Hexapla, that is, A six-fold commentarie vpon the most diuine Epistle of the holy apostle S. Paul to the Romanes wherein according to the authors former method, sixe things are obserued in euery chapter ... : wherein are handled the greatest points of Christian religion ... : diuided into two bookes ...

Controv. 10. Whether as well the decree of reprobation, as of election, be without the foresight of works.

Here are two opinions opposite in two extreames one to the other; the one was of the Pelagians, who vtterly condemned the absolute decree of reprobation, without any respect of works; and Catharinus also in his commentaries vpon this epistle: some other doe make the decree of reprobation and damnation to be a free act of the will and purpose of God, as election is. But beside these there is a third opinion betweene both, that the decree of re∣probation, neither issueth onely from the free and absolute will of God, not yet altogether dependeth of the foresight of sinne; but proceedeth in part from them both. We will now examine these opinions in order.

1. Of the first sort that hold the decree of reprobation altogether to proceede from the foresight of sinne, some doe hold strange paradoxes, as Catharinus before named, whose o∣pinion is this, that God appointed all to be saued, but some absolutely, as Marie, and other holy men and women, some conditionally, if they beleeued and did works, they should be saued, if otherwise, they should be damned; not much differing is the opinion of Becanus, a late Popish writer, who affirmeth that God simply in the beginning appointed all to be sa∣ued voluntate primaria, by his first and principall will, but secundaria voluntate, by his secundarie will he would some to be condemned for their sinne, cap. 1. loc. 12. de pradesti∣nat. &c. 5. loc. 4.

But the former of these opinions, is distasted by the Romanists themselues, as Pererius in c. 8. ad Rom. disput. 25. refuseth it vpon this reason, because vna est ratio, &c. there is one and the same reason of all that are predestinate vnto saluation; how then can some be certainly appointed and absolutely, some vncertainly and conditionally; for all which are or∣dained vnto life, are written in the booke of life, out of the which none can be blotted out. And against Becanus assertion it may thus be obiected.

1. If God indeede would haue all to be saued, why are not all saued? for none can resist the will of God; this then sheweth either God to be impotent in not performing his will, or variable in changing his purpose concerning those, whom he first intended to be saued; neither of which imputations must be laid vpon God. 2. seeing God getteth glorie as well by shewing his power and exercising his iustice vpon the wicked, as by shewing mercie vpon the elect, the one is as primarily the will of God as the other; for God primarily intendeth his owne glorie, but in the punishment of the wicked Gods glorie is set forth, therefore the decree of iustice as well as of mercie standeth with the primarie and principall will of God.

2. Augustine though nothing fauouring these erroneous conceits, yet he referreth re∣probation vnto the foresight of originall sinne, and considereth man in massa corrupta, in the masse of corruption, as all haue transgressed in Adam, Vniversa massa poenas dedit, &c. the whole masse (of mankind) is worthie of punishment, and if the punishment of damnati∣on, should be rendred vnto all, non iniuste proculdubio redderetur, it should not be rendred vniustly, &c. and again in an other place, vna quaedam massa peccati supplicium debens diuina iustitiae, &c. there is one masse of sinne, which is endebted to the diuine iustice: quod siue ex∣igatur, siue donetur, nulla est iniquitas, which though it be exacted or pardoned, there is no iniquitie: ad Simplic. lib. 1. qu. 2.

In this assertion there is no inconueniencie, to say that God beholding and foreseeing all men by the voluntarie transgression of Adam in the state of corruption, did of his free mercy elect some to be saued in Christ, the others he left in their corruption, and so for their sinnes decreed thē to damnation: for here can be no imputation of iniustice at all: for it is free where one hath diuerse debters to remit the debt vnto one, and to exact it of another.

So then if the reason be demanded, why some are reiected of God, it may be answeared, that mans voluntarie transgression, bringing all his posteririe into bondage, beeing fore∣seene of God, is a sufficent cause of their reiection; but if it be further demaunded, why

God out of this masse of corruption, hath elected some, and not others, there no other rea∣son can be giuen, but the good pleasure of God, Ephes. 1.5. so that the absolute decree of reprobation, is grounded vpon the foresight of mans corruption, but of the comparatiue, as why one is reiected and left, and not an other, no reason can be rendred, but Gods graci∣ous and free purpose.

