The history of the world

THE THIRD BOOKE. [unspec 20]

CHAP. I. Of the time passing betweene the destruction of [unspec 30] 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and the fall of the Assy∣rian Empire.

§. I. Of the connexion of Sacred and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Historie.

THE course of Time; which in prophane Histo∣ries [unspec 40] might rather bee discerned through the greatest part of his way, hitherto passed in some out-worne foot-steps, than in any beaten path, hauing once in Greece by the Olympiads, and in the Easterne Countries by the accompt from Nabonassar, left surer marks, and more applia∣ble to actions concurrent, then were the warre of Troy, or any other token of former date; be∣gins at length in the ruine of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to disco∣uer the connexion of antiquitie fore-spent, with [unspec 50] the storie of succeeding ages: Manifest it is, that the originall and progresse of things could ill bee sought in those that were ignorant of the first creation: as likewise that the affaires of Kingdomes and Empire afterwards growne vp, are not to be found among those, that haue now no state nor

policie remaining of their owne. Hauing therefore pursued the storie of the world vnto that age, from whence the memorie of succeeding accidents is with little in∣terruption of fabulous discourse deriued vnto vs, I hold it now conuenient briefly to shew, by what meanes and circumstances the Historie of the Hebrewes, which of all other is the most ancient, may bee conioyned with the following times, wherein that Image of sundrie metalls, discouered by God vnto Nebu∣chadnezzar, did raigne ouer the earth, when Israel was either none, or an vnregar∣ded Nation.

Herein I doe not hold it 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to insist vpon those authotities, which giue, as it were by heare-say, a certaine yeere of some old Assyrian King vnto some action or [unspec 10] euent, whereof the time is found expressed in Scripture: for together with the end of Ninus his line in Sar danapalus, if not before, all such computations were blotted out; the succession of Belochus and his issue that occupied that kingdome after∣wards, depending vpon the vncertaine relations of such, as were neither constant in assigning the yeeres of his beginning, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of credit enough for others to relie vp∣on. Let it therefore suffice, that the consent and harmonie, which some haue found in the yeeres of those ouer-worne Monarchs, doth preserue their names, which o∣therwise might haue beene forgotten. Now concerning the later Kings of that Nation, howsoeuer it be true that we find the names of all or most of them in Scri∣ptures, which are recorded by prophane Historians, yet hereby could wee onely [unspec 20] learne in what age each of them liued, but not in what yeere his raigne beganne or ended, were it not that the raigne of Nebuchadnezzar is more precisely applyed to the times of Iehoiakim and Zedekia. Hence haue we the first light whereby to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the meanes of connecting the sacred and prophane Histories. For vnder Nebu∣chadnezzar was the beginning of the captiuitie of Iuda, which ended when 70. yeeres were expired; and these 70. yeeres tooke end at the first of Cyrus, whose time being well knowne, affoords vs meanes of looking backe into the ages past, and forwards into the race of men succeeding. The first yeere of Cyrus his raigne in Persia, by generall consent, is ioyned with the first yeere of the 55. Olympiad, where, that he raigned three and twenty yeeres before his Monarchie, and seuen yeeres af∣terwards, [unspec 30] it is apparent, and almost out of controuersie. Giuing therefore foure hundred and eight yeeres vnto the distance betweene the fal of Troy, and the instau∣ration of the Olympiads by Iphitus; we may easily arriue vnto those antiquities of Greece, which were not meerely fabulous. As for Princes ruling the whilest in sun∣drie parts of the world, S. Augustine and others may be trusted in setting downe their times, which they had by Tradition from authors of wel-approued faith and industrie.

From Cyrus forwards, how the times are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vnto Alexander, and from him to the battaile of Actium, it were (peraduenture) in this place impertinent to set down. But seeing that the beginning and end of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 are the [unspec 40] markes whereby wee are chiefely directed, in passing from the first vnto the latest yeeres of the world, through any storie, with least interruption, it is very expedient that wee take some paines to informe our selues truely of the 70. yeeres, during [unspec 50] which it continued, euen from Nebuchadnezzar vnto Cyrus.

§. II. A briefe rehearsall of two opinions, touching the beginning of the captiuitie: with an answere to the cauills of PORPHYRIE, inueighing against S. MATTHEW, and DANIEL, vpon whom the later of these opinions is founded.

MAny Commentators, and other Historians and Chronologers finde, that the captiuitie then beganne, when Iechonias was carried prisoner [unspec 10] into Babylon, eleuen yeere before the finall destruction of Ierusalem* 1.1 vnder Zedekias. This they proue out of diuers places in Ezekiel, espe∣cially out of the fourteenth chapter, where he makes a plaine distin∣ction betweene the beginning of the Captiuitie, and vtter destruction of Ierusalem by Nabuzaradan, in these wordes: In the fiue and twentieth yeere of our being in captiuitie, in the beginning of the yeere, in the tenth day of the moneth, in the foureteenth yeere after that the Citie was smitten. In which words hee beginneth the captiuitie in plaine termes, eleuen yeeres before the Citie was destroyed. Beroaldus is of opinion that it beganne in the first of Nabuchodonosor, and the fourth of Ioakim, which hee ende∣uours to proue out of the second of Chronicles, but more especially out S. Matthew, [unspec 20] and Daniel, whose words afford matter of long disputation, but serue not to make good so much as Beroaldus would enforce. That place of S. Matthew, and the whole booke of Daniel, haue ministred occasion of scoffing and railing at the 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 to that wretched man Porphyrie, who, not vnderstanding how the sonnes of King Iosias were called by diuers names, as Epiphanius hath shewed at large, thought that the Apostle had spoken hee knew not what in reckoning the sonnes, or, according to some translations, the Sonne and Nephewes of that good King, begotten about the time of the captiuitie. Vpon Daniel also the same Por∣phyrie doth spend the twelfth of his malicious books written against the Christians, affirming that these prophecies & visions remembred by Daniel, were written long [unspec 30] after his death, and at, or neere the time of Antiochus Epiphanes. This fond sup∣position of his, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Apollonius, and others, haue sufficiently answered. For the seuentie Interpreters, who conuerted the old Testament about an hundred yeere before Epiphanes, did also turne this booke of Daniel out of Hebrew into Greeke, as a part of Scripture receiued. And were there no other argument to confound Por∣phyrie, than that of Alexander Macedon, it were sufficient, who liued diuers yeeres* 1.2 before Antiochus Epiphanes. For Iaddus the high Priest shewed that great Con∣queror, when he came towards Ierusalem to haue destroyed it, this booke of Da∣niel,* 1.3 wherein he beheld his owne glorie foretold, as the same was plainely expoun∣ded vnto him; which not only staied his hand from the harme of that Citie and [unspec 40] people, but his assurance and resolution was so confirmed and strengthened there∣by, as despising all future peril and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, he conquered Darius, and the Easterne Empire in a shorter time than Nabuchodonosor had done one Citie, to wit, Tyre in Phoenicia.

It is true indeed that the Iewes them selues giue lesse authoritie to Daniel, than to Moses, and the Prophets, accompting his booke among those which they call Ceta∣phim, or Hagiographa, or holy Writings, which they say Esdras and the Seniors of the Synagogue compiled after their returne from Babylon. But first, that the book of Daniel (I meane so much as is found in the Hebrew) is Canonicall: secondly, that it was written by Daniel himselfe, and not by Esdras and the Seniors; we may assure [unspec 50] our selues by testimonie of Councels, and Fathers. For in the Councell of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 held about the yeere of our Lord 368. after the death of Iouinian the Emperour, and after the Nicene Councell three and fortie yeeres, this booke of Daniel was re∣ceiued

verified and confirmed among the other 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Scriptures, as in the Epitomie of the same Councell it may be seen, and so doth Meliton the most ancient Bishop of Sardis number it, witnesse Eusebius in his Ecclesiastical historie, the fourth booke, and fiue and twentieth chapter, so doth the same 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the Catalogue of Canonical bookes vpon Origen, so doth Hilarius in his Preface vpon the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and Epiphanius in his booke of Waights and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, &c. To these I may adde S. Hierome, Gregorie Nazianzene, and others. For the Hagiographae bookes or holy Writings, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Rabbines 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to be these, Daniel, Psalmes, Prouerbs, Iob, Canticles, Ruth, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Ecclesiastes, Hester, Esra, Nehemiah, and the Chronicles. And that it was Daniel, and not Esdras, that wrote this booke, Gods commande∣ment [unspec 10] vnto him by his Angell, to seale vp the same to the time appointed, is an vn∣answerable testimonie. Yea that which exceedeth all strength of other proofe, our* 1.4 Sauiour Christ who citeth no Apocryphal Scripture, in Mathew & Marke alleageth* 1.5 Daniel the Prophet, to wit, the last verse of his nineteenth chapter. Further, in the fift of Iohn, Christ distributeth the risen from the dead, as in Daniel the twelfth, verse the second. S. Paul describeth Antichrist out of Daniel, and the Reuelation is wholly an interpretation of Daniels visions.* 1.6

§. III. [unspec 10] That the 70. yeeres of captiuitie are to be numbred from the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Ierusalem; not from the migration of IECHONIA.

HAuing thus farre digressed, in maintaining that authority, which must often be cited in the present argument, it is now conuenient, that wee returne vnto the differences of opinion, concerning the beginning of these 70. yeeres. Neither will I stand to trouble my selfe and others with laying open the grounds or weakenesse of that which Eusebius [unspec 30] and some few namelesse Authors, haue sometimes held in this point, which is late∣ly reuiued by Beroaldus; but will foorth-with enter into consideration of that opinion, which many both ancient and late Writers haue so earnestly maintained, that it wants not much of being common.

Foure Kings of Iuda were carried away captiues to Babylon: First, Manasses; then Iehoiakim, and with him among others, Daniel the Prophet: thirdly, Iechonias, and with him Ezekiel: lastly, Zedekias, at which time the Citie and Temple were de∣stroyed. To the first of these captiuities the beginning of the 70. yeeres is referred by none that I haue read; to the second by few and with weake proofe; to the third by very many and with much confidence. For 〈◊〉〈◊〉 those places of Ezekiel al∣readie [unspec 40] cited, there is a strong argument gathered out of Ieremie, which may seeme to make the matter plaine. For the Prophet in comforting the people that were carried away with Iechonias, vseth these words: Thus saith the Lord, After 70. yeeres* 1.7 be accomplished at Babel, I will visit you, and performe my good promise towards you, and cause you to returne to this place.

But it stands indeed with little reason that we should seeke the interpretation of a prophecie out of circumstances, when the prophecie is such as doth sufficiently expound it selfe. Ieremie had alreadie, in the fourth yeere of Iehoiakim, denounced the iudgement of God against the Land, for the sinnes and impoenitencie of that obstinate people, in these wordes: Behold, I will send and take to me all the families of [unspec 50] the North, saith the Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar, the King of Babel, my seruant, and will bring them against this Land, and against the Inhabitants thereof, and against all these Na∣tions round about, and I will destroy them, and make them an astonishment, and an 〈◊〉〈◊〉,

and a continuall desolation. Moreouer, I will take from them the voice of mirth, and the voice of gladnesse, the voice of the Bridgroome, and the voice of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the mill stones, and the light of the candle, and this whole Land shall be desolate, and an astonish∣ment, and these Nations shall serue the King of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 70. yeeres. And when 70. yeeres are expired, I will visit the King of Babel. Here wee see prescribed vnto the captiuitie the terme of 70. yeeres, which were to commence, neither when the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was vttered; nor when Iehoiakim, who then raigned, was taken by 〈◊〉〈◊〉; nor yet in the time of Iechonia; but with the vtter desolation of the Citie, whereof Ieremie did againe giue notice to those that were alreadie in Babylon, at such time as he sent them the comfort of deliuerance before rehearsed. And so did the peo∣ple [unspec 10] vnderstand this 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in those times when they saw it accomplished, be∣ginning the 70. yeeres at the time of the desolation, as manifestly appeares in the* 1.8 end of the Historie of Iuda, where it is said thus: They burnt the house of God, and brake downe the wall of Ierusalem, and burnt all the Places thereof with fire, and all the pre∣cious vessells thereof to destroy all: And they that were left by the sword, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he away to* 1.9 Babel, and they were seruants to him and to his sonnes, vntill the Kingdome of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had rule, to fulfill the word of the Lord by the mouth of IEREMIA, vntill the Land had her fill of her Sabbaths: for all the daies that she lay desolate, she kept Sabbath, to fulfill 70. yeeres. But in the first yeere of CYRVS King of Persia (when the word of the Lord, spoken by the mouth of IEREMIA, was finished) the Lord stirred vp the spirit of CYRVS. [unspec 20] We seldome find one piece of Scripture so precisely and plainely expounded by another as in this prophecie, to haue afterwards beene the subiect of altercation. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 one can hardly deuise, how either the desolation could haue beene expressed more sensibly than it was by the Prophet, or the euent of the prophecie haue been more exactly set downe, than it was in the place now last of all cited. If it bee re∣quisite that we bring more proofe in so euident a case, the ninth Chapter of Daniel yeelds testimonie sufficient, vnto this exposition of Ieremia his prophecie, that Ie∣rusalem was to lie waste 70. yeeres. For in the first yeere of Darius the Mede, which was the last of the 70. Daniel obtained of God the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that had been promised by praier, which he made vpon consideration of the time that was expi∣red: [unspec 30] as he telleth vs in these wordes: In the first yeere of his raigne, 1 DANIEL vn∣derstood* 1.10 by bookes the number of the yeeres, whereof the Lord had spoken vnto IERE∣MIAH the Prophet, that he would accomplish 70. yeeres in the desolation of Ierusalem. So that howsoeuer the time of Daniel his owne captiuitie bee reckoned from the taking of Iehoiakim, and that the people carried away with Iechonia, did accompt, as well they might, the yeeres of their owne captiuitie; yet with the generall deso∣lation of the Countrie, wherein were few or none of the Israelites left remaining to inhabite, beganne in the nineteenth yeere of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the great captiuitie, which by Gods appointment continued vnto the end of 70. yeeres. This I will not further seeke to proue, by the authoritie of Iosephus and others [unspec 40] affirming the same; for as much as that which alreadie hath beene produced, is enough to satisfie any man that hath not fully determined to hold the contrarie. [unspec 50]

§. IIII. Sundrie opinions of the Kings which raigned in Babylon during the 70. yeeres.

WHat Kings raigned in Babylon, during these 70. yeeres of the captiuity, and how long each of them did weare the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, it is a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of no great importance to know, for as much as neither their acts were notable in the age wherin they 〈◊〉〈◊〉, nor the length of their raignes, any way helpefull to the concordance of times, fore-going or succee∣ding. [unspec 10] The conquests recounted by Xenophon of Syria, Arabia, (or rather some part* 1.11 of it) Hyrcania, Bactria, and perhaps of some other Countries, may seeme fruits of the victories obtained by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Great (or by some of his Ancestors) in the former part of his life, before he betooke himselfe to ease, and to the sump∣tuous building of his great Babel, for the house of his Kingdome, and for the honor of his Maiestie, where it may seeme that he and his Heires kept a great state, and did very little. The idle behauiour of the Assyrian Souldiers, in such skirmishes as af∣terwards they had with the Medes, doth argue no lesse. For whereas vnder 〈◊〉〈◊〉, they were so stout and industrious, that (to omit other proofes) they attempted, and finished, that hardie 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of worke, of winning the strong Citie of [unspec 20] Tyre, by ioyning it vnto the continent, filling vp the deepe and broad channel of the Sea, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it from the maine with a mole, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and other matter, the reparation whereof, when the Sea had washed it away, was the very greatest of Alexanders works in the times following, they became timorous, that they durst not approach 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the enemy than their bowes would carrie, but were readie to turne their backs, as soone as any, though inferiour in numbers, aduenturing with∣in the distance offered to charge them.

Now as their actions from the end of Nebuchadnezzars warres, till the ruine of* 1.12 their Empire, were not worthie to be recorded; so was the distinction of their times, and raigne of their seuerall Kings, vnworthy of the great labour that hath [unspec 30] in vaine been taken in that businesse. For when it is granted, that the captiuitie of Iuda, ending with that Empire, lasted 70. yeeres, we may as reasonably forbeare to search into the particular continuance of two or three slouthfull Kings, as we are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to be ignorant of the ages of the Patriachs, and their children, liuing in the Aegyptian seruitude; resting satisfied in both with the generall assured summe.

Yet for as much as many haue trauelled in this 〈◊〉〈◊〉, vpon desire (as I take it) to approue the beginning and end of the 70. yeeres, not only by the raignes of o∣ther Princes, ruling else-where, but by the times of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 themselues: I wil not refuse to take a little paines in collecting their opinions, and shewing what I thinke, may best be held for likely, if the certaine truth cannot be found. [unspec 40]

The opinions are many, and greatly repugnant, both in recounting the Kings themselues, and in setting downe the yeeres of their seuerall raignes. The first (as I take it) the surest, is theirs, who meerely follow the authoritie of the Scriptures, without borrowing any helpe from others. These name onely three Kings, Ne∣buchadnezzar, Euilmerodach, and Balthasar. Neither haue they only the silence of Daniel, who names none other to be their warrant, but the prophecie of Ieremie 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and in a manner purposely teaching the very same. For God, by the mouth of that Prophet, shewing that he being absolute Lord of all, would dispose of all, according to his owne will, and making it knowne that he had some Coun∣tries here named, into the hands of the King of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, saith thus: And all Nations* 1.13 [unspec 50] shall serue him, and his Sonne, and his Sonnes Sonne, vntill the very time of his Landcome also; then many Nations and great Kings shall serue themselues of him. These wordes expressing the continuance of the Chaldaean Empire, and number of the Kings, will hardly be qualified with any distinction. But indeede I finde no other 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of

qualification to be vsed herein, than such as may grow out of mens desire to recon∣cile the Scriptures vnto profane authors. And this desire were not vniust, if the con∣sent of all histories were on the one side, and the letter of the holy Text were single on the otherside.

But contrariwise, the Authors which are cited in this case, are so repugnant one to the other, and the proofes of their different reports are so slender and vnsuffici∣ent, that the succession of these Princes, had it not bin thus deliucred in Scriptures, but onely set downe by some Author of equall credite with the rest, might verie well haue found and deserued as good beliefe, as any of those things which they* 1.14 haue deliuered in this point. For some there are, who following Iosephus, deriue [unspec 10] that Empire, as by descent from father to sonne, through fiue generations; begin∣ning with Nabuchodonosor the great, and giuing to him 43. yeres, to Euilmerodach 18, to Niglisar the sonne of Euilmerodach 40, to Labosardach the sonne of Niglisar 9. mo∣neths, and lastly to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (whom Iosephus intimates to be of the race of Nabu∣chodonosor, without naming his father) 17. yeeres. And this opinion (saue that he forbeares to reckon the yeeres, and plainely calls Balthasar the sonne of Labo∣sardach) Saint Hierome doth follow, alledging Berosus, and Iosephus as a sectator of Berosus for his Authors; though Berosus, as he is cited by Iosephus, report the matter farre otherwise. For he tells vs that Euilmerodach the sonne of Nabuchodonosor did* 1.15 raigne but 2. yeeres, being for his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and lust, slaine by his sisters husband [unspec 20] 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who occupied the kingdome after him 4. yeeres, and left it to his owne sonne Labosardach, who being an 〈◊〉〈◊〉-conditioned boy, was at the end of 9. moneths slaine by such as were about him, and the kingdome giuen to one Naboni∣dus, who held it by the election of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and left it vnto Cyrus after 17. yeeres. This relation ill agrees with that of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and both of them as bad with the Scriptures, in number either of yeeres, or of generations; yet the particularities which they handle, haue procured vnto them some authoritie, so that the names which they haue inserted, are taken as it were vpon trust. There is a third opinion, which makes the three last kings brethren, and sonnes of Euilme∣rodach; and this may well enough agree with the Scripture: though I had rather [unspec 30] beleeue Xenophon, who saith that the last king of Babylon was immediate successour* 1.16 to his father. But whereas the Author of the Scholasticall Historie, who is foun∣der of this opinion, placeth betweene him that tooke Ierusalem, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, another Nabuthodonosor: plaine it is that he hath, out of any Historie sacred or pro∣fane, as little warrant to guide him, as we haue reason to follow him. Eusebius, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Seuerus, and Theodoret, vpon better ground, haue supposed, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Balthasar were brethren and sonnes of the great Nabuchodonosor. This is built on the fift chapter of Daniel, wherein Balthasar (for of Euilmerodach there is none that euer doubted) is often called Nabuchodonosor his sonne. And so common grew this explication, that Saint Hierome called it the vulgar opinion. But the place of Ie∣remie [unspec 40] before cited, prooues that Balthasar was not the sonne indeede, but the grand∣child of that great conquerour, though by the phrase very common in Scriptures, and familiar in those Easterne languages, he was called the sonne.

Annius his Metasthenes hits very rightly the 70. yeres of captiuity, giuing to Nabu∣chodonosor 45. yeeres, to Euilmerodach 30. yeeres, and to the three sonnes of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, nephews of Nabuchodonosor 14. yeeres; that is, to Reg-Assar the eldest sonne three yeeres, to Lab-Assar Dach the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sonne sixe yeeres, and to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the third sonne fiue.

To this accompt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with the Scriptures, both in the whole summe of yeeres, and in the number of generations, I haue sometime subscribed, as not da∣ring [unspec 50] to reiect an appearance of truth, vpon no greater reason than because the Au∣thor was of Annius his edition. Yet could I not satisfie my selfe heerein; both for that none of the Ancient, and few such of the moderne Writers as deserue to be re∣garded, haue consented with this Metasthenes; and for that in making 〈◊〉〈◊〉

succeede vnto his brother in the kingdome, and not vnto his father, he is wholly a∣gainst 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whose Historie of the elder Cyrus in his Assyrian warre I can not slightly value in many respects, and especially because it is very agreeable to the Scriptures, in the taking of Babylon, while the king was at his drunken feast.

Seeking therefore diligently into all circumstances that might giue any light in this obscuritie, I found manifest proofe, that the time allotted vnto Balthasar, by Annius his Metasthenes, was farre short of the truth, which is enough to render all* 1.17 suspected that he hath said in distributing what part of the 70. yeeres hee pleased a∣mong the rest. For in the third yeere of Balthasar, Daniel saw a vision, after which he was sicke certaine dayes, but when hee rose vp, he did the kings businesse: from [unspec 10] which businesse, that hee did afterwards withdraw himselfe, and liue retired, so long that he was forgotten in the Court, it appeares plainely, both by the many words which the old Queene vsed to set out his sufficiencie, and by the Kings asking of him, when he came into his presence, whether he were Daniel. Now to thinke* 1.18 that a man of such account and place as Daniel had held, could in two yeeres haue beene worne out of remembrance, were in my iudgement a very 〈◊〉〈◊〉 conceipt, which rather than I would entertaine, I can well be contented, to thinke the whole* 1.19 storie (thus related) a part of Annius his impostures.

Out of these reports of Iosephus, Berosus, and others, many new opinions are fra∣med, by coniectures of late Writers. For the endurance of the captiuitie being 70-yeeres, [unspec 20] and these yeeres extending vnto the first of Cyrus, in which course of time Nebuchadnezzar, his sonne and grand-child, must haue raigned; it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 seemed need∣full to supply the yeeres of these three descents, by inserting some, whose raignes might fill vp the whole continuance of the captiuitie, with which the time allotted by Berosus and others, to Euilmerodach and Balthasar, ioyned vnto the yeeres fol∣lowing the nineteene of Nebuchadnezzar, (wherein Ierusalem was laid desolate) are nothing euen.

Therefore Mercator and others following him, fashion the yeeres of Euilmero∣dach in this sort. They say, that the 18. yeeres giuen to him by Iosephus in the tenth of his Antiquities, should be read and numbred 28. yeeres, and the two yeeres [unspec 30] that Berosus hath allowed to Euilmerodach should be written 23. in the first number the figure of (1) is mistaken for the figure of (2) and in the latter there should haue bin added the figure of (3) to that of (2:) this granted (to wit) that Euilmerodach raigned 28. yeeres, whereof fiue together with his father, and 23. after his death, and the same number of 23. added to the 25. which Nabuchodonosor liued after the destruction of Ierusalem, make 49, then 4. yeeres of Niglisar according to Berosus, 9. moneths of Labassardach his sonne, and 17. yeeres of Labonidus or Balthasar make vp the number of 70. yeeres to the first of Cyrus. But whether by errour in figures, or in words, the numbers be vtterly mistaken, in all copies extant; vpon how weake a foundation doe they build, who haue nothing to helpe them, saue onely the bare [unspec 40] names of two vnknowne Kings, found in Authors manifestly corrupted, and such as if they had beene entirely extant, were not worthy, to haue that place of Ieremie called into dispute, in regard of their authoritie?

§. V. A more particular examination of one opinion touching the number, persons, and raignes of the Babylonian Kings.

OTher suppositions, little different in substance from this of Mercator, [unspec 50] I purposely forbeare to rehearse, as falling vnder the same answere. That of Ioseph Scaliger I may not forget, as deseruing to be consi∣dered apart from the rest. He giues to Nebuchadnezzar 44. yeres, to Euilmerodach 2, to Belsazer, 5: and to Nabonidus 17. So that from

the 19. of Nabuchadnezzar, in which Ierusalem was destroyed, vnto the time of Cyrus he accompteth onely 59. yeeres; beginning (as many doe) the captiuitie 11. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sooner, from the transportation of Iechonia. But hereof enough hath beene said al∣ready. That which we are now to consider, is his distribution of the time running betweene the 19. of Nabuchadnezzar, and the fall of the Caldoean Empire: wherein if he haue 〈◊〉〈◊〉, then is all further inquisition friuolous.

Concerning the length of Nabuchadnezzars raigne, I shall hereafter vpon better occasion 〈◊〉〈◊〉 my opinion. The time which he giues to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, is very short, and more precisely 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with Berosus than with the Scriptures. For wee find in Ieremie, that this Euilmerodach in the first of his raigne, shewing all fauour to [unspec 10] Iechonia, did among other things take order for him at his table; and that he did con∣tinually eate bread before him all the dayes of his life. His portion was a continuall portion giuen him of the King of Babel, euery day a certaine, all the dayes of his life* 1.20 vntill he died. The very sound of these words (which is more to be esteemed, than the authoritie of Berosus, were he perfectly extant) imports a farre longer time than two yeeres, wherin Iechonia, vnder this gentle Prince, enioyed the comfort sent by God, whose commaundement he had obeyed in yeelding himselfe to Nabuchadnez∣zar. Indeed how long Iechonia did liue it can not be proued; but plaine it is hereby, that all his remaining daies hee did cate bread before this King. Now that hee li∣ued not so short a while after this as 2. yeeres, it is more than likely, for he was but [unspec 20] 55. yeeres old when he was set at liberty, hauing bin 37. yeeres in the prison, where∣into he was cast at the age of 18. yeeres; after which time it seemes plaine that hee begat Salathiel, as well by the age of Zorobabel, who is said to haue beene but a yong man, and one of Darius his Pages threescore yeeres after this, as by other circum∣stances of his imprisonment it selfe.

Of Belsazer, to whom Scaliger giues the next fiue yeeres, naming him also Labo∣rosoardoch, I should wonder why he calls him Nabuchadnezzars daughters sonne, were it not that herein I find him very carefull to helpe out Berosus, by shifting in his Niriglissoroor, as husband to Nabuchadnezzars daughter, and Protector of his son foure of these yeeres; by which meanes there remaines about one yeere to Bel∣sazer [unspec 30] alone, agreeing neerely with the 9. moneths assigned by Berosus to the sonne of Niglisar. But Ieremie hath told vs that it was to Nabuchadnezzar, and to his son, and to his sonnes sonne (not to his daughters sonne) that the Empire was promi∣sed: which difficultie if Scaliger could not helpe, it was well done of him, to passe it ouer with silence.

Nabonidas the last of these (whome others, desirous to reconcile Berosus to the Scriptures) haue iudged to be all one with Balthasar, is by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thought to bee Darius of the Medes. But herein Scaliger is no firme Berosian: for Berosus makes him of the same stocke or race a Babylonian. I speake not this to disgrace the trauaile of that most learned man (for it highly commends his diligence and iudgement, that [unspec 40] he was not so wedded to any author, as affected with the loue of truth) but to shew that he himselfe hauing in some points disliked those Writers, whome in generall he approueth, might with greater reason haue wholly reformed them by the Scrip∣tures, wherein can be no errour. Two things there are which chiefly did breed or confirme this opinion in Scaliger, that hee whome 〈◊〉〈◊〉 calls Nabonidus, was the same whom Daniel had called Darius of the Medes: First, the phrase of Scrip∣ture, which signifies vnto vs, that Darius tooke the kingdome, not saying that hee wanne it by force ofarmes; Secondly, a fragment of Megasthenes found in Eusebius, wherein this Nabonidus is called the Median. Touching the word of the Originall, or of the Greeke translation, which expressing no force of armes, doth only signifie, [unspec 50] that Darius tooke or receiued the kingdome; I see no reason why we should ther∣upon inferre, that the next king entred by Election: seeing Daniel relateth not the meanes and circumstances of Balthasars death, but onely the swift accomplishment of his owne prophecie. Neither could it indeede haue properly beene said (if Da∣niel

had cared to vse the most expressiue termes) that Darius of the Medes breaking into the citie, did win the kingdome; seeing this was performed by Cyrus in the ab∣sence of Darius, though by his forces, and to his vse. Now concerning the fragment of Megasthenes, true it is, that in Eusebius his workes printed at Basile, in the yeere 1559. I finde onely thus much of Megasthenes, cited out of 〈◊〉〈◊〉; That Nabu∣chodonosor was more valiant than Hercules; that hee subdued all Lybia, and the rest of Asia as farre as to the Armenians; and that as the Chaldoeans report, being re∣turned into his kingdome, and rapt with a diuine furie, he cried with a loude voice: O Babylonians, I foretell yee of a great calamitie that shall come vpon you, which neyther Bel, nor any of the Gods shall auert: There will come a Persian, halfe an Asse, that shall bring [unspec 10] slauery vpon yee: and that, this and the like when he had spoken, he vanished. Of all this I beleeue little or nothing, sauing that Nabuchodonosor knew before-hand, that his Empire should be translated, as Daniel had foretold from the golden head, to the siluer brest. But that he wan all Africa or Lybia, I hold it neither true nor pro∣bable.

If Scaligers copy of Eusebius were the more perfect, out of which Megasthenes tells vs that Nabuchodonosor wanne both Afrike and Spaine, I beleeue the fragment so much the lesse: and am as little moued with the authoritie of it, where it calls a Median the pride and confidence of the Assyrians, as where it tells of Nebuchad∣nezzar his owne vanishing away. Indeed that same title of halfe an Asse, by which [unspec 20] he calleth Cyrus, makes me to suspect the fable as cunningly forged out of Apollo his Oracle, wherein he termeth him a Mule, because his parentage was more noble on the mothers side, than on the fathers; as Mules are begotten by Asses vpon Mares. And thus much in answer of the two principall foundations whereon this opinion is built. As for the concinnitie and coherence which it hath within it selfe, I easily allow it. But this proues nothing, for meere fictions haue not wanted these com∣mendations: neither can any man beleeue that one so iudicious, industrious and deepely learned as Ioseph Scaliger, would ouer-shoote himselfe in setting downe re∣pugnancies.

It now remaineth to examine the agreement of this with the Scriptures, from [unspec 30] which there is no appeale. And herein it seemes that Scaliger, well knowing his owne sufficiencie, hath beene little carefull to satisfie men that would frame Argu∣ments against him. For if the prophecie of Daniel were true, that the kingdome of Balthasar was diuided, and giuen to the Medes and Persians, either wee must thinke that Darius of the Medes was not Nabonidus, or else wee must bethinke our selues what Persian it might be that shared the kingdome with him. For it is not more certaine, that Balthasar lost his life and kingdome, than that his kingdome was diui∣ded and giuen to the Medes and Persians. Neither did the Medes and Persians fall out and fight for it, as by supposing Nabonidus to haue beene Darius, they should be thought to haue done; but these two Nations did compound the body of that [unspec 40] Empire, and were accounted as Lords ouer all the subiect prouinces, in so much that the Greeke Historians did commonly call those warres which Darius, and after him Xerxes, made vpon Greece, The warres of the Medes. Yea to cleare this point, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Daniel himselfe resembles that King, with whom Alexander fought, vnto a Ramme* 1.21 with two hornes, calling him the King of the Medes and Persians. Wherefore the whole Nation of Chronologers were not to haue been condemned by Ioseph Scaliger, for maintaining vpon such good grounds, that Darius of the Medes, was partner with Cyrus in his victories, and not a Chaldoean King by him subdued. Neither was Iosephus to be the lesse regarded, for affirming that Balthasar was destroyed by Dari∣us [unspec 50] of the Medes, and his nephew Cyrus, though herein hee varied from Berosus, and others, whose authoritie elsewhere he gladly citeth. For Iosephus had no reason to beleeue any mans faith or knowledge of those times, halfe so well as Daniels, whom I beleeue that hee vnderstood as farre as was needefull in this case. Lawfull it was for him to alleage all Authors that had any mention, though vnperfect of the same

things that were contained in the writings of the Iewes, to whose histories thereby he procured reputation in the Roman world, where they were strangers, and might seeme fabulous. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Eusebius, and other 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Writers, willingly em∣brace the testimonies of heathen bookes making for the truth in some particulars; yet will they not therefore be tried in generall by the selfe same Ethnicke philoso∣phers, but leaue them where they are against the truth; as Iosephus in this case hath left Berosus. And thus much I thought it meete to say of Scaligers opinion in this point; holding neuerthelesse in due regard his learning and iudgement, which if in some things it had not failed, the miracle had beene very great. [unspec 10]

§. VI. What may be held as probable of the Persons and Times of NABVCHO∣DONOSOR his successors.

IT now remaines that I freely acknowledge mine owne weaknes, who cannot find how the 70. yeeres of captiuitie are to be diuided among them which raigned in Babylon, though I finde that the distribution made of them, in such wise as already is rehearsed, be ill agreeable to the holy Scriptures. Wherefore I may truely say with Pererius, that [unspec 20] wee ought liberally to pardon those whose 〈◊〉〈◊〉 haue failed them in the slipperie wayes of Chronologie, wherein both learning and diligence are subiect to take a fall at one time or other, by ignorance, forgetfulnesse, or heedelesse reckoning. Yet will I aduenture to deliuer my opinion, wherein the iudgement of Lyra and others (holding those onely to haue raigned ouer Chaldoeans, whose Names are found in the Scriptures) appeares more conformable to reason and account of time, than any of the other Sentences or Coniectures before rehearsed. Not that I will take vpon me to defend Lyra his Coniectures, when hee supposeth by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Labosardach to be meant the same persons which are called in Scrip∣tures Euilmerodach and Balthasar (for this can by no good colour be maintained) but [unspec 30] onely to shew that the Kings by him cited, are likely to haue occupied the whole time of seuenty yeeres. First therefore let vs consider the raigne of Nebuchadnezzar, in whose eighteenth yere Ierusalem was taken and sackt, but in his nineteenth layd vtterly desolate.

Most of Writers haue giuen to him 43. yeeres of raigne, following therein Bero∣sus. There are who haue added one yeere more; and some haue made it vp 45. To dispute about the certainety were needlesse: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in shewing by what length of time the Scriptures measure him, we shall shew the certaine truth.

Manifest it is, that the 19. yeere of Nebuchadnezzar, is ioyned with the 11. of* 1.22 Zedekia; as also that his eight yeere, was the first yeere of Iechonia his captiuitie; the [unspec 40] raigne of Zedekia occupied all the meane space being of 11. yeeres. This is generally* 1.23 agreed vpon, so that it needes no further proofes: As for the beginning of his suc∣cessor* 1.24 Euilmerodach, it was in the seuen and thirtieth yeere of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his captiuitie; so that Nebuchadnezzar after his eight yeere (which was the first of Iechonia his bon∣dage) raigned 35. whole yeeres, and peraduenture a good part of the sixe and thir∣tieth, forasmuch as Iechonia was inlarged with so great fauour, not vntill the end of the yeere. Substracting therefore out of these foure and forty, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 raigne did wel-neere occupie, those eighteene yeeres of his which passed a∣way before the captiuitie of Iuda, and ruine of the citie, we haue remaining sixe and twenty yeeres of the seuentie, that were almost wholy spent, when his sonne be∣ganne [unspec 50] to raigne.

It is now to be considered how the remainder of the seuentie yeeres were diuided betweene the kings ruling in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vntill the first of Cyrus. A question more dif∣ficult (as I said before) than greatly needefull: the whole summe being certaine, and the distinction of times affording no benefit in knowledge of their actions, who

were slouthfull Princes. Neither can any man the more iustly suspect the begin∣ning or end of the whole 70. yeeres, for that the distribution of some part of them is only coniecturall; seeing that none who giues any other termes to their begin∣ning or end, hath refused to follow both vnlikely and desperate coniectures in diui∣ding them. I will therefore be bold to doe as others haue done; knowing well be∣fore-hand, that whosoeuer shall discouer my errour, must doe mee the pleasure (which I could rather wish in a case more materiall) of making mee to vnderstand the truth.

Of the foure and forty yeeres remayning in accompt at 〈◊〉〈◊〉 death, we are to take away the last, which was the first of Darius the Mede, and then ha∣uing [unspec 10] authority good enough to warrant vs from blame of presumption, in giuing vs seuenteene yeeres to Balthasar, we finde left in our hands to bestow vpon 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sixe and twenty yeeres. Of the yere belonging to Darius the Mede, I haue already spoken what I thought sufficient, in deliuering my opinion of the begin∣ning & continuance of this captiuity. That Balthasar did raigne seuenteene yeeres, we haue the authority of Iosephus, before cited in expresse words; We haue also the generall consent of all, or the most late Writers, interpreting Berosus his Nabonidus, who raigned so long; and Balthasar to haue beene one. But nothing moueth me so much to beleeue this Tradition, as first those euident places in Daniel, shewing that* 1.25 in the third yeere of Balthasar he followed the Kings businesse, and yet was forgot∣ten [unspec 20] ere the end of his raigne, (a proofe sufficient of no few yeeres, passing vnder this man, especially seeing it is no where found that Daniels emploiments tooke end ei∣ther that yeere or the next.) Secondly, the consideration of Cyrus his warres against the Assyrians, which beginning with the death of this mans father, and being al∣waies prosperous, could hardly haue occupied any longer time, though wee make large allowance to his deedes in the lower Asia, which fell out in the mid-way: I haue already shewed, that there appeares in the Scriptures likelihood enough to make it credible, that the raigne of Euilmerodach was not short: and that men of great iudgement haue found it most probable, that he was King three and twentie yeeres. More, I thinke, they would haue allowed him, had not the desire of satis∣fying [unspec 30] Berosus caused them to rest content with this. And surely it were greatly to be wished, that bookes of such antiquitie, as those of Berosus, were extant without corruption; a great light (no doubt) they would yeeld in many darke passages of Antiquitie. I will yet confesse, that were his workes neuer so excellent, and in all things else vnquestionably true, I would not therefore condescend vnto him in some one point, wherein the Scriptures were his open enemie. How much lesse ought I to obey a broken fragment of his, containing only seuen or eight lines, and part euen of the title corrupted, as they beleeue that follow him in the rest? The Scriptures haue told vs that God gaue the Empire to Nebuchadnezzar, to his sonne,* 1.26 and to his sonnes sonne: How long each of them held it, wee finde not expressed; yet would we gladly know it of Berosus, or of any other that would teach vs; proui∣ded [unspec 40] alwaies, that helping vs in a particularitic, he destroy not thereby the generall truth. More words are needlesse. It is enough to say with others, that Berosus or Iosephus who cited him, hath bin wronged by the carelesnesse of Scribes; and that it was as easie for those Scribes to erre in writing two for sixe & twentie, as for three and twentie, or perhaps more easie. For the omission of the second figure, was as likely the one way as the other; and the Character 5. signifying 6. hath a neerer re∣semblance of β that stands for 2. than hath γ which is vsed for 3. So that the nu∣merall notes β 5. expressing 26. were not safe enough from being mistaken in the true copie, and might be altered, as ill written, if some crooked hand, or other mis∣chance [unspec 50] not vnusuall, had omitted the first stroke of the former letter, or added a dash to the latter, which might cause them to seeme not two different figures, but the one a correction of the other, which how it could be supposed in βγ standing for 23. I doe not well perceiue. As for the arithmeticall figures now in vse, they

were long after the time of Iosephus brought in by the Arabians, and therefore doe not appertaine to this businesse; vnlesse we should ghesse that his works were cor∣rupted in that vnlearned age, which following the Saracen conquest, was little occu∣pied in the studies of humanitie, but in a sort wholly giuen ouer to the doctrine of Aristotle. If this will serue to make Berosus our friend, so let it be; if not, I will not purchase the fauour of his authoritie, by forsaking Ieremie and Daniel, when they seeme his opposites.

§. VII. Of the victories which NABVCHODONOSOR obtained betweene the destruction of Ierusalem and conquest of Aegypt. [unspec 10]

WIth what actions this time of 70. yeeres was entertained by the Baby∣lonian Kings, few haue written, or little is remaining in record. Which may peraduenture haue bin some cause that the time it selfe was, and is yet sought to bee abridged, as not hauing left sufficient matter to witnesse the length of it. But by such an argument wee might as well deny to many people euen their being. For euery Nation (I know not whom I [unspec 20] should except) betweene the beginning and last end of it, hath in some slothfull age rather dreamt away the time, than spent it. It is therefore no maruell, if the posteritie of Nabuchodonosor, finding all things readie to their hand, which their hearts could haue desired, betooke themselues to their ease and pleasures, thinking perhaps, like the prodigall sonnes of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fathers, their owne wisedome greater, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 how to enioy, than that of their Ancestors, which wearied away their daies in the restlesse trauell of purchasing: Though indeede the raigne of Nabu∣chodonosor was so diuided, that his youthfull and stronger yeeres hauing beene ex∣ercised in victorious armes, no small part of his life was remaining to be spent in e∣stablishing what was gotten, and gathering the fruit of his worthie labours past. [unspec 30] The nineteenth yeere of his raigne it was, when destroying vtterly the great and mightie Citie of Ierusalem, hee enriched himselfe with abundance of spoyle, and terrified all that would offer to resist him, by that fearefull example. From that time forward, he, vntill his three and twentieth yeere, laboured in the conquest of those adioyning Regions, which God had exposed vnto his sword, & commanded to weare his yoke; namely, the Edomites, Moabites, Ammonites, Tyrians, Sidonians, and Aegyptians, though some of these were already become his followers, and ser∣ued vnder him, when Ierusalem was beaten down and burnt. But the Tyrians, whose Citie was founded on an Iland, safe enough from any danger of a Land armie, and whose fleet was so strong, that they needed not to feare any enemy at sea, were nei∣ther [unspec 40] danted with the fall of their neighbour Cities, nor with the obstinate resoluti∣on of this mightie Prince, imploying all his power to their subuersion.

That the Citie of Tyre was rather well pleased, than any way discouraged with the fall of Ierusalem (which had held the same course that Tyrus did, and endured all that might be in the same quarrell against the common enemy) it appeares by the words which Ezechiel condemneth as the common voice of Tyrus; AHA, the gate* 1.27 of the people is broken, it is turned vnto me; for seeing shee is desolate, I shall be replenished. Yet at the length, euen in the nineteenth yeere of Nabuchodonosor, that great worke of his, whereof we haue alreadie spoken, began to appeare aboue the waters, and threaten them with ineuitable mischiefe. [unspec 50]

But those prophecies of Ieremie and of Esay, which appoint vnto this desolation* 1.28 of Tyre the same terme of 70. yeeres, that was prescribed vnto the raigne of the* 1.29 Chaldaeans, doe plainely shew, that shee followed Ierusalem, the same nineteenth yeere of Nabuchodonosor, in the same, or a very like fortune. The particularities,

which doubtlesse were memorable in the issue of so great and laborious a siege, are in a manner vtterly lost. Thus much we finde, That the Citizens perceiuing the Towne vnable to hold out, embarked themselues, and fled into the Isle of Cyprus. Neuerthelesse it seemes that this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 serued only the principall men, who esca∣ping with their goods, abandoned the poorer sort vnto the enemies furie. For not only such people of Tyre as dwelt on the Continent (who are called her Daughters in the field) were put to the sword; but the like execution was done in the streets, into which, with excessiue labour, the Assyrian made way for his Horses and Cha∣riots. Thus NABVCHODONOSOR caused his Armie to serue a great seruice against* 1.30 TYRVS, wherein euery head was made bald, and euery shoulder was made bare, yet had he* 1.31 [unspec 10] no wages, nor his Armie; but was faine to rest contented with the Honor of hauing destroied that Citie, which in all mens iudgements had beene held inuincible.

The destruction of these two great and powerfull Cities, hauing made the name of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dreadfull in the eares of all the Nations thereabout, Nabuchodono∣sor vsed the aduantage of that reputation which hee had obtained by victories al∣readie gotten, to the getting of more, and more profitable, with lesse paine. The Kingdome of Aegypt was the marke at which he aimed; a Country so abounding in all riches and pleasures, that it might wel haue tempted any Prince, finding him∣selfe strong enough, to seeke occasion of quarrell against it; and so farre an enemie to the Crowne of Babylon, that had it beene poorer, yet either it must haue beene sub∣dued, [unspec 20] or the conquest of Syria could ill haue beene established. Neuerthelesse it was needfull, that before hee entred into this businesse, the Countries adiacent should be reduced into such termes, that either they should wholly stand at his de∣uotion, or at least bee vnable to worke him any displeasure. And herein the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of God concurred, as in all prosperous enterprises, with reason of state. For the people of Moab, Ammon, Edom, Damascus, Kedar, Hazor, and other adioyning Re∣gions, whom God for their sins had condemned to fall vnder the Babylonian swords, were such, as regarding onely their owne gaine, had some of them, like Rauens, fol∣lowed the Chaldaean Armie, to feede vpon the carcasses that fell by the crueltic thereof; others taking aduantage of their neighbours miseries, occupied the Coun∣tries [unspec 30] which were by his victories belonging to Nabuchodonosor; al of them thinking, that when the Assyrian had satisfied his furie, he should be faine to forsake those de∣solate parts, and leaue the possession to those that could lay hand vpon it. Particu∣larly the Edomites and Philistims had shewed much malice to the Iewes when their* 1.32 Citie was taken. What good seruice they had done to the Chaldaeans, I finde not; if they did any, it is likely to haue been with reference to their own purposes, where∣in* 1.33 they were disappointed. The Ammonites were not contented to reioyce at the* 1.34 fall of Ierusalem, but presently they entered vpon the Country of Gad, and took pos∣session, as if not the Assyrians, but they, had subdued Israel. Neither can I perceiue what other ground that practice had of Baalis King of the Ammonites, when he sent [unspec 40] Ismael, a Prince of the bloud of Iuda, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Gedalia, whom the King of Babel had left Gouernour ouer those that remained in Israel, and to carry captiue into the Ammonites Countrie the people that abode in Mizpah, than a desire of embroiling Nabuchodonosor with so many labours at once, as should make him retire into his owne Country, and abandon those wasted Lands to himselfe and others, for whom* 1.35 they lay 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Such or the like policie the Moabites did exercise; whose* 1.36 pride and wrath were made frustrate by God, and their dissimulation condemned, as not doing right.

All these Nations had the art of rauening, which is familiar to such as liue or bor∣der vpon desarts; and now the time afforded them occasion to shew the vttermost [unspec 50] cunning of their theeuish wits. But Nebuchadnezzar did cut asunder all their de∣uices by sharpe and suddaine war, ouer-whelming them with vnexpected ruine, as it were in one night; according to the prophecies of Esay, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and Ezekiel, who* 1.37 fore-told, with little difference of words, the greatnesse and swiftnesse of the mi∣serie

that should come vpon them. With which of them he first began, I find not; it seemes that Moab was the last which felt his hand: for so doe many good Au∣thors interpret the prophecie of Esay, threatning Moab with destruction after three yeeres, as hauing reference to the third yeere following the ruine of Ierusalem; the next yeere after it being spent in the Aegyptian expedition. This is manifest, that all the principall Townes in these Regions were burnt, and the people slaine, or made slaues, few excepted, who being preserued by flight, had not the courage to returne to their habitations ouer-hastily, much lesse to attempt any thing against Nabucho∣donosor, but liued as miserable out-lawes, or at least, oppressed wretches, vntill the end of the seuentie yeeres, which God had prescribed vnto the desolation of their [unspec 10] Countries, as well as of the Land of Iuda.

§. VIII. That Aegypt was conquered, and the King therein raigning slaine by NABVCHODO∣NOSOR, contrarie to the opinion of most Authors: who following HERO∣DOTVS and DIODORVS, relate it otherwise.

WHen by a long course of victorie Nabuchodonosor had brought into [unspec 20] subiection all the Nations of Syria, & the bordering Arabians, in such wise, that no enemie to himselfe, nor friend of the Aegyptian, was left at his back, that might giue impediment vnto his proceeding, or take aduantage of any misfortune; then did hee forth-with take in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the conquest of Aegypt himselfe, vpon which those other Nations had formerly beene depending. Of this expedition, and the victorious issue thereof, the three great Prophets, Esay, Ieremie, and Ezechiel, haue written so plainely, that I hold it al∣together needlesse to looke after more authoritie, or to cite for proofe halfe of that which may be alleadged out of these. Neuerthelesse, we finde many and good Au∣thors, who following Herodotus, and Diodorus Siculus, are well contented to straine [unspec 30] these prophecies with vnreasonable diligence vnto such a sense, as giues to Nabucho∣donosor little more than the honour of hauing done some spoile in Aegypt, omitting the conquest of that Land by the Babylonian, and referring the death of Apries or Hophra to a chance long after following, which had no coherence with these times or affaires. So preposterous is the delight which many men take in the meanes and second helps conducing to their purpose, that often-times they preferre the Com∣mentator before the Author; and to vp-hold a sentence, giuing testimonie to one clause, doe carelesly ouerthrow the historie it selfe, which thereby they sought to haue maintained. The reports of Herodotus and Diodorus, concerning the Kings of Aegypt, which raigned about these times, are already rehearsed in the former book: [unspec 40] but that which they haue spoken of Apries, was purposely reserued vnto this place. Herodotus affirmes, that he was a very fortunate King, but wherein he telleth not;* 1.38 (vnlesse we should vnderstand that he was victorious in the Warre, which he is said to haue made vpon Tyrus and Sidon) that hee raigned fiue and twentie yeeres, and was finally taken and put to death by his owne subiects; who did set vp Amasis, as King, which preuailed against him. The rebellion of the Aegyptians he imputeth to a great losse which they receiued in an expedition against the Cyrenians, by whom almost their whole Armie was destroied. This calamitie the people of Aegypt thought to be well pleasing to their King, who had sent them on this dangerous expedition, with a purpose to haue them consumed, that so he might with greater [unspec 50] securitie raigne ouer such as staied at home. So they who escaped, and the friends of such as were 〈◊〉〈◊〉, rebelled against Apries, who sent Amasis to appease the tu∣mult; but Amasis became Captaine of the rebells, and was by them chosen King. Finally, the whole Land consented vnto this new Election; whereby Apries

was driuen to trust vnto his forraine Mercenaries, the Ionians and Carians, of whom hee kept in readinesse 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thousand good Souldiers that fought va∣liantly for him, but were vanquished by the great numbers of the Aegyptian forces, amounting vnto two hundred and fiftie thousand, which were all by birth and education, men of warre. Apries himselfe being taken prisoner, was gently intreated by Amasis for a while, vntill the Aegyptians, exclaiming vpon him, as an extreme enemie to the Land, got him deliuered into their hands, and strangled him, yet gaue him honourable buriall. Such is the report of Hero∣dotus, with whome Diodorus Siculus neerely agrees, telling vs that Apries did* 1.39 vanquish the Cyprians and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in battell at Sea, tooke by force and demo∣lished [unspec 10] Sidon, wan the other townes of Phoenicia, and the Isle of Cyprus, and finally, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as is before rehcarsed, when he had raigned two and twentie yeeres. This authoritie were enough (yet not more than enough) to informe vs of Apries his hi∣storie, if greater authoritie did not contradict it. But the destruction of Aegypt by the Babylonian, fore-told by the Prophets, which hath no coherence with these re∣lations, hath greater force to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 our beliefe, than haue the traditions of Ae∣gyptian Priests (which the Greeke Historians followed) and greater probabilities to perswade those that looke onely into humane reasons. For Esay prophecied long* 1.40 before of the shameful captiuitie of the Aegyptians, whom the king of Asshur should carry away naked, young and old, in such wise, that the Iewes, who 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vnto them [unspec 20] fo: deliuerance from the Assyrian, should bee ashamed of their owne vaine confi∣dence in men so vnable to defend themselues.

But Ezekiel and Ieremie, as their prophecies were neerer to the time of execution, so they handled this Argument more precisely. For Ezekiel telleth plainely, that Aegypt should be giuen to Nebuchadnezzar, as wages for the seruice which hee had done at Tyre: Also hee recounteth particularly all the chiefe Cities in Aegypt, say∣ing,* 1.41 That these by name should bee destroyed, and goe into captiuitie; yea, that* 1.42 PHARAOH and all his armie should be slaine by the sword. Wherefore it must needes be a violent exposition of these Prophecies, which by applying the issue of such threatnings to an insurrection and rebellion, concludes all, without any other alte∣ration [unspec 30] in Aegypt, than change of the Kings person, wherein Amasis did succeed vn∣to Apries, by force indeede, but by the vniforme consent of all the people. Cer∣tainely, if that notable place of Ieremie, wherein hee 〈◊〉〈◊〉 how the Iewes in* 1.43 * 1.44 Aegypt should see Pharaoh Hophra deliuered into the hand of his enemies, as Zedekia had beene, were to be referred vnto the time of that rebellion, whereof Herodotus hath spoken, as the generall opinion hath ouer-ruled it, then was it vainely done of the same Prophet (which God forbid that any Christian should thinke, seeing hee did it by the appointment of God himselfe) to hide in the clay of a Brick-hill, those very stones, vpon which the throne of Nabuchodonosor should be ser, and his paui∣lion spred. Yea then was that prophecie no other than false, which expressed the [unspec 40] 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Pharaoh thus: Behold, I will visite the common people of No, & PHARAOH, and* 1.45 Aegypt, with their gods and their kings, euen PHARAOH, and all that trust in him: and I will dcliuer them into the hands of those that seeke their liues, and into the hand of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, King of Babel, and into the hands of his seruants. The clearenes of this prophecy being such as could not but refute that interpretation of many other places, which referred all to the rebellion of Amasis, it caused me to wonder what those Commentators would say to it, who are elsewhere so diligent in fitting all to the Greeke Historians. Wherefore looking vpon Iunius, who had in another place taken the enemies of Pharaoh Hophra to be Amasis, and his followers, I found him* 1.46 heere acknowledging that the Aegyptian Priests had notably deluded Herodotus [unspec 50] with lies, coined vpon a 〈◊〉〈◊〉-glorious purpose of hiding their owne disgrace and bondage. And surely it may well be thought, that the historic of Nebuchadnezzar, was better knowne to the Iewes, whom it concerned, than to the Greekes, that scarce∣ly at any time heard of his name. Therefore I see no cause why we should not ra∣ther

beleeue Iosephus, reporting that Nabuchodonosor in the three & twentieth yeere of his raigne, and the fift yeere of the destruction of Ierusalem, did conquer Egypt, kill the King thereof, and appoint another in his stead, than Herodotus or 〈◊〉〈◊〉;* 1.47 who being meere strangers to this businesse, had no great reason to labor in search∣ing out the truth, but might rest contented with any thing that the Priests would tell them. Now if setting aside all aduantage of authoritie, we should only consider the relations of Iosephus, and of the Greeke 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as either of them might bee verified of it selfe by apparant circumstances, without reflecting vpon the Hebrew Prophets, or Aegyptian Priests; me thinks the death of Apries can no way be appro∣ued as hauing beene wrought by consent of the people, but affords great matter of [unspec 10] suspition; yea, though no man had opposed the reports of Herodotus and Diodore. For the great loue and houour which the Aegyptians did beare vnto their Kings, is notorious by the vniforme testimony of al others that haue handled the matters of that Countrey, as well as by the report of Diodore himselfe. How then can wee thinke it probable, that Apries hauing wonne great victories, did for one only losse fall into the hatred of all his people, or which may serue to perswade vs, that a King of Aegypt would seeke, or so demeane himselfe, that he might be thought to seeke the destruction of his naturall subiects? As for that armie of thirtie thousand soul∣diers, Carians and Ionians, which the King of Aegypt, whom Amasis tooke prisoner, is said to haue kept for his defence: doth it not argue that hee was a forrainer, and [unspec 20] one that armed himselfe against the Aegyptians, wishing them few and weake; ra∣ther than any of the Pharaohs, who accounted the force of the Country, as assured∣ly their owne, as the strength of their owne bodies? It were more tedious than a∣ny way needfull, to vse all Arguments that might bee alleadged in this case. The very death of this supposed Apries, which the clamours of the people obtained of Amasis, who sought to haue kept him aliue, doth intimate that he was some forren Gouernour, not a naturall Prince; otherwise the people would haue desired to saue his life, and Amasis to take it quickly from him. I will not labour any further to disproue that opinion, whereunto I should not haue yeelded, though it had stood vpon great apparance of truth, considering that the voice of Truth it selfe [unspec 30] cries out against it; but leaue the circumstances, prouing the Conquest of Aegypt by Nabuchodonosor to bee obserued, where due occasion in course of the storie fol∣lowing shall present them.

§. IX. How Aegypt was subdued and held by NABVCHADNEZZAR.

