The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson

The .vii. deceipt.

IGnoratio elenchi, (that is the mistakyng of cōtradictorie pro∣positions) is a disceiptful argu∣ment which comprehēdeth in it selfe al other aboue rehersed subtilties Aristotel notwithstandynge hath com∣passed this deceipt with in his boūdes. First when respect is not made to one and the same thynge, but diuersely ap∣plied.

To eate fleshe is good for helth sake.

To eate fleshe is not good when offence maye folowe.

Ergo to eate fleshe is good and not good.

Truth it is & yet shal it not folowe, that whosoeuer eateth, the same man doth offende: cōsidering to eate is law∣full, and is none offence to God at all, beyng ones allowed by the magistrate, in whose hande lyeth the whole orde∣ryng of this matter.

Againe, this deceipt is vsed when contradiction is made according to di∣uerse respectes, as thus.

The law is to be folowed in mo¦rall preceptes, and not in cere∣monials, nor yet alwayes in iu∣dicials neyther.

Ergo the lawe is to be folowed and not to be folowed.

It is euen so, and yet not true ney∣ther, that the law is alwayes to be re∣iected, and to be folowed, as it pleaseth our phantasies.

Thirdly, this subtiltie is fashioned, when a contradiction is vsed, and yet not vsed of lyke sorte, so that the latter parte doth not denye the former in one maner of vnderstandyng, as thus.

I knowe the worde of God, and I doe not knowe it.

Those that liue licentiously, & feare not the general resurrection, may iust∣ly be here included, and the .ij. senten∣ces whiche seeme to gayne saye, maye both be true in them: for some knowe that the scriptures are of God, or at least, thei know that the scriptures are

commonly taken for the worde of god, and yet they themselues, knowe not one worde of gods will, nor yet passe a whitte for it. Or we may say that those poore soules in the Popes reigne knew the word of god o••ly by here say, when thei hard the ghosphell redde in latine, & coulde not tel one word what it mēt.

Fourthly, the time, maye alter thin∣ges, and make .ij. diuerse thinges to be both true, thus.

To worke vpon the Saboth is forbid, and yet, not to worke v∣pon other dayes, is also forbid.

Ergo to worke, & not to worke, are both forbed.

It is an easye matter to auoyde all suche deceiptes. Therfore there is a rule in logique that .ij. contradictions can neuer be both, either false or true, at one and the same time, and that in one respect, as thus.

Al true beleuers shall attayne saluation.

Some true beleuers shall not attayne saluation.

These .ij. propositions can neuer be

bothe together either true or false. Nowe the other whiche were made be¦fore, maye be both true, at one and the same time, & therfore they are not con∣tradictories, bycause they are not con∣sidered in respec••e of one, and the same thing, at one and the same time, but di∣uersly applied and considered, as thus.

To preache in the congregation is meete for a man, and not for a woman.

Ergo to preache is meete and not meete.

Al this is true being diuersly consi∣••ered, first, a womā may not preache, & yet a man may, & so the sentēce is true, and it maye well be sayde to preache is meete and not meete, with out anye contradiction at all, bycause of the di∣uerse respectes, whiche be had bothe to the man, and to the woman. if the rule of contradictorie propositions before rehersed, be well marked, all these de∣ceiptes may easely be auoyded.