The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson

The Arte of Logique.

Logique is an art to reason probably on both partes, of all matters that be put furth, so farre as the na∣ture of euery thing canne beare.

The diuision of Logique.

THis Arte is deuided into .ii. partes. The first parte stādeth in framing of thinges aptlye together, in knitting woordes, for the purpose accordingly, & in Latin is called Iudicium.* 1.1

The second parte consisteth in fin∣ding out matter, and searching stuffe agreable to the cause, and in Latine is called Inuentio.* 1.2 For you must vnderstande, that when one goeth about to proue any thing, he must firste inuente somewhat to proue his cause, the which whē he hath done: he muste vse iudgement, bothe in fra∣ming the same reason so inuēted, & also to see, whether it serueth for the pur∣pose or not.

¶And now some wil say, that I should first speake of the finding out of an ar∣gument,

before I should teache the waye how to frame an argument. Truthe it is that naturally we finde a reason or we beginne to fashiō thesame. And yet notwithstanding, it is more mete that the ordring of an argument shoulde be first handeled: forasmuche as it shal no more profit a man to find out hi•• argu∣ment, except he first know how to or∣der thesame and to shape it acording••y (which he doth not yet perfectli know) then stones or Timber shal profite the ••••a••ō or Carpenter, which knoweth not how to work vpō thesame. A reasō is easlier found then fashioned, for eue¦ry manne can geue a reason naturally and without arte, but how to fashion and frame thesam••, according to the art, none can do at all, except they be learned. Therfore, because euery mans wit can geue lightly a reason of diuers thinges without any learning at all, e∣uen by the instinct of nature, & yet not be able to set thesame in order Scho∣lerlike, either to proue or to confute: I purpose firste to shew the maner of

making an Argumente, as whyche is more nedefull: Nexte after that ye shall learne the maner of finding of an Argument. And the places where all Argumentes dooe reste, and laste of all ye shall know the captious or de∣ceiptful Argumentes, as they be in A∣ristotle.

A brief declaration in meter, of the vij, liberal artes, vvherin Logique is comprehended as one of them.

GRammer dothe teache to vtter vvordes. [ 1] To speake bothe ape and playne, Logiquely art settes furth the truth, [ 2] And doth tel 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vvhat is vayne. Rethorique at large paintes vvel the cause, [ 3] And makes that seme right gay, Vvhiche Logique spake but at a vvorde, And taught as by the vvay. Musike vvith tunes, d••lites the eare, [ 4] And makes vs thinke it heauen, Arithmetique by number can make [ 5] Reconinges to be ••auen. Geometry thinges thicke and brode, [ 6] Measures by L••ne and Square, Astronomy by sterres doth tel, [ 7] Of foule and eke of fayre.

¶The difference betwene Logique and Sophistry.

LOgique otherwise called Dia∣lecte (for they are bothe one) is an Arte to try the corne from the chaffe, the truthe frō euery falshed, by defining the nature of any thing, by diuiding thesame, and also by knitting together true Argumentes and vntwining all knotty Subtiltees that are bothe false, and wrongfully framed together.

¶Sophistrie is euer occupied ey∣ther in prouing the truthe alwayes to bee false, or els that whiche is false to be true, so that euermore•• one parte of the argument is either false, by vsing some ambiguous worde, or by not wel appliyng it to the purpose, or els not framing it according to the Rules: so that a skilful artificer•• mai y^• soner put the vayne Sophister to silence by ope∣ning the fraude, & declaring the crafte of his inuencion. Wheras otherwise an argument made by the rulers of Lo∣gique cānot be auoyded, but must nedes be true, whosoeuer say nay. And so

muche more is Logique to be preferred before Sophistrie, as he is the more to be estemed that telleth a true tale, thē he whiche telleth a lie. And euen as a Grammarian is better liked, that spe∣keth true and good Latine, then he is that speaketh false: Euen so Logique of it selfe is good, when Sophistrie on the otherside is nought. And wel may we saye, that Sophisters are like those whiche play with false dice, and would make other beleue that they are true, or els properly to tearme them, they be like those that go for honest men and are none.

The difference betwene Logique and Rethorique.

BOthe these Artes are much like sauing that Logique is occupied aboute all matters, and doeth playnly and nakedly setfurthe with apt wordes the summe of thinges by the way of Argumentacion. Againe of the other side Rethorique vseth gay paincted Sentences, and setteth furth those matters with fresh colours and goodly ornamentes, and that at large

Insomuche, that Zeno beyng asked the difference betwene Logique and Rethorique, made answere by De∣monstration of his Hande, declaring that when his hande was closed, it re∣sembled Logique, when it was opē & stretched out, it was like Rethorique.

The Office of Logique.

LOgique professeth to teach tru∣ly, orderly & plainly. And here wee may se how vniuersall this cōmoditie is, and howe largely it ex∣tendeth, not onely to know worldly af∣faires: but also to know God, and all his heauēly workes, so farre as nature may comprehend.

There be .iiij. partes of this office or duty wherunto Logique is bounde. That is. To define the nature of euerye thing, to diuide, to knitte true argumentes, and vnknit false,

Of Questions.

THIS same maner of knitting wordes in a due order, beyng one of y^• partes of Logique, or rather Logique it self, sheweth the maner of all Questions, called otherwise either

Propositions, or seueral wordes.

A questiō is either a word or sentence put furth, as when I aske what such a thing is, & would know an other mans aduise therin, as thus, What is man? What is truthe? What is ambicion?

Euery Question is either Single or double. A single questiō resteth in a sin¦gle word, as thus. What is frendship? What is Philosophy? A doble questiō standeth not in one word, but in .ii. seue∣ral sentences, as thus. Is the study of Philosophy praise worthy, or is it not?

Lykewise a propositiō, which is a sen∣tence vttered in plain wordes e••presly signifiyng either truth or falshed, is ei∣ther single or doble. A single Proposi∣tion as thus: Wicked men cānot abide to reade the word of God. Of the whi∣che you may make a double proposition by addyng somwhat therunto as thus. Wicked men not onely can they not a∣bide to reade the word of God, but also they seke by al meanes possible to ouer throwe the same.

¶Of the ••iue Predicables, otherwise called the fiue common wordes, which are spoken of other

WHen we go about to expound any matter, first we must be∣ginne with the definition, to know the very nature of the thing, the whiche we cannot do, except we first learne the predicables, for thei shew the largenes and the narrownes of wordes, how farre they do extende, and how muche they comprehende in them. As when I se one afarre of come vnto me, first I know that he is a man, then when he commeth nigher, I know whether he be of mine acquaintance or no. Likewise, when I go aboute to de∣clare what one is, & to open the nature of any thīg, I vse the largest words, & so it must nedes bee, that I begin with the Predicables, because they shewe how muche euery worde doth compre∣hende in it selfe, and how large or nar∣row it is. They be called Predicables because some one thing is spoken of an other. And they are (as a mā wold say) markes or notes of words y^t are spoken of many, shewing how & by what man∣ner the same words are atributed to o∣ther.

They be .v. in number.

Genus

The general worde.

Species

The Kinde

Differentia

The difference.

Proprium

The properte.

Accidens

The thing chaūcing or cleuing to the substance

GENVS is a general word,* 1.3 the which is spoken of ma∣ny that differ in their kind: as when this Question is asked, What it is. As Ani∣mal. A liuing creature. Ars an Arte. Virtus, Uertue. Gemma. A precious stone. Or els thus. Genus, is a general worde, vnder the whiche diuers kindes or sortes of things are comprehēded, as vnder a liuīg creature are cōprehēded men & beastes. Under art, are cōprehē∣ded, Logique, Grāmer, Retorique. &c. Euery general word, hath diuers kin∣des, & is spokē euermore, of theim al. As Gemma. A precious stone. comprehen∣deth in it self, A Saphire, A Rubie, A Christal, A Turkas. As thus. Saphi∣rus est gemma. A Saphire is a preci∣cious stone. And so of other.

¶Euery general worde is .ij. wayes considered, and commonlye called the

ch••ef general, in latin, Genus ••••mum. and the midle general, in latin, Genus intermedium.

The chief general is so•• that where as it is the head of al & aboue al, it can neuer become inferior, to be of any kin¦de or sort in thinges. As the Substance the Quantitee, the Qualitee, are euer chief generall wordes, and cannot bee comprehended vnder any other.

The middle general, is the same that beyng comprehended betwixt the chief general, and the lowest kinde or sort in thynges, maye be also some kynde or fourme it self, as a body, a liuing crea∣ture: the whiche .ij. beyng compared with their in••eriors, are generall wor∣des: beyng referred to their superiors, they are Species. That is to say, sha∣pes, kindes or sortes in thinges.

Species, seu fo••ma, the kinde, or sort of any thing comprehended, vnder a worde more vniuersall, is thesame of whome the general woorde, is spoken, when the question is asked, what it is. As when I aske, What is Iustice? I answere a Uertue. Therfore in this

proposition (Iustice is a vertue) Iusti∣ce is the Species, and vertue is the ge∣neral worde, which comprehendeth the sayde Iustice, and is spoken of the same

Or thus, Species•• is a common word that is spoken of many whiche differ only in number, as manne is spoken of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and of eue∣ry proper name belonging to any man. As Socrates is a man. Plato is a man. Aristotle is a man.

Euery Species or kinde in thinges is of .ij. sortes. The one is called the low∣est kind, whiche is alwayes spoken of euery proper name, & euer is Species neyther can it at any tyme be Genus, although somtime it beare the name of gen{us}. The other is called Species īter∣media, that is the kind placed betwixt the higheste and the loweste, whiche at diuers times and by diuers considerati¦ons may both be Genus, and Species For that whiche is vnder the gene∣rall Woorde that same maye be called Species or Kinde, that whiche com∣prehendethe other, maye bee called

the general word.

¶A Nowne proper is that wher∣of the kinde is rehersed. As Cato est Homo. Cato is a man: in this proposi∣tion, Cato is the Nowne pro∣per, which belon∣geth to one man only, and Man, is the kinde, whiche is more large, and compre∣hendeth all men.

THis Table sheweth the Order of e∣uery substaunce and kinde as they are apoīted by nature, what are the chief generall woordes, what are the midle general, what are the lo∣west kindes in euery thing, and what are the kindes bewixt bothe.

with body	A Sub∣stance.	Without bodie. as	God Angelles Spirites. The soule of man.
Compounded of diuers ele∣mente••	A body.	Withoute mixtur as	the iiij. elemen¦tes. Fire. Ayer. Water. Earth heauen and al the planetes.
Being a li∣uing thing	A body cōpoūded	With oute life as	Stones. Metalles Liquores.
••auing the sence of felīg	A body liuing.	Withoute Sence or feling at al as	a Tree. a Shrubbe. an Hearbe?
Endued with reason.	A liuing creature.	Withoute the gift of reason as Beastes, birdes or fishe, some liuing.	vpō the lande. in the Water. in the Ayer or in bothe.
	A man. as.	Scipio. Socrate•• Alexāder and euery seueral mā liuing.

* 1.4¶Differentia, that is to say the diffe∣rence, is the same that is spoken of ma∣ny whiche differ in fourme and kinde, when the question is asked, What ma∣ner of thing it is, as when wee saye. Quale quid est homo? What maner of thing is man? we must answere, He is endued with reason. Yf the question be asked what is a man, we must answere by his Genus, or general word, he is a liuing creature. If the questiō be asked what maner of thīg a beast is? We may sai, He is without the gift of reasō. E∣uery difference that is moost proper to euery thing, is naturally and substāci∣ally ioyned to the kinde•• ••hiche is cō∣prehended vnder the general worde,

* 1.5PROPRIVM, That is to say a properte, is a natural pro••e••es, & man∣ner of doyng, whiche agreeth to one kinde and to the same onely and that e∣uermore. And also mai be spoken of the same kind, and by conuersion, the same kinde may be spoken of him also. As to speake & to haue power to laugh, doeth only agre to man, & to none other crea∣ture earthely. And as I may say, Who¦soeuer

is a man hath power geuen him of nature to speake: So may I also say by conuersiō backewarde, whoso e∣uer hath power geuen him of nature, to speake, that same body is a ma••. To barke is proper to a Dogge, and onely proper ād euermore proper. Ergo who¦soeuer hathe power or rather an incli∣nation geuen of nature to Barke, that same is a dogge. And again, Whatsoe∣uer creature is a dogge, that same hath powre or rather an inclinatiō to bark. To go vpright is proper to a man, & on¦ly to a mā, & to none other liuing crea∣ture. Notwithstanding, you must mark one thing, that although many men go crooked & some also cannot speak••: yet bothe to go vpright & to speake are pro¦per to all men generally, and therefore this rule serueth to auoid such obiecti∣ons. Verba in definitionibus posita, nō actū, sed potētiā significāt. which is asmuch to say, y^t wor••••s vied in defi∣nitions, do not signifie the very acte in dede, but the power, the apines, or the inclinatiō of nature therunto: as whē I sai, it is proper for euery mā to speke

I meane to be able or to be apt by Na∣ture to speake, is proper to euery man.

¶Note further that Proprium is not alwayes taken after one sorte, but it is foure wayes considered.