Against this opinion of Augustine, there are two principall obiections. 1. Pererius dis∣put. 12. thus obiecteth: the Angels had no originall sinne, they were all created in the state of grace, and yet some of them were elected, some reprobate: therefore sinne is not the cause of reprobation.

Ans. 1. As the Angels were created in the state of grace, so also was Adam in Paradise; and as Adam fell by voluntarie transgression and so enthralled his posteritie, so did the Angels that fell, abuse the gift of freewill, and so for their pride were iustly condemned for euer: so then the foresight of the apostasie of the reprobate Angels, was the cause of their reiection and condemnation: as the Apostle saith, Iud. 6. The Angels, which kept not their first estate, he hath reserued in euerlasting chaines: as man then hath originall sinne, out of the which proceed actuall sinnes, which are the ground and cause of reprobation and con∣demnation; so the Apostate Angels for their sinne of pride were reiected: onely here is the difference, that the Angels fell irrecouerable, falling by their owne pride beeing not seduced: but man falling by the sedition and tentation of the deuill, hath a redeemer in Gods mercie prouided for him.

2. Pareus thus obiecteth: the foresight of originall corruption is generall and common to all mankind, therefore it cannot be the cause of the reprobation of some onely: dub. 8. argum. 4. so also Vrsinus catech. 3. p. 357.

Ans. Not simply the foresight of originall corruption, which all are subiect vnto, but it beeing considered together with Gods decree, because he purposed to deliuer some, and not others, is the cause of reprobation.

3. Some doe wholly referre the decree of reprobation and election onely to the will and purpose of God: and thinke, that no other cause can be rendred, why God hath elect∣ed some, and condemned others but the absolute will, pleasure, and purpose of God: their reasons are these.

1. As God loued Iacob, before he had done any good, so he hated Esau, without any respect vnto the euill which he did, Rom. 9.11.

2. The Apostle also saith, v. 18. That God hath mercie on whom he will, and whom he will be hardeneth: Gods will is the cause of both.

3. And God is compared to the potter, that as he hath power ouer the clay to make thereout vessels of honour, or dishonour, as he thinketh good: so much more the Lord may out of the same masse, make some vessels of mercie, some of euerlasting shame.

4. Our Blessed Sauiour maketh this the reason, why God had hid the misterie of salua∣tion from the wise men, and reuealed it to babes, because O Father, thy good pleasure was such, Matth. 11.25.

Ans. 1. Why God loued not Esau as well as Iacob, the cause was onely the gracious purpose of God: and hereof neither the good workes of the one, nor the euill workes of the other were the cause: yet both of them beeing considered in their originall corruption, as it was Gods mercie to deliuer the one, so it was no iniustice to leaue the other. 2. here the hatred of God is taken onely for the not conferring of his grace and loue, which God freely bestowed without respect vnto workes: but that hatred, which is an ordaining of men vnto euerlasting punishment, is not without respect vnto their sinnes.

2. Mercie presupposeth miserie, and hardening a corrupt inclination in the heart before, for the which it is hardened: here then mans miserable estate is insinuated, out of the which some by Gods mercie are deliuered.

3. By that similitude the Apostle sheweth what God may doe by his absolute power, not what he doth: he dealeth not with men, as the potter with the clay, though he might; that is stricto & absoluto iure, by his strict and absolute right; but aequissimis rationibus, vpon most equall and iust conditions: he might doe as the potter doth, but yet he taketh not that rigorous and strict course.

4. It is indeed Gods good pleasure to reueale the secrets of his will to whom he plea∣seth, and to hide them from whom he will: because he is not bound vnto any, he may doe

with his owne, as he please and bestow his graces freely: but if he should keepe them from all, none had cause to complaine, seeing their naturall blindnes and corruption was brought vpon them by the voluntarie corruption of Adam: and though it was Gods gracious fa∣vour, to reueale vnto some his will, yet the rest were hardened and blinded iustly through their owne wilfulnesse and obstinacie against the truth.

And further against this opinion of the absolute decree of reprobation, without any respect vnto the sinnes of men originall and actuall, these two strong obiections are made: first there would be an imputation of iniustice vpon God, if he should decree any to be condem∣ned but for sinne: for like as none are indeed in time condemned but for sin: as the Apostle saith, Ephes. 5.6. For such things commeth the wrath of God vpon the children of diso∣bedience, &c. so the decree of damnation before all time must be vpon the foresight of sinne.

