The arte of logick Plainely taught in the English tongue, according to the best approued authors. Very necessary for all students in any profession, how to defend any argument against all subtill sophisters, and cauelling schismatikes, and how to confute their false syllogismes, and captious arguments. By M. Blundevile.

The effect of Accontius his booke, de methodo, which he affirmeth to be the second part or office of Logicke.

FOr the first office of Logicke teacheth how to finde out the truth in any speech: but method teacheth how to attaine to the Art or knowledge of any thing. In which method, three things (as he saith) are to be considered: First, what method is: Secondly, what is the effect or vttermost end thereof: Thirdly, what be the causes of that end or effect.

Method is a certaine right way, whereby wee may search out the knowledge of any thing; and hauing attained it, how to teach the same commodiously to any other, without examining whe∣ther it be true or false; for that belongeth to the first part of Lo∣gicke.

The effect or vttermost end of method, is the knowledge of anything.

The causes of that end are these three, forme, matter, and cause efficient.

Forme here seemeth to be that which is knowne by all the parts of such knowledge, being gathered together (as it were) into one selfe body: which parts are these; first, what the thing is; secondly, what be the causes thereof, and also what be the causes of those causes, euen to the last or vttermost cause: thirdly, what be the effects, and also what be the effects of those effects, as well when the thing is taken generally, as for some whole thing, or as when the whole is diuided into all his parts, euen vnto the parts indiuisible.

Matter here is generally taken, and not for the matter of any determinate or certaine kinde: vnto which matter doe appertaine all things that be finite, perpetuall, and immutable, that is to say, all vniuersals.

The causes efficient are partly those things that are more knowne, as first, to know what the thing is by definition consi∣sting of the generall kinde, and of the differences thereto belon∣ging: secondly, what is the effect or end of the thing, as in those things which doe not depend vpon our will: and thirdly, what

be the causes of that end or effect, the consideration of which end belongeth to those things which doe depend vpon our will, and partly the cause efficient is the right applying or ordering of the more knowne things, which order containeth two parts: for first wee must proceed alwaies from the most generall kindes to the next generall kindes, as hauing to begin with the definition of the thing which you seeke to know, when need requireth, you must proceed from the most generall kinde of all, that is to say, from the highest generall kinde, and so descend downward, vn∣till you come to the thing that is to be defined: but if you haue to begin from the vttermost end of the thing, then next of al con∣sider that, from whence the end doth immediately spring, and what doth follow next to that, and so proceed from one to ano∣ther, till you come to the first cause of all. Finally, if you haue to begin from the first causes, then you must orderly proceed from that which is first vnto the second, and so to the third, and so forth vntill you come to the vttermost effect or last end.

Now as touching the second part of applying or ordering the more knowne things, you must haue consideration of euery whole thing, and of all his parts: wherefore if you haue to define any thing, Art, or science, whereof you treat, you must define the whole, and then euery part thereof, vntill you come to the lowest part thereof, and yet euery one in his proper place. And if you cannot comprehend in one definition all those things that are to be referred to one head, then vse diuision in diuiding the whole into his parts, and define euery such part in order. But if all the parts which the thing containeth, haue not one selfe end, but di∣uers, then diuide it by such differences as euery part may haue his proper end.

Moreouer, if the forme, matter, or cause efficient haue diuers respects and considerations, then (according to that diuersitie) make diuers diuisions, and first declare what is common to all the parts in generall▪ and what is proper to euery one in particular.

Finally, if some one whole thing lieth hidden, then it is to bee found out by looking into some of the particular parts thereof. And these are al the chiefest points contained in the Latine Trea∣tise which my friend A•…•…ontius wrote de methodo. And though

that Petrus Ramus maketh but one kinde of method, that is to say, to proceed from the first principles or elements: yet I am sure he will not denie, but that to goe forward and backward, be two diuers things, though not contrarie, as doth well appeare by the compositiue and resolutiue method before defined.

I doe not yet perfectly vnderstand by all this, with what method a simple question is to be handled: therefore I pray you shew the true way and order thereof.

The method or way in handling a simple question, dependeth vpon these 9. Interrogatiues, that is to say, 1. First, what signifi∣cations the name or word hath, whereof the question is made, and how it is to be taken. 2. Secondly, whether there bee any such thing, or not. 3. Thirdly, what it is. 4. Fourthly, what be the parts or speciall kindes thereof. 5. Fiftly, what be the cau∣ses. 6. Sixtly, what be the effects. 7. Seuenthly, what things be incident or appurtenant vnto it. 8. Eightly, what things are like vnto it. 9. And ninthly, what things bee contrarie to it. All which questions Aristotle reduceth into these foure, that is to say, Whether it be? What it is? What manner of thing it is? and, Why it is?

Giue example of a simple question handled according to the nine questions before recited.

As for example: If we haue to treat of vertue, first, wee must shew the diuers significations of vertue; for vertue signifieth sometime power and abilitie, as when we say, vertue attractiue, vertue digestiue, or vertue expulsiue: but here vertue is to be ta∣ken for a morall habit, bringing forth good and commendable actions. Secondly, whether vertue be, or not, it plainly appeareth by the diuers doings of men, whereof some bee good, some bee bad. Thirdly, what vertue is, we know by the definition thereof, in saying, that vertue is a morall habit, inclining mans will to doe that which is alwaies good, and agreeable to true iudgement. Fourthly, the kindes of vertue be diuers, as Prudence, Iustice, Temperance, Fortitude, Modestie▪ and such like. Fiftly, the causes of vertue be also diuers; for the cause efficient thereof is good, and mans will obedient to true reason, and to true judgement: the matter or subiect of vertue is the minde or heart of man: the

finall cause is blessednesse. Sixtly, the effect of vertue is tranquil∣litie of the minde, and many prosperous successes, and also pub∣like vtilitie and peace. Seuenthly, things incident to vertue are these, the honour, praise, and commendation of good men. Eightly, things of affinitie or like to vertue, be all good inclina∣tions, dispositions, or good naturall affections, as to be louing, kinde, and mercifull. Ninthly, things contrarie to vertue, bee all manner of vices, as pride, couetousnesse, hypocrisie, dissimu∣lation, &c.

What method is to be obserned in handling a compound question?

A compound question is to be handled by arguing and reaso∣ning on both sides, whereof wee shall treat hereafter. In the meane time we haue to speake of a Proposition, without the which no argument can be made: for all arguments doe consist of pro∣positions.