• First the propertie is that which agre∣eth to some kinde only, although not to euery persone comprehended vnder the same kind. As it is proper to a man on∣ly to be a Poete, or to be a Phisition, and yet not proper to euery man.
• Secondly, the propertie is that whi∣che agreth to euery singuler persone, and yet not onely to Man. As to haue two fete agreeth to euery singuler per¦sone, and yet not to man onely.
• Thirdly, the propertie is that whiche agreeth to euery man, and to man only and yet not alwayes nor for euermore. As to haue hoare heares in the old age agreeth to man only, & yet not alway∣es, but for the moste parte menne haue hoare heares in theyr olde age.
• Fourthly, the propertie is that which in dede is most aptly and chiefly called Proprium, when any thing doeth agre to euery man, to man only and alwaies

• to man. As to be able to Speake, to laughe, to go vpright, agreeth to euery man, to man only, and alwayes to man

This diuersite many haue made be∣twixt the differēce & the properte, that the difference is one parte of Mannes substance, and is the parte that maketh vp man. As to haue the gift of reason doeth signifie the minde, whiche is one parte of man, for man himself is cōpact of body and minde.

A Propertie doth signifie a certaine thing, Whiche is attributed to Man when he is made, and as a man woulde say, doth come after, when man is holy made, as to be able to speake, to laugh, to go vpright.

Accidens (that is to say, a thing clea∣uing, or chaunsing, or cōming to a sub∣staūce) is that which doth not stande by himselfe, neither is the parte of a sub∣stance, but rather is after suche sorte in the substaunce, that it may bothe be a∣way, and be there, sometimes more and sometime lesse, without destruction or losse of the Subiecte, or substaunce, as mirth, sorow, to runne, to sit, to be well

coloured, all these may be away, & yet the man maie be on lyue in whom they ware before. So that the lacke of them in their quantite, or greatnes, is not y^e losse of the Substaunce. And al though no Substaunce at any tyme doth alto∣gether forsake his Accidētes, Yet this we see, that one & the same Substan̄ce, doth some time alter his Accidētes, for∣saking some, and takyng other. As wa∣ter beyng sette on the fire, altereth the coldnes, & taketh heat, so that we maie iudge by this, that coldenes in the wa∣ter is not a Substaūce, but an Accidēt.

An Accident is two wayes conside∣red, for either it may be separated, or it maie not•• some maie be separated from their Subiecte as colde maie be taken from water, and knoweledge from the mind. Other are inseparable, be∣cause they cannot be taken awaie al to∣gether, as ••••ature or brodenes, can∣not be taken from man. Heate cannot be taken from fire, nor moisture from water, the which notwithstādyng they are not separat frō their substaūce, yet the quantite or greatnes is changeable

in euery one of them, for some time it is more, and some time it is lesse. And wee se heate in other thynges to be separa∣ted from the Subiecte. Where vpō we iudge that the heate is an other thyng then the very Substan̄ce of fire. Ther∣fore this is worthy to be knowen, that the Substaunce is one thyng, and the Accident an other thyng, and mete it is to make a difference betwixt them, as thus. The soule is one thyng, the feare of God is an other thing. Man may be without the feare of God (as many one is at this day the more pite) Therfore the feare of God is an Accident, the soule is a Substaunce.

¶The vse and commodite, which we hau•• by these fiue commune wordes cal∣led otherwise Predicables.

THere be .iiij. especiall commo∣dites. First they shew the lar∣genesse, and the narrownes of the most generall wordes, cal∣led otherwise Predicamentes, whiche hereafter folowe: so that here by, you may perceiue howe muche euery word comprehendeth in it selfe, and howe

farre it may be applied. The second profite is, that euery thyng is defined by these fiue common woord••s, foras∣muche as al thynges the more narowe they be, are alwayes defined by wor∣des that are more large. As by the ge∣neral worde, by the difference, and the propretie. Thirdly, they are good to iudge the knitting of wordes, and to se what thing may truely be ioyned to o∣ther. for there is no Proposition, nor yet ioi••ing together of any sentēce (ac∣cordyng to the commō order of nature) but they alwayes agre to these aboue rehersed Predicables: so y^t either the kynd is spokē of the singular or proper name (which is euer some one person, as thus•• Cicero est homo. Cicero is a mā) Or els the general worde, the dif∣ference, the propretie, or the accident, are all spoken either of the kynde, or of some one person•• as thus•• Homo, vel Ci¦cero•• est animal ratione praeditum, lo∣quendi facultatem habens, album, lō∣gum, latū. A man, or Cicero, is a liuing creature, endewed with reason, hauing aptnes by nature, to speake, beyng,

white, long, and brode. So that no pro∣position can be, but the partes of the same are comprehēded with in these .v. cōmune wordes. Fourthlie, the general worde, the kynde, the difference, & pro∣prete are ioyned together necessarily, so that when yow name one, al thother folowe. Therfore when a propositiō is made from the kynde, to the general, to his difference, or propertie: it is euer∣more an vndoubted true proposition, as this. Homo est animal ratione prae∣ditū, loquendi facultatem habens. A man is a liuing creature endewed with reason, hauyng aptenesse by nature to speake. A man can not he except he be a liuyng creature, endewed with reason and hauing aptnes of nature to speake. The accident not withstandyng is not necessarely spokē of the subiect, but is there casually, & may be chaunged, as thus. Homo est albus. Somme man is white. This proposition may be af∣treward false, for he may be blacke, or alter his complexiō some other way, so that the accidēt is often altered, & an o∣ther succedeth in his ronme. Therfore

it is good to be knowē, when you haue a Proposition, whether it be vndoub∣ted true, for euermore, or els maye be false at any tyme.

¶Of the Predicamentes, called in En∣glishe Generall wordes.

A Predicament is an ordre of sin∣gle wordes, wherein thynges of one kinde, are couched aud com∣prehended vnder one woorde, whiche is most generall.

A Predicamente is nothyng els in Englishe, but a shewyng or a reher∣syng what wordes maye be truely ioy∣ned together, or els a settyng furthe of the nature of euery thyng, & also she∣wyng what may be truely spoken and what not. and for this cause artes were inuented, because that the truth might be knowē, & euery thyng vttered with his propre wordes. For when I say, A man is a creature, I know this propo∣sition hath his propre wordes, and that like as Man is a Substaunce, so is the creature, which is the generall worde vnto him, which bothe are in one Pre∣dicamente, and the ordre in this Pro∣position

is obserued accordyng to the Arte, for we muste alwaies begynne at the lowest and go vpwardes, which or∣dre agreth also to nature, when thyn∣ges lesse knowne, are declared by thin∣ges that are more knowē, as shall more plainly hereafter appere.

The Predicamentes are deuided in to the Substaunce, and the Accidente. The first, is both called the Substaūce and is a Substaunce in deede. The o∣ther are Accidentes, as not beyng of the Substaunce, but cleauyng there∣vnto.

The commoditee of these Predica∣mentes is great. First, where as they be deuided into the Substaunce & Ac∣cident, it is a good lesson to know euer∣more the substaūce, frō the thing which is Accidentall. Again, of these moste generall woordes ariseth this profite•• that if you wil define any thing, or shew the nature thereof, you maye know in which of al these store houses the wor∣de resteth, whiche shoulde expresse the nature of another.

Thirdly, yf one will bestow a litle

diligēce herin, searchyng where euery worde is setteled, & knowyng to which of al these most general wordes he may best referre it: he shal faithfully knowe the nature of all thynges, no man bet∣ter, then the which, nothing is more ne∣cessary. and this difference is betwixte the .v. commune wordes otherwise cal∣led the Predicables, and these most ge∣nerall wordes called Predicamentes, that the Predicables, set forth the lar∣genesse of wordes, the Predicamentes do name the verey nature of thynges, declaryng (and that substātially) what they are in very deede.

¶A note of certaine thynges diligently to b•• obserued before the rehersal of the most generall wordes.

COnsideryng ambiguite bredeth error, moste warenesse ought to be vsed, that the doublenesse of no one worde deceaue the hearer. The cause of all controuersie, is either the not wel vnderstanding, or els the wily vsyng of wordes that in sēce haue dou∣ble meanyng. Aristotel the Scolemai∣ster to all scholers, geueth good war∣ning

that all men be right ware in any wyse to haue the ryght vnderstanding of euery seueral worde.

There be wordes that vnder one & the same title, comprehende the nature of many thynges, as these wordes fo∣lowyng.

• as a Croune.
• as a Beare.
• as Tyme.
• as Sage.
• ...a noble

A croune signifieth the croune of a mās head, & also signifi∣eth a croun of gold, suche as is curraunt, or els suche as Kynges weare at the daye of their coronacion. A beare, signifieth a brute beast that is baited with dogges, & also signifieth the cophine where in a dead man is caried to his burial. Tyme no∣teth both the space of howre, daie and yeare, and yet we call an herbe by that name, whiche groweth in gardyns. Sage also betokeneth an herbe, & yet we cal wyse men, sage men: so y^t euery one of these wordes haue a double mea¦nyng, and ioyned onely together by fe∣lowship of name, by nature, and in ve∣ry deede, do veri muche dissente. Ther¦fore this ought euermore to be marked

that al wordes be wel noted according to their natures, that the rather wee may escape errour. Those are onely to be receiued and vsed, for the maynte∣naunce of all truthe whose name, and nature is all one, or the which are euer more to be taken and vnderstanden af∣ter one sorte. As homo a mā, signifieth none other thing but mā. Arbor, a tree signifieth none other thyng in all the worlde but a tree only, and so of other. If any worde be vsed that hath a dou∣ble meanyng, restrayne the largenesse therof, and declare how yow wil haue it taken, by meanes wherof, the fraude shall soner be auoided, and the truthe bette•• knowen.

The Predicamentes are in number .10.

1 Substantia.

The Substance.

2 Quantitas.

The Quantite.

3 Qualitas.

The Qualitee.

4 Relatiua.

The Relacion.

5 Actio.

The maner of doing.

6 Passio.

The Suffring.

7 Quando.

When.

8 Vbi.

Where.

9 Situs.

The Settelling.

10 Habitus.

The appareiling.

SVbstātia, the Substance, or beyng which Cicero calleth Nature, is a thing whiche standeth by it selfe, and nedeth no helpe of an other, but hathe his propre beyng and substaunce naturally, or thus.

The substaunce is a thing whiche hath his propre being of hymsel••e, and conteineth accidentes whiche happen therunto, neither can any substance be sene, sauing only the accidentes, as the colour, the greatenes, and suche lyke qualities of man are sene, but the very substaunce cannot be sene.

¶The diuision of the Sub∣stance.

THe substance is diuided into the first, and second. The first substance is called euery sin∣guler persone or propre name as Socrates, Plato, Virgil, Homere.

¶The second substance cōprehendeth both the general worde, and the kinde also of euery singuler persone, as thus Tullie, Coesar, Hanibal with other. Likewise this word (a liuīg creature) being a substance and general worde to

euery propre name conteineth al thin∣ges particulerlie that haue life.

It is profitable to marke the order of substaunce, set furthe in a table a li∣tle before, for we maie by the same, de∣uide seuerally euery substaunce, of all thynges in this worlde•• the whiche when we knowe, and remembre in our myndes, we perceiue euidētly, the dif∣ference, betwene God, and his creatu∣res, & seyng the thyng created of God and the properties there with all, we rest vpon the same, and learne the vse, and propre cōmoditie of many thinges here in yearth. We maie define many thynges, by the same table: as we maie define God, man, heauen, yearth, beast stone, & any thyng els y^t is a substance.

¶Of quantitee.

THe quantitie, is the greatnes of a thyng, or the nombre. And proper it is to this mooste ge∣nerall woorde, to be deuided, as greatnesse, is deuided into seuerall partes, and nombres into euery seue∣rall nombre.

¶Quantitee is .ii. waies considered.

The one is called Continua quan∣titas, that is, when the question is as∣ked, how greate, or brode any thyng is•• and therefore the length, the latitude, and the depenesse of bodies artificiall, are herein obserued: the vse whereof, is moste sene in Geometrie.

The other is called discreta quan∣titas, when the question is asked, how many thinges there be, and is occupied altogether in nōbryng. The vse of this is perceiued in Arithmetique.

¶Of qualit••e.

THe qualite, is a forme, or shape of the body, or mynde, wherof some name is deriued, as of wisedom, men are called wise, of Iustice, men are called Iust.

