The workes of Lucius Annæus Seneca, both morrall and naturall Containing, 1. His bookes of benefites. 2. His epistles. 3. His booke of prouidence. 4. Three bookes of anger. 5. Two bookes of clemencie. 6. His booke of a blessed life. 7. His booke of the tranquilitie of the minde. 8. His booke of the constancie of a wiseman. 9. His booke of the shortnesse of life. 10. Two bookes of consolation to Martia. 11. Three bookes of consolation to Heluia. 12. His booke of consolation to Polibius. 13. His seuen bookes of naturall questions. Translated by Tho. Lodge, D. in Physicke.

The Argument of IVS••VS LIPSIVS.

THe Bookes of Anger seeme to be written amongst the first Books of Phi∣losophy vndoubtedly amongst those which we haue: we gather the same out of SENECAES owne words in his third Booke and eighteenth chap∣ter. At this time CAIVS CAESAR caused SEXTVS PAPINIVS whose father was Consul, and BELENIVS BASSVS who was Thre∣surer, to be whipped. He saith at this time, euen now but newly done, nay more, whilst CALIGVLA himselfe was liuing, out of the Chapter following. That which thou s•• much admirest was vsuall and ordinary with this beast, he liueth for this, he watcheth for this, he studieth for this; vndoubtedly all these thing were spoken by a man that is, not that was. He wrote at that time therefore, but he published it not, the more his wise∣dome, although as I suppose he did it shortly after his death.

The Argument is as the title testifieth; How to know Anger, and afterwards to es∣chue it. The first Booke therefore hath the description thereof, and the loathsome habite and face of such as are angrie: then certaine definitions: then questions whether man onely be subiect thereunto? He maintaineth it: Whether it be according to nature? He ••enieth it with the Stoicks. Whether it be profitable, especially if it be tempered? This likewise denieth he, and diuersly disput••th against the Peripatetiques: that neyther the minde nor the strength is whetted thereby. That we ought not to be angry, no not with those that are euill; neyther at the death of our father, nor at the rauishing of our mother, yet that they are to be defended and reuenged. To conclude, that this is a signe, not of a great but of a weake minde. The Bookes art in part very excellent and eminent in the whole, scarce distinct but confused in repetitions and digestions.

CHAP. I.

THOV hast exacted of me, * 1.1 Nouatus, to write vn∣to thee how wrath might bee pacified, neyther without cause seemest thou vnto me to haue fea∣red this affection especially, which is the most cruell and enraged of all others: for in the rest there is somewhat that is pliant and pleasing, but this is alwayes violent and full of immoderate sorrow, of armes, of bloud, of punishments, incen∣sed with more then humane desire, neglecting her selfe so she may hurt another, rushing in vpon the sharpest weapons, and greedy of reuenge, and complotting murthers. Some therefore of the wiser sort haue said that * 1.2 Anger

is a short madnesse, for she is as little Mistresse of her selfe as the other: she for∣getteth all respect, neglecteth friendships, intent and obstinate in that she hath vndertaken, and neglectfull of reason, and incapable of counsaile: she is trans∣ported by vaine pretexts, stupid in the presence of equitie and veritie, properly resembling the ruines of houses, which breake themselues vpon that ruine which they themselues haue beaten downe. And to the end thou mayest know that they who are surprised with Anger are truely mad, consider a little their countenance, and the manner of their behauiour. For euen as these are certaine signes of confirmed madnesse, to haue a bolde and threatning counte∣nance, a heauie brow, and dreadfull face, a swift and disordered gate, vnquiet handes, changed colour, and frequent and deepe sighes: so those that are angry haue the same signes. Their eyes sparkle and shine, their face is on fire thorow a re••••uxe of bloud that boileth vp from the bottom of their breasts, their lips quiuer, their teeth grate, their haire startleth and standeth vpright, their breath is inforced and wheeseth, they wrest and cracke their fingers, their speech is in∣terrupted with plaints and grones and muttering, which a man may hardly vn∣derstand. They often clap their hands, and stampe the ground with their feet; their whole bodie startleth, and is shaken, their actions are full of furious me∣naces. In briefe, they haue a dreadfull and horrible countenance, resembling s••ch men that disfigure and puffe themselues vp after a strange fashion. Thou canst not say whether it be a more detestable or deformed vice: the rest we may hide and nourish in secret; Anger discouereth it selfe and appeareth in the countenance, & the greater it is, the more manifestly discouereth she her impa∣tience. Seest thou not in brute beasts whatsoeuer, that as soone as they are ad∣dressed to hurt, there are certaine signes as forerunners of their intention; how all their bodies giue ouer their peaceable and accustomed habite, and how they exasperate th••ir naturall fiercenes? The Boares some and gnash their teeth: the hornes of Bulls are tossed in the ayre, and by the trampling of their feete the sand is scattered: the Lions roare, the incensed Serpents haue swelling neckes, mad Dogs haue a dreafull look. There is no liuing creature so cruell and perni∣cious whatsoeuer, that discouereth not some new furie, as soone as displeasure hath seized him; neyther am I ignorant that other affections also are scarcely hidden, and that lust•• feare, and boldnesse make show of themselues, and may be foreknowne. For there is none so vehement and inward thought, that bewray∣eth not it selfe in the countenance. What difference then is there, that other affections doe appeare, and this is eminent?

CHAP. II.

BVt now if thou wilt consider the effects and damages thereof there is no plague that hath ruined and cost the world more then this.* 1.3 Thou shalt see murthers, imprisonments, shamefull and mutuall reproches of guiltie men, sacking of Citties, ruines of whole nations, heads of Princes and great Lords taxed and solde to him that offereth most, houses burned, and fire not restrained within the walls of a Cittie, but whole spaces of Regions shining with hostile flame. Be∣hold the foundations of the noblest Citties, now scarcely knowne, these hath wrath ouerturned. Behold the desert and vnhabited, extended to many thou∣sand paces, these hath wrath dispoyled. Beholde so many great Chieftaines,

