The workes of Lucius Annæus Seneca, both morrall and naturall Containing, 1. His bookes of benefites. 2. His epistles. 3. His booke of prouidence. 4. Three bookes of anger. 5. Two bookes of clemencie. 6. His booke of a blessed life. 7. His booke of the tranquilitie of the minde. 8. His booke of the constancie of a wiseman. 9. His booke of the shortnesse of life. 10. Two bookes of consolation to Martia. 11. Three bookes of consolation to Heluia. 12. His booke of consolation to Polibius. 13. His seuen bookes of naturall questions. Translated by Tho. Lodge, D. in Physicke.

EPIST. CXIII.

He questioneth whether vertues be liuing creatures. He stoically affirmeth that the vices and affections are no lesse. Then preferred he a dispute, that were ridiculous in th••se dayes. He disswadeth vs from such like, and summoneth vs to th••se things that are profitable to life.

THou desirest me to write vnto thee what I thinke of this question so much canuassed amongst Stoicks, whether justice, fortitude, prudence, and the rest of the vertues are liuing creatures. By this subtilty, my deerest Lucilius, we giue occasion to some to thinke that we whet our wits about vnprofitable things, and that we lose our time in such disputes as serue to no purpose. Yet will I do that which thou desirest, and expresse vnto thee what the opinion of our Stoicks is; yet protest

I that I am of anoth••r opinion. I thinke there are some things that be••ome those that weare the ••at and cloke amongst the Grecians. I will therefore tell thee what the reasons were which moued antiquitie. It appeareth that the soule is a liuing creature, considering she is the efficient cause whereby we are a∣nimated: and for that liuing creatures haue der••ued this name from her. But vertue is nought else then a soule possessing her selfe in some so••t, it is therefore an animall. Againe•• vertue doth something, but nothing can be done without motion; if she hau•• motion, which none hath except it be a liuing creature, she is a liuing creature: and if she be a liuing creature, then vertue containeth vertue in her selfe, why not? she hath her selfe. Euen as a wise-man doth all things by the assistance of vertue, so doth vertue by her selfe: & th••rfore s••ith he, all Arts, and all those things which we thinke, and whatsoeuer we comprehend in our mindes are animals. It followeth therefore that in those narrow breasts of ours there inhabiteth diuers thousands of animals, and that euery one of vs are ma∣ny animals, or containe many animals in our selues. Askest thou me what is an∣swered hereunto? Each one of these things shall be an animall, and no•• diuers. The reason? I will tell it thee, if thou wilt heare me patiently & attentiuely•• all animals ought to haue each of them a proper substance: all animals haue one soule•• they cannot therefore subsist euery one, neyther can they be diuers. I am an animall, and a man, thou wilt not therefore say that I am two. Why? To make them two, they ought to be seuered the one from the other. Euery one of diuers sorts hath but one nature, and therefore is but one. My soule is an animall, and I my selfe am one also; yet for all this are we not two. Why? By reason that my soule is a part of me. Then shall any thing be numbred by it selfe, when it consisteth by it selfe, but when it is a part and member of ano∣ther, it cannot seeme to be another thing. And why? I will tell thee. Because that which is another must be his own, and properly his owne, and wholly his owne, and absolute within it selfe. I haue declared that I was of another opini∣on: for not only shall vertues be animals if this be admitted, but those vices and affections which are opposite vnto them likewise, such as are wrath, feare, sor∣row and suspition. And yet this thing shall proceed further, all sentences, all thoughts shall be animals, which must in no sort be admitted. For euery thing that a man doth is not a man; what is justice, saith he? A soule that possesseth her selfe in some sort: if therefore the soule be an animall, justice is an animall. Nothing so: for this is a habite and certain power of the soule. The same soule is conuerted into diuers figures, and yet is not the soule an animall, so often∣times as it changeth thus; neither is that which the soule doth an animall. If justice, magnanimity and those other vertues be animals, I demaund of thee if sometimes they cease to be, or if they begin againe, or if they be alwayes? Ver∣tues cannot cease to be vertues, therfore many liuing creatures are animals, nay, more innumerable animals are in this soule. There are not many (saith he) but this is but one soule assembled of diuers, which are the members and parts of one. By this reckoning we represent vnto our selues such a forme as the Hydra•• which hath diuers heads, each one of which fighteth and hurteth by it selfe. But none of those heads is an animall but the head of an animall, yet is she but one animall. No man said that in Chimera the Lion was an animall, or the Dra∣gon; these are the parts of him, but the partes are not animals. Where doost thou gather that justice is an animall? It acteth, saith he, somewhat and profi∣teth. But that which doth somewhat and pro••iteth, and hath force and moti∣on•• Ergo, that which hath force and motion is an animall. True it is, if it haue his