Secondly, whereas God in Scripture is set forth to be exceeding aboundant in mercie, as Psal. 25.10. All the waies of the Lord are mercie and truth: and Psal. 144.9. His mercies are ouer (or aboue) all his workes: and Iames 2.13. mercie reioyceth against iudgement: Now the Lord should be accused of seueritie and inclemencie, and farre more readie and prompt vnto iustice, then mercie, if he out of his owne will should decree more to be con∣demned, then to be saued: these obiections, the former position of the absolute decree of damnation beeing maintained, cannot possibly be answeared.

4. Whereas to shunne these rockes of offence, and to preuent these obiections, some here haue found out a middle or meane way, to referre the decree of reprobation partly to the will of God, as the efficient, partly to the foresight of sinne, as the materiall cause there∣of: And here these distinctions are brought in.

1. Lyranus thus distinguisheth, that reprobation is either taken large, largely, and so it signifieth onely simplicem negationem ad gloriam, a simple deniall of glorie: and this hath no cause in Gods prescience, but onely in the will of God: or it is taken proprie, properly, for ordinario ad poenam, an ordaining vnto punishment, and so it is not willed or decreed of God, nisi propter culpam, but for sinne: Bellarmine also fleeth to the same distinction of negatiue reprobation,* 1.1 which is not to haue mercie, & positive to decree vnto condemnation: of this the foresight of sinne (he saith) is the cause, of the other the free will of God: But seeing this negatiue reprobation containeth a priuation and deniall of euerlasting glorie, this also must arise from the foresight of sinne: for God excludeth none out of his kingdome but for sinne: as the Apostle saith, 1. Cor. 6.9. Know ye not, that the vnrighteous shall not inherite the kingdome of God.

2. Gorrhan hath this distinction: there is a double kind of reprobation, temporalis, the temporall, which is, non appositio gratiae, the not affording or giuing of grace, and eterna, vo∣luntas non apponendi, the eternall, which is the will or purpose of not giuing of grace: this is without the foresight of any merite, but not the other: like vnto this is that difference which some make betweene the decree, and the execution of the decree: the first is without respect vnto sinne, but sinne commeth betweene, before the other: But this doth not satis∣fie, as Pareus well obserueth: for the same cause mooued God to decree punishment, which mooueth him in time to execute punishment.

3. Some doe thus consider of predestination, that it is of two sorts: there is decretum〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a decree simply called, of those things whereof God is the author and efficient cause himselfe, such is the decree of election vnto life: there is decretum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, secundum quod, a decree after a sort, which may also be called, permissivum, the decree of permission, as the other is effectivum, an effecting and working decree: of this latter sort is the decree of repro∣bation: the meanes which lead thereunto, God onely permitteth, and effecteth not, as the sinne and iniquitie of men, for the which they are worthily condemned: to this purpose Rollocus in 8. ad Roman. p. 181.182. But this doth not satisfie: for the decree of dam∣nation is as well an effecting decree, as is the decree of election: God willeth and decreeth the damnation of the wicked as effectually in his iustice, as he effectually willeth the salua∣tion of the elect: as the wise man saith in the Proverbs, 16.4. That the Lord hath made all things for his owne sake, yea euen the wicked for the day of euill.

4. Iunius against Puk••us resp. ad ration. 72. maketh two degrees of reprobation: de∣cretum praeteritionis, the decree of preterition, which is the purpose of God, not to shew mercie, and this is absolute without any respect vnto sinne: then there is decretum ex prae∣scientia,

the decree of reprobation, issuing forth of God prescience: and so none are decreed to be condemned, but for sinne: some call the first decretum non miserandi, the decree not to shew mercie, the other decretum puniendi, the decree of punishment: Pareus dub. 8. p. 913. citeth Mr. Perkins, who calleth them, decretum deserendi, the decree of desertion, and ordinatio ad poenam, an ordaining to punishment: Pareus out of his owne iudgement saith, that there are two acts of reprobation, negativus, the negatiue, that is not to haue mercie, and affirmativus, the affirmatiue, which is to condemne: the negatiue act, is either reprobation from grace, or from glorie: the first of these which is a reiection from grace, be thinketh onely to proceed from the good pleasure of God, but not the other: all these distinctions are the same in effect, which else where I haue followed,* 1.2 allowing that distincti∣on especially of Iunius, as giuing full satisfaction in this matter: But now I find some doubts and obiections, which are not yet remooued by these distinctions.