whose memorie remaineth as yet seruing for examples of humane miserie. One of these hath wrath murthered in his bed, another hath wrath slaine at the ta∣ble, without any respect of the sacred rites of the same, another hath she stabbed in the midst of the lanes, and in the market-place in the sight of all men: shee hath commanded another to offer his throate to the murtherous handes of his sonne; another to haue his Kingly throate cut by the sword of his slaue, an∣other to haue his members di••••ended vpon the gibbet. And as yet haue I but reckoned vp some particular mens punishments. But if thou please (pretermit∣ting those whom Anger hath thus massacred man by man) to beholde whole Armies put to the sword, the people of a Cittie murthered by souldiers, expres∣ly sent to that purpose, and whole Nations exterminated without sparing great or small, as if the gods cared not for vs, or they contemned their authoritie. But as touching the Fencers, why is it that the people are so iniustly incensed a∣gainst them, that they repute it to be an iniurie done vnto them, if the sword-players kill not one another speedily, shewing by their countenances, gestures, and heate, that they suppose themselues to be neglected, making themselues by this meanes of spectators mercilesse enemies. Whatsoeuer it be this is not wrath, but a passion resembling wrath, such as is that of children, who if they haue falne will haue the earth beaten, and oft-times they know not with whom they are angrie, yet are they onely angrie without cause and without iniurie, and yet not without some appeareance of iniurie, nor without some desire of re∣uenge. They are deluded therefore with counterfeit beatings of the earth, and are pacified by the feined teares of those that would still them, and by a coun∣terfeit forme of reuenge their feined sorrow is extinguished.

CHAP. III.

WEe are oftentimes displeased (saith he) not with those that haue hurt vs, but with those who hereafter are like to hurt vs•• to the end thou mayest know that Anger proceedeth not onely from an iniurie alreadie done. True it is, that we are angrie with those that should hurt vs, but those that harm vs in their very thought, and he that is to doe vs an iniurie, hath alreadie done it. To the end thou mayst know (saith he) that wrath is not a desire of reuenge, oft-times the weakest are displeased with the strongest. Neyther wish they for reuenge, which they hope not to see. We haue formerly said that wrath was a desire, and not a power to reuenge; but men desire such things as they cannot effect. Furthermore, no man is so humble and base, who cannot hope to see justice done vpon his grea∣test aduersarie:* 1.4 we haue power enough to hurt: Aristotles definition differeth not very much from ours; for he saith, That wrath is a desire to displease those that haue displeased vs. It were a long matter to discourse what difference there is betwixt this definition and ours: against both it is said that beasts are incen∣sed, yet are they not prouoked by any iniurie, neyther desire they the punish∣ment or paine of any other beast: for although they reuenge themselues, yet is it not with a desire of vengeance. But we must answer, that wilde beasts, and all other creatures, except man onely, do want Anger. For whereas it is opposite to reason, yet doth it neuer grow in any one, but such in whom reason hath place. Brute beasts haue their assaults, their rage, their fiercenesse and incursi∣on, yet haue they Anger no more then lecherie, and in some pleasures they are

more intemperate then man is. Thou must not giue credit to him that saith:

The Boare remembers not his wrathfull ire, The Hind doth scarcely trust her swift retire. Nor Beares to pray vpon the mightie h••ardes.

By this word anger, he intendeth emotion, or incitation. They know no more to be angrie, then how to pardon. Dumbe beasts want humane affections, but they haue certaine impulsions which resemble the same. Otherwise if loue were in them, hatred should be in them also: if friendship, enmitie: if discenti∣on, concord: whereof some markes doe appeare in them. But good and euill are onely proper to the hearts of men. Wisdome, diligence, and cogitation, are only granted to a man, and bruite beast••s are not only not partakers of hu∣mane vertues but are also exempted from their vices. All them, forme both ex∣terium and interium is vnlike vnto mans. Their vnderstanding is grosse and im∣perfect, their voice strange, confused, and without any signification, their tongue is tied, and hath no diuersities of sounds, neyther can it distinctly speake and pronounce. The beast then receiueth the obiect of that which shee seeth, and the kindes of all thinges that incite her vnto furie, but she receiueth them troubled and confused. Thence commeth their springings and vehement as∣saults, which may not be called either feares, or cares, or sadnes, or displeasures, but some things like vnto these. Therefore is it that they are quickly appeased and are changed into a contrarie estate, and after they haue most inragedly exe∣cuted there cru••ltie, they returne vnto their pasture and fodder, and after a neighing and furious course, they seeke out to their rest and sleep.

CHAP. IIII.

WE haue sufficiently declared what anger is, and wherein it differeth from an inclination to be carried in such sort, as a drunkard diffe∣reth from drunkennesse, and a man that is afraid from a coward. A man may be angry; although he be not ordinarily inclined and subject to bee angrie, hee that is subject to displeasure, cannot choose but sometimes hee must bee subject to choller. As touching the other kinds of choller, which the Graecians expresse by diuers other names, I let them passe because we haue no proper words to expresse them, although that wee say that that which is sowre is bitter, that he that is excessiuely bent to indignation is mad, that hee that is cl••morous is hard to be reconciled and fierce, all which are differences of wrath,* 1.5 amongst th••se may we put froward, which is a delicate kind of choler. For there are some displeasures which are appeased with crying, some that are ordinarie and no lesse obstinate, some sparing in wordes and vio∣lent in execution, some that discouer their bitternesse in the multitude of wordes and curses, some passe not further, then plaints and reproaches, some others are profound and weightie, and are fixed deeply in the thought. There are a thousand sorts of euils in this euill, which are so diuerse, and spread into so many branches.

CHAP. V.

