CHAP. XXXIX. The Actions of the Vnderstanding, Invention, Wit, Iudgement; of Invention, Distrust, Prejudice, Immaturity: of Tradition, by Speech, Writing: of the Dignities and Cor∣ruption of Speech.

HItherto of the more Passive Operation of the Vnderstan∣ding, which I called Recepti∣on or Knowledge of Objects. Now follow the more active; which consist more in the Action of Reason, than in its Apprehension▪ And they are the Actions of Invention, of Wit, and of Iudgment. The former of these hath two principall parts; the Discovering of Truth; and the Communicating of it. The former only is properly Invention; the other a Consequent thereof, Tradition: but both much making to the honour of the Faculty. For the former, I shall forbeare any large discourse touching the particular Dignities thereof, as be∣ing a thing so manifestly seen in Contemplati∣ons, Practises, dispatches in the maintaining of Societies, erecting of Lawes, government of Life; and generally, whatsoever enterprize a man fastens upon, this one Faculty it is, that hath been the Mother of so many Arts; so great Beauty and Page  501 Ornament amongst men, which out of one world of things have raised another of Learning.

The Corruptions then which I conceive of this part of Invention, are,

First, a Despaire and Distrust of a mans owne Abilities: For as Corruption and Selfe Opinion is a maine Cause of Errour: so Dissidence and Feare is on the other side a wrong to Nature, in abusing those Faculties which she gave for enqui∣ry, with Sloath and Dulnes. Multis rebus inest Mag∣nitudo (saith Seneca) non ex naturâ suâ, sed ex debilita∣te nostrâ: and so likewise, Multie rebus inest difficultas; non ex natura sua, sed ex opinione nostrâ▪ Many things seem hard & involved, not because they are so, but because our suspition so misconceives them. Thus as in an affected and ill disposed Body, •…very light Weaknes is more felt than a more violent distem∣per, where the Constitution is stronger. So with fearfull and despairing wits, every Inquiry is esti∣mated, not according to the nature of the Object, but according to the Disopinion & slender Con∣ceipt which they have of their own Abilities. Non calcant spina•…, sed habent. It were but ridiculous for a Blind man to complaine of dark weather, when the fault is not in the Aire, but in the Eye.

Another prejudice to this Faculty, is that which I observed before on another Occasion, an Over-Reverend Opinion of those who have gone before us. For when men shall so magnifie the Gifts of others, that they sleight and neglect their owne; when out of a prejudicate Conceipt that the Antients have sufficiently perfected the Page  502 Body of more serious Learnings, they shall exer∣cise their Wits (capable of greater imploiments) in degenerate and unusefull Studies; Knowledge must needs be hindred from attaining that Matu∣rity, to which by their owne Inventions it might be raysed. Thus as it fals out amongst men of thirstlesse Minds in their Fortunes: Divitiarum abundantia inter Causa•… paupertat is est. Their pro∣fusenesse out of their present store, with a negli∣gence to recover and new make their Estates, drawes them quickly beyond their Fortunes▪ or as it was in the like case amongst the Romanes in those times of Publique Luxury, and Effeminate∣nesse, the valour of their Auncestors procuring unto them large wealth, and securing them from forreigne hostility, did also by the means of that Wealth and Ease soften and melt their valour, so that their Weaknesse was principally occasioned by the invincible spirit of their Predecessors: So it is in the matter of Learning, when we spend our time onely in the Legacies that our Fathers have left us, and never seeke to improve it by our owne Inventions, the Large measures of Know∣ledge which we receive from them, is by our pre∣posterous use made an occasion of a Large mea∣sure of Ignorance in other inquiries, where in their Labours offer greater Assistance, than discou∣ragement. There was not I perswade my selfe amongst the Ancients themselves, a greater means of disclosing so large a measure of Truth, than the Freedome of their owne Opinions. For notwith∣standing this Liberty was often the occasion of Page  503 many prodigious Births; yet this disadvantage was coun•…vailed with many fruitfull and good ly iss•…; all which might haply have been undi scovered, had men laboured only in Traditions, and contented themselves with Learning upon Trust. And those more Errours being still exami∣ned, were lesse pernicious than fewer beleeved. And even of them I make no question but there hath been good use made by those that have en∣quired into Truth. For first, there are very few Errours that have not some way or other Truth annexed unto them, which haply might not otherwise have been observed. It is an Errour in that man which shall presume of Gold hid in his Land, to dig and turne it up for no other end, but to find his Imaginary treasure; yet that stir∣ring and softning of the Ground is a means to make it the more fertile. Lastly, this use may bee made even of Errours, when discovered in the In quiry after Truth, that they let us know what it is not: and it is speedier to come to a Positive Con∣clusion by a Negative Knowledge, than a naked Ignorance: as hee is sooner likely to finde out a place, who knowes which is not the way, than hee that only knows not the way.