1. Seeing damnation necessarily followeth reiection, and where grace is denied, glorie cannot follow: if the deniall of the one should be the absolute act of Gods will, so by con∣sequence should the other also.

2. And the Scripture sheweth that the cause why God reiecteth man, is for that they re∣iect God first; as Samuel saith concerning Saul, 1. Sam. 15.23. Because thou hast cast away the word of the Lord, the Lord hath cast away thee: and Rom. 1.24.27. the Apostle sheweth that the giuing vp of the Gentils vnto their hearts lusts, was a iust recompence of their error; therefore because the substraction and deniall of grace, the hardening of the heart, the blin∣ding of the mind, are punishments of sinne, and sinne goeth before the punishment thereof, it followeth that these things, as they are not temporally inflicted but for sinne, so neither are they eternally decreed but vpon the foresight of sinne.

3. If God should absolutely reiect any otherwise thou for sinne, and more are reiected, then elected, then should Gods iustice farre exceed his mercie, and his seueritie farre surpasse his clemencie.

To this last obiection Thomas Aquin. maketh this answer by a distinction, that bonum proportionatum communi status naturae, &c. the good things which are proportioned to the common state and condition of nature, are found in the most: but bonum quod excedit com∣•••••••• statum, &c. the good things, which exceed the commō state, are found in few: as they are found more, which haue sufficient knowledge and direction for the gouernment of their life, then they which want it, such as are idiots and fooles; but there are few, which are found, that haue the profunditie and depth of knowledge: and of this kind of euerlasting life, it exceedeth the common state and condition of humane nature, and therefore it is no maruel, if it be found in the fewest and smallest number: to this purpose Thomas 1. part. qu. 25. artic. 7.

But this answer is not sufficient; he hath giuen a good reason, why eternall life is not me∣rited, or procured by mans deserts, because it is a gift, which exceedeth the proportion, and condition of mans nature; but yet the reason appeareth not, neither is the doubt satis∣fied, why, seeing God aboundeth in mercy, euerlasting life is not giuen vnto the most: there∣fore Thomus addeth further, that Gods mercie appeareth in that he directeth some vnto life from the which the most decline, by the common cause and inclination of nature: And indeed this is the best and most sufficient answear, that Gods mercie herein exceedeth his iustice, that whereas all men by nature are the children of wrath, and God might iustly ••aue them in their sinne, as he did the reprobate Angels, yet out of that masse of corruption he saueth some, to bring them vnto glorie; so then, vnlesse the fall and transgression of man he presupposed, there is no way to magnifie Gods mercie aboue his iustice. Thus Thomas Aquin, though he mislike Augustines opinion (who maketh the foresight of originall ••••••ne the ground of the decree of reprobation) and thinketh that God absolutely reiecteth the reprobate without any foresight of sinne, yet is constrained to seeke shelter here for the ••••••iding of this obiection.

5. Wherefore fully to decide this great question, and controversie touching the decree •••• reprobation, we will determine of it in this manner.

1. There is reprobatio indefinita, & definita, a reprobation indefinite; that is, that some ••••e elected, some reiected: and a definite reprobation, whereby some are certainely reiected, and not others; of the first the cause is onely in God, for the demonstration of his mercie ••••••ard the elect, and of his iustice and power toward the reprobate, as the Apostle sheweth

v. 22.23. and so the wise man saith, Prov. 16.4. that God made all things, euen the wicked for himselfe: and to this purpose Thomas well saith, that the reason of election and reprobation is taken from the goodnesse of God, quae multiformiter in rebus representa∣tur, which by his meanes is diuersely represented and set forth in the creatures: when a•• some things are in an high, some in a low degree: If all should be elected, Gods iustice should not appeare, if all were condemned, where were his mercie? But of the definite and certaine reprobation, why some are in particular reiected, the cause is the foresight of their sinne.

