A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R.

¶Of Ciuil freendship. Cap. 40.

CIuile Freendship is of thrée sortes. The first is a common or generall good will,* 1.1 wherby we wish wel vnto all men, and are prouoked the••unto by the rites, lawes and customes of our Coun∣trie, or otherwise by any common thing to all men. And therefore it is a great cause of looue and amitie among men to be vnder the same Princes, to be in sub∣iection to the same lawes, to be of one so∣cietie, of one Contrie, Cittie,* 1.2 to be of one religion. &c. There be also many things which men haue in common, and belong aswel to the one as to the other, as Chur¦ches, market places, stages, guildhalles, places appointed to the vse of all men, and doo conioine men in gadwil meruai∣lously. And this common amitie is so re∣quisit, as without the same there is no di¦fference betweene brute beast{is} and men: we should without the same liue in soli∣tarines, neuer without snares to intrap vs, & mischeef{is} to bereaue him of al ioies. Which made Cicero to say,* 1.3 that he whi∣ch would cut of this common freendship, did euen as it were go about to take the Sun from the world. And in a certaine

Oration of his he hath a pretie place to the praising of this Fréendship, where he saith, that those citizens whiche will not willingly helpe one another, doo in that whiche in them lieth, go about to ouer∣throwe the common estate of a common weale, and to disturbe the fellowship of this life. For saith he, nature hath not so made vs, that of our selues we can doo all things without the aide of others, and one is more apt to one thing then an other. And therfore goodwil is gotten, that so by helping one another according to their calling the common profit may be sought for.* 1.4 The Epicures whose inde∣uor{is} are t'encrease plesure, doo altogither commēd this kinde of Fréendship abooue any other, as that without which no ple∣sure could be in this life. But their freend¦ship is nought els, but that which we call Good fellowship,* 1.5 whiche in deed continu∣eth but a time as lōg as pleasure lasteth, but no pleasure: no Fréendship. The na∣ture of this fréendship shalbe better decla¦red héerafter bothe whē we shall speake of Concorde, & also of th'other partes of this Ciuil fréendship. The second kinde of this Ciuil Fréendship, is that which is gotten not without pleasure or profit, but

only by vertue and likenes of manners This fréendship bringeth to passe,* 1.6 that a∣mong men there be a greate agreement bothe in wil and in woorking. For as Sa∣lust saeith: this is perfect and vnfained freendship, to think one & the same thing. And as Tullie saith,* 1.7 there is none more certain token of true fréendship, then is consent and communicating of our cogi∣tations one with another. This fréend∣ship is only between honest and wel dis∣posed persons.* 1.8 For the cōsent which is be¦twéene wicked men, is not fréendshippe, (whose end is the increase of godlines) but a faction to il purpose and disquieting of the common weale. Isocrates writeth very wel of this matter & saith, that the gréement of the wicked is easely vpon a a small occasion brokē, but y^e fréendship of the vertuous cōtinueth for euer. And wil you knowe in déed who is a true & perfect fréend? Then harken vnto a lerned man.* 1.9 Be not drawen away with fair woord{is}, nor seduced w^t wickednes, nor ouercōe with iniuries, looue w^t all your hart vn∣fainedly,* 1.10 and then shall you be a perfect fréend. This fréendship hath many note{is} to be knowē by. For it is a freendship for her self, it is the greatest y^e moste perfect,

••he best, the most surest & therfore it is the rarest freendship. It is called a fréendship Per se, because the spring of the same is that which is only good of it self, and that is vertue. It is y^e gretest, because it is for the sake of that which is greatest, which is only vertue. It is the moste perfects, for what is more perfect then vertue? It is the best, because bothe the cause and end thereof is vertue. It is the surest and continueth longest: for no aduersitie can breake the same, no sicknes can wea¦ken it, no time can alter it, no death can dissolue it: and therfore it is rare and e∣mōg few. And what meruel? For what is lesse estéemed then vertue? or who careth almoste for her? And therefore the cause béeing rare, and little estéemed, the effect must néeds be rare, and there∣fore no meruail though this Fréendship be little imbraced.* 1.11 In all Grecia béeing so populous a Contrie, there was scarce three copel that were faithful fréends. It was a rare thing in those dayes, when so few were celebrated for their vnfai∣ned fréendship, but much more wunder∣ful is it in these dayes. For who wil be content to lose his life for his Damon,* 1.12 as did Pytheas? Or who wil say he is O∣restes,

when he is Pylades, for the saue∣garde of his fréend? Nay,* 1.13 that is a great thing: who wil in these daies almost for go his goods (doo I say all his goods?) nay, who wil forgo but parte of his goods, to ••a••ue his fréend frō misery? Such fréend{is} are as rare as were those Greciā fréend{is}. Wel this fréendship is not popular, it is peculiar vnto few: for many cannot be in perfect fréendship togither: goodwill there may be, but vnfained Fréendship cannot be. For as a kingdom cānot haue many gouernors, nor one wife many hus¦bands & looue thē, and be looued of them entirely: so one cannot looue many, and be loued again hartely without hypocri∣sey. For as mightie fluds,* 1.14 by how much they are brought into small riuers, by so much they loose of their strength: so looue cannot be borne to many without aba∣ting the force therof. The more it fa••ou¦reth, of the lesse force: but the fewer, the more faithful.* 1.15 That is a true saying in Philosophie Vis vnita fortior, at partes in plures secta peribit, Strength is thē weakned when it is diuided. Cicero writing to his fréend Atticus,* 1.16 declareth the wāt of a true fréend, the place though it be long, yet because of the worthinesse