IT is a great losse, that the generall Historie of the World hath suffe∣red, by the spoile and waste which Time hath made of those Monu∣ments, [unspec 40] that should haue preserued the memorie of such famous acti∣ons as were accomplished by this mightie Prince Nabuchodonosor; wherein, whether his Vertue, or Fortune were greater, it is now vn∣certaine. That his victories following the Conquest of Syria, and the Neighbour∣Prouinces, were such as did more enlarge his dominion, than all his former warres had done, it may easily be gathered out of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vp in his thirtieth chapter (besides the whole Countrey of Aegypt) Phut and Lud, with other Nati∣ons that may seeme to haue reached out into Mauritania, as people subdued by this great Babylonian. The circumstances of these warres are in a maner vtterly lost; but that the victorie was easie and swift, any man shall find, who will take the pains [unspec 50] to conferre the places, wherein the three great Prophets touch this Argument. Thus much I thinke worthy of more particular obseruation; that Pharaoh, who (as is already noted in the former Booke) thought himselfe safe in Aegypt by the well defenced situation of his Countrey, did very vnwisely in suffering his enemies

to sweepe the way cleane vnto his owne doores, by consuming all his friends and adhaerents in Syria. For as the labour of this businesse did more harden then 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Chaldaean army, so the confidence and vaine securitie of the Aegyptians, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vpon the difficult passages which the enemie was to make thorow the Arabian desarts, and the much aduantage which the great riuer of Nilus would afford vnto themselues, did little auaile them in prouision for the war, and much astonish them (as may iustly bee thought) in the time of execution: it being vsually seene, that the hearts of men faile, when those helps faile, in which they had reposed more confidence than in their owne vertue. Hitherto the Kingdome of Aegypt had flou∣rished vnder the rule of the Pharaohs, about a thousand fiue hundred & foure score [unspec 10] yeeres; but from this time forward it remained forty yeeres without a King, vnder the subiection of the Babylonians; and then at length it began to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by little & litle the former greatnes, yet so, that it was neuer dreadful vnto others, God hauing said of that people, I wil diminish them, that they shal no more rule the Nations. For wher∣as* 1.48 it hath beene said of Pharaoh: I am the sonne of the wise, I am the sonne of the anci∣ent* 1.49 Kings: and whereas he had vaunted, The Riuer is mine, and I haue made it; the* 1.50 Princes of Aegypt now became fooles, the riuer failed them, the King himselfe was taken and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and that ancient linage quite extinguished. This came to passe in the first yeere after the destruction of Ierusalem, and the three and twentieth of Nebuchadnezzar, at which time (saith Iosephus) He slew the King then raigning, pla∣ced* 1.51 [unspec 20] another in his roome, and carried captiues thence to Babylon, the Iewes whome he found in that Countrie. Now concerning the time which Iosephus giues vnto this bu∣sinesse, and the businesse it selfe, I haue already shewed, that it is warranted by all the prophecies which insinuate the same. As likewise the last destruction of Ierusa∣lem, and carrying a way those vnto Babel, who inhabited the miserable ruines of that great city, which was in the same three & twentieth yeere of NEBVCHADNEZZAR, is not vnprobably thought by good authors to haue beene at the returne from this* 1.52 Aegyptian expedition. But whereas Iosephus tels vs, that there was another King put in the roome of Apries by Nebuchadnezzar, wee must vnderstand, that hee was one∣ly a Viceroy, and not (as some haue mistaken it) thinke that this was Amasis. For to [unspec 30] place the beginning of Amasis his raigne in the three and twentieth of Nebuchadnez∣zar, were as well repugnant vnto the prophecies before 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as to all Chrono∣logie and historic. Some there are, which to helpe this inconuenience, imagine that there were two successiuely bearing the name of Amasis; others, that there were two Apries, the one slaine by Nebuchadnezzar, the other by Amasis: a question of small importance, because the difference is onely about a name, it being once granted that the person mentioned in Scriptures, was depriued of life and kingdome by the As∣syrians. Yet for any thing that I can perceiue, that Apries, of whom the Greeke Histo∣rians wrote, could not be the Deputie of Nebuchadnezzar, seeing that hee was the Grand-childe of Pharao Necho, and made warre (as they report) vpon the Phoenici∣ans, [unspec 40] who were, before the Aegyptians, become subiect vnto the Crowne of Babylon. I might adde, perhappes, that he whom Nebuchadnezzar left as Gouernour of Ae∣gypt, was more likely to haue had some Chaldaean or 〈◊〉〈◊〉, than Aegyptian name; vnlesse we should thinke that hee had beene a traytor to his naturall Prince, and so rewarded by the Conquerour with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Country: about which it were but friuolous to dispute. Thus much in briefe we ought to beleeue, that Na∣buchodonosor made an absolute Conquest of Aegypt; that he was not so foolish as to giue it away, any man may guesse; that he appointed one to rule the Countrey, it is conscquent vnto the former, and hath authoritie of Iosephus; that this Gouernour (or some successour of his) was afterwards taken and slaine by Amasis, I see pro∣babilitie [unspec 50] enough to perswade my selfe, and yet can well bee content, that others vse their libertie, and beleeue what they list. As for the armie which this Aegyptian King Apries is supposed to haue kept of Ionians and Carians; I hold them to be none other than the garisons of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 souldiers which were left by the Assyrian

for the guard of his Viceroy, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the new 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Prouince: as likewise the company returning from Cyrene and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who together with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of such as were slaine in that expedition, remembred before out of the Greeke Histori∣ans, deposed and slew Apries, I take them to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 beene the Aegyptian fugitiues, which then recouered their owne Countrey. Sure it is that this Prophecie of Eze∣kiel was verified, At the end of fortie yeeres will I gather the Aegyptians from the people* 1.53 where they were scattered, and I will bring againe the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Aegypt, and will cause them to returne into the land of Pathros, into the land of their habitation, and they shall be there a small kingdome. If the Aegyptian Priests alluded heereunto in the tale which they made of Amasis his obtaining the Kingdome, then are they to be helped with [unspec 10] this or the like interpretation; if they deuised matter that had no shadow of truth, onely to keepe the Greekes from knowledge of their Countries disgrace; then are they little to be regarded, since we know the truth with them.

§. X. Of the sundry accompts drawne from sundry acts of NEBVCHADNEZZAR, and of the destruction of Niniuie, by him; the time of which action is vncertaine.

THese victories brought the greatnes of the Assyrian Empire to the full, [unspec 20] and from them was reckoned the time of Nebuchadnezzar's raigne in sundry places of Scripture. To speake any more of the questions arising about the supputation of Nebuchadnezzar his times, might seeme to be the ouer-handling of one Argument: Yet thus much I will note; that whereas Daniel was carried captiue in the third yeere of Iehoiakims* 1.54 raigne (which ranne along with some part of Nebuchadnezzar's first yeere) and was kept in diet three yeeres more, before he was brought into the Kings presence; it could not be the second of Nebuchadnezzar's kingdome, wherin he interpreted the forgotten dreame of the great Image, foreshewing the succession of Monarchies, but [unspec 30] the second of his Empire. The same or the like may be said of diuers places which referre sundry matters vnto their set yeeres; as that of Ezekiel before-cited, where he fore-tells, that Aegypt should be giuen in reward for the seruice done before Ty∣rus, dating his prophecie in the seuen and twentieth yeere; and that of Daniel, pla∣cing the erection of the golden Image in the eighteenth yeere: for these yeeres held no dependance vpon either the beginning of Nebuchadnezzar's kingdome, or of his Empire, nor yet vpon any of the captiuities, but had reference to some memorable action, omitted in Scripture, and therefore not easie to be found, nor worth the la∣bour of vncertaine search.

Ofany warre made by Nebuchadnezzar, after such time as he returned from the [unspec 40] Conquest of Aegypt, I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not read: excepting that against Niniuie, the destruction whereof was fore-tolde by the Prophet Naum. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had long before 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ta∣ken by Merodach (as in due place hath beene shewed) and together with the rest of Assyria made subiect to Babylon. Yet was it left vnder a peculiar King, who 〈◊〉〈◊〉 against the Chaldaean, as Iehoiakim & Zedekias, tributary Kings of Iuda, had done, tasted likewise of the same fortune. That the destruction of Niniuie followed the Conquest of Aegypt, it appeareth by the comparison which Nahum the Prophet* 1.55 made betweene this Citie, that was to fall, and the Citie of No in Aegypt, that was fallen already. But how long after this came to passe, it is (me thinks) vnpossible to finde out. For whereas it is found in an Hebrew Chronologie, that it was in the first [unspec 50] of Nebuchadnezzar's raigne; the place of Nahum last cited is enough to disprooue it. Whereas it is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by some vnto the first of his Monarchie, which began at the end of the Aegyptian warres; the whole Prophecie of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which went 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the one and the other, argueth 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that there was a longer space of time inter∣current.

So that to enquire into the very yeere of this destruction, or other cir∣cumstances of the Warre, whether managed by Nabuchodonosor in person, or by his Lieutenants, were somewhat like vnto the vaine curiositie of Tyberius Caesar, enqui∣ring who was the Mother of Hecuba; or to the like idle paines which he should take, who would seeke to learne what woman that Huzzab Queen of Niniuie was, whose wofull captiuitie the same Prophet Naum likewise did fore-tell.

§. XI. Of the later time of NEBVCHADNEZZAR; his buildings, madnesse, and death. [unspec 10]

OF the time which this great Monarch spent in quiet, I thinke there are no Monuments extant; saue those which wee finde among the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Daniel. Among these wee may reckon his great works at Babylon, wherewith he pleased himselfe so well, that he brake out in∣to these glorious words: Is not this great Babel that I haue built for the* 1.56 house of the Kingdome, by the might of my power, and for the honour of my Maiestie? Surely if those things bee true that are by Iosephus rehearsed of him out of Berosus and Megasthenes, he might well delight himselfe with the contemplation of such [unspec 20] goodly and magnificent buildings. For it is said, That he fortified Babylon with a triple wall; that besides other slaterly works, he raised those huge arches wherewith were borne vp the high Orchards, hanging as it were in the ayre, and equalling the tops of Mountaines; which most sumptuousframe, that out lasted all the remain∣der of the Assyrian, and all the Persian Empire, is said to haue beene reared, and fi∣nished in fifteene daies.

But of all this, and other his magnificence, we finde little else recorded, than that (which indeede is most profitable for vs to consider) his ouer-valuing of his owne greatnesse abased him vnto a condition, inferiour to the poorest of men. And not vndeseruedly fell these iudgements of God vpon him. For whereas God had ho∣noured [unspec 30] him, not onely with many victories, and much happinesse in his owne life, but with a discouerie of things to come after him, yea and had approoued the cer∣taintie of his dreame, by the miraculous reducing of it into his memorie, and inter∣pretation thereof by Daniel the Prophet: he neuerthelesse became so forgetfull of God, whose wonderfull power he had seene and acknowledged, that hee caused a golden Image to be set vp and worshipped: ordaining a cruell death as reward vnto them that should 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to disobey his Kingly will and pleasure, which was vtterly repugnant to the law of him that is the King of Kings. Hereof S. Hierome hath well noted; Velox obliuio veritatis, vt qui dudum seruum Dei quasi Deum 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 statuam sibi fieri iubeat, vt ipse quasi Deus in statuâ adoraretur: A hastie forget∣fulnesse [unspec 40] of the truth, that hee who so lately had worshipped (DANIEL) the seruant of God, as if he had beene God himselfe, should now command a Statua to be erected vnto himselfe, wherein himselfe might bee worshipped as God. From this impietie it pleased God to reclaime him, by the strange and wonderfull deliuerie of those bles∣sed Saints out of the fierie fornace; who being throwne into it bound, forrefusing to commit Idolatrie, were assisted by an Angell; preserued from all harme of the fire; loosened from their bands; and finally called out with gracious words, and restored to their former honour, by the King: who amazed at the miracle, made a decree tending to the honour of God, which by erection of his Image he had viola∣ted. Yet this deuotion of Nabuchadnezzar was not so rooted in him, that it could [unspec 50] bring foorth fruit answerable to his hastie zeale. Therefore was he forewarned by God in a dreame of the terrible iudgement hanging ouer his head, which Daniel expounding, aduised him to breake off his sinne by righteousnesse, and his iniquitie by mercy towards the poore, that there might be an healing of his error. Hereby it seemes

that iniustice and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were the faults, for which he was threatned, but this threating sufficed not vnto his reformation. For that so great a Monarch should be driuen from among men, (according to the tenor of the dreame and interpretation) yea, compelled to dwell with the beasts of the field, and made to eate grasse as the Oxen, was a thing so incredible in mans iudgement, that easily it might be thought an idle dreame, and much more easily be forgotten at the yeeres end. One whole yeeres leasure to repent was giuen to this haughtie Prince: which respite of the exe∣cution may seeme to haue bred in him a forgetfulnesse of Gods sentence. For at the end of twelue moneths, walking in the royall Palace of Babel, he was so ouer-ioyed and transported with a vaine contemplation of his owne seeming happinesse, that [unspec 10] without all feare of Gods heauie iudgement pronounced against him, hee vttered those loftie words before rehearsed, in vaunting of the Maiesticall works which he had reared, as well beseeming his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 person. But his high speeches were not fully ended, when a voice from heauen, telling him that his Kingdome was de∣parted from him, rehearsed ouer vnto him the sentence againe, which was fulfilled vpon him the very same houre.

That Salomon, and many other Princes, and great ones, haue taken delight in their owne buildings, it cannot any way be doubted; yet I doe not remember that euer I haue read of any, that were punished for reioycing in works of this kinde (though it is hard in ioy, or any passion of the minde, to keepe a iust measure) excepting one∣ly [unspec 20] this Nabuchadnezzar.

The like may be said of Dauid: for other (and some very godly) Kings haue mu∣stred all their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the very last man; but few or none haue been known to haue beene punished as Dauid was. Surely I not onely hold it lawfull to reioyce in those good things, wherwith God hath blessed vs; but a note of much vnthankfulnesse to entertaine them with a sullen and vnfeeling disposition. Yet as all humane affecti∣ons, wherein due reference to God is wanting, are no better than obscure cloudes, hindring the influence of that blessed light, which clarifies the soule of man, and predisposeth it vnto the brightnesse of eternall felicitie; so that in solent ioy, which man in the pride of his vaine imagination conceiueth of his owne worth, doth a∣boue [unspec 30] all other passions blast our mindes, as it were with lightning, and make vs to reflect our thoughts vpon our seeming inherent greatnesse, forgetting the whilest him, to whom wee are indebted for our very being. Wherefore these malamentis gaudia; The euill ioyes of the minde, were not vnaptly, by the Prince of Latine Poets, bestowed in the entrance of Hell, and placed further inward than sorrowes, cares, and feares; not farre from the yron Cabbins of the Furies. And certainely it is no vnlikely token of vengeance neere at hand, when these vnreasonable flushes of proud and vaine ioy, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 rage in a minde, that should haue beene humbled with a iust repentance and acknowledgement of ill deseruing.

This was verified vpon Nebuchadnezzar, whose punishment was singular and [unspec 40] vnexampled. For he ranne among beasts in the fields and woods, where for seuen yeeres hee liued, not onely as a saluage man, but as a saluage beast, for a beast hee thought himselfe secundum suam imaginationem, as Thomas noteth, and therefore* 1.57 fed himselfe in the same manner, and with the same food that beasts doe; Not that he was changed in figure externall, according to Mediana, in so much as he appeared* 1.58 a beast to other mens eies, as S. Hierome in the life of Hilarius (how true God knows) speakes of a woman that appeared to all other mens sight a Cow, but to Hilarius onely a woman; neither was he changed as Iphigenia the Daughter of Agamemnon was said to be, into a Hinde, nor made a Monster, as Dorotheus and Epiphanius drea∣med:* 1.59 but according to S. Ieromes exposition of these words: At the same time was my [unspec 50] vnderstanding restored vnto me &c. Quando dicit (saith S. Ierome) sensum sibi redditum, ostendit non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se amisisse, sed mentem; When he saith that his sense was restored vnto him, he sheweth that he had not lost his humane shape, but his vnderstanding. Seuen yeeres expired, it pleased God to restore Nabuchodonosor, both to his vnderstan∣ding,

and his estate, for which he acknowledged and praised God all the rest of his life, confessing his power, and euerlasting being; that he was the Lord of heauen and earth, and wrought without resistance what he pleased in both; that his works* 1.60 were all truth, and his waies righteous. Which gaue argument to many of the Fa∣thers, and others, not to doubt of his saluation; namely, S. Augustine, Theodoret, Lyra, Carthusianus, and others. And for that place of Esay, the fourteenth, out of which his perdition may be gathered, the aforenamed Authors apply the same to Balthasar, because Isay, both in the thirteenth and fourteenth Chapter, speaketh of the King, and the destruction of Babylon ioyntly. [unspec 10]

§. XII. Of EVILMERODACH.

HAuing already spoken what I could of the succession and yeeres of Nebuchadnezzars posteritie; the most that may be said of him, is said of Euilmerodach, which I will not here againe rehearse.

He lost some part of that which his Father had gotten; and left his Kingdome burning in a warre that consumed it to ashes. He lost Ae∣gypt by rebellion of the people, in the nineteenth yere of his raigne, which was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 [unspec 20] yeeres after his Father had conquered it. But this agrees neither with the ac∣compt of Herodotus, who allowes to Amasis foure and fortie yeeres of raigne; nor with that of Diodorus, who giues him fiue and fiftie, saying that he died in the third yeere of the threescore and third Olympiad, when Cambyses did conquer Aegypt. There were indeed but seuen and thirtie yeeres, which passed betweene the second yeere of the foure and fiftieth Olympiad, (which was the nineteenth of Euilmero∣dach, and the first of Amasis) and the fift of Cambyses his raigne, wherein hee wanne Aegypt; of which seuen and thirtie yeeres it is credibly held, that Psamennitus, the sonne of Amasis, raigned three: so that Amasis could be no longer King than foure and thirtie yeeres. But seeing that these two Greeke Historians haue beene abused [unspec 30] by Aegyptian Priests, in the substance of that which was spoken of Amasis, it is no maruell though they were also deceiued in the length of his raigne. This is the plaine answere to this obiection. For to say either that the numbers were miswrit∣ten, and foure and fortie set downe in stead of foure and thirtie, or that Amasis did temporise awhile with the Assyrians, and not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 himselfe as absolute King of Ae∣gypt, vntill the nineteenth of Euilmerodach (at which time, and not before, it hath beene proued out of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that Aegypt became againe a Kingdome) I hold it a superfluous excuse.

Whether these Aegyptian troubles did animate the King of the Medes to deale with Euilmerodach, as with a Prince greater in fame, and reputation, gotten by the [unspec 40] decaied valour of his people, than in present forces; or whether (as I rather thinke) some foile receiued by the Assyrian inuading Media, emboldned the Aegyptians to rebell against him: I will neither vndertake, nor seeke to define. Xenophon tels, that* 1.61 the first 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of young Cyrus in warre, was vnder Astyages King of the Medes, his Grand-father, in a prosperous fight against the Assyrian Prince, who did set vpon him; at which time Cyrus was fifteen or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 yeeres old. If therefore Cyrus liued threescore & three yeeres (as he is said to haue died well stricken in yeeres) which is held to be the ordinarie terme of no short life, then was this encounter in the third yeere of Euilmerodach his raigne. Yet by the same reckoning it should follow, that* 1.62 the warre began more early betweene these Nations, for as much as the manner [unspec 50] of their fight in former times, with other circumstances insinuating as much, are found in the same place of Xenophon. And it may well be, that the death or destru∣ction of Nabuchodonosor gaue courage vnto those that had felt him a troublesome neighbour, to stand vpon prouder termes with the Assyrians, than in his flourishing

〈◊〉〈◊〉 they durst haue vsed. Howsoeuer the quarrell beganne, wee finde that it en∣ded not before the last ruine of the Assyrian Monarchie. For the Babylonian, being too proud to digest the losses which hee receiued by the Medes and their Allies the Persians, drew vnto his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Lydians, and all the people of the lesser Asia, with gifts and strong perswasions, hoping so to ouer-whelme his enemies with a strong inuasion, whome in vaine hee had sought to wearie out with a lingring Warre.

This happened after the death of Astyages, who left the World in the nineteenth yeere of Euilmerodach, at which time Amasis tooke possession of Aegypt. So that the Assyrian hauing his hands alreadie full of businesse, which more 〈◊〉〈◊〉 did [unspec 10] affect him, seemes thereby to haue giuen the better meanes vnto the 〈◊〉〈◊〉; of new erecting their Kingdome, which by long distance of place did sundry 〈◊〉〈◊〉 finde occasion to rebell in after-ages, and set vp a King within it selfe, against the far more 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Persian.

The issue of these great preparations made by Euilmerodach against the Medes, was such as opened the way vnto the fulfilling of those prophecies, which were ma∣ny yeeres before vttered against Babel, by Esay and 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

For the Assyrians, and their Confederates, who, trusting in their numbers, thought to haue buried the Medes and Persians vnder their thicke shewres of arrowes and darts, were encountred with an armie of stout and well-trained men, weightily ar∣med [unspec 20] for close fight, by whom they were beaten in open battell, wherein 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was slaine. So that great frame of Empire which Nabuchodonosor had raysed and vp-held, being shaken and grieuously crackt vnder his vnfortunate Sonne, was left to bee sustained by his vnworthy Nephew: a man more likely to haue ouer∣throwne it, when it was greatest and strongest, than to repaire it, when it was in way of falling.

§. XIII. Apriuate coniecture of the Author; seruing to make good those things, which are cited out of BEROSVS, concerning the Successors of EVILMERO∣DACH, without wrong to the truth, the qualitie, and death of BALTHASAR. [unspec 30]

THough I haue alreadie (as it seemes to mee) sufficiently prooued that Balthasar was the Sonne, and immediate Successour to Euilmerodach, yet considering earnestly the coniectures of those Writers, which fol∣lowing Berosus, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or Niriglissoroor, and his sonne Labas∣sardach [unspec 40] betweene them: as also that which I finde in Herodotus of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, a famous Queene of Babylon, who greatly adorned and fortified that 〈◊〉〈◊〉; I haue thought it not superfluous here in this place to shew, by what meanes it was possible that some errour might haue crept into the Historie of those times, and thereby haue brought vs to a needlesse trouble of searching out the truth as it were by candle-light, in the vncertaine fragments of lost Authors, which we might haue found by day-light, had we adhered onely to the Scriptures. First, therefore I ob∣serue, that the time which Berosus dinides betwixt Euilmerodach, and the two next Kings, agrees with the yeeres in which Nebuchadnezzar liued wilde among brute beasts in the open field: Secondly, that the suddainenesse of this accident, which [unspec 50] came in one houre, could not but worke much perturbation in that state, wherein doubtlesse the honour of so noble a Prince was highly regarded, his calamitie pit∣tied, and his restitution hoped; the prediction of Daniel finding reputation in that

clause which promised his recouerie, as being verified in that which had bin more incredible. Now if we doe in common reason iudge, what course was like to be ta∣ken by the great ones of the Kingdome, for settling the gouernment, whilest the King was thus distracted, we shall finde it most likely, that his Sonne and Heire did occupie the royall 〈◊〉〈◊〉, with condition to restore it vnto his Father, when God should enable him to repossesse it. In this his rule Euilmerodach being to supplie the vtter want of vnderstanding in his Father, as Protectors doe the vnripenesse of it in* 1.63 young, but reasonable Kings, might easily either commit the insolencies, or fall into the troubles, incident to such an office. That hee had in him very small abilitie of gouernment, it appeares by his ill maintaining the Empire, when hee held it in his [unspec 10] owne right. That his Sister Nitocris (if Nitocris were his sister) was a woman of an high spirit, it appeares by that which Herodotus reports of her, saying that shee was more cunning than Semiramis, as appeared in her magnificent and vsefull works a∣bout the Riuer of Euphrates, and her fortification of Babylon against the Medes, who had gotten many Townes from the Assyrians, & amongst them Niniuic. Wherfore it were not vnreasonable to think, that such a woman, seeing how the Empire went to decay through her brothers misgouernment, vsed practices to get the rule into her owne hands, and afterwards, as a mother, to leaue it vnto her vngracious sonne. Other time than this, wherein Nitocris could haue raigned, we doe not finde; but we finde in Berosus (as Iosephus hath cited him) that Niglissar, who got the Kingdom [unspec 20] from Euilmerodach, was his sisters husband; which argues this to haue beene the same woman. As for Labassardach the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Niglissar, if at the end of nine Mo∣neths raigne hee were for his lewd 〈◊〉〈◊〉 slaine by the Nobilitie, as the same Berosus reporteth, it seems that God 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hereby the way for Nebuchadnezzars restitution (whose terme of punishment was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 expired) by raising such troubles as should make him the more desired, both of the Princes and the people. I will not here vse many words to confute that which Berosus hath further set downe of Euilmerodach, telling vs that hee was slaine by his sisters husband: for the plaine words of Scripture, naming the yeere wherein he gaue libertie to Iechonia, do plain∣ly testifie that he out-liued the three or foure and fortieth yeere of his Fathers [unspec 30] raigne, which was the last of his life.

This may suffice to shew, that they who are said to haue succeeded Euilmerodach in the Kingdome, might indeede haue so done, though not when hee held it in his owne right. Of Balthasar, who was his Sonne and Heire, we finde, that he had such conditions, as God permitteth to be in a King for the ruine of the people. He was from his young yeeres of a mischieuous nature; hauing in his Fathers time slaine a Noble yong man that should haue married his sister, onely for spight and enuie to see him kill two wild beasts in hunting, at which himselfe hauing throwne his Iaue∣line had missed them. Another great Lord he had gelded, because a Gentlewoman commending his beautie, said it were a happie woman that should be his wife. Such [unspec 40] barbarous vilanies caused many which had loued his Father (as a good and gra∣cious, though vnfortunate Prince) to reuolt from him vnto the enemie as soone as he was King. Neither doe I finde that hee performed any thing worthy of record, but as a Coward and a Foole hee lost all; sitting still, and not once daring to giue battell to them that daily tooke somewhat from him: Yet carelesly feasting when danger had hemmed him in on euery side, and when death arrested him by the hands of those whom hee had wronged in his Fathers life. So the end of him was base and miserable; for he died as a foole taken in vnexcusable securitie, yet had not that happinesse, such as it is, of a death free from apprehension of feare, but was ter∣rified with a dreadful vision; which had shewed his ruine not many houres before, [unspec 50] euen whilest hee was drinking in that wine, which the swords of his insulting ene∣mies drew out of him, together with his latest bloud. It is therefore in this place e∣nough to say of him, That after a dishonourable raigne of seuenteene yeres, he pe∣rished

like a beast, and was slaine as he deserued. The rest that concerneth him in question of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 time, hath beene spoken heretofore; in matter of his affaires, shall be handled among the acts of Cyrus, to whose storie that of Balthazar is but an ap∣pendix.

CHAP. II. [unspec 10] Of the originall and first greatnesse of the Persians.

§. I. That the Medes were chiefe actors in the subuersion of the [unspec 20] Babylonian Empire.

THE Line of Belochus being now extinguished in Bal∣thasar, the Empire of Babylon, and of Assyria, was ioy∣ned first to that of Media, which then was gouerned by Cyaxares or Darius Medus, after whom Cyrus became Lord and Monarch, both of Assyria and of Media it selfe.

Of the race of Phul Belochus there were ten Kings besides himselfe, and of Arbaces as many are found [unspec 30] by Metasthenes. These two Prouinciall Gouernours hauing cut downe the last branch of Ninus in Sarda∣napalus, diuided betweene them the Easterne Empire. Cyaxares (whom the Scriptures call Darius Medus) the last of the race of Arbaces, dying about two yeeres after that the line of Belochus was ended in Balthasar; the Dominions aswell of the Conquerour, as of the conquered, fell to a third Familie, namely, to Cyrus of the house of Achaemenes, the Princes of which bloud raigning in Persia, had formerly beene dependants on the Medes, and were of as little power at home, as of fame abroad in the World.

Of the Family of the Achaemenes, and Line of the Persian Kings, we shal hereafter [unspec 40] finde occasion in due place to intreat.

The Nation of the Medes descended from Madai the third sonne of Iaphet; that they had Kings soone after the floud, Lactantius and Diodorus haue found re∣cord; For Lactantius remembreth an ancient King of the Medes called Hydaspes, and Diodor speaketh of Pharnus with his seuen Sonnes, slaine by the Assyrian in the beginning of their Empire.

But of these who succeeded Arbaces the first, that freed his Nation from the Assyrians. I take the list and number from Eusebius, adding Darius Medus: of whom I haue spoken in their proper places heretofore; and they are these. [unspec 50]

• Arbaces. Who raigned 28. yeeres.
• Sosarmus. Who raigned 30. yeeres.
• Medidus. Who raigned 40. yeeres.
• Cardiceas. Who raigned 13. yeeres.
• Diocles. Who raigned 53. yeeres.
• Phraortes. Who raigned 24. yeeres.
• Cyaxares. Who raigned 32. yeeres.
• Aslyages. Who raigned 38. yeeres.
• Darius Medus. Who raigned

And though the Greekes ascribe the conquest of Babylon to Cyrus alone, yet the [unspec 10] Scriptures teach vs that Darius was not onely King of Media, and had the Persians his followers, but that the Armie victorious ouer Balthazar was his; as the Assy∣rian and Babylonian Empire also was during his owne life. For wee finde in Daniel, that Darius of the Medes tooke the Kingdome being threescore and two yeres old: And further, what Officers it pleased him to set ouer the Kingdome. And so was it prophecied by Isay long before: Behold, I will stirre vp the Medes against them, &c.* 1.64 And by IEREMIE; The Lord hath raised vp the Spirit of the King of the Medes: for his purpose is against Babel to de destroy it; and in the eigth and twentieth Verse, Pre∣pare against her the Nations, with the King of the Medes, the Dukes thereof, the Princes [unspec 20] thereof, and all the Land of his Dominion. These Scriptures Iulius Affricanus doth well open, who taking authoritie from Diodor, Castor, Thallus, and others, deliuereth that Babylon was taken before Cyrus beganne to raigne, which also agreeth with Strabo, where he saith, That as the Medes were subiugated by the Persians, so be∣fore* 1.65 that, both the Babylonians and Assyrians were mastered by the Medes. And ther∣fore the reports of Iustine, and Herodotus, are not to be receiued, who attribute the taking of Babylon to Cyrus alone.

§. II. [unspec 30] By what meanes the Empire was translated from the Medes to the Persians.

HOW the Kingdome of the Medes fell into the hands of Cyrus, it is a doubt not sufficiently cleared by Historians, but rather their diffe∣rent relations of his beginnings haue bred the former opinion of those who giue the conquest of Babel to the Persian only. For some there are who denie that Astyages had any other Successour than Cyrus his Grand-child by Mandane. Whereas Ctesias on the contrarie side affir∣meth, [unspec 40] that Cyrus was no way descended from Astyages (whom hee calleth Astigas or Apinia) but onely that hauing vanquished him in battaile, and confined him to Bactria, hee married his Daughter Amytis. But I finde the relations of Ctesias often cited and seldome followed, and himselfe sometimes very iustly reproued of will∣full vntruth.

Viginier a diligent and learned Historian of this age, produceth many probable reasons that Astyages had no such sonne as Cyaxares, or Darius Medus; and to con∣firme his opinion, the more he citeth Diodore, Iustine, Strabo, Plato, Aristotle, Iso∣crates, and before them Castor, Thallus, and Phlegon, who doe not finde any such Successour. Neither doe Tatianus, Theophilus, Antiochenus, Iulius Affricanus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Iustine Martyr, Lactantius, Eusebius, S. Hierome, or S. Augustine, [unspec 50] make report out of any faithfull Author by them read, that hath giuen other Son or Successour to Astyages than Cyrus.

Yet seeing that this manner of argument ab authoritate negatiuè, doth neuer in∣force

consent; we may bee the bolder (all this great list of noble Writers by him alleaged notwithstanding) to affirme that either Astyages himselfe must haue been Darius of the Medes, which cannot agree with his place in the course of time; Or* 1.66 else to giue him some other Successour, according to Iosephus, and Xenophon, the* 1.67 same whom Daniel calleth Darius. For it is manifest, and without dispute, that the* 1.68 King of the Medes commanded in chiefe, and was absolute Lord of that Con∣quest, Cyrus during his life, being no other then the Lieutenant of his Armie, and subiect to his authoritie; The strength of both Nations, to wit, the Medes and Persians, with other the Vassalls of Darius, being ioyned together to com∣pound it. [unspec 10]

But it is very certaine that the honour of that great victorie ouer Babylon was wholly giuen to Cyrus, who was the instrument preordained and forenamed by God himselfe, not onely for his action, but for the deliuerie of his Church; a grea∣ter worke in the eies of God, than the subuersion of any State or Monarchie, how powerfull soeuer.

And it may well be thought, that the Souldiers imployed in that seruice did rather ascribe the glorie to him that was the best man of Warre, than to the Median, who was greatest in riches and power. All which also falling vpon Cyrus by succession, and continuing in his posteritie, did much augment the same of his ver∣tue, which among prophane Historians ouergrew altogether the honour due to [unspec 20] Cyaxares, both because he was old, and did nothing in person; as also because hee soone after quitted the world, and left all to Cyrus, who was possest of whatsoe∣uer belonged to Darius, before the fame of any such King or Conquerour was car∣ried farre off.

And for the Greeke Historians, they tooke all things from the relations of the Persians, who gaue to Cyrus all the praise of a most excellent Prince, making none his equall. Only Daniel in the first, fift, and sixt Chapters of his prophecies, makes it plaine, that himselfe not onely liued a great Officer vnder King Darius, but that hee continued in that estate to the first of Cyrus; which being the yeere of Daniels death, could not haue bene distinguished from the raigne of Darius, if they [unspec 30] had begunne together and raigned ioyntly; Neither can it bee imagined that Darius held the Kingdome by Cyrus permission, considering that Cyrus beganne after him.

§. III. XENOPHONS relation of the Warre with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Per∣sians, made with ioynt forces vpon the Assyrians, and others. [unspec 40]

THese Testimonies of the Scriptures, which neede no other confirma∣tion, yet made more open to our vnderstanding, by that which Xeno∣phon hath written of these warres: The cause whereof, according to his report, was this.

When the Assyrian had enlarged his Empire with victories, and was become Lord of all Syria, and many other Countries, hee beganne to hope that if the Medes could be brought vnder his subiection, there should not then be left any Nation adioyning able to make head against him. For the King of the Medes was able to bring into the field threescore thousand foote, and aboue tenne [unspec 50] thousand horse, to which the forces of Persia being ioyned, made an exceeding strong Armie.

The Assyrian considering the strength of such a Neighbour, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Croesus King of Lydia, a Prince very mightie both in men and treasure, and with him other

Lords of Asia the lesse to his assistance, alleaging that those Easterne Nations were very powerfull, and so firmely conioyned by league and many alliances, that it would not bee easie, no not possible, for any one Nation to resist them. With these incitements strengthned with great presents, he drew to himself so many adherents as he compounded an Armie of two hundred thousand foot, and threescore thou∣sand horse, of which, ten thousand horse, and fortie thousand foote were led by Croesus, who had great cause of enmitie with the Medes, in regard of the Warre made by them against his Father Alyattes; But this great Armie was by Cyaxares King of the Medes, and by Cyrus generall of the Persian forces, vtterly broken; Vp∣on which defeat the Assyrian King being also slaine, so many of the Assyrians re∣uolted, [unspec 10] as Babylon it self could not longer be assured without the succours of Merci∣naries, waged with great summes of money out of Asia the lesse, Aegypt, and else∣where. Which new gathered forces were also scattered by Cyrus, who following his aduantage, possest himselfe of a great part of the lesser Asia, at which time it was, as I take it, that Croesus himselfe was also made 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

The attempt of Babylon following soone after, the Armie lying before it being paid by Darius, whom Xenophon calleth Cyaxares, and led by Cyrus his sisters sonne, preuailed against Balthasar, as in due time shall be set downe.

Those Persians which followed Cyrus, and by him leuied, are numbred thirtie thousand foot-men, of which a thousand were armed Gentlemen, the rest of the [unspec 20] common sort were Archers, or such as vsed the Dart and the Sling. So farre Xeno∣phon. Of whom in this argument, as it is true, that he described in Cyrus the paterne of a most Heroicall Prince, with much 〈◊〉〈◊〉 addition: So it cannot be denyed, but that the bulke and grosse of his Narration was founded vpon 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Historicall truth.

Neither can it indeed bee affirmed of any the like Writer, that in euery speech and circumstance he hath precisely tyed himself to the phrase of the speaker, or na∣ture of the occasion, but borrowed in each out of his owne inuention, appropria∣ting the same to the times and persons of whom he treated. Putting therefore a∣part the Morall and Politique discourse, and examining but the Historie of things [unspec 30] done, it will easily appeare, that Xenophon hath handled his vnder-taken subiect in such sort, that by beautifying the face thereof, hee hath not in any sort corrupted the bodie.

§. IIII. The estate of the Medes and Persians in times fore-going this great Warre.

FOr it is commonly agreed vpon, that Achaemenes the sonne of Perses [unspec 40] being Gouernour of Persia, did associate himselfe with Arbaces, who commanded in Media in that rebellion against Sardanapalus, and that each of them after the victorie obtained, held for himselfe the Domi∣nion of those Countries, which he had formerly ruled for the Assyri∣ans; as also that they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ouer the same honor and power to their posteritie; which in Media was not absolutely Regall, but with some restraint limited, vntill such time as Deioces tooke vpon him the full authoritie and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a King. From the death of Sardanapalus to the raigne of Deioces, are vsually accounted about an hundred and forty yeeres, in the last sixtie whereof there raigned in Assyria mightie Princes, namely Salmanasser and his Successours, whose great atchiuements in Syria [unspec 50] and elsewhere witnesse, that the Medes and Persians found it not for their aduantage to vnder-take any offensiue warre against those victorious Kings, it being also pro∣bable that the league continued as yet betweene these the successours of Belochus, and Arbaces, who had formerly shared the Empire.

Now from the beginning of Deioces to the first of Astyages, therepast aboue ninetie yeeres, in which if 〈◊〉〈◊〉 haue written truely, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 conquered Persia, and how he and other the Kings of Media by many victories greatly en∣larged their dominions, and commaunded many parts of Asia, it had beene but an vnaduised enterprise of the Assyrians and Babylonians, to haue wasted themselues a∣gainst the Syrians and Aegyptians, leauing so able and victorious a Nation on their backes. But that the Medes had done nothing vpon the South parts of Persia, and that the Persians themselues were not masters of Susiana in Nabuchodonosors time, it is manifest in Daniel, who was then Gouernour for the Babylonian in Susa or Susan, the chiefe Citie thereof. It is true indeed, that the Medians, either vnder Cyaxares [unspec 10] or Astiages, or both, had quarrell with Halyattes the father of Croesus, which after some sixe yeeres dispute was compounded.

How the affaires of Persia stood in so many ages, I doe not find any memorie. It seemeth that the roughnesse of the mountainous Countrey which they then pos∣sest, with the confederacie which they continued with the Medes, gaue them more securitie than 〈◊〉〈◊〉: For if their Kings, being the posteritie of Achaemenes; had done any memorable acts, the greatnesse which they afterward obtained would not haue suffered any forgetfulnesse thereof. But as we find all Xenophons reports, both of these Warres and the state of those Countries to be very conso∣nant and agreeable to the relation of many other good Authors, so it appeares, [unspec 20] that the race of Achaemenes held the Principalitie of Persia from father to sonne for many descents. And therefore we may better giue credit to Xenophon, who affir∣meth, That Cambyses the father of Cyrus was King of Persia: than to those that make him a meane man, and say, that Astiages gaue him his daughter Mandane in marriage, to the end that her sonne (whose 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he feared) might be disabled from any great vndertaking by his fathers ignobilitie.

For what cause of griefe could it be to Astiages, that the sonne of his daughter should become Lord of the best part of Asia? No; it was more likely, that vpon such a Prophecie his loue to his grand-child should haue encreased, and his care beene the greater to haue married her to some Prince of strength and eminent [unspec 30] vertue.

Yea, the same Herodotus, who is the first Author, and as I thinke the deuiser of the mischiefe intended against Cyrus by his grandfather, doth confesse, That the line of the Achaemenidae was so renowned, that the great King Xerxes in the height of his prosperitie did thence 〈◊〉〈◊〉 himselfe, and vaunt of it: which he would ne∣uer haue done, had they beene ignoble, nor had they been the vassals of any other King or Monarch.

For in this sort Xerxes in the seuenth of Herodotus deriueth himselfe.

• Achaemenes. [unspec 40]
• Cambyses.
• Cyrus.
• Teispeus.
• Ariaramnes.
• Arsamnes.
• Hystaspes.
• Darius.
• Xerxes.

Of the Achaemenidae there were two races: of the first was Cyrus the great, whose [unspec 50] issue male fayled in his two sonnes, Cambyses and Smerdis. This royall familie is thus set downe by the learned Reineccius.

• Achaemenes, the sonne of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, first King of Persia.
• ...Darius.
• Cyrus, the first of that name, had Cambyses and Atossa, who, mar∣ried to Pharnaces, King of Cappadocia, had Artystona and other daughters.
• Cambyses had
• Cyrus the Great, Cyrus had
• Cambyses, who succeeded him, and Smerdis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by his brother Cambyses.

Of the second were those seuen great Princes of Persia, who hauing ouerthrowne [unspec 10] the vsurped 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Magi, chose from among themselues Darius the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Hystaspes King.

This Kingdome of Persia was first knowne by the name of Elam, so called after Elam the sonne of Sem, and the people therein 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Elamitae; by Elianus, Ely∣mae; by Iosephus, Elymi.

Suidas deriues this Nation sometimes from Assur, sometime from Magog, of whom they were called Magusaei; which Magusaei, according to Eusebius, are not to* 1.69 be taken for the Nation in generall, but for those who were afterward called the Magi or Wise men. So doe the Greekes, among many other their sayings of them, [unspec 20] affirme, That the Persians were anciently written Artaei, and that they called them∣selues Cephenes. But that they were Elamitae, Moses and the Prophets, Esay, Ieremie,* 1.70 Ezechiel, Daniel, and Esdras in many places confirme: Which also S. Hierome vpon* 1.71 * 1.72 Ieremie the fiue and twentieth, vpon Daniel the eight and twentieth, and in his He∣brew* 1.73 questions approueth, saying: Elam à quo Elamitae Principes Persidis; ELAM, of* 1.74 whom were the Elamites Princes of Persia.* 1.75

And that Citie which the Author of the second booke of the Maccabees cal∣leth* 1.76 Persepolis, is by the Author of the first called Elimais, but is now called Siras,* 1.77 being the same which Antiochus, for the great riches thereof, twice attempted in vaine, and to his great dishonour. And yet this Citie, now called Siras, was not the [unspec 30] old Persepolis; for Alexander, at the request of Thais the Harlot, burnt it.

The first King of Persia to vs knowne, if wee follow the current of Au∣thors interpreting the foureteenth chapter of Genesis, was Che∣dorlaomer, who liued with Amraphel or Ninias, and ioyned with him in the warre against those Arabians, who was afterward ex∣tinguished by the forces of Abraham.* 1.78 [unspec 40] [unspec 50]

CHAP. III. Of CYRVS.

§. I. Of CYRVS his name and first actions. [unspec 10]

AS touching the name of Cyrus, Strabo sayth, That the same was taken from a Riuer which watereth Persia; this great Prince hauing Agradatus for his proper name. But the great Cyrus was not the first of that name. Herodotus otherwise; and that Cyrus signifieth* 1.79 a father in the Persian Tongue, and therefore so in∣tituled by the people.

It is true that for his Iustice and other excellent vertues he was indeed called a Father; but that the name of Cyrus had any such signification, I thinke it [unspec 20] be mistaken.

Plutarch hath a third opinion, affirming, That Cyrus is as much to say as the* 1.80 Sunne, in the same Language. Howsoeuer it be, yet the Prophet Esay, almost two hundred yeeres before Cyrus was borne, giues him that name, Thus saith the Lord vnto CYRVS his 〈◊〉〈◊〉, &c.

Before the Conquest of Babylon, the victories which Cyrus obtained were many and great: among which, the Conquest of Lydia, and other Prouinces thereto sub∣iect, together with the taking of Croesus himselfe, are not recounted by Eusebius, Orosius, and others, but placed among his latter atchiuements, whose opinion for this difference of time is founded vpon two reasons; namely, That of the Median [unspec 30] there is no mention in that last warre against Croesus: and that the obtaining of Sardis is referred to the eight and fiftieth Olympiad, and the glorious victory which Cyrus had ouer Babylon, to the fiue and fiftieth Olympiad.

The former of which might haue beene vsed (and was by the Greekes) to ex∣clude the Medes from the honour of hauing wonne Babylon it selfe, which in due place I haue answered. The latter seemes to haue reference to the second Warre which Cyrus made vpon Lydia, when it rebelled; at which time hee so established his former Conquest, as after that time these Nations neuer offered to reuolt. Wherefore I like better in this particular to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whome the most of Chronologers follow, and finde the enterprise of Sardis to praecede that [unspec 40] of Babylon.

§ II. Of CROESVS the King of Lydia, who made warre vpon CYRVS.

I Haue in the last Booke spoken somewhat of Croesus, of his race and predecessors, as also of those Kings which gouerned Lydia in more ancient times: of which the first (to prophane Authors knowne) was Lydus the sonne of Atys: Which familie extinguished, the King∣dome [unspec 50] was by an Oracle conferred vpon Argon, descended from Her∣cules, whereof there were two and twentie generations, Candaules being the last, who by shewing his faire wife naked to Gyges his fauorite, he was by the same Gyges

(thereto vrged vpon perill of his owne life by the Queene) the next day slaine. Which done, Gyges enioyed both the Queene and the Kingdome of Lydia, and left the same to Atys his sonne, who was father to Sadyattes, the father of Halyattes (who thrust the Cimerians out of 〈◊〉〈◊〉) and Halyattes begat Croesus: Which fiue* 1.81 Kings, of a third race, enioyed that Kingdome an hundred and seuentie yeeres. Halyattes the father of Croesus was an vndertaking Prince, and after hee had continu∣ed a warre against Cyaxares the Median, a Prince very powerfull, and maintained it six yeeres: a peace was concluded vpon equall conditions betweene them.

Astyages, the sonne of Cyaxares, and grandfather to Cyrus, thought himselfe greatly honoured by obtayning Aryenis, Croesus sister, whom he married. [unspec 10]

But Croesus so farre enlarged his dominions after 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fathers death, as he was no∣thing inferior in territorie to any King or Monarch of that age: Of which, about that time there were foure in effect of equall strength; to wit, the Median, the Ba∣bylonian, the Aegyptian and the Lydian: onely Nabuchodonosor, after he had ioyned Phoenicia, Palestina, and Aegypt to his Empire, had thence-forward no competitor during his owne life.

But Croesus, notwithstanding the men and treasure spent in the quarrel of the Ba∣bylonians, he yet mastred Aeolis, Doris, and Ionia, Prouinces possest by the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Asia the lesse, adioyning to 〈◊〉〈◊〉; gaue law to the Phrygians, Bithinians, Carians, Mysians, Paphlagonians, and other Nations. And that he also inforst the Ephesians to [unspec 20] acknowledge him, notwithstanding they compassed their Citie with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gir∣dle,* 1.82 Herodotus witnesseth. Moreouer, Athaeneus out of Berosus (which also 〈◊〉〈◊〉* 1.83 confirmeth) makes report of a Signall victorie which Croesus obtained against the Sacaeans, a Nation of the Scythians, in memorie whereof the Babylonians his allies did yeerely celebrate a Feast, which they called Sacaea: All which hee performed in foureteene yeere.

And being now confident in the continuance of his good fortune, and enuious of Cyrus fame, doubting also, that his prosperous vndertakings might in the ende grow perillous to himselfe, he consulted with the Oracle of Apollo, whom he pre∣sented with maruellous rich gifts, what successe he might hope for against Cyrus, if [unspec 30] he vndertooke him: from whom he receiued this riddle; CROESVS passing ouer the Riuer Halys, shall dissolue a great dominion. For the diuell being doubtfull of the successe, payed him with marchandize of both sides like, and might be inuerted ei∣ther way to the ruine of Persia, or of his owne Lydia.

§ III. CROESVS his Expedition against CYRVS.

HEreupon Croesus being resolued to stop the course of Cyrus fortunes, [unspec 40] if he could, despised all the arguments vsed by Sandanes to the con∣trarie, who desired him to fore-thinke, That he vrged a Nation inha∣biting a barren and mountainous Region, a people not couered with the soft silke of wormes, but with the hard skinnes of beasts; not fed with such meat as they fancied, but content with what they found; drin∣kers of water, not of wine: and in a word, a Nation warlike, enduring, valiant and prosperous; ouer whom if he became victorious, he could thereby enrich himselfe in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 but fame, in which he alreadie excelled: and if by them beaten, and subiected, so great would his losse appeare of all things which the world hath in account, as the same could neither hastily be told, nor readily conceiued. [unspec 50]

Notwithstanding this solide Counsaile, Croesus hauing prepared a powerfull ar∣mie, he led the same towards Media, but in his passage, he was arrested at Pterium, a Citie of great strength in Cappadocia; which while he sought by all meanes to sur∣prise or to force, Cyrus came on, and found the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 encamped before it. That

each was inferior to other in strength or opinion, I doe not finde: for out of doubt, Croesus as he excelled any Prince of that age in riches and abilitie; so was hee not vnder any in territorie and fame that then liued.

But as Cratippus of Mitylene answered Pompey when he complained against the gods, because they fauoured a disturber and vsurper of the Commonweale against him who fought for the Romane 〈◊〉〈◊〉, That Kingdomes and Commonweales had their encrease and period from diuine Ordinance: so at this time was the Win∣ter of Croesus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 at hand, the leaues of his flourishing fortune ready to fall, and that of Cyrus but in the flower and first spring. The God of all power, and not Admetis Herdman, Apollo, had giuen date to the one, and a beginning of glory to the [unspec 10] other.

When these two Armies were in view of each other, after the entertainement of diuers skirmishes, the Persians and Lydians beganne to ioyne in grosse troupes: sup∣plies from both Kings thrust on vpon the falling off, and aduauncement of either Nation: and as the Persians had somewhat the better of the day, so when the darke vaile of night had hidden each armie from the others view, Croesus doubting what successe the rising Sunne would bring with it, quitted the field to Cyrus, and with all speede possible retyred, and taking the next way into Lydia, recouered Sar∣dis his first Citie and Regall Seat, without any pursuite made by Cyrus to retard him. Where being arriued, and nothing suspecting Cyrus approach, or any other [unspec 20] warre for that Winter, he dismissed the souldiors, and sent the troupes of his sun∣dry Nations to their owne Prouinces, appointing them to reassemble at the end of fiue moneths, acquainting his Commaunders with his intents for the renewing of the warre at the time appointed.

§. IIII. The Conquest of Lydia by CYRVS.

CYRVS in the following morning finding the Lydians departed, put [unspec 30] his armie in order to pursue them, yet not so hastily, and at their heeles, as to be discouered. But hauing good intelligence of Croesus his proceeding, hee so measured his Marches, as he presented not himselfe before Sardis, till such time as Croesus had disposed his ar∣mie to their Wintring garrisons: when being altogether vnlooked for, and vnfea∣red, he surrounded Sardis with his Armie: Wherein Croesus hauing no other Com∣panies than his Citizens and ordinary Gards, after fourteene dayes siege the same was entred by assault, and all executed that resisted. Croesus hauing now neither armes to fight, nor wings to flye, Sardis being on all parts strongly encompassed,* 1.84 thrust himselfe into the heape and miserable multitude of his vassals, and had vn∣dergone [unspec 40] the common fortune of common persons vanquished, had not a sonne of his, who had beene dumbe all his life (by extremitie of passion and feare enabled)* 1.85 cried out to the souldiors to spare Croesus. Who thereupon being taken and impri∣soned, despoyled of all things but the expectation of death, he was forth with tied in fetters, and set on the top of a great and high heape of wood, to be consumed to ashes thereon. To which when the fire was set and kindled, remembring the dis∣course* 1.86 which he had with the Athenian Law-giuer, he thrice cryed out on his name, Solon, Solon, Solon: and being demaunded what he meant by that inuocati∣on he first vsed silence: but vrged againe, he told them, That he now found it true which Solon had long since told him, That many men in the race and courses of [unspec 50] their liues might well be accounted fortunate, but no man could discerne himselfe* 1.87 for happy indeede, till his end.

Of which answere Cyrus being speedily informed, remembring the changes of fortune and his owne mortalitie, he commaunded his ministers of Iustice to with∣draw

the fire with all diligence to saue Croesus, and to conduct him to his presence: Which done, Cyrus demaunded of him, Who it was that had perswaded him? Or what selfe reason had conducted him to inuade his territorie, and to make him of a friend an enemie? To whom he thus answered, It was thy prosperous and my vn∣prosperous destinie (the Graecian God flattering therewithall my ambition) that were the inuerters and conductors of Croesus warre against Cyrus.

Cyrus being pierst with Croesus answere, and bewayling his estate, though victori∣ous ouer 〈◊〉〈◊〉, did not onely spare his life, but entertained him euer after as a King and his companion, shewing therein a true effect of mercy indeed, Quaenon causam sed fortunam spectat. [unspec 10]

And herein is the reall difference discerned betweene that behauior which wee call Beneficium latronis, & gratiam Principis: A theefe sometime sparing the life of him which is in his power, but vniustly: A King that giueth breath, and a continu∣ance of being, to him that was the cause and author of his owne euill.

The report made by Xenophon is, That Cyrus did friendly entertaine Croesus at the first sight, not mentioning that which Herodotus deliuers, and is here already set downe, that hee should haue beene burnt aliue. It may well 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that Xenophon pourtraying (in Cyrus) an heroicall Prince, thought an intent so cruell fitter to be forgotten than rehearsed, as too much misbeseeming a generous nature. And it is very likely, that neerenesse of alliance might with-hold Cyrus (had he beene other∣wise [unspec 20] vitious) from so cruell a purpose against his grandmothers brother. How so∣euer it was, the Morall part of the Storie hath giuen credit and reputation to the re∣port of Herodotus (as to many the like it often doth) and made it passe for currant, though the trust reposed in Croesus afterwards may seeme to argue, that Cyrus did not vse him inhumanely at the first.

For as Herodotus himselfe telleth vs, when Cyrus past with his armie ouer Araxes into Scythia, he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Croesus to accompanie and aduise his sonne Cambyses, Gouernour of the Empire in his absence, with whom he liued all the time of Cyrus, and did af∣terward follow Cambyses into Aegypt, where he hardly escaped his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hand. What his end was I doe not finde. [unspec 30]

But in this time the races of three of the greatest Kings in that part of the world tooke end; to wit, of the Babylonians, Medians, and Lydians; in Balthasar, Cyaxares, and Croesus.

§. V. How CYRVS wonne Babylon.

AFter this Lydian warre ensued the great Conquest of Babylon, which [unspec 40] gaue vnto Cyrus an Empire so large and mighty, that he was iustly reputed the greatest Monarch then liuing vpon earth. How long time the preparations for this great action tooke vp, it is vncertaine; onely it seemes, that tenne whole yeeres did passe betweene his taking those two Cities of Sardes & Babylon, which neuerthelesse I doe not thinke to haue beene wholly occupied in prouision for the Assyrian warre, but rather to haue beene spent in settling the Estate which hee had already purchased. And hereunto per∣haps may be referred that which Ctesias hath in his fragments of a warre made by Cyrus vpon the Scythians, though related as foregoing the victory obtained against Croesus. He telleth vs, That Cyrus inuaded Scythia, and being victorious ouer that [unspec 50] Nation, tooke Amorges their King prisoner: but being in a second battaile ouer∣throwne by the wife of Amorges, Sparetha, and therein taken, the one King was de∣liuered for the other.

Likewise it may be thought, that no small part of those troubles which arose in

the lower Asia, grew soone after the departure of the victorious 〈◊〉〈◊〉, before the Conquest was fully established.

For after Cyrus was returned out of Asia the lesse, many Nations, conquered for∣merly by Croesus, and now by Cyrus, reuolted from him; against whom 〈◊〉〈◊〉 imploy∣ed Pactias, and then Harpagus, who first reduced the Phocians vnder their former o∣bedience: and then the rest of the Greekes inhabiting Asia the lesse, as the Ionians, Carians, Aeolians, and Lycians, who resoluedly (according to the strength they had) defended themselues. But in the attempt vpon Babylon it selfe it is not to be doub∣ted, that Cyrus employed all his forces, hauing taken order before-hand, that no∣thing should be able to diuert him, or to raise that siege, and make frustrate the [unspec 10] worke vpon which he did set all his rest. And great reason there was, that he should bend all his care and strength vnto the taking of that 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the same and reputation that it held, as being head of an Empire thereon depending, was so strongly fenced with a treble wall of great height, and surrounded with waters vn∣foordable, so plentifully victualled for many yeeres, that the inhabitants were not onely free from all doubt and feare of their estate, but despised and derided all pur∣poses and power of their besiegers.

The onely hope of the Medes and Persians, who despaired of carrying by assault a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so well fortified and manned, was in cutting off all supplies of victuals and o∣ther necessaries; whereof though the Towne was said to be stored 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 [unspec 20] more than twentie yeeres, yet might it well be deemed, that in such a world of peo∣ple as dwelt within those gates, one great want or other would sooner appeare, and vanquish the resolution of that vnwarlike multitude. In expecting the successe of this course, the besiegers were likely to endure much trauaile, and all in vaine, if they did not keepe straight watch and strong gards vpon all quarters.

This was hard to doe, in regard of the vast circuit of those wals which they were to gird in, with numbers neither great enough, nor of men sufficiently assured vnto their Commaunder: The consideration whereof ministred vnto the Babylonians matter of good pastime, when they saw the Lydians, Phrygians, Cappadocians, and o∣thers,* 1.88 quartered about their Towne to keepe them in, who hauing beene their [unspec 30] auncient friends and allies, were more likely to ioyne with them, if occasion were offered, than to vse much diligence on the behalfe of Cyrus, who had, as it were, yesterday laid vpon their neckes the galling yoake of seruitude. Whilest the besieged were pleasing themselues in this deceitfull gladnesse, that is the ordi∣narie fore-runner of suddaine calamitie; Cyrus, whom the Ordinance of God made strong, constant, and inuentiue, deuised by so many channels and tren∣ches as were sufficient and capable of Euphrates, to draw the same from the wals of Babylon, thereby to make his approach the more facile and assured: which when by the labour of many hands hee had performed, hee stayed the time of his aduantage for the execution: for hee had left certaine bankes or heads [unspec 40] vncut, betweene the maine riuer which surrounded the Citie, and his owne Trenches.

Now Balthasar, finding neither any want or weakenesse within, nor any 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of approach for his enemies without, prepared an exceeding sumptuous feast, publike Playes, and other Pastimes, and thereto inuited a thousand of his Princes or Nobilitie, besides his wiues, curtizans, and others of that trade. This he did ei∣ther to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 know, that his prouisions were 〈◊〉〈◊〉, not onely for all needfull vses, but euen for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and excesse: Or because hee hoped that his ene∣mies, vnder the burthen of many distresses were well neere broken, or in honour of Bel his most 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Idoll: Or that it was his birth or coronation day: Or for [unspec 50] many or all these respects. And he was not contented with such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as no Prince else could equall, but (vsing Daniels words) he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 himselfe vp against the Lord of Heauen: For hee and his Princes, wiues and concubines, made carowsing cuppes of the Vessels of God, in contempt of whom he praised his owne puppets,

made of siluer and Gold, of Brasse, of Iron, Wood, and Stone, Quanta fuit stultitia in vasibus aureis bibentes ligneos & lapideos Deos laudare; How great a foolishnesse was it (sayth S. HIEROME) drinking in golden Cuppes, to praise Gods of Wood and Stone. While Balthasar was in this sort triumphing, and his braines well filled with vapors, he beheld a hand, which by diuine power wrote on the wall opposite vnto him cer∣taine words which he vnderstood not: wherewith so great a feare and amazement seized him, as the ioynts of his loynes were loosed, and his knees smote one against* 1.89 the other. Which passion when he had in some part recouered, hee cryed out for his Caldeans, Astrologians, and Southsayers, promising them great rewards, and the third place of honour in the Kingdome to him that could reade and expound the [unspec 10] writing; but it exceeded their art. In this disturbance and astonishment the Queene hearing what had past, and of the Kings amazement, after reuerence done vsed this speech: There is a man in thy Kingdome, in whom is the spirit of the holy Gods, and in the dayes of thy father, light, and vnderstanding and wisdome, like the wisdome of the Gods, was found in him, whom the King NABVCHODONOSOR thy father, the King (I say) thy father made chiefe of the Inchanters, Astrologians, Chaldeans, and Southsayers, because a more excellent spirit, and knowledge, and vnderstanding, &c. were found in him, euen in DANIEL, &c. Now let DANIEL be called, and he will declare the interpretation.

This Queene, Iosephus takes for the grandmother; Origen and Theodoret for the* 1.90 mother of Balthasar; either of which may be true: for it appeareth, that shee was [unspec 20] not any of the Kings wiues, because absent from the feast; and being past the age of dauncing and banquetting, she came in vpon the bruit of the miracle, and to com∣fort the King in his distraction: and whereas Daniel was forgotten and neglected by others of younger yeeres and times, this old Queene remembred well what he had done in the dayes of Nabuchodonosor, grandfather to this Balthasar, and kept in mind both his religion and diuine gifts.