The last Cause of Disability in the Invention may be Immaturity and Vnfurniture for want of acquainting a mans selfe with the Body of Lear∣ning: For Learning is a Tree or Body, which in one continued Frame, brancheth it selfe into sun∣dry members: So that there is not onely in the Object of the Will: which is the Good of things; Page  504 but in the Object of the Vnderstanding also, which is their Truth, a certain mutuall Concatenation, whereby every part hath some reference unto the other.▪ insomuch that in the handling of particu∣lar Sciences, there are often such occurrences, as doc necessarily require an insight into other Learnings: So that of Tully is generally true, Difficile est pauca esse e•… nota, Cui non sint,*aut plera{que} aut omnia. All that addresse them∣selves either to the Invention of Arts not known, or to the polishing of such as are already found out, must ground their endeavours on the Expe∣riments and Knowledge of sundry kinds of Lear∣ning.

For the other part of Invention, which I call Tradition, Communication, or Diffusion, I com∣prehend it within that perfection peculiar to man from all other Creatures, Oration, or Speech. Wherin I consider a double ministerial reference; the one to the eye; the other to the eare: that is Vox scripta, a Visible Voice; this Vox viva, an Audible Voice. To which purpose Scaliger acutely: Est quidem Recitator Liber Loquens, Liber recitator Mu∣tus. The Dignities which this particular 〈◊〉 on man, and wherein it gives him a preheminence aboue other Creatures, are taken from the Ends or Offices thereof; for the worth of every service able or Ministeriall Instrument is to bee gathered from the Regularity of its function, whereunto it is naturally instituted.

The end whereunto Living and Organicall Speech was principally ordained, is to maintaine*Page  505 mutuall Society amongst men incorporated into one Body. And therefore Tully well cals it, Hu∣mana Societatis Vinculum, the Ligament and Sin∣new, whereby the Body of Humane Conversation is compacted and knit into One.

It would be a long and large labour to speake of the Honour which God hath bestowed upon our Nature in this noble Gift of Speech, making our Tongue 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as the Poet calleth it, The* Messenger of Reason, and as it were the Pen of the Minde which cloatheth our Conceits with Characters, and makes them obvious unto others. I shall not engage my selfe on so great an Argu∣ment, which hath already filled the Volumes of so many learned men, who have written some Rhe∣toricall, others morall Institutions and Precepts touching Speech. I shall therefore content my selfe with but naming some few particulars, by Consideration whereof we may acknowledge the Bounty of God, and Excellency of our Nature, which is attended on by so noble a servant.

•… For the Dignity hereof it appeares in this, That whereas in other lesse Considerable Perfe∣ctions, other Creatures have an Exquisitenesse above man, yet in this man excelleth all other In∣ferior Creatures, in that he is able to communi∣cate the Notions of Reason cloathed in sensible Characters unto others of his owne kinde. For though some melancholy men have beleeved that* Elephants and Birds, and other Creatures have a Language whereby they discourse with one ano∣ther; yet wee know that those narrow and poore Page  506 Voices which Nature hath bestowed on them proceed onely from the Impression of Fancy, and sensitive Appetite to serve themselves, but not to improve one another. And therefore Speech is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by the Name of Reason, because it at∣tendeth onely upon Reason. And as by this the Soule of man differeth in Excellency from all other Creatures: so in two things amongst many others (both subservient unto Reason) doth his*Body excell them too. First, in the Vprightnesse of his Stature, whereby he is made to looke up to Heaven, and from his Countenance to let shine forth, the Impression of that Light which dwel∣l•…th within him. For the Face is the Window of the Soule▪

