A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R.

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Title
A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R.
Author
Rogers, Thomas, d. 1616.
Publication
Imprinted at London :: By I[ohn] C[harlewood] for Andrew Maunsell, dvvelling in Paules Church yarde, at the signe of the Parret,
1576.
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Subject terms
Ethics.
Conduct of life -- Early works to 1900.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A10969.0001.001
Cite this Item
"A philosophicall discourse, entituled, The anatomie of the minde. Nevvlie made and set forth by T.R." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A10969.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 11, 2024.

Pages

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❧The Preface to the friendly Reader.

AMongst those (gentle Reader) whose endeuour is to profite in knowledge, (and there is none eyther of nature so wylde, or for behauior so wicked, but in theyr kinde, (as it is for a hounde naturall to smell, and for a birde to flie) are desirous to learne, and be conning in somewhat) they are of all most to bee praised, whose chiefest, though not onely, care is to know themselues. For if the Ethikes (because they prescribe good rules for the framing of manners, expell vices, aduaunce vertue) excel other parts of Philoso∣phie, and be chieflie commended: then must those men of necessitie bee deemed the best, who addict themselues rather to the knowing of theyr owne nature, then naturall thinges: and are more studious how to be glorious for good liuing, then desirous to bee famous for great learning. And that was it which Apollo saide: For being demaunded who was the wy∣sest man in his tyme, aunswered, that not that as learned, as famous hypocritical Hippocrates,

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but Socrates: one which labored no for po∣pular praise, nor for vnprofitable profound∣nesse, but his care was to know him selfe, and therefore pronounced the wisest of the God of wisedome. The auncient Grecians made much of those of the sect of Socrates, but ba∣nished out of their countrey Poets and Ora∣tors: for they knewe verie well that these pric∣ked vnto wickednesse oftentymes, the other did alwaies adhort the Grecians to the kno∣wing of them selues. Furthermore, it was the counsaile of the same Apollo, that euerie man should knowe him selfe. Not for that other knowledge is vnnecessary, but because with∣out this it is mere vanitie. For what a daunge∣rous thing is it with that wise man Thales the Astronomer, earnestly to beholde the starres, and not to care for that vnder our feete? be∣sides what a ridiculous? VVhat a foolishe thing is it with Thraso the warrier to put men in aaie, and bee afraide to fight? besides howe vaine glorious? Howe vnseemely is it with Aristippus the Philosopher, to professe wisedome, and to be a flatterer? besides howe pernitious? VVhat a madnesse is it with Gor∣gias the Orator, publikely abrode to praise a∣mitie, and priuately at home to practise en∣mitie?

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••••••ides howe odious? And that is to speak ••••e thing, to thinke another, to talke wisely, to walke wickedly, what great incon∣stancie? what greater vanitie? And therefore better were it to be ignorant of al things, then of our selues. Knowe thy selfe, and thou shalt not offend: forget thy self, and what wilt thou not do? Neither reason from wickednesse, nor religion from vngratiousnesse can hold thee backe. Art thou an Aristides for vprightnes? forget thy selfe, and what art thou but an Ac∣teon for couetousnesse? A Lucretia for chaste∣tie? forget thy selfe, and thou shalt be a Messa∣lina for incontinencie. A Caesar for clemencie? forget thy selfe, and thou art a Nero for cru∣eltie. An Aemylius for abstinencie? forget thy selfe, and thou art a Verres for intemperancie. A Numa for religion? forget thy selfe, and thou shalt be a Pherecydes for athisme. At one worde art thou a man? forget thy selfe, and what art thou but a beast? And such a beast, as surpasseth all beasts in beastlinesse. VVhat so vnreasonable as Alexander, when he was ashamed of his father Philip, and woulde be called the sonne of Iupiter? vvhat so sauadge as Xerxes, which appointed a great rewarde vnto him, which inuented a new pleasure ne∣uer