When Daniel was brought to the Kings presence, who acknowledged those ex∣cellent graces wherwith God had enriched him, he prayed him, together with pro∣mises of reward and honour, to reade and interprete those words miraculously written; to whom Daniel made answere in a farre different style from that he vsed [unspec 30] towards his grandfather: for the euill which he foretold Nabuchodonosor, he wished that the same might befall his enemies, but to this King (whose neglect of God and vice he hated) he answered in these words, Keepe thy rewards to thy selfe, and giue thy gifts to another, yet will I reade the writing vnto the King, and shew him the interpretati∣on: Which before he had performed, he gaue him first the cause of Gods just judge∣ment against him, and the reason of this terrible sentence; whereof the King and all his Wisemen were vtterly ignorant: Which being written at large in Daniel, hath this effect, That forgetting Gods goodnesse to his father, whom all Nations feared* 1.91 and obeyed, and that for his pride and neglect of those benefits, as he depriued him of his estate and vnderstanding; so vpon the acknowledgement of Gods infinite [unspec 40] power he restored him to both. This King notwithstanding lifted himselfe vp a∣gainst 〈◊〉〈◊〉 same God, and presumed both to abuse those vessels, dedicated to holy vses, and neglecting the Lord of all power, praysed and worshipped the dead Idols of Gold, Siluer, Brasse, Iron, Stone, and Wood: and therefore those wordes, from the Oracle of a true God deliuered, (to wit) Mene Tekel, Vphraisin, gaue the King knowledge, that God had numbred the time of his Kingdome, and finished it: That he was weighed in the ballance of Gods justice, and found too light; and that his Empire was diuided and giuen to the Medes and Persians.

The very euening or night of this day, wherein Balthasar feasted and perished, Cyrus either by his espiall, according to Xenophon, or inspired by God himselfe, [unspec 50] wose ensigne he followed in this warre, found the time and opportunitie to inuite him: and therefore while the Kings head, and the heads of his Nobilitie were no lesse filled with the vapours of wine, than their hearts were with the feare of Gods judgement, he caused all the bankes and heads of his trenches to be opened and cut

down with that diligence, as by them he drew the great Riuer of Euphrates drie for the present, by whose channell running, his armie made their entrance, finding none to disturbe them. All the Towne lay buried (as the Poet saith) in sleepe and wine: such as came in the Persians way, were put to the sword, vnlesse they saued themselues by flight, as some did, who ranne away crying, and filling the streets with an vncertaine tumult.

Such Assyrian Lords as had reuolted from Balthazar, and betaken themselues to the partie of Cyrus, did now conduct a selected companie to the Kings Palace; which hauing easily forced, they rushed into the chamber where the King with his Princes were banqueting, slew both him and them without any mercie, who strug∣led [unspec 10] in vaine to keepe those liues which God had newly threatned to take away. And now was the prophecie of Ieremie fulfilled, & that of Esay, two hundred yeeres* 1.92 before this subuersion, who in his three & fortieth Chapter, and else where, writeth* 1.93 this destruction so feelingly and liuely, as if he had beene present both at the terri∣ble slaughter committed, and had seene the great and vnfeared change and calami∣tie of this great Empire; yea, and had also heard the sorrowes and bewailings of euery suruiuing soule thereunto subiect. His prophesie of this place he beginneth in these words: Come downe, and sit in the dust, O virgine daughter of Babel: sit on the ground, there is no throne, &c. And againe, Sit still and get thee into darknesse, O daugh∣ter of the Chaldaeans, for thou shalt no more be called the Ladie of Kingdomes. For though [unspec 20] it cannot be doubted, that God vsed Nabuchodonosor & the Chaldaeans, to punish the idolatrie of the Iudaeans, yet Esay teacheth vs in this place, That he did not yet for∣get, that the execution of his iudgements was mixt with a rigorous extremitie. For (saith Esay) in the person of God, I was wroth with my people, I haue polluted mine in∣heritance,* 1.94 and giuen them into thine hand: thou didst shew them no mercie, but thou didst* 1.95 lay thy very heauie yoke vpon the ancient. I will rise vp against them, saith the Lord of Hosts, and will cut off from Babel the name and the remnant, and the sonne and the nephew. And* 1.96 in the thirteenth, Euery one that is found, shall be stricken thorow: and whosoeuer ioy∣neth himselfe, shall fall by the sword, their children also shall be broken in pieces before their eyes, their houses spoyled, and their wiues rauished. So as there is no Historian who was [unspec 30] either present at this victorie of Cyrus, or that receiued the report from others true∣ly as it was, that could better leaue the same to posteritie after it happened, than E∣say hath done in many places of his prophecies, which were written two hundred yeeres before any thing attempted.

The greatnesse and magnificence of Babylon, were it not by diuers graue Au∣thors set downe, might seeme altogether fabulous: for besides the reports of Saint Heirome, Solinus, and Orosius, Aristotle in the third of his Politikes, the second Chap∣ter, receiued the report for true, That one part of the Citie knew not that the rest was taken three daies after. Which is not impossible, if the testimonie of Diodorus Siculus may be taken; who findes the compasse thereof at three hundred* 1.97 [unspec 40] and threescore Stadia or Furlongs, which makes fiue and fortie miles: the walls whereof had so great a breadth, as sixe chariots might passe in front thereon. And of height, according to Ctesias and Clitracus, three hundred threescore and fiue foot, garnished with an hundred and fiftie Towers. Strabo in the beginning of his sixteenth Booke of Geographie giues it a greater circuit, adding fiue and twen∣tie furlongs more to the former compasse, reckoning the same at three hundred fourescore and fiue furlongs, which makes eight and fortie myle and one furlong: but findes the wall farre vnder that which Diodor reports: and so doth Curtius measure their thicknesse but at two and thirtie foot, and their height at an hun∣dred cubits; which is also very much: euery cubite containing a foot and halfe [unspec 50] of the large measure, though to the whole circuit of the Citie hee giues the same with Siculus, and eight furlongs more. Herodotus findes a greater content than Strabo doth, namely, foure hundred and fourescore furlongs in circle; the thick∣nesse

of the wall he measures at fiftie cubits, and the height at two hundred of the same regall cubit. For entrance it had an hundred gates of Brasse, with posts and* 1.98 hookes to hang them on of the same metall: and therefore did the Prophet Esay* 1.99 rightly intitle Babylon, The Princesse and glorie of Kingdomes.

But when Cyrus had wonne her, he stript her out of her princely Robes, and made her a slaue, diuiding not onely all her goodly houses, and her whole Terri∣torie, with all the riches therein contained, among his souldiers: but bestowing the inhabitants themselues as bondslaues vpon those that had taken possession of their goods.

Touching the raigne of Cyrus, and the time which he enioyed in rest and plea∣sure, [unspec 10] I can say no more of it, than that it is generally agreed by all Chronologers to haue lasted onely seuen yeeres: in which time he made such Constitutions, as differ little from the Ordinances of all wise Kings that are desirous to establish a Royal power in themselues and their posteritie.

§. VI. The end of CYRVS. [unspec 20]

THe last warre, and the end of this great King Cyrus, is diuersly written. Herodotus and Iustine deliuer, That after the Conquest of Asia the lesse Cyrus inuaded the Massagetes, a very warlike Nation of the Scythians, gouerned by Tomyris their Queene: and that in an incounter be∣tweene the Persians and these Northerne Nomades, Tomyris lost 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Armie, and her Sonne Spargapises, that commanded it: In reuenge whereof, this Queene making new leuies of men of warre, and following the warre against Cy∣rus, in a second battaile beat the Persian armie, and taking Cyrus prisoner, cut off his head from his body, and cast the same into a boule of bloud, vsing these wordes; Thou that hast all thy life time thirsted for bloud, now drinke thy fill, and sati∣ate [unspec 30] thy selfe.

It should hereby seeme, that Cyrus knowing the strength and multitude of those frozen Nations, was perswaded to abate their furie by some forcible inuasion and depopulation, because in the time of Syaxares, father to Astyages, those Scythians inuaded Media and Asia the lesse, and held the same in a seruile subiection eight and twentie yeeres.

This warre which Metasthenes calleth Tomyrique, lasted (saith he) sixe yeeres, and tooke end at the death of Cyrus.

But in this particular I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with Viginer, that this Scythian warre was rather the same which Cyrus made against the Sacians, before the Conquest of Lydia, ac∣cording [unspec 40] to Ctesias before cited, who calleth Tomyris, Sparetha, though he deliuer the* 1.100 successe of that warre otherwise then Herodotus doth: The rather (saith Viginer) because Strabo in his eleuenth booke reciteth, That Cyrus surprised the Sacians by the same stratageme by which Iustine saith, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 defeated the sonne of Tomyris. And the same Ctesias also reporteth, That the last warre which Cyrus made was a∣gainst* 1.101 〈◊〉〈◊〉, King of the Derbicians a Nation (as the rest) of 〈◊〉〈◊〉; whom though he ouercame, yet he then receiued the wound of his death, which he suffe∣red three dayes after.

Strabo also affirmeth, That he was buried in his owne Citie of Pasagardes, which* 1.102 himselfe had built, and where his Epitaph was to be read in his time; which is [unspec 50] said to haue beene this: O vir quicunque es, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 advenis, neque enim te ad∣venturum ignor aui: Ego sum CYRVS qui 〈◊〉〈◊〉 imperium constitui, pusillum 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 quo meum 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 mihine inuideas; O thou man, whosoeuer thou art, or whencesoeuer

thou commest; for I was not ignorant that thou shouldest come: I am CYRVS that foun∣ded the Persian Empire, doe not enuie vnto me this little earth, with which my bodie is co∣uered.

This Tombe was opened by Alexander, as Qu. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 reporteth, either vpon* 1.103 hope of treasure, supposed to haue beene buried with him, or vpon desire to ho∣nour his dead body with certaine ceremonies; in which there was found an olde rotten Target, two Scythian Bowes, and a Sword. The Coffin wherein his bodie lay, Alexander caused to be couered with his owne garment, and a Crowne of gold to be set vpon it. These things well considered, as they giue credit to the reports of Xenophon and Zonaras, so they derogate much from Herodotus, who leaues his bodie* 1.104 [unspec 10] in the hands of Tomyris.* 1.105

And surely, had Cyrus lost the Armie of Persia in Scythia, it is not likely, that his sonne would so soone haue transported all his remaining forces into Aegypt, so far off from that quarter: the Scythian Nation then victorious, and bordering Media; neither had Cambyses beene able in such haste to haue vndertaken and performed so great a Conquest. Wherefore I rather beleeue Xenophon, saying, That Cyrus died aged and in peace: and that finding in himselfe, that hee could not long en∣ioy the world, hee called vnto him his Nobilitie, with his two sonnes, Cambyses and Smerdis; or after Xenophon, Tanaoxares: and after a long Oration, wherein he assured himselfe, and taught others, of the immortalitie of the Soule, and of [unspec 20] the punishments and rewards following the good and ill deseruing of euery man in this life; he exhorted his sonnes by the strongest arguments hee had, to a per∣petuall concord and agreement. Many other things hee vttered, which make it probable, that hee receiued the knowledge of the true God from Daniel, when hee gouerned Susa in Persia; and that Cyrus himselfe had read the prophecie of E∣say, wherein hee was expressely named, and by God (for the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of his peo∣ple) praeordained. Which act of deliuering the Iewes from their 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and of restoring the holy Temple and Citie of Hierusalem, was in true consideration the noblest worke that euer Cyrus performed. For in other actions he was an instrument of Gods power, vsed for the chastising of many Nations, and the establishing of a [unspec 30] Gouernement in those parts of the world, which was not long to continue. But herein he had the grace to be an instrument of Gods goodnesse, and a willing ad∣uancer of his Kingdome vpon earth; which must last for euer, though heauen and earth shall perish.

§. VII. Of CYRVS his decree for building the Temple of God in Ierusalem. [unspec 40]

HAuing therefore spoken of his great victories, mentioned by sundry 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the glory of all which was as a reward of this his seruice done vnto him that was Author of them and of all goodnesse: I hold it meete at length to speake of the Decree made in the first of his Raigne, being perhaps the first that euer he made, after his pos∣session of the Babylonian Empire: That the captiue Iewes should returne againe into their owne 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and re-build the House of GOD in Ierusalem, hauing now endured and finished the threescore and tenne yeeres 〈◊〉〈◊〉, by the Pro∣phets foretold. For the accomplishing whereof, hee gaue order to his Treasurers [unspec 50] to furnish them with all things necessarie and wanting. Hee also restored vnto them 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thousand foure hundred threescore and nine Vessels of Gold and Siluer, whereof Nabuchodonosor, the grandfather of Balthasar, had formerly robbed the Temple.

The number of the Iewes which returned out of Chaldaea vnder their leader Zoro∣babel,* 1.106 the sonne of Salathiel, and nephew to King Iecontas, and Iesus or Iosua the* 1.107 * 1.108 sonne of Iosadak, were about fiftie thousand; where, as soone as they arriued, they built an Altar to the liuing God, and sacrificed thereon, according to their owne* 1.109 Law, and afterward bethought themselues how to prepare materials for the re∣building* 1.110 of the Temple.* 1.111

But no sooner did the Iewes begin to lay any one stone, than the Samaritanes and other idolatrous Nations adioyning gaue all the impediment they could. So did the Gouernours of those Prouinces vnder Cyrus altogether countenance the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and in no sort fauoured the Iewes, nor the labours and purposes they had in hand. And not onely those which were but Prouinciall Lieutenants and other of∣ficers* 1.112 [unspec 10] of lesse place, but Cambyses himselfe; who hauing the charge of the whole Empire, while Cyrus was busied otherwise, countermanded the building begun.* 1.113 And whereas some Authors make doubt, that whatsoeuer Cambyses did when him∣selfe had obtained the Empire, yet during the life of Cyrus there was no such impe∣diment or prohibition: They may herein resolue themselues out of Esdras, That by the conspiracies of the neighbouring Nations the building was hindered all the* 1.114 * 1.115 time of King Cyrus life, &c. And therefore it is true, that the Iewes themselues af∣firme as it written in the second of Iohn, That the Temple was sixe and fortie yeeres in setting vp, hauing receiued so many hinderances from the first foundation to the second of Darius. [unspec 20]

And if wee seeke the naturall and politique causes which moued Cambyses to withstand his fathers decree, as well while he gouerned vnder him, as when him∣selfe became sole and soueraigne Monarch, we shall finde them in that Epistle re∣membred by Esdras, written by Belemus, Mithridates, and the rest, Presidents and Counsellors in Phoenicia, wherein they complaine, that the Iewes were euermore rebellious & troublers of Kings; that their Citie being once built, they would then refuse to pay Tribute, and fall from the obedience of the Empire, as they had for∣merly done in the times of other Kings.* 1.116

But that which for that present seemed the most forcible impediment was, that Cambyses, hauing it in his resolution to inuade Aegypt, and that it was a common o∣pinion, [unspec 30] That the Iewes were descended of those Nations, because they issued thence vnder Moses, when they conquered Iudaea; their Citie being once repaired and for∣tified, they might returne to their old vomit, and giue the same disturbance to Cam∣byses Conquest, which they did to Senacherib, Nabuchodonosor, and other Kings of Babylon. For as it is written in EZEKIEL, Aegypt was the confidence of the house of* 1.117 ISRAEL.

But it is to be vnderstood, as Codoman and others haue obserued, that Artaxerxes, to whom the Counsellors & Gouernors of Phoenicia complained against the Iewes, did not praecede, but succeed Darius Hystaspes, as in the sixt and seuenth chapters of Esdras it is made plaine: and also that those Gouernors (whose Epistle sheweth as [unspec 40] much) did not withstand the building of the Temple, but the fortifying and inclo∣sing of the Citie, as by the reasons giuen in the said Epistle, and by the Kings answer, it is euident.

Also in the sixt of Ezra, the foureteenth verse, the Kings are named in order as they gouerned, and Artaxerxes written after Darius; as: And they built and finished it (to wit, the Temple) by the appointment of the God of Israel, and by the commandement of CYRVS and DARIVS, and ARTAHSHASTE King of Persia. Lastly, in the se∣uenteenth of Ezra it is written; Now after these things, in the raigne of ARTAH∣SHASTE King of Persia: which was as much to say as after the finishing of the Temple in Darius time. And therefore Artaxerxes in the second of Esdras is there [unspec 50] named by anticipation, not in his owne time and place.

And thus much concerning the rebuilding of the Citie and Temple of Hierusa∣lem. Which action though prospered by the hand of God, was very slowly pursued

by the men whom it most concerned, but first set on foot by Cyrus. The other or∣dinances of Cyrus, with his forme and manner of gouernment, are to be found in Xenophon. At his death he bequeathed the Empire vnto his eldest sonne Cambyses, appointing Smerdis or Tanaoxares his younger sonne to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or Lieutenant of Media, Armenia, and Cadusia, and then died, after he had raigned (saith Herodotus) one and thirtie yeeres, or (according to Iustine) but thirtie.

§. VIII. [unspec 10] Of CYRVS his issue: and whether ATOSSA were his daughter, or (as some thinke) were the same with Queene HESTER.

CYRVS had issue two sonnes, Cambyses and Smerdis, with three daugh∣ters, Atossa, Meroe, and Artystona: Ctesias addeth to these, Amytis. Atossa and Meroe their brother Cambyses married; Artystona, Darius Hystaspes obtained; so did he Atossa, Cambyses being dead: who (as some Writers haue supposed) inflamed both her husbands Darius, & Xerxes after him, to inuade Greece, to be auenged of the whole Nation for the cruell intent that Aman (whom the old translation calleth a Macaedonian) had against the [unspec 20] Iewes though the opinion of Iosephus be more probable, who findes Aman to be an Amalekite. But it is hard to bee vnderstood, how Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, should haue beene Esther; whose Historie seemes rather to appertaine to the time of Artaxerxes Longimanus, than of Darius the sonne of Hystaspes, or of Xerxes. The desire of Atossa to haue Greece brought vnder theyoke of Persia, was partly groun∣ded vpon the honour which thereby shee thought her husband might obtaine, partly vpon a feminine humor of getting many braue Dames, Corinthians, Atheni∣ans, and others of that Nation to be her bond-women. Wherefore I cannot giue assent to the opinion of Codoman, who vpon the neere sound of the two names, Atossa and Hadassa (by the latter of which Esther was also called) makes them to [unspec 30] haue beene one person. For though it be true, that Esther concerning her paren∣tage a while, might be taken for a great Ladie; yet Codomans inference is nothing probable, that she should therefore, and for the great affection which the King bare vnto her, be thought the daughter of Cyrus. Certaine it is, that Esther did at length discouer her Kindred and Nation; whereby if Hystories could not be kept free from this error, yet the people, and especially the Nobilitie, must needs haue vnderstood the truth: who neuerthelesse did so well know the parentage of Atossa, that for her sake, as being daughter of Cyrus, her sonne Xerxes was preferred to the Kingdome be∣fore his elder brother, against whom also he could [unspec 40] haue pretended a very weake clayme. But of these things more here∣after in fitter place. [unspec 50]

CHAP. I III. The estate of things from the death of CYRVS to the Raigne of DARIVS.

§. I. Of the number and names of the Persian Kings. [unspec 10]

OF the successors of Cyrus, and the continuance of the Persian Empire, there are many opinions; As that of Metasthenes, who hath numbred the Persian Kings and their times, as followeth.

• Darius Medus, and Cyrus iointly 2 yeares.
• Cyrus alone. 22 yeares.
• Priscus Artaxerxes. 20 yeares.
• Darius Longimanus. 37 yeares.
• Darius Nothus. 19 yeares. [unspec 20]
• Artaxerxes Mnemon. 55 yeares.
• Ataxerxes Ochus. 26 yeares.
• Arses, or Arsames. 4 yeares.
• Darius the last, conquered by Alexander. 6 yeares.

To which Philo agreeth; which number of yeeres added, make in all an hundred ninetie and one. But in this Catalogue Metasthenes hath left out Cambyses and Xerxes, and names Artaxerxes Assuerus for the immediate successor of Cyrus; in place (saith Melancthon) of Darius the sonne of Hystaspes: for Metasthenes, as Me∣lancthon coniectureth, doth not account Cambyses in the Catalogue, because his [unspec 30] raigne was confounded with that of Cyrus.

There is a second opinion, though ridiculous, of Seder Olam, who finds but foure Persian Kings from the beginning to the end of that Empire.

Genebrard, Schubert, and Beroaldus haue also a differing account from the Greekes; whom neuerthelesse Eusebius and most of the Latines follow, and so doth Krentz∣heim, who hath fully answered, and as I take it, refuted all the former Authors va∣rying* 1.118 from that account: For in this sort doe the Greekes marshall the Persian Kings with the times of their raignes.

• Cyrus in all.* 1.119 30 yeeres. [unspec 40]
• Cambyses, with the Magi. 8 yeeres.
• Darius Hystaspes.* 1.120 36 yeeres.
• Xerxes 21 yeeres.
• Artaxerxes Longimanus. 40 yeeres.
• Darius Nothus. 19 yeeres.
• Artaxerxes Mnemon.* 1.121 43 yeeres.
• Artaxerxes Ochus. 23 yeeres.
• Arsames. 3 yeeres.
• Darius the last.* 1.122 6 yeeres.

Which numbers, put together, make in all two hundred and thirtie. [unspec 50]

This account (as I haue said) the most Chronologers and the best learned ap∣proue. These Persian Princes being all warranted by the authoritie of the Scrip∣tures, as Peucer in his historicall Animaduersions hath gathered the places; finding

first Cyrus in the second of Chronicles, chap. 36. vers. 22, 23. Ezra 1. chap. 1. vers. 1. and often elsewhere.

Secondly Cambyses in the 11^th of Daniel, who may indeede be well esteemed for one of those three Kings in the second verse named, and so the marginall Commen∣tor vpon the Geneua vnderstands that place; but, vnder correction, mistakes the mat∣ter greatly, when he saith in the same note, that Darius 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was an enemie to the people of God, and stood against them: his great fauour and liberalitie to the Iewes being elsewhere proued.

Thirdly, is Darius Hystaspes found in Ezra the first, c. 4. v. 5 who in the sixt verse is also named Ahassuerus. [unspec 10]

Fourthly, in the eleuenth of Daniel verse the second, Xerxes is plainely foretold and described, and the great warre which hee should make against the Greekes by Daniel remembred.

〈◊〉〈◊〉, Artaxerxes Longimanus in Ezra the fourth, verse seuen, who is also called Arthasasta, c. 4. 1. lib. Ezra v. 7. and cap. 7. v. 7.

Sixtly, Darius Nothus, Ezra cap. 4. vers. 24. and cap. 5. vers. 6. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. cap. 12. vers. 22.

Seuenthly, Artaxerxes Mnemon in Nehe. c. 2. v. 1. who was father to Artaxerxes Ochus, and Arsames: for Darius the last he was of another Familie, the Line of Cyrus the Great ending in Ochus, who descended from Xerxes the sonne of Atossa, Cyrus his [unspec 20] Daughter; and the issue male of Cyrus failing with his owne Sonnes.

But to proceede. Eusebius with the Latines, following the Greekes, apply the be∣ginnings and ends of euery Persian King with their Acts, to some certaine Olym∣piad; As the war of Astyages (Cyrus his maternall Grand-father) and Alyattes (Croesus his father) to the nine and fortieth Olympiad; The beginning of Cyrus raigne to the beginning of the fiue and fiftieth Olympiad; The taking of Sardis by Cyrus to the eight and fiftieth Olympiad; The inuasion of Aegypt by Cambyses to the third yeere of the threescore and third Olympiad, and so of the rest. Which reference with good agreement betweene seuerall formes of computation adde the more credit vnto both. [unspec 30]

Againe, this historicall demonstration is confirmed by the Astronomicall com∣putation* 1.123 of Ptolomie, who refers the death of Alexander the Great, who died the 12. of Nouember, in the beginning of the hundred and fortieth Olympiad, to the foure hundred and foure & twentieth yeere after Nabonassar. And the Aera of Nabonassar beganne on the sixe and twentieth of Februarie: which conferred with the Olym∣piad, was in the ninth Moneth of the first yeere of the eighth Olympiad; So that whether we follow the accompt of the Olympiads, as doe the Greeke Historians, or that of Nabonassar with Ptolomie, we shall finde euery memorable accident to fall out right with each computation.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 Ptolomie reckons the time answerable to two hundred and foure and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 [unspec 40] Iulian yeeres, and an hundred and fortie daies from Nabonassar, to the sixteenth of Iulie in the seuenth yeere of Cambyses.

The Greekes, and namely Diodorus Siculus, place the taking of Aegypt by Cambyses in the second or third yeere of the threescore and third Olympiad, and the begin∣ning of Cambyses seuenth yeere in the first of the threescore and fourth Olym∣piad: which first of the threescore and fourth Olympiad runnes along with part of the two and twentieth of Nabonassar. The like agreement is consequently found about the beginning and end of Cyrus.

Likewise the twentieth of Darius, who succeeded Cambyses, is according to Ptolo∣mie the two hundred and sixe and fortieth of Nabonassar, which (obseruing the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 [unspec 50] of Nabonassars Aera and the Olympiad, viz. eight and twentie yeeres) it a∣grees with the third of the threescore and ninth Olympiad, where in it is placed by the Greekes. In this Iosephus agrees with the Greekes throughout, sauing that he ioy∣neth Darius Medus, whom Xenophon calleth Cyaxares, with Cyrus, in the destruction

of Babylon, which is true, and not contrarie to the Greeke computation, but may very well stand with it.

Lastly, the disagreements and confused accompts of those that follow the other Catalogue of the Persian Kings formerly rehearsed, doth giue the greater credit to this of the Greekes, which being constant in it selfe, accordeth also with the com∣putation of other Historians, and Astronomers, and likewise with the holy Scriptures.

§. II. Of CAMBYSES, and the conquering of Aegypt by him. [unspec 10]

WE will therefore according to the truth giue the Empire of Persia to Cambyses, the sonne of Cyrus, though degenerate in all things, sauing the desire to increase the greatnesse of his Empire: whereof hee was possest in his Fathers time while Cyrus made warre in the North. Cte∣sias with others giue him a longer raigne than agreeth with the Groe∣cian accompt before receiued.

In the fifth yeere of his sole raigne, and in the third yeere of the threescore and [unspec 20] third Olympiad, according to Diodor and Eusebius, he inuaded Aegypt, and hauing ouerthrowne the King thereof, Psammenitus, he not only caused him to bee saline,* 1.124 but also did put to death all his kindred and dependants, with the most of his* 1.125 children.

Herodotus and Ctesias giue for cause of this Warre (being no other indeede than the Ambition of Cambyses) that when he sent to Amasis King of Aegypt, to haue his daughter in marriage, Amasis presented him with Nitetis the daughter of Apries his predecessour, which Cambyses disdained.

Howsoeuer it were; true it is, that Cambyses gathered an Armie fit for such an enterprise, and caused the same to march. But before they entred Aegypt, Amasis died and left Psammenitus, whom Ctesias called Amyrtoeus, his successour; who in∣ioyed [unspec 30] Aegypt after his father (according to the best copies of Herodotus) but sixe Moneths, though other Chronologers giue him sixe yeeres.

But how long soeuer he held the Crowne, in one battaile heelost it, and was himselfe taken prisoner.

It is said that Cambyses following therein the example of Cyrus, did not only spare life to the conquered King, but that hee also trusted him with the gouernement of Aegypt, and that vpon some reuolt, or the suspition thereof, hee caused him to bee slaughtered. But the race of this King was not so extirpated, if wee may beleeue Herodotus and Thucydides, but that he left a Sonne called Inarus, who caused the Ae∣gyptian [unspec 40] to reuolt both from Xerxes and Artaxerxes.

That Psammenitus was at the first entreated gently by Cambyses, I hold it very improbable, if it be true which is also written of him, That he so much hated Ama∣sis the King of Aegypt, who died before his arriuall, that hee caused his body to be drawne out of the graue, and after diuers indignities vsed, commanded the same to bee burnt, contrarie to the custome both of the Aegyptians and Persians. For the Aegyptians vsed to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their dead bodies with salt, and other drugges, to the end the wormes might not deuoure them. The * 1.126 Persians durst not consume them with fire, which they esteemed as a God, and therefore feared to feede it with Carrion. [unspec 50]

§. III. The rest of CAMBYSE s his acts.

AFter this victorie obtained in Aegypt, Cambyses sent an Armie into Cy∣prus, and constrained Euelthon King 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to acknowledge him, who before held that Iland of the Aegyptians.

While Cambyses yet busied himselfe in Aegypt, he so much detested the Idolatry of that Nation, as he caused the Images them selues, with the Temples wherein they were worshipped, to beetorne downe and defaced. [unspec 10] That done, he directed a part of his Armie into Lybia, to ouer-turne the Temple of Iupiter Ammon; but the Deuill in defence of his Oratorie raised such a tempest of* 1.127 Sand, wherewith the greatest part of that Countrey is couered, as the Persians were there-with choked and ouer-whelmed.* 1.128

Notwithstanding which misaduenture, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 report, that disday∣ning* 1.129 to be resisted, he prepared the rest of his Armie, which himselfe meant to con∣duct into those parts, but that finding a beginning of those incommodities, which his first-sent troupe had tried, hee changed his purpose. For though conquering Kings haue power ouer men, yet the Elements doe not obey them, according to [unspec 20] that old English prouerbe, Goe, saith the King. Stay, saith the Tide.

After his returne from the attempt of Aethiopia, hee caused Apis the Aegyptian Bull, worshipped by that Nation as God, to be slaine: a deed very commendable, had it proceeded from true zeale, and beene executed as in seruice of him that only is, and liueth. But soone afterwards, when in a dreame it seemed vnto him that Smerdis did sit in the royall Throne of Persia (which apparition was verified in Smerdis the Magus) hee gaue it in charge to his fauourite Praxaspes, to murther Smerdis his brother. And hauing married his owne sisters, contrarie to the Persian Lawes, hee committed a most causelesse and most detestable murder vpon the one of them, called Meroe, then by himselfe with child, because shee bewailed the death of her brother Smerdis. I find it written of this Cambyses, That because his Predeces∣sors* 1.130 [unspec 30] obserued religiously the ordinances of their Empire, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 assembled his Iudges and enquired of them, whether there were any law among the Persians that did permit the brother to marry his owne sister: it being his owne intent so to doe. The Iudges (who had alwaies either lawes or distinctions in store to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Kings and times) made answere, that there was not any thing written allowing any such coniunction, but they notwithstanding found it in their 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that it was al∣waies left to the will of the Persian Kings to doe what best pleased themselues; and so, as Nauclerus termes it, inuenerunt occasionem: That is as much to say, as the Iudges found a shift to please the King, and to secure themselues. And yet, where it con∣cerned not the Kings priuate satisfaction, he caused Sisamnus one of his Iudges, and [unspec 40] perchance one of those which fauoured his incestuous match, to be flayed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 iudgement giuen, and the same his hide to bee hung vp 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the iudge∣ment seate. After which bestowing the fathers Office on his sonne, hee willed him to remember, that the same partialitie deserued the same punishment.

Among other his cruelties, that which he exercised against the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of his belo∣ued Praxaspes was very strange and vngratefull. For when he desired to bee truely informed by him what the Persians thought of his conditions, Praxaspes answered, That his vertues were followed with abundant praise from all men; only it was by many obserued, that he tooke more than vsuall delight in the taste of Wine. With which taxation inflamed, hee vsed this replication: And are the Persians double∣tongued, [unspec 50] who also tell me that I haue in all things excelled my Father 〈◊〉〈◊〉? thou Praxaspes shalt then witnesse, whether in this report they haue done mee right: for if at the first shot I piercethy sonnes heart with an arrow, then is it false that hath beene spoken; but if I misse the marke, I am then pleased that the same be accounted

true, and my subiects beleeued. This being spoken, hee directed an arrow towards the innocent child, who falling dead with the stroke, Cambyses commanded his bo∣dy to be opened, and his heart being broched on the arrow, this monstrous Tyrant greatly reioycing, shewed it to the Father with this saying, in stead of an Epitaph: Now PRAXASPES, thou maiest resolue thy selfe that I haue not lost my wits with Wine, but the Persians theirs, who make such report.

Many other barbarous cruelties hee exercised, till at the last, according to the phrase of our Law, he became felon de soy. For when he was informed that Patizites, and Smerdis the Magi, (〈◊〉〈◊〉 writeth them Sphendanes and Cimerdius) Ministers of his domesticall affaires, taking aduantage of the great resemblance betweene [unspec 10] Smerdis the Kings brother, and Smerdis the Magus, possest themselues of the Em∣pire, he made all haste towards Persia, and in mounting hastily on horsebacke, his sword dis-sheathing pierced his owne thigh, where-with deadly wounded, falling into an ouer-late and remedilesse repentance of the slaughter which hee had execu∣ted vpon his owne brother, he soone after gaue vp his wicked ghost, when hee had raigned eight yeeres, accounting therein those seuen Moneths in which the Magi gouerned, while he was absent.

In Cambyses the Male line of Cyrus failed. For he had no issue either by Atossa or Meroe: yet Zonaras out of Hierome giues him a Daughter called Pantaptes, and a* 1.131 sonne called Orontes, who being drowned in the Riuer Ophites by 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the same [unspec 20] was afterward in memorie of the Princes death called Orontes.

He built the Citie of Babylon in Aegypt, in the place where Latopolis was formerly seated, and that of Meroe in the Iland of Nilus, calling it by the name of his sister Meroe.

§. IIII. Of the inter-regnum betweene CAMBYSES and DARIVS. [unspec 30]

CYRVS and his two sonnes beeing now dead, and the Kingdome in the possession of one of the Magi, the counterfait of Smerdis, the Princes, or Satrapes, or Prouinciall Gouernours of the Empire (to wit, Otanes, Intaphernes, Gobrias, Megabysus, Asphatines, Hidarnes, and Darius, who were all descended from 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the first Persian King, hauing discouered the fraud of this imposture, ioyned their forces together, surprised and rooted out the Conspirator with his Companions, and assistants. In which action (saith Iustine) Intaphernes and Asphalines were slaine; but Herodotus o∣therwise, that they were only wounded, for he auoweth, that all the seuen Princes [unspec 40] were present at the election following.

For the Empire being now without a Gouernour, these Princes grew into con∣sultation how the same might be ordered from thence-forth. Otanes one of the se∣uen did not fancie any election of Kings, but that the Nobilitie and Cities should confederate, and by iust lawes defend their liberty in equality, giuing diuers reasons for his opinion, being as it seemed greatly terrified by the cruelties of Cambyses; As first, that it was not safe to giue all power to any one, seeing greatnesse it selfe, e∣uen in good men, doth often infect the minde with many vices, and the libertie and freedome in all things is most apt to insult, & to commit all manner of wicked out∣rage. Againe, that tyrants do commonly vse the seruices of wicked men, and fauour [unspec 50] them most; they vsurpe vpon the lawes of their Countrey; take other mens wiues by force, and destroy whom they please without iudgement.

Megabysus was of another opinion, affirming that the tyrannie of a multitude was thrice more intolerable, than that of one. For the multitude doe all things

without iudgement runne into businesse and affaires with precipitation, like raging and ouer-bearing flouds.

He therefore thought it safest to make election of a few, and those of the best, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and most vertuous; because it is euer found, that excellent Counsailes are euer had from excellent men.

Darius gaue the third iudgement, who perswaded the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a King, because 〈◊〉〈◊〉 among few diuturnitie of concord is seldome found, and in great Empires it doth euer happen that the discord of many Rulers hath inforst the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of one Supreme. It were therefore, saith Darius, farre safer to obserue the Lawes of our Countrie, by which Kingly gouernement hath beene ordained. [unspec 10]

The other foure Princes adhered to Darius, and agreed to continue the same Im∣periall gouernement by God established, and made prosperous. And to auoide par∣tialitie, it was accorded, that the morning following these seuen Princes should mount on Horse-back, and on him the Kingdome should be conferred, whose horse* 1.132 after the Sunne-rising should first ney or bray. In the euening after this appoint∣ment was made, it is said that Darius consulted with the Master of his horse Oebarus, who in the Suburbs of the Citie when the election was resolued of, caused the same Horse, whereon in the morning Darius was mounted, to couer a Mare, who as soone as he came into the same place was the first horse that brayed. Whereupon the o∣ther sixe Princes descended from their horses, and acknowledged Darius for their [unspec 20] Lord and King.

Plato in the third of his Lawes affirmeth, that in memorie of the seuen Princes, whereof Darius himselfe was one, that deliuered the Empire from the vsurpation of the Magi, hee diuided the whole into 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉; Herodotus saith into 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Satrapies.

CHAP. V. [unspec 30] Of DARIVS the sonne of HYSTASPES.

§. I. Of DARIVS his Linage.

DARIVS was descended of the ancient Persian Kings, [unspec 40] to wit, of the Achaemenidae, of which, Cyrus the Great was the lineall Successour. For in this sort Herodotus deriues him as before.

Cyrus the first, who had Teispius, who begat Ariaramnes, who was father of Arsamnes, the father of Hystaspes, the father of [unspec 50] Darius, surnamed Celes, the father of Xerxes.* 1.133

Hystaspes accompanied Cyrus the Great in the warres against the Scythians, at which time Cyrus being made jelous of Darius by a dreame of his owne, caused him

to be sent into Persia, others say to be imprisoned, from whence by the death of Cyrus he was deliuered, and made Gouernor of the Persian Magi. He afterward fol∣lowed* 1.134 Cambyses into Aegypt; he then ioyned with the rest of the Princes against the Magi, and either by the neying of his horse, or, as others affirme, by strong hand he obtained the Empire, which he the more assured to himselfe by taking two of Cyrus Daughters, and as many of his Neeces for his wiues.* 1.135

Hystaspes, according to* 1.136 Herodotus, had besides Darius these three sonnes, who* 1.137 were great Commanders in the warre which Darius made in Asia the lesse, Thrace,* 1.138 Macedon, and Greece; Atarnes, Artophernes; and Artabanus, who disswaded Xerxes* 1.139 from the second Graecian warre. Hystaspes had also a Daughter married to Gobryas* 1.140 [unspec 10] the Father of Mardonius, who commanded the Armie of Darius in Macedon, and* 1.141 married the Daughter of Darius, Artozostre his Cosen germaine.

Reineccius giues to Hystaspes fiue sonnes, Darius who sueceeded Cambyses, Artaba∣nus,* 1.142 Artaphernes, Otanes, and Atarnes, with two daughters.* 1.143

§. II. Of DARIVS his Gouernment, and suppressing the rebellion of Babylon. [unspec 20]

DARIVS deuised equall lawes whereby all his subiects might be go∣uerned, the same being formerly promised by Cyrus. He gaue accesse to all his subiects, and behaued himselfe so mildly to al men, that ma∣ny Nations desired and offered themselues to become his Vassalls: Only hee laied diuers payments and taxes on the people, which had not beene accustomed in Cyrus time, to the value of foureteene thousand fiue hun∣dred and threescore talents, saith Herodotus.

The warre which Cambyses made a farre off in Aegypt, and the contention be∣tweene the Magi, and the Princes of Persia, for the Empire, gaue heart to the Baby∣lonians to recouer their libertie, and to shake off the Persian yoke, wherof Darius be∣ing [unspec 30] aduertised, he prepared an Armie to recouer that Citie and State reuolted. But finding the same a difficult worke, he vsed the seruice of Zopirus, who for the loue he bare Darius, did cut off his owne Eares and Nose, and with other wounds yet fresh bleeding, he seemed to flie to the Babylonians for succour, to whom he accused the cruelty of Darius: who, for hauing giuen him aduice to giue ouer the siege of their Citie, had in this sort dismembred and deformed him; whereupon the Baby∣lonians gaue him that credit, as they trusted him with the disposition & comman∣dement of their greatest forces: which when Zopirus had obtained, after some small colourable ouer throwes giuen to the Persians vpon sallies, hee deliuered the Citie* 1.144 into Darius his hands, who had lyen before it twentie Moneths. [unspec 40]

§. III. Of DARIVS his fauour to the Iewes in building the Temple.

IN the second yeere of Darius, he gaue order that the building of the Temple at Hierusalem should goe on, and commanded that the same should be finished at his own charge, and out of the reuennues of the Crowne. And whereas the Gouernors of those Prouinces which are [unspec 50] situate betweene Euphrates, and the Phoenician, and mid-land Sea, (whom Ezra calleth the Captaines beyond the Riuer) had hindred the worke in* 1.145 Cambyses his time, Darius gaue commandement that they should not thence-forth come neere vnto Ierusalem, to giue any impediment to the building, but that they

should with-draw themselues, and get them farre off till all were finished and at an end. In the old Latine it is written, Procul recedite ab illis; With-draw your selues farre from them; In our English, Be yee farre from thence, to wit, from the Citie, and Tem∣ple, now in building.

Hee also made a decree, which concerned his owne Subiects, That whosoeuer* 1.146 should thenceforth hinder the setting vp of the Temple of God, that his house should be torne downe, and the disturber hanged on a Gallowes made of the Tim∣ber thereof. He also in the same decree maketh inuocation to God, That hath caused his name to dwell there, (to) destroy all Kings and People that put their hands to alter, and to destroy this house of God which is in Ierusalem, &c. In foure yeeres afrer which decree [unspec 10] (the Iewes being really furnished with money and all things necessarie from Darius) the Temple was in all finished, to wit, in the beginning of the Spring, in the sixth yeere of Darius Hystaspes, and in the two and forttieth after their first returne.* 1.147

§. IIII. Of DARIVS his Scythian Warre.

AFter the recouerie of Babylon he inuaded the Soythians, whose King* 1.148 * 1.149 Iustine calleth Lauthinus; and saith, that Darius vnder-tooke this warre [unspec 20] against him, because he refused him his Daughter in marriage. The better to conuoy his Armie into Scythiae, hee built a Bridge of small Vessels ouer the Riuer Ister or Danubius, and gaue the custodie of the same in charge (among others of Asia the lesse) to the Ionians, and Aeolians, among whom was Miltiades, who perswaded the Asian Graecians to breake downe the bridge, to the end 〈◊〉〈◊〉 might not returne thereby, and if by any other way, then not without great difficultie; but the same was resisted by Histiaeus Prince of Milet, a Citie of Ionia, which Nation being a Colonie of the Greekes, Diodorus calleth Trai∣tors to their Countrie, because they ioyned themselues to Darius. But the Scythians* 1.150 more elegantly termed them good slaues, for as much as they would not runne a∣way [unspec 30] from their Master, but were more mindfull of doing their duties, than of sha∣king off their bondage, when they were presented with as faire an occasion of liber∣tie as could haue beene desired. For the great Armie of Darius entring the de∣sart Countrie called Bessarabia, found in it neither people to resist them, nor any su∣stenance to relieue them. For the Scythians were then, as are the Chrim Tartars, their posteritie, at this day, all horse-men, vsing the Bow and Sword. They were not Plough-men, but Grasiers, driuing their Heards from one place to another as op∣portunitie of pasture led them. Standing Townes they had none, but vsed for Houses the Waggons wherein they carried their wiues and children. These Wag∣gons they place at euery Station in very good order, making Streets and Lanes in [unspec 40] the manner of a great Towne, remoueable at their pleasure. Neither hath the Em∣perour himselfe, called now the great Chrim, any other Citie than such an Agora, (as they name it) or Towne of Carts. When as therefore Darius had wearied him∣selfe, and wasted his prouision in those desolate Regions, wherein he found neither waies to direct him, victualls to refresh him, nor any houses, fruitfull trees, or liuing creatures, nor any thing at all, which either hee himselfe might make vse of, or by destroying it might grieue his enemies; he beganne to perceiue his owne folly, and the danger into which he had brought him. Yet setting a good face vpon a badde game, he sent braue messages to the Scythian, bidding him to cease his flight, and ei∣ther to make triall of his valour and fortune in plaine battaile, Or if he acknowled∣ged [unspec 50] himselfe the weaker, then to yeeld by faire meanes, and become his Subiect, gi∣uing him Earth and Water, which the Persians vsed to demand as a signe, that all was yeelded vnto them. To this challenge the Scythian returned an Hieroglyphicall answere; sending a Bird, a Frog, a Mouse, and fiue Arrowes: which dumbe shew

Darius interpreting by his owne wish, thought that heedid yeeld all the Elements wherein those creatures liue, and his weapons withall into his hands. But Gobryas, one of the seuen Princes, who had slaine the Magi, construed their meaning a-right, which was thus; O yee Persians, get yee wings like Birds, or diue vnder the water, or creepe into holes in the earth, for else yee shall not escape our arrowes. And this interpreta∣tion was soone verified by the Scythians themselues, who assailed the Persian camp, draue the horse-men into the trenches, and vexing the Armie with continuall Alarums day and night, were so fearelesse of this great Monarch, and so little regar∣ded him, that within his hearing, and euen in his sight, they did not forbeare the pastime of coursing a Hare, which they had started by chance. By this boldnesse of [unspec 10] theirs, Darius was so discouraged, that he forsook his Camp by night, making many fires, and leauing all that were sicke and weake behinde him, and so with all speede marched away to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Riuer Ister. He was pursued hardly by the Scythians who mist him, yet 〈◊〉〈◊〉 at the Bridge before him, perswaded the Ionians to de∣part, assuring them that the Persian King should neuer more be able to doe them either good or harme. Which words had certainely beene proued true, had not Hystiaeus the Milesian preuailed with his people, to attend the comming of Darius, whom the Scythians did like faile to meete, when they returned from Ister to seeke him out.

§. V. [unspec 20] Some actions of the Persians in Europe, after the Scythian Warre.

DARIVS hauing thus escaped out of Scythia, determined the inuasion of Thrace and Macedon, in which Warre hee imployed Megabasus, who mastered the Poeonians, and transplanted them, & possest Perin∣thus, Chalcedon, Bizantium, and other places, being also soone after [unspec 30] subiected, and added to the Persian Empire by Otanes, the sonne of Sysamnes, whom Cambyses had excoriated for false iudgement. So were the Cities of* 1.151 * 1.152 Selybria and a 1.153 Cardia likewise taken in for the Persian, who hauing now reduced vnder his obey sance the best part of Thrace, did send his Embassadours to Amintas King of Macedon adioyning, demanding of him by the Earth & Water, the Soue∣raignetie ouer that Kingdome. Amintas doubting his owne strength, entertained the Embassadours with gentle wordes, and afterward inuiting them to a solemne and magnificent feast, the Persians greatly desired that the Macedonian Ladies might bee present: which being granted, the Embassadours who were well filled with wine, and presumed vpon their greatnesse, and many victories, beganne to vse such [unspec 40] imbracings, and other lasciuious behauiour towards those Noble Ladies, as Alexan∣der the Kings Sonne, great Grand-father to Alexander the Great, disdaining the Persians barbarous presumption, besought his father to with-draw himselfe from the assembly, continuing notwith standing all honourable respect towards the Em∣bassadours, whom withall hee entreated that the Ladies might refresh themselues for a while; promising their speedy returne. This being obtained, Alexander cau∣sed the like number of well-fauoured yong-men to clothe themselues in the same garments, & to vse the same attires which the Ladies had worne at the feast, giuing them in charge, That when the Persians offered to abuse them, they should forth∣with transpierce them with their long kniues, of which they were prouided for that [unspec 50] purpose, which was accordingly performed. Charge was soone after giuen by Da∣rius for a seuere reuenge of this murder. But Alexander, somewhat before the death of Amintas, gaue his sister Gygea in marriage to Bubaris, a principall Commander of Darius forces on that side, who perswading her husband how helpfull the Alliance of Macedon would proue for the inuasion of Attica intended, so preuailed, as Alexan∣der

escaped that tempest, which threatned to fall vpon him very suddenly; the warre of Asia the lesse, called Ionick, falling out at the same time.

§. VI. The first occasion of the Warre which DARIVS made vpon Greece, with arehear sall of the gouernment in Athens, whence the the quarrell grew.

NOw the better to vnderstand the reason and motiues of that great [unspec 10] Warre, which followed soone after, betweene the Persians and Grae∣cians, it is necessarie to make a short repetition of the state of Athens, which Citie indured the hardest and worst 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Darius inuasion on that side the Sea with admirable successe. Neither doe I hold it any impertinencie, to be large in vnfolding euery circumstance of so great a busi∣nesse as gaue fire to those warres, which neuer could be throughly quenched; vntill in the ruine of this great Persian Monarchie, Persepolis the capitall Citie of the Em∣pire, was at the request of an Athenian Harlot consumed with a flame, as dreadfull as in the pride of their greatnesse, the Persians had raised in Athens.

Now therefore as out of the former bookes it may be gathered, how Athens, and [unspec 20] other parts of Greece, were anciently gouerned, the same being alreadie set downe, though scatteringly, and in seuerall times, among other the Contemporarie occur∣rents of the Easterne Emperors, and the Kings of Iudaea; so I thought it very perti∣nent in this place to remember againe the two last changes in the State of Athens. As for the Lacedaemonians, they maintained still their ancient policie vnder Kings, though these also after some fifteene descents bridled by the Ephori.

Codrus King of the Athenians in the former bookes remembred, who willingly died for the safetie of his people, was therefore so honored by them, as (thinking none worthy to succeed him) they changed their former gouernment from Mo∣narchicall to Princes for terme of life, of which Medon the sonne of Codrus was the [unspec 30] first, after whom they were called Medontidae; and of these there were twelue Ge∣nerations besides Medon, to wit.

• ...Agastus.
• Archippus, in whose times the Greekes transported themselues into Ionia, after Troy an hundred and fourescore yeeres, according to Eusebius: which migration al other Chronologers (such as follow Eusebius here∣in excepted) find in the yeere after Troy fallen one hundred and fortie.
• ...Thersippus.
• ...Phorbas.
• ...Mezades. [unspec 40]
• Diogenetus, in whose time Lycurgus gaue Lawes to the Spartans.
• ...Pheredus.
• ...Ariphron.
• Theispius, in whose time the Assyrian Empire was ouer-throwne by Be∣lochus, and Arbaces.
• ...Agamnestor.
• Aeschylus, in whose time the Ephori (according to Eusebius) were erected in Lacedaemon.
• Alcamenon, the last Prince for life, after whose death the Athenians ele∣cted [unspec 50] Decennall Gouernours: the former Princes for life hauing conti∣nued in all three hundred and sixteene yeeres. The first of those that gouerned for ten yeeres, or the first Archon, was
• Charops, then
• ...Aesymedes.

• ...Elydicus.
• ...Hyppomenes.
• ...Leocrates.
• ...Absander.
• Erixias was the last Archon of the decennal Gouernors, which forme con∣tinuing threescore and ten yeerres, was then changed into into annuall Magistrates, Maiors, or Burg-masters, of which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was the first, according to Pausanias: others finde Leostratus; and then
• ...Anthosthenes.* 1.154
• ...〈◊〉〈◊〉.* 1.155 [unspec 10]
• ...Miltiades.* 1.156
• ...Damasias.* 1.157
• ...Draco.* 1.158
• ...Megacles.
• Solon, and others, who are the lesse to bee regarded, by reason of the yeerely change.

This Solon being a man of excellent wisdome, gaue lawes to the Athenians, which were published according to Gellius, in the three and thirtieth yeere of Tar∣quinius Priscus, and were in after-ages deriued vnto the Romanes, and by the Decem∣viri (Magistrates in Rome created for that purpose) reduced into twelue Tables, [unspec 20] which were the ground of the Romane lawes. But these goodly ordinances of So∣lon, were in his owne daies violated, and for a while almost quite extinguished. For whereas they were framed vnto the practice and maintenance of a popular go∣uernement; the estate of Athens was very soone changed into a Monarchie by Pisi∣stratus the son of Hippocrates: who finding the Citizens distracted into two factions, whereof Megacles and Lycurgus two Citizens of noble Families were become the heads, tooke occasion by their contention and insolencie to raise a third faction more powerfull than the other two, and more plausible, for that he seemed a Pro∣tector of the Citizens in generall. Hauing by this meanes obtained loue and credit, he wounded himselfe, and faining that by malice of his enemies he had like to haue [unspec 30] beene slaine for his loue to the good Citizens, he procured a guard for his defence, and with that band of men surprising the State-house, or Cittadell of Athens, hee made himselfe Lord of the Towne; Hegesistratus being then Gouernour. But the Citizens, who in euery change of gouernement had sought to remoue themselues further and further from the forme of a Monarchie, could so ill brooke this vsurpa∣tion of Pisistratus, that he was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for lack of helpe to flie the Towne, as soone as Megacles and Lycurgus ioyning their forces 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his expulsion. Yet as the builiding of his tyranny founded vpon the dissension of the Citizens, was ruined by their good agreement; so was it soone after well 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by the new breaking out of the old factions. For when Megacles found the power of Lycurgus to grow [unspec 40] greater than his owne, he did (as is the vsuall practice of the weaker side) call in the common 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Pisistratus, to whom he gaue his Daughter in marriage; by which alliance the Familie of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whereof Megacles was chiefe, became very powerfull, yet so that Pisistratus by their power was made Master both of them and all the rest. But this agreement held not long; the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and especially Me∣gacles being incensed against Pisistratus for his misdemeanour towards his Wife. Wherefore they practised with the Souldiers of the Towne, proceeding in their* 1.159 * 1.160 treason so secretly, and so farre, that Pisistratus vpon the first 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of their in∣tent, perceiued no other remedie for his affaires, than to with-draw him selfe to Ere∣tria, where he remained eleuen yeeres. Which time being expired, hauing hired [unspec 50] Souldiers out of many parts of Greece, hee againe recouered the principalitie of Athens: after which third obtaining his estate, hee gouerned Athens 〈◊〉〈◊〉* 1.161 * 1.162 〈◊〉〈◊〉, according to Aristotle, and raigned in all thirtie and three yeeres, saith Elianus, but as Iustine hath it, foure and thirtie, accounting the time belike as well* 1.163

before as after his seuerall expulsions. Herodotus giues the father and the Sonne* 1.164 * 1.165 sixe and thirtie yeeres; Aristotle fiue and thirtie. But Thucidides affirmeth, that hee died very old, leauing for his Successours his two Sonnes Hippias and Hippar∣chus, who gouerned the Athenians with such moderation, as they rather seemed the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 successors of a naturall Prince than of a Tyrant. But in the end, and some three yeeres before 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was expelled out of Athens, his brother Hippar∣chus was murdered by Harmodius and Aristogiton. The cause why, and the manner how performed, Thucidides hath written at large. And though 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were charged with vnnaturall lust after Harmodius, yet Plato in his Dialogue, intituled Hipparchus, doth greatly magnifie him, affirming that hee was a Prince of as [unspec 10] many eminent vertues as that Age had any, altogether condemning the murde∣rers and authors of that scandall. Hippias fearing that this enterprise vpon his brother had more and deeper rootes than were apparent, first sought to discouer the further intents of Harmodius and Aristogiton, by a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of theirs called Lemnia: who because shee would not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 her Companions, did cut out her owne tongue. Then did Hippias, the better to strengthen himselfe, enter into a* 1.166 strait amitie with 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Tyrant of the Citie Lampsacus, whom he knew to bee greatly fauoured by Darius, to whose sonne Hypoclus hee gaue one of his Daugh∣ters in marriage. But some three yeeres after the death of his brother, doubting* 1.167 I know not what strong practice against himselfe, hee beganne to vse the Citizens [unspec 20] * 1.168 with great seueritie, which neither 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Father, nor Hippias himselfe had euer exercised during their vsurpations till this time. And therefore the Athenians fearing lest that this disease might rather increase, than diminish in Hippias, they stirred vp Clistines one of the noblest and best able of their Citie, to practise their deliuerie: who calling to his assistance the banished 〈◊〉〈◊〉, together with an Armie of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ledde by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their King, so affrighted Hippias, as by composition he gaue ouer his estate, and the possession of Athens, and from thence imbarking himselfe tooke land at* 1.169 Sigeum, whence 〈◊〉〈◊〉 went to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gouerned by 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who presented him to Darius. Hee was depri∣ued of his estate, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Thucidides 〈◊〉〈◊〉, twentie yeeres before the [unspec 30] battel of Marathon: all which time he continued, partly with 〈◊〉〈◊〉, at other times with Artaphernes Lieutenant for Darius in Sardis, the Metropolis of Lydia; perswading and practising the enterprise vpon Athens, which Darius in the ende to his great dishonour vnder tooke, twentie yeeres after Hippias had refigned his estate.

Thus farre I haue digressed from Darius, to the ende the Reader may con∣ceiue the better the causes and motiues of this warre: whereof the hope that Hip∣pias had to be restored to Athens by the helpe of Darius, which made him so∣licite and perswade the Persians to conquer Greece, was one; but not the most [unspec 40] vrgent.

§. VII. Of the Ionian Rebellion, which was the principall cause of the warres 〈◊〉〈◊〉 betweene Greece and Persia.

ANother, and a strong motiue to this expedition, was the Ionick warre, breaking out in Asia about the same time. The Colonies transported [unspec 50] out of Greece into Asia, which occupied the greatest part of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, hauing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their libertie about 500. yeeres, euen from the Ionick, migration, to the time of Croesus, were by this Lydian King made 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and afterwards as parcell of his Dominions, were taken in by

Cyrus, and left as hereditarie Seruants to the Crowne of Persia.

But as it is the custome of Nations halfe conquered (witnesse Ireland) to rebell againe vpon euery aduantage and opportunitie: so did the Ionians, and other 〈◊〉〈◊〉, both in Cyrus his life, and after him, seeke by all meanes possible to free themselues.

At this time they found such men readie to spurre them into Rebellion, as had by the Persian been giuen vnto them for bridles to hold them in subiection. Euery one of those Townes had a Lord to rule it, whom they (abhorring the gouernment of one man) called their Tyrants. These Lords were very true to the Persian, by whose onely might they held the people in subiection. And this their dutifull af∣fection [unspec 10] they had well declared, when, Darius being in great extremitie, they vsed all meanes to deliuer him and his Armie (that otherwise had beene lost) out of the Scythians hand. Of this great piece of seruice 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the tyrant of Miletus expe∣cted the chiefe thankes, as hauing beene chiefe Author of their expecting 〈◊〉〈◊〉, when the rest, either perswaded by the Scythians, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 carried away with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 owne desires, were readie to haue abandoned him. But it came so to passe, that Darius be∣ing more fearefull of the harme that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (being powerfull and craftie) might doe to him in the future, than mindfull of the good which he had alreadie receiued at his hand, found meanes to carry him a-long to Susa, where hee detained him with all kind vsage of a friend, yet kept such good espiall vpon him, as an enemie, [unspec 20] he could not start away. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had subtiltie enough to discouer the Kings pur∣pose; which ill agreed with his owned desires. For he thought it more pleasant, and more honourable 〈◊〉〈◊〉 rule as Prince in one faire Citie, hauing a smal Territorie, than to sit and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 at the great Kings table, and heare the counsailes by which a large Empire was menaged; being himselfe an idle beholder, and enioying with much restraint of libertie, none other pleasures than a priuate man might bestow vpon himselfe.

Wherefore he bethought himselfe of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of some tumults in the lower 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which if he might be sent, as one that had great experience and authoritie in those quarters it would afterwards be in his power to stay at home, and either [unspec 30] satisfie the King with excuses, or deale as occasion shall require. Resoluing vpon this course, he sent very secret instructions to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his kinsman, whom he had left his Deputic at 〈◊〉〈◊〉, aduising him to stirre vp some Rebellion. These dire∣ctions came seasonably to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who hauing failed in an enterprise vpon the Isle of Naxos, through the false dealing of a Persian his Associate, stood in feare of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, if not of some further ill that might befall him, as one that that had 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Kings treasures to no good purpose.

