowle, it were not a sufficient demonstration to say, that euery flying beast is a feathered fowle; for some beastes flie, that haue no feathers; as Backs, that flie in the night sea∣son. But if you say, that euery bird is a feathered fowle, & euery Cocke is a bird: Ergo, euery Cocke is a feathered fowle: you shall make a perfect demonstration, because the Subiect, and Predicate of the Maior, haue such conditions as are before re∣quired; for this Maior sheweth the thing to be, and also wher∣fore it is, which is done so often as the Predicate is the true de∣finition

of the Subiect: as when I say, Euery man is a sensible body endued with reason, or else some chiefe part of the defi∣nition, as when I say, Euery man is endued with reason, as hath been said before: for euery good demonstration is either made of a true definition, or taken frō the general kind, special kind, or else from the speciall difference, or propertie, yea, and some∣time they may bee taken out of the whole and of the parts, of the proper causes and effects, of perpetual adiacents, otherwise called common accidents, of proper acts, of contrarieties, and of diuine authoritie, whereof you haue had examples before in the treatise of places, and seates of arguments.

When is it said to be an vnperfect Demonstration?

When the premisses are true, implying a true Consequent, but yet are not first, neither doe they shew the originall cause of the Conclusion; as in this example: Euery sensible body is nourishable; but euery man is a sensible body: Ergo, euery man is nourishable: here though the premisses be true Propo∣sitions, yet they be not first, neither doe they shew the origi∣nal cause of the Conclusion: for the Maior of this Syllogisme may be proued by a former and more knowne Proposition; for that which is more generall, is more knowne then that which is lesse generall, as thus: Euery liuing body is nourish∣able; but euery sensible body is a liuing body: Ergo, euery sen∣sible body is nourishable. Againe, it is said to be vnperfect, when we proceed from the effect to the cause; as when we say, it is day: Ergo, the Sunne is vp. But that demonstration which proceedeth from the cause to the effect, is the more worthier, because we vse therein discourse of reason and vnderstanding: and in the other we onely iudge by the outward sences, wher∣of spring two principall kindes of Methode, (that is to say) compendious or short orders or wayes of teaching in all man∣ner of Sciences whereof the one is called composition, procee∣ding forward from the first to the last, and the other is called resolution, proceeding backward from the last to the first, as hath been said before in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Methode. Lib. 2. cap. 5.

CHAP. XX.

Of Science, Opinion, Ignorance, Witte, and of the foure Sciencial questions.

WHat other things are wont to bee treated of by the Schoolemen in demonstration?

Diuers things; as what difference is betwixt Science and Opinion: also they treate of the diuers kindes of Ignorance, of prompt Witte: and of the foure Scienciall questions.

What difference is betwixt Science and opinion?

Science, as hath been said before, is that which consisteth of necessary, certaine, and infallible Propositions, and of such things as cannot be otherwise. Opinion is the knowledge of things casuall, which may bee sometime false, and sometime true.

How many kindes of Ignorance doe the Schoolemen make?

Two: that is to say, absolute, which of the Schoolmen is called Ignorantia negationis, and ignorance by false conception, which they call Ignorantia affectionis. The first is, when we vt∣terly denie to haue any knowledge of a thing at all: The o∣ther is, when we thinke to know that which we know not, be∣ing deceiued by some false perswasion, whereunto we are af∣fected, whereof it is called Ignorantia affectionis.

How doth Aristotle define prompt Witte, called of the Latines Solertia?

He defineth it to be a promptnesse or readinesse, in quickly finding out the proofe or cause of any thing that is in questi∣on, without any studie.

Which be the foure Sciential questions?

These: whether the thing be, what it is, how it is, and wher∣fore it is: whereof the first enquireth of the Subiect, whether it be: the second of the Predicate, as what it is: the third, how it is, (that is to say) how the Predicate is spoken of the Sub∣iect: and the fourth asketh the cause why it is spoken of the Subiect? And thus much of a Syllogisme Demonstratiue: now of a Syllogisme Dialecticall, or probable.

CHAP. XXI.

Of a Syllogisme Dialecticall.

WHat is a Dialecticall Syllogisme?

A Dialecticall Syllogisme is that which is made of probable and credible Propositions.

What things are said to be probable?

Things probable, according to Aristotle, are these that seeme true to all men, or to the most part of men, or to all wise men, or to the most part of wise men, or else to the most approued wise men: whereby it appeareth that things probable may be said fiue manner of wayes.

Shew how.

First, those things are probable, which vnto all men aswell learned as vnlearned being in their right wits, doe seeme to be true, as these: Euery mother loueth her childe: we loue them that loue vs: we must doe good to them that doe good to vs. Secondly, those things that seeme true to most men, as these: it is better for a communalty to be ruled by one Prince, then by many: It is not good to serue many masters at once. Third∣ly, those things that seeme true to all wise men, as these: what thing soeuer is honest, the same is also profitable: Vertue is better then riches. Fourthly, those that seeme true to the most part of the wise and learned, as thus: the soule of man is im∣mortall: the Sunne is greater then the earth. Fiftly, those things that seeme true to the most approued wise men, as these: The world had a beginning: it is better for a Prince to be lo∣ued, then feared of his Subiects. And generally vnder things probable are contained all true Propositions that be casuall, and not implying any necessitie. I say here true Propositions, to exclude false Propositions, whereof Sophisticall Syllo∣gismes are made, and not those which we call probable or Lo∣gicall Syllogismes; and yet such Propositions be not so true in deede, as those that bee required in a Syllogisme demonstra∣tiue, but onely doe seeme true, ingendring a certaine opinion in mans minde, doubting notwithstanding the contrary: for

it breedeth not a perfect knowledge as Science doth, whereby the minde is of all doubts throughly resolued. And note here, that the Schoolemen doe make the matter (whereof a Diale∣cticall Syllogisme doth consist) to be twofold, that is, Mate∣ria remota, in English, farre off: and Materia propinqua, (that is to say) nigh, or neere at hand.

What doth Materia remota containe?

These foure Dialecticall Predicates, (that is) Definition, called of the Schoolemen Terminus, property, generall kinde, and Accident: All which Predicates are before defined, and are called Predicates, because they are common words spoken of others. But truely I see no cause why these foure Predicates should be attributed to a Dialectical Syllogisme, more then to a Syllogisme demonstratiue: for sure I am, that as good de∣monstrations may be made of these as of any other Predicats.

What is contained vnder Materia propinqua?