therof I wil recite. Knowe you my fréend that at this time there is nothing that I stand more in néede of, then that man to whome I may vnfolde the secrets of my hart & fréely communicate (as if I were a¦lone) those things which any way trou∣ble me, whose wisdom is great, w^t whom I may talke boldely and familiarly with out faining, without dissēbling, without biding any thīg frō him. My brother and most plain. simple & faithful Metellus is absent, no man but a shore▪ and aire, and mere solitarines.* 1.17 And you (my Atticus) which oftentimes with louing talke and graue counsail haue lightned my hart of many sorowes, which hast béene in pub∣like offices a partener, and priuy to all my priuat affaires, and a partaker of all my thoughts & consultations, where art thou? Alas (séeing the want of thée and Metellus) I am now so destitute y^t all the ioy & plesure I haue, is which my wife, my daughter & my hony swéete Cicero, offer vnto me. For y^e ambitious fained and fickle freendship (in our court) hath a certain outward shew, but at home, and my hart it dooth not delight. And ther∣fore when my house in the morning is wel filled, and when we go to the cou••te

compassed aboute with flocks of fréends,* 1.18 among them all I cannot meet with one with whome I may either iest merilie, or talke familiarly. And therefore your comming is much wished, and your sight of me is hartelie desired. &c. By whiche appéereth the excellencie of this fréend∣ship. For he dooth not only prefer y^e same before the common fréendship whiche is among men, but also before y^e loue which is betwéene parents and their children.

And certainly to a faithfull fréend no∣thing can be compared. For he, when all is gone wil continue. And if you respecte either pleasure or profit: he is moste to be wished. For what pleasure is greater then to haue one with whome we may talke merilie: & without fear vtter euen the very secret{is} of our hart{is}? Again what profit is like a fréend to whome in nece∣ssitie we may flye for succour, in aduer∣sitie is a bulwoork against inuasions, and a refuge of whom we may be bolde, whi∣che is one man continually? And come welth, come wo, come prosperitie, come aduersitie, is no chaungeling? Now to that which followeth.

The last kinde of fréendship is called Sociall or Fellowly fréendship. The

cause of which fréendship is only perfect,* 1.19 and therfore it differeth frō these abooue recited kinds of Amitie. For as the one hath pleasure for her end, and the other vertue: so this hath profit. Such is the fréendship of crafts men and merchants: but this dooth continue but for a time as the first. And therfore when pleasure is gone, looue is none: and farewel goodwil (say they) when goods are consumed. Of this fréendship Cicero wrote notably, to this purpose. This woord looue frō whēce freendship is deriued,* 1.20 is charie and déere: which fréendship if we imbrace onely for our owne sakes and profit, not for his whome we looue and beare good will vn∣to, then is it not to be called Amitie, but a certain chopping and chaunging of good wil for gaines, and fréendly woords, for profit and commoditie. After which sorte we should looue our féeldes and pasture ground, and our beasts & cattell, because we hope to receiue profit of them, but the fréendship amōg men should be free with¦out hope of reaping earthly commoditie. But if we only beare goodwill in hope to receiue gain, if there be no kindenes whi¦che is cause of fréendship, and makes the same of her owne nature, or for none o∣ther

cause to be desired, there is no dout, but that we may prefer groues and lāds before freends. For they bring moste pro∣fit to their owners. And therefore it is méet that he which would be coūted my true and faithfull fréend, should looue me for mine owne sake, not for my goods & ri∣ches. And again Cicero in his secōd book De Finibus, declareth the nature of this freendship in these woords: what place hath fréendship, or who can be a freend vn¦to any mā which dooth not loue his fréend only for his fréends sake? And to Looue (from whēce fréendship is deriued) what other thing is it,* 1.21 but to wish vnto him whom we looue, all kinde of goodnes, glo∣ry and prosperitie, although no cōmoditie doo returne to vs at all? &c. But some wil say (saith he) I followe gain and pro∣fit. And then shall your fréendship conti∣nue as long as you reape commoditie.

And therefore true is that saying of a learned man, It is hard in prosperitie to knowe whether our fréends doo looue vs for our owne sakes, or for our goods:* 1.22 but aduersitie proues a fréend. For neither doth prosperitie manifest a fréend, nor ad¦uersitie bide a flatterer. And thus much bréefely of Ciuil fréendship. Of all these

kindes of ciuil amitie, but one can truely be commmended (for praise belongeth on¦ly to vertue) the other be necessary (for without them no estate can florish) but they are not of continuance. Now to the last kinde of fréendship.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Ciuil frend¦ship of thre sortes.
• * 1.2

  Common freendship.
• * 1.3

  Cicero {pro} S. Roscio.
• * 1.4

  Epicures.
• * 1.5

  Good fel∣lowship.
• * 1.6

  Perfect Freendship
• * 1.7

  Cicero {pro} Cu. Plan∣cio.
• * 1.8

  The end of true freend¦ship.
• * 1.9

  A
• * 1.10

  Notes of vnfained frendship.
• * 1.11

  Amicorū paria.
• * 1.12

  Damon. Pytheas.
• * 1.13

  Orestes. Pylades.
• * 1.14

  Faithful Frendshipe among few
• * 1.15

  Vis vni∣ta fortior.
• * 1.16

  Cicero ad Atticū. li. 1 epistolarū
• * 1.17

  Metellus. Atticus.
• * 1.18

  The ex••l••••∣cie of a godly frend
• * 1.19

  Felowly freendship.
• * 1.20

  Cicero. li. 1 de natura Deorū: et li. 2. de fi∣nibus.
• * 1.21

  D••finition of Loue.
• * 1.22

  Aduersitie tryes a freend.