Therefore he readily embraced the counsaile: and the better to draw the whole Countrie of Ionia into the same course which he determined to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, hee abando∣ned his tyrannie, and did set Miletus at libertie. This plausible beginning wanne [unspec 40] vnto him the hearts of the Milesians: and his proceeding with other Ionian Tyrants (of whom some he tooke and sold as slaues to their citizens, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he chased away) caused the whole Nation to bee at his command. The Persian fleet, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of hee lately had beene Admirall in the enterprise of Naxos, hee had surprised in his first breaking out, together with the principall Officers, and Captaines, so that now hee thought himselfe able to deale with the great Kings forces, lying thereabout, either by Land or Sea. But likely it was that the power of all Asia would shortly be vpon his neck, and crush both him and his assistants to pieces, vnlesse that he were able to raise an Armie that might hold the field, which the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 alone were insufficient to performe. Therefore he tooke a iourney to Sparta, where 〈◊〉〈◊〉 assayed in vaine [unspec 50] with many arguments, and the offer of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 talents, to win to his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Cleomenes King of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉: hee went from thence to Athens, and with better suc∣cesse besought the people to led him their assistance. The Athenian Embassadors which had been sent to the Persian Kings Lieutenants in the lower Asia, desiring

them not to giue countenance to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, now a banished man, and lately their Ty∣rant, were a while before this returned with ill answeres, hauing found very chur∣lish entertainement. So that the euill which they were to expect in all likelyhood from the Persian, made them willing to begin with him. To which purpose, their consanguinitie with the Ionians, and the perswasions of Aristagoras, drew them on apace, if perhaps his treasure were not helping. Twentie shippes the Athenians fur∣nished for this voyage; to which the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 added 〈◊〉〈◊〉 more, in regard of anci∣ent kindnesse that had passed betweene the Ionians and them. With these and their owne forces 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the Ionians entred the Riuer Caistrus, which falleth into the Sea by Ephesus: by which aduantage they surprised Sardis when no enemie was [unspec 10] heard of or suspected; insomuch, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who ruled as Vice-roy in those parts, had no other hope of safetie, than by retreating himself into the Castle; which the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 could not force: from whence he beheld the slaughter of the Citizens, and the Citie flaming.

The Persians at length, mixt with the Burgers, began to encourage them to de∣fence, and recouered the Market place, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by the Riuer 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which ran through it, and borrowing courage from desperation, they both defended themselues, and charged their enemies; who well aduising 〈◊〉〈◊〉, made all the haste they could toward the Sea side. But Artaphernes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gathered 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the strength he could, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and found them neere Ephesus; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 set∣ting [unspec 20] resoluedly vpon them, he slaughtered a great part of their Armie; the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sa∣uing themselues in Ephesus. In this fight Eualcides, Captaine of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, pe∣rished: but his fame and memorie was by that excellent Poet Simonides 〈◊〉〈◊〉. After this ouerthrow, the Athenians, which were sent to Aristagoras and to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, could by no arguments of theirs, no not by their teares, be perswaded to make any second triall of their fortunes, on that side the Sea.

Yet the burning of Sardis made a greater noyse in the world, than the good suc∣cesse which the Persians had in one or two skirmishes, could rayse. Wherefore the Ionians brauely proceeding, woon a great part of Caria; and sending their Fleet into the Hellespont, got Bizantium and other Townes into their hands. Yea, the Cypri∣ans, [unspec 30] lately subdued by Cambyses, beganne hereupon to take heart; and entring into confederacie with the Ionians, who were able to giue them aide by sea, rebelled a∣gainst the Persians.

These newes comming to the care of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, filled him with great indignation, and with an extreme hatred of the Athenians, vpon whome hee vowed to take sharpe 〈◊〉〈◊〉. As for the Ionians, his contempt of them, and their knowledge of his power, made him to thinke, that they would not haue dared to attempt such things, but by the instigatin of those, to whom their ignorance of his great might had affoorded the courage to prouoke him. This was the maine ground of the [unspec 40] Warre commenced by Darius, and pursued by Xerxes against Athens: To which, the solicitation of Hippias, before remembred, gaue onely some forme and assistance: the businesse, when once it was thus farre on foot, being like ynough to haue pro∣ceeded, though he had perished 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it were aduanced any further.

Some other occurrents in this Ionian commotion extended the quarrell of Da∣rius against many of the Ilanders, if not against the whole Nation of the Greekes; for all of them gaue to his Rebels free harbour: the Ilanders moreouer did helpe to furnish out a Nauie of three hundred and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 saile against him. These 〈◊〉〈◊〉 did rather breede in him a desire to abate their pride, than any feare of harme that they were like to doe him. For what they had done at Sardis, was but [unspec 50] by surprise. In euery fight they were beaten by the Persians, who had not yet lost the fruits of their discipline, wherein Cyrus had trained them, nor all their ancient Captaines. In one sea-fight by the Isle of Cyprus, the Ionians indeed had the vpper hand; but they were 〈◊〉〈◊〉. ns, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and Cilicians, whom they vanquished: neither was that victorie of any vse to them; the Cyprians, in whose aid they came,

being vtterly beaten by the Persian Armie at Land, and reduced into their old sub∣jection. So had the Persians likewise by open warre and faire force ouerthrowne the Carians in two battailes, and reclaimed that Nation; as also they had recouered the Townes vpon Hellespont, with some Aeolian & Ionian Cities: when Aristagoras with his friends quitting Miletus, fled into Thrace, desirous to seat himselfe in Am∣phipolis, a Colonie of the Athenians. But the Edonians, on whose Territorie belike he landed, ouerthrew him, and cut his troupes in pieces.

About the same time, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the first mouer of this insurrection came downe in∣to those quarters; who hauing vndertaken the performance of great matters to Darius, was glad to flye from his Lieutenants, by whome his double dealing was [unspec 10] detected.

But this euasion preserued him not long. For after many vaine attempts that he made, hee was taken in fight by the Persians, and hastily beheaded, lest the King should pardon him vpon remembrance of old good turnes; as it seemes that hee would haue done, by the buriall which he commanded to be giuen to his dead bo∣dy that was crucified, and by his heauie taking of his death.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 had sought to put himselfe into Miletus; but the Citizens doubting his condition, chose rather to keepe him out, and make shift for themselues, without his helpe. The strength of their Citie by land, which had in old time withstood the Lydian Kings, and their good Fleet which promised vnto them the libertie of [unspec 20] an open sea, emboldened them to trie the vttermost, when very few friends were left vpon that Continent to take their part. But their Nauie was broken as much by threatnings as by force; many of their companions and fellow-rebels for saking them vpon hope of pardon; and many being daunted with the causelesse flight of those that should haue assisted them. Neither was it long before the Towne it selfe being assaulted both by Land and Sea, was taken by force, the Citizens slaine, their wiues and children made slaues, and their goods a bootie to the Persians, whome for sixe yeeres space they had put to so much trouble.

§. VIII. [unspec 30] The Warre which DARIVS made vpon Greece, with the battaile of MARATHON, and DARIVS his death.

THis warre with good successe finished by the Persians, and some at∣tempts made on Europe side with variable successe: Darius obstinate in the enterprise and conquest of Greece (though at first he pretended to* 1.170 make the warre but against the Athenians and Eritraeans, who jointly* 1.171 assisted the Ionians against him, and burnt Sardis in Lydia) did now by [unspec 40] his embassadours demaund an acknowledgement from them all: among whome, some of them not so well resolued as the rest, submitted themselues; as the Aeginets and others. Against these, the Athenians being inflamed (by the assistance of the Lacedaemonians) after diuers encounters forst them to giue pledges, and to relinquish the partie of the Persians. Cleomenes led the Lacedaemonians in this warre, and caused his companion King Demantus to be deposed: who thereupon fled to Darius, farre the more confident of victorie, by reason of these discords, alienations, and ciuill warres among the Greekes. He therefore gaue order to Hippagoras, to prepare a Fleet of shippes fit to transport his Armie ouer the Hellespont: the same consisting of an hundred thousand foot, and tenne thousand 〈◊〉〈◊〉. The charge in chiefe of his Ar∣mie [unspec 50] he committed to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, accompanied and assisted by Hippias, the sonne of Pisi∣stratus, expelled out of Athens twentie yeres before, and by Artaphernes his brother, Gouernour of Sardis, and the Sea-coast of Asia the lesse. These Commaunders ha∣uing their Companies brought downe to the Sea-side, imbarked themselues in sixe

hundred Gallies and other Vessels; and first of all attempted the Islands called Cy∣clades, which lay in the mid-way betweene Asia the lesse, and Greece. For (obtaining those places) the Persians had then nothing to hinder the transportation of their forces ouer the Aegean Sea; but on the contrarie they might alwayes both relieue themselues in their passage, and shrowd themselues from all suddaine tempests and outrage.

To this end they first possest themselues of Samos, secondly, they attempted Na∣xos: Which Island, the inhabitants despairing of their owne forces, abandoned. So did the people of Delos, of which Apollo was natiue: Which Island 〈◊〉〈◊〉 did not onely forbeare to sacke, but recalling the inhabitants, he gaue order to beautifie the [unspec 10] places and Altars of Sacrifice, to Apollo erected. And hauing recouered these and other Islands, the Persians directed their course for Eretria in Euboea: for that Citie* 1.172 (as already hath beene shewed) had assisted the Ionians at the taking and firing of Sardis. In this Island the Persians tooke ground, and besieged Eretria very straitly, and after sixe dayes assault, partly by force, and in part by the treason of Euphabus and Philagius; they tooke it, sack it, and burnt it to the ground. Thus farre the winds of prosperous fortune filled their sayles. From Euboea the Persians past their Armie into 〈◊〉〈◊〉, conducted and guided by Hippias, late Prince of Athens, and marching towards it, they encamped at Marathon, in the way from the Sea, where they landed, towards Athens. [unspec 20]

The Athenians finding the time arriued, wherein they were to dispute with their owne vertue against Fortune, and to cast lots for their libertie, for their wiues, their children, and their liues, put themselues in the best order they could to make resi∣stance, and withall sent away with speed to the Lacedaemonians for succour, imploy∣ing in that Negotiation one Phidippides; who passing through Arcadia, encountred in the way a familiar Diuell, which he supposed to be Pan, who willed him to assure the Athenians of victorie, promising that some one of the Gods should be present at the battaile to assist them and defend them against the multitude of their enemies. Phidippides at his returne seeing he could not bring with him any present succours from Sparta, yet he thought it greatly auailing to bring newes from the Gods, and [unspec 30] promise of assistance from Heauen, which no doubt (though the deuice was likely to be his owne) yet it greatly encouraged the multitude and common people, who in all ages haue beene more stirred vp with fond Prophecies and other like supersti∣tious fooleries, than by any just cause or solid reason. The Athenians being now left to themselues, with one thousand onely of the Plataeans (who hauing beene for∣merly defended by the Athenians against the Thebans, did in this extremitie witnesse their thankefulnesse and gratefull disposition) began to dispute, Whether it were most for their aduantage to defend the wals of Athens, or to put themselues into the field with such forces as they had, the same consisting of tenne thousand Athenians, and one thousand of the Plataeans. In the end, and after great diuersitie of opinions, [unspec 40] Miltiades, who perswaded the triall by battaile, preuailed. The Armies being now in view, and within a myle of each other, the Athenians disposed themselues into three troupes: two wings or hornes, as they tearme them, and the body of a battaile. The Persians, when they perceiued so small a Troope aduauncing towards them, thought the Athenians rather dispossest of their vnderstanding, than possest with the resolution whereof they made 〈◊〉〈◊〉. So inuincible and resistlesse the Persians esteemed their owne numbers to be, and that small troupe of their enemies then in view, rather to be despised than to be fought withall: But in conclusion, the victory being doubtfully ballanced for a while, sometime the vertue of the Graecians, and sometimes the number of the Persians preuailing, the Graecians fighting for all that [unspec 50] they had, the Persians for that they needed not, these great forces of Darius were disordered and put in rout; the Athenians following their victorie euen to the Sea∣shore; where the Persians, so many of them as lost not their wits with their courage, saued themselues in their shippes.

The Persian Armie consisted of an hundred thousand foot and tenne thousand horse; of which there were slaine in the place sixe thousand three hundred, and of the Graecians an hundred fourescore and twelue. For howsoeuer it came to passe, either by strange visions, which were afterward called Panici terrores, or by some o∣ther affright, it seemeth, that the inuading Armie, after the first encounter, fought with their backes towards their enemie, and lost that number, by Herodotus set downe, in their disorderly retreat, or rather in their flat running away. As for Iu∣stines report, That two hundred thousand of the Persian Armie were slaine, the same hath no apparance nor possibilitie of truth. In this fight Hippias the perswader of the enterprise was slaine, sayth Iustine and Cicero; but Suidas tels vs, That he esca∣ped* 1.173 [unspec 10] and died most miserably in Lemnos.

The greatest honour of this victory was cast vpon Miltiades, who both perswaded the triall by battaile, and behaued himselfe therein answerably to the counsell which he gaue. Themistocles had his first reputation in this fight, being but young and of the first beard. Those of the Graecians, of marke and commandement, that fell in the first encounter, were Callimachus and Stesileus. It is also said, That Cyne∣gyrus following the Persians to their embarking, layd hands on one of their Gallies, to haue held it from putting off the shore, and hauing his right hand cut off, he yet offered to arrest it with his left; of which being also depriued, he tooke hold of it with his teeth. This encounter happened in the first yeere of the threescore and [unspec 20] twelfth Olympiad, about the time of the Warre made by Coriolanus against his fellow-Romanes: Alexander the sonne of Amintas being then King of Macedon, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 then Gouernour of Athens, according to Plutarch; or Hybilides, af∣ter* 1.174 Halycarnasseus.

This great fray thus parted, and the Persians returned backe into the lesser Asia, Miltiades sought and obtained an imployment against the Ilanders of Paros, one of the Cyclades, and passing ouer his Companies in threescore and tenne Gal∣lies, after sixe and twentie dayes assault he brake his thigh, in seeking to enter it by the Temple of Ceres, wherewith himselfe being made vnable, and his compa∣nies discouraged, he returned to Athens; where those vngratefull Citizens forget∣ting [unspec 30] all his seruices past, and that of all other the most renowned at the battaile of Marathon, did by the perswasion of Xantippus, the father of Pericles (who enuied his fame) cast him into prison, and set on him a fine of fiftie Talents; where his weake and wounded body being not able to endure the one, nor his estate to pay the o∣ther, he after a few dayes ended his life.

Which enuie of the better sort to each other, with their priuate Factions, assisted by the vnthankfull and witlesse people, brought them, not many yeeres after, from a victorious and famous Nation, to base subjection and slauerie. Miltiades left be∣hind him one sonne called Cymon, begotten on Hegisipila, daughter of Olorus King of Thrace, who (saith Plutarch) was neither inferior to his father in valour, nor to [unspec 40] Themistocles in vnderstanding, but exceeded them both in justice and good go∣uernment.

Now Darius taking greater care how to recouer his honour, than sorrow for the losse receiued in Greece, gaue order for new leuies of men, and all other warlike pro∣uisions. But the Aegyptians reuolting from his obedience (a Kingdome of great strength and reuenue) greatly distracted his resolution for the reinuasion of Greece. The dissension also among his sonnes; of whom, the yonger being borne after he was King, and by so great a mother as Atossa, disdained to giue place to his elder brother, borne before Darius obtained the Empire, greatly vexed him. And lastly, death, who hath no respect of any mans affaires, gaue end to all his consultations [unspec 50] and enterprises, and joyned him to the earth of his auncestors, about a yeere after the battaile of Marathon, and after that he had raigned sixe and thirty yeres. He left behind him fiue sonnes, namely Artabasanes, born before he obtained the kingdome, Xerxes who succeeded him, Achemenes gouernor of Aegypt, Masistes and Anabignes.

CHAP. VI. Of XERXES.

§. I. The preparation of XERXES against Greece. [unspec 10]

XERXES receiued from his father, as hereditarie, a double Warre; one to be made against the Aegypti∣ans, which he finished so speedily, that there is no∣thing remaining in writing how the same was per∣formed: the other against the Graecians; of which it is hard to judge, whether the preparations were more terrible, or the successe ridiculous. In the con∣sultation for the prosecution of this Warre, which was chiefely bent against the Athenians, the Princes [unspec 20] of Persia were diuided in opinion. Mardonius, who had formerly commaunded in Thrace and Macedon, vnder Darius, and had also Hystaspes for his grandfather, as Xerxes had, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Xerxes his sister Artozostres, perswaded by many arguments the Europaean warre. But Artabanus, brother to the late Darius, and vncle to Xerxes, maintained the contrarie counsell, laying before Xerxes the lamentable and ridiculous successe of the two late inuasions, which Darius had made contrarie to his counsell: The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in person vpon the Scythians, the other by his Lieutenants vpon the Greekes; in each of which Darius left to his enemies both his Armie and his honour.

He therefore besought Xerxes to be right well aduised before he did too farre [unspec 30] imbarke himselfe in this businesse. For whatsoeuer vndertaking hath deliberate and sound counsell for conductor, though the successe doe not alwayes answere the pro∣babilitie, yet hath Fortune nothing else thereof to vaunt, than the variablenesse of her owne nature, which only the diuine Prouidence, and not any humane power, can constraine.

But so obstinate was the resolution of Xerxes in prosecution of his former intent, that Artabanus, whether terrified by Visions (as it is written of him) or fearing the Kings hatred, which hee made knowne to all those that opposed his desire to this Warre. (changing opinion & counsell) assisted the graecian Expedition with all the power he had. [unspec 40]

After the Warre of Aegypt was ended, foure yeeres were consumed in describing and gathering an Armie for this inuasion: which being compounded of all Nati∣ons subject to the Persian Empire, consisted of seuenteene hundred thousand foot,* 1.175 and eightie thousand horsemen, besides Chariots, Camels, and other Beasts for Carriage, if we may beleeue Herodotus: for of this multitude, Trogus findes the numberlesse by seuen hundred thousand footmen.

The Commaunders of the seuerall Nations were the Princes of the bloud of Persia, either by marriage in the Kings house, or otherwise: for to these were all commaundements of this nature giuen, some few people excepted, who had of their owne leaders. [unspec 50]

The charge of the whole Armie was bestowed on Mardonius, the sonne of Go∣bryas by a sister of Darius, to whom were joyned some others of Xerxes his neerest kindred, as Generals ouer all; sauing that the charge of tenne thousand select Per∣sians, called the immortall Regiment (because if any one of the whole number died

or were slaine, there was another presently chosen in his 〈◊〉〈◊〉) was giuen to Hy∣darnes; the eighty thousand horsemen were led by the sonnes of Datis, who com∣maunded the late Armie of Darius in Greece.

The Fleet of Gallies were two thousand two hundred and eight, furnished by the Phoenicians, who had Commaunders of their owne Nation, and by the Cypriotes, Cilicians, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Lycians, Dorians, Carians, Ionians, Aeolians, and Hellespontines; who were trusted with the furnishing of their owne Vessels, though commaunded by the Princes of Persia, as by Ariabignes the sonne of Darius, and others. The rest of the Vessels for transportation were three thousand. There were also certaine Gallies furnished by Artemisia, the daughter of Lygdames, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Halycarnassus, [unspec 10] and the Islands adioyning, which her selfe commaunded. Those Gallies by her pre∣pared and furnished, exceeded all the rest of the Fleet, excepting those of Zidon, in which Xerxes himselfe was imbarked.

§. II. XERXES Armie entertained by PYTHIVS: His cutting off Mount Athos from the Continent: his bridge of Boates ouer the Hellespont: and the discourse betweene him and ARTABANVS vp. on the view of his Armie. [unspec 20]

WHen this world of an Armie was throughly furnished, he caused all the Nations of which it was compounded, to make their Rendez-vous and repaire at Sardis in Lydia. And when hee had assembled to the number of seuenteene hundred thousand foot, as he entred the body of Celaenas, he was by one Pythius the Lydian entertained, who out of his Flocks and Heards of Cattell gaue food to Xerxes and his whole Armie. The Feast ended, hee also presented him with two thousand Talents of siluer, and in Gold foure Millions, wanting seuen thousand of the Persian Darici, which make so many of our markes. [unspec 30]

The King ouercome with the exceeding liberalitie of Pythius, did not only refuse his treasure offered, but commaunded that seuen thousand Darici should be giuen him to make vp his foure Millions; of which, so many thousands were wanting when he made the present. But soone after, when Pythius besought him to spare one of his fiue sonnes from his attendance into 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (because himselfe was old, and had none whom he could so well trust as his owne sonne) Xerxes most barba∣rously caused the young man, for whom his father sought exemption, to be sunde∣red into two parts, commaunding, that the one halfe of his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 should be layed on the right, and the other halfe on the left hand of the common way by which the Armie marched. [unspec 40]

Two things he commanded to be done before he came to the Sea side. The one was a passage for Gallies to be cut behind Mount Athos, making the same (which the halfe Island or Headland, whereon it stood) to be an entire Island, sundring thereby from the Continent of Thrace fiue Cities, besides the Mountaine and the Chersone∣sus or Necke of Land it selfe a worke of more 〈◊〉〈◊〉 than of vse, and yet an en∣terprise of no great wonder, the Valley which held it to the Continent hauing but twelue furlongs (which make about a mile and 〈◊〉〈◊〉) to cut through, and the ditch being broad enough onely for two Gallies to passe in front. The Cities so seuered from the maine, were Dion, Olophyxus, Acrothoon, Thysus, and Cleonae.

He also gaue order, that a Bridge vpon Boats should be made ouer the Hellespont [unspec 50] betweene Abidus and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the Sea there hauing am yle of breadth, wanting an eight part; which after the finishing, was by a Tempest torne asunder and disseue∣red: wherewith Xerxes being more enraged than discouraged, commaunded those to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that were masters of the worke, and caused sixe hundred threescore and

fourteene Gallies to be coupled together, thereon to frame a new Bridge; which by the art and industry of the Phoenicians was so well anchored to resist both windes blowing into and from the Euxine Sea, as the same being well boorded and rayled, the whole Armie of seuenteene hundred thousand foot, and fourescore thousand Horse, with all the Moyles and Carriages, past ouer it into Europe in seuen daies and seuen nights, without intermission. This transportation of Armies did Caesar after∣ward vse. And Caligula that mad Emperour, in imitation of Xerxes his Bridge, did build the like.

The Bridge finished, and the Armie brought neere to the Sea side, Xerxes tooke a view of all his Troupes, assembled in the Plaines of Abidus, being carried vp, and [unspec 10] seated on a place ouer-topping the Land round about it, and the Sea adioyning: and after he had gloried in his owne happinesse, to behold and commaund 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ma∣ny Nations, and so powerfull an Armie and Fleet, he suddenly (notwithstanding) burst out into teares, moued with this contemplation, That in one hundred yeeres there should not any one suruiue of that maruellous multitude: the cause of which sudden change of passion when he vttered to Artabanus his vncle, Artabanus spake to the King to this effect: That which is more lamentable than the dissolution of this great Troupe within that number of yeeres by the King remembred, is, That the life it selfe which we enioy is yet more miserable than the end thereof: for in those few daies giuen vs in the world, there is no man among all these, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 else∣where, [unspec 20] that euer found himselfe so accompanied with happinesse, but that he of∣tentimes pleased himselfe better with the desire and hope of death, than of liuing; the incident calamities, diseases, and sorrowes whereto mankind is subiect, being so many and ineuitable, that the shortest life doth oftentimes appeare vnto vs ouer∣long; to auoide all which, there is neither refuge nor rest but in desired death alone.

With this melancholy discourse, Xerxes being not much pleased, prayed Arta∣banus not to ouer-cast those ioyes which they had now in pursuit with sad remem∣brances. And holding stil a doubtful conceit, that Artabanus vtterly condemned the inuasion of Greece, against which he had formerly giuen many strong reasons, desi∣red [unspec 30] him to deale freely with him, Whether he were returned to his first resolution, that the enterprise of Greece could not be prosperous? Or whether, according to the change of mind put into him by his late Vision, he was confident of good suc∣cesse? Artabanus, notwithstanding that he assured himselfe of the Kings resolution to go on, and dared not by any new Arguments to batter the great purpose it selfe, yet he told the King, That there were two things which maruellously affrighted him, and which the King should finde, as he feared, to be most aduerse; to wit, the Sea and the Land: The Sea, because it had no where in that part of the world any Port capable of so great a Fleete: insomuch, as if any tempest should arise, all the Continent of Greece could hardly receiue them, nor all the Hauens thereof af∣foord [unspec 40] them any safetie: and therefore when such shelter shall bee wanting vnto them, he prayed him to vnderstand, that in such a case of extremitie, men are left to the will and disposition of Fortune, and not Fortune to the will and disposition of men. The Land, besides other incommodities, will be found by so much the more an enemie, by how much the vnsatiate desire of man to obtaine more and more thereof, doth leade him forward: for were there no man found to giue resistance, yet the want of meanes to feede such an Army, and the Famine, which cannot bee preuented, will without any other violence offered disinable and consume it. By these Arguments Artabanus hoped to haue diuerted Xerxes, not daring perchance to vtter what indeed he most feared; to wit, the ouerthrow of the Armie it selfe [unspec 50] both by Sea and Land, which soone after followed. These Cautions were excee∣ding weightie, if Xerxes his obstinacie had not misprised them. For to inuade by Sea vpon a perillous Coast, being neither in possession of any Port, nor succored by any party, may better fit a Prince presuming on his fortune, than enriched with vn∣derstanding.

Such was the enterprise of Philip the second vpon England in the yeere 1588. who had belike neuer heard of this Counsell of Artabanus to Xerxes, or forgotten it.

Now concerning the second point, it was verie likely, that Xerxes his Armie, which could not haue lesse in it than two millions of Soules, besides his beastes for Seruice and Carriage, should after a few dayes suffer famine, and vsing Machiauels words, Mourire sans cousteo; die without a knife. For it was impossible for Greece, be∣ing a ragged, strait and mountainous Countrey, to yeeld food (besides what ser∣ued themselues) for twenty hundred thousand strangers, whom they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 meant to entertaine but with the sharpened points of their weapons, destroying withall [unspec 10] whatsoeuer they could not well inclose and defend. Nay, if we may beleeue Hero∣dotus,* 1.176 the Armie of Xerxes, being reuiewed at Thermopylae, consisted of fiue millions, two hundred eightie three thousand, two hundred twentie men, besides Laundres∣ses, Harlots and Horses, and was therefore likely to endure a speedy famine.

The effect of Xerxes his answere was, That it was impossible to prouide for all things; and that whosoeuer should enterprise any great matter, if he gaue the hea∣ring to all that could be objected of accidentall inconueniences, hee should neuer pursue the same farther, than the dispute and consultation: which if his Predeces∣sors, the Persian Kings, had done, they had neuer growne to that greatnesse, or pos∣sest so many Kingdomes and Nations as now they did, and therefore concluded, That great enterprises were neuer vndertaken without great perils. Which resolu∣tion [unspec 20] of Xerxes was not to be condemned, if any necessity had enforst him to that warre. But seeing the many Nations newly conquered, which hee already com∣maunded, were more than could be constrained to obedience any longer than the powerfull prosperity of the Persians endured, and that Greece was separated by the Sea from the rest of Xerxes Dominions (of whose resolution his father Darius had made a deare experience) the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of this warre was answerable to the plantation, and the successe and end 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the weake counsell whereon it was grounded. Furthermore, those millions of men which he transported, and yet in his owne iudgement not sufficient (for he gathered in marching on, all the strength of Thrace [unspec 30] and Macedon) were an argument, that he rather hoped to feare the Greekes by the fame of his numbers, than that he had any confidence in their valour and resoluti∣on, whom he conducted. For it is wisely said of those vncountable multitudes: Non vires habent sed pondus, & impediment a potiùs sunt quàm auxilium; They are great in bulke, but weake in force, and rather a luggage than an aide.

Besides, as it was impossible to marshal such a world of men in one Armie, so the diuers Nations, speaking diuers languages, bred the same confusion among the Per∣sian commaunders when they came to fight, as it did to the builders of Babel, when they came to worke. Whereas if Xerxes had of his fiue millions compounded tenne Armies of fiftie thousand chosen souldiors in each, and sent them yeerely into [unspec 40] Greece well victualed and furnished, he had eyther preuayled by the sword, or forst them to forsake their territorie, or brought them in obedience by necessity and fa∣mine, which cannot be resisted. But while Xerxes, resolued to cut down the bankes of Greece, and to let in a sea of men vpon them, he was deceiued both in his owne hopes, and in their hearts whom he imployed, and beaten by the Greekes, both by Land and Sea; yea, he himselfe, conducted by his feare, fled shamefully into Asia. A great part of his Armie was buried in Greece: the remainder wherof, which win∣tred in Thessalie, and led by Mardonius, who perswaded the Enterprise, was in the Summer following vtterly defeated, and himselfe slaine. [unspec 50]

§. III. Of the fights at Thermopylae and Artemisium.

AFter such time as Xerxes had transported his Armie ouer the Helle∣spont, and landed in Thrace, (leauing the description of his passage a∣longst that Coast, and how the Riuer of Lissus was drunke 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by his multitudes, and the Lake neere to Pissyrus by his cattell, with other accidents in his marches towards Greece) I will speake of the encoun∣ters he had, and the shamefull and incredible ouerthrowes which he receiued: As [unspec 10] first at Thermopylae, a narrow passage of halfe an acre of ground, lying betweene the Mountaines which diuide Thessalie from Greece, where sometime the Phocians had raysed a wall with gates, which was then forthe most part ruined. At this entrance Leonidas, one of the Kings of Sparta, with three hundred Lacedaemonians, assisted with one thousand Tegeatae and Mantineans, one thousand Arcadians, and other Pe∣loponnesians, to the number of three thousand one hundred in the whole, besides one thousand Phocians, foure hundred Thebans, seuen hundred Thespians, and all the forces (such as they were) of the bordering Locrians, defended the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 two whole daies together against that huge Armie of the Persians. The valour of the Greekes appeared so excellent in this defence, that in the first dayes fight, Xerxes is [unspec 20] said to haue three times leaped out of his Throne, fearing the destruction of his Armie by one handfull of those men, whom not long before he had vtterly despi∣sed: and when the second dayes attempt vpon the Greekes had prooued vaine, hee was altogether ignorant how to proceede further, and so might haue continued, had not a run-agate Graecian taught him a secret way, by which part of his Armie might ascend the ledge of Mountaines, and set vpon the backs of those who kept the Straits. But when the most valiant of the Persian Armie had almost inclosed the small forces of the Greekes, then did Leonidas, King of the Lacedaemonians, with his three hundred, and seuen hundred Thespians, which were all that abode by him, refuse to quit the place which they had vndertaken to make good, and with admi∣rable [unspec 30] courage not onely resist that world of men which charged them on all sides; but issuing out of their strength, made so great a slaughter of their enemies, that they might well bee called vanquishers, though all of them were slaine vpon the place. Xerxes hauing lost in this last fight, together with twentie thousand other Souldiers and Captaines, two of his owne brethren, began to doubt what incon∣uenience might befall him by the vertue of such as had not beene present at these battailes, with whome hee knew that hee shortly was to deale. Especially of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he stood in great feare, whose manhood had appeared singular in this try∣all, which caused him very carefully to enquire what numbers they could bring in∣to the field. It is reported of Dieneces the Spartan, that when one thought to haue [unspec 40] terrified him by saying, That the flight of the Persian arrowes was so thicke as would hide the Sunne: he answered thus; It is very good newes: for then shall we fight in the coole shade.

Such notable resolution hauing as freely beene expressed in deedes, as it was vt∣tered in words, caused the Persian to stand in great doubt, when he heard that the Citie of Sparta could arme well-nigh eight thousand men of the like temper, and that the other Lacedaemonians, though inferiour to those, were very valiant men. Wherefore he asked counsell of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, a banished King of the Spartans, who had alwaies well aduised and instructed him in the things of Greece, what course were fittest to bee taken in his further proceedings. The opinion of Demaratus [unspec 50] was, That all the Land-forces would assemble together to defend the Isthmus, that straight necke of ground which joyneth Peloponnesus to the Continent. For which cause he aduised, That three hundred shippes well manned should be sent vnto the Coast of Laconia, to spoyle the Countrie, and to hold the Lacedaemonians, and their

neighbours busied at home; whilest Xerxes at his leasure hauing subdued the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, might afterward bring his whole power vpon them, who remaining destitute of succour, would be too weak alone to make resistance. To this purpose also the same Demaratus further aduised, that the said fleet of three hundred ships should seize vpon the Iland then called Cythera, now Cerigo, which lying neere to the Coast of Laconia, might serue as a fit place of Rendez vous vpon all occasions either of their own defence or endamaging the enemie: whereby that ancient speech of Chilon the Lacedemonian should be verified, that it were better for his Countrie-men to haue that Ile drowned in the sea, than stand so inconueniently as for them it did. What effect this counsell might haue taken had it been followed it is not easie to [unspec 10] guesse. But a contrarie opinion of Achaemenes brother to King Xerxes was preferred as the safer. For the Persian fleet had bin sorely vexed with a grieuous tempest which continued three whole dayes together, wherein were lost vpon the coast of Magnesia foure hundred ships of war, besides other vessels innumerable, accor∣dingly as Artabanus had foreseene, that if any such calamity should ouertake them, there would not be found any Harbor wide enough to giue them succour. There∣fore Achaemenes perswaded his brother not to disperse his fleet; for if (said he) after the losse of foure hundred shippes we shall send away other three hundred to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aduentures, then will the Greekes be strong enough by sea to encounter the rest of the Nauie, which holding altogether is inuincible. To this counsel Xerxes yeelded, hoping that his Land-armie and fleet should each of them stand the other in good [unspec 20] stead, whilest both held one course, and lay not farre asunder. But herein he was farre deceiued; for about the same time that his armie had felt the valour of the Greekes by Land, his Nauie likewise made a sorrowfull proofe of their skill and courage at Sea. The Grecian fleet lay at that time at Artemisium in the straits of Eu∣boea, where the Persians thinking to incompasse them, sent two hundred sayle a∣bout the Iland to fall vpon them behind, vsing a like strategem to that which their King did practise against Leonidas in a case not vnlike, but with far different successe. For that narrow channell of the sea which diuideth Euboea from the maine, was in the same sort held by a Nauy of two hundred threescore and eleuen saile against the [unspec 30] huge Persian Armada, as the straits of Thermopylae had formerly been maintained by Leonidas, till he was so circumuented as this Nauie might haue been, but was not. The departure of those two hundred ships that were sent about the Iland, and the cause of their voiage, was too well knowne in the Persian fleete, and soone enough disclosed to the Greekes, who setting saile by night, met them with a counter sur∣prise, taking and sinking thirtie vessels, inforcing the rest to take the Sea, where be∣ing ouertaken with foule weather, they were driuen vpon the rocks & cast al away. Contrariwise, the Nauie of the Greekes was increased by the arriuall of fiftie three Athenian ships, and one Lemnian, which came to their partie in the last fight. As these new forces incouraged the one side: so the feare of Xerxes his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 stir∣red [unspec 40] vp the other to redeeme their losse with some notable exploit. Wherefore set∣ting aside their vnfortunate policie, they resolued in plaine fight to repaire their honour, and casting themselues into the forme of a Crescent, thought so to inclose the Greekes, who readily did present them battell at Artemisium.

The fight endured from no one till night, and ended with equall losse to both parts. For though more of the Persians ships were sunke and taken, yet the lesser losse fell altogether as heauie vpon the Greekish sleet, which being small could worse beare it. Herein onely the Barbarians may seeme to haue had the worse, that they for sooke the place of fight, leauing the wracke and spoyles to the enemie, who ne∣uerthelesse were faine to abandon presently euen the passage which they had vn∣dertaken [unspec 50] to defend, both for that many of their ships were sorely crusht in the bat∣taile, and especially because they had receiued aduertisement of the death of Leo∣nidas at Thermopylae. Before they waied anchors, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 general of the Athenians engraued vpon stone at the watering place an exhortation to the Ionians, that either

they should reuolt vnto the Greekes or stand neutrall; which perswasion, he hoped would either take some place with them, or at the least make them suspected by the Persians.

§. IIII. The attempt of XERXES vpon APOLLOE'S temple: and his taking of Athens.

WHen Xerxes had passed the straites of Thermopylae, he wasted the coun∣try [unspec 10] of the Phocians, and the regions adioyning: as for the inhabitants, they chose rather to flie, and reserue themselues to a day of battell, than to aduenture their liues into his hands, vpon hope of sauing their wealth by making proffer vnto him of their seruice. Part of his armie he sent to spoile the temple of Delphi; which was exceeding rich by meanes of many offerings that had there beene made by diuers Kings and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 personages; Of all which riches it was thought that Xerxes had a better Inuentorie than of the goods left in his owne Palace. To make relation of a great astonishment that fell vpon the companies which ariued at the Temple to haue sacked it, and of two Rocks, that breaking from the mount Parnassus, ouerwhelmed many of the Barbari∣ans, [unspec 20] it were peraduenture somewhat superstitious. Yet Herodotus, who liued not long after, saith, That the broken Rocks remained euen to his memorie in the Temple of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whither they rowled in their fall. And surely this attempt of Xerxes was impious; for seeing hee beleeued that Apollo was a god, hee should not haue dared to entertaine a couetous desire of inriching himselfe by committing sa∣criledge vpon his Temple. Wherefore it may possibly be true, that licence to cha∣stise his impietie, in such manner as is reported, was granted vnto the Diuel, by that Holy one, who saith, Will a man spoile his gods? and elsewhere; Hath any nation chan∣ged* 1.177 their gods, which yet are no gods? Go to the Iles of Kittim, and behold, and send to Ke∣dar,* 1.178 and take diligent heed, and see whether there be any such things. Now this impietie of [unspec 30] Xerxes was the more 〈◊〉〈◊〉, for that the Persians alleadged the burning of Cy∣beles Temple by the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, when they set fire on the Citie of Sardis in Asia, to be the ground and cause of the waste which they made in burnings of Cities and Temples in Greece. Whereas indeed, in the enterprise against Delphos, this Vizzor of holy and zealous reuenge falling off, discouered the face of couetousnesse so much the more vglie, by how much the more themselues had professed a detestation of the offence which the Athenians had committed in that kind by meere mischance.

The remainder of that which Xerxes did, may be expressed briefly thus: He came to Athens, which finding for saken, he took & burnt the Cittadel & temple which was there∣in. The Cittadel indeed was defended a while by some of more courage than wise∣dome, [unspec 40] who litterally interpreting Apollo's Oracle; that Athens should be safein wood∣den walls, had fortified that place with boords and Palissadoes: too weake to hold out long, though by their desperate valour so well maintained at the first assault, that they might haue yeelded it vpon tolerable conditions, had they not vainely relied vpon the prophecie: whereof (being somewhat obscure) it was wisely done of Themistocles, to make discretion the interpreter, applying rather the words to the present neede, than fashioning the businesse to words. [unspec 50]

§. V. How THEMISTOCLES the Athenian drew the Greekes to fight at Salamis.

THe Athenians had, before the comming of Xerxes, remooued their wiues and children into Troezene, Aegina, & Salamis, not so highly pri∣zing their houses and lands, as their freedome, and the common liber∣tie of Greece. Neuerthelesse, this great zeale, which the Athenians did [unspec 10] shew for the generall good of their Countrie, was ill requited by the other Greekes, who with much labour were hardly intreated to stay for them at Sa∣lamis, whilest they remooued their wiues and children out of the Citie. But when the Citie of Athens was taken, it was presently resolued vpon, that they should for∣sake the Ile of Salamis, and with-draw the fleet to Isthmus: which neck of land they did purpose to fortifie against the Persians, and so to defend Peloponnesus by Land, and Sea, leauing the rest of Greece, as indefensible, to the furie of the enemie. So should the Ilands of Salamis and Aegina haue beene abandoned, and the Families of the Athenians (which were there bestowed as in places of securitie) haue beene gi∣uen ouer into mercilesse bondage. Against this resolution Themistocles, Admirall [unspec 20] of the Athenian fleet, very strongly made opposition; but in vaine. For the Pelo∣ponnesians 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so possessed with feare of losing theit owne, which they would not hazard, that no perswasions could obtaine of them, to regard the estate of their di∣stressed friends and Allies. Many remonstrances Themistocles made vnto them, to allure them to abide the enemie at Salamis; As first in priuate vnto Eurybiades the Lacedaemonian, Admirall of the whole fleet; That the selfe same feare which made them forsake those coasts of Greece, vpon which they then anchored, would after∣ward (if it found no check at the first) cause them also to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the fleet, and euery one of the Confederates to with-draw himselfe to the defence of his owne Citie and estate: Then to the Councell of Warre which Eurybiades vpon this motion [unspec 30] did call together (forbearing to obiect what want of courage might worke in them hereafter) he shewed that the fight at Isthmus would be in an open Sea, whereas it was more expedient for them, hauing the fewer ships, to determine the matter in the straights; and that, besides the safeguard of Aegina, Megara, and Salamis, they should by abiding, where they then were, sufficiently defend Isthmus, which the Barbarians should not so much as once looke vpon, if the Greekes obtained victorie by sea; which they could not so well hope for else where, as in that present place which gaue them so good aduantage. All this would not serue to retaine the Pe∣loponnesians, of whom one, vnworthie of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, vpbraided Themistocles with the losse of Athens, blaming Eurybiades for suffering one to speake in the Councell, that [unspec 40] had no Countrie of his owne to inhabite. A base and shamefull obiection it was, to lay as a reproch that losse, which being voluntarily sustained for the common good, was in true estimation by so much the more honourable, by how much it was the greater. But this indignitie did exasperate Themistocles, and put into his mouth a reply so sharpe, as auailed more than all his former perswasions. Hee told them all plainely, That the Athenians wanted not a fairer Citie, than any Nation of Greece could boaft of; hauing well-neere two hundred good ships of Warre, the bet∣ter part of the Graecian fleet, with which it was easie for them to transport their Fa∣milies and substance into any part of the World, and settle themselues in a more se∣cure habitation, leauing those to shift as well as they might, who in their extremitie [unspec 50] had refused to stand by them. Herewithall he mentioned a towne in Italie belong∣ing of old to the State of Athens, of which towne hee said an Oracle had fore-told, That the Athenians in processe of time should build it a new, and there (quoth he) will we plant our selues, leauing vnto you a sorrowful remembrance of my words,

and of your owne vnthankfulnesse. The Peloponnesians hearing thus much, began to enter into better consideration of the Athenians, whose affaires depended not, as they well perceiued, vpon so weake termes, that they should bee driuen to crouch to others; but rather were such, as might inforce the rest to yeeld to them, and con∣descend euen to the vttermost of their owne demands.

For the Athenians, when they first embraced that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 resolution of leauing their grounds and houses to fire and ruine, if necessitie should inforce them so far, for the preseruation of their libertie; did imploy the most of their priuate wealth, and all the common treasure, in building a great Nauie. By these meanes they ho∣ped (which accordingly fell out) that no such calamitie should befall them by land, [unspec 10] as might not well be counterpoised be great aduantages at sea: Knowing well, that a strong fleet would either procure victorie at home, or a secure passage to any o∣ther 〈◊〉〈◊〉. The other States of Greece held it sufficient, if building a few new ships, they did somewhat amend their Nauie. Whereby it came to passe, that, had they been vanquished, they could not haue expected any other fortune than either present death, or perpetuall slauerie; neither could they hope to be victorious with∣out the assistance of the Athenians, whose forces by sea did equall all theirs toge∣ther; the whole consisting of more than three hundred and fourescore bottomes. Wherefore these Peloponnesians beginning to suspect their owne condition, which would haue stood vpon desperate points, if the fleet of Athens had forsaken them; [unspec 20] were some perswaded, by the greater feare of such a bad euent, to forget the lesser, which they had conceiued of the Persians: and laying aside their insolent brauerie, they yeelded to that most profitable counsaile of abiding at Salamis.

§. VI. How the Persians consulted about giuing battaile: and how THEMISTO∣CLES by policie held the Greekes to their resolution; with the vi∣ctorie at Salamis thereupon ensuing. [unspec 30]

IN the meane season the Persians had entred into consultation, whe∣ther it were conuenient to offer battell to the Greekes, or no. The rest of the Captains giuing such aduice as they thoughtwould best please the King their Master, had soon agreed vpon the fight: but Artemisia Queene of Halicarnassus, who followed Xerxes to this war in person, was of contrarie opinion. Her Counsell was, that the King himselfe directly should march toward Peloponnesus, whereby it would come to passe, that the Greeke Nauie (vnable otherwise to continue long at Salamis for want of prouision) should pre∣sently be disseuered, and euery one seeking to preserue his owne Citie and goods, [unspec 40] they should, being diuided, proue vnable to resist him, who had wonne so far vpon them when they held together. And as the profit will bee great in forbearing to giue battell; so on the other side, the danger will bee more (said shee) which wee shall vnder-goe, than any need requireth vs to aduenture vpon; and the losse in case it fall vpon vs, greater than the profit of the victory which we desire. For if we com∣pell the enemies to flie, it is more than they would haue done, we sitting still: but if they, as better Sea-men than ours, put vs to the worst, the iourney to Pelopon∣nesus is vtterly dasht, and many that now declare for vs, will soone reuolt vnto the Greekes. Mardonius, whom Xerxes had sent for that purpose to the fleet, related vn∣to his Master the common consent of the other Captaines, & withall this disagree∣ing [unspec 50] opinion of Artemisia. The King well pleased with her aduice, yet resolued vpon following the more generall, but farre-worse counsaile of the rest; which would questionlesse haue beene the same which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gaue, had not feare and flatterie made all the Captaines vtter that, as out of their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 iudgement, which

they thought most conformable to their Princes determination. So it was indeede that Xerxes had entertained a vaine perswasion of much good, that his owne pre∣sence vpon the shore to behold the conflict, would worke among the Souldiers. Therefore he incamped vpon the Sea-side, pitching his owne 〈◊〉〈◊〉 on the mount Aegaleus, which is opposite vnto the Ile of Salamis, whence at ease hee might safely view all which might happen in that action, hauing Scribes about him to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 downe the acts and behauiour of euery Captaine. The neere approch of the Bar∣barians, together with the newes of that timorous diligence, which their Countri∣men shewed in fortifying the Isthmus, and of a Persian Armie, marching a-pace thi∣ther, did now againe so terrifie and amaze the Peloponnesians, that no intreatie, nor [unspec 10] contestation would suffice to hold them together. For they thought it meere mad∣nesse to fight for a Countrey alreadie lost, when they rather should endeuour to saue that which remained vnconquered; propounding chiefly to themselues what miserie would befall them, if losing the victorie, they should be driuen into Salamis, there to be shut vp, and besieged round in a poore desolate Iland.

Hereupon they resolued forth-with to set saile for Isthmus: which had presently beene done, if the wisedome of Themistocles had not preuented it. For he perceiuing what a violent feare had stopt vp their eares against all good counsaile, did practise another course, & forth-with labour to preuent the execution of this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 decree; not suffering the very houre of performance to find him busie in wrangling [unspec 20] altercation. As soone as the Councell brake vp, hee dispatched secretly a trustie Gentleman to the Persian Captaines, informing them truely of the intended flight, and exhorting them to send part of their Nauie about the Iland, which incompas∣sing the Greekes, might preuent their escape; giuing them withall a false hope of his assistance. The Persians no sooner heard than beleeued these good newes, well knowing that the victorie was their owne assured, if the Athenian fleet ioyned with them; which they might easily hope, considering what abilitie their Master had to recompence for so doing, both the Captaines with rich rewards, and the People with restitution of their 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and Territories. By these meanes it fell out, that when the Greekes very early in the morning were about to waigh Anchor, they [unspec 30] found themselues inclosed round with Persians, who had laboured hard all night, sending many of their ships about the Ile of Salamis, to charge the enemie in reare, and landing many of their men in the Isle of Psyttalea, which lycth ouer-against Sa∣lamis, to saue such of their owne, and kill such of the Graecian partie, as by any mis∣fortune should be cast vpon the shore. Thus did meere necessitie enforce the Grae∣cians to vndertake the battaile in the Straights of Salamis, where they obtained a memorable victorie, stemming the formost of their enemies, and chasing the rest, who falling foule one vpon another, could neither conueniently fight nor 〈◊〉〈◊〉. I do not finde any particular occurrances in this great battaile to be much remarkable. Sure it is that the Scribes of Xerxes had a wearisome taske of writing downe many [unspec 40] disasters that befell the Persian fleet, which ill acquited it selfe that day, doing no one peece of seruice worthie the presence of their King, or the registring of his Notaries. As for the Greekes, they might wel seeme to haue wrought out that victo∣rie with equall courage, were it not that the principall honour of that day was ascribed to those of Aegina, and to the Athenians, of whom it is recorded, That when the Barbarians did flie towards Phalerus, where the Land-armie of Xerxes lay, the ships of Aegina hauing possessed the Straights, did sinke or take them, whilest the Athenians did valiantly giue charge vpon those that kept the Sea, and made a∣ny countenance of resisting. [unspec 50]

§. VII. Of things following after the battaile of Salamis: and of the flight of XERXES.

AFter this victorie, the Greekes intending, by way of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to deter∣mine which of the Captaines had best merited of them, in all this great seruice; euery Captaine, being ambitious of that honour, did in the first place write downe his owne name, but in the second place as best deseruing next vnto himselfe, almost euery Suffrage did concur vpon Themistocles. Thus priuate affection yeelded vnto vertue, as soon as her own [unspec 10] turne was serued. The Persian King, as not amazed with this calamitie, began to make new preparation for continuance of warre; but in such fashion, that they which were best acquainted with his temper, might easily discerne his faint heart, through his painted lookes. Especially Mardonius, Author of the warre, began to cast a warie eye vpon his Master, fearing lest his counsell should be rewarded accor∣ding to the euent. Wherefore purposing rather to aduenture his life in pursuite of the victorie, than to cast it away by vnder-going his Princes indignation; he ad∣uised the King to leaue vnto him three hundred thousand men, with which forces he promised to reduce all Greece vnder the subiection of the Persian Scepter. Here∣withall he forgot not to sooth Xerxes with many faire words; telling him, that the [unspec 20] cowardise of those Aegyptians, Phoenicians, and Cilicians, with others of the like met∣tall, nothing better than slaues, who had so ill be haued themselues in the late Sea∣seruice, did not concerne his honour, who had alwaies been victorious, and had al∣readie subdued the better part of Greece, yea taken Athens it selfe, against which the Warre was principally intended. These words found very good acceptance in the Kings eare, who presently betooke himselfe to his iourney homewards, ma∣king the more haste, for that he vnderstood, how the Greekes had a purpose to saile to Hellespont, and there to breake downe his bridge, and intercept his passage. True it was that the Greekes had no such intent, but rather wished his hastie departure, knowing that hee would leaue his Armie not so strong, as it should haue beene, had [unspec 30] he in person remained with it. And for this cause did Eurybiades giue counsel, that by no meanes they should attempt the breaking of that bridge, lest necessitie should inforce the Persians to take courage, and rather to fight like men, than die like beasts. Wherefore Themistocles did, vnder pretence of friendship, send a false aduertisement to this timorous Prince, aduising him to conuay himselfe into Asia with all speed, before his bridge were dissolued: which counsell Xerxes tooke verie kindly, and hastily followed, as before is shewed. Whether it were so that hee found the bridge whole, and thereby repassed into Asia; or whether it were torne in sun∣der by tempests, and he thereby driuen to imbarke himselfe in some obscure vessel, it is not greatly materiall; though the Greekes did most willingly imbrace the later [unspec 40] of these reports. Howsoeuer it were, this flight of his did well ease the Countrie; that was therby disburdened of that huge throng of people, which, as Locusts, had before ouerwhelmed it.

§. VIII. The negotiations betweene MARDONIVS and the Athenians, as also be∣tweene the Athenians and Lacedaemonians; after the slight of XERXES.

MARDONIVS with his three hundred thousand had withdrawn him∣selfe [unspec 50] into Thessalie, whence 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sent Alexander, the sonne of Amyntas King of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as Embassadour to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, with promise of large amends for all their losses receiued; and of extending their Ter∣ritories as farre as their owne desires; allowing them to retaine

their libertie and lawes, if they would make peace with Xerxes, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 him in that Warre.

The Athenians had now reentred their Citie, but not as yet brought backe their wiues and children; for as much as they well perceiued that the place could not be secure, till the Armie of Mardonius were broken and defeated. Wherefore the Lacedaemonians, vnderstanding what faire conditions this Embassadour would pro∣pound, were perplexed with very great 〈◊〉〈◊〉, lest hee should finde good and ready acceptance. Hereupon, they likewise very speedily dispatched their Embassadours for Athens, who arriuing, before the Macedonian had audience, vsed the best of their perswasion to retaine the Athenians firme. They alleadged, that neither Xerxes [unspec 10] nor Darius had any pretence of Warre against the rest of Greece, but had onely threatned the subuersion of Athens, till they and all their Confederates arming themselues in defence of that Citie, were drawne into the quarrell, wherein the A∣thenians without much crueltie of injustice could not leaue them. Wee know, said they, that yee haue indured great calamities, losing the fruit of the grounds, and being driuen to forsake the Towne, the houses whereof bee ruined, and vnfit for your habitation; in regard whereof, we vndertake to maintaine as our owne, your wiues and children amongst vs, as long as the war shall continue, hoping that yee, who haue alwaies procured libertie to others, will not now goe about to bring all Greece into slauerie and bondage. As for the Barbarians, their promises are large, but their words and oathes are of no assurance. It was needlesse to vse many argu∣ments [unspec 20] to the Athenians, who gaue answere to Alexander in presence of the Spartan Embassadours; That whilest the Sunne continued his course, they would be ene∣mies to Xerxes, regarding neither gold nor any riches, with which he might seek to make purchase of their libertie. Concerning the maintenance of their wiues and children, it was a burden which they promised to sustaine themselues, only desiring the Lacedaemonians, that with all speede they would cause their Armie to march, for as much as it was not likely, that Mardonius would long sit still in Thessalie, hauing once receiued such a peremptorie answere. In this their opinion of Mardonius his readinesse to inuade Attica, they found themselues nothing deceiued. For hee, as [unspec 30] soone as Alexander had returned their obstinate purpose of resistance, did foorth∣with leade his Armie towards them, and their Citie: they hauing now the second time quitted it, and conueyed themselues into places of more securitie abroad in the Countrie, where they expected the arriuall of their Confederates.

From Athens he sent his Agent vnto them with instructions, not only to perswade them to acceptance of the conditions before to them propounded, but with great promises to allure the principall of them to his partie. His hope was that either the people, wearied with forsaking their houses so often, would be desirous to preserue them from fire, and to haue those which were alreadie laid waste, reedified at the Kings charges: Or if this affection took no place with them, but that needes they [unspec 40] would relie vpon their old Confederates, whose succours did very slowly aduance forwards, yet perhaps the Leaders might bee wonne with great rewards, to draw them to this purpose; all which projects if they should faile, the destruction of A∣thens would be a good meane to please his Master, King Xerxes, who must thereby needes vnderstand, that Mardonius kept his ground, and feared not to confront the whole power of Greece, in the strongest part of their owne Countrie. But his ex∣pectation was beguiled in all these. For the Athenians so little regarded his offers, that when one Lycidas, or (as Demosthenes calls him) Cyrcilus, aduised the Senate to accept the conditons, and propound them to the people; all the Senators, and as many as abiding without the Counsaile-house heard what he had said, immediate∣ly [unspec 50] set vpon him, and stoned him to death; not examining whether it were feare or money, that had mooued him to vtter such a vile sentence. Yea, the women of A∣thens, in the Ile of Salamis, hearing of his bad counsaile, and bad end, assembling to∣gether, did enter his house there, & put his wife and children to the like execution.

All this brauerie notwithstanding, when they perceyued the slacknesse of the Pelo∣ponnesians in giuing them aide, they were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to betake themselues to Salamis a∣gaine, the old place of their securitie. Remaining there, and seeing little forward∣nesse in those whom it most concerned to assist them, they sent verie seuere messa∣ges to Sparta, complaining of their slacknes, & threatning withal, to take such course as might stand best with their owne good, seeing that the common estate of all was so little regarded. These messengers were at the first entertained with dilatorie an∣sweres, which euery day grew colder, when as the Peloponnesian Wall, builded a∣thwart the Isthmus, was almost finished. But as the Lacedaemonians waxed carelesse and dull, so the Athenians hotely pressed them to a quicke resolution, giuing them [unspec 10] plainely to vnderstand, that if they should hold on in those dilatorie courses, it would not be long ere the Citie of Athens tooke a new course, that should little please them. All this while the Persian fleet lay vpon the coast of Asia, not daring to draw neerer vnto Greece, as being now too weake at Sea. Likewise the Greekish Nauie contained it selfe within the Harbours vpon Europe side; both to doe seruice where neede should require at home; and withall to shunne the danger which might haue befallen any part of it, that being distracted from the rest, had aduen∣tured ouer far. So mutuall feare preserued in quiet the Ilands lying in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Seas. But it was well and seasonably obserued by a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Sparta, that the wall vpon Isthmus would 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to little purpose for the defence of [unspec 20] Peloponnesus, if once the Athenians gaue eare to Mardonius: considering that many dores would be opened into that Demie-Iland, as soone as the Enemie should by winning the friendship of Athens, become the Master of the Seas about it. The Lacedaemonians vpon this admonition, making better pervsall of their own dangers, were very careful to giue satisfaction to the Athenian Embassadors, who not broo∣king their delaies, were vpon point of taking leaue, yea as it seemed, of renouncing their alliance. Wherefore dispatching away fiue thousand Spartans in the euening, vnder conduct of Pausanias; they gaue audience the next day to the Embassadours, whose complaints they answered with vehement protestations of their readinesse; deeply swearing that the Armie of Sparta was already farre vpon the iourney; and [unspec 30] giuing them leaue to take vp other fiue thousand Lacedaemonians, out of the Region adioyning, to follow after them.

The Athenians, though distasting such want of grauitie, in a matter so important, were neuerthelesse contented with the finall conclusion; and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the number appointed of Lacedaemonian Souldiers, made what haste they could to incampe in Attica. The other Graecians were nothing slacke in sending forth Companies, whose neere approch caused Mardonius to forsake Attica as a rough Country, and there∣fore of much disaduantage to Horse, wherein consisted the best of his power. Before his departure he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Citie of Athens, beating downe the wals of it, and rui∣ning all that had formerly escaped the fury of Warre. [unspec 40]

§. IX. The great battaile of 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

IT were too long a rehearsall to shew all that hapned in many skir∣mishes betweene the Greekes and him, in the Countrie of Boeotia, which Mardonius had chosen to bee the seate of that Warre. Much time was spent before the quarrell was decided by trial of one maine battaile: for both parties did stand vpon their guard, each expecting [unspec 50] when the other should assaile them.

The Armie of Mardonius contained about three hundred thousand, which were by him chosen out of Xerxes his Armie; to whom were adioyned the forces of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Macedonie, Thessalie, and other parts of Greece, that now siding with the Persian,

furnished his Campe with fiftie 〈◊〉〈◊〉 men. Against these the Lacedaemonians, Athenians, and their Confederates, had leauied an Armie of one hundred and ten thousand, of which fortie thousand were waightily armed, the rest were only assi∣stants to these fortie thousand, being armed more slightly, as rather to make excur∣sions and giue chase, than to sustaine any strong charges.

These two Armies hauing eleuen daies confronted one the other, without per∣forming any memorable piece of seruice; Mardonius, whose victualls beganne to faile, resolued to begin the fray. The Greekes were promised victorie by an Oracle, if they fought in the Land of the Athenians, and in the plaine of Ceres & Proserpina, making prayers vnto certaine gods, Demi-gods, and Nymphs. But it was hard to [unspec 10] finde the certaine place which the Oracle designed. For the plaine of Ceres was in∣deede in the Territorie of Athens; but there was also an old Temple of Ceres and Proserpina, neere vnto the place where they lay at that time encamped, as likewise the memorialls of those Nymphs, and Demi-gods, were in the same place, vpon Mount Cithaeron, and the ground serued well for foot-men against horse; onely the Land belonged vnto the Plataeans, and not vnto the Athenians.

Whilest the Greekes were perplexed about the interpretation of this doubtfull Oracle; the Plataeans, to make all cleere, did freely bestow their land on that side the Towne vpon the Athenians.