owne force and motion, but it hath not his owne force and motion, but that of the soule. Euery Animal vntill it die is that which it began to be. A man vntill he die is a man, so likewise a horse and a dogge, for they cannot passe into ano∣ther forme and substance. Iustice that is the soule which possesseth it selfe in any sort, is an Animal. Let vs beleeue it. Moreouer, Magnanimitie, that is to say, the soule in any sort mistris of her selfe, is an Animal. What soule is that? That which euen now was Iustice, is inclosed in the first Animal, and cannot passe into another Animal, but must remaine in him where she began to be. Furthermore, one soule cannot be in two liuing creatures together, much lesse in many. If Iu∣stice, Magnanimitie, Temperance, and those other vertues be Animals. How can they haue but one soule, it must needs fall out that euery one hath his own•• else cannot they be Animals. One body cannot be the body of diuers Animals. What is, saith he, the bodie of Iustice, the soule, and of magnanimitie also; but one bodie cannot be the bodie of two Animals. But some one will say, that one and the same soule hath taken the habitude of Iustice, magnanimitie and tem∣perance, This might be, if at such time as Iustice was in vigor, magnanimitie was not, and when value was, temperance was not. But all vertues are toge∣ther. How should these be different Animals, since there is but one soule, which can make but one Animal. Furthermore, no Animal is a part of another Ani∣mal. But Iustice is a part of the soule, it is not therefore an Animal. Truely in my iudgement, it is but lost time to contest vpon a matter that is granted, wee should rather be angry thereat, then dispute thereupon. No Animal is a part of another. Consider all mens bodies, and there is not one of them but hath his particular colour, forme, and proportion. Amidst other miracles, which make the wisdome of God the Creator admirable, I esteeme this to be one, that a∣midst so many things that are created, the one resembleth not the other, and as touching those that are like one another, yet will there be some difference found, if thou curiously obserue the same. He hath made infinite sorts of leaues distinguished the one from the other by some speciall marke. Infinite and dif∣ferent Animals, yea euen those which are of the same kinde, doe not in euerie part resemble one another. The Creator hath required and obtained this of himselfe, that these Animals of different kindes should not resemble one ano∣ther, either in forme or proportion. Thou sayest that all the Vertues are like one another, and therefore they are not Animals. There is not any Animal but doth something of it selfe. But Vertue doth nothing by her selfe, but with a man. All liuing creatures are either endowed with reason, as men and gods, or depriued of reason as beasts are. Vertues are endowed with reason, and yet for all that, they are neither gods nor men, and consequently they are not Ani∣mals. Euery reasonable liuing creature doth nothing, except it be first incited and pushed forward in regard and consideration of something: this stirreth the ••am•••• and then consent stirreth this motion. As touching Consent, see heere 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it is. I must walke out, I set forward, after I am commanded so to do, and ••••uing found it good. I must sit downe, and then I sit. This Consent is not in Vertue. Presuppose that Prudence is a liuing creature, how should she consent? I must of necessitie set forward, Nature opposeth her selfe against this point, for Prudence prouideth not for her selfe, but for him that is endowed with her, which cannot go nor sit downe, and therefore hath no consent. That which is depriued of iudgement and consent, is not a liuing creature endowed with rea∣son. If Vertue be a liuing creature, she is a reasonable liuing creature. But she is a reasonable liuing creature: Ergo, no liuing creature. If Vertue be a liuing