These: a Dialecticall Proposition, Probleme, and Position.

What difference is betwixt these three words, Dialecticall Pro∣position, Probleme, and Position?

A Dialecticall Proposition is a probable question vttered with a simple Interrogatory; as whether the mother loueth her childe? which is no question in deede, but to him that asketh.

A Probleme is a doubtfull question vttered with a double Interrogatory, as whether the least fixed starre in the firma∣ment be greater then the Moone or not? or whether that the Sunne be bigger then the earth or not? Position is a wonder∣full opinion maintained by some excellent Clerke, as to say, that all things are but one essence or being, as Melissus affir∣med, or that all things doe continually flowe and change, as Heraclitus held, or that the earth moueth, and not the heauens, as Copernicus supposeth, onely to finde out thereby the true motions of the Planets, and not for that he thought so in deed.

CHAP. XXII.

Of a sophisticall Syllogisme.

WHat is a Sophisticall or false Syllogisme?

A false Syllogisme is that which is either made of false Propositions, or else of such as seeme probable, and be not in deede, or else of probable premisses not rightly concluding: and of such Syllogismes there be three sortes, the one failing in matter, the other in forme, the third in both.

When is it said to faile in matter?

It faileth in matter, when the Syllogisme hauing true forme, is made of such Propositions as seeme probable, and bee not probable in deede, as thus: no opposites are both true at once, but subcontraries are opposites: Ergo, they are not true. Here though this Maior seemeth probable, because many oppo∣sites, as contraries, and contradictories be neuer both true at once, yet it is not probable in deede: for those opposites which be called subcontrarie and subalternate, may bee both true at once as hath been before.

When is it said to faile in forme?

It faileth in forme, when it is made of probable premisses, not rightly concluding: because they be not orderly disposed according to Moode and Figure, as thus: Some opposites are both true at once, but contradictories are opposites: Ergo, Contradictories are both true at once. Here the premisses be probable, but the Syllogisme halteth in forme, because that of meere particulars no good conclusion can follow.

When is it said to faile both in matter and forme?

It faileth both in matter and forme, when the premisses are neither probable, nor yet doe conclude rightly according to the rules of Logicke, as thus: No opposites are both true at once, but subcontraries are opposites: Ergo, no subcontraries are both true at once. Here first it faileth in matter, because the Maior, (as hath been said before) is not probable in deed. A∣gaine, it faileth in forme, because that contrary to the rules of a

Syllogisme, an vniuersall conclusion is implied, one of the pre∣misses being particular, which should not be.

Is there no other kindes of false Syllogismes?

Yes, there is another kinde of false Syllogisme, called of A∣ristotle, Syllogismus falsigraphus, which proceedeth of the pro∣per principles of some discipline, misconstrued, or not rightly vnderstood, as thus: All lines drawne from one selfe-point to another selfe-point, be equall, a right line and a crooked line be drawne from one selfe-point to another selfe-point: Ergo, a right line and a crooked line be equal, as you see in the figure* 1.4 a. b. in the Margent: Here the Maior being a principle in Ge∣ometrie, is not rightly vnderstood; for the right meaning of the principle is, that the lines should be also drawn in one selfe space, and then they must needes be equall, (that is to say) all of one length: but as touching false Syllogismes, wee shall treate of them hereafter more at large in the Elenches: in the meane time we minde to speake of the other kindes of argu∣ments before mentioned; and first of Induction.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Induction.

WHat is Induction?

Induction is a kind of argument, wherein we proceede from many particulars to a vniuersall conclusion, comprehending all the said particu∣lars: and by the particulars here I mean not only singularities, called in Latine Indiuidua, but also such things as be lesse common then that vniuersall which is concluded; as when we proceed from many speciall kinds, to some generall kinde comprehending the same, or from things lesse common to more common.

What is to be obserued in this kind of reasoning?

That the particulars be all of like nature; for if there be any one contrary or vnlike to the rest, then the Induction is not good.

How manifold is Induction?

Twofold: Perfect, and Vnperfect: it is called perfect, when all the singularities are rehearsed: and vnperfect, when but some certaine parts are only recited.

Giue example of Induction.

Of an Induction, proceeding from meere singularities vnto vniuersall, let this be your example: Malmesie is hot, Gascoin wine is hot, Romney wine is hot, Sack is hot, Renish wine is hot, French wine is hot, & sic de singulis: Ergo, Euery wine is hot; which may bee brought into a Syllogisme thus: Euery thing that is wine, be it eyther of Greece, Spaine, Italy, Ger∣many, France, or of any other countrey is hot, but euery wine is one of these: Ergo, euery wine is hot.

Giue example of an Induction proceeding from the speciall kinds to their generall kinds?

Of an Induction proceeding from the speciall kindes to the generall kind, let this be your example: Euery Man hath mo∣uing, euery Horse hath mouing, euery Oxe hath mouing, & sic de singulis: Ergo, euery sensible body hath mouing. In which example you see, that to euery speciall kinde is added an vni∣uersall signe to make your Induction good, which would not be so, if you should vse a particular signe, in saying, some Man, some Horse, some Oxe, and so forth.

Which of these two kindes of reasoning, eyther an Induction or a Syllogisme is most familiar and easie to man?

Induction is more familiar to man then a Syllogisme, for the Syllogisme proceedeth from vniuersalities vnto particulari∣ties, which vniuersalities be more knowne to nature (that is to say) to the discourse of reason, and lesse knowne to our out∣ward sences. But Induction proceedeth from particularities vnto vniuersalities, which particularities are more knowne vn∣to vs, (that is to say) to our outward sences, and lesse knowne to Nature. Againe, by Induction wee are able to proue the principles of Demonstration, which are not otherwise to bee proued, as this principle: Euery whole is more then his part, may be proued by Induction in this sort: This whole is more then his part, and that whole is more then his part, neyther is there to be found any whole, but that is more then his part:

Ergo, Euery whole is more then his part. Also this principle, Euery sensible bodie endued with reason is apt to learne, may be proued thus: This man is apt to learne; and that man is apt to learne, and so of the rest: Ergo, Euery sensible body endued with reason is apt to learne.

CHAP. XXIIII.

Of an Enthimeme.

WHat is an Enthimeme?