This magnificence of the Plataeans caused Alexander the Great, many ages after, to reedifie their Citie, which was ruined in the Peloponnesian warres. [unspec 20]

All things being readie for battaile; the Lacedaemonian Generall thought it most mecte, that the Athenians should stand opposite that day to the Medes and Persians, whom they had formerly vanquished at Marathon; and that he, with his 〈◊〉〈◊〉, should entertaine the Thebans and other Greekes which followed Mardonius, as bet∣ter acquainted with their fight, and hauing beaten them often-times before. This being agreed vpon, the Athenians changed place with the Lacedaemonians; which Mardonius vnderstanding (whether fearing the Athenians, of whose valour the Medes and Persians had felt heauie proofe, or desiring to encounter the Spartans, as thinking them the brauest Souldiers of Greece) hee did also change the order of his [unspec 30] battaile, and oppose himselfe to Pausanias. All the Greekes might well perceiue how the Enemie did shift his wings, and Pausanias thereupon returned to his former Sta∣tion; which Mardonius noting, did also the like. So one whole day was spent in changing to and fro. Some attempt the Persians made that day with their Archers on horse-back, who did so molest the Greekes at their watering place, that they were faine to enter into consultation of retiring; because they could not without much losse to themselues, and none to the enemie, lie neere to that Fountaine which did serue all the Camp. Hauing therefore concluded among themselues to dislodge; and part of the Armie being sent away before day-light: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 perceiued their departure in the morning, and thereupon being encouraged by their flight, (which [unspec 40] to him seemed to proceede out of meere cowardise) he charged them in reare with great violence. It may well be recorded as a notable example of patient valor, That the Lacedaemonians being ouer-taken by the Enemies horse, and ouer-whelmed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 great flights of Arrowes, did quietly sit stil, not making any resistance or defence, til the Sacrifices for victory were happily ended, though many of them were hurt and slaine, and some of especiall marke lost, before any signe of good successe appeared in the entrailes.

But as soone as Pausanias had found in the Sacrifice those tokens, which the super∣stition of that Age and Countrie accounted fortunate; hee gaue the Signall of bat∣taile: and therevpon the Souldiers, who till then did sit vpon the ground, as was [unspec 50] their manner, arose altogether, and with excellent courage receiued the charge of the Barbarians, that came thronging vpon them without any feare of such notable resistance. The rest of the Greeke Armie that was in march, being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by Pau∣sanias, came in a-pace to succour the Lacedaemonians: onely that part of the Armie

which was led by the Athenians, could not arriue vnto the place of the great battaile, because the Thebans, and other 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, gaue them checke by the way. Neuerthelesse, the Spartans with other their Assi∣stants, did so well acquite themselues, that the Persians were 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and Mardonius with many thousands more slaine in the field; the rest fledde into the Campe, which they had fortified with woodden walls, and there defended them∣selues with such courage as desperate necessitie inforced them vnto, holding out the longer, because the Lecedaemonians were not acquainted with the manner of as∣saulting Fortresses, and Walls. In the meane season, the Athenians hauing found strong opposition of the Thebans and Thessalians, did with much labour and courage [unspec 10] obtaine victorie, which hauing not long pursued, they came to helpe the Lacedaemo∣nians, whom they found wearily busied in assaulting the Campe, with more valour than skill. Wherefore they themselues vnder-tooke it, and in short space forced a passage through the Wall, at which breach first, and then on all sides, the Greekes entred with such furie, and iust desire of vengeance, that of three hundred thou∣sand they are said not to haue left three 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aliue, excepting those who fled away with Artabazus, when the Persian Armie first fell to rout.

If the execution were so great, as is reported, an especiall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of it was the foolish retrait, or rather flight into the Campe. For though it were so, that the place was well fortified, and the number of those who cast themselues into it, grea∣ter [unspec 20] than of the Assailants; yet they being of seuerall Nations and Languages, and hauing lost their Generall with other principall Commanders, it was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that they in such a terrour and astonishment should make good that piece of ground, lying in the heart of an Enemie Countrie, against an Armie of men, farre more valiant then themselues, and enflamed with present victorie. Therefore the same wall which for a few houres had preserued their liues, by holding out the E∣nemie, did now impale them, and leaue them to the slaughtering furie of vnpitti∣full Victors. Artabazus fled into Thrace, telling the people of Thessalie, and other Countries in his way, that hee was sent by Mardonius vpon some piece of seruice: For hee well knew, that had they vnderstood any thing of that great discomfiture, [unspec 30] all places would haue been hostile vnto him, and sought with his ruine to purchase fauour of the vanquishers. Therefore making so large marches, that many of his Souldiers being feeble were left behinde and lost, hee came to Byzantium, whence hee shipped his men ouer into Asia. Such was the end of the vaine-glorious expe∣dition, vnder-taken by Xerxes against the Greekes, vpon hope of honour, and great Conquest, though sorting otherwise, accordingly as Artabazus had fore-seene, and rather worse, for as much as it began the quarrell, which neuer ended, before the ruine of the Persian Empire was effected by that Nation of the Greekes, despised and sought to haue beene brought into slauerie. Hereby it may seeme, that the vi∣sion appearing to Xerxes, was from God himselfe, who had formerly disposed of [unspec 40] those things, ordaining the subuersion of the Persian Monarchie by the Greekes, who, thus prouoked, entred into greater consideration of their owne strength, and the weakenesse of their Enemies. [unspec 50]

§. X. The battaile of Mycale, with a strange accident that fell out in the be∣ginning of it: and examples of the like.

THe same day on which the battaile was fought at Plataeae, there was another battaile fought at Mycale, a Promontorie, or Head-land in Asia, where the Persian fleet rode.

Leutychides the Spartan, with Xantippus the Athenian, Admiralls of [unspec 10] the Greeke Nauie, at the request of some Ilanders and Ionians, did saile into those parts, to deliuer the Samians, and procure the Ionians to reuolt from the Persian. Xerxes himselfe at this time lay at Sardis, a Citie in Lydia, not farre from the Sea-side, hauing left threescore thousand vnder the command of Tigranes for defence of Ionia and the Sea-coast. Therefore when Artayntes and Ithramitres, Ad∣miralls of the Persian fleet, vnderstood that the Greekes bent their course towards them; they did forth-with draw their ships a-ground, fortifying with Palissadoes and otherwise, as much ground as did seem needfull for the encamping of al their Land and Sea-forces. Leutychides at his arriuall, perceiuing that they meant to keepe within their strength, and resoluing to force them out of it, rowed with his Gallie [unspec 20] close aboord the shore, and called vpon the Ionians (who more for feare then good wil were encamped among the Persians) exhorting them in the Greeke tongue to re∣member libertie, and vse the faire occasion which they now had to recouer it. Here∣in he did imitate Themistocles, who had done the like at Euboea; trusting that either these perswasions would preuaile; or if the Persians did happen to vnderstand them, that it would breed some ielousie in them, causing them to fight in feare of their owne Companions. It neede not seeme strange, that this very same stratageme, which little or nothing auailed Themistocles, did now very happily succeede. For Xerxes being in his full strength, it was a matter of much difficultie, to perswade those Inhabitants of Asia to reuolt; who now, in his declining estate, gaue a willing [unspec 30] eare to the sweet sound of libertie. The Persians likewise, who in their former bra∣uerie, little regarded and lesse feared any treason, to be contriued by their Subiects, were now so warie, that from the Samians which were amongst them, they tooke away their armes; the Milesians, whom they did suspect, but would not seeme to mistrust, they placed farre from them, as it were for defence of the straight passages of Mycale; pretending that these Milesians did best of all others know those places. But these deuices little auailed them. For the Samians perceiuing that they were held as Traitors, tooke courage in the heate of the fight, and laying hold vpon such weapons as came to hand, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Persians manfully within the Campe; which example the Ionians presently followed, being very glad to haue found some that [unspec 40] durst beginne. It is said that while the Greeks were yet in a march towards the Ene∣mies campe, a rumour suddenly ranne in the Armie, that Mardonius was ouer∣throwne in Greece, which (though perhaps it was giuen out by the Captaines to en∣courage the Souldiers) was very true. For the battaile of Plataeae was fought in the morning, and this of Mycale in the euening of the same day.

The like report of that great battaile, wherein Paulus Aemylius ouerthrew Per∣seus the last king of Macedon, was brought to Rome in foure daies, as Liuie with others doe record. And Plutarch hath many other examples of this kinde. As that of the battaile by the Riuer Sagra in Italie, which was heard of the same day in Peloponnesus: That of the battaile against the Tarquinians and the Latines, presently [unspec 50] noised at Rome: And (which is most remarkable) the victorie obtained against Lu∣cius Antonius, who was Rebell to Domitian the Emperour. This Lucius Antonius being Lieutenant of the higher Germanie, had corrupted his Armie with gifts and

promises, drawing the barbarous people to follow him, with great hope to make himselfe Emperour; which newes much troubling the Citie of Rome, with feare of a dangerous Warre; it was suddainely reported that Antonius was slaine, and his Armie defeated.

Hereupon many did offer sacrifice to the gods, and shew all manner of publique ioy, as in such cases was accustomed. But when better inquirie was made, and the Author of these tidings could not be found; the Emperour Domitian betooke him∣selfe to his iourney against the Rebell; and being with his Armie in march, hee receiued aduertisement by Poste, of the Victorie obtained, and the death of An∣tonius: whereupon remembring the rumour noised before in Rome, of the selfe∣same [unspec 10] victorie, hee found that the report and victorie were borne vpon one day, though twentie thousand furlongs (which make about fiue and twenty hundred miles) a-sunder. It is truely said of Plutarch, that this last example giues credit vnto many the like. And indeede it were very strange, if among so many rumours, be∣gotten by forgerie or mistakings, and fostered by credulous imagination, there should not be found (as happens in dreames among many thousand vaine and fri∣uolous) a fewe precisely true. Howbeit wee may finde, that God himselfe doth sometimes vse to terrifie those who presume vpon their owne strength, by these light meanes of tumultuous noises; as hee raised the siege of Samaria, by causing a sound of Horses and Chariots to affright the Aramites; and as he threatned Sena∣cherib, [unspec 20] saying: Behold, I will send a blast vpon him, and hee shall heare a noise, and re∣turne* 1.179 to his owne Land. Wherefore it may well haue beene true, that God was plea∣sed by such a meane as this, to animate the Greekes; who (as Herodotus notes) went towards the Enemies with heauie hearts, being in great feare, lest their owne ad∣uenture should by no meanes fall out well; considering in what danger they had left their Countrie of Greece, which was readie to be subdued by Mardonius, whilest they went wandring to seeke out enemies a-far-off, vpon the coast of Asia. But the fame of the battaile fought at Plataeae being noised among them; euery man desired that his owne valour in the present fight, might be some helpe to worke out the full deliuerance of Greece. In this alacritie of spirit, they diuided themselues into [unspec 30] two Battalions, whereof the Athenians led the one, by the way of the plaine, direct∣ly towards the enemies campe; the Lacedaemonians conducted the other, by the Mountaines and straight passages, to winne the higher ground. The Athenians did first set vpon the Campe (ere the Lacedaemonians could 〈◊〉〈◊〉 on the other part) and being desirous to get all the honour of the day to themselues, did so forcibly assault it, that they brake way through the Palissadoes and Gabions, and made themselues Masters of the place, slaying all that could not saue themselues by flight. In this fight the Samians did good seruice, as is formerly mentioned.

But the Miletians, who vpon the like iealousie, were placed by the Persians on [unspec 40] the tops of Mycale, to defend the passages; did now (as if they had beene set of pur∣pose to keepe them from running away) put as many to the sword as fell into their hands, letting none escape, except a very few, that fled through by-pathes. The Lacedaemonians that day did little seruice, for the businesse was dispatched ere they came in: Only they broke such companies as retyred in whole troups; making them flie dispersed in very much disorder, whereby the Milesians were enabled to doe the greater execution vpon them. This was the last fight of that huge Armie leauied against Greece, which was now vtterly broken, and had no meanes left to make offensiue Warre. [unspec 50]

§. XI. Of the barbarous qualitie of XERXES: with a transition from the Persian affaires to matters of Greece, which from this time grew more worthie of regard.

XERXES lay at Sardis, not farre from the place of this battaile; but little minde had hee to reuenge either this or other his great losses, [unspec 10] being wholly giuen ouer to the loue of his Brothers Wife: with whom when he could not preuaile by intreatie, nor would obtaine his desire by force, because he respected much his Brother her hus∣band, hee thought it best to make a match betweene his owne Sonne Darius, and the Daughter of this Woman; hoping by that meanes to finde occasion of such familiaritie as might worke out his desire. But whether it were so, that the cha∣stitie of the Mother did still reiect him, or the beauty of her Daughter allure him; he soone after fell in loue with his owne Sonnes wife, being a vicious Prince, and as ill able to gouerne himselfe in peace, as to guide his Armie in Warre. This yong Ladie hauing once desired the King to giue her the Garment which hee [unspec 20] then wore, being wrought by his owne Wife; caused the Queene thereby to perceiue her husbands conuersation with her, which shee imputed not so much to the beautie of her Daughter-in-law, as to the cunning of the Mother, against whom thereupon shee conceiued extreme hatred. Therefore at a Royall feast, wherein the custome was that the King should grant their request, shee craued that the Wife of Masistes, her husbands Brother, the yong Ladies Mother, might bee giuen into her disposition. The barbarous King, who might either haue reformed the abuse of such a custome, or haue deluded the importunate crueltie of his Wife, by threatning her selfe with the like, to whatsoeuer shee should inflict vpon the innocent Ladie, granted the request; and sending for [unspec 30] his brother, perswaded him to put away the Wife which he had, and take one of his Daughters in her stead. Hereby it seemes, that hee vnderstood how villai∣nously that poore Ladie should be intreated, whom hee knew to bee vertuous, and whom himselfe had loued. Masistes refused to put her away; alleaging his owne loue, her deseruing, and their common Children, one of which was mar∣ried to the Kings Sonne, as reasons important to mooue him to keepe her. But in most wicked manner Xerxes reuiled him; saying, That hee now should nei∣ther keepe the Wife which hee had, nor haue his Daughter whom hee had promised vnto him. Masistes was much grieued with these wordes, but much more, when returning home, hee found his Wife most butcherly mangled by [unspec 40] the Queene Amestris, who had caused her Nose, Lippes, Eares, and Tongue to be cut off, and her Brests in like manner, which were cast vnto Dogges. Ma∣sistes enraged with this vilanie, tooke his way with his children, and some Friends, towards Bactria, of which Prouince hee was Gouernour, intending to rebell and auenge himselfe. But Xerxes vnderstanding his purpose, caused an Armie to bee leauied, which cut him off by the way, putting him and all his Company to the sword. Such was the Tyrannicall condition of the Persian Gouernement; and such are generally the effects of Luxurie, when it is ioyned with absolute power.

Yet of Xerxes it is noted, that he was a Prince of much vertue. And therefore [unspec 50] Alexander the Great, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 an Image of his ouer-throwne, and lying vpon the ground, said, That hee doubted, whether in regard of his vertue, hee should againe erect it, or, for the mischiefe done by him to Greece, should let it lie.

But surely whatsoeuer his other good qualities were, he was foolish, and was a co∣ward, and consequently mercilesse.

Therefore wee may firmely beleeue, that the vertue of Cyrus was very great, vpon which the foundation of the Persian Empire was so surely laid, that all the wickednesse and vanities of Xerxes, and other worse Princes, could not ouer throw it, vntill it was broken by a vertue almost equall to that which did establish it. In warres against the Aegyptians, the fortune of Xerxes did continue, as at the first it had beene very good; but against the generall estate of Greece, neither hee, nor any of his posteritie, did euer make offensiue warre, but receiued many los∣ses in Asia, to which the last at Mycale serued but as an introduction; teaching the [unspec 10] Greekes, and especially the Athenians, that the Persian was no better Souldier at his owne dores, than in a forraine Countrie: whereof good triall was made forth-with, and much better proofe as soone as the affaires of Athens were quietly settled and assured.

From this time forward I will therefore pursue the Historie of Greece, taking in the matters of Persia, as also the estate of other Countries, collaterally, when the order of time shall present them. True it is, that the Persian estate continued in her greatnesse, many Ages following, in such wise that the knowne parts of the World had no other Kingdome, representing the Maiestie of a great Empire.

But this greatnesse depended only vpon the riches and power that had formerly [unspec 20] beene acquired, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 few actions or none that were worthy of remembrance, excepting some Tragedies of the Court, and examples of that excessiue Luxurie, where-with both it, and all, or the most of Empires that euer were, haue beene e∣neruated, made vnweldie, and (as it were) fattened for the hungrie swords of poore and hardie Enemies. Hereby it came to passe, that Xerxes and his successours were faine to defend their Crownes with money and base policies; very seldome or ne∣uer (vnlesse it were with great aduantage) daring to aduenture the triall of plaine battaile with that little Nation of Greece, which would soone haue ruined the foundations laid by Cyrus, had not priuate malice and ielousie vrged euery Citie to enuie the height of her Neighbours walls, and thereby di∣uerted [unspec 30] the swords of the Greekes into their owne bowels, which after the departure of Xerxes beganne very well, and might better haue continued, to hew out the way of conquest, on the side of Asia. [unspec 40] [unspec 50]

CHAP. VII. Of things that passed in Greece from the end of the Persian Warre, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian.

§. I. [unspec 10] How Athens was rebuilt and fortified.

AFTER that the Medes and Persians had receiued their last blow, and were vtterly beaten at Mycale: Leoty∣chides, who then commanded the Graecian Armie, leauing the pursuit of the warre to the Athenians, assisted by the reuolted Iones, returned with the La∣cedaemonians and other Peloponnesians to Sparta and o∣ther [unspec 20] places, out of which they had been leauied. The Athenians in the meane while besieged Sestos, a Citie on the strait of the Hellespont, betweene which and Abydus, Xerxes had lately fastned his Bridge of Boats: where the inhabitants, desperate of succour, did not long dispute the defence thereof, but quitted it to the Greekes, who entertained themselues the Winter following on that side the Hellespont. In the Spring they drew homeward, and hauing left their wiues and children, since the inuasion of Attica, and the abandoning of Athens, in diuers Islands, and at Troezen, they now found them out, and returned with them to their owne places. [unspec 30]

And though the most part of all their houses in Athens were burnt and broken downe, and the walls of the Citie ouer-turned, yet they resolued first on their com∣mon defence, and to fortifie their City, before they cared to couer themselues, their wiues and children, with any priuate buildings: Whereof the Lacedaemonians being aduertised, and misliking the fortifying of Athens, both in respect that their owne Citie of Sparta was vnwalled, as also because the Athenians were growne more powerfull by Sea, than either themselues, or any other State of Greece, they dispat∣ched messengers to the Athenians to disswade them; not acknowledging any priuat mislike or ielousie, but pretending, that if the Persians should returne to inuade Greece a third time, the Athenians being in no better state to defend themselues than [unspec 40] heretofore, the same would serue to receiue their enemies, and to bee made a Seate for the Warre, as Thebes had lately beene. To this the Athenians promised to giue them satisfaction by their owne Embassadors very speedily. But being resolued to goe on with their workes by the aduice of Themistocles, they held the Lacedaemoni∣ans in hope of the contrarie, till they had raysed their wals to that height, as they cared not for their mislikes, nor doubted their disturbance; and therefore (to gaine time) they dispatched Themistocles towards Lacedaemon, giuing him for excuse, that he could not deliuer the Athenians resolutions, till the arriuall of his fellow-Com∣missioners, who were of purpose retarded. But after a while, the Lacedaemonians expectation being conuerted into ielousie (for by the arriuall of diuers persons out [unspec 50] of Attica, they were told for certaine, That the walls of Athens were speedily growne vp beyond expectation) Themistocles prayed them not to beleeue reports and vaine rumors, but that they would be pleased to send some of their own trustie Citizens to Athens, from whose relation they might resolue themselues, and deter∣mine

accordingly. Which request being graunted, and Commissioners sent, The∣mistocles dispatched one of his owne, by whome hee aduised the Athenians, first to entertaine the Lacedaemonians with some such discourse as might retaine them a few dayes, and in conclusion to hold them among them, till him selfe and the other A∣thenian Embassadors, then at Sparta, had their libertie also to returne. Which done, and being also assured by his associates and Aristides, that Athens was already de∣fensible on all parts, Themistocles demaunding audience, made the Lacedaemonians know, That it was true that the wals of Athens were now raysed to that height, as the Athenians doubted not the defence of their Citie; praying the Lacedaemonians to beleeue, That when soeuer it pleased them to treat with the Athenians, they would [unspec 10] know them for such, as right well vnderstood what appertained to a Common∣weale and their owne safetie, without direction and aduice from any other: That they had in the warre of Xerxes abandoned their Citie, and committed themselues to the woodden wals of their shippes, from the resolution of their owne counsels and courage, and not thereto taught or perswaded by others: and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in all that perillous warre against the Persians they found their owne judgements and the exe∣cution thereof in nothing inferior, or lesse fortunate, than that of any other Nati∣on, State, or Commonweale among the Greekes; And therefore concluded, that they determined to be Masters and Iudges of their owne affaires, and thought it good reason, that either all the Cities confedered within Greece should be left open, or [unspec 20] else that the wals of Athens should be finished and maintained.

The Lacedaemonians finding the time vnfit for quarrell, dissembled their mislike, both of the fortifying of Athens, and of the diuision, and so suffered the Athenians to depart, and receiued backe from them their owne Embassadors.

The wals of Athens finished, they also fortified the Port Pyreus, by which they might vnder couert imbarke themselues vpon all occasions.

§. II. The beginning of the Athenian greatnesse, and prosperous warres made [unspec 30] by that State vpon the Persian.

THe Athenians hauing settled things in good order at home, prepared thirtie Gallies for the pursuit of the warre against the Persians, to which the Lacedaemonians added other twentie; and with this Fleet, strengthened by the rest of the Cities of Greece confederated, they set sayle for 〈◊〉〈◊〉, vnder the conduct of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Lacedaemonian; where after their landing hauing possest themselues of many principall places, they imbarked the Armie againe, and tooke land in Thrace, recouering from the Persians by force the Citie Bizantium, now Constantinople: from whence Pausanias, behauing [unspec 40] himselfe more like a Tyrant than a Captaine, especially towards the Ionians lately reuolted from Xerxes, was called backe by the counsell of Lacedaemon, and not onely accused of many insolent behauiors, but of intelligence with the Medes, and Trea∣son against his Countrey. In his stead they imployed Docres, who either gaue the same cause of offence; or else the Athenians, who affected the first commaundement in that warre, practised the souldiors to complaine, though indeed the wise and ver∣tuous behauior of Aristides, Generall of the Athenian forces, a man of rare and in∣comparable sinceritie, had beene able to make a good Commaunder seeme ill in comparison of himselfe; and therfore was much more auaileable, in rendring those detested, whose vices affoorded little matter of excuse. Howsoeuer it were, the La∣cedaemonians [unspec 50] being no lesse wearie of the warre, than the Athenians were eagre to pursue it, the one obtained their ease, and the other the execution and honor which they desired: for all the Greekes (those of Peloponnesus excepted) willingly subjected themselues to the commandement of the Athenians, which was both the beginning

of their greatnesse in that present age, and of their ruine in the next 〈◊〉〈◊〉. For the charge of the warre being now committed vnto them, they began to rate the confederated 〈◊〉〈◊〉, they appointed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Treasurers, and beganne to leuie money, according to their discretion, for the maintenance of the generall de∣fence of Greece, and for the recouering of those places on Europe side, in Asia the lesse, and the Islands, from the Persians. This tribute (the first that was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 payed by the Greekes) amounted to foure hundred and threescore Talents; which was raysed easily by the honest care of that just man Aristides, to whose discretion all the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 referred themselues, and no one man found occasion to complaine of him. But as the vertue of Aristides, and other worthy 〈◊〉〈◊〉, brought vnto [unspec 10] the Athenians great commoditie; so the desire which they conceiued of encreasing their commoditie, corrupted their vertue, and robbing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the generall loue, which had made them powerfull, abandoned their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of her 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which with her in the next age perished. For it was not long ere these foure hundred & threescore Talents were raysed to sixe hundred, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 long, after that, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Tyrannie had conuerted their followers into slaues, and extorted from them yeerely thirteene hundred Talents. The Isle of Delos was at the first appointed for the Treasure-house wherein these summes were layd vp; and where, at the generall 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the Captaines of those forces, sent by the confederates, were for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sake called to consultation. But the Athenians, who were stronger [unspec 20] by sea than all Greece besides, had lockt vp the common treasure in an Island, vnder their owne protection, from whence they might transport it at their pleasure, as af∣terward they did.

The generall Commaunder in this Warre was Cimon, the sonne of Miltiades, who first tooke Eiona, vpon the Riuer Strimon; then the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Sciros, inhabited by the Dolopes: they mastered the Caristij, and brought into seruitude the Naxij, contrarie to the forme of the confederacie: So did they other the inhabitants of Greece, if at any time they fayled of their contribution, or disobeyed their com∣maundements; taking vpon them and vsurping a kind of soueraigne authority ouer the rest: which they exercised the more assuredly, because they were now become [unspec 30] Lords of the Sea, and could not be resisted. For many of the confederated Cities and Nations, wearie of the warre in their owne persons, and giuen vp altogether to their ease, made choise rather to pay their parts in money, than either in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of warre, or in shippesl leauing the prouision of both to the Athenians. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the one grew weake in all their Sea-defences, and in the exercise of the Warres; the o∣ther greatly strengthened their Nauie and their experiences, being alwayes armed and imployed in honourable Seruices, at the cost of those, who hauing lifted them into their Saddles, were now enforced to become their footmen. Yet was the Tribute-money, leuied vpon these their confederates, employed so well by the Athenians at the first (as ill proceedings are often founded vpon good be∣ginnings) [unspec 40] that no great cause of repining was giuen. For they rigged out a great Fleet of Gallies, very well manned, wherewith Cimon the Admirall scouring the Asiaticke Seas, tooke in the Citie of Phaselis; which hauing formerly pretended neutralitie, and refused to relieue, or any way assist the Greekes, were enforced to pay 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Talents for a fine, and so to become followers of the Athenians, paying yeere∣ly contribution.

From thence hee set sayle for the Riuer Eurymedon in Pamphylia, where the Persian Fleet rode, being of sixe hundred sayle, or (according to the most sparing report) three hundred and fiftie, and hauing a great Land-Armie, encamped vpon the shoare; all which forces hauing beene prouided for aduauncing the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 af∣faires [unspec 50] in Greece, were vtterly defeated in one day, and two hundred shippes taken by the Athenians, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 being broken to pieces, or sunke, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 euer they had swomme in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Seas. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hauing in one day obtained two great victo∣ries, the one by the Sea, and the other by Land, was very soone presented with a

third. For fourescore sayle of Phoenicians (who were the best of all Sea men, vn∣der the Persian commaund) 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to haue joyned themselues with the Fleet 〈◊〉〈◊〉 destroyed, arriued vpon the same Coast, ignorant of what had passed, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nothing lesse than what 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Vpon the first notice of their approach, Ci∣mon weighed anchor, & meeting them at an head-Land, called Hydra, did so amaze them, that they only sought to runne themselues on ground; by which meane pre∣seruing few of their men, they lost all their shippes. These losses did so breake the courage of the Persian, that, omitting all hope of preuailing vpon Greece, he condis∣cended to whatsoeuer Articles it pleased the Athenians to propound, graunting li∣bertie vnto all the Greekes inhabiting Asia; and further couenanting, That none of [unspec 10] his shippes of Warre should sayle to the Westward of the Isles, called Cyaneae and Chelidoniae.

This was the most honourable peace that euer the Greekes made; neither did they in effect, after this time, make any warre that redounded to the profit or glory of the whole Nation, till such time as, vnder Alexander, they ouerthrew the Em∣pire of Persia; in which Warre few, or perhaps none of them, had any place of great commaund, but serued altogether vnder the Macedonians.

§. III. [unspec 20] The death of XERXES by the treason of ARTABANVS.

BEsides these losses, which could not easily haue beene repaired, the troubles of the Empire were at this time such, as gaue just cause to the Persian of seeking peace vpon any tearmes not altogether into∣lerable. For Artabanus, the vncle of Xerxes, perceiuing, that the King his master did easily take small occasions to shead the bloud of such, as in kindred or place were neere vnto him, beganne to repose lesse hope of safetie in remaining faithfull, than of obtaining the Soueraignetie, by destroying [unspec 30] a Prince that was so hated for his crueltie, and despised for his cowardise and misfortunes. Hauing conceiued this Treason, he found meanes to execute it by Mithridates an Eunuch, in such close manner, that (as if he himselfe had beene inno∣cent) he accused Darius the sonne of Xerxes, and caused him to suffer death as a Par∣ricide. Whether it be true, that by this great wickednesse he got the Kingdome, and held it seuen moneths; or whether intending the like euill to Artaxerxes the sonne of Xerxes, he was by him preuented and surprised, it were hard to affirme any cer∣tainetie. But all Writers agree vpon this, That taken he was, and with his whole familie put to death by extreme torments, according to the sentence, whereof the truth is more 〈◊〉〈◊〉 than the Verse. [unspec 40]

Raro antecedentem scelestum Deseruit pede poena claudo.

Seldome the villaine, though much haste he make, Lame-footed Vengeance failes to ouer-take. [unspec 50]

§. IIII. The banishment of THEMISTOCLES: His flight to ARTAXERXES newly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Persia; and his death.

ARTAXERXES being established in his Kingdome, and hauing so compounded with the Athenians, as the present necessitie of his af∣faires required, began to conceiue new hopes of better fortune against the Greekes, than he or his predecessors had euer hitherto found. For [unspec 10] the people of Athens, when the Persians were chased out of Greece, did so highly value their owne merites in that seruice, that they not onely thought it fit for themselues to become the Commanders ouer many Townes and Islands of the Greekes, but, euen within their owne wals, they would admit none other forme of Gouernment than meerely Democraticall. Herein they were so insolent, that no integritie nor good desert was able to preserue the estate of any such as had borne great office, longer than, by flattering the rascall multitude, he was con∣tented to frame all his words and deedes to their good liking.

This their intolerable demeanour much offended 〈◊〉〈◊〉; who, though in former times he had layed the foundations of his greatnesse vpon popularitie, yet [unspec 20] now presuming vpon his good 〈◊〉〈◊〉 done to the State, hee thought that with great reason they might graunt him the libertie to checke their inordinate procee∣dings. But contrariwise, they were so highly offended with his often 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the benefits which they had receiued from him, that they layed vpon him the punish∣ment of Ostracisme, whereby he was banished for tenne yeeres, as a man ouer-bur∣thensome to the Commonwealth.

Before the time of his returne was halfe expired, a new accusation was brought against him by the Lacedaemonians, who charged him of consulting with Pausanias, about betraying the whole Countrey of Greece vnto Xerxes. Heereupon Themi∣stocles finding no place of securitie against the malice of two such mightie Cities, was [unspec 30] driuen, after many troublesome flights, and dangerous remouings, to aduenture himselfe into Persia; where he found Artaxerxes newly settled, and was by him ve∣ry honourably entertained. But the great hope which Artaxerxes had conceiued of aduauncing his affaires by the counsell and assistance of Themistocles, proued al∣together fruitlesse. For when the Athenians, in fauour of Inarus the Lybian, (who infested Aegypt, causing it to rebell against the Persian) had sent a Fleet to Sea, lan∣ding an Armie in Aegypt, and scowring those Easterne Seas, to the great hinderance of Artaxerxes, and (for ought that I can vnderstand) to the manifest breach of that peace, which to their great honour they had concluded with 〈◊〉〈◊〉; then did the King send his Letters to Themistocles, requiring him to make good the hopes which [unspec 40] he had giuen, of assuring the Persian estate against the Greekes.

But whether Themistocles perceiued much vnlikelinesse of good successe, in lea∣ding a great Armie of dastardly Persians against the warlike people of Greece; or else (as in fauour of his vertue it is more commonly reported) the loue of his Countrey would not permit him to seeke honour by the ruine of it: sure it is, that being ap∣pointed by Artaxerxes to vndertake the conduct 〈◊〉〈◊〉 great forces against the Atheni∣ans, hee decided the great conflict betweene thankfulnesse to his well-deseruing Prince, and naturall affection to his owne ill-deseruing people, by finishing his life with a cup of poyson. [unspec 50]

§. V. How the Athenians, breaking the peace, which to their great honour they had made with the Persian, were shamefully beaten in Aegypt.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 was Artaxerxes driuen to vse the seruice of his owne Captaines in the Aegyptian warre, wherein it appeared well, That a just cause is a good defence against a strong enemie. An 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Fleet of two hun∣dred saile strong was sent forth vnder Cimon, to take in the Isle of [unspec 10] Cyprus: which conquest seemed easie both to make and to maintaine, the Persian being vtterly broken at Sea, and thereby vnable to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Island. Now although it were so, that a peace had beene concluded, which was likely to haue beene kept sincerely by the Persian, who had made so good proofe of the Grae∣cian valour, that he was nothing desirous to build any shippes of Warre (without which the Greekes could receiue no harme from him) whereof if any one should be found sayling towards Greece, the peace was immediately broken, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 if not, his whole estate; yet all the Sea-coast (no small part of his Dominions) 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the waste of an enemie too farre ouer-matching him. Yet whether the Athenians were in doubt, lest the league which in his owne worser fortunes hee had made with [unspec 20] them, he would breake in theirs; and therefore sought to get such assurance into their hands, as might vtterly disable him from attempting ought against them; or whether the increase of their reuenues and power, by adding that rich and great I∣land to their Empire, caused them to measure honour by profit; they thought it the wisest way, to take whilest they might, whatsoeuer they were able to get and hold, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vnable to defend.

The Ile of Cypres lying in the bottome of the straights betweene Cilicia, Syria and Aegypt, is very fitly seated for any Prince of State, that being mighty at Sea, doth either seeke to enrich himselfe by trade with those Countries, or to infest one or more of them when they are his enemies. And this being the purpose of the Athe∣nians, [unspec 30] their Ambition which had already deuoured, in conceit, this Iland, was on the sodaine well nigh choaked with a greater morsell, to smatch at which, they let Cyprus alone, which they might easily haue swallowed and digested. For Inarus King of the Lybians confining Aegypt, hauing found how greatly the Country was exhausted by the late warres, and how weakely defended by very slender Persian garrisons, conceiued rightly, that if such small forces as the Satrapa or Viceroy could make on the sodaine of his owne Gardes, or leuie out of the ordinarie Garrisons, were by him defeated; the naturalls of the Countrey, not long since oppressed by Camby∣ses, and after a reuolt very lately subdued by Xerxes, would soone breake faith with [unspec 40] him who had no other title to that kingdome than a good sword. Further, he per∣swaded himselfe that the people, vnable to defend themselues against the Persian without his assistance; would easily be drawne to accept him, the author of their deliuerance for king. Neither did this hope deceiue him. For hauing taken and cruelly slaine Achaemenes the Viceroy; diuers Cities forthwith declared themselues for him, and proclayming him king, shewed the most of their endeuour for prose∣cution of the warre. But hee considering his owne weakenesse, and that the meanes of the Aegyptians his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were not answerable to their desires, perceiued wel, that to resist the power of Artaxerxes, farre greater forces than his and theirs were to be procured, at what price 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he obtained them. Therefore hearing of the [unspec 50] great Athenian fleete, and knowing well the vertue of the souldiers therein embar∣qued; he inuited the Commaunders to share with him the kingdome of Aegypt, as a farre greater reward of their aduenture, than such an addition as that of Cyprus could be to their estate. Whether hee or they (if things had wholy sorted accor∣ding to their expectation) would haue beene contented with an equall share, and

not haue fallen out in the partition, were perhaps a diuination 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Hee was possessed of the peoples loue, they were of most power. But the issue of those affaires was such as left them nothing to cōmunicate but misfortunes, which they shared somewhat equally. Yet had the beginnings of their enterprise very good and hopefull successe: For they entred the Land as farre as to Memphis, the princi∣pall Citie; and of the Citie it selfe they tooke two parts: to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 part, which was called the White wall, they layd such hard siege, that neither those forces of the Persians, which then were in Aegypt, were strong enough to remoue them; nei∣ther could Artaxerxes wel deuise what meanes to vse for the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of that which was lost, or for the preseruation of the remainder. The best of his hope was by [unspec 10] setting the Lacedaemonians vpon Athens, to enforce the Athenians to looke home∣wards to their owne defence. This was the first time that the Persian sought to pro∣cure 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Greekes one against the other, by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them vp with gold to the entertainement of priuate quarrels, for the good of their common enemie. To this purpose he sent Megabazus to Sparta with much Treasure; who, after great expence, finding that the Lacedaemonians were nothing forward in imploying their whole force against the Athenians, whome in many conflicts of great importance they had found to be their matches, notwithstanding the absence of their Armie in Aegypt; he thought it his wisest way to imploy the rest of his money & meanes to their reliefe, who had now the space of sixe yeeres defended his masters right in [unspec 20] Aegypt. Therefore he hastily dispatched another of his name, the sonne of Zopy∣rus, who arriuing in Aegypt, was first encountred by the reuolted people; ouer whome he obtained a victorie, which made him master of the Countrey, whilest the Athenians lay busied about Memphis the great Citie. It cannot be doubted, that long abode in a strange ayre, and want of supply, had much enfeebled the Atheni∣ans: sure it is, that when Megabazus, hauing reduced the Countrey to obedience,* 1.180 attempted the Citie it selfe, whether his former successe had amended the courage of the Persians, or want of necessaries made the Athenians inferior to themselues, he chased them out of Memphis, and pursued them so neere, as they were forst to fortifie themselues in the Isle of Prosopites, where Megabazus, after eighteene [unspec 30] moneths siege, turning away one part of the Riuer by diuers Trenches, assaulted the Athenian without impediment of waters, tooke their Gallies, and put all to the* 1.181 sword, saue a few that saued themselues by flight into Lybia; the same entertaine∣ment had fiftie other Gallies which they sent to the succour of the first two hun∣dred. For those Athenians hauing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nothing that their Fleet and Armie was consumed, entred by the branch of Nilus, called Mendesium, and fell vnawares a∣mong the Phoenician Gallies and the Persian Armie; so as the Persians recouered all* 1.182 Aegypt, but that part held by Amyrteus, and Inarus the King of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, being by them taken and hanged. This was the end of the Athenians sixe yeeres warre in Aegypt, and the reward of their vanitie and indiscretion to vndertake many enterprises at [unspec 40] once.

§. VI. Of other Warres made by the Athenians for the most part with good successe, about the same time.

NOtwithstanding these ouerthrowes in Aegypt, yet the Athenians in their home-warres waded through many difficulties, and held the re∣putation of their forces against the Lacedaemonians, Corinthians, and [unspec 50] others, rather to their aduantage than otherwise. For as they were beaten neere vnto Halia by the Corinthians & Epidaurians, so they ob∣tained two great victories soone after; the one ouer the Peloponnesians, neere vnto Cecryphalia; the other ouer the Aeginets, neere vnto Aegina; where they sunke and

carried away threescore and ten Gallies of their Enemies. Furthermore, they lan∣ded their forces on the suddaine, and besieged Aegina, from whence they could not be moued, notwithstanding that the Corinthians, to diuert them, inuaded Megara; where, after a great fight, with equall losse, the Corinthians, when they returned a∣gaine to set vp their Trophie, as Victors in the former battaile, were vtterly bro∣ken and slaughtered by the Athenian Garrisons, and Megarians, to their great losse and dishonour.

Againe, as the Athenians were discomfited neere to Tanagra, by the Lacedaemoni∣ans, who returned from the succour of the Dorians against the Phocians, (at which time the Thessalian horse-men turned from their Allies the Athenians, and fought a∣gainst [unspec 10] them) so about threescore daies after, the Athenians entred Boeotia vnder the conduct of Myronides, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 beating that Nation, they wanne Phocis on the gulfe Oeteus, and euened the walls of Tanagra to the ground. Finally, they enforced 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to render vpon most base conditions; as to beat downe the walls of their Citie, and to giue them hostages for Tribute; the siege whereof they had continued, not∣withstanding all their other brabbles and attempts elsewhere. Besides these victo∣ries they sackt and spoiled many places vpon the Sea-coast of Peloponnesus, belong∣ing to the Lacedaemonians; wan vpon the Corinthians, and ouerthrew the Sicyonians that came to their succour. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were the vndertakings of the Athenians, and their Allies, during the time of those sixe yeeres that a part of their forces made [unspec 20] warre in Aegypt. In the end whereof they attempted Thessalie, perswaded thereun∣to by Orestes, but were resisted 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 King Pharsalus, who had chased Orestes out of his Dominions. They also 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and had victorie ouer those that resi∣sted, after which they made 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for fiue yeeres, and sent Cimon into Cyprus with two hundred 〈◊〉〈◊〉, but they were againe allured by Amyr∣teus one of the race of their former Kings, who held the Marish & Wooddie parts of Aegypt from the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to whom they sent sixtie of their ships. The rest of their Armie failing in their enterprise of Cyprus, and their fortunate and victorious Leader Cymon dying there, as they coasted the Iland, incountred a fleet of the Phoe∣nicians and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ouer both which Nations they returned victorious into Greece: [unspec 30] as also those returned safe which were sent into Aegypt.

§. VII. Of ARTAXERXES LONGIMANVS, that he was AHASHVEROSH the husband of Queene HESTER.

THese Aegyptian troubles being ended, the raigne of Artaxerxes con∣tinued peaceable, wherof the length is by some restrained into twen∣tie [unspec 40] yeeres, but the more and better Authors giue him fortie, some al∣low vnto him foure and fortie. He was a Prince of much humanitie, and noted for many examples of gentlenesse. His fauour was excee∣ding great to the Iewes, as appeareth by the Histories of Esdras and Nehemias, which fell in his time.

To proue that this was the King who gaue countenance and aide to that great worke of building the Temple, it were a needelesse trauaile; considering that all the late Diuines haue 〈◊〉〈◊〉 very much paine, to shew that those two Prophets were licensed by him, and succoured in that building, in such sort as appeares in their writings. [unspec 50]

This was likewise that King Ahashuerosh who married Hester. Wherof if it be need∣full to giue proofe, it may suffice; That Ahashuerosh liued in Susa, raigning from India to Aethiopia, and therefore must haue beene a Persian; That he liued in peace, as ap∣peares by the circumstances of the Historie, and vsed the counsaile of the seuen

Princes, the authoritie of which Princes beganne vnder Darius, the sonne of Hystas∣pes, wherefore he could be neither Cyrus nor Cambyses.

The continuall Warres which exercised King Darius the sonne of Hystaspes, to∣gether with the certainety of his marriages with sundry wiues, from none of whom he was diuorced, but left his first wife Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, aliue in great honour, shee being mother to Xerxes the succeeding King; doe manifestly prooue that Hester was not his. Whereunto is added by Philo the Iew, That at the perswa∣sion of Mardochaeus, Ioiachim the high Priest the sonne of Iesua, caused the feast of Purim to be instituted in memorie of that deliuerance. Now the time of Iotachim was in the raigne of Artaxerxes, at the comming of Esdras, and Nehemias: Iesua his [unspec 10] father dying about the end of Darius.

The same continuance of warres, with other his furious and tragicall loues, wherewith Xerxes did consume such little time, as hee had free from warre, are e∣nough to proue, that the storie of Hester pertained not vnto the time of Xerxes, who liued but one and twentie yeeres, whereas the two & thirtieth of Ahasuerus or Ar∣tasastha is expressed by Nehemias. Againe, it is well knowne, that Xerxes in the se∣uenth yeere of his raigne (wherein this marriage must haue been celebrated) came not neere to Susa. Of the Princes that succeeded Artaxerxes Longimanus, to prooue that none of them could be Ahashuerosh, it is enough to say, that Mardochaeus ha∣uing beene carried from 〈◊〉〈◊〉 captiue, with Iechonia, by Nebuchadnezzar, was [unspec 20] vnlikely to haue liued vnto their times.

But of this Artaxerxes it is true, that he liued in Susa, raigned from India to Ae∣thiopia, liued in peace, was contemporarie with Ioiakim the high Priest: and further he had happily by his Lieutenants reclaimed the rebellious Aegyptians in that se∣uenth yeere of his raigne; which good fortune might well giue occasion to such a Royall feast, as is described in the beginning of the booke of Hester. This is the summe of the arguments, brought to proue the age of Hesters storie by the learned and diligent Krentzhemius, who addes the authorities of Iosephus, affirming the same, and of Philo, giuing to Mardochaeus eighteene yeeres more than Isaac the Pa∣triarch liued, namely, one hundred fourescore and eighteene yeers in all, which ex∣pire [unspec 30] in the fiue and thirtieth of yeere of this Artaxerxes, if we suppose him to haue beene carried away captiue, being a Boy of ten yeeres old.

§. VIII. Of the troubles in Greece, foregoing the Peloponnesian Warre.

BVt it is fit that we now returne to the affaires of the Greekes, who from this time forward, more vehemently prosecuting their ciuill warres, suffered the Persians for many ages to rest in peace: this Aegyptian ex∣pedition [unspec 40] being come to nought. Soone after this, the Lacedaemonians vndertooke the warre called, Sacred, recouered the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Ile of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and deliuered both to the inhabitants; but the Athenians regained the same, and gaue it in charge to the Phocians. In the meane while the banished Boeo∣tians 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their owne Land, and mastred two of their owne Townes possest by the Athenians, which they soone recouered againe from them; but in their returne towards Athens, the Boeotians, Euboeans, and Locreans, (Nations opprest by the Athe∣nians) set vpon them with such resolution, as the Athenians were in that fight all slaine 〈◊〉〈◊〉 taken, whereby the Boeotians recouered their former libertie, restoring to the Athenians their prisoners. The Ilanders of Euboea tooke such courage vpon this, [unspec 50] that they reuolted wholly from the Athenians, whom when Pericles intended to re∣conquer, he was aduertised that the Megarians, (who first left the Lacedaemonians, and submitted themselues to Athens) being now wearie of their yoke, had slaine the Athenian Garrisons, and ioyned themselues with the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and

Epidaurians. These newes hastened Pericles homeward with all possible speede; but ere he could recouer Attica, the Peloponnesians, led by Plistoanax, the sonne of Pau∣sanias, had inuaded it, pillaged, and burnt many parts thereof; after whose returne Pericles went on with his first intent and recouered Euboea. Finally, the Athenians be∣ganne to treat of peace with the Peloponnesians, and yeelded to deliuer vp all the places which they held in the Country of Peloponnesus: and this truce was made for thirtie yeeres. After sixe of these yeeres were expired, the Athenians (fauouring the Mylesians against the Samians) inuaded Samos by Pericles, and after many repulses, and some great losses, both by Sea and Land, the citizens were forc't to yeeld them∣selues vpon most lamentable conditions; Namely, to deliuer vp all their ships, to [unspec 10] breake downe their own walls, to pay the charge of the warre, and to restore what∣soeuer had beene taken by themselues, or by their practice, from the Athenians. In the necke of which followed that long and cruell Peloponnesian Warre, whereof I haue gathered this briefe following: the same contention taking beginning fiftie yeeres after the flight of Xerxes out of Greece. But because there was no Citie there∣of, which either in the beginning of this warre, or in the continuance of it, was not drawne into the quarrell: I hold it conuenient now at the first to shew briefly the estate of the Countrie at that time, and especially the condition of those two great Cities, Athens, and Sparta, vpon which all the rest had most dependance. [unspec 20]

CHAP. VIII. Of the Peloponnesian Warre.

§. I. Vpon what termes the two principall Cities of Greece, Athens and Sparta, stood, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian Warre. [unspec 30]

GREECE was neuer vnited vnder the gouernement of any one Prince or Estate; vntill Philip of Macedon, and after him Alexander, brought them rather to a Vnion and League against the Persian, whereof they were Captaines, than into any absolute subiection. For e∣uery Estate held their owne, and were gouerned by [unspec 40] Lawes farre different, and by their owne Magistrates, notwithstanding the power of the Macedonians, to whom they did yeld obedience no otherwise than as to such, who were (perforce) their leaders in the Persi∣an warre (deemed the General quarrell of Greece) and tooke the profit and honor of the victorie, to their owne vse and increase of 〈◊〉〈◊〉. But the Kings which af∣terwards raigned in Macedonia, did so farre enlarge their authoritie, that all Greece was by them brought vnder such obedience, as differed little from seruitude; very few excepted, who could hardly, sometimes with armes, and sometimes with gifts, [unspec 50] preserue their liberty; of whom the Lacedamonians and Athenians were chiefe: which two people deserued best the plague of tyrannie, hauing first giuen occasion thereunto, by their great ambition, which wearied and weakened all the Countrie by perpetuall Warre. For vntill these two Cities of Athens and Sparta 〈◊〉〈◊〉

all Greece, drawing euery State into the quarrell, on the one or other side, and so gaue beginning to the Peloponnesian warre (the effects whereof in true estimation ceased not, before the time that Philip had ouer-mastred all, forasmuch as euery conclusion of one warre afforded hencefoorth matter to some new distraction of the whole Countrie) the warres, commenced betweene one Citie of Greece and an other, were neither great, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of long continuance. All controuersies were soone de∣cided, either by the authoritie of the Amphictiones, who were the generall Councel of Greece; or by the power of the Lacedaemonians, whose aide was commonly held as good as the assurance of victorie.

These Lacaedemonians had liued about foure hundred yeeres vnder one forme of [unspec 10] Gouernment, when the Peloponnesian warre beganne. Their education was onely to practise feates of Armes; wherein they so excelled, that a very few of them were thought equall to very great numbers of any other people. They were poore, and cared not much for wealth; euery one had an equall portion of the common field, which sufficed to maintaine him in such manner of life as they vsed. For brauery they had none, and curious building or apparell they regar∣ded not. Their diet was simple, their feasts and ordinarie meales being in com∣mon Halls, where all fared alike. They vsed money of yron, whereof they could not be couetous nor great hoarders. Briefly, they liued Vtopian- like, saue that they vsed no other occupation than Warre, placing all their felicitie in the glory of [unspec 20] their valour. Heereby it came to passe that in all enterprises, whereof they were partakers, the leading and high command was granted to them, and all Greece fol∣lowed their conduct. But the Athenians were in all points contrarie to this. For they sought wealth, and measured the honors of their victories by the profit; they vsed mercenarie Souldiers in their warres, and exacted great tribute of their Sub∣iects, which were for the most part Ilanders, compelled to obey them, because the Athenian fleet was great.

As in forme of policy, and in course of life, so in conditions naturall, the diffe∣rence betweene these two people was very much. The Athenians were eager and violent, suddaine in their conclusions, and as hastie in the execution; The Lacedae∣monians [unspec 30] very slow in their deliberations, full of grauitie, but very resolute, and such as would in cold bloud performe what the Athenians did vsually in flagrant. Wher∣by it came to passe, that the Lacedaemonians had all the Estates of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 depending vpon them, as on men firme and assured, that sought honour and not riches; wher∣as the Athenians were followed by such as obeyed them perforce, being held in straight subiection. But the Signorie of the Athenians was nothing large, vntill such time as the Persian Xerxes had inuaded Greece, pretending onely a quarrel to Athens: For then the Citizens perceiuing well, that the Towne of Athens could not be de∣fended against his great Armie of seuenteene hundred thousand men, bestowed all their wealth vpon a Nauie, and (assisted by the other Grecians) ouerthrew the fleet [unspec 40] of Xerxes, whose Land-forces were soone after discomfited by them, and the Greekes, who all serued vnder conduct of the Spartans. After these victories, the Athenians being now very mightie in fleet, reduced al the Ilands of the Greekish Seas vnder their obedience; imposing vpon them a hard tribute, for maintenance (as they 〈◊〉〈◊〉) of warre against the Persian; though indeede they imploied their forces chiefly, to the conquest of such Ilands, and hauen-Townes, of their owne Countrimen, as stood out against them. All which was easily suffered by the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who were In-landers, and men that delighted not in expeditions to be made farre from home. But afterwards perceiuing the power of the Athenians to grow great, they held them in much ielousie, and were very apt to quarrell with them; but much more willing to breed contention betweene them and other E∣states. [unspec 50] Wherefore at such time as the Thebans would haue oppressed the Plataeans, when they of Plataea repaired to Sparta for succour, they found there no other aide, than this aduice, That they should seeke helpe at Athens. Hereby it was

was 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that the Athenians should be intangled in a long and tedious Warre, with their neighbours of Thebes. But it prooued otherwise; for their force was now so great, that all such occasions did onely serue to increase their honour and puissance.

§. II. How Sparta and Athens entred into Warre.

NEuerthelesse many Estates of Greece were very ill affected to Athens, [unspec 10] because that Citie grew very insolent vpon suddaine prosperitie, and maintaining the weaker Townes against the stronger, incroched a∣pace vpon their Neighbours, taking their dependants from them. Especially the Corinthians were much inraged, because the people of the Iland Corcyra, their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which had rebelled against them, and giuen them a great ouerthrow by Sea, was by the Athenians (who desired to increase their fleet by adioyning that of Corcyra vnto it) taken into protection, and the Corinthians thereby impeached of that reuenge which else they would haue taken. Now how∣soeuer it were so, that these dealings of the Athenians were not directly against the [unspec 20] conditions of peace agreed vpon among the Greekes, yet were the complaints made at Sparta so vehement, that (though with much a-doe) they concluded to redresse by warre the iniuries done to their Allies.

First therefore seeking religious pretences, they required the Athenians to expi∣ate certaine offences committed against the gods; whereto hauing for answere, That they themselues should expiate other the like offences, committed in Sparta; they beganne to deale plainely, and required that the people of some Townes, oppressed by the Estate of Athens, should be set at libertie; and that a decree made against those of Megara, whereby they were forbidden to enter any Port of the Athenians, should be reuersed. This last point they so earnestly pressed, that if they [unspec 30] might obtaine it, they promised to absist from their purpose of making Warre.

This they desired, not as a matter of any great importance (for it was a trifle) but only that by seeming to haue obtained somewhat, they might preserue their reputation without entring into a warre, which threatned them with greater diffi∣culties apparent, than they were very willing to vnder-〈◊〉〈◊〉.

But the Athenians would yeeld to nothing; for it was their whole desire that all Greece should take notice, how farre they were from feare of any other Citie. Hereupon they prepared on both sides verie strongly, all that was needfull to the Warre; wherein the Lacedaemonians were Superiour, both in number and qualitie, being assisted by most of the Cities in Greece; and hauing the generall fauour, as men [unspec 40] that pretended to set at libertie such as were oppressed: but the Athenians did as farre exceede them in all prouisions of Money, Shipping, Engines, and absolute power of command among their Subiects; which they held; and afterward found of greater vse in such neede, than the willing readinesse of friends, who soone grow wearie, and are not easily assembled. [unspec 50]

§. III. The beginning of the Peloponnesian Warre.

THe first and second yeeres expedition was very grieuous to the Citie of Athens. For the fields were wasted, the Trees cut downe; the Countrie people driuen to flie, with Wiues, Children, and Cattaile, into the Towne; whereby a most furious pestilence grew in the Citie, such as before they had neither felt, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 heard of. Hereunto was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the reuolt of the Mytilenians, in the Ile of Lesbos, and the siege of Plataea their con∣federated [unspec 10] Citie, which they durst not aduenture to raise, besides some small ouer∣throwes receiued. The Lacedaemonians assembling as great forces as they could raise out of Peloponnesus, did in the beginning of Summer enter the Countrie of At∣tica, and therein abide, vntill victuals beganne to faile, wasting and destroying all things round about: The Gouernours of the Athenians would not suffer the peo∣ple to issue into the field against them; for they knew the valour of their Enemies; but vsed to send a fleet into Peloponnesus, which wasted as fast all the Sea-coast of their Enemies, whilest they were making 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Attica. So the Peloponnesians being the stronger by Land, wanne the Towne of Plataea, which wanted rescue; the A∣thenians likewise being more mightie by Sea, did subdue 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which had re∣belled, [unspec 20] but could not be succoured from Sparta. By these proceedings in that warre, the Lacedaemonians beganne to perceiue how vnfit they were to deale with such e∣nemies. For after that Attica was throughly wasted, it lay not greatly in their power to doe any offence equall to such harme as they themselues might, and did receiue. Their Confederates beganne to set forward very slowly in their expeditions into Attica; perceiuing well that Athens was plentifully relieued with all necessaries, which came by the Sea from the Ilands that were subiect vnto that Estate; and therefore these inuaders tooke small pleasure in beholding the walls of that migh∣tie Citie, or in wasting a forsaken field, which was to them a patterne of the calami∣ties, with which their owne Territorie was the whilest afflicted. Wherefore they [unspec 30] beganne to set their care to build a strong Nauie, wherein they had little good suc∣cesse, being easily vanquished by the Athenians, who both had more and better ships, and were so skilfull in Sea-fights, that a few Vessels of theirs durst vndertake a great number of the Peloponnesians.

§. IIII. Of the great losse which the Spartans receiued at Pylus.

AMong other losses which the Spartans had felt by Sea; they receiued [unspec 40] at Pylus a verie sore blow, that compelled them to sue for peace. A 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Athenian ships bound for Corcyra, wasting in that passage, as their manner was, the coast of Laconia, and all the halfe Ile of Pelo∣ponnesus, was by contrarie windes detained at Pylus, which is a rag∣ged 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ioyning to the maine, by a strange 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Land. Before it there lies a small barren Iland of lesse than two miles compasse, and within that a creeke, which is a good harbour for ships, the force of weather being borne off by the head Land and Isle. This Promontorie the Athenians fortified, as well as in haste they might; and what was wanting in their artificiall fortification, was sup∣plied by the naturall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and site of the place. By holding this piece of ground, [unspec 50] and hauen, they in reason expected many aduantages against their enemies. For the Countrie adioyning was inhabited by the Messenians, who in ancient time had held very strong and cruell warre with Sparta; and (though quite subdued) they were held in straight subiection, yet was not the old 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so extinguished, that

by the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 neighbourhood and assistance of the Athenians, it might not bee reui∣ued. Furthermore it was thought, that many ill-willers to the Lacedaemonians, and as many of their bond-slaues as could escape from them, would repaire to Pylus, and from thence make daily excursions into Laconia, which was not farre off: Or if other hopes failed, yet would the benefit of this hauen, lying almost in the mid∣way betweene them and Corcyra, make them able to sur-round all Peloponnesus, and waste it at their pleasure. The newes of these doings at Pylus, drew the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thither in all 〈◊〉〈◊〉 out of Attica, which they had entred a few daies before with their whole 〈◊〉〈◊〉: but now they brought not only their Land-forces, but all their Na∣uie, to recouer this 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 how bad a neighbour it might proue in time, they [unspec 10] well foresaw, little fearing the grieuous losse at hand, which they there in few daies receiued. For when they in vaine made a generall assault on all sides, both by Sea and Land; finding that small Garrison which the Athenians had left, very resolute in the defence: they occupied the hauen, placing foure hundred and twentie 〈◊〉〈◊〉 men all of them, Citizens of Sparta, in the Iland before mentioned, at each end whereof is a channell, that leades into the Port; but so narrow, that only two ships in front could enter betweene the Isle and Pylus; likewise but feuen or eight ships could enter at once by the further channell, betweene the Iland and the Maine. Ha∣uing thus taken order to shut vp this new Towne by Sea, they sent part of their fleet to fetch wood, and other stuffe, where with to fortifie round about, and blocke [unspec 20] vp the piece on all sides. But in the meane season, the Athenian fleet, hearing of their danger that were left at Pylus, returned thither, and with great courage entring the hauen, did breake and sinke many of their Enemies vessels; tooke 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and infor∣ced the residue to runne themselues a ground.