* 1.6WE haue examined what wrath is, and whether it might seaze any other Creature then a man, wherein it differed from displeasure and of the kinds of the same. Let vs now enquire whether wrath be according to nature, whether it be profitable, and whether in any sort wee ought to restraine the same. It will manifestly ap∣peare whether it bee according to nature if wee consider a man, for there is no∣thing so peaceable, and gouerned as he is, as long as his minde is gouerned and paci••ied: but what is more cruell then anger? what Creature, is more louing to∣ward his like then man is? what is more hateful then wrath? A * 1.7 man is borne to h••lpe other, wrath for the generall ruine of all. A man desir••th nothing more then companie, wrath s••archeth solitude, the one will assist, the other wil hurt, this desireth to shew himselfe kind, though it be but to strangers, the other to endang••r her familiars. A man is readie to hazard his owne life to secure ano∣thers. Wrath is readie to hazard danger, prouided, shee may hazard some o∣ther with her selfe. Who therefore is more ignorant, of the nature of thinges, then hee that to her best and commendablest works assigneth this so sauage and pernicious a vice? Wrath as we said is greedie of vengeance, and that desire of reuenge should be in the most peaceable heart of a man, is a thing which is not consonant to his nature. For humane life consisteth vpon benefits and concord, it is not then by threat••s but by mutuall amitie that men are allied and ti••d to assist one an other. What then? Is not Chastisement sometimes necessarie? Why not? but this must be sincere and with reason. For it hurteth not but hea∣leth vnder a resemblance of hurting. Euen as to straighten the steales of our Ia∣velings, which are wax••n crooked, wee burne them and plie them in a vice of Iron or Wood, not to the intent to breake them, but make them more euen and straight: so correct wee our wits being depraued with vice, with the paine both of bodie and minde.* 1.8 And in like sort, as the Physition, hauing some light infirmities in cure assaieth: First, to change some little of the ordinarie custome of the sicke to prescribe his dyet, his drinke, his exercises, and to confirme his health by the only changes of the order of his life. Secondly, hee indeuoureth to bring this to passe that this meanes may profit, and if it happen other wayes he diminisheth and cutteth of some thinges; and if this be not enough hee for∣biddeth the sick-man all meates, and rectifieth his bodie by enioyning him ab∣stinence: and if these gentle remedies haue effected nothing, he openeth a vaine and if any members be harmeful one vnto an other that cleaue vnto the same, and spread their euill thorow the bodie he deuideth them, and there is no cure that the sick-man supposeth gri••uous, if the effect of the same bring him health: In like sort it behoueth the Magistrate,* 1.9 who is the conseruer and maintainer of the Lawe to heale mens mindes, by gentle wordes and perswasions as much as in him lieth, perswading his subjects to doe that which is commanded them, and imprinting in their thoughts the loue of justice and honestie; in briefe pro∣posing for the reward of vertue he hatred of vice: afterwardes he ought to vse sharper words contenting himselfe as yet to aduertise and threaten. Finally, he must haue reourse to punishments, and yet such as are light and revocable. The vttermost punishments shall be inflicted for the greatest faults: to the ••nd that no man may perish except it be he that is put to death, and for whom it is ex∣pedient to die.

CHAP. VI.

THere is this difference betwixt the Maiestrate and the Physitian,* 1.10 that the one suffer those to die whose life they could not saue; the other contrariwise condemneth the malefactor disgracefully, and forcibly driueth him out of the world, not because hee t••keth pleasure to put any man to death. (for farre off is a wisem••n from such barbarous cruelti••) but to the ende that those who ar•• condemn••d ••o death, should serue for an example to all men, and that the Commonwe••lth might make vse of their death, who during their life, would bee pro••itable to no man. The nature of man therefore is not punishment, and therefore is not wrath according to the nature of a man, because it is desirous of reu••nge. I will propose in this place an Argument of Platoes, For who forbiddeth vs to make vse of other mens reasons? In as much as they mak•• for vs. A good man (saith he) doth not hurt, it is the punishment that hurteth, punishment ther••fore doth not become a good man. And consequently, neither choller, because punishment is agreeable to the same: If a good man take no pleasure in punish∣ing, neither shall he take pleasure in that affect, to which punishment is a plea∣sure. Therefore wrath is not naturall.

CHAP. VII.

IS not wrath therefore to be admitted,* 1.11 although it be vnnaturall, because that oft-times it hath beene pro••itable. It raiseth and in∣citeth m••ns minds, neither doth fortitude performe any wor∣thy action in warre, except by this meanes mens hearts bee infla∣med, and this ins••igation hath whetted and animated bond-men to attempt dangers. Some therefore thinke it requisite to temper wrath, and not to extinguish it, and that being taken away which is exuberant, to reduce it into a laudable forme; and to retaine that without which the action would languish, and the force and vigour of the spirit be resolued. First, it is more ea∣sie to exclude such things as are pernicious, then to gouerne the same, and not to admit them rather then to moderate them when they are admitted. For when they haue put them selues into possession, they are more powerfull then their guide, and suffer not themselues either to bee deminished or cut off. A∣gaine, reason it selfe to whom the ruines are deliuered, is so long powerfull, as long as shee is seperated from passions; But if shee intermixeth her selfe, and bee defiled with them, shee cannot restraine those whom shee might haue re∣mooued. For the minde being once mooued and shaken, is addicted to that whereby it is driuen. The beginning of some things are in our power, but if they bee increased, they carie vs away perforce, and suffer vs not to returne backe: euen as the bodies that fall head-long downeward, haue no power to stay themselues.* 1.12 And can those that are cast downe, retaine or stay themselue•• in their fall, but an irreuocable precipitation hath cut off all counsaile, and all meanes of remedie, neither is it possible to keepe themselues from attaining thither, whether had they their choice they would not arriue. So the minde if it hath plunged it selfe in wrath, loue, and such like affections, is not suffered

to restraine the full, it must needes bee, that the waight and nature of vices, in∣clined vnto their full; carie it away and precipitate it to the bottome.

CHAP. VIII.

* 1.13IT is best therefore forthwith to despise the first assault, and resist the beginnings. And to endeauour that wee fall not into wrath, for if shee beginneth to transport vs, it is a hard matter to recouer the right way. Because reason hath no place, as soone as passion hath gotten the vpper hand, and Will hath giuen him any interrest, then will shee afterwards doe, not what thou permittest, but what shee pleaseth. First of all say I, the enemie is to be driuen from our borders, for when hee is entred and hath gotten the gates, hee taketh no condition with his Captiues. For at that time the minde is not retired, neither exteriourly examineth shee affecti∣ons, to the intent shee suffereth them not to haue further progresse then they should, but is changed her selfe into passion, and therefore can shee not reuoke that profitable and wholesome force, which is alreadie betraied and weakned. For as I said, these haue not their distinct and seuerall seates, I meane passion (which is a change in the Soule from good to euill) and reason (which is a change from euill to goodnesse.) How therefore shall reason which hath giuen place vnto anger, and is seazed and oppressed with vices, rise againe? Or how shall shee deliuer her selfe from confusion, wherein the mixture of the worst hath preuailed? But some (saith he) containe themselues in anger, Is it in such sort that they accomplish nothing which choler commandeth, or doe they obey the same somewayes? If they doe nothing, it appeareth that wrath is not necessarie in humaine actions whom you preferred, as if shee had somewhat more greater efficacie then reason. In conclusion, I aske this question, whether shee be stronger or weaker then reason? If stronger, how may reason giue her a Law and restraine her, considering that they are but feeble things which o∣bey her. If weake, reason of her selfe is sufficient without her to effect things, neither desireth shee the helpe of so powerlesse a passion. But some that are an∣grie are their owne men, and containe themselues. How? Then when anger is alreadie pacified, and remitteth of her owne accord. Not when shee is in height of her feruour, for then is shee stronger. What then? Doe not some men in the height of their displeasure, suffer those to depart safe and secure, whom they hate and abstaine from hurting them? But how? After that a second pa∣ssion hath repulsed the former, or feare or pleasure hath commaunded this or that, wrath staieth it selfe, not for the reuerence she oweth vnto reason, but by reason of a feeble and euil accord which the passions haue amongst themselues.