An Enthimeme is an vnperfect Syllogisme, made for haste or speed of two Propositions only, (that is) of one of the Premisses, called in this kind of argument the Antecedent, and of the conclusion called heere the Consequent, for the other of the Premisses being supposed to be true and well knowne, is left out of purpose, as a thing superfluous, and not needfull to be recited, and sometime the Maior is left out, as thus: Vo∣luptuousnesse is not perpetuall nor proper, it is not therefore the chiefe felicitie: and sometime the Minor is left out, as heere: Euery good thing maketh his possessor the better, ther∣fore voluptuousnesse is not good.

How shall a man know when the Maior or Minor is left out?

It is easie to know which of the Premisses is left out by this meanes, for if the Subiect of the Antecedent and of the Con∣sequent be all one, then the Maior is left out, but if they bee not all one, but diuers, then the Minor is left out, as you may see in the two last examples, and the part lacking, being redu∣ced together with the rest into a Syllogisme, will quickly shew the truth or falsehood of the Argument.

From whence are such kindes of Arguments gathered?

They are gathered for the most part from signes, which if they be necessarie, then the Enthimeme also is necessarie, as thus: The woman giueth milke: Ergo, shee hath had a childe, or is with childe; if the signes be probable, then the Enthi∣meme is also probable, as thus: This man is a night-gadder: Ergo, he is a thiefe.

CHAP. XXV.

Of an Example.

WHat is an Example?

An Example is a kind of Argument, where∣in wee proceed from one particular to proue another particular, by reason of some likenes that is betwixt them, as thus: God did not pu∣nish the Niniuites because they repented: Ergo, Hee will not punish vs if we repent. God did not let to plague King Dauid for adulterie: Ergo, He will not let to plague any other King for committing the same offence.

Wherein differeth this kinde of Argument from the rest?

This kinde of Argument differeth in forme from all the rest before taught, for a Syllogisme proceedeth from the generall kinde to the speciall kinde, or otherwise. An Enthimeme imi∣tating a Syllogisme, reciteth in his Antecedent the cause of the Conclusion. Againe, an Induction out of many particularities gathereth an vniuersalitie, none of which things is to be found in an Example, proceeding onely from one particular to ano∣ther like particular. Notwithstanding Aristotle saith, that it may be reduced partly to an Induction, and partly to a Syllo∣gisme: for in taking the first particular, you may by an vnper∣fect Induction imply an vniuersall Proposition. And so from that vniuersall Proposition to proceed by order of Syllogisme vnto the other particular implyed in the conclusion of the Ex∣ample, as in this Example: Iuaas died euill: Ergo, Pilate also died euill: it may be first reduced into an vnperfect Induction thus: Iudas dyed euill, because hee was the author of Christs death, and did not repent: Ergo, Euery man that was author of Christs death, and did not repent, died euill. Into a Syllo∣gisme thus: Euery man that was author of Christs death, and did not repent, died euil; but Pilat was author of Christs death, and did not repent: Ergo, Pilate died euill.

Whereto serues this kinde of reasoning by Example?

Examples are very good in all morall matters, to perswade, or disswade.

What is to be obserued in reasoning by way of Example?

You must in any wise be sure that the similitude or likenesse of the particulars doe make to the purpose which you intend, and that it be the very cause why the Predicate of the Antece∣dent properly belongeth to the Subiect, for otherwise the ar∣gument is not good; for if you should reason thus: Iudas died euill: Ergo, Peter died euill: because they were both sinners: for their likenes in this behalfe is not the cause that Iudas died euill, but the cause before alledged.

From whence is this kinde of argument fetched?

From the places of Comparison, as from the like, from the more, and from the lesse, of all which the generall rule or Maxime is thus: In things like, is like iudgement or reason, as hath beene said before in the Treatise of Places. Thus farre of the foure principall kinds of reasoning: now of the rest, and first.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of the Argument called Sorites.

WHat is Sorites?

Sorites is a kinde of Argument proceeding as it were by certaine degrees vnto the Con∣clusion, which is gathered of many Propositi∣ons necessarily following one another, and are knit together, so as the Predicate of the first Proposition is the Subiect of the second, and the Predicate of the second the Subiect of the third, and so forth euen to the last Proposition, whose Predicate being ioyned to the Subiect of the first Pro∣position, doth make the Conclusion as thus: The Soule of man doth moue it selfe: whatsoeuer moueth it selfe, is the begin∣ning of mouing: the beginning of mouing hath no end, what∣soeuer hath no end, is immortall: Ergo, the Soule of man is immortall.

When is this kinde of Argument said to be of force?

When it is made of Affirmatiue Propositions, wherein words of affinitie are necessarily ioyned together, as when kindes generall, differences, or properties, are ioyned with those speciall kindes, of whom they are spoken, or when pro∣per effects are ioyned with their proper causes, for if the Pro∣positions be eyther Negatiue, or doe not necessarily hang to∣gether, then it is no good Argument, as in Negatiues let this be your example: A Man is not a Lion, a Lion is a sensible beast: Ergo, Man is not a sensible beast. Now of Propositions not hanging necessarily together, because that proper effects are not ioyned with their proper causes, let this common iest be your example:

Whoso drinketh well, sleepeth well, Whoso sleepeth well, sinneth not, Whoso sinneth not, shall be blessed: Ergo, Whoso drinketh well, shall be blessed.

Which is no good Conclusion, for much drinke is not alwayes the cause of sleepe, nor sleeping the cause of not sin∣ning.

The Rhetoricians vse another kinde of Argument, called Gradatio, which is much like to Sorite•…•…, sauing that the Sub∣iect of the first Proposition is not rehearsed in the Conclu∣sion, for they vse it rather as an ornament of speech, then as a proofe, as the vertue of SCIPIO wanne him Fame, Fame got him Enemies, and his Enemies procured his death.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of diuers other kindes of Arguments, and first of a Di∣lemma, and what kindes it compre∣hendeth.

THere be also other formes of Arguments, whereof some be Fallaxes, and some are good Conclusions, and they be these, Dilemma, Enumeratio, Sim∣plex Conclusio, Subiectio, Oppositio, Vio∣latio.

What is Dilemma?