Now was the Towne secure, and the Spartans abiding in the Iland as good as lost. Wherefore the Magistrates were sent from Sparta to the camp (as was their custome in great dangers) to aduise what where best for the publike safetie; who when they did perceiue that there was no other way to rescue their Citizens out of the Ile, then by composition with their enemies, they agreed to entreat with the Athenians about peace, taking truce in the meane while with the Captaines at Pylus. The con∣ditions [unspec 30] of the truce were, That the Lacedaemonians should deliuer vp all the ships which were in the coast, and that they should attempt nothing against the Towne, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Athenians against the camp: That a certaine quantitie of Bread, Wine, and Flesh, should be daily carried into the Isle, but that no ships should passe into the Iland secretly: That the Athenians should carrie the Lacedaemonian Embassadors to Athens, there to treat of peace, and should bring them backe, at whose returne the truce should end, which if in the meane time it were broken in any one point, should be held vtterly void in all: That when the truce was expired, the Athenians should restore the Peloponnesian ships, in as good case as they receiued them. The Embassadors comming to Athens, were of opinion, that as they themselues had be∣gunne [unspec 40] the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, so might they end it when they pleased. Wherefore they told the Athenians how great an honour it was that the Lacedaemonians did sue to them for peace, aduising them to make an end of warre, whilest with such reputation they might. But they found all contrarie to their expectation: For in stead of conclu∣ding vpon euen termes, or desiring of meete recompence for losse sustained; the Athenians demanded certaine Cities to bee restored to them, which had beene taken from them by the Lacedaemonians long before this warre beganne, refusing likewise to continue the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of peace, vnlesse the Spartans which were in the Ile, were first rendred vnto them as prisoners. Thus were the Embassa∣dours returned without effect; at which time the truce being ended, it was de∣sired [unspec 50] from the Athenian Captaines, that they should, according to their couenant, restore the ships, which had beene put into their handes. Whereto answere was made, that the condition of the truce was, That if any one article were broken, all should be held void; now (said the Athenians) yee haue assaulted our Garrisons,

and thereby are we acquited of our promise to restore the ships. This and the like friuolous allegations which they made, were but meere shifts; yet profit so farre o∣uer-weighed honour, that better answere none could be got. Then were the Lace∣daemonians driuen to vse many hard meanes, for conueiance of victuals into the 〈◊〉〈◊〉; which finally was taken by force, and the men that were in it carried prisoners to Athens, where it was decreed, that when the Peloponnesians next inuaded Attica, these prisoners should all be slaine. Whether fearing the death of these men, or with-held by the troubles, which (according to the Athenians hope) fell vpon them; the Lacedaemonians were now so farre from wasting Attica, that they suffered their owne Countrie to be continually ouer-runne, both by the Athenians, who landed [unspec 10] on all parts of their coast, and by those which issued out of Pylus; which became the Rendeuous of all that were ill-affected vnto them.

§. V. How the Lacedaemonians hardly, and to their great disaduantage, obtained a peace, that was not well kept.

THerefore they indeuoured greatly to obtaine peace; which the Athe∣nians would not harken vnto. For they were so puffed vp with the [unspec 20] continuance of good successe, that hauing sent a few bands of men in∣to Sicilie, to hold vp a faction there, and make what profit they might of the Sicilians quarrells; when afterward they heard that the diffe∣rences in that Ile were taken away, and their bands returned without either gaine or losse, they banished the Captaines, as if it had beene meerely through their de∣fault, that the Ile of Sicilie was not conquered; which (besides the longer distance) was in power to offend others, or defend it selfe, no whit inferiour vnto Peloponne∣sus. Yet was this their ouer-weening much abated shortly after, by some disasters receiued, especially in Thrace, where in a battaile which they lost at Amphipolis, Cleon, and Brasidas, Generalls of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian forces, were both [unspec 30] slaine; which two had most beene aduersaries to the peace. As the Athenians by their losses were taught moderation; so the Lacedaemonians, who not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 felt the like wounds, but through the great Nauie which they had receiued at Pylus, were faine to proceede lamely in the warre, against such as, through commoditie of their good fleet, had all aduantage that could be found in expedition, were feruently de∣sirous to conclude the businesse, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Fortune by any new fauour should reuiue the insolence, which was at this time well mortified in their Enemies. Neither was it only a consideration of their present estate, that vrged them to bring the treatie of peace to good and speedy effect; but other dangers hanging ouer their heads, and ready to fall on them, which vnlesse they compounded with the Athenians, they [unspec 40] knew not how to auoide. The estate of Argos, which had ancient enmitie with them, was now, after a truce of thirtie yeeres well-nigh expired, ready to take the benefit of their present troubles, by ioyning with those who alone found them worke enough. Argos was a rich and strong Citie, which though inferiour to Sparta in valour, yet was not so vn warlike, nor held such ill correspondence with the neighbouring Estates, that the Lacedaemonians could euer farre 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vpon it, when they had little else to doe. This was a thing that in the beginning of this Warre had not beene regarded. For it was then thought, that by wasting the Ter∣ritorie of Athens with sword and fire, the quarrell should easily and in short time haue beene ended, whereby not only the Athenians should haue beene brought to [unspec 50] good order, but the Corinthians and others, for whose sake the warre was vnder-ta∣ken, haue beene so firmely knit to the Lacedaemonians, that they should for loue of them haue abandoned the Argiues, to their owne fortunes. But now the vanitie of those hopes appeared, in that the Athenians abounding in ready money, and meanes

to raise more, were able to secure themselues by a strong 〈◊〉〈◊〉, from any great harme, that the Peloponnesians wanting wherewith to maintaine a Nauie, could doe vnto them, yea as Masters of the Sea, to wearie them out, as in effect alreadie they had done. As for the Confederates of Sparta, they could now endure neither warre nor peace; their daily trauailes, and many losses had so wearied and incensed them. Wherefore the Lacedaemonians were glad to vse the occasion, which the inclination of their enemies did then afford, of making a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 peace, which with much a-doe they procured, as seemed equall and easie; but were indeede impossible to be per∣formed, and therefore all their trauaile was little effectuall.

The restitution of prisoners and places taken being agreed vpon; it fell out by [unspec 10] lot, that the Lacedaemonians should restore first. These had won more townes vpon the continent from the Athenians, than the Athenians had from them; but what they had wonne, they had not won absolutely. For they had restored some Towns to such of their Allies, from whom the State of Athens had taken them; some, and those the most, they had set at libertie (as reason required) which had opened their gates vnto them, as to their friends and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & not compelled them to breake in as Enemies. Now concerning the Townes which were not in their owne hands, but had beene rendred vnto their Confederates, the Spartans found meanes to giue some satisfaction, by permitting the Athenians to retain others, which they had got∣ten in the warre; as for the rest, they promised more than afterwards they could [unspec 20] performe. The Cities which they had taken into protection, could not endure to heare of being abandoned, neither would they by any meanes yeeld themselues in∣to the hands of their old Lords the Athenians, whom they had offended by reuol∣ting, notwithstanding whatsoeuer articles were drawne, and concluded, for their securitie, and betterance in time to come. This dull performance of conditions on the side of the Spartans, made the Athenians become as backward in doing those things which on their part were required; so that restoring only the prisoners which they had, they deferred the rest, vntill such time as they might receiue the full satisfaction, according to the agreement. But before such time as these difficul∣ties brake out into matter of open quarrell, the Lacedaemonians entred into a more [unspec 30] straight alliance with the Athenians; making a league offensiue and defensiue with them. Hereunto they were moued by the backwardnesse of the Argiues, who be∣ing (as they thought) likely to haue sued for peace at their hands, as soone as things were once compounded betweene Athens and Sparta; did shew themselues plainly vnwilling to giue eare to any such motion. Thinking therefore, that by cutting from Argos all hope of Athenian succour, they should make sure worke, the Spartans regarded not the affections of other States, whom they had either bound vnto them by well-deseruing in the late warre, or found so troublesome, that their enmitie (if perhaps they durst let it appeare) were little worse than friendship. It bred great jelousie in all the Cities of Greece, to perceiue such a conjunction betweene two so [unspec 40] powerfull Signories: especially one clause threatning euery one, that was any thing apt to feare, with a secret intent that might be harboured in their proud conceipts, of subduing the whole Countrie, and taking each what they could lay hold on. For besides the other articles, it was agreed, That they might by mutuall consent adde new conditions, or alter the old at their owne pleasures. This impression wrought so strongly in the Corinthians, Thebans, & other ancient Confederates of Sparta, that the hate which they had borne to the Athenians their professed Enemies, was vio∣lently throwne vpon the Lacedaemonians their vnjust friends: whereby it came to passe, that they who had lately borne chiefe sway in Greece, might haue beene aban∣doned to the discretion of their Enemies, as alreadie in effect they were, had the E∣nemies [unspec 50] wisely vsed the aduantage.

§. VI. Of the negotiations, and practices, held betweene many States of Greece, by occasion of the peace that was concluded.

THe admiration wherein all Greece held the valour of Sparta as 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and able to make way through all impediments, had beene so excessiue, that when by some sinister accidents, that Citie was compelled to take and seeke peace, vpon termes not sounding very [unspec 10] honourable, this common opinion was not only abated, but (as hap∣pens vsually in things extreme) was changed into much contempt. For it was ne∣uer thought that any Lacedaemonian would haue endured to lay downe his weapons and yeeld himselfe prisoner, nor that any misfortune could haue beene so great, as should haue drawne that Citie to relieue it selfe otherwise than by force of Armes. But when once it had appeared that many of their Citizens, among whom were some of especiall marke, being ouer-laied by enemies, in the Iland before Pylus, had rather chosen to liue in captiuitie, than to die in fight; and that Pylus it selfe, sticking as a thorne in the foot of Laconia, had bred such anguish in that Estate, as vtterly wearying the accustomed Spartan resolution, had made it sit downe, and [unspec 20] seeke to refresh it selfe by dishonourable ease: then did not only the Corinthians and Thebans beginne to conceiue basely of those men which were vertuous, though vn∣fortunate; but other lesser Cities joyning with these in the same opinion, did cast their eies vpon the rich and great Citie of Arges, of whose abilitie, to doe much, they conceiued a strong beliefe, because of long time it had done nothing. Such is the base condition, which through foolish enuie is become almost naturall in the greater part of mankinde. We curiously search into their vices, in whom, had they kept some distance, we should haue discerned only the vertues; and comparing in∣juriously our best parts with their worst, are justly plagued with a false opinion of that good in strangers which we know to be wanting to our selues. [unspec 30]

The first that published their dislike of Sparta were the Corinthians, at whose ve∣hement entreaty (though moued rather by enuie at the greatnesse of Athens day∣ly encreasing) the Lacedaemonians had entred into the present warre. But these Co∣rinthians did only murmure at the peace, alleadging as grieuances, that some townes of theirs were left in the Athenians hands. The Mantinaeans, who during the time of warre, had procured some part of the Arcadians to become their followers, and for∣sake their dependency vpon the State of Sparta, did more freely & readily discouer themselues; feare of reuenge to come working more effectually, than indignation at things already past. The Argiues feeling the gale of prosperous Fortune that began to fill their sailes, prepared themselues to take as much of it as they could stand vn∣der; [unspec 40] giuing for that purpose vnto twelue of their citizens, a full and absolute commission to make alliance betweene them and any freecities of Greece (Athens and Sparta excepted) without any further trouble of propounding euery particular bu∣sinesse to the multitude. When the gates of Argos were set thus open to all com∣mers; the Mantinaeans began to lead the way, and many Cities of Peloponnesus fol∣lowing them entred into this new confederacy; some incited by priuate respects, o∣thers thinking it the wisest way to doe as the most did. What inconuenience might arise to them by these courses, the Lacedaemonians easily discerned, and therfore sent Embassadors to stoppe the matter at Corinth, where they well perceiued that the mischiefe had beene hatched. These Embassadors found in the Corinthians a very [unspec 50] rough disposition, with a grauity expressing the opinion which they had conceiued of their present aduantage ouer Sparta. They had caused all Cities which had not entred yet into the alliance with Argos, to send their Agents to them, in whose pre∣sence they gaue audience to the Lacedaemonians; the purport of whose Embassie was

this: That the Corinthians, without breach of their oath, could not forsake the alli∣ance, which they had long since made with Sparta, and that reason did as well binde them to hold themselues contented with the peace lately made, as religion enfor∣ced them to continue in their auncient confederacy, forasmuch as it had bin agreed betweene the Spartans and their associates, that the consent of the greater part, (which had yeelded vnto peace with Athens) should binde the lesser number to performe what was concluded, if no Diuine impediment withstood them. Heere∣unto the Corinthians made answere, that the Spartans had first begun to do them o∣pen wrong, in concluding the warre wherein they had lost many places, without prouision of restitution; & that the very clause, alledged by the Embassadors, did ac∣quite [unspec 10] them from any necessity of subscribing to the late peace, forasmuch as they had sworne vnto those people whom they perswaded to rebell against Athens, that they would neuer abandon them, nor willingly suffer them to fall againe into the tyrannous hands of the Athenians. Wherefore they held themselues bound both in reason and religion to vse all meanes of vpholding those, whom by common con∣sent they had taken into protection; for that an oth was no lesse to be accounted a Diuine impediment, than were pestilence, tempest, or any the like accident, hinde∣ring the performance of things vndertaken. As for the alliance with Argos, they said that they would doe as they should finde cause. Hauing dismissed the Embassadors with this answere, they made all hast to ioyne themselues with Argos, and caused o∣ther [unspec 20] States to doe the like; so that Sparta and Athens were in a manner left to them∣selues, the Thebans and Megarians being also vpon the point to haue entred into this new confederacie. But as the affections were diuers, which caused this hastie confluence of sudden friends to Argos, it so likewise came to passe that the friend∣ship it selfe, such as it was, had much diuersitie both of sinceritie & of continuance. For some there were that hated or feared the Lacedaemonians: as the Mantinaeans and Eleans: these did firmly betake them selues to the Argiues, in whom they knew the same affection to be inueterate; others did only hate the peace concluded; & these would rather 〈◊〉〈◊〉 followed the Spartans than the Argiues in warre, yet rather the Argiues in war than the Lacedaemonians in peace. Of this number were the Corinthi∣ans, [unspec 30] who knowing that the Thebans were affected like vnto themselues, dealt with them to enter into the societie of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as they had done: but the different formes of gouernment, vsed in Thebes and Argos, caused the Thebanes to hold rather with Sparta, that was ruled by the principall men, than to incurre the danger of in∣nouation, by joyning with such as committed the whole rule to the multitude.

This businesse hauing ill succeeded, the Corinthians beganne to bethinke them∣selues of their owne danger, who had not so much as any truce with Athens, and yet were vnprepared for warre. They sought therefore to come to some temporarie agreement with the Athenians, and hardly obtained it. For the Athenians, who had dealt with all Greece at one time, did not greatly care to come to any appointment, [unspec 40] with one citie that shewed against them more stomach than force; but gaue them to vnderstand that they might be safe enough from them, if they would claime the benefit of that alliance, which Athens had lately made with Sparta and her depen∣dants; yet finally they granted vnto these Corinthians (which were loth to ac∣knowledge themselues dependants of Sparta) the truce that they desired; but into priuate confederacie they would not admit them, it being an article of the league betweene them and the Spartans, That the one should not make peace nor warre without the other.

Heerein, as in many other passages, may clearely be scene the great aduantage which absolute Lords haue as well in peace as in warre, ouer such as are serued by [unspec 50] voluntaries. We shall hardly finde any one Signorie, that hath beene so constantly followed as Sparta was by so many States, and some of them little inferior to it self, being all as free: whereas contrariwise, the Athenians had lately, and by compulsiue meanes gotten their Dominion, wherein they demeaned themselues as Tyrants.

But in performance of conditions agreed vpon, the Athcnians were able to make their wordes good, by excluding any State out of their Confederacie, and giuing vp such places as were agreed vpon: of which the Lacedaemonians could doe neither the one nor the other. For such Townes as their old Allies had gotten by their meanes in the late warre, could not bee restored without their consent, which had them in present possession; and particularly the Towne of Panacte, which the Thebans held, could by no meanes be obtained from them by the Lacedaemonians (who earnestly desired it; that by restitution thereof vnto the Athenians, as earnestly demanding it, themselues might recouer Pylus) vnlesse they would agree to make a priuate alli∣ance with Thebes; which thereupon they were faine to doe, though knowing it to [unspec 10] be contrarie to the last agreement betweene them and Athens.

The Lacedaemonians hauing broken one article of the league made between them and the Athenians, that by so doing they might enable themselues to the perfor∣mance of another, were shamefully disappointed of their hopes by the Thebans, who did not giue vp the Towne of Panacte, till first they had vtterly demolished it, and made it of no worth to the Athenians. This was sought to haue beene excused by the Lacedaemonian Embassadours, who comming to Athens (whither 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 sent home all prisoners that had beene detained at Thebes) hoped with gentle words to salue the matter; saying, That from henceforth no enemie to Athens should nestle in Panacte, for it was destroied. But these Embassadours had not to deale with [unspec 20] tame fooles. For the Athenians told them in plaine termes, That of three principall conditions agreed vpon in their late League, they had not performed any one, but vsed such base collusion as stood not with their honour: hauing made priuate 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 the Thebans; hauing destroied a Towne that they should haue restored; 〈◊◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊◊〉 their dependants by warre, to make good the couenants of 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 peace. Hereupon they dismissed the Embassadors with rough 〈◊〉〈◊〉, meaning with as rough deedes to anger those that sent them.

There were at that time, both in Athens and Sparta, many that were ill-conten∣ted with the peace: among whom were the Ephori, chosen for that yeere, in Sparta; and Alcibiades a powerfull yong Gentleman in Athens. But the Ephori, though de∣siring [unspec 30] to renew the warre, yet wished that first they might get from the Athenians as much as was to bee rendred to them by couenant, especially Pylus that had so sorely troubled them. 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whose Nobilitie, riches, and fauour, with the peo∣ple, made him desire warre, as the meanes, whereby himselfe might procure some honourable emploiment, vsed all meanes to set the quarrell on foot, whilest the A∣thenians had yet both aduantage enough, as not hauing rendred ought saue their prisoners, and pretence enough to vse that aduantage of breaking the peace, by rea∣son that the Lacedaemonians (though indeede against their wills) had 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all co∣uenants with them. Now the State of Athens had fully determined to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Pylus, and to performe nothing that the Lacedaemonians should, and might require, vntill [unspec 40] they had first, without any longer halting, fulfilled all articles wher unto they were bound, euen to the vtmost point. This was enough to make them sweat, who ha∣uing already done the most that they could, had as yet got nothing in recompence, except the deliuerie of their Citizens, which were prisoners. But Alcibiades 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a speedie beginning of open warre, sent priuily to the Argiues, and gaue them to vn∣derstand how fitly the time serued for them to associate themselues with Athens, which was enough to giue them securitie against all Enemies.

The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vpon the first confluence of many Estates vnto their societie, had embraced great hopes of working wonders, as if they should haue had the conduct of all Greece against the Athenians, robbing Sparta of that honour, as hauing ill vsed [unspec 50] it, and thereby leauing their old enemies in case of much contempt and disabilitie. But these suddaine apprehensions of vaine joy, were suddainely changed into as vaine feare; which ill agreed with the great opinion that had lately beene 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Argos. For when the Thebans had refused their alliance; when the Corin∣thians

had sought securitie from Athens; and when a false rumour was noised a∣broad, Athens, Thebes, and Sparta, were come to a full agreement vpon all points of difference; then beganne the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to let fall their crests, and sue for peace vnto the Lacedaemonians, who needing it as much as they, or more, yet held their grauity, and were not ouer hastie to accept it. At this time, and in this perturbation, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Alcibiades came very welcome to the Argiues, which were not now 〈◊〉〈◊〉 how to become the chiefe of all others, but how to saue themselues. Where∣fore they sent away presently to Athens, their owne Embassadours, accompanied with the Mantinaeans and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to make a league offensiue, and defensiue, between their Estates and the Athenians. [unspec 10]

Of this businesse the Lacedaemonians knew not what to thinke: for well they saw, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a combination tended to their great hurt, and therefore were desirous to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it; but to keepe the loue of the Athenians, the new Ephori thought that more was alreadie done, than stood with their honour, or profit; others held it the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 way, hauing done so much, not to stick vpon a little more, but rather by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 full satisfaction, to retaine the friendship of that State, which was more to bee 〈◊〉〈◊〉 then all the rest of Greece. This resolution preuailing, they sent away such of their Citizens as were best affected to the peace, who comming to Athens with full commission to make an end of all controuersies, did earnestly labour in the Coun∣cell-house, to make the truth of things appeare, saying; that their Confederacie [unspec 20] with the Thebans had tended to none other end than the recouerie of 〈◊〉〈◊〉: con∣cerning which Towne, or any other businesse, that it much grieued the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to see things fall out in such wise as might giue to the Athenians cause of 〈◊〉〈◊〉; but that all should be done which in reason might bee required for ma∣king matters euen betweene them; to which purpose they shewed that themselues had absolute commission. Wherefore they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that Pylus might be restored vn∣to them, and especially for the present, that the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with the Argiues might be called a-side. Fauourable audience was giuen to this proposition, the rather be∣cause, they which promised amends, had power to make their words good. But all this faire likelihood of good agreement was dasht on the suddaine, by the practice [unspec 30] of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who, secretly dealing with the Lacedaemonian Embassadours, perswa∣ded them well of his friendship towards their Citie, and aduised them to take all care that their absolute power to conclude what they pleased in the name of Sparta, might not be knowne to the Communaltie of Athens, lest the insolent multitude should thereupon grow 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and yeelde to nothing, vnlesse they could draw them to vnreasonable conditions. The Embassadours beleeued him, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their tale in the assembly of the people, as hee had aduised them. Here∣upon the same Alcibiades taking presently the aduantage, which their double dea∣ling affoorded, inueighed openly against them, as men of no sinceritie, that were come to Athens for none other purpose, than to hinder the people from strength∣ning [unspec 40] themselues with friends, meaning to draw the Argiues and their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to their owne alliance, as (〈◊〉〈◊〉 to their oath) already they had the 〈◊〉〈◊〉. The people of Athens, whom a pleasing errand would hardly haue satisfied, or brought into a good opinion of the Lacedaemonians, (whose honest meanings had so ill beene seconded with good performance) were now so incensed with the double dealing of the Embassadours, and the strong perswasions of Alcibiades, that little wanted of concluding the league with 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Yet for the present so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 did Ni∣cias, an honourable Citizen, and great friend to the peace, preuaile with them, that the businesse was put off, till he himselfe with other Embassadours might fetch a better answere from Sparta. [unspec 50]

It may seeme a great wonder, how so poore a tricke of Alcibiades was able to carrie a matter of such importance, when the Spartan Embassadours might haue cast the loade vpon his owne shoulders, by discouering the truth:

But the grauitie which was vsually found in the Lacedaemonians, hindred them (per∣haps) from playing their game handsomely against so nimble a wit; and they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 wel haue been thought vntrusty men, had they professed themselues such as would say and vn-say for their most aduantage.

Nicias and his Companions had a sowre message to deliuer at Sparta, being per∣emptorily to require performance of all conditions, and among the rest, that the Lacedaemonians should take the paines to rebuild Panacte, and should immediately renounce their alliance made with the Thebans; letting them vnderstand that o∣therwise the Athenians, without further delay, would enter into confederacie with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and their Adherents. The Ephori at Sparta had no minde to forsake the [unspec 10] Thebans, assured friends to their State; but wrought so hard, that the anger of the Athenians was suffered to breake out what way it could, which to mitigate, they would doe no more, than only (at the request of Nicias their honourable friend, who would not seeme to haue effected nothing) sweare a-new to keepe the articles of the league betweene them and Athens. Immediately therefore vpon returne of the Embassadours, a new league was made between the Athenians, Argiues, Manti∣naeans, & Eleans, with verie ample prouision for holding the same common friends and enemies; wherein, though the Lacedaemonians were passed ouer with silence, yet was it manifest that the whole intent of this confederacy did bend it selfe chief∣ly against them, as in short while after was proued by effect. [unspec 20]

At this time the Lacedaemonians were in ill case, who hauing restored all that they could vnto the Athenians, and procured others to doe the like, had themselues re∣couered nothing of their owne (prisoners excepted) for default of restoring all that they should. But that which did most of all disable them, was the losse of reputa∣tion, which they had not more impaired in the late warre by misfortunes, than in sundrie passages betweene them and the Athenians: to procure and keepe whose A∣mitie, they had left sundrie of their old friends to shift for themselues. Contrari∣wise the Athenians, by the treatie of peace, had recouered the most of that which they lost in warre; all their gettings they had retained; and were strengthned by the accesse of new Confederates. [unspec 30]

§. VII. How the peace betweene Athens and Sparta was ill kept, though not openly broken.

IT was not long ere the Argiues and their fellowes had found busines where with to set the Athenians on worke, and make vse of this con∣iunction. For presuming vpon the strength of their side, they began to meddle with the Epidaurians, whom it concerned the State of Spar∣ta [unspec 40] to defend. So, many acts of hostilitie were committed, wherein A∣thens and Sparta did (as principals) 〈◊〉〈◊〉 each the other, but came in collaterally, as to the aide of their seuerall friends.

By these occasions the Corinthians, Boeotians, Phocians, Locrians, and other people of Greece, beganne a-new to range themselues vnder the Lacedaemonians, and follow their ensignes. One victorie which the Lacedaemonians obtained by their meere va∣lour in a set battaile, neere to Mantinaea, against the Argiue side, helped well to re∣paire their decaied reputation, though otherwise it yeelded them no great profit. The ciuill 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 shortly after within Argos it selfe, betweene the prin∣cipall Citizens and the Commons, had almost throwne downe the whole frame of [unspec 50] the new combination. For the chiefe Citizens getting the vpper hand, made a league with Sparta, wherein they proceeded so farre as to renounce the amity of the Athenians in expresse words, and forced the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the like. But in short

space of time the multitude preuailing, reuersed all this, and hauing chased away their ambitious Nobilitie, applied themselues to the Athenians as closely as be∣fore.

Beside these vprores in Peloponnesus, many assaies were made to raise vp troubles in all parts of Greece, and likewise in Macedon, to the Athenians; whose forces and readinesse for execution, preuented some things, reuenged other, and requited all with some prosperous attempts. Finally, the Athenians wanting matter of quarrell; and the Lacedaemonians growing wearie, they beganne to be quiet, retaining still that enmitie in their hearts, which they had sufficiently discouered in effects, though not as yet breaking out into termes of open warre. [unspec 10]

§. VIII. The Athenians sending two fleets to sacke Siracuse, are put to flight and vtterly discomfited.

DVring this intermission of open warre, the Athenians re-intertained their hopes of subduing Sicil, whither they sent a fleet so mighty as neuer was set forth by Greece in any Age before or after.

This fleet was very well manned, and furnished with all necessa∣ries [unspec 20] to so great an expedition. All which came to nought; partly by the factions in Athens, whence Alcibiades Author of that voyage, & one of the Ge∣neralls of their fleet, was driuen to banish himselfe, for feare of such iudgement, as else he was like to haue vnder-gone, among the incensed people; partly by the in∣uasion which the Lacedaemonians made vpon Attica, whilest the forces of that State were so farrefrom home. Hereunto was added the aide of the King of Persia, who supplied the Peloponnesians with money.

Neither was the successe of things in Sicilia such, as without helpe from Athens, could giue any likelyhood of a good end in that warre. For although in the begin∣ning, the enterprise had so well succeeded, that they besieged Siracuse, the chiefe Ci∣tie [unspec 30] of the Iland, and one of the fairest Townes which the Greekes inhabited, obtay∣ning the better in sundry battailes by Land and Sea; yet when the Towne was re∣lieued with strong aide from Peloponnesus, it came to passe that the Athenians were put to the worse on all sides, in such wise that their fleet was shut vp into the hauen of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and could not issue out.

As the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 affaires went very ill in Sicil, so did they at home stand vpon hard termes, for that the Lacedaemonians, who had beene formerly accustomed to make wearisome yeerely iournies into Attica, which hauing pilled and foraged, they re∣turned home; did now by counsell of Alcibiades, (who seeking reuenge vpon his owne Citizens was fled vnto them) fortifie the Towne of Decelea, which was neere [unspec 40] to Athens, whence they ceased not with daily excursions to harrie all the Countrie round about, and sometimes giue alarme vnto the Citie it selfe.

In these extremities, the peruerse obstinacie of the Athenians was very strange; who leauing at their backes, and at their owne doores, an enemie little lesse mighty than themselues, did yet send forth another 〈◊〉〈◊〉 into Sicil, to inuade a people no lesse puissant, which neuer had offended them.

It often happens, that prosperous euent makes foolish counsaile seeme wiser than it was, which came to passe many times among the Athenians, whose vaine conceits 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was said to turn vnto the best. But where vnsound aduice, finding bad proofe, is obstinately pursued, neither Pallas nor Fortune can be iustly blamed for a misera∣ble [unspec 50] issue. This second fleet of the Athenians, which better might haue serued to conuey home the former, that was defeated; after some attempts made to small purpose against the Siracusans, was finally (together with the other part of the Na∣uie, which was there before) quite vanquished, and bard vp into the hauen of Sira∣cuse,

whereby the campe of the Athenians, vtterly depriued of all benefit by Sea, either for succour or departure, was driuen to breake vp, and flie away by Land, in which flight they were ouer-taken routed, and quite ouerthrown in such wise that scarce any man escaped.

This mischiefe well deserued fell vpon the Athenians, who had wickedly con∣demned into exile Sophocles and Pthiodorus Generalls, formerly sent into that Ile, pretending that they had taken money for making peace in Sicil, whereas indeede there was not any meanes or possibilitie to haue made warre. Hereby it came to passe, that Nicias, who had the chiefe command in this vnhappie enterprise, did ra∣ther choose to hazard the ruine of his Countrie by the losse of that Armie, wherin [unspec 10] consisted little lesse then all the power of Athens; then to aduenture his owne 〈◊〉〈◊〉, his life, and his honour, vpon the tongues of shamelesse accusers, and the sen∣tence of Iudges before his triall resolued to condemne him, by retiring from Syra∣cuse, when wisdome and necessitie required it. For (said he) they shall giue sentence vpon vs, who know not the reason of our doings, nor would giue eare to any that would speak in our behalfe, but altogether harken to suspicious and vaine rumours that shall be brought against vs, yea these our Souldiers who now are so desirous to returne in safetie, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in our danger be well contented to frame their tales to the pleasure of the lewd and insolent multi∣tude.

This resolution of Nicias, though it cannot be commended (for it is the part of [unspec 20] an honest and valiant man to doe what reason willeth, not what opinion expecteth, and to measure honour or dishonour by the assurance of his well-informed consci∣ence, rather than by the malicious report and censure of others) yet it may bee ex∣cused; since he had before his eies the iniustice of his people; and had well vnder∣stood that a wicked sentence is infinitely worse than a wicked fact, as being held a president and patterne, whereby oppression beginning vpon one, is extended as warrantable vpon all. Therefore his feare of wrongfull condemnation was such, as a constant man could not easily haue ouer-mastered; but when afterwards the Ar∣mie, hauing no other expectation of safetie then the faint hope of a secret flight, he was so terrified with an Eclipse of the Moone, happening when they were about to [unspec 30] dislodge, that he would not consent to haue the camp break vp till seuen and twen∣tie daies were past. His timorousnesse was euen as foolish and ridiculous, as the issue of it was lamentable. For he should not haue thought that the power of the Hea∣uens, & the course of Nature, would be as vninst as his Athenians, or might pretend lesse euill to the slothfull, than to such as did their best. Neither doe I thinke that any Astrologer can alleage this Eclipse, as either a cause or prognostication of that Armies destruction, otherwise then as the follie of men did, by application, turne it to their owne confusion. Had C. Cassius the Roman, he, who slew Iulius Caesar, imi∣tated this superstition of Nicias, he had surely found the same fortune in a case very like. But when, he retyring, the broken remainder of Crassus his Armie defeated by [unspec 40] the Parthian Archers was aduised, vpon such an accident as this, to continue where he then was, till the Sunne were past the signe of Scorpio; he made answere that hee stood not in such feare of Scorpio, as of Sagittarius. So aduenturing rather to abide the frowning of the Heauens, then the neerer danger of Enemies vpon earth, hoe made such a safe and honourable retrait, as did both shew his noble resolution, and giue a faire example to that good rule;

— Sapiens dominabitur astris.

Thus we see that God, who ordinarily works by a concatenation of meanes, de∣priues the Gouernours of vnderstanding, when he intends euill to the multitude; and that the wickednesse of vniust men is the readie meane to weaken the vertue of [unspec 50] those who might haue done them good.

§. IX. Of the troubles where-into the State of Athens fell, after the great losse of the Fleet, and Armie, in Sicilia.

THe losse of this Armie was the ruine of the Athenian Dominion, and may bee well accompted a very little lesse calamitie to that Estate, than was the subuersion of the walls, when the Citie about 〈◊〉〈◊〉 yeeres after was taken by Lysander. For now began the subiects of the [unspec 10] Athenian Estate to rebell, of whom, some they reduced vnder their o∣bedience; others held out; some for feare of greater inconuenience were set at li∣bertie, promising only to be their good friends, as formerly they had beene their Subiects; other hauing a kind of libertie 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by the Athenians, were not there∣with contented, but obtained a true and perfect libertie by force. Among these troubles it fell out very vnseasonably, that the principall men of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 being wea∣ried with the peoples insolencie, tooke vpon them to change the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of that E∣state, and bring the gouernement into the hands of a few. To 〈◊〉〈◊〉 purpose con∣spiring with the Captaines which were abroad, they caused them to set vp the forme of an Aristocratic in the Townes of their Confederates; and in the meane [unspec 20] time, some that were most likely to withstand this innouation, being slaine at A∣thens, the Commonaltie were so dismaid, that none durst speake against the Conspi∣rators, whose number they knew not, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 man was afraid of his Neighbour, lest he should be a member of the league. In this generall feare the Maiestie of A∣thens was vsurped by 400. men, who 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in shew the ancient forme of pro∣ceeding, did cause al matters to be propounded vnto the people, and concluded vp∣on by the greater part of voices: but the things propounded were onely such as were first allowed in priuate among themselues; neither had the Commonaltie any other libertie, than only to approue and giue consent: for whosoeuer presumed any further, was quickly dispatched out of the way, and no inquirie made of the mur∣der. [unspec 30] By these meanes were many decrees made, all tending to the establishment of this new Authoritie, which neuerthelesse indured not long. For the Fleet and Ar∣mie which then was at the Ile of Samos, did altogether detest 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dealings of the foure hundred vsurpers, and held them as Enemies; whereupon they reuoked Al∣cibiades out of banishment, & by his assistance procured that the supplies which the Persian King had promised vnto the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, were by Tissaphernes his Lieute∣nant, made vnprofitable, through the slow and bad performance. Alcibiades had at the first beene very well entertained in Sparta, whilest his seruice done to that State was not growne to be the obiect of enuie. But when it appeared that in coun∣saile and good performance he so farre excelled 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Lacedaemonians, that all their [unspec 40] good successe was ascribed to his wit and valour, then were all the principall Citi∣zens wearie of his vertue; especially Agis one of their Kings, whose wife had so far yeelded her selfe to the loue of this Athenian, that among her inward friends shee could not forbeare to call her yong child by his name. Hereupon order was taken, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 should be killed out of the way. But he discouering the Spartan tre∣cherie, conueighed himselfe vnto Tissaphernes, whom he so bewitched with his great beautie, sweet conuersation, and sound wit, that he soone became the Master of that barbarous Vice-roies affections, who had free power to dispose the great Kings tre∣sures and forces in those parts. Then beganne he to aduise Tissaphernes, not so farre foorth to assist the Lacedaemonians, that they should quite ouerthrow the State of A∣thens, [unspec 50] but rather to helpe the weaker side, & let them one consume another, where∣by all should fall at length into the hands of the Persian. By this counsaile he made way to other practices, wherein by strength of his reputation (as the only fauourite

of so great a Potentate) hee played his owne game, procuring his restitution. At length his banishment being repealed by the Armie, but not by the Citizens (who then were oppressed by the foure hundred) hee laboured greatly to reconcile the Souldiers to the Gouernors; or at least to diuert their heat another way, and turne it vpon the Common Enemie. Some of the foure hundred approued his motion, as being wearie of the tyrannie wherof they were partakers, partly because they saw it could not long endure, & partly for that themselues, being lesse regarded by the rest of their companions, than stood with their good liking, sought to acquit them∣selues of it as honestly as they might. But the most of that Faction laboured to ob∣taine peace of the Lacedaemonians, desiring chiefly to maintaine both their owne au∣thoritie, [unspec 10] and the greatnesse of their Citie, if they might: but if this could not be, they did rather wish to preserue their owne power, or safetie at least, then the good E∣state of the Common-wealth. Therefore they made sundrie ouertures of peace to the Lacedaemonians, desiring to compound in as good termes as they might, and affir∣ming that they were fitter to be trusted than the wauering multitude; especially considering that the City of Sparta was gouerned by an Aristocratie, to which form they had now reduced Athens. All these passages betweene the foure hundred (or the most and chiefe of them) and the Lacedaemonians, were kept as secret as might be. For the Citie of Athens, hoping, without any great cause, to repaire their losses, was not inclined to make composition; from which vpon iuster ground the enemie was [unspec 20] much more auerse, trusting well that the discord of the Athenians (not vnknowne abroad) might yeeld some faire opportunitie to the destruction of it selfe, which in effect (though not then presently) came to passe. And vpon this hope King Agis did sometimes bring his forces from Decelea to Athens, where doing no good, hee receiued some small losses. Likewise the Nauie of Peloponnesus made shew of at∣tempting the Citie, but seeing no likelihood of successe, they bent their course from thence to other places, where they obtained victories, which in the better Fortune of the Athenians might more lightly haue beene regarded, then in this their decaied estate. Yet it seemes, without any disparagement to their wisdome, they should rather haue forborne to present vnto the Citie, or to the Countries neere adioyning [unspec 30] any terrour of the warre. For the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 within the walls might soone haue done more good then could be receiued from the Fleet or Armie without, which indeed gaue occasion to set the Citizens at vnitie, though it lasted not very long. The foure hundred, by meanes of these troubles, were faine to resigne their autho∣ritie, which they could not now hold, when the people hauing taken armes to repel forraigne enemies, would not lay them downe, till they had freed themselues from such as oppressed the State at home. Yet was not this alteration of gouernment a full restitution of the soueraigne command vnto the people, or whole body of the Citie, but onely to fiue thousand; which company the foure hundred (when their authoritie beganne) had pretended to take vnto them as assistance: herein seeming [unspec 40] to doe little wrong or none to the Commonalty, who seldome assembled in greater number. But now when the highest power was come indeede into the handes of so many, it was soone agreed that Alcibiades and his Companions should bee re∣called from exile, and that the Armie at Samos should be requested to vndertake the gouernement: which was forthwith reformed according to the Souldiers desire. [unspec 50]

§. X. How ALCIBIADES wanne many important victories for the Athenians; was recalled from exile; made their Generall, and againe deposed.

THis establishment of things in the Citie, was accompanied with some good successe in the warres. For the Lacedaemonians were about the same time ouerthrowne at Sea, in a great battaile, by the Athenian [unspec 10] fleet, which had remained at Samos, to which Alcibiades afterwards joyning such forces as he could raise, obtained many victories. Before the Towne of Abydus, his arriuall with eighteene ships, gaue the honour of a great battaile to the Athenians; he ouerthrew and vtterly destroyed the fleet of the Lace∣damonians, commanded by Mindarus, tooke the Townes of Cyzicus, and Perinthus, made the Selymbrians ransome their Citie, and fortified Crysopolis. Hereupon let∣ters were sent to Sparta, which the Athenians, intercepting, found to containe the distresse of the Armie in these few words: All is lost; MINDARVS is slaine; the Souldiers want victualls; we know not what to doe.

Shortly after this, Alcibiades ouerthrew the Lacedaemonians in fight by Land at [unspec 20] Chalcedon, tooke Selymbria, besieged and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Byzantium, now called Constantino∣ple, which euen in those dayes was a goodly, rich, and very strong Citie. Hereupon he returned home with very great welcome, and was made high Admirall of all the Nauie.

But this his honour continued not long; for it was taken from him, and he dri∣uen to banish himselfe againe; only because his Lieutenant, contrarie to the ex∣presse command of Alcibiades, fighting with the enemies in his absence, had lost a great part of the fleet.

The second banishment of Alcibiades was to the Athenians more harmeful than the first; and the losse which thereupon they receiued, was (though more heauie [unspec 30] to them, yet) lesse to be pittied of others, than that which ensued vpon his former exile. For whereas at the first, he had sought reuenge vpon his owne Citie; now, as inured to aduersitie, he rather pittied their furie, who in time of such danger had cast out him that should haue repaired their weake estate, than sought by procu∣ring or beholding the calamitie of his people, to comfort himselfe after injurie re∣ceiued. Before they, who were instituted in the place of Alcibiades, arriued at the fleet, he presented battaile to Lysander the Lacedaemonian Admirall, who was not so confident vpon his former victorie, as to vndertake Alcibiades himselfe, bringing ships more in number (notwithstanding the former losse of fifteene) than his ene∣mies had, and better ordered than they had beene vnder his Lieutenant. But when [unspec 40] the decree of the people was published in the Nauie, then did Alcibiades with-draw himselfe to a Towne vpon Hellespont, called Bizanthe, where hee had built a Castle.

§. XI. The battaile at Arginusa, and condemnation of the victorious Athenian Captaines by the people.

AFter this time, the Athenians receiuing many losses & discomfitures, [unspec 50] were driuen to flie into the Hauen of Mytelene, where they were straightly besieged both by Land and Sea. For the raising of this siege necessity inforced them to man all their Vessells, and to put the vtter∣most of their forces into the hazzard of one battaile. This battaile

was fought at Arginusae, where Callicraditas, Admirall of the Laced amonians, losing the honor of the day, preserued his owne reputation by dying valia ntly in the fight. It might well haue beene expected, that the ten Captaines, who joyntly had com∣mand in chiefe ouer the Athenian fleet, should for that good daies seruice, and so happy a victorie, haue receiued great honour of their Citizens. But contrariwise they were forth-with called home, and accused, as if wilfully they had suffered many of the Citizens, whose ships were broken and sunke, to be cast away, when by appointing some Vessels to take them vp, they might haue saued them from being drowned. Hereto the Captaines readily made a very iust answere; That they pur∣suing the victorie, had left part of the fleet, vnder sufficient men, to saue those that [unspec 10] were wrackt; which if it were not well accomplished, it was, because a tempest ari∣sing about the end of the fight, had hindred the performance of that, and other their intendments. This excuse auailed not: For a lewd fellow was brought forth, who said, That he himselfe escaping in a meale-tubbe, had beene intreated by those who were in perill of drowning, to desire of the people reuenge of their deaths vpon the Captaines. It was very strange, that vpon such an accusation maintained with so slender euidence, men that had well deserued of their Countrie should bee ouer∣throwne. But their enemies had so incensed the rascall multitude, that no man durst absolue them, saue only Socrates the wise and vertuous Philosopher, whose voice in this judgement was not regarded. Sixe of them were put to death, of whom one [unspec 20] had hardly escaped drowning, and was with much a-doe relieued by other vessells in the storme: but the Captaines which were absent escaped; for when the furie of the people was ouer-past, this judgement was reuersed, and the accusers called into question for hauing deceiued and peruerted the Citizens. Thus the Athenians went about to free themselues from the infamie of injustice; but the diuine justice was not a-sleepe, nor would be so deluded.

§. XII. [unspec 30] The battaile at Aegos-Potamos, wherein the whole State of Athens was ruined; with the end of the Peloponnesian Warre.

THe Peloponnesian fleet vnder Lysander, the yeere next following, ha∣uing scowred the Aegean Seas, entred Hellespont, where (landing Souldiers) it besieged and tooke the Towne of Lampsacus. Hereup∣on all the Nauie of Athens, being an hundred and fourescore saile, made thither in haste, but finding Lampsacus taken before their com∣ming, they put in at Sestos, where hauing refreshed themselues, they sailed to the [unspec 40] Riuer called, Aegos-Potamos, which is (as we might name it) Goates-brooke, or the Riuer of the Goate; being on the Continent, opposite to Lampsacus: and there they cast Anchors, not one whole league off from Lysander, who rode at Lampsacus in the harbour. The next day after their arriuall they presented fight vnto the Peloponne∣sians, who refused it, whereupon the Athenians returned againe to Aegos-Potamos, and thus they continued fiue dayes, brauing euery day the Enemie, and returning to their owne harbour when it drew towards euening.

The Castle of Alcibiades was not farre from the Nauie, and his power in those places was such as might haue greatly auailed his Countrimen, if they could haue made vse of it. For he had waged Mercinaries, and making warre in his owne name [unspec 50] vpon some people of the Thracians, had gathered much wealth, and obtained much reputation among them. He perceiuing the disorderly course of the Athenian Com∣manders, repaired vnto them, and shewed what great inconuenience might grow, if they did not soone fore-see and preuent it. For they lay in a roade subject to eue∣ry

weather, neither neere enough to any Towne where they might furnish them∣selues with necessarie, nor so farre off as had beene more expedient. Sestus was the next Market-Towne; thither both Souldiers and Mariners resorted, flocking away from the Nauie euerie day, as soone as they were returned from brauing the Enemie. Therefore Alcibiades willed them either to lie at Sestus, which was not farre off, or at the least to consider better how neere their enemie was, whose feare proceeded rather from obedience to his Generall, than from any cowardise. This admonition was so farre despised, that some of the Commanders willed him to meddle with his owne matters, and to remember that his authoritie was out of date. Had it not beene for these opprobrious words, hee could (as hee told his [unspec 10] familiars) haue compelled the Lacedaemonians, either to fight vpon vnequall termes, or vtterly to quit their Fleet. And like enough it was that hee might so haue done by transporting the light-armed Thracians his Confederates, and others his Followers ouer the Straights, who assaulting the Peloponnesians by Land, would either haue compelled them to put to Sea, or else to leaue their ships to the mercy of the Athenians. But finding their acceptance of his good counsaile no better than hath beene rehearsed, he left them to their fortune, which how euill it would be he did prognosticate.

Lysander all this while defending himselfe by the aduantage of his Hauen, was not carelesse in looking into the demeanour of the Athenians. When they depar∣ted, [unspec 20] his manner was to send forth some of his swiftest Vessels after them, who ob∣seruing their doings, related vnto him what they had seene. Therefore vnderstan∣ding in what carelesse fashion they romed vp and downe the Countrie; he kept all his men a-boord after their departure, and the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 day gaue especiall charge to his Scouts, That when they perceiued the Athenians, disembarking, as their custome was, and walking towards Sestos, they should forth with returne, and hang vp a bra∣zen shield in the Prow, as a token for him to weigh Anchor.

The Scouts performed their charge, and Lysander being in a readinesse, made all speed that strength of Oares could giue, to Aegos-Potamos, where he found ve∣ry few of his enemies a-boord their Ships, not many neere them, and all in great [unspec 30] confusion vpon the newes of his approch.

Insomuch that the greatest industrie which the Athenians then shewed, was in the escape of eight or nine ships, which knowing how much that losse imported, gaue ouer Athens as desperate, and made a long flight vnto the Ile of Cyprus, all the rest were taken, and such of the Souldiers as came in to the rescue cut in pieces. Thus was the warre which had lasted seuen and twentie yeeres, with variable suc∣cesse concluded in one houre, and the glory of Athens in such wise eclipsed, that she neuer afterward shone in her perfect light.

Immediately vpon this victorie Lysander, hauing taken such Townes as readily did yeeld vpon the first fame of his exploit, set sayle for Athens, and ioyning his [unspec 40] forces with those of Agis and Pausanias, Kings of Sparta, summoned the Citie, which finding too stubborne to yeeld, and too strong to bee wonne on the sud∣den, hee put forth againe to Sea, and rather by terrour than violence, compelling all the Ilands, and such Townes of the Ionians, as had formerly held of the Athe∣nians, to submit themselues to Sparta, hee did thereby cut off all prouision of vi∣ctuals, and other necessaries, from the Citie, and inforced the people by meere fa∣mine to yeeld to these conditions: That the long walles, leading from the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the Port, should bee throwne downe; That all Cities subiect to their 〈◊〉〈◊〉, should be set at libertie; That the Athenians should bee Masters only of their owne Territories, and the fields adioyning to their Towne; And that they [unspec 50] should keepe no more then twelue Ships; That they should hold as Friends or E∣nemies, the same, whom the Lacedaemonians did, and follow the Lacedaemonians as Leaders in the Warres.

These articles being agreed vpon, the walls were throwne downe with great re∣joycing of those who had borne displeasure to Athens; and not without some con∣sultation of destroying the Citie, and laying waste the Land about it. Which ad∣uice, although it was not entertained, yet were thirtie Gouernours, or rather cru∣ell Tyrants, appointed ouer the people, who recompensed their former insolencie and injustice ouer their Captaines, by oppressing them with all base and intolera∣ble slauerie.

The only small hope then remaining to the Athenians, was, that Alcibiades might perhaps repaire what their owne folly had ruined. But the thirtie Ty∣rants perceiuing this, aduertised the Lacedaemonians thereof, who contriued, and (as [unspec 10] nowe domineering in euery quarter) soone effected his suddaine death.

Such end had the Peloponnesian Warre. After which the Lacedaemonians abu∣sing the reputation, and great power, which therein they had obtained, grew ve∣ry odious to all Greece, and by Combination of many Cities against them, were dispossessed of their high authoritie, euen in that very Age, in which they had subdued Athens. The greatest foile that they tooke was of the Thebans, led by Epaminondas, vnder whom Philip of Macedon, Father to Alexander the Great, had the best of his education. By these Thebans, the Citie of Sparta (besides other great losses receiued) was sundrie times in danger of being taken. But these haugh∣tie attempts of the Thebans came finally to nothing; for the seuerall Estates and Si∣gnories [unspec 20] of Greece, were growne so jealous one of anothers greatnesse, that the La∣cedaemonians, Athenians, Argiues, and Thebans, which were the mightiest, associating themselues with the weaker partie, did so counterpoize the stronger, that no one Citie could extend the limits of her jurisdiction so farre as might make her terrible to her Neighbours. And thus all parts of the Countrie remained rather euenly ballanced, than well agreeing, till such time as Philip, and after him Alexander, Kings of Macedon, (whose forefathers had beene dependants, and followers, yea almost meere Vassalls to the Estates of Athens and Sparte) found meanes, by making vse of their factions, to bring them all into seruitude, from which they neuer could be free, till [unspec 30] the Romanes presenting them with a shew of libertie, did themselues in∣deede become their Masters. [unspec 40] [unspec 50]

CHAP. IX. Of matters concurring with the Peloponnesian Warre, or shortly following it.

§. I. How the affaires of Persia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in these times.

DVRING the times of this Peloponnesian Warre, and [unspec 10] those other lesse expeditions foregoing it, Artaxerxes Longimanus, hauing peaceably injoyed a long raigne ouer the Persians, left it by his death either to Darius, who was called Darius Nothus, or the Bastard, whom the Greeke Historians (lightly passing ouer Xerxes the second, and Sogdianus, as Vsurpers, and for their short raigne little to be regarded) place next vnto him, or to Xerxes the second, who, and his brother Sogdianus [unspec 20] after him (seeming to haue bene the sonnes of Hester) held the Kingdome but one yeere betweene them, the yonger succeeding his elder brother. It is not my purpose (as I haue said be∣fore) to pursue the Historie of the Persians from henceforth, by rehearsall of all the particulars, otherwise then as they shall be incident to the affaires of 〈◊〉〈◊〉. It may therefore suffice to say, That Xerxes the second, being a vicious Prince, did 〈◊〉〈◊〉 after a moneth or two, if not by surfeit, then by treachery of his as riotous bro∣ther Sogdianus. Likewise of Sogdianus it is found, that being as ill as his brother, and [unspec 30] more cruell, he slew vnjustly Bagorazus a principall Eunuch, and would haue done as much to his brother Darius the Bastard, had not hee foreseene it, and by raising a stronger Armie than this hated King Sogdianus could leauie, seized at once vpon the King and Kingdome. Darius hauing slaine his brother, held the Empire nineteene yeeres. Amyrtaeus of Sais an Aegyptian rebelled against him, and hauing partly slaine, partly chased out of the Land the Persian Garrisons, allied himselfe so firmely with the Greekes, that by their aide he maintained the Kingdome, and deliuered it ouer to his posteritic, who (notwithstanding the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of their ciuill Warres) main∣tained it against the Persian, all the daies of this Darius, and of his sonne Artaxerxes Mnemon. Likewise Amorges, a subject of his owne and of the Roiall bloud, being [unspec 40] Lieutenant of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, rebelled against him; confederating himselfe with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉. But the great calamitie, before spoken of, which fell vpon the Athenians in Sicil, hauing put new life into the Spartans, and giuen courage to the Ilanders and others, subject to the State of Athens, to shake off the yoke of their long continued bondage: It fell out well for Darius, that the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 being destitute of mo∣ney, wherewith to defray the charge of a great Nauie, without which it was impos∣sible to aduance the warre against the State of Athens, that remained powerfull by Sea, were driuen to craue his assistance, which he granted vnto them, first vpon what conditions best pleased himselfe, though afterwards the articles of the league betweene him and them were set downe in more precise termes; wherein it was [unspec 50] concluded, That he and they should make warre joyntly vpon the Athenians, and vpon all that should rebell from either of them, and (which was highly to the Kings honour and profit) that all the Cities of Asia, which had formerly beene his, or his Predecessours, should returne to his obedience. By this Treatie, and the warre en∣sung

(of which I haue already spoken) he recouered all that his Grand-father and Father had lost in Asia. Likewise by assistance of the Lacedaemonians 〈◊〉〈◊〉 got Amorges a-liue into his hands, who was taken in the Citie of Iasus; the Athenians wanting either force or courage to succour him. Neuerthelesse Aegypt still held out against him; the cause whereof cannot bee the emploiment of the Persian forces on the parts of Greece, for he abounded in men, of whom he had enough for all occasions, but they wanted manhood, which caused him to fight with gold, which effected for him by Souldiers of other Nations, and his naturall 〈◊〉〈◊〉, what the valour of his owne Subjects was insufficient to performe. Darius had in marriage Parysatis his owne sister, who bare vnto him (besides other children) Artaxerxes called Mne∣mon, [unspec 10] that is to say, the Mindfull, or the Rememberer, who succeeded him in the Kingdome; and Cyrus the yonger, a Prince of singular vertue, and accounted by all that knew him, the most excellent man that euer Persia bred after Cyrus the Great. But the old King Darius, intending to leaue vnto his elder sonne Artaxerxes the in∣heritance of that great Empire, did cast a jealous eye vpon the doings of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Cyrus, who being Lieutenant of the lower Asia, tooke more vpon him than befitted a Sub∣ject: for which cause his father sent for him, with intent to haue taken some very sharpe course with him, had not his owne death preuented the comming of his yonger sonne, and placed the elder in his Throne. Of the warre betweene these brethren, and summarily of Artaxerxes, we shall haue occasion to speake somewhat [unspec 20] in more conuenient place.

§. II. How the thirtie Tyrants got their Dominion in Athens.

I Hold it in this place most conuenient to shew the proceedings of the Greekes, after the subuersion of the walls of Athens, which gaue end to that warre called the Peloponnesian warre, but could not free the vnhappy Countrie of Greece from ciuill broiles. The thirtie Gouer∣nours, [unspec 30] commonly called the thirtie Tyrants of Athens, were chosen at the first by the people to compile a body of their Law, and make a collection of such ancient Statutes, as were meetest to be put in practice: the condition of the Ci∣tie standing as it did in that so sodaine alteration. To this charge was annexed the supreme authoritie, either as a recompence of their labours, or because the necessi∣tie of the times did so require it, wherein the Law being vncertaine, it was fit that such men should giue judgement in particular causes, to whose judgement the Lawes themselues, by which the Citie was to bee ordered, were become subiect. But these thirtie hauing so great power in their hands, were more carefull to hold it, than to deserue it, by faithfull execution of that which was committed to them [unspec 40] in trust.

Therefore apprehending such troublesome fellowes, as were odious to the citie, though not punishable therefore by law, they condemned them to death; which proceeding was by all men highly approued, who cōsidered their lewd conditions, but did not withall bethinke themselues, how easie a thing it would be vnto these thirtie men, to take away the liues of Innocents, by calling them perturbers of the peace, or what else they listed, when condemnation without due triall and proofe had beene once well allowed. Hauing thus plausibly entred into a wicked course of gouernement, they thought it best to fortifie themselues with a sure guard, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they brake out into those disorders, which they must needes commit for the esta∣blishing [unspec 50] of their authoritie. Wherefore dispatching two of their owne companie to Sparta, they informed the Lacedaemonians, that it was the full intent of the thirtie, to keepe the City free from all rebellious motions, to which purpose it behoued them to cut off such as were seditious; and therefore desired the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to send

them a Garrison, which they promised at their owne cost to 〈◊〉〈◊〉. This mo∣tion was well approued, and a guard sent, the Captaine of which was so well enter∣tained by the thirtie, that none of their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 could want his high commenda∣tions at Sparta. Hereupon the Tyrants beganne to take heart, and looking no more after base and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 persons, inuaded the principall men of the City, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ar∣med men from House to House, who drew out such as were of great reputation, and likely, or able to make any head against this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 forme of gouernement: whereby there was such effusion of bloud, as to Theramenes (one of the thirtie) see∣med very horrible, and vnable to escape vengeance. His dislike of their proceedings being openly discouered, caused his fellowes to bethinke themselues, and prouide [unspec 10] for their owne security, and his destruction, lest he should make 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a Captaine of the discontented (which were almost the whole Citie) and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his owne peace with their ruine. Wherefore they selected three thousand of the Citizens, whom they thought 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and gaue vnto them some part of publike authority, the rest they disarmed; and hauing thus increased their owne strength, and weake∣ned their opposites, they began a fresh to shead the bloud, not only of their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 enemies, but of such whose money, or goods, might inrich them, and 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 for the paiment of their guard. And to this purpose they concluded, that euery one of them should name one man, vpon whose goods he should 〈◊〉〈◊〉, putting the ow∣ner to death. But when Theramenes vttered his detestation of so 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉; then [unspec 20] did Critias, who of all the thirtie was most tyrannicall, accuse him to the Councell, as a treacherous man, and (〈◊〉〈◊〉 one maine priuiledge of the three thousand was, that none of them should suffer death at the appointment of the thirtie, but haue the accustomed trial) he took vpon him to strike out of that number the name of Theramenes, and so reduced him vnder the triall and sentence of that order. It was well alleaged by Theramenes, that his name was not more 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to be blotted out of the Catalogue, than any other mans, vpon which consideration, he aduised them all to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 no otherwise of his case, than as of their owne, who were liable to the same forme of proceeding: but (euery man choosing rather to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his owne life by silence, than presently to draw vpon himselfe the danger, which as yet con∣cerned [unspec 30] him little, and perhaps would neuer come neere him) the Tyrants 〈◊〉〈◊〉 silence as consent, condemned him forth with, and compelled him to drinke poyson.

§. III. The conspiracie against the thirtie Tyrants, and their depositior.