CHAP. IX.

* 1.14TO conclude it hath nothing profitable in it selfe, neither doth it whe•• the courage in warlike exploits. For Vertue which is con∣tented with her selfe, must neuer bee assisted by vice. As often∣times as shee is to attempt any thing, shee is not angrie but raiseth her selfe so farre forth as she thinketh it necessarie, ••he is both in∣tended and remitted no otherwise then those arrowes which are shot out of

Engines, are in the power of him that shooteth, how farre they shall be shot: Anger saith Aristotle is necessarie, neith••r c••n any thing be atchieued without her, except she encourage the minde, and enkindle the spirit. But wee are to vse her not as a Captaine but as a Souldier:* 1.15 which is false. For if shee giue eare to reason, and follow the way shee is directed, then is it not anger whose pro∣pertie is contumacie: but if she resist and is not quieted when she is commanded, but passeth further with pride and furie, shee is as improfitable a Minister of the minde•• as a Souldier that retireth not to his colours when the retreat is sounded. If therefore she suffer her selfe to be kept in measure, she must bee cal∣led by another name, she ceaseth to be wrath, which I vnderstand to be vnbride∣led and vntamed. If she suffer it not she is pernicious, neither is she to bee recko∣ned amongst the number of helpes: So that either she is not Anger or else she is vnprofitable: For if any man exacteth punishment, not being greedie of the punishment it selfe but because hee must, hee is not to bee numbred amongst those that are Angrie. That man shall be reputed a profitable Souldier, who knoweth how to obey Counsaile, as for affections, they are as euill Ministers as they are Captaines. Reason therefore will neuer take to her assistants, impro∣vident and violent passions ouer whom she hath no authoritie, and whom shee neuer may restrain except she oppresse their equals, and likes vnto them as feare to Anger, Anger to cowardise, desire to feare.

CHAP. X.

FArre be it from vertue to be reduced to this extremitie,* 1.16 that reason should be constrained to haue his recourse to vices. Here cannot the minde remaine in any certaine quiet; hee must needes bee in perpetuall agitation and trouble, who is secure in his euils, who cannot be strong except he be wrathful, nor modestuous except he desire, nor quiet except he feare, he must liue in a Tyranny that becommeth a slaue to any passion. Are you not ashamed to thrust Vertues vnder the prote∣ction of vices? Moreouer, reason looseth her power if she can doe nothing with∣out passion, but beginneth to be equall, and like vnto her. For what importeth it, whether passion be an inconsiderate a thing without reason, or that reason be feeble: and of no force without passion? All comes to one, the one cannot be without the other. But who will endure that passion, should bee equalled with reason? Choler (saith he) is a profitable passion, if it bee small and little. I if she be profitable by nature: but if shee bee incapable both of gouernment and reason, she shall attaine this only thing, by her moderation: that the lesser she is, the lesse hurtfull shee shall be. Therefore a light passion is nothing else but a small euill.

CHAP. XI.

BVT against our enemies (saith hee) Wrath is necessarie.* 1.17 Neuer lesse. Wherein our passions should not bee intemperate but obe∣dient and moderate. For what other thing was it, that crushed and confounded the Barbarians so strong in their bodies, so pa∣tient in their labours, but Wrath which is most pernicious to her

selfe? Art likewise defenceth the sword-players, Wrath layes them open to danger. Furthermore what need wee wrath, wh••re reason may doe the same. Thinkest thou that Hunter is angri•• with wild beasts, either when hee chaseth them as they ••lie,* 1.18 or assaileth them when they draw neere him? Reason doth all these thinges without Wrath. What hath so confounded so many thousand Cimbrians and Teutons, that were spread vpon the Alpes, that the notice of so great an ouerthrow was not related, to their friends by a messenger but by Fortune, but that Wrath in them had the place of Vertue? Which as some times shee hath defeated and ouerthrowne, those that met her, so oftentimes is shee the cause of her owne confusion. May a man finde out a Nation more couragious, more forward and readie to incursions and charges, more desirous of warre, then the Almaines, who are borne and brought vp to Armes: who are onely diligent herein, and negligent in the rest? Is there a people more hardned vnto labour, and that indureth trauaile better? For the most part they care not, to make prouision of garments for their bodies to keepe them warme: neither striue they to retire themselues from the perpetual furie of the frost, which is in that Countrie; yet are they defeated and put to flight vpon the ••irst charge, and before the Legions were seene by Spaniards, French, Asians, and Syrians, who are but cold Souldiers in the Warre: being subject by no o∣ther meanes to this disaster, but by reason of their wrath. So then, to these bo∣dies, to these mindes that are ignorant of delights,* 1.19 excesse, and riches, giue rea∣son and discipline to guide them. But without farther debating in this kinde, I must call to remembrance in this place the Auncient custome of the olde Ro∣mans. By what other meanes did Fabius reserue the decayed forces of the de∣clining Empire, but that he knew how to delay, how to lengthen out matters, and dally with the time, all which angrie men cannot doe. The Common-Weale had beene vtterly ouerthrowne, that then stood in great extremitie, if Fabius had dared so much as wrath perswaded him vnto; but hauing for coun∣saile the consideration of the estate of Rome, and the forces hee had, vn∣der his gouernment, which had they beene defeated either in the whole or in part, all the rest was vtterly ruinated, hee laid wrath aside, and the desire of vengeance, a••d hauing his minde fixed vpon the good of the Common-Weale and vpon the present occasion: he first of all surmounted Choler, and after that Hanibal. What did Scipio? Hauing forsaken Hanibal, and the Carthaginian A••mie, and all these with whom he should be angrie, did hee not translate the Warre into Africa in so slow a manner that they who enuied his Vertue, repu∣ted him for an idle and dissolute man. What did the other Scipio? did he not be∣le••ger Numantium for a long time, and patiently disiested both this his pri∣uate griefe, and the discontent of the whole State, by reason that Numantium kept out longer then Carthage. VVhich while hee trencheth about and shut∣teth vp his Enemie, he drew them to this extremitie; that they murthered o••e an other.

CHAP. XII.