Next in the Faculty of Speech, which is the Gare of the Soule, through which she passeth, and the Interpreter of the Conceits, and Cogita∣tions of the mind, as the Philosopher speaks. The uses whereof are to convey and communicate the Page  507 Conceptions of the Mind (and by that means to preserve humane Society) to derive Knowledg to maintaine mutuall love and supplies; to multiply our Delights, to mitigate and unload our sorrows; but above all to Honour God, and to edifie one another, in which respect our Tongue is called our Glory. Psal. 16. 2. Act. 2. 26.*

The force & power of Speech upon the minds of men, is almost beyond its power to expresse, How suddenly it can inflame, excite, allay, com∣fort, mollify, transport, and carry captive the Af∣fections of men. Caesar with one word quiets the Commotion of an Army. Menenius Agrippa with one Apologue, the sedition of a people. Fla∣vianus the Bishop of Antioch with one Oration; the fury of an Emperour. Anaximenes with one Artifice, the indignation of Alexander; Abigail with one Supplication, the Revenge of David; Pericles and Pisistratus even then when they spake against the peoples liberty, over ruled them by their Eloquence, to beleeve and imbrace what they spake, and by their Tongue effected that willingly, which their Sword could hardly have extorted. Pericles and Nicias are said to have still pursued the same Ends, and yet with cleane diffe∣rent successe. The one in advancing the same busines pleased; the other exasperated the people; and that upon no other Reason but this, the one had the Art of Perswasion which the other wanted.

And this power of Speech over the Minds of men is by the Poet, in that knowne passage of his thus elegantly described:

Page  509The Vertues of Speech (whereby it worketh with such force upon the Minde) are many, which therefore I will but name, some Grammaticall, as Property, and Fitnesse, and Congruity, without* Solaecismes and Barbarousnesse, some Rhetoricall, as choice, Purity, Brevity, Perspecuity, Gravity, Pleasantnesse, Vigo•…, Moderate Acrimony and Vehemency; some Logicall, as Method, Order, Distribution, Demonstration, Invention, Defini∣tion, Argumentation, Refutation. A right dige∣sting of all the Aydes of Speech; as Wit, Lear∣ning, Poverbs, Apologues, Emblemes, Histories, Lawes, Causes, and Effects, and all the Heads or Places which assist us in Invention. Some Morall, as Gravity, Truth, Seriousnesse, Integrity, Autho∣rity; When words receive weight from manners, and a mans Speech is better beleeved for his Life than for his Learning. When it appeares, That they arise esulce pectoris, and have their foundation* in Vertue, and not in Fancy. For as a man recei∣veth the selfe same Wine with pleasure in a pure and cleane Vessell, which he lo•…ths to put unto his mouth, from one that is soule and soiled: so the selfe same Speech adorned with the Piety of one man, and disgraced with the Pravity of another, will be very apt accordingly to be received, either with delight or loathing.

Page  510And therefore the Spartan Princes when they* heard from a man of a disallowed and suspected Life, an Opinion which they approved, They re∣quired another man of reputation to propose it: That the prejudice of the person might not pro∣cure a rejection of his Iudgement. For wee are apt to nauseate at very good meat, when we know that an ill Cooke did dresse it. And therefore it is a very true Character which Tully and Quinti∣lian* give of a right Oratour. That he must be Vir bonus dicendi Peritus, as well a Good man as a Good speaker. Otherwise though he may speake with admirable wit, to the fancy of his hearers, he will have but little power over their Affections. Like a fire made of greene wood, which is fed with it as it is fewell, but quencheed as it is greene.