There be three maner of qualitees, whereof the first doth contein the ha∣bite, otherwise called, the perfecte ha∣uyng of any thyng. The other is, a for∣wardnes in any thing, gottē by labour and trauaile, not geuen by natures goodnesse, or els wee maie call it, the halfe attainyng of that, whiche we go aboute to haue, wantyng perfeccion,

for lacke of full tyme, and is called in Latine dispositio, as to haue meane knowlege, & not to be fully instructed in y^e practise of iustice, is dispositio. A∣gain to be fully learned, to haue accō∣plished all thynges, due to righteous∣nesse and Iustice, is called in Latine, habitus, as who should saie, the abso∣lute atteinyng, and strong hold of the∣same. The pith of this worde habitus, can hardely be vttered with one worde in this our tongue. Notwithstandyng it maie in mo wordes be opened, for the better vnderstandyng of it. For e∣uen as wax chaufed with the hande, is made softer, euen so some partes of mā are made by vs more apte to compasse any thing. He that vseth oft to speake Frenche, shall by continuance, obtein perfecciō: he that vseth much to write, at length shall haue a redy hande, and this is called habitus. So that no mā hath knowlege, or perfecte skill in any thyng, except he get it by labour, & ac∣quaint nature with trauail. Notwith¦standyng, I muste nedes confesse, that all natures be not like apte, to receiue

knowlege. Some are geuē to one thing and some to another. Therefore 〈◊〉〈◊〉 whiche by nature haue a promptnes••e•• shall so••er attein perfeccion, then any other can do, if by labour and earnest trauaile, they will stretche to attein that whereunto thei are apt, and with good indeuoure, ••ilip nature forward. God geueth some one manne a passyng gift, to serche the influence of the star∣res, to another he graunteth, a natu∣ral enclinacion to Musike, and al hea∣uenly harmonies. So that if either of these two, would seke to folowe their natural aptnesse, it wer moste like thei should e••cell. Other that do not finde nature so fauorable, can neuer come to any suche perfeccion.

The full atteinyng of any thyng, by long tyme, is twoo waies considered, for either it is of the body, or els of the mynde. Perfectiō, gottē b•• helpe of the body, is when men can by muche vse, leape, wrastle, or cast the barre, better then any other, or els do excell in any handie craft, aboue the common sorte.

The habite of the mynde, that is to

saie, that constaunt hold of any thyng, whiche is in the mynde, either consi∣steth in knowlege, or els in practise. In knowlege, are comprehended all artes as Grāmer, Logique, Astronomie &c. and all other learnyng, wherunto wit canne atteine. That habite of the mynde, whiche is in practise, and by good aduisement is chosen, standeth in the will of man. As all vertue, and all vice do. Iuste dealyng euermore, man∣hode in sufferyng all harmes stoutly for honesties sake, and temperaunce of life, in forbearyng lust, and ••ilthie glo∣tonie. These vertues though their of∣spryng be from God, yet tyme maketh them perfect, in the iyes of man. Other vertues are geuen of God wholy, and altogether without mannes labor to attain thē. As faithe, hope, charitee, & all other like giftes of the holy ghoste.

The secōd forme, is called y^e power strēgth, or pronesse of nature, in latine Naturalis uis. And the contrary here∣vnto, is called the weakenesse of na∣ture, when she hath denied her power, to any one thyng, in Latine it is called

Imbecillitas naturae.

The natural strength, is an aptnes of nature, geuen either to the body, or to the mynd. To the mynd, as the apt∣nes to learne, the prōptnes of memory•• of the body (in mā) to be apt by nature to wrastle, for a horse, to be quicke and stirryng, for a birde, to be apte to flie, for fishe, to liue in the water, (the whi∣che man cannot dooe) for an Asse to be slowe, for a stone to be hard. &c. Natu∣rall weakenes, is whē nature dimini∣sheth her gift, as when she denieth apt∣nes to learnyng, as we see many dull wittes for lernyng, & muche vnfit that waie. Nature hath denied some men, health of body, that thei are neuer wel at ease, some men are so sicke in their braine, that thei are neuer wise, some are capons by kynd, and some so blunt by nature, that no arte can whet them An Asse will neuer bee swifte, a stone will neuer be soft of nature. All quali∣ties be instrumentes of nature, where by the worketh, as heate, is the instru∣ment of fire. The heate and cold, in the iuyce of herbes are instrumētes, wher∣by

menne either are healed, or els past healyng, for this worlde.

The third kynd comprehendeth, the affeccions of manne, called in Latine, pe••turbationes, and also those passiōs whiche tary but for a litle while.

A perturbacion, or els affeccion, is a sodain chaunge of the mynd, and also of the body.

There bee .iii••. perturbacions prin∣cipall, whiche are in the mynd, where∣of all other haue their ofspryng.

Libido, seu cupidi••as.

Lust or desire.

Leticia.

Mirthe.

••g••••tudo.

Grief.

Metus.

Feare.

The whiche are stirred vp, by some mociō of the mynd, either desiryng any thyng earnestly, or abhorry••g the same

There be fiue perturbacions of the body, whiche moue the senses, and are c••lled thynges offered to the senses•• as colours, either whitenesse, blacknesse, or any like, moue the iyes. All soundes and ••oyses that be made•• moue the hea∣ryng, as co••ghyng, speakyng, bra••yng of a D••ere•• ••lowyng of a Cow, or neigh∣yng

of an horse. Sauors moue the smel¦lyng, as perfumes, swete odours, the strong smell of ordure, and suche filth. Sauces moue the taste, as bitternes, tart••es, sow••rnes. Suche qualities as are touched, moue the sēce of touchyng as hardnes, softnes, roughnes, plaines.

The affecciōs, called Patibiles qua¦litates, (the passions that abide but a∣while) differ from perturbacio••s, for as muche as thei tary not long, but so∣dainly come, and sodainly goo, as blu∣shyng in a mānes face, sodain feare, so∣dainly to chaunge coloure, and ware pale. The other tary longer, as en••ie, ambicion, loue, continuall feare, gre∣dinesse, with suche other.

The fourthe comprehendeth•• the fi∣gure, and fourme of any thyng. The fi∣gure comprehend••th the shape of thyn∣ges that haue no life, as the fashion of the Element•• of trees, of floudes, of an house, a shippe, a cote, and suche like.

The forme cōteineth the portrature of al liuyng thynges, as the very liuely image of man, of an horse, or a liō, as we cal a mā well fauored, or hard fauored.

¶The table of qualitie.

The Qualitee.

Of the mynde.		Of the body.
	Of the mynde	Geuen by nature, as the naturall in¦clinacion to any thyng.
Gotten by studie.	Gottē by ••••udy
Tariyng stil with a man, and harde∣ly goyng awaie.		Goyng ••one a∣waye, as the af∣feccions.
	Tariyng still with a man.
As knowledge, whiche either cō∣sisteth by practised skill.		Or els by specu∣lacion, and by the only obseruaciō of thynges natural.
	Practised skill.
Either of vertue.		Or els of v••ce.
	Of vertue.
As Iustice.		Fortitude.
	Temperaunce.
	Tēperance or iust dea∣lyng of eue∣ry synguler persone. As Ca••o, So∣crates, Pla¦to.

¶Of Relatiues.

RElatiues are those, whiche are comprehended with other, or the whiche are named, one with another, and (as a man

would say) haue a mutuall respect, one to another.

The other predicamentes before re∣hersed, were absolutely spoken, so that we maie vnderstande by one, and the∣same woorde, what it meaneth. As we may perceiue what a man is, although we ioyne nothyng to hym, wee knowe what Iustice is, although we compare hym with none other thyng. But these Relatiues, cannot bee so well vnder∣standen, excepte we ioyne some thyng to them. As when I saie a father, I cā not so call hym, excepte I vnderstande a sōne that he hath. So that euery bo∣dy is called a father, in respect that he hath a sonne, or els not. Again, no body can be called a Schole Master, except he haue scholers. There is no husband except he ha••e a wife.

Therefore we maie se, that Relati∣ues are referred euermore to another, neither can thei bee taken absolutely, without hauyng respect, to some other worde. There is no worde, but we maie considre thesame to bee a Relatiue, if we referre it to some other thyng, and

therefore wee maie go throughout all the predicamētes, with this one place, and finde relacion in euery one of thē.

Those that are referred to some thyng, are of two sortes. First thei are properly so called, as the father, and the sonne, the master, and his seruaūt, neither can thei be considered, excepte thei bee compared with some other, for when one is called father, he is proper¦ly so called, because he hath a sonne, and thereof hath he his proper beyng.

Again relatiues, vnproperly so cal∣led, are those seuerall woordes, whiche are knowen, & haue their beyng, euen when thei stande alone: and yet consi∣dered with other, thei haue diuerse re∣spectes. as loue, is the loue of the thyng loued. Or thus, loue beholdeth the thyng loued. Faithe beholdeth that thyng, whervnto it leaueth. And ther∣fore where as Paule saieth, we beyng iustified by faithe, haue peace before God, it is asmuche to saie, that we are not receiued for the worthinesse of the qualitee, but for his sake, that is the sonne of God. For I praie you, wher∣vnto

leaueth faithe, or what thyng doeth it els behold? Sauyng onely our Lorde Iesus, that died freely once for al. Or els thus, Relatiues are so cal∣led, (and yet vnproprely) whiche are not accordyng to their propre beeyng, but accordyng as thei are so named, whereof the .vj. predicamentes that fo∣lowe, beare the name. As he that doth any thyng, is referred to a thyng doen, whe••ein the twoo places that folowe are declared, whiche signifie, to do, and to suffer. By the place (vbi) where, one neighbor is cōpared with his ne••t neighbor. By the place quando, whē, A childe of .vj. yere olde, is compared with a child of thesame yeres. He that lieth vpright, is cōpared with him that•• lieth doune grouelyng. In all these the proper beeyng, is not declared, for a childe maie bee sixe yeres of age, al∣though he be not compared with ano∣ther, and therefore it is called relatio secundum dici improprie. But a man can neuer be a father, sauyng o••ely in consideraciō of his sonne And yet note this one thyng, it is proper to all Re∣latiues,

alwaies to be true, euen by cō∣uercion. And thus whosoeuer is a fa∣ther, thesame hath a sonne, whosoeuer is a sonne, thesame hath a father. Who soeuer hath faithe, that same man lea∣neth to Christ onely. Whosoeuer lea∣neth to Christ onely, that same manne hath faithe. Here are twoo thynges to be marked in relacion. The ground of euery thyng, and the ende wherevnto it hath respecte, or consideracion. As a father is the grounde, in that he doeth begette, and hath respect to his sonne, in that he is begotten. The sonne is the ground, in that he is begotten, & hath re∣spect to his fa∣ther, whi∣che did beget hym. And thus likewise in all other.

The table of the Relatiues.

	By nature.	As by the cause and the effect, the father, and the sonne, are considered.
	By some maner or waye vsed.	The magistrate, and the Mace, the Kyng, and his sworde caried before hym are compared together.
	By degrees in callyng.	The lord, and his seruant, the aduocat, and his client.
	By kynted.	The brother and Sister.
Relatiues are compa∣red one with an o∣ther.	By ma∣riage.	The sonne in lawe, the mo∣ther in lawe.
	By coue∣naunt.	The graunter of a lease, and the tenaunt.
	By acci∣dētal, hap∣penyng.	A poete, to be a lier, a phi∣sician, to be a man queller, or a lawyer, to be a thefe.
	By natu∣ral kynd.	A man, a woman.
	By yeres.	A yong man, an olde man.
	By condi∣cion of life.	A poore man, a riche man, a freeman, a bonde man.

¶The maner of doyng, in latin called. Actio.

A Gere, seu facere, is whā we are saide to be occupied in a matter that is before vs, or whan oure

labor is extēded vpon a weaker or lesse thing, and in this place, ar conteyned al verbes actiues, as to write, to dispute, to banket, to beget, to encrease, to di∣minishe, or to chaunge, and to speake at a word, al those are cōteyned in this place, which answere to this question, what doth he, or what doth it, excepted alwaye verbes perteinynge to the sen¦ses or affections, as to heare, to tast, to see, to enuye, al which haue the passiue significacion.

Euery action is either naturall, or volūtary. That is called natural, whi∣che is done by the mighte of nature, as to begette, or to bring forth, to encrea∣se, or decrease, to alter by qualite, as to be moyst, drye, colde, or hotte, to moue from place, to place. That is called vo∣lūtarie, which doth betoken any thing done freely, as to teache, to write, to reade, to playe the marchaunt man, or to do any other action. And hereunto maye be referred euerye mans deutie lyuyng.

¶Perpessio called in Englishe a sufferynge.

PAti, fieri, seu accipere, to suffer, to be done, or to take, is the ef∣fecte of the action, and to make it ••lai••e, it is a verbe passiue, euen the ••ame, which the grāmarians vse, as to ••e taught, to be encreased, to be dimi∣nished, all these are passiues, and are referred to this predicament.

Vbi. Where.

VBi is an order, or predicament, whiche comprehendeth the de∣scriptiō of places, wherin some ••hyng is reported either to be done, to ••aue ben done, or els hereafter, to be ••one. As to be at London, to be at Cā∣••rydge, to be at home, to be in a cham∣••er, to be aboue, beneth, on the righte hand, lefte hand, before, or behinde, and what soeuer is answered to this que∣stion, whan I aske where any thynge is, or where any thyng is done. This place wel serueth for cōiectures, either ••n praysyng or dispraisyng.

Quando. When.

THis Predicamēt Quando, cō∣teineth the difference, & diuer∣site of times, as. Nunc, Nowe Heri, yesterdaye, noctu, in the

night time, Interdiu, in the day tyme. This place also gyueth lighte to con∣firme causes. As to proue that one is paineful, I may say such a one studieth day, and night, so muche as nature can beare. Therfore he is a payneful man.