AFter the death of Theramenes, the thirtie began to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 such outrage, as excelled their former villanies. For hauing three thousand (as they [unspec 40] thought) firme vnto them, they robbed all others without feare or shame, despoiling them of lands and goods, and causing them to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 into banishment, for safeguard of their liues. This flight of the Citi∣zens procured their 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and the generall good of the City. For the banished Ci∣tizens, who were fled to Thebes, entred into consultation, and resolued to hazard their liues in setting free the Citie of Athens. The very thought of such a practice had been treason at home, which had no other danger abroad, than might be found in the execution. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 men, or thereabout, were the first vndertakers, who with their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Thrasybulus tooke Phyla, a place of strength in the Territorie of Athens. No sooner did the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 heare of their exploit, than 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 to pre∣uent [unspec 50] further danger; assembling the three thousand, and their Lacedaemonian 〈◊〉〈◊〉, with which force they attempted Phyla, but were with some losse of their men re∣pelled. Finding the place too strong to be taken by assault, they intended to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it; which purpose came to nought by meanes of snow that 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and other 〈◊〉〈◊〉

weather, against which they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not made prouision. Retiring therefore to the Ci∣tie, which aboue all they were to make good, they left the most of their guard, and two companies of Horse, to wearie out them which lay in Phyla, with a flying siege. But it was not long 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the followers of Thrasybulus were encreased from seuenty to seuen hundred, which aduentured to giue charge vpon those guards, of whom they cut off aboue an hundred & twenty. These small but prosperous beginnings, added more to the number of those in Phyla, who now with a thousand men got entrance into Piraeus, the suburbe of Athens, lying on the Port. Before their comming, the thirtie had resolued to fortifie the Towne of Eleusine, to their owne vse, whereinto they might make an easie retrait, and saue themselues from any sudden perill. It [unspec 10] may well seeme strange, that whereas their barbarous manner of gouernement had brought them into such danger, they were so farre from 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to obtaine mens good wil, that contrariwise, to assure themselues of Eleusine, they got al of the place who could beare armes into their hands by a traine, and wickedly (though vnder forme of iustice) murthered them all. But, Sceleribus tutum per 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est iter, the mischiefes which they had alreadie done were such, as left them no hope of going back ward, nor any other apparant likelihood of safetie, than by extending their crueltie vnto all, seeing few or none were left, whom they could trust. When Thra∣sybulus and his fellowes, who as yet were termed 〈◊〉〈◊〉, had taken the Piraeus, then were the three thousand armed againe by the Tyrants, and brought to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 [unspec 20] it; but in this enterprise Thrasybulus had the better, and repelled his enemies, of whom although there were slaine to the number of seuentie, onely yet the victory seemed the greater, because Critias, & one other of the thirty, perished in that fight. The death of Critias, and the stout defence of Piraeus, together with some exhorta∣tions vsed, by Thrasybulus to the Citizens, wrought such effect, that the thirtie were deposed. Neuerthelesse there were so many of the three thousand, who hauing communicated with the thirty in their misdeeds, feared to be called to a sharpe ac∣count, that no peace, nor quiet forme of gouernement could be established. For Embassadors were sent to Sparta, who crauing aide against Thrasybulus, and his fol∣lowers, had fauourable 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and a power sent to their assistance, both by Land [unspec 30] and Sea, vnder the conduct of Lysander, and his Brother; whom Pausanias the Spar∣tan King did follow, raising an Armie of the Cities confederate with the Lacedaemo∣nians. And here appeared first the iealousie, wherein some people held the State of Sparta. The Boeotians, and Corinthians, who in the late warres had been the most bitter enemies to Athens, refused to follow Pausanias in this expedition; alleaging that it stood not with their othes, to make warre against that people, who had not hitherto broken any one article of the league: but fearing, indeede, lest the Lacedae∣monians should annexe the Territorie of Athens to their owne Demaines. It is not to bee doubted, that Pausanias tooke this answere in good part. For it was not his purpose to destroy those against whom he went, but only to crosse the proceedings [unspec 40] of Lysander, whom he enuied. Therefore hauing in some small skirmishes against them of Thrasybulus his party, made a shew of warre, finally wrought such meanes, that all things were compounded quietly: the thirtie men, and such others, as were like to giue cause of tumult, being sent to Sparta. The remainder of that tyrannicall faction, hauing with drawne themselues to Eleusine, were shortly after found to at∣tempt some innouation; wherevpon the whole City rising against them, took their Captaines, as they were comming to Parlie, and slew them: which done, to auoide further inconuenience, a law was made, that all iniuries past should be forgotten, and no man called into question for wrongs committed. By which order, wisely made, and carefully obserued, the Citie returned to her former quietnesse. [unspec 50]

CHAP. X. Of the expedition of CYRVS the younger.

§. I. The grounds of CYRVS his attempt against his brother. [unspec 10]

THE matters of Greece now standing vpon such termes, that no one Estate durst oppose it selfe against that of Lacaedemon; young Cyrus, brother to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, King of Persia, hauing in his fathers life time very carefully prosecuted the warre against Athens, did send his mes∣sengers to Sparta, requesting that their loue might ap∣peare no lesse to him, than that which he had shewed towards them in their dangerous warre against the [unspec 20] Athenians. To this request, being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Lace∣daemonians gaue a sutable answere, commanding their Admirall to performe vnto Cyrus all seruice that hee should require of him. If Cyrus had plainely discouered himselfe, and the Lacedae∣monians bent their whole power to his assistance, very like it is, that either the King∣dome of Persia should haue been the recompence of his deserts, or that he perishing in battaile, as after he did, the subuersion of that Empire had forth with ensued. But it pleased God, rather to shew vnto the Greekes the waies, which vnder the Macedo∣nian Enfignes, the victorious foot-steps of their posteritie should measure; and ope∣ning vnto them the riches, and withall the weakenesse of the Persian, to kindle in [unspec 30] them both desire and hope of that conquest, which he reserued to another genera∣tion; than to giue into their hands that mightie Kingdome, whose houre was not yet come. The loue which Parysatis, the Queene-Mother of Persia bare vnto 〈◊〉〈◊〉 her yonger sonne, being seconded by the earnest fauour of the people, and ready de∣sires of many principall men, had moued this yong Prince, in his fathers old age, to aspire after the succession. But being sent for by his Father (as hath before beene shewed) whose meaning was to curbe this ambitious youth; hee 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 brother Artaxerxes established so surely by the old Kings fauour, that it were not safe to attempt any meanes of displanting him, by whose disfauour, himself might easily lose the place of a Viceroy, which he held in Asia the lesse, and hardly bee [unspec 40] able to maintaine his owne life. The neerest neighbour to Cyrus of all the Kings Deputies in the lower Asia, was Tissaphernes, a man compounded of cowardise, tre∣cherie, craft, and all vices which accustomably branch out of these. This man ac∣companied Cyrus to his Father, vsing by the way all faire shewes of friendship, as to a Prince, for whom it might well be thought, that Queene Parysatis had obtained the inheritance of that mightie Empire. And it was very true, that Parysatis had v∣sed the best of her endeuour to that purpose, alleaging that (which in former ages had bin much auaileable to Xerxes, in the like disceptation with his elder brother) Artaxerxes was borne whilest his father was a priuate man, but Cyrus, when he was a crowned King. All which not sufficing; when the most that could bee obtained [unspec 50] for Cyrus, was the pardon of some presumptuous demeanour, and confirmation of his place in Lydia, and the parts adioyning: then did this Tissaphernes discouer his nature, and accuse his friend Cyrus to the new King Artaxerxes, of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dangerous trea∣son intended against his person. Vpon this accusation, whether true or false, very

easily 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Cyrus was arrested, and by the most vehement intreatie of his Mo∣ther very hardly deliuered, and sent back into his owne Prouince.

§. II. The preparations of CYRVS, and his first entrie into the Warre.

THe forme of gouernement which the Persian Lieutenants vsed in their seuerall Prouinces, was in many points almost Regall. For they made Warre and Peace, as they thought it meete, not onely for the Kings [unspec 10] behoofe, but for their owne reputation; vsually indeede with the Kings enemies, yet sometimes one with another: which was the more easily tolerated, because their owne heads were held only at the Kings plea∣sure, which caused them to frame all their doings to his will, whatsoeuer it were, or they could coniecture it to be. Cyrus therefore being settled in Lydia, began to con∣sider with himselfe, the interest that he had in the Kingdome; the small assurance of his brothers loue, held only by his Mothers intercession; the disgrace endured by his late imprisonment; and the meanes which he had by loue of his owne peo∣ple, and that good neighbourhood of the Lacedaemonians, whom he had bound vnto him, to obtaine the Crowne for himselfe. Neither was it expedient that he should [unspec 20] long sit idle, as waighting till occasion should present it selfe: but rather enterprise somewhat whilest yet his Mother liued, who could procure a good interpretation to all his actions, if they were no worse than only questionable. Hereupon he first beganne to quarrell with Tissapherues, and seized vpon many Townes of his iuris∣diction, annexing them to his owne Prouince; which displeased not Artaxerxes at all, who (besides that hee was of condition somewhat simple) being truly paid by Cyrus the accustomable Tributes out of those places, was well contented to see his brothers hot spirit exercised in priuate quarrels. But Tissaphernes, whose base con∣ditions were hated, & cowardise despised, although he durst not aduenture to take armes against Cyrus, yet perceiuing that the Milesians were about to giue vp them∣selues [unspec 30] into the hands of that yong Prince, as many other townes of the Ionians had done, thought by terrour to preserue his reputation, and keepe the Towne in his owne hands. Wherefore he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 many, and many he banished, who flying to Cy∣rus, were gently entertained, as bringing faire occasion to take armes, which was no small part of his desire. In leuying Souldiers he vsed great policie; for he took not only the men of his owne Prouince, or of the Countries adioyning, whose liues were readie at his will; but secretly he furnished some Graecian Captaines with mo∣ney, who being very good men of warre, entertained Souldiers therewith, some of them warring in Thrace, others in Thessalie, others elsewhere in Greece; but all of them ready to crosse the Seas, at the first call of Cyrus, till which time they had se∣cret [unspec 40] instructions to prolong their seuerall warres, that the Souldiers might 〈◊〉〈◊〉 held in continuall exercise, and readie in armes vpon the sudden. Cyrus hauing sent a power of men to besiege Miletus, forth with summoned these bands of the Greekes, who very readily came ouer to his assistance, being thirteene thousand very firme Souldiers, and able to make head (which is almost incredible) against the whole power of Artaxerxes. With this Armie, and that which he had leuied before, hee could very easily haue forced Miletus, and chased away Tissaphernes out of Asia the lesse: but his purpose was not so to lose time in small matters, that was to be im∣ploied in the accomplishment of higher designes. Pretending therefore that the Pisidians, a people of Asia the lesse, not subiect to the Persian, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 inuaded his Terri∣torie, [unspec 50] he raised the siege of Miletus, and with all speed marched Eastward, leauing Tissaphernes much amazed, who had no leisure to reioyce that Cyrus had left him to himselfe, when he considered, that so great an Army, and so strong, was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 leuied against the Rouers of Pisidia, but rather against the great King his Master. For which

〈◊〉〈◊〉 taking a band of fiue hundred horse, hee posted away to carrie tidings to the Court, of this great preparation.

§. III. How CYRVS tooke his iourney into the higher Asia, and came vp close to his Brother.

THe tumult which his comming brought was very great, and great the exclamations of the Queen Statira, against Parysatis, the Queene-Mo∣ther, [unspec 10] whom she called the Author and occasioner of the warre. But whilest the King in great feare was arming the high Countries in his defence, the danger hastned vpon him very fast. For Cyrus made great marches, hauing his numbers much increased, by the repaire of his Countrimen, though most strengthned by the accesse of seuē hundred Greeks, and of other foure hundred of the same Nation, who reuolted vnto him from the King. How terrible the Greekes were to the Barbarians, he found by triall in a Muster, which (to please the Queene of Cilicia, who had brought him aide) 〈◊〉〈◊〉 made in Phrygia; where the Greekes by his direction making offer of a charge vpon the rest of his Armie, which contained a hundred thousand men, the whole Campe (not perceiuing that this [unspec 20] was but a brauerie) fled a-maine, the victuallers and baggagers forsaking their cab∣bins, and running all away for very feare. This was to Cyrus a ioyfull spectacle, who knew very well, that his brother was followed by men of the same temper, and the more vnlikely to make resistance, because they were prest to the warre a∣gainst their will and dispositions, whereas his Armie was drawne a-long by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 affection and good will. Neuerthelesse he found it a very hard matter to perswade the Greekes to passe the Riuer of Euphrates. For the very length of the way which they had troden, wearied them with conceit of the tedious returne. Therefore he was driuen, being yet in Cilicia, to seeke excuses, telling them, that Abrocomas, one of the Kings principall Captaines, and his owne great enemy, lay by the Riuer, against [unspec 30] whom he requested them to assist him. By such deuices, and excessiue promise of reward, he brought them to Euphrates, where some of the Greekes considering, That whoso passed the Riuer first, should haue the most thankes, and might safely re∣turne if the rest should refuse to follow them, they entred the Foords, whereby were all finally perswaded to doe as some had begunne, and being allured by great hopes, they resolued to seeke out Artaxerxes, wheresoeuer he was to be found. The King in the meane time hauing raised an army of nine hundred thousand men, was not so confident vpon this huge multitude, as to aduenture them in triall of a plaine battaile. Abrocomas, who with three hundred thousand men, had vnder-taken to make good the Straights of Syria, which were very narrow, and fortified with a [unspec 40] strong wall, and other defences of nature, and art, which made the place to seeme impregnable, had quitted the passage, and retired himself toward the Kings forces, not daring to look Cyrus in the face, who despairing to finde any way by Land, had procured the Lacedaemonian fleete, by the benefit whereof to haue transported his Armie. I doe not finde that this cowardise of Abrocomas, or of his Souldiers, who arriued not at the Campe, till fiue daies were past after the battaile, receiued either punishment, or disgrace; for they, toward whom he with-drew himselfe, were all made of the same metall.

Therefore Artaxerxes was vpon the point of retiring to the vttermost bounds of his Kingdom, vntill by Teribazus, one of his Captaines, he was perswaded not to a∣bandon [unspec 50] so many goodly Prouinces to the Enemie, who would thereby haue gathe∣red addition of strength, and (which in the sharpe disputation of Title to a King∣dome is most auaileable) would haue growne superior in reputation. By such ad∣uice, the King resolued vpon meeting with his brother, who now began to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se∣cure,

being fully perswaded, that Artaxerxes would neuer dare to abide him in the field. For the King hauing cast vp a Trench of almost fortie miles in length, about thirtie foot broad, and eighteene foote deepe, intended there to haue encamped: but his courage failing him, he abandoned that place, thinking nothing so safe, as to be farre distant from his enemies.

§. IIII. The battaile betweene CYRVS and ARTAXERXES.

THe Armie of Cyrus hauing ouercome many difficulties of euil waies, [unspec 10] and scarcitie of victuals, was much encouraged by perceiuing this great feare of Artaxerxes, & being past this trench, marched carelesly in great disorder, hauing bestowed their Armes in Carts, and vpon Beasts of carriage; when on the sudden one of their Vaunt-currors, brought newes of the Kings approch. Hereupon with great tumult they armed themselues, and had ranged their battailes in good order vpon the side of the Riuer Euphrates, where they waited for the cōming of their enemies, whom they saw not till it was after-noone. But when they saw the cloud of dust raised by the feete of that huge multitude, which the King drew after him, and perceiued by their neere [unspec 20] approch how well they were marshalled, comming on very orderly, in silence, whereas it had beene expected, that rushing violently with loude clamours, they should haue spent all their force vpon the first brunt; and when it appeared that the fronts of the two Armies were so vnequall in distent, being all embattailed in one bodie and square, that Cyrus taking his place (as was the Persian maner) in the mid∣dest of his owne, did not with the corner, and vtmost point therof, reach to the halfe breadth of Artaxerxes his battaile, who carried a front proportionable to his num∣ber, exceeding nine times that of Cyrus: then did the Greekes begin to distrust their owne manhood, which was not accustomed to make proofe of it self, vpon such ex∣cessiue oddes. It was almost incredible, that so great an Armie should bee so easily [unspec 30] chased. Neuerthelesse, it quickly appeared, that these Persians, hauing learned (contrary to their custome) to giue charge vpon their enemies with silence; had not learned (for it was contrary to their nature) to receiue a strong charge with cou∣rage. Vpon the very first offer of on-set, made by the Greekes, all that beastly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of cowards fled amaine, without abiding the stroke, or staying till they were within reach of a Dart. The Chariots armed with hookes and sithes (whereof Artaxerxes had two hundred, and Cyrus not twentie) did small hurt that day, because the dri∣uers of them leaping downe, fled away on 〈◊〉〈◊〉. This base demeanour of his ene∣mies gaue so much confidence to Cyrus, and his Followers, that such as were about him forth-with adored him as King. And certainely, the Title had beene assured [unspec 40] vnto him that day, had not he sought how to declare himselfe worthy of it, ere yet he had obtained it For, perceiuing that Artaxerxes, who found that part of the field which lay before him voide, was about to encompasse the Greeks, and to set vp∣on them in the reare, he aduanced with sixe hundred Horse, and gaue so valiant a charge vpon a squadron of sixe thousand, which lay before the King, that he brake it, slaying the Captaine thereof, Artagerses, with his owne hands, and putting all the rest to flight. Hereupon his whole companie of sixe hundred, very few excepted, began to follow the chase, leauing Cyrus too ill attended, who perceiuing where the King stood in troupe, vncertaine whether to fight, or leaue the field, could not containe himselfe, but said; I see the man: and presently with a small 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of [unspec 50] men about him ranne vpon his brother, whom he strake through the Curace, and wounded in the brest. Hauing giuen this stroke, which was his last, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 receiued im∣mediately the fatall blow, which gaue period at once to his ambition and life being wounded vnder the eye with a 〈◊〉〈◊〉, throwne by a base-fellow, wherewith astonied,

he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dead from his horse, or so hurt, that it was vnpossible to haue recouered him, though all which were with him, did their best for his safety; not caring after∣wards for their owne liues, when once they perceiued that Cyrus their Master was slaine. Artaxerxes caused the head and right hand of his brother to bee forthwith stricken off, and shewed to his people, who now pursuing them, fled apace, calling vpon the name of Cyrus, and desiring him to pardon them. But when this great ac∣cident had breathed new courage into the Kings troupes, & vtterly dismaied such Persian Captaines, as were now, euen in their owne eies, no better than rebels; it was not long 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Campe of Cyrus was taken, being quite abandoned, from whence 〈◊〉〈◊〉, making all speede, arriued quickly at the quarter of the Greekes, [unspec 10] which was about three miles from the place where Cyrus fell. There hee met with Tissaphernes, who hauing made way through the battaile of the Greekes, was readie now to joyne with his Master in spoiling their Tents. Had not the newes, which Artaxerxes brought with him of his brothers death, beene sufficient to counter∣uaile all disasters receiued; the exploit of Tissaphernes in breaking through the Greekes would haue yeelded little comfort. For Tissaphernes had not slaine any one man of the Greekes, but contrariwise, when he gaue vpon them, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 opening their battaile, draue him with great slaughter through them, in such 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that he rather escaped as out of an hard passage, than forced his way through the squadron of the Greekes. Hereof the King being informed by him, and that the Greekes, as Masters [unspec 20] of the field, gaue chase to all that came in their sight; they ranged their Companies into good order, and followed after these Greekes, intending to set vpon them in reare. But these good Souldiers perceiuing the Kings approch, turned their faces, and made head against him; who not intending to seeke honour with danger of his life, wheeled about and fled, being pursued vnto a certaine Village, that lay vnder a Hill, on the top whereof he made a stand, rather in a brauerie, than with purpose to attempt vpon these bold-fellowes any further. For he knew well that his brothers death had secured his estate, whom he would seeme to haue slaine with his owne hand, thinking that fact alone sufficient to giue reputation to his valour; and this reputation he thought that he might now preserue wel enough, by shewing a man∣ly [unspec 30] looke, halfe a mile off. On the top of this Hill therefore he aduanced his Stan∣dard, a golden Eagle displaied on the top of a Speare. This ensigne might haue en∣couraged his people, had not some of the Greekes espied it, who not meaning that he should abide so neere them, with all their power marched toward him. The King discouering their approch, fled vpon the spurre; so that none remained in the place of battaile, saue only the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who had lost that day not one man, nor taken any other harme, than that one of them was hurt with an arrow. Much they wondred that they heard no newes of Cyrus, but thinking that hee was pursuing the Armie, they thought it was fittest for them, hauing that day done enough, to returne to their quarter, and take their Supper, to which they had good 〈◊〉〈◊〉, because the [unspec 40] expectation of the Kings comming had giuen them no leisure to dine.

§. V. The hard estate of the Greekes after the fight; and how ARTAXERXES in vaine sought to haue made them yeeld vnto him.

IT was now about the setting of the Sunne, and they bringing home darke night with them, found their Campe spoiled, little, or nothing [unspec 50] being left, that might serue for food: so that wanting victualls to sa∣tisfie their hunger, they refreshed their wearie bodies with sleepe. In the meane season Artaxerxes returning to his Camp, which he entred by Torch-light, could not enjoy the pleasure of his good fortune entire, because he

percciued that the basenesse of his people, and weakenesse of his Empire, was now plainely discouered to the Greckes: which gaue him assurance, that if any of these who had beheld the shamefull demeanor of his Armie, should liue to carry tidings home, it would not be long, ere with greater forces they disputed with him for his whole Signoric. Wherefore hee resolued, to trie all meanes, whereby hee might bring them to destruction, and not let one escape to carrie tidings of that which he had leene: to which purpose hee sent them a braue message the next morning; Charging them to deliuer vp their Armes, and come to his Gate, to awaite there vpon his Mercie. It seemes that he was in good hope to haue found their high cou∣rages broken, vpon report of his brothers death: but he was greatly decciued in that [unspec 10] thought. For the Greekes being aduertised that morning from Ariaeus, a principall Cōmander vnder Cyrus, that his Master being slaine, he had retired himselfe to the place of their last encamping, about eight miles from them, whence intending to re∣turne into Ionia, his meaning was to dislodge the next day, awaiting for them so long if they would joyne with him, but resoluing to stay no longer: they sent an∣swere back to Ariaeus, that hauing beaten the King out of the field, and finding none that durst resist them, they would place Ariaeus himselfe in the Kings Throne, if he would joyne with them, and pursue the victorie. Before they receiued any re∣ply to this answere, the Messengers of Artaxerxes arriued at the Campe, whose er∣rand seemed to the Captaines very insolent: One told them that it was not for the [unspec 20] Vanquishers to yeeld their Weapons; another, that he would die ere hee yeelded to such a motion; a third asked, whether the King, as hauing the victoric, required their Weapons; if so, why did he not fetch them? or, whether he desired them in way of friendship; for then would they first know, with what courtesie hee meant to requite their kindnesse. To this question Phalinus a Graecian, waiting vpon Tissa∣phernes, answered; That the King hauing slaine Cyrus, knew no man that could pretend any Title to his Kingdome, in the middest whereof he held them fast en∣closed with great Riuers, being able to bring against them such numbers of men, as they wanted strength to kill if they would hold vp their throats, for which cause he accounted them his prisoners. These words, to them, who knew themselues to [unspec 30] be free, were nothing pleasant. Therefore, one told Phalinus, that hauing nothing left, but their Armes & Valour, whilest they kept their Armes, their Valour would be seruiceable, but should they yeeld them, it was to be doubted, that their bodies would not long remaine their owne. Hereat Phalinus laughed, saying; This yong∣man did seeme a Philosopher, and made a pretty speech; but that his deepe specula∣tion shewed his wits to be very shallow, if he thought with his Armes, and his Va∣lour, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 against the great King. It seemes that Phalinus being a Courtier, and imploied in a businesse of importance, thought himself too profound a States∣man, to be checkt in his Embassage by a bookish discourser. But his wisdome here∣in failed him. For what soeuer he himselfe was (of whom no more is knowne than [unspec 40] that he brought an vnhonest message to his owne Countrimen, perswading them basely to surrender their Weapons, & Liues, to the mercilesse Barbarians) this yong Scholler by him despised, was that great Xenophon, who, when all the principall Commanders were surprised by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Persians, being a priuate Gentle∣man, and hauing neuer seene the warres before, vnder-tooke the conduct of the Ar∣mie, which he brought safe into Greece, freeing it from all those, and from greater dangers than Phalinus could propound. Some there were who promised to be faith∣full to the King, as they had beene to Cyrus, offering their seruice in Aegypt, where they thought Artaxerxes might haue vse of them. But the finall answere was, That without Weapons they could neither doe the King good as Friends, nor defend [unspec 50] themselues from him as Enemies. Hereupon Phalinus deliuered the Kings further pleasure, which was to grant them Truce, whilest they abode where they thē were, denouncing Warre if they stirred thence; Whereunto hee required their answere. Clearchus the Generall told him, they liked it. How (saith Phalinus) must I vnder∣stand

you? as choosing peace if we stay, otherwise warre, said Clearchus. But whe∣ther warre or peace? quoth this politique Embassadour. To whom Clearchus (not willing to acquaint him with their purpose,) Let our doings tell you; and so dis∣missed him, no wiser than he came. All that day the Greckes were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vp∣on their Horses, Asses, and other Beasts, which they rosted with arrowes, darts, and woodden targets, throwne away by the Enemies.

§. VI. How the Greekes beganne to returne home-wards. [unspec 10]

AT night they tooke their way towards Ariaeus, to whom they came at mid-night; being for saken by foure hundred foot, and forty horse, all Thracians, who fled ouer the King, by whom how they were en∣tertained, I doe not finde. Like enough it is that they were cut in pie∣ces; for had they been kindly vsed, it may well bee thought that some of them should haue accompanied Tissaphernes, and serued as Stales to draw in the rest. Ariaeus being of too base a temper, and birth, to thinke vpon seeking the King∣dome for him selfe, with such assistance as might haue giuen it vnto Cyrus, was very [unspec 20] well pleased to make couenant with them for mutuall asfistance vnto the last: Wherunto both parts hauing sworne, he aduised them to take another way home∣ward, which should bee somewhat longer, yet safer and fitter to relieue them with victuals, than that by which they came. The next day, hauing made a wearisome march, and tired the Souldiers, they found the Kings Armic which had coasted them, lodged in certaine Villages, where they purposed themselues to haue en∣camped: towards which Clearchus made directly, because hee would not seeme by declining them to shew feare, or weakenesse. That the Kings men were contented to remoue, and giue place to their betters, it cannot be strange to any that hath con∣sidered their former behauiour; Nor strange, that the Graecians being wearie and [unspec 30] hungrie, and lying among enemies in an vnknowne Countrie, should be very feare∣full: but it is almost past beliefe, that the noise which was heard of these poore men, calling one to another tumultuously, as the present condition inforced them to doe, should make the Persians 〈◊〉〈◊〉 out of their Campe, and so affright the great King, that in stead of demanding their Armes, he should craue peace of them. The next day very early, came messengers from Artaxerxes, desiring 〈◊〉〈◊〉 accesse for Em∣bassadours, to entreat of peace. Were it not that such particulars doe best open the qualitie of the persons, by whom things were managed, I should hold it fitter, to runne ouer the general passages of those times, than to dwel among circumstances. But surely it is a point very remarkeable, That when Clearchus had willed the Mes∣sengers [unspec 40] to bid the King prepare for battaile, because the Greekes (as he said) wanting whereupon to dine, could not endure to heare of truce till their bellies were full; Artaxerxes dissembling the indignitie, was contented sweetly to swallow downe this pill, sending them guides, who conducted them to a place where was plentie of victuals to relieue them. [unspec 50]

§. VII. How TISSAPHERNES, vnder colour of peace, betraied all the Captaines of the Greekes.

HItherto the Greekes, relying vpon their owne vertue, had rather aduan∣ced their affaires, than brought thēselues into any straights or termes of disaduantage. But now came vnto them the subtile Fox Tissapher∣nes, who circumuenting the chiefe Commanders by fine sleights, did mischieuously entrappe them, to the extreme danger of the Armie. [unspec 10] He told them, that his Prouince, lying neere vnto Greece, had caused him greatly to desire, that their deliuerance might be wrought by his procurement; knowing well that in time to come, both they, and their Countrimen at home, would not be vn∣thankefull for such a benefit. Here withall hee forgot not to rehearse the great ser∣uice that he had done to his Master, being the first that aduertised him of Cyrus his intent, and hauing not only brought him a good strength of men, but in the day of battaile shewed his face to the Greekes, when all others turned their backs: that he, together with the King, did enter their Campe, and gaue chase to the Barbarians that stood on the part of Cyrus. All this (quoth hee) did I alledge to the King, en∣treating that he would giue me leaue to conduct you safe into Greece; in which suite [unspec 20] I haue good hope to speede, if you will send a milde answere to him, who hath wil∣led me to aske you, for what cause yee haue borne Armes against him. The Cap∣taines hearing this, were contented to giue gentle words, which Tissaphernes relating to the King, procured (though very hardly as he said) that peace should bee gran∣ted: the conditions whereof were; That they should passe freely through all the Kings Dominions, paying for what they tooke, and committing no spoile: yet that it should be lawfull forthem to take victuals by force, in any place that refused to affoord them an open Market. Hereunto both parties hauing sworne, the League was concluded, and Tissaphernes returning to the King to take leaue, and end all bu∣sinesse, came vnto them againe after twentie daics, and then they set forward. This [unspec 30] interim of twenty daies, which Tissaphernes did spend at the Court, ministred great occasion of mistrust to his new Confederates. For besides his long absence, which alone 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to breede doubt; the Brethren, and Kindred of Ariaeus, repairing dai∣ly to him, and other Persians to his Souldiers, did work him and them so with assu∣rance of pardon, and other allurements, that hee daily grew more strange to the Greekes, than 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he had beene. This caused many to aduise Clearchus, rather to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 forward as well as he might, than to relie vpon couenants, and sit still whi∣lest the King laied 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to entrap them. But he on the contrarie perswaded them, to rest contented whilest they were well, and not to cast themselues againe into those difficulties, out of which they were newly freed by the late Treatie; reciting [unspec 40] withall their owne wants, and the Kings meanes, but especially the Oathes mutu∣ally giuen and taken, where with hee saw no reason why the enemie should haue clogged himselfe if hee meant mischiefe, hauing power enough to doe them harme by a faire and open Warre.

Tissaphernes was a very honourable Man (if honour may bee valued by great∣nesse and place in Court) which caused his Oath to bee the more esteemed; for as much as no inforcement, or base respect, was like to haue drawne it from him. But his falshood was such, both in substance and in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 may fitly expound that saying, which proceeded from the fountaine of Truth, I hate a rich man a lyar. A lye may finde excuse when it growes out of feare 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for that passion hath his ori∣ginall [unspec 50] from weakenesse. But when Power, which is a Character of the Almightie, shall be made the supporter of vntruth, the falshood is most abominable; for the offender, like proud Lucifer, aduancing his owne strength against the diuine Iustice, doth commit that sinne with an high hand, which commonly producech lamen∣table

effects, and is followed with sure vengeance. It was not long ere 〈◊〉〈◊〉 found meanes to destroy all the Captaines, whom hee subtilly got into his power by a traine; making the Generall Clearchus himselfe the meane to draw in all the rest. The businesse was contriued thus: Hauing trauailed some daies together in such wise, that the Persians did not encampe with the Grcekes, who were very jea∣lous of the great familiaritie, appearing betweene Tissaphernes, and Ariaeus; Clearchus thought it conuenient to roote out of Tissaphernes his braines all causes of distrust, whereof many had growne in that short time. To which purpose obtaining priuate conference with him, he rehearsed the oath of Confederacie, which had past be∣tweene them, shewing how religiously he meant to keepe it, and repeating the be∣nefits, [unspec 10] which the Greekes did receiue by the helpe of Tissaphernes, he promised that their loue should appeare to him not vnfruitful, if he would make vse of their seruice against the Mysians or Pisidians, who were accustemed to infest his Prouince, or a∣gainst the Aegyptians, who were then Rebels to the great King. For which cause he desired him, that whereas al diuine and humane respects had linked them together, he would not giue place to any close accusation or suspition, whereby might grow sudden inconuenience to either of them, vpon no just ground. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 faithlesse Per∣sian was very much delighted with this speech, which ministred faire occasion to the execution of his purpose. Therefore he told 〈◊〉〈◊〉 chus, that all this was by him wisely considered, wishing him further to call to minde how many waies hee could [unspec 20] haue vsed to bring them to confusion, without perill to himselfe, especially by bur∣ning the Countrie, through which they were to passe, whereby they must needes haue perished by meere famine. For which cause hee said that it had beene great folly, to seeke by perjurie, odious to God and Man, the destruction of such as were alreadie in his hands; But the truth was, that his owne loue to them had moued him to worke their safetie, not onely for those ends which Clearchus had recounted, of pleasures that might redound to himselfe, and the King, by their assistance: but for that he might by their friendship, hope to obtaine what Cyrus had mist. Finally, he inuited the credulous Gentleman to Supper, and sent him away so well assured of his good will, that he promised to bring all the Captaines with him to the same [unspec 30] place, where, in presence of them all, Tissaphernes likewise promised to tell openly, which of them had by secret information sought to raise dissension between them. Clearchus himselfe being thus deceiued, with great importunitie drew all the chiefe Commanders, and many of the inferiour Leaders, to repaire with him to the camp of Tissaphernes, whither followed them about two hundred of the common Soul∣diers as it had beene to some common Faire. But being there arriued, Clearchus with other the fiue principall Coronels, were called into the Tent, the rest staying without, where they had not waited long ere a signe was giuen, vpon which they within were apprehended, and the residue slaine. Forthwith certaine bands of Per∣sian Horse-men scoured the field, killing as many Greekes as they met, and riding vp [unspec 40] to the very Campe of the Graecians, who wondred much at the tumult, whereof they knew not the cause, till one, escaping sorely wounded, informed them of all that had beene done. Hereupon the Greekes took Armes in haste, thinking that the enemy would forthwith haue assailed their Campe. Anon they might perceiue the Embassadours of Tissaphernes, among whom were his owne brother, and Ariaeus, followed with three hundred Horse, who called for the principall men in the Ar∣mie, saying, that they brought a message from the King, which Ariaeus deliuered to this effect. That Clearchus hauing broken his faith, and the league made, was justly rewarded with death; that Menon and Proxenus, two other of the siue Co∣ronels, for detecting his treacheric, were highly honoured; and finally, that the [unspec 50] King required them to surrender their Armes, which were due to him, as hauing belonged vnto his seruant Cyrus. When some altercation had followed vpon this message, Xenophon told the Embassadours, that if Clearchus had in such sort offen∣ded, it was well that he was in such sort punished: but he willed them to send back

Menon and Proxenus, whom they had so greatly honoured, that by them, as by common friends to both Nations, the Greekes might be aduised how to answere the Persian. Hereunto the Embassadours knew not how to frame any reply, and there∣fore departed without speaking one word more. Clearchus, and the other foure were sent to Artaxerxes, by whose commandement their heads were striken off. I hold it not amisse to preuent the order of time, annexing to this perfidiousnesse of Tissaphernes, the reward which he afterward receiued. He saw his Prouince wasted by the Greekes, against whom receiuing from his Master conuenient aide of men and money, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 did so ill manage his affaires, that neither subtiltie, nor perjurie (to which he failed not to haue recourse) auailing him; finally, the King was jealous of [unspec 10] his cunning head, and sent a new Lieutenant into those parts, who tooke it from his shoulders. Such was the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of his treacherie, which made him so mis∣trusted at home, that the seruice which he could not doe, he was thought vpon pri∣uate ends to neglect; and so hated abroad, that he knew not which way to flye from the stroke, all the world being shut against him. But now let vs returne to the pro∣speritie, where in hee triumphed without great cause, hauing betrayed brauer men than himselfe, and intending to bring the like mischiefe vpon the whole Armie.

§. VIII. How XENOPHON heartened the Greekes, and in despight of TISSA∣PHERNES [unspec 20] went off safely.

GReat was the heauinesse of the Souldiers, being now destitute of Lea∣ders, and no lesse their feare of the euill hanging ouer their heads, which they knew not how to auoide. Among the rest, Xenophon, whose learning supplied his want of experience, finding the deepe sadnesse of the whole Armie to be such as hindred them from taking any course of preuenting the danger at hand, began to aduise the vnder Officers of Proxenus his companies, whose familiar friend he had beene, to bethinke them∣selues [unspec 30] of some meane, whereby their safetie might be wrought, and the Souldiers encouraged: setting before their eyes whatsoeuer might serue to giue them hope, and aboue al perswading them in no wise to yeeld to the mercy of their barbarous enemies.

Hereupon they desired him to take vpon him the charge of that Regiment; and so together with him, the same night calling vp such as were remaining of any ac∣count, they made choice of the fittest men to succeede in the places of those who were slaine, or taken. This being done, and order set downe for disburdening the Armie of all superfluous impediments, they easily comforted themselues for the losse of Tissaphernes his assistance, hoping to take victuals by force better cheap than [unspec 40] he had beene wont to sell them; To which purpose they intended to take vp their lodging two or three miles further, among some plentifull Villages, and so to pro∣ceede, marching towards the heads of those great Riuers, which lay in their way, and to passe them where they were foordable. Many attempts were made vpon them by Tissaphernes, whom they, seruing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 on foot, were not able to requite for the harme which they receiued by the Persian Archers, who shot at a farther distance than the Greekes could reach. For this cause did Xenophon prouide slings, wherewith he ouer-reached the enemy; and finding some Horses fit for seruice, that were im∣ployed among the carriages, he set men vpon them; training likewise his Archers to shoote compasse, who had beene accustomed to the point blanke. By these [unspec 50] meanes did hee beare off the Persians who assailed him; and sometimes gaue them chace with that band of fiftie Horse, which being well 〈◊〉〈◊〉, with a firme bodie of footmen, and seconded with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the light-armed-shot and flingers, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the enemie to lie a-loose. Tissaphernes not daring to come to handie gripes with

these resolute men, did possesse the tops of Mountaines, and places of aduantage, by which they were to passe. But finally, when their valour made way through all such difficulties, he betooke himselfe to that course, which was indeede the surest, of burning the Countrie. With great sorrow did the Greekes behold the Villages on fire, and thereby all hope of victuals cut off. Some aduised to defend the Coun∣trie, as granted by the enemie himselfe to be theirs; others to make more fires, if so perhaps the Persians might be ashamed to doe that which were the desire of such as made passage in hostile manner; But these were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 comforts. The best counsaile was, that being neere vnto the Carduchi, a people enemie to the Persian, they should enter into their Countrie passing ouer some high Mountaines which lay betweene [unspec 10] them. This course they followed, which could not haue auailed them, if Tissapher∣nes had begunne sooner to cut off their victuals, rather then to seeke to force, or to circumuent them by his fine wit.

§. IX. The difficulties which the Greeke Armie found in passing through the Land of the Carduchi.

ENtring vpon the Land of the Carduchi, they were encountred with [unspec 20] many difficulties of waies, but much more afflicted by the fierce In∣habitants, who, accustomed by force to defend themselues against the huge Armies of the Persian, were no way inferiour to the Greekes in daring, but only in the Art of warre. They were verie light of foot, skilfull Archers; and vsed the Sling well; which weapons in that mountainous Countrie were of much vse against these poore trauailers, afflicting them in seuen daies which they spent in that passage, farre more than all the power of the great King had done. Betweene the Territorie of these Carduchi, and the parts of Arme∣nia confining them, ranne Centrites a great Riuer, vpon which the Greekes refreshed themselues one day, reioycing that they had so well escaped these dangers, and ho∣ping [unspec 30] that the remainder would proue easie. But the next morning they saw cer∣taine troupes of Horse, that lay to forbid their passage. These were leauied by the Kings Deputies in those parts; Tissaphernes and his Companies hauing taken their way towards Ionia. The Riuer was broade and deepe, so that it was not possible for such as would enter it, to make resistance against those which kept the opposite bankes. To increase these dangers the Carduchi following vpon them, lay on the side of a Mountaine, within lesse than a mile of the water. But it was their good hap to discouer a Foord, by which the greater number of them passing ouer, did easily chase away the Subiects of the Persian, and then sending backe the most expedite men, gaue succour to the Reare-ward, against which the Carduchi being slightly ar∣med, [unspec 40] could not on plaine ground make resistance hand to hand. These Carduchi seeme to haue inhabited the Mountaines of Niphates, which are not farre from the Spring of Tygris; though Ptolomie place them far more to the East vpon the Riuer of Cyrus in Media, wherein he differs much from Xenophon, whose relation being grounded vpon his owne knowledge, doth best in this case deserue credit. Of the Riuer Centrites (as of many other Riuers, Townes, and Places, mentioned by Xenophon) I will not labour to make a coniecture, which may endure the seueritie of a Critick. For Ptolomie, and the whole Nation of Geographers, adde small light to this expedition: only of this last, I thinke it the same which falleth into Tigris, not much aboue Artasigarta springing out of Niphates, and running by the Towne of [unspec 50] Sardeua in Gordene, a Prouince of Armenia the Great, wherein the Greekes hauing passed Centrites did arriue.

§. X. How 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Gouernour of Armenia, seeking to entrap the Greekes with termes of fained peace, was disappointed and shamefully beaten.

THe Armie finding in Armenia good prouision, marched without any disturbance about fiftie or three score miles to the heads of the Riuer Tigris, and passing ouer them, trauailed as farre further without re∣sistance, till they were encountred by Teribazus at the Riuer 〈◊〉〈◊〉, [unspec 10] which Xenophon commends as a goodly water, though small; but Pto∣lomie and others omit it. Teribazus gouerned that Countrie for the Persian, and was in great fauour with Artaxerxes, whose Court may seeme to haue beene a Schoole where the Art of falshood was taught as wisdome. He desired peace of the Greeks, which was made vpon this condition, that they should take what they pleased, but not burne downe the Townes and Villages in their way. As soone as he had made this league, he leauied an Armie, & besetting the Straights of certaine Mountaines which they were to passe, hoped wel to make such benefit of their security, as might giue him the commendation of being no lesse craftily dishonest than Tissaphernes. Yet his cunning failed of successe. For a great snow fell, which caused the Greekes [unspec 20] to make many fires, and scatter themselues abroad in the Villages. Teribazus also made many fires, and some of his men wandred about seeking reliefe. By the fires he was discouered, and by a Souldier of his that was taken prisoner, the whole 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was reuealed. Heereupon the Greekes, taking this captiue with them for a guide, sought him out; and comming vpon his Campe, did so affright him, that before the whole Armie could arriue there, the shout which was raised by the Vaunt-currors, chased him away. They tooke his Pauilion, wherein (besides many slaues, that were Artificers of voluptuousnesse) verie rich furniture was left by the treacherous coward, who returned no more to challenge it. From hence the Armie went north∣ward, and passing Euprates, not far below the springs thereof, trauailed with much [unspec 30] difficulty through deepe snow, being followed aloofe by the enemy, who durst not approach them, but did cut off such as they found stragling behinde. The Inhabi∣tants of the Countrie, through which they marched, had their wintring houses vn∣der ground, wherein was found great plentie of victuals, and of cattaile, which like∣wise did winter in the same Cellars with the owners. Hauing refreshed themselues in those parts, and taken sufficient 〈◊〉〈◊〉 after the miserable iourney, which had con∣sumed many of them with extreme cold; they departed, leading with them many bond-slaues, and taking away (besides other Horses and Cattaile) some Colts that were bred vp for the great King. [unspec 40]

§. XI. The passage of the Armie to Trabizonde, through the Countries bordering vpon the Riuer of Phasis, and other ob∣scure Nations.

SO without impediment they came to the Riuer Phasis, neere where∣vnto the people called 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Taochi, and Chalybes were scated. These Nations ioyned together, and occupying the tops of a ledge of Moun∣taines, which the Greekes were to passe, made countenance of warre: [unspec 50] but some companies being sent by night to seize vpon a place of e∣quall height to that whereon the enemies lay, making good the piece of ground which they had taken, secured the ascent of the rest; which caused these people to flie, euery one retyring to the defence of his owne. The first vpon whose Countrie

the Greekes did enter were the Taochi, who conuaying all their prouision of victuals into strong holds, brought the Armie into much want, vntill with hard labour one place was forced, wherein great store of cattaile were taken; the people, to auoide captiuitie, threw themselues head-long downe the rocks, the very women throw∣ing downe first their owne children, and then casting themselues vpon them. Here was taken a great bootie of Cattaile, which serued to feed them, trauailing through the land of the Chalybes, of whom they got nothing but strokes. The Chalybes were a very 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Nation, well armed at all points, and exceeding fierce. They encoun∣tred the Greekes hand to hand, killing as many as they tooke prisoners, and cutting off their heads, which they carried away, singing and dancing, to the great griefe of [unspec 10] their companions liuing; who were glad, when after seuen daies iourney they e∣scaped from those continuall skirmishes, wherewith they had been vexed by these Barbarians. Hence trauailing through a good corne-Countrie, inhabited by an ob∣scure Nation called the Scythini, they came to a rich Towne, the Lord wherof, and of the Region adioyning, vsed them friendly, and promised to guide them to a Mountaine, whence they might discouer the Euxine- Sea. From Gymnias (which was the name of his Towne) he led them through the Territorie of his enemies, desiring them to waste it with sword and fire. After fiue daies march, they came to a Mountaine called Teches, being (as I thinke) a part of the Mountaines called 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whence their guide shewed them the Sea; towards which they bent their [unspec 20] course, and passing friendly through the Region of the Macrones, (with whom by meanes of an interpreter, found among themselues, who borne in that place had beene sold into Greece, they made a good peace) they arriued in the Land of Colchos, wherein stands the Citie of * 1.183 Trabisond, called then Trapezus, a Colonie of the Greekes. The Colchi entertaining them with hostilitie, were requited with the like; for the Armie hauing now good leisure to repose themselues among their friends the Trapezuntians, did spoile the Countrie thirtie daies together, forbearing onely the Borderers vpon Trabizonde, at the Citizens request. [unspec 30]

§. XII. How the Armie beganne at Trabizond to prouide a Fleet, wherewith to returne home by Sea: how it came into the Territorie of Sinope, and there prosequuted the same purpose.

HAuing now found an Hauen Towne, the Souldiers were desirous to take shipping, and change their tedious Land-iournies into an easie Nauigation. To which purpose Cherisophus a Lacedemonian, one of the principall Commanders, promised by meanes of Anaxibius the Lacedaemonian Admirall, who was his friend, that he would prouide [unspec 40] Vessels to embarke them. Hauing thus concluded, they likewise tooke order for the staying of such ships as should passe that way, meaning to vse them for their na∣uigation. Lest all this prouision should be found insufficient for the transportation of the whole Armie, Xenophon perswaded the Cities adioyning to cleare the waies, and make an easie passage for them by Land; whereunto the Souldiers were vtterly vnwilling to giue 〈◊〉〈◊〉, being desirous to returne by Sea, but the Countrie fearing what inconuenience might grow by their long stay, did readily condescend to Xeno∣phons request. Two ships they borrowed of the Trapezuntians, which they man∣ned and sent to Sea: the one of them sailed directly into Greece, forsaking their Companions, who had put them in trust to bring ships into the Port of 〈◊〉〈◊〉: [unspec 50] the other tooke Merchants and passengers, whose goods were safely kept for the owners, but the Vessels were staied to increase the fleet. After long abode, when victuals beganne to faile, by reason that all the Land of the Colchi, neere vnto the Campe was alreadie quite wasted, they were faine to embarke their sickmen, with

the women, children, and such of the baggage as might best be spared, in those few ships which they had already prouided. The rest of the Armie tooke their way by Land to Cerasus, a Greeke Towne, where the fleet likewise arriued. Here the Armie being mustered, was found to consist of eight thousand and six hundred men From hence they passed through the Countrie of the a 1.184 Mosynaci, who were diuided into factions. The stronger partic, despising their friendship, caused them to ioyne with the weaker, whom they left Masters of all.

The next place of their abode was b 1.185 Cotyora, a Greeke Towne likewise, and a Colo∣nie of the Sinopians, as Trapezus and Cerasus were; but the entertainement which here they found was very churlish, hauing neither an open Market affoorded to [unspec 10] them, nor the sick-men that were among them admitted into any house. Hereupon the Soul diers entred the Towne by force, and (committing no outrage) bestowed those which were sicke in conuenient lodgings, taking into their owne hands the custody of the Gates. Prouision for the Armie they made by strong hand, partly out of the Territorie of the Paphlagonians, partly out of the Lands belonging to the Towne. These newes were vnwelcome to c 1.186 Sinope, whence Embassadours were sent to the Camp, who complaining of these dealings, and threatning to joyne with the Paphlagonians, if redresse could not otherwise be had, were roundly answered by Xenophon, That meere necessitie had enforced the Armie to teach those of Cotyora good manners in so bad a methode: letting them know, that he feared not to deale [unspec 20] with them and the Paphlagonian at once; though perhaps the Paphlagonian would be glad to take Sinope it selfe, to which, if cause were giuen, they would lend assistance. Vpon this answere the Embassadors grew better aduised, promising all friendship that the State of Sinope could shew, and commanding the Towne of Cotyora to re∣lieue the Souldiers as well as they might. Further, they promised to assist them with shipping, letting them vnderstand how difficult the passage by Land would proue, in regard of the many and great Riuers, as Thermodon, Iris, Halys, and Par∣thenius, which crossed their way. This good counsaile, and the faire promises ac∣companying it, were kindly accepted by the Armie, which well perceiued, that the Citie of Sinope would spare for no cost, to be freed from such a neighbourhood. It [unspec 30] was therefore decreed that they would passe the rest of the way by Sea; prouided that if there should want such number of Vessels as might serue to embarke euery one man of them, then would they not put from the shore.

§. XIII. Of dissension which arose in the Armie; and how it was embarked.

HItherto the danger 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and miseries of weather & wants, had kept the companie in firme vnitie; which now beganne to dissolue [unspec 40] and to thaw, by the neighbouring aire of Greece, warming their heads with priuate respects to their seuerall ends and purposes. Whilest they, who were sent as Agents from the Campe, remained at Sinope; Xenophon considering the strength and valour of his men, and the opportunitie of the coast wheron they lay, thought it would be an honorable worke to build a Ci∣tie in those parts, which were soone like to proue great and wealthie, in regard both of their owne puissance, and of the great repaire of the Greekes into that quarter. For this cause he made sacrifice, according to the superstition of his time and Coun∣trie, diuining of his successe by the entrailes of beasts. The Sooth-sayer whom hee imployed had receiued a great reward of Cyrus, for coniecturing aright, that Ar∣taxerxes [unspec 50] would not giue 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in ten daies: hee therefore, hauing preserued his money carefully, was desirous to be soone at home, that he might freely enioy his gettings. By him the purpose of Xenophon was diuulged, which was interpreted ac∣cording to the diuersitie of mens opinions; some approuing the motion, but the

greater part reiecting it. They of Sinope and Heraclea, being informed of this con∣sultation, were sore afraide, lest the pouertie of the Souldiers, who had not where∣with to maintaine themselues at home, should giue successe to the proiect. Which to preuent, they promised to supply the Armie with a sufficient fleet, and likewise offered money to some of the Captaines, who thereupon vnder-tooke to giue the Souldiers pay, if they would presently set saile for Greece. One of these Captaines being a banished man, desired them to follow him into Troas; another offered to leade them into Cherronesus. Xenophon who desired only the common good, was pleased greatly with these propositions and professed openly that hee would 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them to set forward, and hold together in any case, punishing him as a Traitor that [unspec 10] should for sake the Armie, before such time as they were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 at their iournies end. Silanus the Sooth-sayer, who had vttered Xenophons purpose, was heereby staied from outrunning his fellowes, and driuen to abide with his wealth among poore men, longer than stood with his good liking. Also the other Captaines were much troubled and afraid, when they perceiued, that ships were prepared sufficient for their Nauigation, but that the money promised to them, and by them to the Souldiers, came not. For the people of Sinope, and Heraclea, knowing that the Armie was now resolued for the voiage, & that 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whom they feared, had perswa∣ded them to this resolution; thought it the wisest way to furnish them with a Nauy whilest they were in good readinesse to depart, but to keepe the money to them∣selues. [unspec 20] The Captaines therefore who being disappointed by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Townes, found themselues in great danger of their men, whom they had deceiued with fair hopes, repented much of their hastie offers, & signifying as much to Xenophon, praied him to make proposition to the Armie, of taking the ships, and sayling to Phasis, where they might seize vpon Lands, & plant themselues in such wise as should stand best with their good liking. But finding him cold in the businesse, they began to worke the principall of their own followers, hoping by them to draw in all the rest. These newes becomming publike, bred a suspition of Xenophon, as if he had wonne the rest of the Captaine to his purpose, and meant now to carrie the Armie quite another way from their owne home. Wherefore assembling the Companies, he gaue them [unspec 30] satisfaction, and withall complained of some disorders which he caused them to re∣dresse. A generall inquisition was likewise made of offences committed since the death of Cyrus; which being punished, all 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were in quiet. Shortly after came Embassadours from Corylas, Lord of the Paphlagonians, who sending presents desi∣red peace of the Greekes: the Embassadours were friendly entertained, and peace concluded, which needed not to haue been sought, for that the Greckes hauing now their fleet in a readinesse, did soone weigh Anchors, and set saile for Harmene the Port of Sinope, whither Cherisophus came, bringing with him a few Gallies from the Admirall Anaxibius, who promised to giue the Armie pay as soone, as they came into the parts of Greece. [unspec 40]

§. XIIII. Another great dissension and distraction of the Armie. How the muti∣ners were beaten by the Barbarians, and rescued by XENOPHON.

THe neerer that they approched to Greece, the greater was their desire to make prouision for themselues, that they might not returne home [unspec 50] emptie-handed. Wherefore trusting well that if the charge of the Armie were absolutely committed to one sufficient man, hee might the more conueniently procure the good of them all, they determi∣ned

to make Xenophon sole Commander of all, in whose fauour as well the Captains as the common Souldiers were very earnest and violent. But he, either fearing to displease the Lacedaemonians, who were iealous of him already (being incensed by that fugitiue who forsooke the Armie at Trabizond, flying with one of their two ships) or moued by some tokens appearing to him in the entrails that threatned ill successe to his gouernment, procured with vehement contention, that this honour was laied vpon Cherisophus a Lacedaemonian. It seemes that Xenophon, considering the vexations incident to the conduct of a voluntarie Army, wanting pay, did wisely in yeelding to such tokens as forbad him to accept it: especially, knowing so well their desire, which was by right or by wrong to get wealth wheresoeuer it might bee [unspec 10] found, without all regard of Friend or of Foc. Cherisophus had beene Generall but sixe or seuen daies, when he was deposed, for hauing been vnwilling to robbe the Towne of Heraclea which had sent presents to the Campe, and beene very benefi∣ciall vnto them in lending ships for their transportation. Two daies they had sailed by the coast of Asia, when being past those great Riuers, which would haue giuen impediment to their iourney by Land, they touched at Heraclea, where consulting how to take their way on wards, whether by Land or Sea, one seditious man began to put them in minde of seeking to get somewhat for themselues; telling them that all their prouision would be spent in three daies, and that being now come out of the enemies Countrie, victuals and other necessaries could not bee had without [unspec 20] money; for which cause he gaue aduice to send messengers into the Towne of He∣raclea, giuing the Citizens to vnderstand what their wants were, and demanding of them three thousand pieces of money, called Cyzicens, which summe amounteth to two thousand and fiue hundred pound starling, or thereabout. This motion was greatly applauded, and the summe raised to tenne thousand Cyzicens at least: which to require, they thought Cherisophus, as being Generall, the fittest man; o∣thers had more desire to send Xenophon: but in vaine, for they both refused it, and renounced the action as dishonest. Lest therefore either of these should faile in ma∣naging the businesse which agreed not with his disposition, others of more impu∣dencie and lesse discretion were sent, who in such wise deliuered their insolent mes∣sage; [unspec 30] that the Citizens taking time to deliberate vpon their request, brought what they could out of the fields into the Towne, and shutting the Gates, did forthwith man the walls. When the Souldiers perceiued themselues to be disappointed of their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 purpose, they fel to mutiny, saying, That their Leaders had betraied them: and being for the more part of them Arcadians, and Achaeans, they forsooke immediately Cherisophus and Xenophon, choosing new Leaders out of their owne number. Aboue foure thousand and fiue hundred they were, all heauily armed, who electing ten Captaines, sailed into the Port of Calphas, which is in the mid-way betweene Heraclea and Bizantium, with purpose to assaile the Bythinians on the sud∣daine. With Cherisophus there abode two thousand and one hundred, of whom one [unspec 40] thousand and foure hundred were armed weightily: Xenophon had two thousand foot, three hundred whereof were lightly armed, and fortie horse, which smal band had done good seruice alreadie, and could not haue beene spared now. Cherisophus had agreed with Cleander Gouernour of Bizantium, to meet him at the mouth of the Riuer Calphas, whither Cleander promised to bring some Gallies to conuey him ouer into Greece; for which cause he tooke his way thither by Land, leauing to Xenophon such shipping as he had, who passing some part of the way by Sea, landed vpon the Confines of Heraclea, and Thracia Asiatica, intending to make a cut through the mid-land-Countrie to the Propont. The Mutiners, who had landed at Calpas by night, with purpose to take spoiles in Bythinia, diuided themselues into ten Compa∣nies, [unspec 50] euery Captaine leading his owne Regiment into some Village, fiue or sixe miles from the Sea, in the greater Townes were two Regiments quartered; and so was that part of the countrie surprised on the suddaine, & sacked all at one time.

The place of Rendeuous was an high peece of ground, where some of them arri∣ued, finding no disturbance; others, not without much trouble and danger; two Companies were broken and defeated, only eight men escaping, the rest were all put to the sword. For the Thracians which had slipt at first our of the Souldiers hands, did raise the Countrie, and finding the Greekes loden with bootie, tooke the aduantage of their disorder, cutting in pieces those two Regiments: which done, they attempted the rest, encompassing the hill whereon they encamped. One great aduantage the Thractans had, that being all light armed, they could at pleasure make retrait from these Arcadians, & Achaeans: who wanting the assistance of horse, and hauing neither Archers nor Slingers among them, were driuen to stand meere∣ly [unspec 10] vpon their defence, bearing off with great danger, and many wounds receiued, the Darts and Arrowes of the Barbarians, till finally they were driuen from their watering place, and enforced to craue parly. Whatsoeuer the articles of compositi∣on were, the Thracians yeelded to all; but pledges for assurance they would giue none, without which the Greekes well knew, that all promises of such people, especi∣ally so incensed, were nothing worth. In the meane time Xenophon holding his way quietly through the In-land Region, did enquire of some Trauailers, whether they knew ought of any Graecian Armie, passing along those parts: and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by them true information of the desperate case into which these Gallants had foolishly throwne themselues, he marched directly towards the place where they lay, taking [unspec 20] with him for guides them who gaue him the intelligence. His horse-men hee sent before to discouer, and to scowre the waies; the light-armed foot-men tooke the hill-tops on either hand, all of them setting fire on whatsoeuer they found com∣bustible, whereby the whole Countrie seemed to be on a light-flame, to the great terrour of the enemies, who thought that some huge Armie had approched. That night he encamped on a Hill, within fiue mile of the Arcadians, encreasing still the number of his fires, which hee caused hastily to be quenched soone after Supper. The enemies perceiuing this, thought certainely that hee would haue fallen vpon them in the darke, which caused them in all haste to dislodge. Early the next mor∣ning Xenophon comming thither in very good order, to haue giuen battaile, found [unspec 30] that his deuice, to affright the Thracians, had taken full effect; but hee maruailed that the Greekes were also departed, concerning whom he learned by enquirie, that they remoued at breake of day, and perceiued by signes that they had taken the way to the Port of Calpas, in which journey hee ouertooke them. They embraced Him, and His, with great joy: Confessing that they themselues had thought the same which the enemies did, looking that hee should haue come by night, wherein fin∣ding themselues deceiued, they were afraid lest he had forsaken them, and there∣fore hastened away, to ouertake him, and joyne with him. So they arriued at the Hauen of Calpas, where it was decreed, That whosoeuer from thenceforth made a∣ny motion to disioyne the Armie, should suffer death. [unspec 40]

§. XV. Of diuers pieces of seruice done by XENOPHON; and how the Armie retur∣nedinto Greece. The occasions of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 betweene the Lacedae∣monians and the Persian.