WRath then is neither profitable in skirmishes or in Warre, for it is too prone to temeritie, and whilst shee endeuoureth to harme o∣thers she hazardeth h••r selfe. That Vertue is most assured, that hath long time examined and gouerned her selfe, and hath beene

guided by good and wise counsaile.* 1.20 What then (saith he) shall not a good man be angrie, if hee see his Father stroken, his Mother rauished? Hee shall not bee angrie, but reuenge and defend them. What fearest thou that his pie••ie to∣wards his parents is not an occasion more pregnant to incite him therunto then wrath is? Wee say after the same sort. What therefore? shall not a good man when he seeth his Father, or his sonne, cut in peeces, weepe or fall in a sound? as we see it falleth out in women, as often as any slight suspition of danger doth awake them. A good man executeth his offices without confusion or feare, and in such sort will performe those thinges that are worthie a good man, that hee will doe nothing that is vnworthie a man. Shall my Father be murthered? I will defend him.* 1.21 Is he slaine? I will burie him, not because I am sorrie there∣fore, but for that I am bound thereunto. VVhen thou saist thus, Theophrastus thou seekest to draw more stronger precepts into hatred, & forsaking the Iudge hast recourse vnto the people; because in such accidents euerie one is accusto∣med to be angrie: thou thinkest that men wil judge that that ought to be done which they doe. For the most part, euerie one judgeth that affection to be just which they allow of. Are good men angrie at their injuries? but they doe the same, if warme water bee not fitly mixed, if their glasse bee broken, if their shooe be sprinkled with dirt. It is not pietie, but their infirmitie that moueth that wrath. We resemble those to children who wil weepe no lesse for the losse of their Ants, then for the death of their parents. It is the part of no pious but an infirme and weake minde to he angrie for a mans friends. But this is a wor∣thie matter, and well beseeming a man to shew himselfe a protector of his pa∣rents, his children, his friends, and his Countrie: not by violence, or passion; but voluntarily with iudgement, and discretion, with prouidence, and mode∣ration. For there is no affection so desirous of reuenge, as wrath is, by reason whereof she is wholly vnproper to that effect, being hindered by her violence and furie; euen as ••uerie passion is opposite and contrarie to it selfe, in all that whereunto she is inclined, and whereto she runneth hastily. And therefore, nei∣ther in peace, or warre, was it euer good. For she maketh peace like vnto warre; and in Armes forgetteth her selfe, that warre is common, and commeth into an other mans power, whilst she is not in her owne. Furthermore, vices therefore are not to be intertained and vsed because at sometime they haue done some good: for feuours also doe cure some kindes of sicknesses•• neither ••herefore is it better not to haue wanted them wholy. It is an abhominable kind of reme∣die to recouer health by the asistance of a ••icknesse. In like manner, wrath al∣though sometimes it hath beyond expectation profited as venomne precipi∣tation and shipwrack haue done, yet it is not therefore to be reputed a thing in∣tirely profitable, for oftimes poysons haue preserued the life of diuers person••.

CHAP. XIIII.

MOreouer those thinges which wee ought to esteeme good, are the better, and more to be desired, the greater they be. If justice bee good, no man will say, that it is like to bee better, if any thing should be taken from it; if Fortitude be good•• no man wil desire that it should be diminished in any part, & wrath the greater it is

the better that is,* 1.22 for who refuseth the increase of any good thing? but the in∣crease of wrath is vnprofitable, and consequently the bearing of the same is vn∣profitable. It is no good thing that by increase becommeth euill. Wrath (saith he) is profitable: because it maketh men more hardie to fight. In this manner Drunkennesse is profitable, for it maketh men more insolent and audacious, and many that haue drunken ouer freely, are more readie at their weapons, In this manner say, that both ••renzie, and Madnesse, are necessarie for valiant men: because oftentimes Furie maketh men more strong and able. VVhat? hath not feare sometimes made a Coward valiant, and the feare of death like∣wise enkindled, the weakest hearted men to the battle? But Wrath, Drunken∣nesse, Feare, and such like, are but filthie and fraile prouocations, neither confirme V••rtue which hath no need of vice, but doe sometimes a little quic∣ken a slow and idle mind. No man is strengthened by his anger, except he haue beene strong before his anger. To them anger assisteth not, but supplieth the place of Vertue. In briefe, if this passion were recommendable, it would fol∣low euerie one that were most perfect; but they that are the most tetchie, are infants, old-men, and sick-men, and euery Creature that is by na••ure weake and feeble, is ordinarily froward.

CHAP. XIIII.

* 1.23IT cannot be (saith Theophrastus) but that a good man should bee displeased with the wicked. In this sence the better men should be the most cholericke. But contrariwise they should be more peace∣able, exempt from passions, and without hatered of any man. What reason might moue them, to hate sinnes, considering that it is errour which driueth them into these faultes: But it is not the part of a Wise man to haue those that erre, otherwise he should hate himselfe. L••t him bethinke himselfe, how many faults he committeth against good manners, how many thinges he hath done which require pardon? Then shall he bee angrie with himselfe. For a just Iudge pronounceth not one sentence in his owne be∣halfe, another in anothers. A man (saith hee) is not to be found, that can ab∣solue himselfe, truth it is, that euerie man (saith he) is innocent but it is in regard of witnesses not of his conscience. How farre more humane were it for a man to shew himselfe gentle, and pacified to those that offend, and rather to re∣con••••le them then to persecute them. It were better to lead them, into the di∣rect way who for want of knowledge haue straied out of it; as to thrust them out of the way.* 1.24 A man ought to correct him that offendeth by admonitions•• forcible reprehensions, friendly but effectuall speech: to the end to make him better for himselfe and for others. In briefe, hee ought to chastise him without passion of Choler. For what Physitian is he, that will bee angrie and displea∣sed with his Patient, whom he would recouer?

CHAP. XV.

BVt they cannot bee corrected, neither is there any thing in them that is capable of good hope;* 1.25 Let those bee exterminated out of the companie of men, who are like to infect those who con∣uerse with them, and since it is the onely meanes, let them cease to be euill, but let this bee done without hatred. For what cause haue I to hate him whom I then pro••it most, when I take him selfe from him selfe. Doth a man then hate his limmes when hee cutteth them off, this is not Wrath but a miserable cure. We chace away mad Dogges, we kill a res••ie and vntractable Oxe. Wee arde our scabbe Sheepe, for feare least they infect the flocke; we strangle monstruous birthes; wee drowne our owne children like∣wise if they be borne deformed and monsters. It is not an act of wrath but of reason, to seperate those things that are vnprofitable from those that are helth∣full and profitable. There is nothing•• which he that chastiseth an other should more refraine then from wrath, because that chastisement profiteth when it is done with iudgement. Thenc•• it is that Socrates said vnto his slaue, I had bea∣ten thee, had I not beene angrie. Hee deferred the admonition of his seruant till a more conuenient time, and at that time he admonished himselfe. Whose affe∣ction shall be temperate, when as Socrates da••e not trust him selfe to his wrath? There needeth therefore no angrie corrector to chastise those that are wicked and do amisse. For whereas wrath is an offence of the minde, he that is faultie himselfe, must not punish offenders.