Situm esse, to be settled.

Situm esse, is than considered, whan a mans body is in any wyse place, a•• to lie a syde, to stande vpright, to sitte, to leane, to lye grouelyng, to lye wyde open.

Habitus, the araiyng or clothyng.

SOme call this Predicament Habitus, integumētum, that is a coueryng or apparelynge of any body, as to haue a coate to weare a goune, to be harneysed, to haue a iacke, a sheart of mayle, a cote armoure. Also to go gorgiously, as to weare cheines of golde•• to haue brase∣lets, rynges, ouches, & stones, to hau•• asceptre or mace in his hand. Thirdly to possesse gold, siluer, land, wyfe, and children, or to contayne any thynge, as the hogges head dothe hold wyne, the barne holdeth corne. &c.

¶The vse and commoditie of these Predicamentes.

IF you will define any worde, & knowe the propre nature of the same, ye must nedes know these ten Predicamentes. As for an example, if ye will knowe what a man is, ye muste haue recourse to the place ••f Substantia, and there ye shall learne ••y the same place that mā is a liuyng creature endued with reason If ye wil knowe what vertue is, ye must go to the Predicamente Qualitas, and there ye shall se, that vertue is a con∣stant habite of the mind, makyng them praise worthye in whom it is. If ye wil define the nature of a father, seke for Relatiua, and there ye shal learne that he is a father, that hath a sonne, he is a maister, that hath a seruaunt, and so forthe in the realte. Therfore ye muste nedes haue these Predicamentes rea∣dye, that whan so euer ye wyll define any worde, or geue a natural name vn∣to it, ye maye come to this store house, and take stuffe at wyll.

Of a diffinition.

THere is nothyng in all this whole art of logique more ne∣cessarie for man to know, than to learne diligentlye the defi∣finition, and diuision of euerye matter that by reason maye be comprehen∣ded. For he that firste well vnder∣stādeth what he doth go about, (know∣yng fullye the nature of euery cause propoūded,) shal lesse erre in the whole discourse folowing, and easie shal it be for him to auoyde false argumētes, if he can lear••e firste to se the verye nature, & substantial propretye of euery thyng.

A definition is .ii. wayes considered, for either it is a defi••ition of a worde, or of a substaūce. A definitiō of a word, is any maner of declaration of a word, as, a Realme, is so called by cause it is by a kynge ruled, and meryly to saie it, A woman hath her name so giuen her, by cause she bringeth wo vnto man.

A definition of the substaunce, is a speach, which sheweth the very nature of the thyng, & euery perfect definition is made perfect by the generall worde, and his difference ioyned together.

So that what soeuer is defined, it is ••l wayes the kynde or sorte of some ••hyng, as thus. Man is a lyuyng crea∣••ure endued with reason: man, is the ••hyng defined, and the other (that is, a ••••uing creature endewed with reason) ••••s the definition.

There be .iiij. rules to be obserued ••n euery perfecte definition. Firste ••hat the definition conteyne no more than the thing defined, nor yet that the thyng defyned, conteine any more than ••he definition dothe. Againe we muste ••ake hede, that the definition expresse ••he very nature, and substaunce, of the ••hynge defined, or els it is no good ••efinition.

Thirdly, we must see that the defi∣nitiō be plaine, and open, without am∣biguitie, not hauynge anye obscure or ••ar fetched wordes.

O•• a diuision.

IT is an old saiyng. Qui bene di¦stinguit, bene docet. He y^t doth well diuide, doth teache well. And Socrates in Phedro Pla∣tonis praisyng muche the maner of di∣uidyng

saith at length, that if he kne•• a man whiche coulde well deuide, and seuerallye set euery thyng in his pla∣ce, he woulde followe hym as though•• he shuld follow god himselfe. In what miserable blindnes ware we, yf we knewe not the difference betwixt the law, and the gospel, the whiche onelye we do knowe by the benefite of diui∣sion. There be manye fonde people whiche haue muche dispraised all tem∣poral lawes, & ciuile lawes, thinkyng•• it mete that al common weales should onlye haue the gospell, and none other ••awe at all. This maye seme to some a gaie saie••ge, where as in dede it is bothe folishe, and wicked. For ther is a difference betwi••te Politicall lawes, and the gospel: For the politicall lawe dothe cause an outwarde discipline to be obserued euē of the wycked, so that thei dare not offende outwardlye for feare of corporall punishement. The magistrate whiche hath this charge is ordeyned of god, and first his charge is to sette forth the ten commaundemen∣tes geuen to Moses, in the stony ta∣••es,

and to cause the same to be obser∣••••d vniuersallie, punishyng the offen∣••urs for their euil dedes corporallye. ••fter this he must enacte other parti∣••••lar lawes, as occasion shall serue ••hich do not dissent from these .x. con∣••••••eryng these lawes are generall, and therefore particular thynges maye be ••••awen out of them. As where it is s••••d. Thou shalt do no thefte, the ma∣••••trate seynge falsehode in bargay∣••yng, and muche disceipte vsed to de∣••aude one, an other, straight causeth •• to be proclaimed that all suche as v∣•••• disceipt in bargaynyng, committe ••efte, a••d shalbe attainted therupon •••• felc••s, the whiche man in so doyng h••th fulfilled goddes commaund••mēt. Nowe againe, as for the preachynge of the Godspell, it is an other maner of thyng, for thereby sinnes ar forgiuen. ••e inheritaunce of lyfe euerlastynge ••••aunted, and an euer liuyng Churche ••f mankynd gathered to be Goddes ••••osen people, and also the true know∣l••ge of God, perfite rightuousnes, and the hope of life euerlasting, is kindled in

the hartes of al godlie through the po∣wer of goddes holie ghoste. But there be fewe that will obey wyllynglie, and with all ther hartes, the wordes of the gospell in suche wyse.

Neither can any Lawe be able vio∣lentlye to force the inward thought of man. Therfore the outward magistrat though he cannot binde mens cōscien∣ces frō y^e thing that is eui••, yet doth he muche to with draw them from doyng euil, and in dede if lawes ware, not men coulde not liue. Therfore the political regiment, and the gospell are .ij. diuer∣se thynges. This ••horte distinction ge∣ueth a lighte to many waightie mat∣ters, the which thyng whan men know not, they wander in greate darkenesse, and for lacke of light, faull in to error.

What a diuision is.

A Diuision is a diuidynge of that whiche is more commune, into those whiche are lesse common. As a definition therfore dothe declare what a thyng is, so the diuision sheweth howe many thynges are con∣tayned in the same.

A diuision, is either the deuidyng of a worde, or of a thyng. A diuision firste of a word, is whē any worde that signi∣fiyng diuerse thynges, is deuided into euery seueral significatiō that he hath, as if I would deuide this word, Canis, into a dog, a fish of the sea, and a starre in the Elemente, thus might I say, Ca∣nis is either a dog that liueth vpō the yearth, or els a starre in the elemente.

A diuision of the thyng is .iij. wayes considered, for either it is whan the generall is deuided into his kynde, the whole into his partes, or els whan the substaunce is deuided into his acciden∣tes. The generall is deuided into his kynde thus, as an Element is deuided into the fier, the aier, the water, and the yearth. A common weale is deui∣ded into the state of people whiche be∣are rule, & also into that powre where the beste, and wisest haue the gouer∣naunce, and thirdly into ones hande whiche alone beareth the stroke and is chief magistrate. Of liuyng creatures some are endued with reason, some are with out reason.

The whole is diuided into his par∣tes as thus. The body is diuided into the head, bealie, hādes, & feete. A man is deuided into bodie, and soule, & this kynde of deuidyng is proprelie called Partitio. And the very difference be∣twixt diuisio, and partitio is, that in a deuision where the general, and the kynde are, the generall worde is spo∣ken of the kynde it self, as. Iustitia est virtus. Iustice is a vertue, where as it cannot be so, when the whole is de∣uided into his partes, that the whole should be spoken of his part, as I can not saye, Caput est homo. the head is man. For the head is not man, nor yet the bealy, al though they both be par∣tes of man. We haue euermore nede of this Partition in all matters. The law of Moses is deuided into .iij. par∣tes, for either it is Morall, Iudiciall, or Ceremonial, neither is this Parti∣tion necessarie for Moses common weale only, but for all other regimen∣tes that be. The morall law standeth for euer, and is not altered at any time but is receyued from tyme, to tyme, e∣uen

as Moses receyued the same of God in stony tables. The Iudiciall law is next, the which although we be not boūd to obserue as the Israelites ware, yet must ther be actes of Par∣liamente made for the reformacion of thinges that be amisse, and Magistra∣tes apointed to punysh such as breake the ten commaundementes, called the morall lawe, and euen so maie we iud∣ge of the Ceremoniall Lawe. that al∣though it appertaine nothing to vs to kepe suche Ceremonies as Moses, and Aaron haue enacted, yet it is nedefull that there be an ordre in al our doings and that we resort together to the tem¦ple reuerently, and that the Parentes appoint their childrē a tyme to learne at schole, and for their seruauntes a tyme to do their true seruice.

The substaunce is deuided into his accidētes, as thus, of men, som are fre, some are bo••de.

¶An other maner of deuiding there is contrary to this, as when the accidentes are deuided into there substaunces, as thus. Of good thinges some are of the mind, some of y^e

bodie, and some of fortune. Also there is a deuision when accidentes are de∣uided into accidentes, as of good thin∣ges, some are honeste, some profitable, and some plesaunt.

¶Rules necessarie to be obserued in euerie diuision.

FIrst it must be prouided that the diuision as muche as maie be (for it cannot alwaies be so) ought to be made with twoo contrary differences, fully containyng in them self the whole cumpasse or wi∣denes of the generall worde, or that which is deuided, for it is a fault to for¦get any thyng, or let slip any part.

Againe the differences whiche de∣uide the generall worde, beyng ioined both together, must be egall to the said generall worde, and the partes coupe∣led together, must be asmuche as the hoole, or els the diuision is not good. A liuyng creature is deuided into his twoo differences, as into a thyng ha∣uyng reason, and a thyng that hath no reason. Nowe what so euer is a liuyng creature, the same is a thyng that ei∣ther

hath reason or els that lacketh rea¦son. And agayne euerie thyng that is endewed with reason, and without rea¦son, that same is a liuing creature. So that in euerie diuisiō, the membres, or partes that dooe deuide, by conuersion are turned with y^e thyng deuided, euen likewise it is with partitiō, as I haue spoken before of deuisiō. Where as lo∣gike hath two partes, Iudgement and findyng o••t of thynges, euen as I saie logique is nothing els but iudgement, and findyng out of thynges, so of the other side, iudgement, and findyng out of thinges, is nothyng els, but logique it self. Wherby appereth a plain•• con∣uersion, that what so euer the one is, the same is the other, whiche thyng must diligentlie be obserued in euerie diuision. Fo•• if the membres that do de¦uide, be either more or lesse than the thyng deuided: streight waie the diui∣sion is not good, for accordyng to a Pre¦cept that we haue in latine. Memb••a diuidentia semper cum diuiso conuer¦ti debent. The partes that do deuide must alway be equall with the thyng

deuided, and turned by cōuersion with the same, or els the diuision is not law∣full.

¶The maner of handeling a single Que∣stion, ••nd the readie waie howe to teache and sette forth any thyng plainlie, and in or∣der, as it should be, in latine Methodus.

IN handeling of any single que∣stion, the preceptes and rules geuen before in the commune wordes, in the moste generall wordes, in the definition, and diuision, doe very good seruice, and helpe to∣wardes the orderyng of euery suche mater. The whole nature of suche que¦stions are thoroughlie sene by vsyng of this order. Euery single question is eight waies examined, first to aske whe¦ther the thing be, or no. As thus. Is there any one man that maye be called wise? Is there any lawe? Is there any frendship vpon yearth? This question is often proued, either by experience, or els by authoritee of the wise. Therfore in questionyng what the thyng is, we muste declare the very nature•• as if I shall speake of frendshippe, I will

first be at a pointe of what frendshyp I must speake. For frendship is of two sortes. The one is true & perfect frend¦shippe, whiche commeth from the hart for vertues sake, and is onely among good men: the other is fay••ed fauour, when one for lucre beareth a fayre face outwardely, and fedeth inwardly a maliciouse stomake. And this is the commune frendshippe, wherof the wic¦ked onely are partakers. The seconde question is, to aske what a thyng is. And this cometh from the definition, whiche is of two sortes. either of the substaunce of any thyng, or els of the name. Of the name as thus, a realme is that countrey whiche is ruled by a kyng. Of the substance thus. A realme is a gatheryng of people together, be∣yng able to liue, and withstande other for preseruatiō of thēselues, abiding se∣uerall. The law is an ordina••••ce which commaundeth thynges in ordre, to be done, and forbiddeth the cōtrary. The third question is, when the partes, and euery seuerall kynde is considered, & for this question the deuision and par∣tition

dooe much good. As the lawe of the Gospell and the politicall lawe. The fourthe question is to aske what are the causes, and especially what is the efficient cause, and what is the fi∣nall cause, or the ende of any thyng. The efficient cause of all good lawes, is God, and his minister. The finall cause, or the end, is to liue vprightlie in the feare of God, and to walke all the daies of our life in the obseruacion of his holy will. The fifte question is, when the effecte, the office, or propre workyng is examined. As the effecte of the lawe is, to conserue the state of mā to continue peace vniuersally, to en∣creace wealth, and make loue betwixt all. The syxt question is when thinges be asked that happē after, or the which haue great affinite, or likelyhode toge∣ther. As if lawes be kept and folowed, we se our childrens children waxe to welth. We se muche neyghbourhode and good will to helpe the needie, & so forth. The seuenth is to aske what are disagreyng. As from the lawe, dissen∣teth rebellion, stubbournesse, pryde,

with other. The eight question is to bryng in witnesse, & to showe by whose authoritee the lawe taketh place. The scripture teacheth that God gaue the lawe to Moses, and Poule with Pe∣ter also, and Christ himself commaun∣ded euery man to obeye the higher po∣wer in all thynges, that are not direc∣tely repugnaunt from the wil of God. Thus ••he question is eight waies exa∣mined, and the maner taught thereby to frame it in dewe ordre, so that he whiche kepeth well this trade, can not faile in ani cause that he taketh in hād. And because they maie the rather be re¦membred, I wil sette them altogether.

