The arte of logick Plainely taught in the English tongue, according to the best approued authors. Very necessary for all students in any profession, how to defend any argument against all subtill sophisters, and cauelling schismatikes, and how to confute their false syllogismes, and captious arguments. By M. Blundevile.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Post-predicaments.

WHat meane you by Post-predicaments?

They be interpretations of certaine words more plainly expounded after the predicaments, for the better vnderstanding of certaine of the said predi∣caments.

Which are they?

These fiue, Oppositio, prius & posterius, simul, motus, & habere, that is to say in English, Opposition, before and after, together, mo∣uing, and to haue: euery one whereof may be taken and interpre∣ted diuers waies.

What is opposition?

Opposition is the repugnancie or contrarietie of two extremes which are contrary one to another, in such sort as none of them is in like manner repugnant to any other thing: as for example, white and blacke being two extremes, are more contrary one to another, then either of them is to any other colour, as to red, yel∣low, russet, or blew.

Sith some things are said to be agreeable one to another, and some contrary one to another, and some diuers one from another; it were not amisse, first here to tell how, and when things are said to be agreeable, diuers, or repugnant one to another.

Things are said to be agreeable one to another three manner of waies: First, when they agree in generall kinde, as those which are subiect to one next generall kinde, as man and horse do agree in generall kinde, because this word animal, or sensible body, is the next generall kinde to them both. Secondly, things are said to agree in speciall kinde, as Edward and Iohn are both compre∣hended vnder this word man. Thirdly, things are said to agree in number, as words hauing one selfe signification, called in Greeke Synonyma, as a blade, a rapier, a curtilas or stucke, signi∣fying a sword: also things of like substance or definition, as man, and a sensible body endued with reason. And by these three waies things are said also to differ one from another; for they

may differ one from another in generall kinde, in speciall kinde, and in number: in generall kinde, as a sensible body, and a tree; in speciall kinde, as a horse, and an as•…•…e: againe, they may differ in number, as the Indiuiduums that be comprehended vnder one speciall kinde, as Iohn and Edward, doe differ only in number.

Is it all one, to be diuers, and contrarie?

No: for those things are said to be diuers, which differ any of the waies aboue said, or by any other difference, be it common, proper; or most proper. Yet few or none of these things are con∣trarie one to another: for no substance admitteth contrarietie, nor yet many accidents, vnlesse it be by reason of qualitie, where∣unto contrarietie doth properly belong.

How many waies are things said to be contrarie one to another?

Foure manner of waies, that is, relatiue, contrarie, priuatiue, and contradictorie, that is to say, by relation, by contrarietie, by priuation, and by contradiction.

Which things are said to be opposite or contrarie by relation?

Those things are opposite by relation, which according to their owne significations, haue mutuall relation one to another, neither can they be both verified of one selfe thing in one selfe re∣spect, as the father and the sonne, the Lord and the bondman: for one man cannot be both a father and a sonne in one respect, but in diuers respects he may: for euery man that hath a sonne, is notwithstanding a sonne to his owne father, and a father to his owne sonne.

Which things are said to be opposite by contrarietie?

Those things are said to be contrarie, which being compre∣hended vnder one selfe kinde, doe most differ one from another, and yet both may be one after another in one selfe subiect meet to receiue the same, because the one giueth place to the other, vn∣lesse it be such a thing as is naturally incident to the said subiect: as heat and cold, being contained vnder qualitie, are most con∣trarie one to another, and yet may be one after another in mans body, or any other subiect apt to receiue the same: for many times heat driueth out cold, and cold heat. Yet in fire it is not so: for heat is alwaies naturally incident to fi•…•…e; and will neuer giue place to cold, so long as it is fire, and not extinct.

How are contraries diuided?

Of contraries, some haue a meane, called of the Schoolemen, Contraria mediata, and some haue no meane, called, Contraria immediata.

When are they said to haue a meane?

When the two contraries are such, as neither of them is of meere necessitie, in any subiect meet to receiue the same, as white & blacke: for that subiect which is apt to receiue them both, may be yellow or russet, and so the subiect is neither white nor blacke.

When are they said to haue no meane?

When the one of the two contraries may be alwaies truly af∣firmed of any subiect apt to receiue the same, as sicknesse and health▪ for man or beast is truly said to be either sicke, or whole. Also vice and vertue haue no meane: for a man is said to be either good, or euill: yet some make good and euill to haue a meane▪ called a thing indifferent. Likewise, hot and cold to haue a meane, that is to say▪ luke-warme. And betwixt health and sick∣nesse Galen maketh a meane estate, that is to say, neither whole nor sicke, but betwixt both.

Which are opposites by priuation?

Opposites by priuation are two contraries belonging to one selfe subiect apt to receiue the same, in the which subiect, when the one is wanting at such time as nature doth appoint, the other must needs be, as sight and blindnesse in the eie, hearing and deaf∣nesse in the eare, light and darknesse in the skie, or in any other thing meet to receiue both.

Wherefore doe you adde this clause, at such time as nature doth ap∣point?

Because it is not needfull that one of these opposites be in the subiect in all times: as for example, the whelpe which is not nine daies old, though as yet hee seeth not, yet is hee not said to bee blinde, because Nature hath appointed him no sooner to see.

Which be opposite by contradiction?

They be two contraries, hauing no meane, and doe consist in contradiction, that is to say, in denying the one the other: and such contradiction consisteth either in propositions, or else in simple or single termes.

Giue examples of both.

In propositions thus: Iohn is honest, Iohn is not honest: Plato disputeth, Plato disputeth not: in which kinde of propositions, there is no meane of truth or falshood; for of necessitie the one of them must alwaies be either true or false, in such sort, as both can∣not be true together, nor both false together. In simple termes thus: a man, no man: to know, not to know: to be, and not to be: and therefore opposites by contradiction be most contrarie, and doe differ from all the rest; for in all the other opposites, it is easie to finde out some meane subiect, whereof neither of them can be truly spoken or affirmed.