creature, and vertue be a good thing, euery good thing is a liuing creature. The Stoickes auow this. It is a good thing for a man to saue his fathers life, to speake materially and to the purpose, his opinion in publique assembly, to giue a sen∣tence according to the lawes, by this reckoning to saue a mans father, shall be a liuing creature, and to thinke and debate well, another. In briefe, this Paradox will seem•• so great in the end, that a man cannot containe himselfe from laugh∣ter. To know how to hold a mans peace in time and place, to sup well is a good thing, and therefore to hold a mans peace, and to sup well, are liuing creatures. I will not cease to tickle my selfe, and make me pleasure by these follies. Truly if Iustice and Magnanimitie be liuing creatures, they are terrestriall, euery ter∣restriall liuing creature suffereth cold, hunger and thirst. So Iustice hath a cold, Magnanimitie is hungry, and Clemencie drie. Moreouer, I would willingly aske of these Doctors, if these liuing creatures haue the figure of a man, of a horse, or of a sauage beast. If they attribute vnto them a round forme, as they doe vnto God, I would aske of them, whether couetousnesse, riot, and folly are round? For these likewise are Animals, if they be round. I would desire them further to let me know, if to walke discreetly be a liuing creature or no? They must of necessitie confesse that it is a liuing creature of a round forme. But to the end thou mayest know that I speake by my booke, and that it is not my priuate opi∣nion which I heere doe publish. Cleanthes and his scholler Chrysippus are not one in opinion, as touching this walking. Cleanthes saith that it is an agitation dis••persed from the head vnto the feete. Chrysippus is of another opinion: why then according to Chrysippus example cannot any man maintaine that which he shall iudge to be the best, and laugh at the number of these Animals, so great, as the world would be too little to containe them. The Stoicks say that Ver∣tues are not diuers Animals, and yet notwithstanding that they are Animals, e∣uen as one man is an Orator and Poet, so are Vertues Animals, and not diuers liuing creatures, but one onely. The soule that is iust, prudent, and couragious, is one and the same, being in some sort in possession of her selfe, in euery one of the vertues. The dispute ceaseth, we are agreed, for I confesse that the soule is a liuing creature, referring it to another place to speake my opinion as touching the same. I deny that the actions of the soule are liuing creatures, otherwise all the words, and euery Poets verses should be liuing creatures. For if a word well spoken be a good thing, and euery good thing be a liuing creature, the word shall be a liuing creature. A verse that is well made is good, that which is good is called an Animal, and consequently a verse shall be an Animal: and so

Arma virumque cano,

Is an Animal, which cannot for all that be round, because it is a verse of six feet. All this is but meere Sophistrie, which being well examined makes me readie to swound with laughing, when I remember that a Solecisme, a Barbarisme, and a Syllogisme is an Animal, and I depaint euery one of them such a forme as best liketh me. These things dispute we with loftie lookes and bended browes. I cannot in this place refraine to exclaime in this sort with Lucilius, O hatefull follies. They are ridiculous. But why manage we not rather some matters that may make vs better! Why search we not out the meanes to attaine vnto vertue, and the way that may leade vs thereunto? Breake not my braines in teaching me whether Magnanimitie be a liuing creature, but learne me that in this world there is not any liuing creature found that is happie, except hee bee

magnanimous, except he be resolute against all accidents, if in his thought hee hath not ouercome all aduersities before he felt them. Magnanimitie is the im∣pregnable fortresse of humane infirmitie, whosoeuer is inclosed therein, he re∣maineth assured in this beleagring of life. For he vseth his owne strength and his owne weapons. In this place I will set downe vnto thee the notable saying of the Stoick POSIDONIVS, Neuer thinke thy sel••e assured with the armes of Fortune, combate against her with thine owne. Casualties doe not arme vs. They therefore that are armed against their enemies, are disarmed against aduersitie. Alexander spoiled and put to flight the Persians, the Hircanians, the Indians, and all those Nations that inhabit the extent of the East Countries vnto the sea. Notwithstanding he himselfe hauing slaine one friend and lost another, lay groueling in a darke chamber detesting his wickednesse, deploring his losse, and this conquerour of so many Kings and Nations, was ouercome by choler and sorrow. For all his endeuours were aimed to this end, to master all other things except himselfe. O how blinde are men, who desire to make their Scepters passe beyond the seas, who thinke themselues happy if they conquer diuers countries and Prouinces by their souldiers, and ioyne new to the old, not know∣ing that the greatest Empire, and that which is wholly conquered, is to com∣mand a mans selfe. Let them teach mee how sacred a thing Ius••ice is, that it is a vertue that is carefull of another mans good; that seeketh not commodities or aduantages to her selfe. That she hath no alliance with ambition and vaine-glorie, but pleaseth her selfe. Before all things let euery one perswade himselfe this. It behoueth me to be a good man, without hope or desire of recompence. This is a small matter, let him adde more: I am commanded to employ my selfe wholly and freely in the studie of vertue, in such sort as all my thought is as much as in me lieth, to be driuen from the consideration of my priuate profit. Studie thou not whether the reward of vertue, is more great then vertue it selfe. Fix thou that likewise in thy minde, which I haue touched heretofore, it skilleth not whether thy vertue be knowne to few men, or to many. He that wil haue his vertue published, laboureth not for vertue, but for glory. Wilt thou not be iust without glory? But vndoubtedly thou must be iust with infamie, and then, if thou art wise, an euill opinion well gotten doth delight.