Dilemma is an Argument made of two members, repug∣nant one to another, whereof which soeuer thou grantest, thou art by and by taken, as thus: It is not good to marrie a wife, for if shee be faire, shee will be common, if foule, then loathsome: notwithstanding, this is but a slipperie kinde of argument, vnlesse both the repugnant parts be such, as neyther of them can bee turned againe vpon the maker of the argu∣ment, for then by conuersion, the Dilemma is soone confuted, as for example, you may conuert both parts of the argument last recited thus: It is good to marry a wife, for if she be faire, she shall not be loath some, if foule, then not common: much like to this is that captious Argument, which Protagoras the Lawyer made against his Scholler Euathlus, who had coue∣nanted to pay his Master a certaine summe of mony at the first Suite or Action that he should winne by pleading at the Law: whereupon his Master did afterwards commence an Action a∣gainst him, and in reasoning with him of the matter, made him this Dilemma: Eyther (saith he) iudgement shall bee giuen a∣gainst thee, or with thee: if against thee, then thou must pay me by vertue of the iudgement; if iudgement bee giuen with thee, then thou must also pay me by couenant; which the Schol∣ler immediately confuted by conuersion in this sort: Eyther (saith he) iudgement shall be giuen with me, or against me; if with mee, then I shall bee quit by Law; if against mee, then I ought to pay nothing by couenant.

What other iutricate kindes of reasoning are said to be compre∣hended vnder Dilemma?

Diuers, whereof some be called Certains or horned Argu∣ments, some Crocodolites, some Assistatons, some Pseudome∣nons.

Define all these kindes, and giue examples.

• 1 The horned Argument is, when by some subtile and craf∣tie manner of questioning, we seeke to haue such an answere, as we may take vantage therof, as the Pharises did, when they questioned with Christ touching the payment of Tribute to Caesar.
• 2 The Crocodolite is, when being deceiued by some craf∣tie manner of questioning, we doe admit that which our Ad∣uersary turneth againe vpon vs, to our own hindrance, as in the fable of the Crocodile, whereof this name Crocodolite pro∣ceedeth: for it is said, that the Crocodile hauing taken away a childe from his mother, reasoned with her in this sort; I will deliuer thee thy childe againe, if thou wilt say a troth: whether therfore shall I deliuer him or not? The mother answered, thou shalt not deliuer him, and therefore of right thou oughtest to deliuer him. No, saith he, I will not deliuer him, to the intent it may seeme that thou hast said troth; and though thou had∣dest said that I should deliuer him, yet I would not deliuer him indeed, for making thee a lyar.
• 3 Assistaton, is a kinde of cauelling, not consisting of any sure ground, as if a man did say, that he doth hold his peace, or lyeth, or knoweth nothing; another by and by might cauill thereof in this sort: Ergo, He that holdeth his peace, speaketh, he that lyeth, saith truth, he that knoweth nothing, knoweth something.
• 4 Pseudomenon, is a false or lying kinde of cauelling, as thus: The heauen couereth all things: Ergo, it couereth it selfe. Epimenides, being a Candiot himselfe, said, That the Candiotes were lyers; the question is, whether he said true or not; for though he said true, and that the Candiotes were lyers, yet it is false, because a Candiot said it: againe, if the Candiotes be no lyers, nor Epimenides is a lyer, then hee is to be beleeued.

How are the Fallaxes of these captious Arguments to be found out?

The Fallaxes of all these kindes of captious Arguments are soone found out, if wee consider well the rules before taught, touching the rep•…•…gnances of Propositions, as whether there be any ambiguitie in the Termes, and whether the selfe-same Termes in the repugnant parts haue respect to one selfe-thing, time, or place, or not: it is good also to consider the substance, quantitie, and qualitie of the Propositions: for in the last ex∣ample, this saying Candiotes be lyers, is a Proposition indefi∣nite, and therefore is not of such force, as to say, all Candiotes be lyers, which is an vniuersall Proposition, for of particular Premisses nothing rightly followeth. In the other examples you shall finde that there is some doubtfulnesse in the Termes, hauing respect eyther to diuers things, to diuers times, or di∣uers places, as to say, he holdeth his peace when he speaketh: Heere is doubtfulnesse in the Termes, hauing respect to diuers things, that is to say, as well to those things, which hee mea∣neth to keepe in silence, as to those words which hee vttereth by mouth: so in this word, Suite, in the example of Protagoras was doubtfulnesse, for that Protagoras meant some other Suite, and not that which he himselfe commenced.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of Enumeration.

WHat is Enumeration?

Enumeration is a kinde of Argument, wher∣in many things being reckoned vp and denied, one thing onely of necessitie remaineth to bee affirmed, as thus: Sith thou hast this Horse, ey∣ther thou didst buy him, or he came to thee by inheritance, or hee was giuen thee, or bred at home with thee, or else thou didst take him from thine enemie in time of warre; or if none of these were, then thou must needs steale him: but thou ney∣ther boughtest him, nor he fell not vnto thee by inheritance,

nor was giuen thee, •…•…or bred vp at home with thee, nor yet taken by thee from the enemie: it followeth therefore of neces∣sitie that thou hast stolne him.

When is this kind of argument to be confuted?

When your aduersary can prooue any necessary part to bee left out.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of a simple Conclusion.

WHat is a simple Conclusion?

A simple Conclusion is no other thing, but a necessary Enthymeme, in the which the Conse∣quent doth necessarily follow the antecedent, as thus: shee hath had a childe: Ergo, she hath layne with a man.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Subiection.

WHat is Subiection?

Subiection is a questioning kinde of Argu∣ment, in the which wee confute each question with a reason immediatly following the same, as thus: How is this fellow become so wel mo∣neyed? had he any great Patrimonie left him? No, for all his Fathers lands were sold. Came there any inheritance to him by discent any otherwise? No, for hee was disinherited of all men. Came there any goods vnto him by Executorship, &c. If then hee hath not been enriched by any of these honest wayes, either he hath a golden Myne at home, or else hee is come to these riches by some vnlawfull meanes. This argument faileth when any principall part is left out, and therefore differeth not much from Enumeration before recited.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Opposition.

WHat is Opposition?

Oppositio•…•… is a kind of Argument, made of Repugnant parts, wherein we reuert from the Opposite of the first Proposition, vnto the same Proposition againe, as thus: If I were in the Citie at such time as this man was slaine in the Countrey, then I slew him not; this Proposition is now a simple Conclusion, and may be made an Opposition in this maner: If I had been in the Countrey at such time as you say this man was slaine, then you might well suspect mee to haue slaine him: but sith I was not there at that time, there is no cause therefore why you should suspect mee.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of Violation.

WHat is Uiolation?

Violation is a kinde of Concluding, more meete to confute then to prooue, whereby we shew the reason of our aduersarie, to make for vs, and not for him, as thus: it is not good to marrie a wife, because that of marriage many times commeth the losse of children to our great sorrow, yea, rather it is good therefore to marrie a wife, to get other children for our com∣fort. Thus much touching the diuers kindes of reasoning: now we will treate of Fallaxes, or false Conclusions, and shew how •…•…o confute them.