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heard of before? vvhat so cruell as Laodice, which to liue in adulterie, murthred hr owne sonnes? And certaine it is that all ambitious Alexanders, and voluptuous Xerxes, and ad∣ulterous Laodices, that is, all suche which for∣getting them selues, thirst after that which is vnlawfull, are more to bee abhorred for their poisoned behauior, then any viper, and shun∣ned for their deuillish conuersation, then any monster in the world. It was not for naught then that Philip that most famous king of the Macedonians so carefully willed his page eue∣ry morning at his chamber doore to crie, Phi∣lip remēber thou art a man: and repeted these wordes with a most lowde voice three times, Remember Philip thou art a man. Neither withour great consideration haue most graue, and wise Philosophers in fore tyme, so often repeted this of Apollo, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Know thy selfe. VVhich notwithstanding, that Ci∣cero in his Tusculan questions, deemeth to be spoken not of the knowledge of our external mēbers, but internall motions, must of necessi∣tie be referred aswell to the knowledge of our bodily shape, as the state of our mindes. And though we can not with Socrates, discerne a wise man from an idiot, but only by his talke,

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yet may e know a man from a beast by other proper••••es. And yet shall not that be a man which hath a boddie senselesse: or if it haue sense, reasonlesse: nor if it haue reason, and is boddilesse, but a cōposition of these makes him. Hereof is mā called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a litle worlde: because that with euerie thing created of God, he hath some affinitie. By which it is euidēt that he which throughly would know him selfe, must aswell knowe his boddie, as his minde. The boddie to put him in minde, of his slauerie: the minde of his soueraigntie. The boddie of his misery, the minde of his felicitie. The boddie of his mortalitie, the minde of his eternitie. For by the one vve participate the nature of beastes, by the other of Angels. By the one vve are for a tyme, by the other vve continue for euer. By the one vve die, by the other vve liue. Such as they are, such are their goodes. For the goodes of the boddie lasteth not, but leaueth vs: the goodes of the minde more increase in vs, the more vve esteeme of them, and the elder vve grovve, the more they prosper. For beutie, strength, health, and other giftes of the boddie, either by tyme doo vanishe, or perishe by sicknesse: but vvisedome and other

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goodes of the minde encrease continuallie, and vvith the minde remaine immortall. Againe the goodes of the minde, be the euils of the boddie, and the euils of the minde, are the goodes of the boddie. For vvhat is more hurtfull to our mindes then is riches, good cheere, and life? and vvhat is more gratefull to the boddie, for by them it continueth? vvhat is more profitable to the boddie, then to be vvell nourished? and vvhat is more per∣nitious to the minde, for thereby it is kept in seruitude? Suche as they are by nature, such are their friendes. For the louers of their boddies, are the haters of their mindes: and they vvhiche loue their soules, hate them vvhich are in the fleshe. Then is it meete that vve knowe our boddies vvhat they are, vvhat their goods, and vvhat are their friends, least through ignorance vve preferre frayle thinges, before eternall: vaine thinges, be∣fore profitable: and vitious fellowes, before vertuous men. Of vvhich knowledge these maye suffice, and the rather because the ma∣nifolde calamities vvhich daily vve doo, and continually maie feele, are to bringe into remembraunce the boddies miserie.

But the better to knovve the other part of

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vs, vvhich is our minde: I dyd once for my profite n the Vniuersitie. drawe into Latin tables, vvhich since for thy profite (christi∣an Reader) at the request of a gentleman of good credite and vvorship, I haue Englished, and published in these two bookes. The former of vvhich is of Perturbations (and discourseth of that parte of the minde of man vvhich is voide of reason) The latter of Mo∣rall vertues (so called because it is of that parte of the minde, vvhiche is endued vvith reason). In consideration vvhereof, I haue named the vvhole, the Anatomie of the mind, because the minde in them is diuided, and euerie parte of eyther of them sufficientlye manifested, and illustrated vvith many ex∣amples of Heathen men, to the bettering I hope of dissembling Christians, vvhich (if not by vvholsome sermons of godlie men, yet) by notable examples of others (destitute of those giftes and graces vvhiche vvee are adorned vvith all) maye knowe them selues, bee ashamed of their vngratefulnesse, em∣brace vertue, and encrease in godlinesse. In the doing of vvhich, if I haue not dischar∣ged my duetie, according to thy expectati∣on,

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pardon me, I beseech thee, and ccept this howsoeuer it be at this tyme in good part: hereafter (if God so please, and graunt mee life and leisure) it maye be published both in sweeter phrase to delight, and in better methode to profite. Valeas.

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