As touching the lawe .8. waies.

• 1•• whether it is or no
• 2. what it is••
• 3. what are the parte••.
• 4•• what are the causes.
• ••. what are the effec∣tes or propre workyng.
• 6 What are next adioyning, what are like, what happē therbi
• 7 What do disagree, or what are contrarie.
• ••. What example there is, or au¦thorite to pro¦ue it.

And this lesson ought diligentlie to be learned of al, that euermore thei be∣ginne from the generall, and come to euery seuerall parte. As in declaryng what vertue is, first to tell the nature of it generally, and after to handle e∣uery

vertue by it selfe. And this order both Tullie hath folowed in his boke de officijs, and also Aristotle in hys Ethikes hath done the like, to y^e great admiration of al those that be learned.

¶Of a proposition.

EUen the very ordre of nature requireth that first of all we should speake of seuerall wor∣des, and as a man woulde saie, teache one his lettres, and teache hym the maner of spelling, before we teache him to rede, and afterward ioyne sen∣tences together, & frame propositions by knittyng seuerall woordes in or∣dre, for it is the very office of the mind first to knowe, and then to knitte•• ney∣ther can any chylde vtter a sentence, before he learne to speake a worde. A∣gaine, when nature hath taught seue∣ral wordes, then the minde ioyneth to guether, deuideth, and afterwarde ge∣ueth a Iudgement whether they be well or no. For a man ware litle better then a brute beaste, if he could but one∣lie apprehende seueral wordes, hauing no gifte, or aptnes to ioyne them in or∣der,

and to iudge howe thynges are ioyned together. But seyng God hath kindeled th••s light in man, that he can both ioyne, and iudge, we will nowe speake of the knittyng together, & the ioynyng of wordes in a proposition.

¶What a Proposition is.

A Proposition is a perfite sen∣tence spoken by the Indicatiue mode, signifiyng either a trewe thyng, or a false, without al am∣biguitie, or doubtfulnes. As thus, eue∣ry man is a liar.

There be two partes in a proposi∣tion, the one is called Subiectum (that is to saye that where of sumwhat is spoken,) the other is attributum, com∣mōly called predicatum, that is to sai, that whiche is spoken of any thyng, as in the aboue rehersed propositiō. Eue∣ry man is a liar, Man, is that whereof this saiyng (to be a liar) is spoken, and this same saiyng (to be a liar) is that whiche is spoken of man.

Euerie proposition is two waies de¦uided, either it is a single sentence, stan¦ding of one perfect sentence, as Iustice

is a vertue, or els it is a double sentēce hauyng two propositiōs in it, as thus. If iustice be a vertue, it is a good thing prayse worthie.

That propositiō is called false, the which either naturall reason proueth to be plaine false, or the experience of man declareth to be vntrue, as thus. The stone doth feale. the soule of man is mortall. Experience showeth the soule to be immortall, and nature tea∣cheth vs that no stone hath the sence of fealyng.

The second diuision of a Proposition.

AGaine Propositions do either affirme, or denie, as this propo∣sitiō. Pleasure is a good thing, dothe affirme that pleasure is good. Againe, pleasure is not a good thyng, doth denie y^t pleasure is good. That Propositiō doth affirme, whē a∣ny thing is reported to be in any thing That Proposition doth denie, when any thyng is denied to be in any thing.

¶The third deuision of a Proposition.

THirdly al Propositions ar ei∣ther, generall, particular, in∣diffinite, or singular•• Those Propositions ar called gene∣ral, or vniuersal, the which haue a ge∣neral signe ioyned to the first parte of the Propositiō, as thus. Euery coue∣tous mā is poore. No mā both loueth, and is wise. No man is euermore hap∣pie. General signes are these•• Omnis, Nullus, Quilibet, Nemo. Euery bodie, nobodie, all the world, not one in all the world.

Particular propositions are these, where a particular signe is added to the former parte of the Proposition, which doth not conteine al but a part or a fewe, as thus. Some men feare God. Some men are to muche desie∣rous of glory. The particular signes be these. Quidam, Aliquis, Plerique, Plerun{que}. A certain man, some bodie, all men for the most part, oftentymes.

The Propositions are called Inde∣finite (that is to say, vncertain) where the former part of the Proposition is a generall woorde without a signe, as

thus. The soule is immortall. Man∣hode is a vertue. One man is better then an other. Old men are couetous. And note this diligētly, that those In∣definite Propositions (whose laste re∣hersed parte is necessary, and is so spoken of the former part, that it doth alwaie agree to the same, and to the whole nature of the same) do implie as muche as a generall propositino, as in the aboue rehersed Proposition. The soule is immortal. this word (to be immortall) whiche is spoken of the soule, agre••h not to one man, or to cer∣taine, but to euery man liuyng. when the Accidentes are spokē of the former part, it implieth as muche as a parti∣cular Proposition doth. as•• Homo ho∣mini prestat ingenio, virtute, doctri∣na. (Some man is better then an o∣ther in witte, learnyng, and vertue,) is no more to say, than Quidam homo homini prestat. Some one mā is bet∣ter then an other.

A singular Proposition, is when a propre name of a man is conteined in a Proposition, and is the former part

of the same, as. Cicero est Orator. Cicero is an Oratour. Alexander est bellicosus. Alexander is a warriour.

The repu••naunce of Propositions

REpugnācie, is the diuersitee of .ij. propositiōs, which haue both one subiectum, (called the former part,) & one attri¦butum, which is the rehersed part, and in sence spoken of the former.

There be .iiij. in nombre, called in Latine. Contrariae, Subcontrariae, Cō∣tradictoriae, and Subalternae.

Generall cōtrarie Proposiciōs, are those, whereof the one doth affirme, & the other doth denye, as thus. Omnes homines gloria ducuntur, All men are moued with glory. Nulli homines gloria ducuntur, No men are moued with glory.

Particular contrarie, are twoo Particulars, whereof the one doth af∣firme, the other doth deny. Aliqui ho∣mines gloria ducuntur, Some men are moued with glory. Aliqui homi∣nes gloria non ducuntur, Some men are not moued with glory.

Contradictory Proposiciōs are, whē the one is Uniuersal affirmatiue, and the other Particular negatiue. or els when the one is Uniuersal negatiue, and the other Particular affirmatiue, as thus. Omnes homines gloria du∣cuntur•• All men are moued with glo∣ry. Aliqui homines gloria non ducū∣tur. Some men are not moued with glory, and likewyse backeward.

Subalternae are those, whiche be ei∣ther Uniuersall affirmatiue, & Par∣ticular affirmatiue, or els vniuersall negatiue, and particular negatiue.

¶A single P••oposicion, is thre waies denided.

PRopositio Categorica (other wise called a single Proposi∣tion) is deuided into, true and false Propositions.

They are true Propositiōs, whiche agre to the matter, and are either ne∣cessarie, or els such as maie be either true, or false, called in Latine fortuitae or contingentes.

Necessarie Propositions, are assu∣redly true, and knowen so to be either

by nature, or els by experience.

Of those that necessarily be knitte together are these. The propre name, the kynde, the generall worde, the dif∣ferēce, the propretie, the definition, the causes, the propre worke of causes, and some Accidentes that euer tarie, as thus, Cicero est homo, Cicero is a man. Homo est animal ratione praedi∣tum, aptum ad risum, A man is a li∣uyng creature, endued with reason, apt to laugh. Dies est necessario, quo∣niam Sol exoriens est, It must nedes be day, because the Sonne is vp. Ignis calidus est, Fier is hotte.

Those Propositions are chaungea∣ble, whiche may be true, or chaunce to be so; as. Pecunia est bonum, Mony, is a good thyng. & whersoeuer the Ac∣cident is spoken of that which contei∣neth hym: euery suche Proposition is called chaunceable or that which may be true, as: Water is made whot; here we see that it chaunceth to water (cō∣trary to her nature) to be warme, and therefore it is called chaunceable as the which maie chaunce•• or be chaunged.

[illustration]

The Table of repugnaunt Propositions.

HEre we must be diligent that in all such repugnauncie of Pro∣positiōs, there be no doubtful∣nes in any worde, and that al∣waies there be one maner of woordes that go before, and also one maner of wordes that ende the sentence, plainly and without double vnderstandyng. This diuersite of Propositions is ve∣ry necessary to discerne, the truth, frō that which is false, for when we ioyne two Propositions that are dissonant, we shal easely trie the chaffe from the corne, the which when we haue done, we maie the better, sticke to the truth with full assente, the contrary beyng ones disclosed and reiected.

¶De Conuersione, of the turnyng of Propositions.

COnuersion, is the chaungyng or alteryng of wordes in a Proposi∣cion, when y^e former part (wher∣of any thyng is rehersed) and the hynder parte (which is rehersed of the former) are chaunged, the one, into the others place.

There be .iij. maner of Conuersiōs,

Simplex, per Accidens, per Contra∣positionem.

A plaine Conuersion is, when both the Proposition•• are like in all thy••∣ges, both in signes, and also in affir∣macion, or negation, sauing onely that of the last rehersed, is made the former part of the sentence, & the former part, is made the last rehersed part.

Suche Conuersion is made, when both Propositions be either Uniuer∣sall negatiues, or els particular affir∣matiues, for the first thus. Nemo ti∣mens Deum, cōtaminat se adulterio. Ergo, Nemo contaminans se adul∣terio timet Deum. No man that fea∣reth God, de••ileth him self with adul∣trie•• therfore, no man that defileth him self with adultrie, feareth God. Here we maie see the Conuersion plaine, as the rule aboue rehersed teacheth. For ij. particular affirmatiues, this shalbe an example. Quidā aulici, boni sunt. Ergo quidā boni, aulici sunt. Some courtiers are honest, Ergo some ho∣nest men are courtiers.

A Conuersion by Accidēt, is when

the former parte of y^e sentence, is made the last rehersed parte, and the last re∣hersed parte, made y^e former part, both the Propositions affirmyng, or deni∣yng, sauyng onely that the signes bee chaunged, that is the one beyng Uni∣uersall, the second beyng Particular. First a Conuersion is made of .ij. affir∣matiues, thus. Omnis virtus est lau∣dāda, Ergo laudandū aliquid, est vir∣tus. All vertue is to be praised, there∣fore some thing to be praised is a ver∣tue. A conuersiō of .ij. negatiues, thus. Nemo malus foelix, foelix igitur (sa∣piens cum sit) non est malus. No euill man is absolutely happy. Therfore an absolute happie man (consyderyng he is wise) cannot be euill. This kynde of Conuersion is very profitable for him that wil dispute. for where as we rea∣son often frō the general worde, to the kynde, we must nedes vse this maner of Conuersion, as thus. If al exercise be good, then this exercise is good, and so of other.

A Conuersion by contraposition, is when the former part of the sentēce

is turned into the last rehersed parte, and the last rehersed part, turned into the former parte of the sentence, both the propositions being vniuersall, and affirmatiue, sauyng that in the second Proposition there be certaine negati∣ues enterlaced, as thus.

Omnis homo auet aliquid videre, audire, scire.

Ergo quod non auet aliquid vide∣re, audire, scire, non est homo.

Euery mā desireth to se, to heare, or to know somwhat, therfore what soe∣uer he is that desiereth not to see, to heare, or to know somwhat, that same bodie is not a man. This Conuersion is profitable, and serueth well to rea∣son by. thus reasoneth Christ by this Conuersion against the Iewes in the viij. Chapter of Iohn•• Qui ex Deo est, verba Dei audit, vos igitur cum non audiatis, ex Deo non estis. He that is of God, heareth the woordes of God, You therefore because you heare not, be not of God. This Conuersion co••∣futeth the Iewes plainly, & proueth that they are not of God. Yf, we will

reason from the general worde to the kynd, or from the greater, to the lesse, we may vse this Conuersiō very wel. Omnis homo est animal, Ergo quod∣cnn{que} nō est animal, id nec homo est. Euery man is a liuing creature, there¦fore what soeuer thyng is not a liuyng creature, that same is not a mā. Take away the general worde, and there cā no kynde remaine at all. From the su∣perior vniuersall, to the inferior, thus we maie reason. All pure golde loketh yealowe, therefore what soeuer loketh not yealowe, y^t same is not pure golde. This Conuersiō serueth wel to make an Argument in the second figure, as I will declare hereafter, the whiche ought diligently to be obserued.