Lastly, some are Civill in Causes Deliberative, or Iuridicall, as Wisedome, pertinency and fitnes to the Nature and Exigence of the End or* Matter whereupon we speake. For in that case we are to ponder and measure what we say, by the end whereunto we say it, and to fit it to all the Cir∣cumstances incident thereunto. Paul amongst the Philosophers disputed with them from the Inscription of their Altar, from the Authority of their Poets, and from confessed Maximes of Reason, by these degrees convincing them of Idolatry, and lending them to Repentance. But amongst the Iewes hee disputed out of Scripture. With Felix that looked for money, he disputed of Righ∣teousnesse and Iudgement to come, but amongst Page  511 the Pharisees and Sadduces, of the Resurrection, that a Dissention amongst themselves might* procure a party for him. It is not wisedome for a man in misery to speake with a high stile: or a man in Dignity with a Creeping. The same speech may be excellent in an umbratile Exerci∣tation, which would be too pedanticall, and smel∣ling of the Lampe in a matter of serious and weighty debate; and that may be dainty meat i•… one place for the fancy, which in another would be too thinne for the Conscience. Nature hath guarded and compassed in the Tongue with the lips, like a folding Gate, and with the Teeth like* a double Hedge, that wee might be admonished to weigh and ponder our words before we produce them.

These are the principall Vertues. And in Op∣position unto these, wee may easily collect the principall Corruptions of this Faculty, which I will content my selfe with but the naming.

The Vices in Grammer, are Solaecismes, Bar∣barismes, Obsoletenesse, Impropriety, Incongru∣ity of Speech. In Rhetoricke, Sordidnesse, Tedi∣ousnesse, Obscurity, Flatnesse of Conceit, Ar∣gutenesse, and Minutiae, Gawdinesse, Wordinesse, and Empty Ostentation. In Morals, the Vices* may be comprised under these two Generals, Mul∣tiloquium and Turpiloquium, Garrulous and Rot∣ten Communication. Lastly in Civill Respects, Levity and Impertinency, like the advices of Thersites,〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Many and to little pur∣pose.

Page  512But besides all these, there is one thing which* seemeth to be the most proper Corrupter of this Ornament of Speech, and that is a Lye. For a•… every thing is then most Regular when it retains the purity of its first office and institution: So on the other side it is most depraved, when it deviates from that service, whereunto it was principally ordained. Thus a Picture, though it be never so much in the frame abused, crackt, spotted, or made any other way unvaluable; yet if the resemblance which it beares, be expresse and lively, we still call it a true Picture: whereas if that be a false and deceitfull resemblance (be all other adventitious Ornaments never so exquisite) wee still accompt it False and Corrupt: So it is with the Speech of man, which though of never so great Weaknesse and Insufficiency in other respects; yet if it retain that one property of shaping it selfe to the Con∣ceipts of the Mind, and make levell and proporti∣onable the words with the thoughts, it may still be said to be (though not a good) yet in some respect a Regular Speech, in that it is conformable to the first institution: But be all other Excellencies never so great; yet if it be a false Image of our Intentions, Nature is diverted from her prime End, and the Faculty quite depraved, as for saking its originall office: and indeed, other Morall Du∣ties of the Tongue do necessarily presuppose this adequation and conformity to the thoughts, which I speake of, without which they are but Hipocrisie, and come within the compasse of the noted Corruption, a Lye: for every Hipocrite is a Page  513 Lyer. I confesse there are Sinnes of Speech grea∣ter than a Lye, in the intention and degrees of their owne Guilt: But herein is the difference: the Tongue may in it (whether Morally religiously considered) beare a double Irregularity (wherein it differs from other powers.)

First it may be Vnconformable to the Law of right Reason, as in all manner of vitious and un∣savory Speeches. And the Corruption which hereby it incurres, is common to it with other Faculties, as the disproportion betweene Evill Thoughts and Reason dictating the contrary, worketh Corruption in the thoughts.

And then secondly it may be disproportioned to the Conceipts of the Mind in proposing them otherwise than they are inwardly 〈◊〉, and this is properly a Lye. Which I therefore call the principall Corruption of Speech, not (as I said) because I conceive in it a greater measure of hei∣nousnesse and Guilt, than in any other Speeches (because all Guilt followes the Incomformity and Remotion from the Law of God and Reason; and therein other Speeches, as Blasphemy, and Se∣dition, may have a greater measure of wickednes) but because in a Lye I finde both the forenamed Irregularities, it being a Speech not only uneven to the Conceipts of the Mind; but repugnant also to the Will of God, and the Law of Na ture.