CHAP. XVI.

WHat then shall I not be angrie with a thiefe?* 1.26 Shall I not be displea∣sed with a Witch. No; For neither am I angrie with my selfe when I let my selfe bloud. For I apply all sorts of punishment in stead of remedie. Thou that as yet hast made but an entrance into errour, neither offendest grieuously but frequently, shalt first of all bee secretly, then publikely reprooued. If thou engage thy sel••e fur∣ther in sinne, so as words may not correct thee, thou shalt bee fined for thy fol∣ly; but if thy fault requireth some more forcible and feeling punishment, thou shalt bee banished and sent to vnknowne places.* 1.27 But if thy malice increaseth, and waxeth obdurate, that thou haue neede to vse more sharper remedies then the precedent; thou shalt be thrust into shackles and lockt vp in prison. If thou be come incurable, and thou growest to heape sinne vpon sinne, if thou not one∣ly layest hold on the occasions to doe euill (which neuer faile those that seeke them) but that which is worst, if to doe euill, thou hast no other occasion, but the wicked custome thou hast taken, thou hast drunke iniquitie, and ••rt in such sort tainted and so deepely tinctured with wickedn••ss•• inwardly, that it cannot finde issue out, except thou burst and die presently. Thou hast long time sought for death, poore man that thou art, w•• will gratifie thee•• wee will heale thee of this furie of thy spirit wherewith thou art torm••nted, and hauing made thee passe by the punishment of other men and thine owne, I will let thee see and feele the onely good which remaineth for thee that is to say, death. Why should I bee displeased with him whom I assist and greatly helpe at that time.

To take a mans life from him,* 1.28 is sometimes to shew him fauour and to doe him a good turne. If I were a well experienced Physitian, and should enter into an Hospitall or some rich mans house, I would not ordaine one and the same me∣dicine for diuers sick men. I see diuers vices in so different minds, & am appoin∣ted to haue the gouernment of a Citie, I must search out a medicine for euery one of their sicknesses. Shame must cure this man, trauell that man; the whip one man, necessitie the other, and the sword the last. Therefore, although in being a Maiestrate, I ought to change my Garment, and cause the people to be assembled vpon the sound of a Trumpet, yet will I ascend the Tribunall, not mooued or displeased, but with the countenance of an vpright Iudge, armed with the authoritie of the Lawes, and will pronounce the sentence with a voice rather pleasing and graue, then furious: and peaceably yet seuerely will com∣maund the hangman to execute his office. And when I shall commaund any malefactors head to be strooken off; and when I cause the parricide to be sowen into a sacke, and afterwards to bee cast into the water; and when I iudge the offending Souldier to passe the pikes; and when I command the Traitour and publicke enemie to be cast downe from the Tarpeian rocke, I will bee so farre from wrath, and so temperate in my minde, as when I kill Serpents or other venimous beas••es. But wrath is necessarie for him that will punish. What thinkest thou that the Law is angrie with those shee knoweth not? Whom shee seeth not? Whom shee hopeth not to be? We ought therefore to inuest his af∣fection, which is not displeased but onely defineth. For if it be conuenient for a good man to be angrie for euill deedes, it shall bee as lawfull for him to enuie the prosperitie of euill men. For what is more vnworthie then that some men flourish, yea and such who abuse the indulgence of fortune, for whom no for∣tune may be found out euill enough. But as well shall hee see their commodi∣ties without enuie, as their hainous offences without wrath. A good Iudge condemneth that which is euill, and yet hateth it not: What then? Shall not a wise man when he hath such a lik•• thing in his hands bee touched in minde, and more troubled then ordinarie? I confeffe it, hee shall feele some light moti∣on. For as Zeno saith, when the wound in a wise mans Soule is healed, yet re∣maineth there some scarre. So then he shall feele certaine touches of suspition and shadowes of passion, yet without any passion. Aristotle saith, that some affections, if a man vse them well, serue insteede of armes; which should bee true,* 1.29 if they might be vsed and laide aside as warlicke instruments, at the plea∣sure of him that putteth them on. These Armes which Aristotle giueth na∣ture, fight of themselues, and expect not that a man should make vse of them,* 1.30 they gouerne and know not what it is to obey: vertue hath no need of in∣struments. We are sufficiently furnished by reason, wherewith nature hath fit∣ted vs. Shee it is that hath giuen vs a weapon, firme, perpetuall, obsequious, and certaine, and such as cannot be reinforced against the Master. Reason of it selfe is sufficient enough, not onely to foresee, but to execute any action. For what is more fond then that reason should seeke assistance from wrath: a stable thing from an vncertaine: a faithful from a perfidious, a whole from the sicke? Moreouer as touching the actions themselues, wherein the helpe of anger see∣meth to be most requisite, reason it selfe is more stronger. For hauing marked out that which she ought to doe, she remaineth alwaies setled in her resolution and being vnable to finde out any thing better then her selfe to change her, shee departeth neuer from her place. Contrariwise pittie hath oftentimes driuen wrath out of dores, for this passion hath no solid strength, but onely a tumor,