Heere endeth the fift Booke of Logick.

THE SIXT BOOKE OF LOGICKE.

CHAP. I.

Of Confutation.

THere be some that make two kinds of Con∣futation, the one belonging to person, the other to matter. Confutation of person is done either by taunting, rayling, rendring checke for checke, or by scorning, and that either by wordes, or else by countenance, gesture and action: which kinde of Confu∣tation, because it belongeth rather to scof∣fing then to true order of reasoning, I will leaue to speake thereof, dealing onely with that Confutation that belongeth to matter, which is two-fold, the one generall, the other speciall: it is generall, when wee affirme that the Argument faileth either in forme, in mat∣ter, or in both. Againe, the generall Confutation is done three manner of wayes, that is, either by denying the Consequent, by making distinction, or by instance, (that is to say) by bringing in a contrary Example.

Shew when these three wayes are to be vsed.

If the Argument faile in forme, then wee must denie the consequent.

Giue Examples.

Discipline is necessarie, but the Ceremonies of Moses are discipline, therefore the Ceremonies of Moses are neces∣sary: here you must denie the Consequent, because that of meere particulars nothing followeth: and to be short, when any Argument is made contrary to the rules of Figure and Moode before taught, the Consequent is not good, and therefore to bee denied, as here: euery couetous man doth violate the lawes of liberalitie; but euery prodigall man doth violate the lawes of liberalitie; therefore euery prodigall man is a couetous man: This Syllogisme, being of the second Fi∣gure, is made in Barbara, which Moode belongeth not to that Figure: But if the Argument fayle in matter, that is, when either one of the premisses, or both are false, then it may be confuted aswell by denying the false part, bee it Ma∣ior or Minor, as by vsing distinction: and to finde out the falsenesse of the matter, it is necessary alwayes to haue re∣spect to the Maxims of the places, from whence the proofe is fetched; for they doe shew which Propositions are true, and which are not; as for example in this Argument: No pain∣ted speach becommeth Philosophers, but eloquence is painted speach: Ergo, eloquence becommeth no Philosophers: here the Maior is to bee denied, because it is a false definition: for the true definition of eloquence is to speake wisely, aptly, a∣dornedly, and to the purpose, and not to vse painted wordes vainely: Againe, whoso worshippe•…•…h God the Creator, wor∣shippeth the true God; the Turkes worship God the Creator: Ergo, the Turkes worship the true God: This Argument is to be denied, because the Minor is false; for no man can truely worship God the Creator, vnlesse he worship also Iesus Christ his Sonne, which the Turkes doe not, and therefore they worship a fained Idole, and not the true God.

When is distinction to be vsed?

When either the words or matter is doubtfull.

Giue examples of both.

All Verbes actiue doe signifie action, but God vsed this Verbe Actiue Indurabo, in saying, I will harden Pharaohs heart: Ergo, God did harden Pharaohs heart: here distincti∣on

is to bee made; for Verbes actiue haue diuers significati∣ons, according to the diuersities of the Tongues wherein they are vttered: for in the Hebrew Tongue, Verbes actiue doe signifie permission or sufferance, aswell as action; as these wordes I will harden Pharaohs heart (is as much to say) as I will suffer Pharaohs heart to bee hardened; likewise whereas wee say in the Lords Prayer, Leade vs not into temptation, is as much to say, as, suffer vs not to bee led into temptation: Againe, ambiguitie may bee in this matter, as thus: no sinnes are heard of God: but all men are sinners; therefore no men are heard of God: here distinction is to be made be∣twixt penitent sinners, and impenitent: for God will he are the penitent sinner: although hee will not heare the impenitent sinner.

When is confutation by instance vsed?

When the Argument, though it faile neither in sorme, nor matter, yet perhaps it is neither so strong, nor so proba∣ble, but that a stronger and more probable may be made a∣gainst it.

Giue example.

Whoso killeth any Ambassadours in their iourneying, doth violate the Lawes of Armes: but the Frenchmen kil∣led our Ambassadour iourneying to Spaine: Ergo, the French∣men in so doing did violate the Lawes of Armes: Here to the Maior a man may answere by instance, thus: the Athe∣nians killed the Ambassadours of the Lacedemonians iour∣neying to the Kings of Persia, because they went to pro∣cure his aide, to destroy the Citie of Athens: So likewise the Romanes did intercept the Legates of Hanibal going to the King of the Macedonians for the like intent; and yet nei∣ther of these people did thinke to breake the Lawes of Armes, by doing that which should preserue their State and Com∣mon-weale.

CHAP. II.

Of speciall confutation.

WHat is speciall confutation?

Speciall Confutation is, when we confute a∣ny false argument, by detecting and shewing the Fallax thereof, naming the Fallax by his proper name.

What order do h Aristotle obserue in treating of speciall Confu∣tation?

Aristotle first treateth in generall of all those things that commonly appertaine to the disputations of learned men, as first he treateth of an Elench, which is asmuch to say as repre∣hension, then of Syllogismes, and of disputation, and also of the markes and endes of Sophistry, and whereto they tend.

How defineth he an Elench or Reprehension?

Reprehension or Elench (sayeth he) is a Syllogisme which gathereth a conclusion contrary to the assertion of the respon∣dent, as if a man would defend Medea: not to loue her childe because she killed it, another might reason against him in this maner: euery mother loueth her child: but Medea is a mother: Ergo, Medea loueth her child: the Cōclusion of this Syllogisme is contrarie to the first assertion: and note here by the way, that there be two sorts of Elenches, the one true & the other false, it is said to be true▪ when it rightly gathereth a cōtrary conclu∣sion to the respondents assertion: And false, when it fayleth in any part requisite to a true Elench: of which partes wee shall speake hereafter, when we come to treate of the Fallax called Ignorance of the Elench, which is one of the fiue endes or markes whereunto Sophistrie tendeth, for a true Elench see∣meth to belong vnto Dialecticall disputation, rather then to Sophisticall disputation. But now leauing to define a Syllo∣gisme, because it hath beene defined before, and therefore not needfull here againe to be rehearsed, I will proceede to Dis∣putation.

CHAP. III.

Of Disputation: and how manifolde it is.

DIsputation is a contention about some questi∣on taken in hand, either for finding out of truth, or else for exercise sake, and there bee foure kindes of disputation, whereof the first is called doctrinall, because it appertay∣neth to Science.