The next kind of Active Operations were those of Wit. The use whereof is so much the more Excellent, by how much the Wrestings and Page  514 Abuse of it is the more dangerous▪ I shall suffici∣ently declare the worth of it, by shewing what it is: For I take not Wit in that common Accepta∣tion, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of Conceipt, whether in Stile or Conference, which like •…otten wood in the darke, have more Shine than Substance; whose Vse and Ornament are like themselves Swift and Vanishing; at once both Admired and Forgotten: but I understand a setled, constant, habituall sufficiency of the Vn∣derstanding, whereby it is inabled in any kinde of Learning, Theory, or Practise, both to sharpnes in Search, subtilty in Expression, and dispatch in Ex∣ecution. As for that other kinde seen in Panegy∣ricks, Declamatory Discourses, Epigrams, and other the like sudden issues of the braine, they are feats only and sleights, not Duties and Ministe∣ries of the Wit, which serve rather for Ostentati∣on than Vse: and are onely the Remission of the Mind and Vnbending of the thoughts from more severe Knowledge: as walking for recreation is rather Exercise than Travell, although by the vio∣lence of the motion, or length of the way there may ensue Sweat and Wearinesse.

Now for the Corrupters of the Wit, though there be diverse; yet none so immediate and cer∣taine as it selfe, if alone: For Wit, though it bee Swift, yet is often Blind. And therefore the faster it hastens in Errour, the more dangerous it is to it selfe. And hence it is, that as Learning was never more bound to any, than those men, who have been emment in this Faculty, if they Page  515 swayed it by Moderation and Prudence: So none have been more pernicious and violent Oppug∣ners of Truth, than men best furnished with Acutenesse, when they turned the use of it to the strengthning of their owne Fancies, and not sub∣mitted it to Iudgement and Examination. As the fattest Soiles in Greece caused the greatest trou∣bles; and the Beauty of Helena, the ruine of Troy. Wit like Wine is a good remedy against the poison of the Minde; but being it selfe poisoned, it doth kill the sooner. There ought to be•… for the right disposing of our Inventions, a mutuall reference and service between Wit and Iudge∣ment. It is a vexation of Mind to discerne what is right and profitable, and have no inablement to attaine it: and that is Iudgement without Wit. And to have a facility of compassing an End, and a working and restlesse fancy, without direction to fasten it on a fit Object, is the onely course to multiply Errour, and to be still in Motion, not as in a path, but as in a Maze or Circle, where is con∣tinuall toyle, without any proficience or gaine of Way; and this is Wit without Iudgement. They ought therefore, I say, to be mutuall Coad∣jutors each to other. Wit is the Spurre to stirre up and quicken the Vnderstanding: and Iudge∣ment is the Bridle to sway and moderate Wit: Wit is the Hand and Foot▪ for Execution and Motion; but Iudgement is the Eye for Exa∣mination and Direction. Lastly, Wit is the Sayle and Oare to further the progresse in any Inquiry; but Iudgement is the Ballace to Page  516 Poise, and the Steere to guide the course to its intended End.

Now the manner of the Iudgements Operati∣on in directing either our Practise or Contem∣plation is by a discourse of the Mind, whereby it •…educeth them to certaine Grounds and Princi∣ples, whereunto they ought chiefly to be confor∣mable. And from hence is that Reason which Quintilian observes, why shallow and floating Wits seeme oftentimes more fluent than men of greater sufficiencies: For, saith he, those other ad∣mit of every sudden flash or Conceipt, without any Examination; but apud Sapientes est •…lectio & Modus: They first weigh things before they utter th•…m.

The maine Corruption of Iudgement in this Office, is Prejudice and Prepossession. The Duty of Iudgement is to discerne between Obliquities and right Actions, and to reduce all to the Law of Reason. And therefore tis true in this, as in the course of publique Iudgements: That respect of persons, or things, blind the Eyes, and maketh the Vnderstanding to determine according to Affe∣ction, and not according to Truth Though indeed some Passions there are, which rather hood-winke then distemper or hurt the Iudgement▪ so that the false determination thereof cannot bee well called a Mistake, but a Lye: Of which kind flatte∣ry is the principall, when the Affections of Hope and Feare debase a man, and cause him to dis∣semble his owne opinion.