Propositio Hypothetica, that is to say a double Proposition.

PRopositio Hypothetica, is a sen¦tence with two single Proposi∣tiōs knit together alwaies, with some Coniunction, as thus. Si iustitia est virtus, est laudabilis. If iustice be a vertue, it is praise worthie.

¶There be .iii. maner of double Propositions.

A Double Proposition standet•• of .iij. partes, wherof the one is a conditionall Proposition, af∣firming a thing to be either true or false, with an (if.) As thus. Yf faith be vpon the yearth, some men feare God. Yf the worlde continue stil as it doth, walowyng in most abhominable synne, God wil at length punishe the offenders very sore. All which Propo∣positions are euer true, whē the par∣tes are so knit together: that the lat∣ter parte, must nedes folowe vpō that, which goeth before. The second part is, when a Proposition hath a disiun∣ctiue, which knitteth the sentence vp, as thus. Either it is daie, or els it is night. Suche Propositions are true, when bothe the partes are true, & the same also are false, when either of the partes are false. The thirde parte is, when coniunctions that do denie are ioyned toguether, as thus. Battail be¦yng not laufull, is not to be desiered.

By all which double Propositions wee maie reason formally in diuerse causes, is thus by the first. If faith be

vpon the yearth, some men feare God, but no mā feareth God, therfore faith is not vpō the yerth. Again, if we feare God, we are in charite, but we are not in charitie. Therefore we feare no•• God. By the seconde thus. Either it is daie, or els it is night, but it is daie, Therfore it is not night. Couetouse men either be the seruauntes of God, or els of the Deuill, but they are not the seruantes of God: Ergo, they are the seruauntes of the Deuill. By the third thus. Battail beyng not lauful, is not to be vsed, but battail is lauful Therfore it is to be vsed.

Of makyng an Argument.

I Haue rehersed hetherto al sin∣gle wordes, what the nature is of euery one, & in what gene∣ral worde they may be founde. I haue set forthe the nature of a defi∣nition, and a diuision. I haue taught also to ioyne these seuerall wordes in∣to a proposition, and to make the same a perfect sentence. Nowe therfore by goddes grace, I wyll shewe the maner how to ioyne sentences together, and

to proue a matter by knittyng proposi∣cions handesomely in an argument, or els to cōfute any thing that a man list, by placing the proposiciōs accordingly. Therefore there ought good diligence to be vsed in this behalf, for as muche as it is the clerkliest part of al, and the hardest piece of worke, to frame an ar∣gument aptly, & to know the very rea∣son, why thynges are so knit together.

¶What an argument is.

An argumēt, is a waie to proue how one thyng is gathered by another, and to shewe that thyng, whiche is doubt∣full, by that whiche is not doubtful.

¶To finde out the reason, that shall proue, (in Latine) called medium, (in Englishe) the double repete.

After this sort we maie finde the reason, whereby to proue our matter. When we haue a question or sentence, that we would either confirme, or con∣fute, Aske the cause of our selfe, why, and wherefore that thyng, whiche is spoken of the former parte in any sen∣tence, should be so applied to thesame. And to make the matter more plain, I

will make this question. Est ne auarus pauper? Is a couetous man poore or not? I maie thus reason with my self. why shoulde a couetous man be called poore, what affinitie is betwixt theim twoo? marie in this poynct, thei bothe agree, that like as the poore man, euer lacketh and desireth to haue: so the co∣uetous manne euer lacketh, wantyng the vse of that whiche he hath, and de∣sirereth stil to haue, beyng neuer cōtēt though god geue enough. Then seyng it is euen so, that bothe doe lacke, and bothe do desire to haue: this same rea∣son is the onely cause, whereby myne argument is made perfect. For thus I maie frame myne argument aptly.

Whosoeuer lacketh, & desi∣reth euermore to haue, that same man is poore.

A couetous man lacketh, & desireth euermore to haue.

Therfore a couetous man is poore.

Thus this argumēt is made perfect by askyng this questiō, wherfore a co∣uetous man is poore? As hereafter I

wil shewe it more at large, by other e∣xāples, ••o make the thyng more plain.

¶There be foure kyndes of argumentes.

Syllogismus

a perfect argum••

Enthymema,

an vnperfect argum••

Inductio,

an induction.

Exemplum.

an example.

SYllogismus, is an argument wherby the last sentēce, whi∣che we would proue, is confir∣med by other proposiciōs, and sentences, more vniuersall, and better knowen, then the thyng whiche is pro∣ued: conteinyng in themselfes the rea∣son, why the laste sentence is true, and why thei are applied to the same. This kynd of argument, is from the general worde, to the kynde, as thus. If I wil proue theft worthie of punishement, I must first aske the questiō, why? & that thyng that commeth to my mynd, more vniuersall then theft, cōprehēdyng the offēce of theft in it, maie serue to make the argument. As I maie thus reason, that theft should be punished, because it is a vice, or a mischeuous deede, and

then thus I knit vp myne argument.

Euery vice or mischeuous diede is to be punished.

Theft is a vice, or a mischeuous diede.

Therefore thefte is to be puni∣shed.

Here we se thre proposicions, or sen∣tences, whereof the first is called Ma∣ior, that is to saie, the proposicion at large. the seconde is called Minor, that is to saie, the seuerall proposicion. the thirde is called conclusio. that is, the lappyng vp of all. And here we muste note, that like as there be thre Propo∣sitions, euen so there bee thre diuerse endynges, called in Latine, Termini, of the which, thone is called the terme at large, in the first proposicion onely, and afterwarde is referred, to the for∣mer part of the conclusion, called sub∣iectū conclusionis. The second terme is called the seuerall, whiche is in the second proposicion, & this is the worde whereof the question is made, & is spo∣ken of in the conclusion. The thirde is called the double repeate, whiche is

twise rehersed, before the conclusion, and therefore it is twise rehersed, be∣cause it is the knitting together, of the ij. proposicions, and the cause, why the former part of the proposiciō, (wherof a thyng is saied,) and the last rehersed part, (beyng attributed to the part go¦yng before,) are ioyned together in the cōclusion. As to make the thyng plain by the former argument, I will proue this conclusion. Thefte is to be puni∣shed. Thefte is called the former parte whereof this worde (punished) is spo∣ken, and this worde (punished) there∣fore is called the last rehersed part, be¦cause it is spoken of theft, which went before. Now to make my argumēt, and to proue this sentēce true, I must seke a worde, whiche is more generall then that, whiche is proued. And that worde that commeth to my mynd, & is pertei∣nyng to the cause, beyng more vniuer∣sall: (for euery thyng that is proued, is proued by a thyng more knowen) that same worde or reasō, is called the dou∣ble repete. whose propertie is twise to be rehersed in an argument, and that

in the first and seconde proposicion, ne∣uer enteryng into the conclusion, as thus. Euery vice is to bee punished, (vice) is the double repete, which must be rehersed in the seconde proposicion, (for I saied before) it must be twise re∣hersed because it maie be euident, that the former ••art of the conclusion, is in very deede comprehended, vnder the former part of the first proposiciō. And then the argumēt is made as foloweth.

Euery vice is to be punished

Theft is a vice.

Ergo it is to be punished.

Here we se the double repete (whi∣che proueth the matter) is twise reher∣sed in the first, and second proposicion, and entereth not into the conclusion. The terme at large, is in the first pro∣posicion, and the terme seuerall, is in the second proposicion, and enter both into the conclusion. So that we maye se that, whiche proueth the thyng, doth not entre into the conclusion, but is twise rehersed in the two propo••iciōs, and so the conclusion foloweth, by rea∣son that these twoo woordes, vice, and

theft, agree in a third altogether, and whatsoeuer is saied of the one, is saied of the other, and nothyng can be com∣prehended vnder the generall, but all the kyndes haue thesame conteined in in theim, which in this proposicion, are r••ferred to the generall. (Al vice is to be punished, vnto vice, is referred this worde punished) therfore, whatsoeuer is cōprehended vnder this worde, vice, as theft, adultery, wrōg dealyng, mur∣der, this worde punished, is rehersed of theim all: because it agreeth to the ge∣nerall, & is rehersed of thesame. Ther∣fore I reason thus. All vice is to bee punished.

Therfore

• Adultery•• are to be pu∣nished
• Wrong dealyng. are to be pu∣nished
• Murder. are to be pu∣nished

For if that, whiche is general, is to be punished, then the kyndes, or sortes in thinges, are al••o to be punished. Ac∣cordyng to this saiyng. whatsoeuer is truely, and altogether rehersed, of the generall, that same also is rehersed of the kynde, whiche is included in the generall.

¶There be .v••i. Rules, especially to bee obserued, for the makyng of ••n ar∣gument called Syllogismus.

FIrst, that in euery Syllogis∣mus, the firste proposicion bee vniuersall I call that propo∣sicion vniuersall, when there is omnis, that is to saie, all: or els nul∣lus, that is to saie, none, in the propo∣siciō. As for example. Euery vice is to be punished, this proposiciō is vniuer∣sall, because it hath omnis, in it, which signifieth all, or euery one. Likewise I call it perticular, when the proposiciō hath quidam, or aliquis, that is to saie certaine, or some body, quidam aulici sunt honesti, some courtiers be honest.

¶The se••ond rule.

If one of the proposicions be perti∣cular, or negatiue, the conclusiō is per∣ticular, or negatiue, I call that propo∣sicion negatiue, when nullus, or nemo, (that is to say) none, or no body, is in y^e proposicion. As nullus Christianus est foenerator, no Christian is an vsurer.

¶The third rule.

In a Syllogismus, bothe the propo∣sicions, can neither bee negatiues, nor

yet particulars togethers, for euen as of two negatiues, there foloweth no∣thyng, so of two particulars, there fo∣loweth nothyng. Therefore, when any suche argument is made, we maie bol∣dely saie it is not lawful, because it is in no mode, as it is very plai••e to se in makyng of this argument folowyng.

Some Courtiers are riche.

I will be a Courtier.

Therefore I shalbe riche.

Or this.

Some bishoppes are good.

Suche a one is a bishop.

Therfore he is a good bishop.

This argument is not lawful, first, bycause by my rule I am taught, that of pure particulars, nothyng doth fo∣low, as Quidam (somme) is a particu∣lar Ego, I, is a singular word, or signi∣gnifieng asmuche as a propre name, & againe it is in no figure as hereafter I shal shewe. Thirdly it is mete that the firste parte of the seconde proposition shoulde be included in the first propo∣sition, whereof some what is rehersed

or els it is no good argument, in the first figure.

Some Kynges be righteous.

Nero is a Kyng.

Therfore Nero is righteous.

This is no good argument, bicause that Nero (which is the first worde in the second proposition of whome some thing is rehersed) is not comprehended vnder the former part of the firste pro∣positiō, which is Kynges, for this for∣mer part (some kinges) doth not speake of Nero, nor comprehend such as he is, but honest, and godly disposed gouer∣nors. And yet in weightie causes suche argumentes haue been vsed, euen of those that would haue drawen vs from the obedience of gods holie worde, and persuaded some that we ware free frō the obseruation of any one thyng com∣prehended in Moses lawes. As thus.

The lawe of Moses is abo∣lished from the Gentiles.

The law of the .x. commaun∣dementes is the lawe of Moses.

Ergo the law of the ten com∣man̄dementes

is abolished from the Gentiles.

Where as this first proposition com¦prehendeth not all the lawes of Mo∣ses, but the lawes ceremonialle whi∣che ware as figures ordeined in decla∣cla••ation of Christes commynge, and therfore the scripture saith vntyll Ihon, the lawe was, and the Prophe∣tes, signifiyng that in Ihons tyme he was come, in whome the olde ceremo∣nial lawes ware fully verified and ful¦filled, whiche at his commyng beganne to cease, seyng he himselfe was the ful∣fillyng of the lawe, not that we should not obserue the morall lawes of the heauenlye preceptes commaunded by God, for Christ hymselfe repeteth the obseruacion of them, yea and byndeth vs to a more straightnesse, that not on∣ly we should do none euill, but that al∣so we shoulde consent to none euyll, therfore this firste proposition, is not general, but particular, and so though the ceremoniall lawe be gone, yet the morall lawe taryeth still accordyng to Christes holye wyll.

Medius terminus, called the double repete (whiche is a worde rehersed in both propositions) must not entre into the conclusion, because the other two partes, called termini, be proued by this, and brought to the conclusion, by reason they agree with this thirde, the whiche two otherwise could not entre into the conclusion, if this double re∣pete were not mencioned in both propo¦sitions, and kept out it selfe from the conclusion, as is euidently to se by an argumentacion.

¶The fift Rule.

