A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R.

¶Of Reason. Chap. 9.

THe firste and moste principall parte of wisdome is reason,* 1.1 whiche (accor∣ding to the sentence of Cicero) is an or∣der to do all things, by the consideration of things to come.* 1.2 And he prefers the same aboue all other gifts which man is endued with all, and that worthely: Es∣pecially in his bookes de Finibus he hath a notable place in the prayse of Reason, his wordes are these: Men, although by many other thinges, yet chiefly by this one, doo most differ from beasts, for that they haue Reason of nature, and a mind geuen them which is sharpe, liuely, and noting many thinges at once most rea∣dely, which doth beholde, both the cau∣ses, and euent of thinges, it compareth one thing with another, and ioyneth that which is separate, and tyeth that which is to come with thinges present, and doth consider the state of our lyfe, which we haue to lyue: the same reason makes a man to loue men, and to lyue

with them charitably, not in worde or deede to disagree, that so from a domisti∣call friendship they may step to a ciuile, to a general good wyll towards all men: and as Plato writ vnto Archytas, the same Reason makes a man to remem∣ber that he is not borne to himselfe only, but also for his parentes, friendes, con∣trey, and for other mens causes, so that lyttle tyme he hath to bestowe for his priuate profite, but all his labors, and studie, shoulde be conferred to the profi∣ting of others. Much more Tullie brin∣geth forth in praise of Reason, which for breuity sake I passe ouer, and the rather because his words are not so fit & proper for this part, for here we vnderstande not reason so largely as it shall be that thing, whereby a man differeth from a beast, but rather more stricktly for a reasoning of the minde, as it were pro and con,* 1.3 whether this be good or to bee embraced or bad, and to be auoyded. And so doeth Aristotle take the same in that place of his Ethiks, where he talks of Prudēce. And so is it of Cicero so be a diligent & heedeful considering of things

to be done or no. Whose definition is good. For if wisedome be perceiued by chusing thinges good or euyll (which all men doo graunt) then is it the parte of a prudent man, well to consult before he begin, and that must be had in all which he goes about. Which consultation is the reasoning of the minde. which rea∣soning doeth spring from reason. And when we haue wel pondered any thing in our minds, reason must be iudge, and geue sētence whether it ought to be done or no. Hereof is that of Salluste, Prins∣quam incipias consulto, & vbi consulueri•• maturè facto opus est: Before a man be∣gin any thing, consultation shoulde be had, but hauing deliberated, speedy exe∣cution.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Reason what.
• * 1.2

  Cicero lib. 2 de Finibus.
• * 1.3

  Ratiocina∣tio.