The arte of logick Plainely taught in the English tongue, according to the best approued authors. Very necessary for all students in any profession, how to defend any argument against all subtill sophisters, and cauelling schismatikes, and how to confute their false syllogismes, and captious arguments. By M. Blundevile.

Of the speciall kinde, called in Latine Species.

WHat is Species?

Species is a speciall kinde, which is spoken of many things, that is to say, it comprehendeth many things differing only in number, in asking the question, what the thing is: as when I aske, What is Iohn? it is rightly answered, to say, A man: for this word man is an vniuersall word, comprehending both Iohn, Thomas, Robert, and all other singular men.

How manifold is Species?

Twofold, that is, Infima and Subalterna. Infima, that is to say, the lowest or most especiall kinde, is that which comprehendeth many things differing only in number, and therefore cannot be a generall kinde, as man, horse, and such like speciall kindes. Spe∣cies subalterna, is that which comprehendeth many things diffe∣ring in kinde, and in diuers respects may be both genus and spe∣cies, as these words, animal or sensible body, bird, fish: for this word bird, in that it comprehendeth diuers kindes of birds, as a Blackbird, a Mauys, a Goldfinch, and many other kinds of birds, it is a generall kinde: but in respect of these words, substance, body, or animal, it is but species.

How is species called of the Greekes?

It is called Idea, which is as much to say, as a common shape conceiued in the minde, through some knowledge had before of one or two Indiuiduums hauing that shape: so as after wee haue seene one wolfe, or two, we beare the shape thereof continually in our mindes, and thereby are able to know a wolfe whensoeuer we finde him, or (if need be) to paint him. But genus extendeth too farre, and comprehendeth too many speciall kindes to bee so easily painted. And note that such shapes or Ideae are said also to be perpetuall.

Why are they said to be perpetuall?

Because they continue in the minde, though the things them∣selues cease to haue any being: as the shape of a Rose continueth in our mindes in the cold heart of Winter, when there is no Rose indeed. And this is the true meaning of Plato touching Ideae, that is, to be perpetuall in the minde, not separate from mans intelli∣gence, as some men faine: for vniuersalities are alwaies to bee comprehended in mans mind, but not Indiuidua: which, because they are infinite, there can be had of them no certaine science or knowledge.