A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R.

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Title
A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R.
Author
Rogers, Thomas, d. 1616.
Publication
Imprinted at London :: By I[ohn] C[harlewood] for Andrew Maunsell, dvvelling in Paules Church yarde, at the signe of the Parret,
1576.
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Subject terms
Ethics.
Conduct of life -- Early works to 1900.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A10969.0001.001
Cite this Item
"A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A10969.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed October 31, 2024.

Pages

¶The definitions of Vertue, and her partes. Chap. 7.

PYthagoras defineth vertue to be a na∣turall harmonye to which all honeste thinges do aunswere.* 1.1 Manie of the Stoikes according to the opinion of So∣crates do define vertue to be a knowledg of those thinges which are agreable to nature: which opinion caused Herillus to suppose knowledge to be the chiefest good.* 1.2 Of his minde was Possidonius, which sayde, that to lyue honestly was nothing but a perfecte vnderstanding of those thinges which accompany nature. Horace by a contrary defines the same, and sayth that Vertue is nothing but an

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auoyding of wickednesse. Cicero defines it in two sortes: for sometyme it is a per∣fection of reason: sometyme an habite of the mind agreeable to reason. Cleanthes sayde, it was an election of the minde, obeying to nature, which of it selfe was able to bring an happie estate. Aristotle sayde, It is a chosing habite of the mind, consisting in a meane, betweene two ex∣tremes, of which one excéedeth, the other wanteth much: as Fortitude when it excéedeth, falleth into rashnesse, when it fainteth, into chyldishe fearefulnesse: and Liberalitie, when it lauisheth out of reason, is called prodigality, when it is not extended any whit, purchaseth the name of couetousnes. And therof came this prouerbe: That in good things no∣thing is eyther wanting or superfluous. The consideration of whiche made the Pythagorians to saye,* 1.3 that wickednesse coulde not be comprehended, but godly∣nesse might. And therfore much easier is it to become wicked then vertuous. For the wayes to wickednesse are many, plaine, and common: but to goodnesse are not many, but one, & that same is harde to finde, because it is but little troden.

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Nowe séeing we know what is vertue let vs learne of howe many kinds it is.* 1.4 Aristotle deuides them into two sortes, and calles them eyther morall, or intel∣lectuall: he calleth all such intellectual which by nature are ingrafted in vs,* 1.5 as Heede, Warinesse, Wisedome: Morall, are suche which by custome, and ciuile conuersation we attaine: These flowe from the manners of men, and vse makes them perfecte: the other out of the mind: for many men may be found whiche are (although not in lyke man∣ner) wyse, and haue discretion to knowe good from euyll, although not perfectly and fully, for wisedome per∣fecte, is gotten by long exercise, and ma∣ny yeares. Some call those, as dyd Panetius, eyther contemplatiue, or ac∣tiue. Againe, some into three kindes deuide them, and call them eyther natu∣rall, rationall, or morall.

* 1.6But Plato best of all sayeth plainely, that vertue is diuided into fowre parts, the first is Prudence, the seconde Tem∣perance, the thyrde Fortitude, and the laste Iustice, and he calleth them the fowre principall vertues, because that

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out of them doo spring all the other ver∣tues. Nowe seeing we knowe which are they, let vs also tell what they are.

Notes

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