2. Againe reprobation is considered two waies, absolute, comparate, absolutely, as in re∣iecting these and these, and comparatiuely, in reiecting these rather, then those: of the first the reason is the generall corruption of mankind, which transgressed in Adam, who abused his freewill in choosing euill, it beeing in his power to haue made choice of the good, and so he brought all his posteritie into bondage vnto sinne; in which state of corruption God iustly might haue left all, if it had pleased him: but of the comparatiue reprobation, why God left others in their naturall corruption, and freed others, no reason can be giuen, but the good pleasure of God: as Saint Paul saith, Ephes. 2.3. We were by nature the children of wrath, as well as others, but God who is rich in mercie through his great loue, &c. hath quickned vs: so Augustine well saith, quare hunc Deus trahat, & illum non trahat, no•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dijudicare, si non vis errare, why God draweth one (out of that masse of corruption) and not an other, take not vpon thee to iudge, if thou wilt not erre. epistol. 105.

3. We must distinguish betweene absolutum ius Dei, and ordinatum, the absolute right which God hath ouer his creatures, and his moderate or subordinate right: By his absolute right the Creator hath power to dispose of his creature, as it pleaseth him, to life or to death, as the potter hath power of the same clay to make some vessels of honour, some of disho∣nour: and if the Lord should thus deale with his creature, euen without any respect vnto sinne, no man could accuse, or challenge God: But he dealeth not thus with vs, secundum spiritum & absolutum ius, according to his strict and absolute right; but according to his subordinate right, whereby he proceedeth not against the creature, either in condemning it, or decreeing the same to be condemned, without iust cause giuen by the creature: And thus the Apostle dealeth in this place: by the similitude of the potter, v. 20.22. he sheweth what absolute power, and right God hath if he would please to vse it, and v. 22.23. he speaketh of the other ordinarie right and power, which God indeed vseth in proceeding a∣gainst the vessels of wrath, prepared (by their owne sinnes) vnto destruction. Pareus. And Tolet here well obserueth, that the Apostle maketh two answers vnto the obiection pro∣pounded, one to stop the mouthes of gainesayers, in vrging the absolute power of God, the other to satisfie the faithfull, in shewing that God doth not execute his wrath vpon any but for their sinne: annot. 28.

Concerning this distinction of the strict or absolute right and power of God, and his or∣dinarie or rather subordinate right, though it be admitted on both sides, both by Protestant, and Popish writers, yet there is this difference. 1. Some doe thinke, and so professe and teach, that God vseth as well his absolute, as subordinate power in the decree of reprobati∣on: and thus Bucer, Calvin, Zanchius, affirme that God by his absolute will hath reprobate and reiected some, without respect vnto their sinnes. 2. Pareus, who also acknowledgeth Gods power herein, yet he would not haue this doctrine handled either in schooles, or be∣fore the people, but according to Gods subordinate power, in reiecting no otherwise then for sinne, p. 912. 3. Both these thinke that God bringeth this his absolute power into act: but I thinke it more safe, to hold that God might if it please him, vse that absolute power, which if he did, none could accuse him of iniustice, but he dealeth otherwise in this myste∣rie of reprobation, refusing none but iustly for their sinne: and this is that which Augustine affirmeth,* 1.3 by way of supposition in this manner: Si hominum genus, quod creatum const•••• primitus nihilo, &c. if mankind, which at the beginning God created of nothing, were not brought forth endebted both to sinne and death, and yet the almightie Creator should con∣demne some of them to euerlasting destruction, who could say vnto him, Lord why hast thou done so? God in his infinite power might haue done thus, but not according to the ordinarie course of iustice.

Then seeing I absolutely subscribe vnto the iudgement of Augustine, seene before in the 2. opinion produced, that mans originall corruption is the first ground of the decree of re∣probation:

