The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson

About this Item

Title
The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson
Author
Wilson, Thomas, 1525?-1581.
Publication
[Imprinted at London :: By Richard Grafton, printer to the Kynges Maiestie],
An. M.D.LI. [1551]
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Subject terms
Logic -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A15542.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe, by Thomas Vuilson." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A15542.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 14, 2024.

Pages

¶The second rule.

From that, whiche by nature is in any thyng, to that whiche happeth ca∣sually, or cōmeth by some miseuill, the reason is not good. As thus.

Sobre diet is good:

A feuer causeth sobre diet.

Ergo a feuer is good.

Another argument vsed by the Romishe bishop.

Synne doth not beget man.

The worke of lust begetteth man.

Therfore lust otherwise called concupiscentia, is not synne.

The second proposicion is not true, for wicked concupiscence, came in by mannes foly, and hath muche defaced that, which nature first ordeined. Ther¦fore nature it self through god, geueth increase, whiche is muche contrary to the wicked lust of concupiscence.

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