A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R.

About this Item

Title
A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R.
Author
Rogers, Thomas, d. 1616.
Publication
Imprinted at London :: By I[ohn] C[harlewood] for Andrew Maunsell, dvvelling in Paules Church yarde, at the signe of the Parret,
1576.
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Subject terms
Ethics.
Conduct of life -- Early works to 1900.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A10969.0001.001
Cite this Item
"A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A10969.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed October 31, 2024.

Pages

Page 80

¶Of the Goods of the minde. Chap. 4

NOwe are we come to the goodes of the minde, which in deede are onely good, and sufficiently good of them selues. The other to wit, the Goods of Nature & Fortune, are so far good, as when they serue to good purpose: and are hande∣maides wayting vppon vertue, not mi∣nisters to vices: and therefore they are not simply & sufficiently of them selues good, but by reason of theyr good vsage.

Cicero tels howe there appeared vnto Hercules two maydens diuersly appa∣relled, of diuers nature:* 1.1 the one plaine & simple: the other gorgeously decked and very fine. Each of them promised accor∣ding to their hability rewards vnto him▪ if he chused according to their mindes: The plaine and simple sayde: if hee would entertaine her, he shoulde in this worlde bée wretched, and of small ac∣coumpte, but afterwarde his felicite should be great, & his same euerlasting.

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The other braue Dame sayde,* 1.2 if he would thinke well of her, and make her his owne, he shoulde not lacke, as long as he liued, any thing, whiche coulde be to his delectation, his riches shoulde be infinite, his pleasures vnspeakeable, ac∣cording to his desires euery thing should happen, so that in this worlde, as long as he lyued, he should be glorious: paines he shoulde take none, but liue at ease: but afterwarde she was not to promise any thing. Hercules perceyuing her to be vaine pleasure, forsooke her, and embraced the other, simple and rude vertue. Whereby he shewed him selfe more to estéeme vertue, bare, and voyde of all ornamentes, miserable: then de∣lightfull pleasure accompanied with all the goodes of Nature and Fortune. Democritus was of his minde,* 1.3 and ther∣fore, because the pleasure of this worlde shoulde not carrie him from contempla∣tion, he plucked out his owne eyes. Spurina lykewise, a rare example of a vertuous yonge man,* 1.4 rather woulde mangle, and deforme his beutifull face, then be an occasion that others shoulde by his fayrenesse offende. And certainly

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there was neuer any desirous of a good name, which dyd not prefer celestiall before earthly thinges, eternall before transitory, vertue before vanitie. So that the true felicitie is attayned by the good qualities of the minde. Cicero con∣firmeth the same, and sayth,* 1.5 that Swee∣tr and more comfortable are the plea∣sures of the minde, then the delyghts of the fleshe. To declare the excellencie of this Vertue, the auncient Romanes cal∣led theyr Iupiter, Optimus, Maximus:* 1.6 the best, and the greatest: and we call our God so, to signifie that for vertue and power hee is peerelesse. And first he is called Optimus, afterwarde Maximus, to shewe that his diuinitie is before his Omnipotencie.* 1.7 And againe Plutarche sayde, that for thrée thinges God is iudged most glorious, for his im∣mortalitie, for his Omnipotencie, & for his Vertue: & yet sayth he, of all these his vertue is most to be wondered at. And so we maye saye that man is adorned with three thinges, with the Goodes of Nature, Fortune, and the Minde, and yet of all these the Goodes of the minde are moste excellent. And he which is

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Optimus, the best man, shall excell him which is Maximus of greatest power, riches, and aucthoritie. So that he which cōmeth nighest vnto God in ver∣tue, is the most happiest of al others: and the fardest from vertue, the fardest from felicitie.* 1.8 Here I haue to distinguishe mankind into two sortes espetially, the one are such which forsaking this world and the glory thereof, altogether addicte them selues to the contemplation of ce∣lestiall thinges (supposing all the cares and cogitations of man, should onely be referred to the studie of him which hath created all thinges of nothing most my∣raculously: and that in token of thanke∣fulnesse, he shoulde onely serue him in true holinesse) and for the better dischar∣ging theyr dueties, be altogether care∣lesse of worldly matters. The other be such, which considering they are aswell compounded of boddie as of soule, thinke it good, that a care shoulde be had aswell of boddie, as of the soule: & yet so, as the care of the soule should be greater, then of ye boddie. These are called Ciuile, the other Contemplators, or as we saye di∣uines. These Contemplators, although

Page 82

they serue not altogether to our purpose, yet shall be mentioned, because that wel we can not expresse the one without speaking of the other.

Notes

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