In an argumēt, called Syllogismus there ought not to be doubtfull wor∣des, or mo wordes in y^e conclusion then was before rehersed. For mo thinges to be in the conclusion, this example shall serue which An••honius maketh in the first boke of Tullie de oratore.

Unprofitable thynges are not to be taught.

In Philosophie are vnpro∣fitable thinges.

Ergo philosophie is not to be taught

This argument is to be denied, be∣cause

there is more in the conclusion, then was rehersed in the two first pro∣positions. For this shuld haue bene the conclusiō. Some vnprofitable thynges whiche be in philosophie, are not to be learned, not y^t philosophie it selfe is to be reiected, for els we myght make this argument likewise.

Dronkenes is not to be al∣lowed.

In drinking is often times dronkenes.

Therfore drinkyng at any tyme is not to be allowed.

Therefore we must frame our argu¦ment so, that nothing be more in the cō¦clusion, then was in the other proposi∣tions. As thus.

Dronkenes is not to be al-alowed.

In some drinkyng is often¦times dronkenes.

Therefore some drinkyng is not to be allowed.

¶The sixt Rule.

There ought not to be mo termes

in an argumentacion then thre, for o∣therwise there is no good argument.

Euerie politicall Magistrate ought to kepe vnder disobedient persones, with corporall punish∣ment.

Peter is an Apostle.

Therefore Peter shoulde pu∣nishe the disobedient.

In this argument, is no ioynyng to¦gether of the first proposition, and the second: for the politicall magistrate, & an Apostle, are two maner of thynges. Therfore it hāgeth together like ger∣maines lyppes as we vse to saye.

¶The seuenth Rule.

The double repeate, which is twise mencioned in both propositions, ought to be no doubtfull worde, for doubtful wordes make foure seuerall termes whiche should not be, as thus.

No bondman is free.

All that beleue the Gospel true∣ly, are free.

Ergo none that beleue the go∣spell truely, are bond men.

This argument is false, and must

be de••ied at the first, because, there be foure termes, for in the first propositiō, fredome, is taken for such a libertie as men do vse in cōmon weales, to make seruauntes, and apprentises fre, in the seconde proposition, fredome is taken for deliueryng the soule frō the wrath of God, from sinne, and from death e∣uerlasting, as we rede in the scripture. Whom the sonne hath made free, they are fre in very diede, not that this fre∣dome taketh away all orders in the cō∣mon weale, that no man shall haue an apprentise, or a bond mā. For although the father in heauen hath made them free from sinne, from death, and from the wrath of God, yet are they still ap∣prentises, and bond by a political law•• therfore we may see that there be .iiij. endynges or termes, consideryng he speaketh of one libertie in the first pro¦position, and of an other in the second, so that the argumēt is not good. A like argument there is, which one made to Diogenes.

That whiche I am, thou art not

I am a man.

Ergo thou art none.

Here is ambiguite in this verbe (I am) far if it be vnderstanded in the first propositiō that this worde (I am) is not considered accordyng to the ge∣nerall substaunce, but according to the qualitie, or rather propre beyng, spea∣kyng of y^e diuersitie of men, as when I liue, I haue mine own bodie, my flesh, and mine owne bones, thou hast thyne also propre vnto the, and not that I am thou, nor thou art I. Then it is well sayde, that whiche I am, thou art not. But if I vnderstand this word (I am) in the first proposition as a substaunce vniuersall, or rather generall copula∣tiue, to be rehersed of the inferiors, thē it is not good. For as I may saie, Dio∣genes is a mā, Aristotle is a man, so I maie saye of al men. Whereby we may see here also foure partes, or endinges, and therfore the argument must be de∣nied at the first, geuyng this reason y^t I haue shewed before.

Nowe that I haue set forth the pre∣ceptes whiche are to be obserued in an argument, I will declare howe to seat

be & place an argument, that any bodie may geue a reason, why euery worde is set in an argument, in this, or that place. First therfore we must considre, there be foure figures, whiche serue for the makyng of an argument, & mo∣des also, whiche teache the ordering of propositions whether they shalbe vni∣uersal, particular, affirmatiue, or nega¦tiue. I wil define them both after this sorte.

A figure is a lawfull placing of the double repeate, in the twoo proposi∣tions, and euen as the double repeate is placed, so we maie iudge with ease in what figure the argument is. The first figure is such an order of proposi∣tions in an argumēt, that y^e double re∣peate must be the former part in y^e first proposition, and the last rehersed parte in the second proposition, where vpon the cōclusion doth folow. And the rea∣son that it must be so, is because that where as in this figure the argument is euermore made from the generall, to the kynde vniuersally, (for y^e first pro∣position euermore in these two figures

must be vniuersal, either affirmatiue, or negatiue) and because of the general worde, there is sumwhat rehersed of the kynde: one of the propositions must be so placed, that it may euidently ap∣peare that the kynde is encluded in the general. And therfore y^e general is spo∣ken in the seconde proposition of the kynde.

A mode, is a lawfull placing of propositions in there due qualitie, or quantitie. I call that in the propositiō a qualitie, when it doth affirme or de∣nie. I call it a quantitie, when it is ei∣ther vniuersal, or particular. Unto the first figure belong foure modes, which may be perceiued by these .iiij. wordes.

• ...Barbara.
• ...C••larent.
• ...Darij.
• ...Ferio.

THese foure wordes must not be forgotten if we wil make an argument truely in the first fi∣gure, for euery argument that is made in this figure, is in one of these

foure modes, or els it is no argument of the first figure. If the double repete be the former parte in the first proposi∣tion, and the laste rehersed parte in the second proposition, it is in the first ••i∣gure, notwithstandyng, except it be in mode also, it is no argument. There∣fore we must learne to place an argu∣ment in mode al••o. And for the better knowledge of this thyng, note that in these wordes there be foure vowels to be considered, and marked. That is to saye, A, E, I, &, O. And where we see A in Barbara thrise, we must cōsidre that these thre AAA in this one worde, de∣clare vnto vs thre vniuersall proposi∣tiōs affirmatiue, E, declareth a proposi∣tion negatiue vniuersall. As in Cela∣rent we se twise. E, whereby we are taught that the argument (if we make it in this mode) must haue two vniuer∣sall negatiues, and one vniuersal affir∣matiue, by reason of A, which is in the middest of Celarent. I dothe signifie a particular affirmatiue. O. doth signi••••e a particular negatiue, as in Ferio, the first must be a negatiue vniuersall, the

second an affirmatiue particular, the third a negatiue particular. That the∣se thynges may be more euident to ma∣ke an argument, both in figure, and mode, I will gyue examples for euery mode of this figure, that one may plai∣nely see the whole matter as though it were in a glasse, remembryng alwaies, that these modes serue for this figure, whiche figure is knowē (as I sayd be∣fore) when the double repete is the for∣mer part of the first proposition, and the last rehersed part of the second pro¦position. And where as I sayde before that certayne argumentes were in no mode, althoug they were in the first fi∣gure, and therefore not good because they were not both in one mode, and fi∣gure, these shalbe to vnderstande, they were not in one mode, because the first proposition must be vniuersall euer, or els it is not good. Now therefore here folowe examples of the first figure and of the modes thereof.

Bar

All honest thynges are to be em∣brased.

ba

All law made by a christian ma∣gistrate

ra

Therfor all lawes made by a Christian magistrate are to be embrased.

Ce

No contemner of the magi∣strate is a christian.

la

All Anabaptistes are contem∣ners of the magistrate.

rent

Therfore no Anabaptiste is a Christian.

Da

Whatsoeuer deserueth the fa∣uor and grace of god, the same only doth iustefy.

ri

Faith onely deserueth the fa∣uor and grace of God.

Some riche man is an extor∣cioner.

f

Ergo faith only doth iustifie.

Fe

No extorcioner is godly.

ri

Faith onely deserueth the fa∣uor and grace of God.

Some riche man is an extor∣cioner.

o

Ergo some riche men are not godlye.

The second figure is, where the the double repete is the last, rehersed parte in bothe propositions, after this sorte followynge, and there be .iiij. mo∣des

belongyng to the same figure, as it shal appere, whiche all they haue these iiij. vowels in thē. A.E.I.O. so that they make the proposition to be vni∣uersal, or particular, affirmatiue, or ne∣gatiue, as it was before.

Note that the cōclusion is alwayes negatiue, for asmuche as the firste, and the second, are alwayes repugnaunt, neither do they agree in the double re∣peate, called Medius terminus. And therfore the conclusion is negatiue by contraposition, wherof I spake before when I entreated of the conuersion or turnyng of propositions.

Ce

No iust mā, before god hath an vnquiet, and doubtful cōscience.

sa

All they that trust to be iusti∣fied by their workes, haue vn∣quiet consciences.

re

Therfore none trusting to his workes, is iust before God.

Ca

The christian righteousnesse, is the purenesse of the mynde.

mest

To weare a tipete, a coule, a shauen croune, is not the purenes of the minde.

tres

Therfore the outwarde attyre is not the christian righteousnesse.

Fes

No true diuine cōtemneth phi∣losophie.

ti

Some Englishe preachers con∣temne philosophie.

no

Ergo some Englishe preachers are no true diuines••

Ba

All christians refuse to gette goodes vngodlye

ro

Some vsures refuse not to gette goodes vngodlye.

co

Therfore some vsurers are no christians.

The .iij. figure is, where the double repete is the former part in bothe pro∣positions. And ther be .vj. modes of the same figure. Note also that the conclu∣sion muste nedes be par••icular, in this figure where y^e ••ormer part in both pro¦positions is the double repete, for lyke as we reason in the first figure frō the general word, to the kynd, that is frō the vniuersal, to the particular, so in this figure we reason from the kynde

(which is lesse) to the generall worde whiche is more vniuersall, but so not withstandynge, that the conclusion be particular. and therfore this kynde of argument is very good. For the Spe∣cies, or kynd, beyng ones put, the gene∣rall, must nedes folowe.

Da

Euery common weale hath nede of armour, and lawes.

All those that thincke them sel∣ues holie by their beades, by

rap

Euery common weale is goddes ordenaunce.

ti

Therfore lawes, and armour, are goddes ordenaunce.

Fe

No vertue should be eschued.

lap

All vertue hath her wo with her.

ton

Therfore some wo shoulde not be eschued.

Di

Mercie only forgyueth sinnes.

sa

Al mercie is purchased by faith.

mis

Therfore by faith onely forgy∣uenesse is obteyned.

Da

Euery common weale hath nede of armour, and lawes.

All those that thincke them sel∣ues holie by their beades, by

ti

Some priestes in Englande think no lesse.

Some beare their neygh∣bours deadly malice.

si

Ergo some priestes are nei∣ther wise, nor godly.

Bo

Some battaill is not to be eschued.

car

Euery battail is full of mo∣che miserie.

do

Ergo some miserie is not to be escheued.

Fe

None that beare any deadly malice, feare God.

ti

Some priestes in Englande think no lesse.

Some beare their neygh∣bours deadly malice.

son

Therfore some feare not God.

It is verye necessarie that there shuld be .iij. figures, as I haue shewed alreadye. for in euerye argument that hath the shape of a Sillogismus (for the induction & the exāple haue it not, ne∣ther be thei in mode & figure) euermore we reason from the general, to the kind

vniuersal, makyng the conclusion vni∣uersal, or els we reason from the kynd, to the generall, makyng the conclusion particular, or els there is a repugnan∣cie of the terme at large, and the seue∣rall, when they do not agree with the double repete, or laste of all we ioyne many causes, and many effectes toge∣ther, wherof is made an argument, cal∣led Sorites, or coaceruatio, that is to say, a heapyng together of thinges

Whan we make an argument, and procede from the general worde, to the kynde, it is in the first figure. and euen by oure reason we learne this, that if the greater be not, the lesser cannot be. As thus, if one be no liuyng creature, howe can he be a man, if he be a liuyng creature, he muste either be a man or a brute bodye.

Whan we procede from the kynd, to the generall, makynge the conclusion particular, the argumēt is in the third figure. And this is for euer true, that whan the kynde is rehersed, the gene∣rall must nedes folow.

But whan there is a repugnauncie

in an argument of the terme at large, and the seuerall, so that they agree not ••ith a thirde word, it is euer in the se∣cond figure. And this is playne to see that suche an argument must nedes be well concluded, whan we go about to co••••ute any thyng, seyng: that .i••. kyn∣des which are repugnaunt, must nedes be disseuered, and so the conclusion to be made vpon the same. As it is easie to se in the argumentes of the second fi∣gure. Therfore it is good reason that both there shoulde be two figures, and also that the argument doth well pro∣cede beyng made in any of them.

Some tymes an argument is made whan we couple many causes together & the very effectes of the same, as thus••

Ouermuche gourmandise hyn∣dreth digestion in the sto∣make.

By euil digestion in the stomake, cor∣rupte blod is e••gendred in the liuer.

When euill blode is brede in the liuer euill humours are spred through out all the bodye••

Euill humours spred through out the bodie, cause a distem∣perature in the bodie, and af∣ter that bryng the dropsey.

Therfore ouermoche gourman∣dise causeth dropsey.

Of an halfe argument called Enthimema.