out of the which God in mercie saued some by the election of grace, leauing o∣thers, which adding to their originall corruption other actuall sinnes, are made worthie of condemnation: and so Augustine well concludeth, investigabilis Dei miserecordia,* 1.4 &c. the mercie of God is vnsearcheable, whereby he hath mercie on whom he will, no merits of his going before, and vnsearcheable is his truth, whereby he hardeneth whom he will, (eius praecedentibus meritis) his merites going before, but the same with his, vpon whom God sheweth mercie. Learned Pareus hereunto agreeth, dub. 17. massa damnata propriè est obie∣ctum, &c. the damned masse is properly the obiect of election & reprobation: Vrsinus also as Pareus hath set forth his workes, defineth reprobation,* 1.5 to be the immutable and eternall decree of God, whereby he hath decreed in his iust iudgement, to leaue some in their sinnes, &c. and not beeing made partakers of Christ, to condemne them for euer: Iudicious Polanus hath the like definition of reprobation, in his partitions: It is the decree, whereby God pur∣posed to himselfe to leaue those, of whom it pleased him not to haue mercie, in euerlasting de∣struction, vnto the which they should be obnoxious, for their sinnes, for the declaration of his iustice. In these distinctions all the causes are touched of euerlasting damnation, and the ••••re-ordaining thereunto: the efficient, is Gods decree and purpose, the materiall, is sinne, the formall, the deniall of mercie, and the leauing them to themselues, the finall cause, is the setting forth of the iustice of God: And thus I trust it hath beene sufficiently shewed, how the decree of reprobation, may safely be held to proceede from the prescience of originall and actuall sinne, and not to be an absolute act of Gods will and purpose, as the decree of e∣lection is: and in this resolution of this question (whatsoeuer I haue before thought and written otherwise) I set vp my rest, as the safest from any inconuenience, and the fittest to giue satisfaction to the contrarie obiections, which are such as here follow.

1. Obiect. Seeing the number of the reprobate farre exceedeth the number of the elect, how is Gods mercie magnified aboue his iustice?

Ans. They which hold an absolute reprobation without relation vnto sinne, cannot here remooue this doubt: for if God out of his owne will should cast off more, then he recei∣ueth, he should be farre more iust then mercifull: But this beeing first laid as a foundation, that God casteth off none, but for sin, in that he saueth some out of that masse of corruption, whereas he might iustly leaue all, his mercie exceedeth his iustice; and in these three points. 1. in that God in the beginning made man righteous, Ecclesi. 7.31. and gaue him free∣will so to haue continued if he would, and if he had not willingly transgressed, he should haue remained in the state of grace, and fauour with God, and not haue tasted of his iustice. 2. after man had fallen, and brought all his posteritie into the bondage of corruption, Gods mercie appeared, in sauing some, whereas he might in iustice haue condemned all, as he did the reprobate Angels, that kept not their first state. 3. his mercie is euident euen toward those, which are left in their corruption, that the Lord denieth not vnto them meanes, whereby they might be called, if they had grace to vse them: and he suffereth euen the ves∣sels of wrath with much patience, not presently cutting thē off, as he might: in al these points Gods mercie exceedeth his iustice.

2. Obiect. When God had made Adam righteous, it was in his power to haue kept him from falling, that all might haue beene saued: is not God therein accessarie to their sin, is suffering that which he might haue hindered?

Ans. 1. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was fit that the Creator hauing made man with free will, should suffer the creature freely to exercise that naturall power and facultie, which was giuen him, as other creatures do•••• their kind. 2. although God permitted Adam to fall, yet he knew how to vse it for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 further demonstration of his glorie: and in this behalfe it is iust with God to suffer euill ••••••••e in the world, which he knoweth how to turne vnto good: as he suffered Iob to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Sathan, for the triall of his faith.

3. But in that God saueth some out of that masse of corruption and perdition, and not all, how is he not now partial, and an accepter of persons, in dealing vnequally with those which are in equall state and condition?

Ans. Where one is bound to giue equally to all, there it is partialitie and iniustice not to giue vnto all alike: but in free and voluntarie gifts one may giue vnequally vnto those, which are of equall sort without any touch at all: as when a man hath two debters, he may forgiue vnto one his debt, and yet require it of another: So God is not bound to giue his grace vn∣to any, especially where they haue willingly fallen from his grace, as Adam did in Paradise,

and we in him: we beeing then all now endebted vnto Gods iustice in our naturall corrup∣tion, God may haue mercie where and on whom he will: it is lawfull for him to do with his owne, as he will, Matth. 20.15.

4. Obiect. It seemeth to be an hard and cruell part to destroie any for the setting forth of ones power and magnificence, as the Turke and other Tyrants make no account of mens liues to serue their pleasure.