and vseth violent beginnings, no otherwise then the windes which arise from the earth and being entertained by the flouds and marshes are vehement•• but not permanent. It beginneth with a great violence, and a••terwardes fainteth being wearied before her time, and when shee hath inuen••••d nought else but crueltie, and new kinds of punishment, when execution is to be done, she is pa∣cified and becommeth gentle. Affection qua••leth quickly, reason is equal. Moreouer also where wrath perseuereth sometimes, if there are many that haue deserued death, after the bloud of two or three, she beginneth to bee cal∣med. The first assaults of her are sharpe, euen as the venomnesse of Serpents are hurtfull: that creepe from their d••nnes•• her teeth are harmelesse, when as often byting hath spent them. They therefore suffer not equally, who haue offended equally, and oft times hee that hath offended the least, suffereth the most because he is the object of the latest anger and is wholy vnequall•• some∣times it extendeth it selfe farther then it should, sometimes it resisteth more then it ought. For shee flattereth her selfe and iudgeth as shee list, and will not heare, and leaueth no place for excuse, and retaineth that which shee hath ap∣prehended; and suffereth not her iudgement to be taken from her, although it be euill. Reason giueth place to either part, and time likewise, Afterwards shee demaundeth a terme for her selfe, to the end she may haue time to discusse the truth; wrath is hastie:* 1.31 Reason will haue that iudged which is rightfull, wrath will haue that seeme rightfull which shee iudgeth. Reason respecteth nothing but that which is in question, wrath is mooued with vaine things, and such as are nothing to the purpose. An assured countenance, a firme voice, a free speech, an exquisite garment, a delay without delay, a ••auour of the people, ex∣aspereth wrath. Oftimes in despight of the aduocate ••he condemneth him for whom he pleadeth. And although the truth be laid before her eyes, shee lo∣ueth and maintaineth errour, shee will not bee reprooued and in euill enterpri∣ses shee esteemeth it more honest to bee obstinate, then to repent herselfe. Caius Piso was in our memorie a man exempt from many vices,* 1.32 yet extremely cholericke, and such a one as tooke pleasure in his austeritie. He being displea∣sed, when he had commaunded a Souldier to be brought before him, who had returned from his pillage without his companion as if he had murthered him, whom he could not bring in person, when he was requested time to finde him out, denied it him, and condemned him to die. This Souldier, thus sentenced being brought without the trenches, alreadie tendered his neck vnto the Hang∣man, when suddenly his fellow Souldier appeared, whom men suppo••ed to be slaine: wherevpon the Centurion who had the charge to see the execution done, commanded the Hangman to put vp his sword, and after brought him to Piso, who was condemned to the end hee might make proofe of his innocen∣cie, since Fortune had afforded him the meanes. The other Souldiers flocked about these two, who embraced one another to the content of all their compa∣nions. But Piso incensed with choler, ascended the Tribunall seat and comman∣ded both the Souldiers to bee ledde to death: both that Souldier that had not slaine his fellow, and him that was not slaine. What indignitie is this? Because the innocencie of him that was condemned was manifest, both perished. Piso added the third. For hee commanded that Centurion who had brought backe him that was condemned; to bee ledde to execution. Here three were appointed to die in one place for one mans innocencie. Oh how cunning is wrath to faine causes of furie; I command thee, saith hee, to bee led to death, because thou art condemned; thee, because thou wert the occasion of thy fel∣low

Souldiers death; thee, because being commanded to see him executed, thou didst not ••bay thy Commander. He deuised how to finde three crimes because hee found none. Wrath, say I, hath this euill in it, it will not be gouerned. Shee is angrie with truth it selfe•• ••f she seeme in any sort opposite against her will. With crie, tumult, and iactation of the whole body, she persecuteth these whom she hath resolued to iniurie with reproches and curses. This doth not reason, but if it must needes bee so, silently and quietly, shee ruineth whole houses from their foundations, and destroieth whole families that are enemies to their Countrie. With their wifes and children, shee raceth downe their houses, and leueleth them with the earth, and obscureth their names that are enemies to libertie, This doth shee not with foaming at the mouth,* 1.33 nor shaking of the head, nei∣ther doing any thing that is vndecent for a Iudge, whose lookes, at that time especially, ought to be most pleasing, and staied when he pronounceth matters of consequence. What needest thou, saith Ierosme, when thou art intended to strike any man, to bite thy lip first? What if he had seene, the Proconsull leaping from the Tribunall, and taking away the Sergeants rods, and renting his gar∣ments, because the garments of such, as were condemned, were not rent off soone enough? What needeth it to ouer-torne the table, to breake and fling a∣way the pots, to beate ones head against the pillers, to teare his haire, and to thumpe his thigh and breast? How great is that anger thinkest thou, which be∣cause it is not so sodainly vented against another, as a man would, reflecteth vp∣on her selfe? He is therefore held by his Neighbours, and intreated to pacifie himselfe, none of which things doth he, who is void of anger, but inioyneth e∣uery one his deserued punishment. Oft-times dismisseth he him whose guilti∣nesse and forfeit he hath apprehended, if by confessing the act he promise great hope of amends, if he vnderstand that the offence grew not from the malice of his heart, but as they say, was committed and not complotted with sinister in∣tent. He will giue such a pardon as neither shall be hurtfull to those that re∣ceiue the same, nor to those that giue it. Sometimes will he represse the grea∣test offences committed by infirmitie, and not by crueltie, more gently then o∣ther lesse, if in them be some hidden, couered, and inueterate craft. He will pu∣nish the same fault in different men, after a different manner: if the one haue committed it through negligence, the other studied to doe hurt. Hee will ob∣serue this alwaies in euery iudgement, and execution to ordaine one sort of pu∣nishment, to correct the euill, an other to cut them off. And in both these shall he consider, not those things that are past, but those things that are to come. For, as Plato saith, No wise man punisheth for euill doing, but lea••t wee should fall to euill doing. For those things that are past cannot be recalled, those things that are to come may be preuented, and those whom he would make examples of. For some cursed crime, hee executeth them publikely, not only to the end they may die, but that others might be deterred from doing euill, by beholding the execution.* 1.34 Each one ought to weigh and consider these reasons. Thou se••st how much a Magistrat•• should be exempt from all passion, when he vn∣dertaketh a thing of so great consequence, as the life and death of men, that are vnder his hands. The sword is indiscreetly committed to a furious mans hands. Neither ought we to thinke this that wrath addeth any thing to the greatnesse of the minde. For that is no greatnesse but a swelling, neither to bodies that are intended by aboundance of bad humours, is the sicknesse and increase, but a pestilent plentie. As they whom anger, which is a passion vile and base, puf∣feth vp and raiseth aboue the thoughts of other men, make themselues beleeue