AN halfe argument, is an argu∣ment vnperfect, the whiche is, whan one proposition is reher∣sed, and the conclusion straight brought in there vpon, as thus. That is not good whiche bryngeth a man to mischefe. Therfore money is not good•• The bible teacheth a man his duetye towardes god, and his neighbour, Er∣go it is necessary to be knowen, & read of euery bodye. Pleasure bryngeth en∣deles payne after it, Ergo pleasure is to be eschued. These argumentes be∣halfe argumētes, wantyng one propo∣sition euermore, the whiche if we adde a perfecte argumentation foloweth therupon, as thus.

Whatsoeuer bryngeth endlesse 〈2 pages duplicate〉〈2 pages duplicate〉

payne after it, that same is to b•• e••chued.

Pleasure bryngeth endelesse payne after it.

Ergo pleasure is to be eschued.

These half imperfect Argumentes called Enthymemata, consiste parte∣ly of likelyhodes, and partely of infal∣lible reasons.

Likelyhodes, are those, that often hitte the trueth, & yet are not alwaies so, as thus.

Such a youngmā talketh often, and that alone also, with such a young maide.

Ergo he is in loue with her.

This maie be true, and this maie be false. for although the coniecture haue some probabilite with it, yet is it not for euer true. The other called infalli∣ble reasons, or rather necessary Argu∣mentes, muste by all reason be euer∣more true, as thus.

Such a womā is brought in bed.

Ergo she hath had the company of a man.

¶An other.

The Sunne is rysen,

Ergo it is daie.

Therfore in all cōmunicacion, good hede ought to bee taken, that likely∣hodes of thynges, be not vsed for ne∣cessarie reasons

¶Of an Argument, called Syllogismus Expositorius.

THis kynde of Argument hath euermore a nown propre, to be as the double repete in both Propositions: cōtrarie to the maner of all other Argumentes•• and it maie be referred to the thirde figure.

Paul doth alleage godlie sen∣tences of the Ethnicques,

Paul was a preacher.

Ergo, a preacher maye alleage godly saynges of the Eth∣nicques.

For what so euer is truely gathered of particular thynges, the same also is propre to thynges generall, & what soeuer agreth to the propre name, the same also agreeth to the kynde, to the difference, or propretie, of the saide nowne propre.

Inductio.

AN Induction, is a kynde of Ar∣gument when we gather suffi∣ciently a nōbre of propre names, and there vpon make the cōclu∣sion vniuersall, as thus.

Rhenyshe wine heateth,

Maluesey heateth,

Frenchewine heateth, neither is there any wyne that doth the contrary:

Ergo all wine heateth.

¶An other Example.

Dathan for dis••obience againste the superiour poure, ended his life wretchedly.

Likewise Abiron,

Likewise Chore,

Likewise S••mei.

Neither is there any example to the contrary.

Therfore all rebelles, and tray∣tors to their Prince, & Kyng, shall dye wretchedly.

¶An other Example.

Nembroth although he was a iolie

hūter, yet he liued like a wretche in great miserie.

Laban also liued wretchedly,

Pharao was sore plaged,

Amalech, Madian, Abimelech,

Herode, with other ware scourged greuously for their wickednes, neither is their any example to the contrary,

Therfore the ende of wicked men is wretched.

This kynde of Argument is called Inductio, because that shewing diuer∣se propre names, it enduceth at length, and moueth the mind to make a gene∣rall conclusion. Therfore necessary it is, that in such Argumentes al the ex∣amples which are induced be like, for if any be found contrary, the Argument is of no force, as thus,

Athanasius liued vnmaried,

Ambrosius liued vnmaried,

Basilius had no wife & a great many mo.

Ergo all Bishoppes heretofore were vnmaried.

The Argument is not Lawful, for∣asmuche

as diuerse haue been maried in the Primatiue Churche, as Spiri∣dion, Hermes, Hilarius, Policrates, Tertullianus, and diuers other. for it was the maner in y^e primatiue church that honeste maried men were chosen to be Bishoppes, and had the charge of christes flocke. The Apostles also (as Egnatius wittenesseth) had wiues aswel as other men, and as I think v∣sed them, as other mē do their wiues, or elles asked their leaue, and consent to forbeare them.

De Exemplo.

AN example, is a maner of Argu∣mentation, where one thyng is proued by an other, for the like∣nes, that is found to be in them both, as thus. If Marcus Attilius Regulus had rather lose his life, then not kepe promise with his enemie, thē shoulde euery man beyng taken priso∣ner kepe promise with his enemy. Yf cities haue bene destroied for breaking of wedlocke, then adulterers muste nedes be punished. Yf Alexander daw∣ned a weake souldiour when he was

almost frosen for colde, and did set him in his owne chaire against the fier: thē should al captaines, and mē of warre, be tendre ouer there poore warriours and base souldiours.

E••er more take hede that in this kynde of Argument the causes be like of both sydes, or els the Argumente proueth not, as thus.

Peter killed Ananias taken with an open lye.

Therfore spiritual ministres, may punishe open offendours, with temporal sworde.

The examples are not like. Peter did kill Ananias with the worde, & po∣wre of the holy Ghost-therfore prea∣chers must not kil the body, but onely excommunicate men, accomptyng thē vnworthie to be in the congregacion. The sworde is lauful for the tēporall Magistrate onely, & for none other.

¶Sorites.

SOrites, vel coaceruatio, is a heapyng together of causes, one, vpon an other. A kynd of Argument when the last re∣hersed

worde of the first Proposition, is repeted in the firste parte of the se∣conde Proposition, necessarily agre∣yng there vnto, and so goyng stil forth in like maner, til at the length the last rehersed worde be added vnto the first woorde, called Subiectum of the first Proposition. And it is a kynde of Ar∣gument muche vsed, when we ascend vpward frō the lowest, to the highest. or els when we go from the causes, to the next thyng done. whiche thynges done, are the occasiō of other thynges besides, as thus.

A man is a liuyng creature,

A liuyng creature is a liuely body

A liuely bodie is a substaunce,

Ergo a man is a substaunce.

Where the Lawe is, there is transgression,

Where there is transgression, there is feare,

Where there is feare, there is remorse of conscience.

Therefore, where the Lawe is, there is remorse of conscience.

¶An other.

Iustificatiō is not without faith

Faith is not without a repentāt harte,

Therfore, iustification is not without a repentant harte.

No Argumentes be made negatiue∣ly by this kynd of Argumentation, as thus.

The Gospel is not the Law,

The Law teacheth vs the feare of God.

Therfore the Gospell doth not.

¶Or thus.

Christ the sonne, is not in per∣son, God the Father,

God the father is euer liuyng.

Therefore Christ is not euer-liuyng.

But these, and such like be as wise as this that foloweth.

Iohn is not Iacke,

Iacke is a good boye.

Therfore Iohn is none.

And the reason is: No Argumentes are made negatiuely by this kynde of reasonyng, neither is the consequent good, when wordes that agree not ne∣cessarily,

are ioyned together.

Of euill maners are made good lawes,

Good lawes are thynges worthy to be praised,

Thynges worthy praise, are to be desired.

Therefore euill maners are to be desired.

This knittyng is not laufull, for e∣uil maners of them selues, are not the occasion of good lawes, but the godly mynd of good Magistrates is the very chiefe cause•• as the disease, is not the cause of healyng, but rather the Phi∣sicion, and his Medicines, and mans nature, whiche resisteth the poyson of sickenes is the very cause. Again in e∣uery heapyng vp of Argumentes af∣ter suche sorte, learne, and marke, how they procede, and you shall easely se false packyng.

¶Thus merie fellowes reason when they are at nale.

He that drynkes wel, slepes wel••

He that slepes well, sinnes not,

He that sinnes not, shalbe saued.

Therfore let vs drynk wel, and we shalbe saued.

Marke the procedyng and you shal easely auoide the errour, for although in slepe, we sinne not, yet by drinkyng we cause synne, & no one man, at one time both drynketh & slepeth: therfore though in slepyng he offended not, yet in drynkyng he passeth measure.

¶A horned Argument, called Dilemma.

DIlemma, otherwise comple∣xio, vel cornu••us syllogis∣mus, called a horned Argu∣ment, is when the reason cō∣sisteth of repugnaūt membres, so that what so euer you graunt, you fall into the snare, and take the foile. As yf I should aske whether it were better to marie a faire woman, or a foul. Yf you say a faire. Then answer I, that is not good, for thei comōly say, she wilbe co∣mō. If you say it wer good to mary an hard fauored woman, then I answere, she wil be lothsome, and so ye fall into an inconuenience. Notwithstandyng if either of the partes maie be turned

into the aduersaries necke againe, or both of them, it is a faulty Argument. and you maie confute the same by in∣uersiō, that is to say, turning his taile cleane contrarie, as thus. If I shall marie a faire womā, I shal haue great pleasure, and cōfort in her: yf I marie a browne woman, she shal not be com∣mon to other, for few men wil seke af∣ter her. Therfore, I shal haue comfort both waies.

De Consequentiis.

IF profiteth not a litle, after the rehersall of such Argumentes briefly to show the knittyng of Propositions, and to declare the maner of a shorte Argument vtte∣red by twoo Propositions, which are said to stand vpon the Antecedent and the Consequent: as the Logicians vse to terme them.

¶The f••rst rule.

From the vniuersall to the particu∣lar, the argument goeth well, but not contrary, as thus.

This officer doth his dutie.

Ergo all officers doth their dutie••

But this is true.

All officers do their dutie,

Ergo this officer doth his dutie.

¶The second rule.

From that, whiche by nature is in any thyng, to that whiche happeth ca∣sually, or cōmeth by some miseuill, the reason is not good. As thus.

Sobre diet is good:

A feuer causeth sobre diet.

Ergo a feuer is good.

Another argument vsed by the Romishe bishop.

Synne doth not beget man.

The worke of lust begetteth man.

Therfore lust otherwise called concupiscentia, is not synne.

The second proposicion is not true, for wicked concupiscence, came in by mannes foly, and hath muche defaced that, which nature first ordeined. Ther¦fore nature it self through god, geueth increase, whiche is muche contrary to the wicked lust of concupiscence.

¶••••e third rule.

Thynges disagreeyng, are not con∣••idered bothe one waie, and with one

respecte.

The Gospell willeth vs to make no difference of meates.

The Phisicens appoynct vs a diet, and forbid vs this and that.

Ergo the Gospell, and the phi∣sicens teache thynges contrary

These do not disagree, consideryng their endes are diuerse. The scripture forbiddeth supersticion, in the obserua∣cion of daies: the Phisicen hath respect to the state of a mannes body.

¶The fourth rule.

The argument is good, when sub∣staūces are set, accordyng to their pro∣pre differences. But when thei are set, the one against the other, accordyng to the accidentes, whiche are conuenient to bothe, the argument is not good. As thus.

It is lawfull for you, not to drynke wine.

Ergo to drynke wine, is vn∣lawfull.

Where as this woorde lawfull, is common to bothe, aswell to drynke, as not to drynke.

¶The .v. rule.

Euery thyng, the more that other thynges are through it, thesame is al∣waies the more it self. As thus.

The water is hote through fire.

Ergo the fire is more hote.

Another.

Some loue to mary for goodes••

Therefore thei loue goodes best of all.

Some argumētes made, accordyng to this rule, are nothyng true. & ther∣fore it is good to geue warnyng of thē.

It is wel said, and wisely, this rule holdeth in causes, that are next adioy∣nyng, and the whiche wholy compasse a matter•• not in those causes, that are fetched farre of, and beeyng but halfe causes, partly and by the waye, geue onely the occasion. As thus.

Ouide came to be a Poete by his Master.

Therefore his master was the greater Poete.

The argumen•• is not good in those causes, that are but half causes, for O∣uid is not a Poete, onely because he

learned Preceptes of his Master, but al••o because he had a greate aptnes by nature, and a wonderfull witte, to do better then another.

Some hold fast vpon a saiyng of. S. Augustine, and buylde wonders vpon that text. I would not beleue the Go∣spell saieth Augustine, excepte the ca∣tholike churche did perswade me. And herevpon saie thei.

The Gospel is beleued, for the churche sake.

Ergo the Churche is of more aucthoritee.

And here thei heape a nōbre of mis∣chiefes. Therfore (saie thei) the church maie make lawes, appoynct tradicions whatsoeuer thei bee. But I answere thus, the Antecedent is false. For I chiefly beleue the Gospell, cōsideryng God is the aucthor: and seyng the wō∣ders that he hath doen, I geue credite to it for his sake. I graūt we do beleue the Gospell, for the churche sake, but yet principally, for that GOD is the chief aucthor, that perswadeth vs to receiue his worde, and after the chur∣che

(as the secōde cause) telleth vs that the Gospel is the truth of God. Ther¦fore if thei will make this suche an ar∣gument, as thei seme to saie it is, then this that foloweth, is of as good force, for in all thynges it is like.

This child is a good boye, gra∣mercie rod.

Ergo the rodde is better then the boye.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Iudicium
• * 1.2

  Inuentio.
• * 1.3

  Genus
• * 1.4

  Di••••erentia.
• * 1.5

  Proprium.