A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R.

Chap. 1.

MYnding to dis∣course of the affections, or perturbations in man, necessary it is some what briefly to speake of them in generall, ac∣cording to the straunge opinions of two sectes of Philosophers, namelye, the Stoikes, and Peripatetions, and the ra∣ther because they haue bene the Fathers and protectours of Philosophie. Which as they were of two sectes in generall pointes of humane wisdome, so are they of two sortes, concerning the motions of the minde.* 1.1 For the Stoikes wyl not per∣mit a man to be moued any whytt, for any thing: the Peripatetions contrari∣wyse,* 1.2 thinke it méete that a man should be moued, and being passioned, he should keepe himselfe within the bounds of mo∣destie. Eyther opinion in respect of o∣ther, straunge, and yet neyther true.

The Stoikes too seuere,* 1.3 or better preci••e▪ the Peripatetions in this point too prodi∣gall. For (as termeth them Lactantius) furious and mad are the Stoikes, which are so farre from tempering them, that they woulde cut of, and as it were gelde men of those thinges which are grafted and planted in them by nature. Which what other thing is it, then from Hartes feare: from Snakes poyson: fearcenesse from wyld Beasts, from tame quietnes to take awaye? for looke what particular and speciall thinges are geuen to wylde Beastes, those are to bée founde in one man altogether. And if true it be which Phisitions affyrme, that cherefulnesse hath abiding in the Splene, anger in the Gaule, luste in the Lyuer, and feare in the harte, then easier is it to slay▪ then to plucke any thing out of the bodie, that is to alter the naturel & disposition of man.

But these wyse men perceaue not that when they take vices out of man, they take vertue also, which only they would, should haue the rule and gouernment of him. For if it be the part or propertie of vertue, in the mydst of anger to brydle & suppresse that vnruly affection (which

they can not deny) then must he néeds be without vertue, which is without anger: and if is be vertue to contain y^e insatiable desire of the flesh within his bounds, then must he needes lacke vertue, which is without y^e lust which he should asswage: & againe if it be a part of vertue to bridle the desire from coueting that which is a∣nother mans, then can he haue no vertue which hath not that in the suppressing of which the vse and office of vertue con∣sisteth. And therefore except there bée passions and perturbations in man, ther is no place for vertue. Euē as there is no victorie, where as there is no aduersary. And therfore how precise in their opiniō the Stoikes haue bene, it may easily ap∣peare. Now the Perip. saye that a man shoulde be affectioned, but yet modicè meanly, and in his passions kéepe a mea∣sure: As though that then he should fall into none offence. But, as he offendeth aswell which goeth softlye, as he which runneth, if they both wander and be out of the waye: euen so is he aswell to bée reprehended, which is subiect to pertur∣bations, though it be but in measure, as he which immoderatly doth serue them, if both be vnlawfull. For as directly to

walke is good, and to goe astraye daun∣gerous: so to be moued with affections to a good purpose is commendable, but to an yll ende and purpose altogether dam∣nable. For a more illustration, the bur∣ning desyre of the fleshe, though it bée without measure, as lōg as it is in law∣full Mariage, is without blame: but if it once desire another mans wyfe, though it be not in such burning, and vehement wyse is a most horrible crime. And ther∣fore to be angrie, to couet, to lust, is no offence, but to be an angrie, a couetous, and a lecherous man, deserueth great reproche. For he which is an angrye man, is moued, when he should not: and he which is couetous, desyreth which he ought not: and the lecherous hunteth after that which is vnlawfull. So that neyther can we saye with the Stoikes, that a man ought not, neither with the Peripatetions, that one shoulde some∣what sharply without any respect serue his affections: when as necessarye it is that perturbations should raigne for the illustratiō of vertue, and to haue them but a lytle, if it be not in respect of ver∣tue, and to a good entent is much to bée

reprehended. And therefore as that wa∣ter which is alwayes standing, and ne∣uer runneth, must néedes bée noysome and infectious: so that man, which is ne∣uer moued in mind, can neuer be eyther good to himselfe, or profitable to others. But haue them we must, and vse them we maye (and that aboundauntly) in ho∣nest wyse. And therefore the ende of our affections, make them eyther good, and so to be commended: or bad, & therefore to be dispraised. And thus briefly of the perturbations in general, and of the vse of them.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Stoikes.
• * 1.2

  Peripateti∣ons.
• * 1.3

  Lactantius de vero cul∣tu. Cap. 15