that their thoughts are sublime and high, whereas there is nothing firme in all that which they doe, but as they haue builded in the aire, so sinketh it and fal∣leth of it selfe. Wrath hath no assistant or sustainer, shee proceedeth not from any thing that is permament and durable, but is windy and vaine, and differeth so farre from greatnesse of minde as audaciousnesse from fortitude, insolence from confidence, sadnesse from austeritie, and crueltie from seueritie. There is a great difference betwixt a constant and a proud minde. Wrath enterpriseth nothing that is great or worthy. Contrariwise, in my iudgement, it is a token of a dull and vnhappie man, and guiltie of his owne weaknesse, to be sorowfull oftentimes. Euen as those bodies that are exulcerated and sicke, complaine i•• they be touched neuer so little, so is it a womanish and childish fault: yet is it in∣cident to men, for men likewise haue childish and womanish wits. What then? are not some wordes vttered by angrie men, who haue not the true knowledge of magnanimitie, which seem notwithstanding to proceed from a great & gene∣rous mind? As that most dire and abhominable speech, Let them hate me, so they feare me. Know that this was written in Syllaes time, I know not whether wish were worse for him, either to be hated, or to be feared: Let them hate me. He forethinketh that which will happen, that his subiects will curse, betray, and oppresse him. What addeth he hereunto, The gods confound him, so wor∣thie a remedie hath he found out for hatred. Let them hate: What? whilst they obay? No: whilst they approue? no. What then? so they feare, so would not I haue him be beloued. Thinkest thou that this is spoken with a great spirit? Thou art deceiued; for this is not greatnesse but crueltie. Thou art not to giue credit to wrathfull mens wordes, whose boasts are great and threating, but in∣wardly there hearts are crauen and coward. Thou must not repute that to be true which is spoken by Liuie that eloquent man. Of him, A man that had a minde rather great then good. These cannot be separated, ••ither it shall be great and good, or it shall not be great; because I meane th•• greatnesse of a man that is vnshaken, and inwardly solide, and euen and equall from one end vnto ano∣ther, which cannot bee in euill mindes. For they may bee terrible, tumultuous and dangerous to death, but they shall not haue greatnesse whose foundation is strength and goodnesse: yet in speech, in action, and all outward appearance they will make shew of great courage. They will let slip some wordes, which thou wilt suppose to be worthie and wittie, as Caius Caesar did, who being an∣grie with the heauens, because it thundred whilst his plaiers acted, whom hee imitated more diligently then he beheld them, and because his banquet was in∣terrupted by lightning, that was scarce rightly aimed, hee challenged Iupiter to fight with him without delay, pronouncing this Verse in Homer:

Either kill me, or I thee.

What madnesse was it? he thought that either Iupiter could not hurt him or that hee could hurt Iupiter. I cannot imagine but that this speech of his was of some great moment to incense their hearts of those that had conspired against him for they supposed it to bee an insufferable matter to suffer him who could, not endure Iupiter. Then there is nothing great or noble in wrath, no not when it seemeth to be most v••hement and despiseth both men & gods: or if any man supposeth that wrath produceth a great mind, let him say as much of dissolute∣nesse. Shee will be carued in Iuorie, clothed with purple, couered with gold, transferre one Countrie to an other, shut vp Seas, precipitate Riuers, hang For∣rests

in the aire. Let Auarice also be esteemed generous: shee lieth vpon heaps of gold and siluer, his pastures and lands are tilled vnder the name of whole Prouinces. And vnder euery one of his Farmers he enioyeth a greater quantitie of land, then the Prouinces that were allotted to those that were Consuls. Let lust likewise be reputed to be a worthy thing. It swimmeth ouer Seas, geldeth troups of yong children, maketh the wise without apprehension of death to be murthered with her husbands owne hands. The same may we say of Ambi∣tion, that shee is magnanimous, and contenteth not her selfe with yearly ho∣nours, but will, if it may be, fill all the moneths and daies of the yeare with one name, and plant her armes through all the world. It skils not how farre all these proceede and extend themselues, they are trifles, they are miserable and depressed. Only vertue is great and excellent, for there is nothing great except it bee pleasing and peace∣able likewise.

Notes

• * 1.1

  No••atus was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••allus 〈…〉〈…〉 ••on.
• * 1.2

  He 〈…〉〈…〉 in th•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••••ly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to Th••••ist••us.
• * 1.3

  That Ch••l••r and Anger is ••urthful lo••s, be appro∣ueth by exam∣ple, and by the e••••••cts and dis∣commodities thereof, se••••ing Syllac•• cruel∣••es, and the Tri∣liui••ates tyranie for an example of hatred therof ••o all men.
• * 1.4

  1•• de Anima. cap. 1.
• * 1.5

  Differences of Anger.
• * 1.6

  Whether Anger be a thing na••u∣rall, profitable, a••d to be rec••i∣ued.
• * 1.7

  It is not na∣turall.
• * 1.8

  An excellent Similitude.
• * 1.9

  The cure of the Ma••estrate, pro∣p••••ly applied to ••h••t of the Phi∣si••ion.
• * 1.10

  The difference be••wixt a Magi∣strate and a Physitian.
• * 1.11

  He proueth no•• that anger is not pro••itable.
• * 1.12

  A fit similitude to confirme hi•• second proo••e.
• * 1.13

  The remedie of the precedent di••••i••ultie.

  A reason that ought to be care∣fully obserued and marked.
• * 1.14

  A continuation of the obiection and answer.
• * 1.15

  Learne here the vse of anger.
• * 1.16

  An answer to A∣ristotles opini∣on, who in his Ethikes saith that choler is ne∣cessari••.
• * 1.17

  The continuati•••• of the confutati∣on of Aristotles opinion.
• * 1.18

  See Marius life in Plutarch.
• * 1.19

  S•••• Liuie of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Wa••••••s, and Pluta••ch i•• th•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 o•• Fa∣biu•• Maximus and Haniball.
• * 1.20

  The conclus••on of the refutation which is pre∣cedent, and ••n an••wer to an other obiection.
• * 1.21

  A pretie re••uta∣tion of Theo∣phrastus.
• * 1.22

  The increase of wrath is vnpro∣fitable, and there••ore wrath it selfe.
• * 1.23

  A new obiection of Theophra∣stus, touching the hearts good, men conceiue a∣gainst euill men.
• * 1.24

  An answer gro••∣ded vpon diuerse reas••••s.
• * 1.25

  That a man may chastise, nay may ex••••ute ••••∣••enders withou•• being transpor∣ted by Choler.
• * 1.26

  An answer to an other obiection.
• * 1.27

  Of the orde•• that ought to bee ••bse••••ed in punishing male∣fac••ors.
• * 1.28

  An amplification of that example aboue written and an answer to the pr••cedent obiection.
• * 1.29

  If the wiseman ought to be mo∣ued and ••ow.
• * 1.30

  That which the Stoick•• doctrine maintaineth & the examination of Aristotles ••∣pinion a•• tou∣ching passions.
• * 1.31

  The designes of Reason & wrath.
• * 1.32

  A notable exam∣ple, confirming that which ••e saith, that An∣ger ought not to be indued with Reason, because sh•••• extingu••sh∣eth it.
• * 1.33

  Note this you that are Magi∣gis••rates.
• * 1.34

  An aduertise∣ment for Magi∣strates to beware of anger which cannot make a man more mag∣nanimous.