The second is called Dialecticall, which belongeth to proba∣ble opinion.

The third is called Tentatiue, which serueth to trie another mans knowledge, in any kinde of Science.

The fourth is called Sophisticall, which tendeth onely to deceiue.

Giue examples of all these foure kindes?

The Doctrinal Disputation vseth no other but Syllogismes Demonstratiue as this is, whatsoeuer hath reason, is capable of learning; but Iohn hath reason: Ergo, Iohn is capable of lear∣ning. Dialecticall Disputation vseth onely probable Syllo∣gismes, as the former example of Medea, euery mother loueth her child; but Medea is a mother: Ergo, Medea loueth her childe: against this another probable argument may be made thus: whosoeuer killeth her child, loueth not her childe: but Medea killed her child: Ergo, she loued not her child. Tenta∣tiue disputation vseth such arguments as are made of the first common principles of any science, in which principles who so is ignorant, cannot be skilful in that Science; as if a man would professe Geometrie, and know not the definitions of a point, or pricke of a line, or superficies, or of such common Maxims, as these are; the whole is more then his part: take equall from equall, and equall remaine, &c. should quickly bewray his owne ignorance.

Sophisticall disputation vseth nothing but decei•…•…full argu∣ments, or Fallaxes, whereof there be thirteene kindes hereafter set downe: but first I will shew you which be the fiue Markes and Ends of Sophistrie.

CHAP. IIII.

Of the fiue Markes and Endes of Sophistrie.

ARistotle saith, that the fraudulent disputation of the Sophister, tendeth alwayes to one of these fiue Ends or Markes; that is, either by force of argument, to bring you into some absurditie, which he calleth Elench; that is to say, a repre∣hension or reproofe, or else to make you to confesse that which is manifestly false, or to grant some Pa∣radox, which is asmuch to say as an opinion contrary to all mens opinions: or to allow of incongrue speach contrarie to the rules of Grammar, called in Latine, Solecismus, or to ad∣mit some vaine repetition, called in Latine Nugatio.

Giue example of all these fiue Markes.

Of the first Marke, let this be your example: If in disputing of Vertue, you haue perhaps granted, that the meditation of Vertue doth make a man sad, the Sophister will force you by argument, to denie againe that which you before granted, thus: all things that bee contrarie, har•…•… contrary effects: but it is proper to vice to make the minde of man sad: Ergo, Vertue maketh his minde glad: This kinde of reasoning is more plainely taught before, when wee talked of Reduction by impossibilitie.

Of the second Marke let this be your example: Euery dog hath power to barke; but there is a certaine Starre called the Dog: Ergo, that starre hath power to barke. The Fallax of this argument consisteth onely in the word Dogge, which is equi∣uoke, as shall bee declared more at large hereafter, when wee come to speake of that Elench or Fallax.

Of the Paradox, which is the third Marke, let this be your example: the Sophister will make you to grant, that a rich and happie King is wretched, by force of argument, thus: Whosoeuer is subiect to sin, is wretched: but all rich and hap∣py Kings are subiect to sinne: Ergo, all rich and happy Kings

are wretched and miserable: in this is also a Fallax, because that happinesse is spoken heere in two respects, for there is worldly happinesse, and heauenly happinesse.

Of the fourth marke called incongruitie of speech, I can hardly giue you any fit example in our natiue tongue, because that our English Adiectiues doe not differ in Case, Gender, and Number, and therefore I pray you content your selfe with this Latine example, for it is an easier matter for an English∣man to speake false Latine, then false English: the Sophister will make you to allow of this false Latine, mulier est candi∣dus, by force of argument thus: Omnis homo est candidus, at mu∣lier est homo, ergo mulier est candidus; the English whereof is thus: Euery man is white, but woman is man: Ergo, a wo∣man is white: heere this word white in the Latine is of the Masculine gender, contrarie to the rules of Grammar, but this may be very wel referred to the Fallax, called forme of speech, hereafter declared.

Of the fift marke called Nugation, let this be your exam∣ple: the Sophister will make you to allow of this vaine repe∣tition: Plato is learned, a man learned, by force of argument thus: Plato is learned, but Plato is a man learned: Ergo, Plato is learned; a man learned: heere the premisses and the conclu∣sion are all one thing, and therefore contrarie to the rules of Logick. But leauing these things as superfluous, and in my iudgement seruing to small purpose, if I may so say without offence, I minde therefore now to returne to my matter first intended.

CHAP. V.

How to confute all manner of Elenches, or Fallaxes whatsoeuer they be.

EVery Fallax consisteth eyther in words or in things: and of those that consist in words, there are in number sixe, and of others consi∣sting in things, there are seuen, so as in all there be thirteene, as I said before.

Which be those sixe that consist in words?

Equiuocation, Amphibologie, or doubtfull speech, Con∣iunction, Diuision, Accent, and Figure, or forme of speech.

Shew what these Fallaxes be, and giue examples?

Equiuocation is, when the deceit consisteth in the doubt∣fulnesse* 1.5 of some one word, hauing diuers significations, as for example: Euery Dogge is a sensible bodie, there is a certaine Starre called a Dogge: Ergo, That Starre is a sensible bodie: heere the Conclusion is to be denied, because this word Dog hath diuers significations: another example, the Propher saith that there is no euill in the Citie, but God doth it; but there be horrible euils in the Citie: Ergo, God is the Author of e∣uill: the Conclusion is to be denied, because in the Maior this word euill signifieth punishment, and in the Minor it signifieth sinne: another example, Whosoeuer loueth Christ, obserueth his word, and is beloued of the Father: but no bodie that breaketh the Law, obserueth the word of Christ; therefore no bodie is beloued of the Father: heere the Maior is doubtfull, because this voyce, Word, may be taken eyther for the word of the Law, or else for the word of the Gospell, which the A∣postles did euer keepe, as Christ himselfe saith, and therefore they were beloued of the Father, and so consequently euery true Christian, that doth keepe the pure doctrine of Christ, is beloued of the Father: but the word of the Law saith, that e∣uery one is cursed that abideth not in all.

Amphibologia or doubtfull speech, is when some whole* 1.6

sentence is doubtfull, and may bee interpreted diuers wayes, as the Oracle of Apollo, in saying that Cressus passing the Ri∣uer of Halis, shall ouerthrow a great Empire, by which Ora∣cle was meant that hee should ouerthrow his owne Empire, and not the Persian Empire, which by wrong construing that Oracle, he hoped to subdue.