Ans. 1. No earthly potentate hath that power ouer his subiects, which God hath o∣uer his creatures: therefore though it be vniust in the one, it is not in the other. 2. for one to destroy another for his honour and glorie sake, may seeme hard: but to bequeath them to destruction worthily for their faults, to get glorie thereby, is not vniust: & so although God in the destruction and condemnation of the wicked, intend his glorie, yet they are worthily condemned for their sinne.

Obiect. 5. He that willeth the end, willeth also the meanes, that bring and lead vnto that end: if God haue appointed the damnation of the reprobate, then he willeth also sinne, which is the meanes to that end.

Ans. He that simply willeth the end, willeth also the meanes, but God simply willeth not the damnation of any, but for their sinne.

Obiect. 6. If God haue foreseene the sinnes of the reprobate, and willeth their iust dam∣nation for sinne; how is it said, he would haue all to be saued?

Ans. God simply willeth not the damnation of any, but for sinne: and no other thing appeareth in the reuealed will of God, in that he offereth meanes of saluation to all, but that he would haue all to be saued: this then is to be vnderstood of the absolute and reuealed will of God.

7. Obiect. If God foresee the sinnes of the reprobate, and decree their punishment, why doth God complaine of sinners, seeing his will in them is fulfilled?

Ans. Augustine answeareth 1. God iustly complaineth of sinners, quia non cogit eos peccare, because he doth not constraine them to sinne: howsoeuer Gods decree cannot be altered, yet their will is not forced, they sinne willingly, and so are iustly condemned. 2. and when God complaineth of sinners, by this meanes those, on whom God sheweth mercie, are called, & compunguntur corde, and are pricked in heart, howsoeuer the other are harde∣ned.

Obiect. 8. If the case so stand, that the reprobate are appointed to damnation, then it skilleth not what a man doth; for though he should repent him, yet if he be a reprobate, it cannot helpe him?

Ans. If ••••••were apparant who were elected, who a reprobate, then indeed all contrarie endeauour were in vaine: but seeing we haue no other way to prooue our election, then by our faith and fruits, we must thereby labour to make our election sure, 2. Pet. 1.10. 2. for one to be a reprobate, and yet to repent, are contraries: for he that is a reprobate can neuer haue grace to repent, and he that hath grace truely to repent, may be assured he is no reprobate.

Obiect. 9. But if God haue foreseene the sinnes of the reprobate, and that which God foreseeth must needs come to passe, then the reprobate sinne of necessitie, they cannot doe otherwise; how then can they be iustly punished for that, which they cannot auoid?

Ans. There is a double kind of necessitie, the one is called antecedens nec••••••••••tas, an an∣tecedent necessitie, or going before, which proceedeth from necessarie and working causes, as when a thing is forced by violence and strength, as a stone out of the hand it is necessa∣rie it should goe there is consequens necessitas, a following necessitie, or by way of conse∣quent, which is vpon supposition of the effect: as when we see one fit, this beeing supposed, that we see him fit, it is now necessarie beeing done; and yet he was not forced to fit: so it is in this case, the reprobate doe sinne necessarily, not by a necessitie forcing their will, but an infallible necessitie following the effect: for they therefore sinne, not because God did fore∣see they would sinne, but therefore God foresaw it, because they would sinne: The repro∣bate then do sinne freely without any compulsion, and therein are guiltie, though they were foreseene to sinne, and because of the corruption of their nature could doe no other.

And thus is this doctrine deliuered from all those cauils, and obiections; and man i•• found onely to be the cause of his owne ruine and destruction, but the beginning of our saluation is from God, according to that saying of the Prophet Hoshea. c. 13.9. perditio t••••

ex te Israel, salus ex me, thy perdition O Israel, is of thy selfe, thy salvation of me: and so I ende and conclude this point with that saying of Tertullian, Deus de suo optimus, de nostro iustus, &c. God is good and mercifull of his owne, and iust in that which is ours, &c. lib. de resurrect. that is, the originall of mercie is from God, but the occasion of his iustice is from sinne which is of our selues.

Notes

• * 1.1

  lib. 2. de grat. & liber. c. 17.
• * 1.2

  Synops p 822.
• * 1.3

  lib. de praedest. & grat. c. 16.
• * 1.4

  de persever. lib. 2. c. 11.
• * 1.5

  pag. 356.