The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson

¶The first deceipt.

FAllacia accidentis, the deceipt fulnesse of the accident, is whē diuerse thynges are ioyned to gether, in one subiecte, that is to saie, when one, and thesame thyng,

is referred bothe to the substance, and also to the accident, or els, when the ac∣cidētes (which are not of the very sub∣staunce of man, but maie be awaie, the man liuyng still,) are not well ioyned together, or els, when we make our ar∣gument ab euentis, that is to saie, by that thyng, whiche happeneth to a man casually, and pronounce thesame, to be the very proper cause, why, and wher∣fore, this or that is so. Of the first, this maie be an example.

That same whiche fleshe is, bread is not.

Fleshe is foode,

Therefore bread is none.

In the firste proposicion, I vnder∣stand the substance of fleshe, and in the seconde proposicion, I meane the acci∣dent or propertie, whiche is in theim bothe, and therfore myne argument is not lawfull. because I referred, bothe the substance and the accident, to one, and to thesame subiecte. For although fleshe and breade, be not all one in sub∣stance,

because fleshe is one thyng, and bread is another, and either of thē hath their proper beyng, & distinct substāce: yet thei agree bothe in their accident, that is to saie, in foode, to serue for the sustenaunce of man.

No synne must be committed,

Wicked men, euen when thei execute Iustice, do synne.

Therefore, wicked men muste doo no Iustice, beyng set in aucthoritie.

The first proposiciō is true, and the seconde also, for what soeuer is not of faithe, thesame is sinne. Neither can a∣ny thyng be wel, how soeuer it semeth in our iyes, except our faith be first fa∣stened vpon the free mercie of Christ. Therfore the Iewes, how soeuer ••he•• liue, kepyng order, obseruyng lawes, forbearyng riot, yet all their doynges, are nothing but sinne, whatsoeuer thei do, seme it neuer so honest, or Godly, to the sight of man. And yet this argumēt is not truely lapte vp. For in the firste

proposiciō, (synne) is not considered by hymself, and therefore it is truly said, that no synne muste be committed. In the second ••roposicion, where execuciō of Iustice, is reported to be synne, it is not so of it self, but because the person is euill hymself, whiche executeth the Lawe, and therefore the offence com∣meth casually, and as the Logicians saie, per accidens, where as synne be∣fore was considered, accordyng to the substaunce. And therefore, though the officer beeyng naught, offendeth when he ministreth Iustice, (because faithe maketh al workes good) yet must he do iustice, because it is so cōmaunded, euen as he must assuredly beleue, that Iesus is the Messias, and the promised sauior sent of God. And though the doyng be euill to hym, yet it is good to other.

Again, thus reason some.

By faithe we are iustified.

Faithe is a worke.

Ergo by workes we are iustified.

This proposicion is false, conside∣ryng that faithe, in the first proposiciō,

is thesame, through whiche we are iu∣stified, not by the worthines of our be∣leuyng, but through the free mercie of Christ, the whiche we apprehende tho∣rowe faithe. And therefore we must in this saiyng consider, that faithe is re∣ferred by relacion to Christe, through whom onely, al mercie is atteined, and that grace commeth, not because faith is a worke, but because mercy goth be∣fore, and receiueth frely all beleuers, without worthines either of beleuyng or els of doyng any other worke. Ther¦fore in the first proposicion, faith beyng not so taken, as it is in the seconde, we maie saie well, it spryngeth frō this de∣ceiptful place, & is therfore not lawful