Composition or coniunction, is the ioyning together of* 1.7 things that are to be seuered. As for example, two and three be euen and odde, but fiue maketh two and three, therefore fiue is both euen and odde: which kinde of argument is to be denied, because those things are ioyned together, which ought to be seuered.

Diuision is, when things are seuered, which should be ioy∣ned* 1.8 together, as, all the wise men of Greece are seuen: Solon and Periander are wise men of Greece▪ therefore Solon and Pe∣riander are seuen: heere the Consequent is to be denied, be∣cause Solon and Periander are seuered from the rest whereunto they should be ioyned.

The Fallax of Accent is, when words are not rightly and* 1.9 simply pronounced, as when wee doe adde to, or take from a word, any aspiration, letter, or syllable, and thereby alter the true signification thereof, as this Latine word, Hara, signify∣ing a Swines cote, being pronounced without H, doth signi∣fie an Altar. In English let this be your example▪ Euery Hare is swift on foote, but this is a Hayer, (that is to say) a cloth to drie Mault, therefore it is swift on foote. Of like sort is this old iest of a Master that said to his seruant: Go heate this Ca∣pons legge, who immediately did eate it: then his Master be∣ing angry, said, I bade thee heate it, with an h: no Sir (said the seruant) I did eate it with bread. Likewise this Fallax may chance by not obseruing the right quantitie of syllables, in a∣ny word, as Populus hauing o, long, is a Popple tree, but ha∣uing o, short, it signifieth a people. Or when a word vsed In∣terrogatiuely, is made to haue an Affirmatiue signification, as for example: Caiphas said to Christ, Art thou a King? Ergo, He confessed Christ to be a King. Or when a word pronoun∣ced ironiously is turned to good earnest, in speaking one thing

and meaning another, as thus: My Master said, Come hither, you honest man: Ergo, He said that I was an honest man, when indeed he called him knaue.

The Fallax of forme or manner of speech may be diuers* 1.10 wayes, as first, when words are falsely supposed to be like ey∣ther in signification, in case, or in gender, or to be of one selfe Predicament, because they are like in termination, as Poeta, in English a Poet, and Poema, in English a Poesie or poeticall worke: these two words, because they end both in a: Ergo, they are both of the Masculine gender. Also coloured and numbred are like in termination: Ergo, they are of one selfe Predicament, and yet the first belongeth to the Predicament of qualitie, and the other to quantitie. Secondly, when a word is vsed in one selfe argument, sometime according to his proper signification, and sometime as a terme of Arte: as for example, God is euery where: euery where is an Aduerbe, therefore God is an Aduerbe. A Mouse eateth cheese, but a Mouse is a syllable: Ergo, a syllable eateth cheese. Heere Mouse in the Maior hath his proper signification, and in the Minor is vsed as a terme of Arte: and the like is to be said of the word Euery where in the first example. Thirdly, when a word hath not his proper signification, or is not vsed accor∣ding to the true phrase of speech wherein it is vttered, as thus: Whatsoeuer thou hast not lost, thou hast still, but thou hast lost no hornes: Ergo, thou hast hornes. Heere this word, to lose, hath not his proper signification, for wee are said to lose pro∣perly that which wee had, and not that which we neuer had. And finally, this Fallax is called the common refuge and re∣ceptacle of all such kinde of Sophistrie. Hitherto of the Fal∣laxes in words, now of the Fallaxes in things.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Fallaxes in things.

OF these Fallaxes there be seuen kindes (that is to say) Fallacia Accidentis, à dicto secundum quid ad dictum Simpliciter, Ignoratio Elenchi, Petitio principij, Fallacia Consequentis, Cansa pro n•…•…n cansa, Plura interrogata pro vno responsu: which may be Englished thus: The Fallax of the Accident, the Fallax of speech respectiue, in stead of speech absolute, ignorance of the Elench, Petition of the prin∣ciple, a cause that is not the cause indeed, and many questions comprehended in one.

Define what these be, and giue examples.

Fallacia Accidentis, may be diuers wayes: as first, when any* 1.11 thing belonging onely to the substance of some thing, is attri∣buted also to some accident of the said substance, and contra∣riwise, as thus: Whatsoeuer thou hast bought, thou hast eaten, but thou hast bought rawe flesh: Ergo, thou hast eaten rawe flesh: heere the Consequent is to be denied, because the Ma∣ior hath respect to the substance, and the Conclusion to the qualitie. Another example, What I am, thou art not, but I am a man: Ergo, thou art none. Heere in this the Maior hath re∣spect to the qualitie, and the Conclusion to the substance. Se∣condly, when Accidents are not rightly ioyned together, as when the qualities of the bodie are ioyned with the quali∣ties of the minde: as Homer is a Poet, and Homer is blinde: Ergo, Homer is a blinde Poet: heere the Conclusion is to bee denied, because to be blinde, and to be a Poet, are diuers qua∣lities, whereof the one belongeth to the minde, and the other to the bodie, and therefore are not rightly ioyned together. Thirdly, as (Melancthon saith) when an accidentall cause is is made a principall cause, as thus: Elias was an holy Prophet, but Elias was clad with Camels haire: Ergo, I being clad with Camels haire, am a holy Prophet. Heere the Conclusion

is to be denied, because to be clad with Camels haire, was not the cause of Elias holinesse. But me thinkes that this and such like examples doe belong rather to the Fallax of Causa pro non causa (whereof we shall speake hereafter) then to the Fallax of the Accident.

The Fallax A dicto secundum quid ad dictum Simpliciter,* 1.12 chanceth when we goe about to make a thing to seeme abso∣lute, that is spoken in some respect, or to be in all, when it is but in part, as a Moore hath white teeth: Ergo, a Moore is white. Againe, it may be in respect, by reason of time, place, person, comparison, and such like. Of time as thus: I saw Iohn yesterday, but I saw him not to day: Ergo, I did see him, and not see him. Of place thus: It is not good to buy and sell in the Church: Ergo, it is not good to buy and sell. Of person thus: A Magistrate may kill a theefe: Ergo, euery man may kill a theefe. Of comparison, thus: Riches are not good to him that cannot vse them: Ergo, Riches are not good.

Hauing now to speake of the Fallax, called the Ignorance* 1.13 of the Elench: I thinke good to call againe to your remem∣brance the definition of an Elench before briefely set downe, which is a Syllogisme rightly gathering a Conclusion contra∣ry to the assertion of the respondent, which contrarietie con∣sisteth of foure principall points or respects, whereof, if any be wanting, then the contrarietie is not perfect.

Which be those foure points?

First, that it be to one selfe thing. Secondly, in one selfe re∣spect. Thirdly, in one selfe manner. And fourthly, in or at one selfe time: for if you be deceiued at any time by some false Elench, in thinking that it rightly gathereth a Conclusion meere contrarie to your assertion, when it is not so indeed, by reason that it faileth in some part requisite and incident to a true Elench: then it may be rightly said that you are deceiued by ignorance of the Elench, which Fallax, as Aristotle saith, comprehendeth almost all others, and therefore he maketh a long and obscure definition of an Elench, rehearsing all the particularities thereof, nothing apt to be vttered in our Eng∣lish tongue.

Yet I pray you to giue examples of the foure chiefe points before mentioned.

Of the first, let this bee your example: foure is double to two, but not to three: Ergo, foure is double and not double; this is not to one selfe thing. Of the second thus: This peece of timber is double in length to that peece, but it is not dou∣ble to the same in breadth: Ergo, it is to one selfe thing, both double, and not double to one selfe thing, but not in one selfe respect. Of the third thus: This Prince ruleth mightily, but not mercifully: Ergo, he ruleth, and not ruleth; this is not in like manner. Of the fourth thus: I saw Iohn yesterday, but not this day: Ergo, I saw him, and saw him not; this is not in one selfe time. And all these foure wayes in mine opinion are comprehended in the second point; which is when any thing is spoken not absolutely, but in diuers respects: wherefore, it differeth not much from the Fallax of speech respectiue before declared, sauing that this Fallax is more generall, and com∣prehendeth more kindes of Fallaxes then that doth.

Petition of the Principle is, when the Antecedent doth not* 1.14 proue the consequent, which chanceth most commonly three manner of wayes: that is, eyther when the proofe is as little knowne, as the thing that is to be proued. Secondly, when the proofe is lesse knowne then the thing to be proued. Thirdly, when the proofe, and the thing to be proued, doe not differ, but is all one speech, signifying one selfe thing, called of the Greekes Tautologia.

Giue example of these three wayes.

Of the first thus: The Sunne moueth not, but standeth still in the middest of heauen, giuing light to all the world: Ergo, the earth is moueable; or thus: The Heauens are not made of Elementall matter, subiect to corruption: Ergo, the Heauens are incorruptible. Heere in both these examples the Antece∣dent is as doubtfull as the Consequent, and therefore proo∣ueth nothing. Of the second way thus: Euery sensible bodie sometime sleepeth: Ergo, Man sometime sleepeth. Heere it is more to be doubted whether all sensible Bodies, all Beastes, Fowles and Fishes, doe sometimes sleepe or not, then whe∣ther

man doth sometime sleepe: for it is an easier matter to knowe the nature and propertie of one speciall kinde, then of all, or many kindes. Of the third way, thus: Iohn is learned: Ergo, Iohn is learned. The soule doth liue euer: Ergo, it is im∣mortall.

The Fallax of the Consequent chanceth two manner of* 1.15 wayes, that is, either when wee thinke the Consequent to be conuertible with the Antecedent, but it is not so in deede, or else when we thinke, that vpon the contrary of the Ante∣cedent, the contrary of the Consequent must needes also follow.

Giue examples of both these wayes.

This is a man: Ergo, it is a sensible body: now if I would hereof by conuersion conclude thus: it is a sensible bodie: Er∣go, it is a man: this were no good Consequent; for euery sensi∣ble bodie is not a man. Likewise when it raineth, the ground is wette: Ergo, when the ground is wette, it rayneth; for these speaches are not conuertible. Of the second way thus: It is a man: Ergo, it is a sensible body. It is no man: Ergo, it is no sensible body. Here you see that this Proposition, it is no man, is the contrary of the first Antecedent, which saith, It is a man. Of which contrary, the contrary of the Consequent doeth not necessarily sollowe: for though it bee no man, yet it may be some other sensible bodie. This Fallax compre∣hendeth all such false Arguments, as do not obserue the Rules of right and true Consequents before giuen.

The Fallax of non causa pro causa, is, when that thing is* 1.16 made to bee the cause of the Conclusion, which is not the cause in deede; as Wine is naught, because it will make a man drunke. Of which drunkennesse, Wine is not the cause, but the intemperance of the man, and his immoderate vse thereof, for many things that be good of themselues may bee abused, yea, euen the libertie of the Gospell, and yet the do∣ctrine of the Gospell is not cause thereof, but the malice of* 1.17 man abusing the same.

The seuenth and last Fallax, is when vnaduisedly, and without vsing any distinction, you make an answere to manie

questions, as though they were but one; as for example, The Sophister, seeing two men standing together, whereof the one is blinde, and the other hath his fight, will aske you perhaps whether they see, or not; whereunto if you answere di∣rectly, either yea, or no, you are by and by taken: for if you say that they see, then you grant that the blind man also seeth, and if you say, that they doe not see, then you grant, that he which seeth, is blinde; but if you answere, that the one seeth, and the other not, you shall by such distinction easily auoid the Sophisters cauillation: for diuers questions hudled vp in one, doe alwayes require diuers answeres. And thus I ende, with the order of confuting all false Elenches, and Fal∣laxes; the knowledge whereof is very necessary, for the maintenance of the trueth, which God loueth, who is the fountaine of all trueth, yea, and very trueth it selfe; to whom be all honour, glo∣rie and prayse, world without end,

Amen.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  b a—c
• * 1.2

  From the defini∣tion of the sub∣iect.
• * 1.3

  Lib. 3. cap. 1.
• * 1.4

  [illustration]
• * 1.5

  1 Equiuocatio.
• * 1.6

  2 Amphibologia.
• * 1.7

  3 Compositio.
• * 1.8

  4 Diuisio.
• * 1.9

  5 Accentus▪
• * 1.10

  6 Forma Oratio∣nis.
• * 1.11

  1 Fallacia acci∣dentis.
• * 1.12

  2 Dictum secun∣dum quid.
• * 1.13

  3 Ignoratio Elen∣chi.
• * 1.14

  4 Petitio prin∣cipij.
• * 1.15

  5 Fallacia Conse∣quentis.
• * 1.16

  6 Causa pro non causa.
• * 1.17

  7 Plura interroga∣ta pro vno re∣sponsu.