THe Hauen of Calpas lay vnder a goodly head-land, that was very strong, and abounding with all kinde of Graine and Fruits, except [unspec 50] Oliues. There was also Timber for building and shipping, and a very conuenient sea for a great Citie. All which commodities, that might haue allu ed the Souldiers to stay there, and to plant,

caused them to haste away, fearing lest Xenophon should 〈◊〉〈◊〉 some deuice to haue settled himselfe and them in that place. For the greater part of them had good meanes to liue at home, neither did they so much for hope of gaine follow Cyrus in that Warre, as in regard of his Honour, and the loue which they bare vnto him: the poorer sort were such as left the Parents, Wiues, and Children, to whom (though failing of the riches which they had hoped to purchase) they were now desirous to returne. But whether it were so that Xenophon found aduantage by their owne superstition, to make them stay, which they greatly suspected; or whether 〈◊〉〈◊〉 signes appearing in the entrailes, did indeede forbid their departure: so long they were inforced to abide in the place till victualls failed, neither would [unspec 10] the Captaines leade them forth to forrage the Countrie, vntill the Sacrifices should promise good successe. Cherisophus was dead of an Ague, and his ships were gone, being returned to the Heracleans, of whom they were borrowed. His followers were joyned to the rest of the Armie, which the greater it was, the more prouision it needed, and the sooner felt want. For which cause, he that was chosen Coronell into the place of Cherisophus, would needs aduenture to gratifie the Souldiers with the spoile of some Villages that stood neere at hand; in which enterprise he found ill successe, the whole Countrie lying in waite to entrap him, and an Armie of Horse being sent by Pharnabazus the Satrapa, or Vice-roy of Phrygia, to the assistance of these 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Thracians, which troupes falling vpon the Greekes that were scat∣tered [unspec 20] abroade in seeking bootie, slew fiue hundred of them, and chased the rest to a certaine Mountaine thereby. The newes of this ouerthrow comming to Xenophon, he led forth a part of the Armie to the rescue of those that suruiued, and brought them safe to the Campe; vpon which the Bythinians made an offer that night, and breaking a Corps du garde, slew some, pursuing the rest to the very Tents. This new courage of the enemie, together with the present condition of the Armie, so disheartened and vnfurnished of necessaries, caused the Greekes to remoue their Campe to a place of more strength; which hauing intrenched, and committed to the defence of such as were least able to indure trauaile, Xenophon with the firmest and best able men went forth, both to burie those which were lately slaine, and to [unspec 30] abate the pride of the Thracians, and their Assistants. In this journey his demea∣nour was very Honourable. For hauing giuen buriall to the dead, the Enemie was discouered, lying on the tops of the Hills adjoyning, to whom (notwithstan∣ding 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the way was very rough, and troublesome, so that some thought it a matter of too great danger, to leaue at their backes a wood scarce passeable) hee marched directly, telling his men plainely, that hee had rather follow the enemie with halfe the number, than turne his back to them with twice as many, and letting them further know, that if they did not charge the Barbarian, hee would 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with the greater resolution to pursue them; from whom if they could safely re∣tire to the campe, yet what should they doe there, wanting victualls to sustaine [unspec 40] them in the place, and ships, to carrie them away? wherefore hee willed them ra∣ther to fight well that day, hauing eaten their dinners, than an other day fasting; and not to regard the vneasie returne, which might serue to stay Cowards from running away, but to wish vnto the Enemie a faire and easie way, by which hee might 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from them. These perswasions were followed with so valiant execu∣tion, that both Persians and Bythinians being chased out of the field, abandoned the Countrie forthwith, remouing their Families, and leauing all that could not sodainely bee conueighed away, to the discretion of the Greekes, who at good leisure gathered the haruest of these bad Neighbours fields. This was the last fight which they had on the side of Asia. For they were not only suffered quietly [unspec 50] to enjoy the spoile of the Countrie, but when the opinion grew common in those parts, that it was the intent of Xenophon to plant a Colonie on the Port of Calpas, Embassadours were sent from the Neighbour people, to desire friendship, and

make 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of their best assistance. But the Souldiers had no minde to stay. Wher∣fore entring further into Bythinia, they tooke a great bootie, which they carried a∣way to Chrysopolis, a Citie neere vnto Chalcedon, where they sold it. Pharnabazus, Lieutenant in Phrygia to Artaxerxes, did greatly feare, lest their long stay in that Countrie might breede in them a desire to visite his Prouince, where they might haue found great wealth, and little power to guard it. Therefore he sent to the Lacedaemonian Admirall, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 him with much instance and large promises to waft them ouer into Europe; to whom Anaxibius the Admirall condescending, promised to giue the Souldiers pay, as soon as they arriued at Bizantium. So 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they carried out of Asia at the intreatie of the Persian, who in the height of his [unspec 10] pride had thought them so surely imprisoned with mighty Riuers, that he not on∣ly denied to permit their quiet departure, but willed them to surrender their Armes into his hands, and so to yeeld their liues to his discretion. How discourte∣ously they were intreated by Anaxibius, and how to requite his injurious dealings, they seized vpon Bizantium, which by Xenophous perswasion they forbare to sacke, I hold it superfluous to relate. For the residue of their doings appertaine little to the generall course of things. But this expedition, as in all ages it was glorious, so did it both discouer the secrets of Asia, and stirre vp the Greekes to thinke vpon greater enterprises, than euer their forefathers had vndertaken. Likewise it was the only remarkable action which the time affoorded. For the Roman warres did hi∣therto [unspec 20] extend no further than to the next neighbouring Townes of Italie; and in Greece all things were quiet, the Lacedaemonians ruling insolently, but without di∣sturbance. True it is, that the seedes of the Warre shortly following, which the Lacedaemonians made vpon Artaxerxes, were already sowne, before these companies returned out of the high Countries of Asia. For the Townes of Ionia, which had sided with yong Cyrus against Tissaphernes, if not against the great King, prepared to rebell, which they thought safer, than to fall into the hands of Tissaphernes, who was now appointed Lieutenant, both of his old Prouince, and of all that had belonged to Cyrus. Wherefore the Ionians besought the Lacedaemonians to send them aide, whereby to recouer [unspec 30] their libertie; and obtained their request.

For a power was sent ouer, vnder conduct of Thimbro a Spartan, who bestowed his men in such Townes as had already reuolted, to secure the Cities and their Fields, but not to make any offen∣siue Warre. [unspec 40] [unspec 50]

CHAP. XI. Of the affaires of Greece, whilest they were managed by the Lacedaemonians.

§. I. [unspec 10] How the Lacedaemonians tooke courage by example of XENOPHONS Armie, to make Warre vpon ARTAXERXES.

IT seemes that the Lacedaemonians did well 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in how ill part Artaxerxes tooke their fauour shewed vnto his brother, and yet were timorous in begin∣ning an open warre against him, thinking it sufficient [unspec 20] to take all care that no aduantage might slip, which could serue to strengthen their estate, by finding the Persian worke beyond the Sea. But when Xenophons Armie had reuealed the basenesse of those effeminate Asiatiques, and rehearsed the many victories which they themselues had gotten, vpon termes of extreme disaduantage; then was all Greece filled with desire of vndertaking vpon this huge vnweldie Empire, thinking it no hard matter for the joynt-forces of that whole Nation, to hew out the way to Susa, whereof one hand∣full had opened the passage to Babylon, and further, finding no power that was able [unspec 30] to giue them resistance, in all that long journey of foure and thirty thousand two hundred and fifty fiue furlongs, spent in going and returning, which make of Eng∣lish miles about foure thousand two hundred foure score and one, a very painefull march of one yeere and three moneths. Neuerthelesse the ciuill distraction where∣with Greece was miserably torne, and especially that hot fire of the Theban Warre, which, kindled with Persian gold, brake forth sodainly into a great flame, drew backe out of Asia the power of the Lacedaemonians, to the defence of their owne estate; lea∣uing it questionable whether Agesilaus, hauing both the same, and farre greater forces, could haue wrought proportionable effects. Sure it is, that in the whole space of two yeeres, which he spent in Asia, his deedes procured more commenda∣tion [unspec 40] of magnanimitie and faire behauiour, than of stout courage, and great, or profi∣table atchieuements. For how highly so euer it pleased Xenophon, who was his friend, and follower in this, and in other warres, to extoll his vertue; his exploits be∣ing only a few incursions into the Countries lying neere the Sea, carry no propor∣tion to Xenophons owne journey, which I know not whether any Age hath paralle∣led: the famous retrait of Conon the Briton with six thousand men from Aquileia, to his owne Countrie, through all the breadth of Italie, and length of France, in despite of the Emperor Theodosius, being rather like it than equall. But of Agesilaus and his warres in Asia and Greece, we shall speake more in due place. [unspec 50]

§. II. The prosperous beginnings of the warre in Asia.

THIMBRO receiuing Xenophons men, beganne to take in Townes, and to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all such as were willing to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from the Persian, who were many, and some of them such, as had beene highly beholding to the King; who seeme to haue had no other cause of discontent, than that they were to liue vnder the gouernement of Tissaphernes, whom all others did as vehemently hate as the King his Master did loue him. The [unspec 10] managing of the warre begunne by Thimbro, was for his oppressions taken out of his hands, and committed to Dercyllidas a Spartan, who behaued himselfe as a good man of Warre, and a wise Commander. For whereas the rule of the low-Coun∣tries of Asia was diuided betweene Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, who did ill agree, Pharnabazus being the worthier man, but the other by his Princes fauour the grea∣ter, and hauing the chiefe command in those warres against the Greekes; Dercyllidas who did beare a priuate hatred to Pharnabazus (knowing well that Tissaphernes was of a mischieuous nature, and would 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be sorry to see his Corriuall throughly bea∣ten, though to the Kings losse) made an appointment with Tissaphernes, and forth∣with entred Aeolis, which was vnder the jurisdiction of Pharnabazus, which Pro∣uince, [unspec 20] in few daies, he brought into his owne power.

That Countrie of Aeolis had about the same time suffered a violent alteration, which gaue easie successe to the attempts of Dercyllidas. Zenis a Dardanian had beene Deputie to Pharnabazus in those parts; after whose death his wife Mania procured his Office, wherein shee behaued herselfe so well, that shee not only was beloued of the people vnder her gouernement: but enlarged her Territorie, by the conquest of certaine Townes adjoyning; and sundry times gaue assistance to Pharnabazus in his warres against the Mysians and Persians. For shee had in pay some Companies of Greekes, whose valour by her good vsage did her great seruice. But somewhat be∣fore the arriuall of Dercyllidas in those parts, a Sonne-in-law of hers, called Midias, [unspec 30] whom shee trusted and loued much, being blinded with ambition, found meanes to stifle her, and kill her sonne of seuenteene yeeres old; which done, he seized vp∣on two of her principall Townes, wherein her treasure lay, hoping to haue beene admitted into possession of her whole estate. Being denied entrance by her Soul∣diers, that lay in Garrison, he sent Messengers with presents to Pharnabazus, desiring him to make him Gouernour in the place of Mania. His presents were not only re∣jected by Pharnabazus, but reuenge of his foule treason threatned, whereby the wicked villaine was driuen into tearmes of almost vtter desperation. In the meane time came Dercyllidas, to whom the Townes of Mania, that held against Midias, did quickly open their Gates. One only Towne stood out foure daies (against the [unspec 40] will of the Citizens, who were couetous of libertie) the Gouernour striuing in vaine to haue kept it to the vse of Pharnabazus. Now remained only two Cities Gergethe and Scepsis, which the Traitour held, who 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all men, as being loued of none, sent Embassadours to Dercyllidas, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 leaue to speake with him, and pledges for his securitie: vpon the deliuerie of which hee issued out of Scepsis, and comming into the Campe, made offer to joyne with the Greekes vpon such conditi∣ons as might seeme reasonable. But he was plainely told by Dercyllidas, that other condition there was none, than to set the Citizens freely at libertie. And presently vpon these words they marched toward Scepsis. When Midias perceiued that it was in vaine to striue against the Armie, and the Townes men, who were all of one [unspec 50] minde; hee quietly went along with Dercyllidas; who remaining but a few houres in the Citie, did a sacrifice to Minerua, and then leading away the Garrison of Midias, he left the Citie free, and departed toward Gergethe. Midias did not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his Companie, but followed him, earnestly intreating that hee might be suffered to re∣taine

Gergethe: but comming to the Gates, he was bidden to command his Souldi∣ers that they should be opened, for (quoth Dercyllidas) I must here likewise doe a sa∣crifice to Minerua. The Traitor, not daring to make deniall, caused his Mercinaries to open the Gates, whereby Dercyllidas, taking possession of the place, tendred pay to the Garrison, who did not refuse to serue vnder his Ensignes. This done, all the goods of Mania were seized vpon, as belonging to one that had beene subject to Pharnabazus, who was enemie to the Greekes: and so the murderous wretch was sent away naked, not knowing in what part of the World hee might finde any place to hide his detested head. Dercyllidas, hauing in eight daies taken nine Cities, purpo∣sed for the ease of his Confederates to winter in Bythinia, to which end hee tooke [unspec 10] Truce with Pharnabazus, who had not any desire of Warre. That Winter; and the Sommer ensuing, the Truce being recontinued held; in which time, besides the wasting of Bythinia, the neck of Land joyning Cherronea to the Maine, was fortified, being foure or fiue miles in breadth, by which meanes eleuen Townes with much good Land belonging to them, were freed from the incursions of the wild Thractans; and made fit and able to victuall the Campe. Likewise the Citie of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was ta∣ken, which was of great strength, and very well stored with prouision. After this, Dercyllidas had command from Sparta, to diuert the warre into Caria, where was the seate of Tissaphernes; for that hereby it was thought not vneasie to recouer all the Townes of Ionia: Pharax the Admirall of the fleet (which was a yeerely Office) [unspec 20] being appointed to joyne with him. Though it was manifeft that Thissaphernes had neglected Pharnabazus in time of necessity, yet was he not in his owne danger requi∣ted with the like. For Pharnabazus hauing respect to the Kings seruice, came to as∣sist his priuate enemie Tissaphernes, & so passing into Caria, they thrust Garrisons in∣to all places of ftrength; which done, they marched towards Ionia, hoping to finde the Townes ill manned for resistance. As these Persians were desirous to keepe the warre from their owne dores, so was Dercyllidas willing to free his Confederates the Ionians from the spoile and danger of the warre, by transferring it into Caria. For which cause he passed the Riuer of Maeander, and not looking to haue bin so soone encountered, marched carelesly through the Countrie: when on the very sodaine [unspec 30] the whole Armie of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus was discouered, confisting of Per∣sians, Carians, and some Mercinarie Greekes, who were all marshalled in very good order to present battaile. The oddes was too apparent, both in numbers of men, and in readinesse, as also in aduantage of ground: for the Persian had a great multi∣tude of Horse, the Greeke very few and feeble, being to fight in an open plaine. Therefore all the Ionians, together with the Ilanders and others, of such places as bordered vpon the Kings Dominions, did either betake themselues to present flight; or abiding a while for shame, did plainely discouer by their lookes, that they meant not to be more bold than wise. Only Dercyllidas with his Peloponnesians re∣garding their honor, prepared to endure the fight: which must needs haue brought [unspec 40] them to destruction, if the counsaile of Pharnabazus had beene followed, who per∣ceiuing the opportunitie of so great a victorie, was not willing to let it slip. But Tissaphernes, who naturally was a coward, seeing that countenance of resistance was made, beganne to consider what strange defence the Souldiers of Xenophon had shewed, and thinking that all the Greekes were of the like resolution, held it the wi∣sest way to craue parly; the conclusion of which was, That a truce should be made, to last vntill Tissaphernes might receiue answere from the King, and Dercyllidas from Sparta, concerning the demands propounded in the Treatie, which were on the one part, that all the Greekes in Asia might enjoy their owne libertie and lawes, but con∣trariwise on the other side, that the Lacedaemonians should depart Asia, and leaue the [unspec 50] Townes to the Kings pleasure. This Treatie was of none effect; only it serued to free the Greekes from the present danger, and to gaine time vnto Tissaphernes, who desired to auoide the warre by procrastination, which he durst not aduenture to fi∣nish by triall of a battaile.

§. III. How the Lacedaemonians tooke reuenge vpon the Eleans for old displeasure. The discontents of the Corinthians and Thebans, conceiued against the State of Sparta.

IN the meane season the Lacedamonians, who found none able to with∣stand them in Greece, beganne to call the Eleans to accompt for some disgraces receiued by them during the late warres, when leisure was wanting to the requitall of such pettie iniuries. These Eleans being [unspec 10] Presidents of the Olympiaque games, had set a fine vpon the Citie of Sparta, for Non-paiment of which, they forbade them to come to the solemnitie; and publiquely whipt one of them, that was a man of note, for presuming to con∣tend 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their decree. Likewise they hindred Agis King of Sparta, from doing sacrifice to Iupiter; and in all points vsed great contempt toward the Spartans, who now had no businesse that could hinder them from taking 〈◊〉〈◊〉: and therefore sent a peremptorie message to the Eleans, commanding them to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 at libertie the Cities which they held in subiection. This was the vsuall pretence which they made the ground of all their warres: though little they cared for the libertie of such Townes, which they caused afterwards to become followers, and little better than [unspec 20] meere Vassals of the Lacedaemonians. In their late warres with Athens, the strong opposition which they found, caused this goodly Title of libertie to worke verie slowly: but hauing now to doe with a State of great spirit and small force, it gaue present successe to their desires. Two yeeres together they sent an Armie into the Countrie of the Eleans: the first yeere an earthquake (held in those times a prodi∣gious signe, and which did alwaies forbid the prosecution of any enterprise in hand) caused them to retire: the second yeere, all the Townes of the Eleans did hastily re∣uolt, and the Citie it selfe was driuen to submission; consenting both to suffer their old subiects freely to enioy their libertie, and to haue her owne walls throwne downe. Only the Presidentship of the Olympian games was left vnto them, which, [unspec 30] it was not to be doubted that they would in time comming vse modestly, finding themselues to stand at the mercy of Sparta. In this expedition all the Greekes were assistant to the Lacedaemonians, excepting the Corinthians and Boeotians, whose aide hauing been of as much importance in the late Peloponnesian Warre, as the force of Sparta it selfe, they could not smoother their dislike of their vnequall diuision fol∣lowing the victorie; which gaue to Sparta the command of al Greece; to Thebes, and Corinth, only 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 Athens, but such a securitie as was worse than the danger. For when the equall greatnesse of two 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Estates did counterpoise each the other, it was in the power of these Neutral Common-weales to adhere to [unspec 40] either, as the condition of their affaires required; but when to reuenge iniuries, they had by mortall hatred prosecuted the warre to extremitie, leauing the one Ci∣tie naked of power and friends, the other mightily encreased in both, it was then (if not necessarie to obey the greatnesse which themselues had made yet) foolish and dangerous to prouoke it. Neuerthelesse, it was not the purpose of the Spartans to take occasion of any quarrell, which they could not finish at pleasure, till such time as they had by victorie or composition made some good end with the Persian, to∣ward whom they bent all their care and forces. [unspec 50]

§. IIII. The passage of AGESILAVS 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Asia. His warre with TISSAPHERNES. How TISSAPHERNES was put to death, and the warre diuerted into an∣other Prouince, through perswasion and gifts of TITHRAVSTES his successor. How carlesse the Persian Lieutenants were of the Kings good.

AGESILAVS newly made king of Sparta, was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to haue the ho∣nour of the victory, which not without cause, he expected vpon those [unspec 10] of Asia; and therefore procuring a great Armie to ioyne with that of Dercyllidas, he tooke his way in great pompe to Aulis in Boeotia, a Ha∣uen, lying opposite to the Iland of Euboea, in which place Agamemnon (leading the power of all Greece to the warre against Troy, many Ages before) had embarked his men. In imitation of Agamemnon hee meant also to do sacrifice in Aulis, which the Thebans, Lords of that Countrie, would not permit, but saying that the performance of such ceremonies in that place, belonged vnto their Officers, they were so vnable to conceale their malice, that sending some Companies of horse, they threw downe his sacrifice from the Altar. It was not then conuenient time for Agesilaus to entangle himselfe and his Countrie in any new warre; there∣fore [unspec 20] waiting better opportunitie of reuenge, he quietly swallowed the contumelie, and followed his maine intendment. Hauing landed his men at Ephesus, he was en∣tertained by Tissaphernes with a Treatie of peace, wherein Agesilaus peremptorily requiring that the Persian should restore to liberty all the Greek Townes in Asia, was promised that the King, being first informed to his demand, should send answere to his good liking, if he would in the meane while make truce. Truce was therfore made, which Tissaphernes had sought, onely to winne time of making prouision for the warre, and getting supply of men and money from Artaxerxes; whilest 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was busie in setling the Estates of his confederate Cities on that side of the Sea. The end of this long vacation from warre was at the comming down of these for∣ces [unspec 30] which Artaxerxes had sent: at what time Agesilaus receiued a plain message from Tissaphernes, that either he must forth-with depart out of Asia, or make good his aboade by strong hand. Agesilaus returning word, that hee was glad to heare that his enemies had by periurie 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vengeance from Heauen, prepared to inuade them; and sending word to all the Townes which lay betweene him, and Caria, that they should prouide victuals and other necessaries for his Armie, did easily make Tissaphernes beleeue, that his intent was to inuade that Prouince wherein Tis∣saphernes dwelt, and which was vnfit for Horse, in which part of his forces the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had most confidence. Therefore Tissaphernes bestowing all his Companies of foot in Caria, entred with his horse into the plaines of Maeander, hoping thereby to [unspec 40] stoppe the passage of a heauie foot-Armie, not suffering them to passe into that Countrie which was fittest for their seruice. But the Greekes left him waiting there in vaine, and marched directly into Phrygia, where they tooke great spoile without resistance, till such time as the Horse men of Pharnabazus met him, who in a small skirmish hauing the better of the Greekes, were the occasion that Agesilaus returned to Ephesus. Although in this last fight onely twelue men were lost, yet Agesilaus perceiuing by that triall how hard it would be to preuaile, and hold the masterie of the field, without a greater strength of Horse, tooke all possible care to encrease that part of his forces. By which meanes hauing enabled himselfe, whilest win∣ter lasted hee entred vpon the Countrie of Tissaphernes, as soone as the season of [unspec 50] the yeere would permit, and not onely tooke a great bootie, but finding the Horse-men of Tissaphernes in the plaine of Maeander, without assistance of their infanterie, hee gaue them battaile, and had a great victorie, taking their Campe in which hee found great riches. The blame of this losse fell heauie vpon

Tissaphernes, who either vpon cowardise had absented himselfe from the battaile, or following some other businesse, was then at Sardes. For which cause his Master hauing him in distrust, and thinking that peace might be the sooner had, which he much desired, if the man, so odious to the whole Nation of the Greekes, were taken out of the way, he sent into those parts Tithraustes a Persian, to cut off the head of Tissaphernes, and succeede him in the gouernment. Such was the end of this base and cowardly Politician, who little caring to offend Heauen, when by periurie he could aduance his purposes on Earth, failed at the last through too much ouer-wee∣ning of his owne wisdome, euen in that part of cunning, wherein he thought him∣selfe most perfect; for supposing, that by his great skill in subtile negotiation hee [unspec 10] should one way or other circumuent the Greekes, and make them weary of Asia; he did not seeke to finish the warre, and according to his Masters wish, bring all things speedily to quiet, but rather to temporize, till he might finde some opportunitie of making such end as best might stand with the Kings honour and his own. Wherein it seemes that he much mistooke his Princes disposition, who though he had highly rewarded him for the aide which he did bring in his time of danger, yet would hee much more gladly haue taken it, if he could haue found such meanes whereby the danger it sefe might haue beene auoided: as not louing to haue warre, whilest by a∣ny conditions (honourable or not) he might obtaine peace. And this appeared well by the course which Tithraustes tooke at his first possession of the low-Countries. [unspec 20] For he sent Embassadours to Agesilaus, in very friendly sort, letting him know, that the man who had beene Author of the warre, was now taken out of the way; and that it was the Kings pleasure to let the Greekes enjoy their owne lawes and libertie, vpon condition, that they should pay him the tribute accustomed, and the Armie be forthwith dismissed. The answere to this proposition, was by Agesilaus refer∣red to the Councell of Sparta; in the meane season he was content to transferre the warre into the Prouince of Pharnabazus, at the request of Tithraustes, who bought his departure with thirtie Talents.

This was a strange manner of Warre, both on the offensiue and on the defen∣siue part. For Agesilaus hauing entertained great 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of vanquishing the great [unspec 30] King, was contented to forbeare his seuerall Prouinces, at the entreatie of the Lieu∣tenants: and those Lieutenants being emploied by the King to maintaine his E∣states against all enemies (wherein if they failed, they knew that their heads might easily bee taken from their shoulders) were little offended at any losse that fell on their next Neighbour-Prouinces, which were subiect likewise to the same Crowne of Persia, so long as their own gouernement could be preserued free from waste and danger. The cause of this disorder on the Persian side, I can ascribe to nothing so deseruedly, as to the corrupted estate of the Court, wherein Eunuches, Concubines, and Ministers of pleasure, were able by partiall construction to countenance, or dis∣grace, the actions of such as had the managing of things abroade; and to that foo∣lish [unspec 40] manner of the Kings (which was so vsuall that it might be called a rule) to re∣ward or punish the Prouinciall Gouernour, according to the benefit or losse, which the Countrie giuen in charge vnto each of them receiued, during the time of his rule. Whereby it came to passe, that as euery one was desirous to make his owne Territorie yeeld a large increase to the Kings treasure; so no man was carefull to assist his borderers, if losse or danger might thereby grow to himselfe and his; but sate still as an idle beholder, when perhaps by joyning their forces, it had not beene vneasie to recompence the spoile of one Countrie, by conquering another, or de∣fending a third from farre greater miseries. [unspec 50]

§. V. The Warre and Treatie betweene AGESILAVS and PHARNABAZVS.

AGESILAVS hauing thus compounded with Tithraustes, entred Phry∣gia, burning and wasting the Countrie without resistance. Hee tooke the Palace of Pharnabazus, and by his Lieutenant draue him out of his Campe. These actions, together with his honourable behauiour, which added much to their lustre, were more glorious then profita∣ble. [unspec 10] For he did not winne Cities and Places of strength, which might haue encrea∣sed his power, and giuen assurance to the rest of his proceedings: but purchased fame and high reputation, by which he drew vnto him some that were disontented and stood vpon bad termes with the great King, whom he lost againe as easily, by meanes of some slight iniurie done to them by his vnder-Captaines. Pharnabazus did not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 himselfe in any Towne for feare of being besieged, but kept the field, lying as neere as he could safely to the enemies, with whom it was not his pur∣pose to fight, but to make some good end by composition, which he found not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to doe. For the pleasures, by him formerly done to the State of Sparta, in the times of their most necessitie, had beene so great, that when hee (obtaining 〈◊〉〈◊〉) [unspec 20] did set before their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his bountie towards them, and his loue (which had beene such, that besides many other hazards of his person, he had for the rescue of their fleet when it was driuen to runne a-shore at Abydus, aduentured to ride into the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as farre as he could finde any ground, and fight on horse-backe against the 〈◊〉〈◊〉) together with his faith which had neuer beene violated in word or deede: they knew not how to excuse their ingratiude, otherwise then by telling him, That hauing warre with his Master, they were inforced, against their will, to offend him. Agesilaus did make a faire offer to him, that if he would reuolt from the King to them; they would maintaine him against the Persian, and establish him free Prince of the Countrie wherein hee was at that time onely Deputie to Artaxerxes. But [unspec 30] Pharnabazus told him plainely, That if the King his Master did put him in trust to make warre against them, he would not faile to doe the best that he could as their enemie; if the charge were taken out of his hand, and he commanded to obey an other, he would then shift side, and betake himselfe to their alliance. The issue of this parlie was, That the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 should no longer abide in Pbrygia, nor againe re∣turne into it, whilest emploiment could be found elsewhere. The excuse made by 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and the withdrawing of his forces out of those parts, were not sufficient to appease Pharnabazus, whom he had not inuaded for want of more necessarie bu∣sinesse elsewhere; but because his Countrie would yeeld great bootie; and for the hire of thirtie Talents. By this meanes the Lacedaemonians changed an honourable [unspec 40] Friend into a hot Enemie, who afterwards 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their vnthankefulnesse with full reuenge.

§. VI. The great commotions raised in Greece by the Thebans and others, that were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with gold from the Persian.

IN the meane while Tithraustes, perceiuing that Agesilaus meant no∣thing lesse then to returne into Greece, and let Artaxerxes rest quietly [unspec 50] in Asia, tooke a wise course whereby the Citie of Sparta was not only driuen to looke to her owne, and giue ouer her great hopes of subuer∣ting the Empire, but was beaten out of all that had beene gotten by many late victories, and saw her Dominion restrained vnto the narrow bounds of

her owne Territorie. Hee sent into Greece fiftie talents of siluer, to be imployed in raising warre against the Lacedaemonians; which treasure was, by the subtile practice of him that was put in trust with it, in such wise dispersed, among the principall men of the Thebans, Argiues, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that all those Estates hauing formerly borne secret hate to that of Sparta, were now 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of nothing so much as of open war. And lest this great heate of the incensed multitude should, for want of present 〈◊〉〈◊〉, begin to faint, and vanish away in idle wordes, occasion was found out to thrust the Lacedaemonians into Armes, that they themselues might seeme Authours of the quarrell. Some land there was in the tenure of the Locrians, to which the Thebans had in former time laid claime; but the Phocians either hauing the better [unspec 10] title, or finding the greater fauour, had it adjudged vnto them, and receiued yeerly money for it. This money the Locrians were either hired or perswaded to pay now to the Thebans, who readily accepted it. The Phocians not meaning so to lose their Rent, made a distresse by strong hand, recouering a great deale more than their owne; which the Thebans (as in protection of their new Tenants) requited with an inuasion made vpon Phocis, wasting that Countrie in the manner of open warre. Such were the beginnings of professed hostilitie betweene Thebes and Sparta, and the first breaking out of their close enmitie, that had long time, though hardly, been concealed. For when the Phocian Embassadours came to Sparta, complaining of the violence done by the Thebans, and requesting succour, they had very fauourable au∣dience, [unspec 20] and readie consent to their suite; it being the manner of the Lacedaemonians, to deferre the acknowledgement of injuries receiued, vntil occasion of reuenge were offered, and then to discouer their indignation in cold bloud. At this time they had very good opportunitie to worke their owne wills, hauing no other war to disturbe them in Greece, and hearing out of Asia no newes, that could offend or trouble them. Wherefore they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Lysander to raise all the Countries about 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and with such forces as he could leauie, to attend the comming of Pausanias King of Sparta (for Sparta, as hath beene shewed before, had two Kings) who should follow him with the strength of Peloponnesus. Lysander did as he was appointed, and being of great reputation in those parts, he drew the Orchomenians to reuolt from Thebes. Pausanias [unspec 30] likewise raised all Peloponnesus, except the Corinthians, (who refused to assist him in that enterprise) meaning to joine with Lysander, and make a speedie end of the war. The consideration of so great a danger, approching so swiftly, caused the Thebans to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 what helpe they could abroade, forasmuch as their owne strength was farre too little to make resistance against such mightie preparations. It was not vnknown to them, that many followers of the Lacedaemonians were otherwise affected in heart than they durst vtter in countenance; but the good wishes of such people were little auaileable, considering that the most which could be expected from them, was, that they should doe as little hurt as they could: by which manner of tergiuersation, the Corinthians did at that present cast themselues into the displeasure of the Spartans, to [unspec 40] the no great benefit of Thebes. Wherefore it was thought the safest course, to pro∣cure the assistance of some Estate that might presently declare it selfe on their side, which would cause many others to follow the example, & make their partie strong. To this end they sent Embassadours to Athens, excusing old offences, as either not committed by publike allowance, or done in time of the generall warre, and recom∣penced with friendship lately shewne in their refusall of assisting Pausanias, when he came in behalfe of the thirtie Tyrants, against the good Citizens of Athens. In re∣gard of which, and for their owne Honour sake, they requested them of aide in the present warre, offering to doe the best that they could for the restoring of Athens to her former Estate and Dignitie. Thrasybulus and his Friends, who persecuted by the [unspec 50] thirtie, had been well entertained at Thebes, procured now the Citie to make a large requitall of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which they had receiued. For it was decreed, that the State of Athens should not only refuse to aide the Lacedaemonians in this Warre; but that it should assist the Thebans, and engage it selfe in their cause. Whilest Pausanias lay

still, waiting the arriuall of his Confederates; Lysander being desirous to doe some∣what that might aduance the businesse in hand, came to Haliartus, where, though Pausanias did not meet him, as had beene appointed, yet he attempted the Towne, and was slaine in fight by the Thebans, who came hastily to the rescue. As this vi∣ctorie did encourage the Thebans, so the comming of Pausanias with his great Army did againe amaze them, with presentation of extreme danger; but their spirits were soone reuiued by the strong succour which was brought from Athens, in considera∣tion of which, and of the late battaile, Pausanias durst not hazard a new fight with them, but receiuing the bodies of those that were slaine, by composition, departed out of their Territorie, for which, either cowardise or indiscretion, he was at his re∣turne [unspec 10] to Sparta condemned as a Traitour, and driuen to flie into Tegea, where hee ended his daies in banishment.

§. VII. How AGESILAVS was called out of Asia to helpe his Countrie. A victorie of the Spartans. CONON the Athenian, assisted by PHARNABAZVS, ouercomes the Lacedaemonian fleet; recouers the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Seas; and rebuilds the walls of Athens.

THis good successe, and the confederacie made with Athens, gaue such [unspec 20] reputation to the Thebans, that the Argiues, Corinthians, Euboeans, Lo∣crians, and Acarnanes, did forth with side with them, & raising a strong Armie, determined to giue battaile to the Lacedaemonians as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as they might, to their owne dores; Considering that the force of Spar∣ta it selfe was not great, but grew more and more by the adiunction of their Confe∣derates. The Magistrates of Sparta perceiuing the danger, sent for Agesilaus, who readily obeied them, and promising his friends in Asia to returne speedily to their assistance, passed the Straights of Hellespont into Europe. In the meane time the Ci∣ties of the new league had giuen battaile to the Lacedaemonians, and the remainder of [unspec 30] their Associates, but with il successe. For when the right-wing of each part had got∣ten the better hand, the Argiues and Thebans returning from the chase in some disor∣der were broken and defeated by the Lacedaemonians, who meeting them in good order, wonne from them the Honour which they had gotten, by forcing the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, and made the victorie of that day entirely their owne. The report of this battaile meeting Agesilaus at Amphibolis, were by him sent ouer into Asia, where it is not likely that they brought much comfort vnto his friend, who had since his departure seene the Spartan fleet beaten, and Lysander the Admi∣rall slaine. The same man, whose endeuour had brought the Athenians into order, by aduancing the Sea-forces of the Lacedaemonians with money, and all manner of [unspec 40] supplies, was now the occasion that the power of Athens grew strong at Sea, when the Citie was despoiled of her old reputation, and scarsly able to mainetaine an Ar∣mie by Land for her owne defence. Pharnabazus considering how much it impor∣ted the King his Master, to haue the Greeks diuided into such factions, as might vt∣terly disable them from vndertaking abroad, thought it the safest way for himselfe, during these broiles, to take such order, that he should not need any more, to seeke peace by entreatie and commoration of old benefits, at their hands, who vn-pro∣uoked had sold his loue for thirtie Talents. To which purpose he furnished Conon the Athenian with eight ships, who had escaped, when the fleet of Athens was sur∣prised by Lysander at Aegos-Potamos; giuing him the command of a great Nauie, [unspec 50] where with he requited the losse receiued at Aegos-Potamos, by repaying the Lace∣daemonians with the like destruction of their fleet at Cnidus. After this victorie Conon sailed to Athens, bringing with him, partly as the liberalitie of Pharnabazus, partly as the fruit of his victorie, so strong a Nauie, and so much gold, as encouraged the

Athenians to rebuild their walls, and thinke more hopefully vpon recouering the Signiorie which they had lost.

§. VIII. Of sundrie small victories gotten on each part. The Lacedaemonians lose all in Asia; The Athenians recouer some part of their old Dominion.

NEuerthelesse the Lacedaemonians, by many victories at Land, maintai∣ned [unspec 10] for some yeeres the honour of their estate, endangered very greatly by this losse at Sea. For Agesilaus obtained the better with his horse-men from the Thessalians, who were accounted the best riders in Greece: He wasted Boeotia, and fought a great battaile at Coronea a∣gainst the Thebans, and their Allies, whome he ouerthrew; and by his Marshall Gylis forraged the Countrie of Locris: which done, he returned home.

The gaine of these victories was not great, & the reputation of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was, by ma∣ny losses, much defaced. For the Thebans did in the battailes of Coronea vanquish the Orchomenians, who stood opposite vnto them, and retired vnbroken to Mount Helicon, opening way perforce when Agesilaus charged them in the returne from [unspec 20] the pursuit. Likewise Gylis was slaine with a great part of his Armie by the Locrians, and some other exploits by the Lacedaemonians performed against the Corinthians, were repayed with equall damage receiued in the parts adioyning; many Townes being easily taken, and as easily recouered. The varietie of which enter-feates was such, that the Thebans themselues were drawne, by the losse of the hauen of Corinth, to sue for peace, but could not get audience, till such time as the newes came of a great victorie obtained by Iphicrates, Generall of the Athenian- forces at Lechaeum; whereupon the Theban Embassadours being sent for, and willed to doe their mes∣sage, required only in scorne, to haue a safe conduct giuen them, that they might enter into Corinth. From this time forward the Warre was made for a while only [unspec 30] by incursions, wherin the Achaeans, confederates of Sparta, felt most losse, their whole state being endangered by the Acarnanians, who held with the contrarie side, vntill Agesilaus repaied these inuaders with equall, or greater calamities, brought vpon their owne Lands, which did so afflict the Acarnanes, that they were driuen to sue for peace. But the affaires at Sea were of most consequence, vpon which the suc∣cesse of all depended. For when the Townes of Asia 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that the Lacedaemo∣nians were not only intangled in an hard war at home, but almost disabled to passe the Seas, hauing lost their fleet at Cnidus; they soone gaue eare to Pharnabazus, who promised to allow that they should vsed their own lawes, if they would expell the Spartan Gouernours. Onely the Citie of Abidus did stand firme, wherein Dercyl∣lidas [unspec 40] lay, who did his best to containe all the Townes about Hellespont, in the alli∣ance of the Lacedaemonians; which he could not doe, because the Athenian fleet vn∣der Thrasybulus tooke in Byzantium, Chalcedon, and other places thereabout, redu∣cing the Ile of Lesbos to their ancient acknowledgement of Athens.

§. IX. The base conditions offered vnto the Persian by the Lacedaemonians. Of sundrie fights and other passages in the warre. The peace of ANTALCIDAS.

ABout this time the Spartans beganne to perceiue how vneasie a thing it [unspec 50] would bee, to maintaine the warre against men as good as themselues, assisted with the treasures of Persia: wherefore they craued peace of Artaxerxes, most basely offering, not only to renounce the Greekes in∣habiting

Asia, & to leaue them to the Kings disposition, but withall to set the Ilan∣ders, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Towne in Greece, as well the little as the great, at full and absolute libertic whereby they said that all the principal Estates of their Countrie would so be weakened, that no one, nor all of them should be able to stirre against the great King. And sure it was, that the power of the Countrie being so broken, and rent into many small pieces, could neither haue 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Persian, by an offensiue warre, nor haue made any good defence against him, but would haue left it easie for him in continuance of time, to haue taken the Cities one after another, till he had made himselfe Master of all. The Spartans were not ignorant of this, but were so carried with enuie, that perceiuing how the dominion of the Seas was like to re∣turne [unspec 10] to Athens, they chose rather to giue all from themselues and others, and make all a-like weake; than to permit that any of their owne Nation should grow stron∣ger than themselues, who so lately had commanded all. Yet this great offer was not at the first accepted, both in regard that the other Estates of Greece, who had in the Kings behalfe ioyned together against the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, did by their seuerall Em∣bassadours oppose themselues vnto it, and for that it was thought safest for Ar∣taxerxes, rather to weaken the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 yet more, than by interposing himself to bring friends and foes on the suddaine to an equalitie. Especially Struthas, whom Artaxerxes did send as his Lieutenant into the low-Countries, did seeke to repay the harme done by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in those parts: which his intent appearing plaine, and [unspec 20] all hope of the peace being thereby cut off; Thimbro was sent into Asia to make war vpon Struthas; and others were appointed to other places, whereby the warre, be∣ing scattered about, all the Iles and Townes on the firme Land grew almost to the manner of piracie and robberie, affording many skirmishes, but few great actions worthie of remembrance. Thimbro was slaine by Struthas, and in his place Diphri∣das was sent who demeaned him selfe more warily. Dircyllidas was remoued from his charge at Abydus, because he had not impeached Thrasybulus in his enterprises a∣bout Hellespont; Anaxibius, who succeeded him, was surprised and slaine in a skir∣mish by Iphierates the Athenian. Thrasybulus, departing from Lesbos toward Rhodes, was slaine by the way at Aspendus. The Citie of Rhodes had long before ioined [unspec 30] with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who erected there (as was their manner) an Aristocratie, or the Gouernment of a few the principall Citizens, where as contrariwise the Athe∣nians were accustomed to put the Soueraignetie into the hands of the people, each of them seeking to assure themselues, by erecting in the Townes of their Confede∣rates a Gouernment like vnto their owne: which doing (where more especiall cause did not hinder) caused the Nobilitie to fauour Sparta, and the Commons to encline to Athens. The people of Aegina roued vpon the coast of Attica, which caused the Athenians to land an Armie in Aegina, and besiege their towne: but this siege be∣ing raised by the assistance of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fleet, the Ilanders beganne a-new to molest Attica, which caused the Athenians to man their ships againe, that returned [unspec 40] beaten, hauing lost foure of thirteene. The losse of these ships was soone recom∣pensed by a victory which Chabrias the Athenian General had in Aegina, whereup∣on the Ilanders were faine to keepe home, and leaue to the Athenians the Seas free. It may well seeme strange that the Citie of Athens, hauing but newly raised her walls; hauing not by any fortunate and important battaile secured her estate from dangers by land; but onely depending vpon the assistance of such Confederates, as carried vnto different ends, had often discouered themselues irresolute in the com∣mon cause; would send a fleet and an Armie to Cyprus, in defence of Euagoras, when the mastry of the Seas, was so ill assured, that an Iland lying in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, had abilitie to vexe the coast of Attica. But as the ouer-weaning of that Citie did cause [unspec 50] it vsually to embrace more then it could compasse; so the insolencie and shamelesse iniustice of the people, had now bred in the chiefe Commanders, a desire to keepe themselues farre out of sight, and to seeke emploiments at such distance as might se∣cure them from the eies of the enuious, and from publike iudgements, out of which

few or none escaped. For which cause Timotheus did passe away much part of his time in the Isle of Lesbos; Iphicrates in Thrace; and Chabrias now did carrie away in∣to Cyprus a greater force than his Countrie well could haue spared, with which he returned not when the businesse in Cyprus came to an end, but sought new aduen∣tures in Aegypt, whereby arose neither thankes to himselfe, nor profit to his Citie, though honour both to him and it. The Athenians being thus carelesse of things at hand, had a notable blow giuen vnto them, shortly after that Chabrias was gone to Cyprus, euen within their owne Hauen. For Teleutias, a Lacedaemonian, being made Gouernour of Aegina, conceiued a strong hope of surprising the Nauie of Athens, as it lay in Piraeus; thinking a-right that it was an harder matter to encounter with [unspec 10] ten ships prepared for the fight, than with twentie lying in harbour, whose Mari∣ners were asleepe in their Cabbins, or drinking in Tauernes. Wherefore he failed by night vnto the mouth of the Port, which entring at the breake of day, hee found (according to his expectation) most of the men on shore, & few or none left aboord to make resistance: by which meanes hee tooke many ships laden with marchan∣dizes, many fisher-men, passengers, and other Vessels, also three or foure Gallies, hauing sunke or broken, and made vnseruiccable, as many of the rest as the time would suffer. About this time Pharnabazus, the Lieutenant of Phrygia, had one of the Kings Daughters giuen to him in marriage, with whom hee liued about the Court; and many Officers that fauoured the Lacedaemonians were placed in the [unspec 20] lower Asia; by whose assistance, the fleet of Sparta grew victorious about Hellespont; in such wise, that perhaps they should not haue needed the peace, which they themselues procured by Antalcidas, from the great King, the conditions whereof were such as are mentioned before, giuing freedome to all the Cities of Greece, and diuiding the Countrie into as many seuerall States as there were pettie Boroughs in it. Thus Artaxerxes hauing bought his owne peace with money, did likewise by his money become arbitrator & decider of Controuersies betweene the Greekes, disposing of their businesse in such wise as stood best with his owne good. The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Artaxerxes his decree was, That all Asia and Cyprus should be his owne; the Iles of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scirus be subject to Athens; all other Greeke Townes, as [unspec 30] well the little as the great, be set at libertie; and that whosoeuer should refuse this peace, vpon them the approuers of it should make warre, the King assisting them by Land and Sea, with men, and ships, and treasure. The Athenians were so discoura∣ged by their losses at Sea; the Lacedaemonians by reuolt of their Confederates, and the necessitie of maintaining many Garrisons, for which they wanted money; and other States by the miseries of the warre, whereof they saw no end; that all (excep∣ting the Thebans) did consent vnto these Articles. This was called the peace of An∣talcidas: whereof the Lacedaemonians taking vpon themselues the execution, did not only compell the Argiues to depart out of Corinth (which vnder pretence of defen∣ding they held by Garrisons, lately thrust into it, not as Patrons, but as Lords) and [unspec 40] the Thebans to leaue Boeotia free, of which Prouince Thebes had alwaies held the go∣uernment: the Thebans themselues being also comprehended vnder the name of the Boeotians; but caused the Mantinaeans to throw downe their owne Citie, and to dwell in Villages: alleaging that they had formerly beene accustomed so to doe, though purposing indcede to chastise them, as hauing beene ill affected to Sparta in the late Warre. By these courses the Lacedaemonians did hope that all the small Townes in Greece would, when occasion should require it, willingly follow them in their warres, as Authors of their libertie; and that the great Cities hauing lost all their dependants, would be vnable to make opposition. [unspec 50]

§. X. The wrare which the Lacedaemonians made vpon Olynthus. They take Thebes by treason; and Olynthus by famine.

WHilest these warres, which ended without either victorie or profit, consumed the riches and power of Greece, the Citie of Olynthus in Thrace was growne so mighty, that shee did not only command her Neighbour-Townes, but was become terrible to places farre remo∣ued, and to Sparta it selfe. Great part of Macedonia, together with [unspec 10] Pella, the principall Citie of that Kingdome, was taken by the Olynthans, who fol∣lowing the vsuall pretence of the Lacedaemonians, to set at libertie the places ouer which King Amyntas did tyrannize, had almost now driuen him out of his Domi∣nions, and taken all to themselues. The Citizens of Acanthus and of Apollonia, be∣ing neerest vnto the danger of these incroching neighbours, acquainted the Lacedae∣monians with their feare, affirming that this Dominion of the Olynthians would bee too strong for al Greece, if some continuance of time should giue it reputation, which only it wanted, wherefore they requested assistance, but in such termes as did sound of compulsion; protesting that either they must warre vpon Olynthus, or become subject vnto her, and fight in her defence. Hecreupon was made a hastie leauie of [unspec 20] men, two thousand being presently sent a way with promise to bee seconded by a greater Armie. Whilest these two thousand gaue such beginning to the warre, as agreed with their small number, the body of the Armie following them, surprised the Cittadell of Thebes, which was betraied into the hands of Phoebidas the Lacedoe∣monian, by some of the Magistrates, who sought to strengthen their faction by the slauerie of their Countrie. The Thebans were ill affected to Sparta, but had not in any one point violated the peace lately made betweene them; which caused the Lacedaemonians to doubt whether this act of Phoebidas were more worthy of reward or of punishment; In conclusion, profit so farre ouer weighed honestie, that the deede was approued, many principall Citizens of Thebes condemned to death, ma∣ny [unspec 30] driuen into banishment, and the Traitors rewarded with the gouernement of the Citie: by whose authoritie, and the force of the Garrison, the Thebans were com∣pelled to serue the Lacedaemonians, in all, and more than all that they could require. This accesse of power hauing strengthned the Lacedaemonians, caused them to enter∣taine the greater forces about Olynthus, which (notwithstanding the losse of one great battaile, and some other disasters) they compelled at length by famine to ren∣der itselfe to their obedience.

§. XI. How the Thebans recouered their libertie, driuing out the Lace∣daemonian Garrison. [unspec 40]

AFter this Olynthian Warre, which endured almost three yeeres, it see∣med that no Estate in Greece was able to make head against that of Sparta: but it was not long ere the Thebans found meanes to shake off their yoke, and gaue both example and meanes to others to doe the like. One of the banished men found by conference with a Scribe of the Theban Magistrates, comming to Athens, that the tyrannie wherewith his Countrie was oppressed, pleased him no better than it did those who for feare of it [unspec 50] were fled from home. Whereupon a plot was layd betweene these two, that soone found very good successe, being managed thus. Seuen of the banished men forsooke Athens priuily, and entred by night into the fields of Thebes; where spending the next day secretly, they came late in the euening to the Gates like husband-men re∣turned

from worke, and so passed vndiscouered vnto the house of Charon, whom Phyllidas the Scribe had drawne into the 〈◊〉〈◊〉. The day following, a solemne feast being then held in the Citie, Phyllidas promised the Gouernours, who were in∣solent and lustfull men, that hee would conueigh vnto them that night the most beautifull Dames of the Towne, with whom they should take their pleasure. Ha∣uing cheared them with such hope, and plentie of good wine, hee told them when the time of performance (which they vrged) came, that hee could not make good his promise, vnlesse they would 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their followers, because the Gentlewomen, who attended withour a Chamber, would not endure, that any of the seruants should see their faces. Vpon this occasion the attendants were dismissed, and the [unspec 10] Conspirators, attired like Ladies and their Maides, brought into the place; who ta∣king aduantage of the Gouernours loose behauiour, slew them al vpon the sodaine with Daggers, which they brought hidden vnder their garments. Then presently casting off their disguise, they went to other places, where faining themselues to come to the Gouernours vpon businesse, they got admittance, and slew those which were of the Lacedaemonian faction. By the like deuice they brake into the prison; slew the Gaoler; and set at libertie such as they thought 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and being followed by these desperate men, proclaimed libertie, making the death of the Tyrants known. The Captaine of the Castle hearing the Proclamation, thought the Rebels to bee stronger than indeed they were: the Citizens contrariwise mistrusted, that it was [unspec 20] a practice to discouer such, as would be forward vpon occasion of reuolting. But as soone as day-light reuealed the plaine truth, all the people tooke armes & besseged the Castle, sending hastily to Athens for succour. The Garrison also sent for aide vnto the Townes adioyning, whence a few broken troupes comming to the rescne, were defeated on the way by the horse-men of Thebes. On the other side the ba∣nished Thebans did not only make speede to assist their Countrimen, but procured some Athenians to joyne with them, and thereby came so strong into the Citie, that the Castle was yeelded, more through feare than any necessitie, vpon cōdition that the Souldiers might quietly depart with their Armes; for which composition the Captaine at his returne to Sparta was put to death. When the newes of the doings [unspec 30] at Thebes, and the successe arriued at Sparta, an Armie was raised forth with, and all things prepared as earnestly for the recouering of that Citie, as if some part of their ancient inheritance had beene taken from the Lacedaemonians, and not a Towne per∣fidiously vsurped by them, restored to her owne libertie, Cleombrotus, one of the Kings, was sent on this expedition, who hauing wearied his followers, with a toile∣some Winters journey, returned home without any good or harme done; leauing Sphodrias, with part of his Armie, at Thespies, to infest the Thebans; who doing them some displeasures, made large amends by a foolish attempt vpon the Hauen of Athens, which failing to take, hee wasted the Countrie adjoyning, and draue away Cattaile, causing by this outrage the Athenians to [unspec 40] enter with all their power into the Warre, out of which they were before very carefully seeking how to with-draw them∣selues. [unspec 50]

CHAP. XII. Of the flourishing estate of Thebes, from the battaile of Leuctra to the battaile of 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

§. I. How Thebes and Athenr ioyned together against Sparta. How the Athenians made peace for themselues, and others, out of which the Thebans were exclu∣ded. [unspec 10] The battaile of Leuctra, and beginning of the Theban greatnesse.

THE Lacedaemonians were men of great resolution, and of much grauitie in all their proceedings, but one dis∣honorable rule they held, That all respects with stan∣ding the commoditie of Sparta were to be neglected; the practice of which doctrine, euen by the best and wisest of them, did greatly blemish that Estate, but when it was put in execution by insufficient ouer∣weening men, it seldome failed to bring vpon them in [unspec 20] stead of profit vnjustly expected, both shame & losse. And so it befel them in these enterprises of Phoebidas, vpon the Castle of Thebes, and Sphodrias vpon the Pi∣raeus. For howsoeuer Agesilaus did spoile the Countrie about Thebes, in which hee spent two Summers, yet the diligence of the Thebans repaired all, who by the good successe of some attempts, grew stronger than they were at the first.

The Athenians likewise beganne to looke abroade, sailing to the Ile of Corcyra, where they ordered things at their pleasure, and hauing in some fights at Sea pre∣uailed, began as in the Peloponnesian warre, to surround Peloponnesus with a Nauie; afflicting so the Lacedaemonians, that had not the Thebans by their insolencie wearied [unspec 30] their friends, and caused them to seeke for peace, it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 beene very likely that the end of this warre, should haue soone come to a good end, which neuerthelesse, be∣ing prosequuted by the Thebans (who opposed at once both these two great Estates) left the City of Sparta as much dejected as the beginning found it proud and tyran∣nous. But the Athenians perceiuing how Thebes encroched euery day vpon her weake Neighbours, not sparing such as had beene dependants vpon Athens, and fin∣ding themselues, whilest engaged in such a warre, vnable to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their complai∣ning friends, resolued to settle the affaires of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, by renewing that for me of peace which Antalcidas had brought from the Persian. Wherefore they sent Messengers to Thebes, peremptorily signifying, That it was their intent to finish the Warre; to [unspec 40] which purpose they willed the Thebans to send Embassadours along with them to Sparta; who readily condescended, fearing otherwise that they should be left out of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of peace, which came to passe, being so wrought by the couragious wis∣dome of Epaminondas, who vnderstood farre better than his Countrimen, what was to be feared or hoped. In this Treatie the Lacedaemonians and Athenians did soone 〈◊〉〈◊〉; but when the Thebans offered to sweare to the Articles in the name of the Boeotians; Agesilaus required them to sweare in their owne name, and to leaue the Boeotians free, whom they had lately reduced vnder their obedience. Whereunto Epaminondas made answere, That the Citie of Sparta should giue example to Thebes by setting the Laconians free; for that the Signorie of Boeotia did by as good right ap∣pertaine [unspec 50] to the Thebans, as that of Laconia to the Spartans. This was well and truly spoken; but was heard with no patience: For Agesilaus bearing a vehement hatred vnto those of Thebes, by whom he was drawne back out of Asia into Greece, & disap∣pointed of all the glory which he had hoped to atchieue by the Persian Warre, did

now very passionately vrge that point of setting the Boeotians at libertie, and finding it as obstinately refused, he dasht the name of the Thebans out of the league. At the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 time Cleombrotus the other King of Sparta lay in Phocis, who receiued com∣mand from the Gouernours of Sparta forthwith to enter vpon the Land of the The∣bans with all his power, which he did, and was there slaine at Leuctra, and with him the flowre of his Armie. This battaile of Leuctra being one of the most famous that euer were fought betweene the Greekes, was not so notable for any circumstance foregoing it, or for the managing of the fight it selfe, as for the death of the King, and many Citizens of Sparta, but especially, for that after this battaile (betweene which and the conclusion of the generall peace there passed but twentie daies) the [unspec 10] Lacedaemonians were neuer able to recouer the strength and reputation which had formerly made them redoubted farre and neere; whereas contrariwise the Thebans, whose greatest ambition had in former times confined it selfe vnto the little Regi∣on of Boeotia, did now begin to vndertake the leading and command of many Peo∣ple and Estates, in such wise, that soone after they brought an Armie of threescore and ten thousand strong vnto the Gates of Sparta. So much doe the afflictions of an hard warre, valiantly indured, aduance the affaires of the distressed, and guide them into the way of Conquest, by stiffening that resolution with a manly temper, which wealth and ease had through luxurie, rechlessenesse, and many other vices or vani∣ties, made 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and effeminate. [unspec 20]

§. II. How the Athenians tooke vpon them to maintaine the peace of Greece. New troubles hence arising. EPAMINONDAS inuadeth and wasteth the Territorie of Lacedaemon.

THe Athenians, refusing to take aduantage of this ouerthrow fallen vp∣on their old Enemies, and new Confederates the Lacedaemonians; did neuerthelesse finely giue them to vnderstand, that their Dominion was expired, and therefore their pride might well be laid away. For taking [unspec 30] vpon themselues the maintenance of the peace lately concluded, which Agesilaus (perhaps of purpose to make benefit of quarels that mightarise) had left vnperfect, they assembled the Deputies of al the Estates confederated at 〈◊〉〈◊〉; where the generall libertie of all Townes, as well small as great, was ratified, vnder the stile Of the Athenians, and their Associates. Hereupon began fresh garboiles. The Mantinaeans, claiming power by this decree to order their affaires at their owne pleasure, did (as it were) in despight of the Spartans, who had enforced them to raze their towne, reedifie it, & allie themselues with such of the Arcadians as stood worst affected to Sparta. The Arcadians, a strong Nation, consisting of many Cities, were distracted with factions; some desiring to hold good correspondencie with the La∣cedaemonians; [unspec 40] some to weaken & keep them low; yet all pretending other ends. The Lacedaemonians durst not giue impeachment to the Mantinaeans; nor take vpon them to correct their ill-willers among the Arcadians, till such time as the factions brake out into violence, and each part called in forraine helpe. Then was an Armie sent from Sparta, as it were in defence of the people of Tegea, against the Mantinaeans, but indeed against them both. Agesilaus had the leading of it, but effected nothing. The Thebans had by this time subdued the Phocians, & were become head of the Locrians, Acarnanians, Euboeans, & many others; with the power of which Countries they en∣tred Feloponnesus in fauor of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who had, vpon expectatiō of their com∣ming abstained from giuing battaile to Agesilaus. The Armie of the Spartans being [unspec 50] dismissed, and Epaminondas joyned with the Arcadians; the Region of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vvas inuaded and spoiled: a thing so strange, that no Oracle could haue found beliefe if any had foretold it. Almost sixe hundred yeeres were spent, since the Dorians, vnder the posteritie of Hercules, had seized vpon Laconia, in all which time the sound of an

enemies trumpet was not heard in that Countrie: Ten yeeres were not fully past, since all Greece was at the deuotion of the Spartans: but now the Region which nei∣ther Xerxes with his huge Armie could once looke vpon, nor the mightie forces of Athens, and other Enemie-States had dared to set foot on, sauing by stealth, was all on a light fire, the very smoke whereof the women of Sparta were ashamed to be∣hold. All which indignitie notwithstanding, the Lacedaemonians did not issue out of Sparta to fight, but sought how to preserue the Towne, setting at libertie as many of their Heilotes or Slaues as were willing to beare Armes in defence of the State, and somwhat pittifully entreated the Athenians to giue them succour. From Corinth and some Townes of Peloponnesus they receiued speedie assistance; the Athenians came [unspec 10] forward more slowly, so that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 returned without battaile, hauing rebuil∣ded the Citie of Messene, and peopled it a-new by calling home the ancient Inha∣bitants, whom the Lacedaemonians many Ages before had chased away into other Countries, possessing their Territories themselues.

§. III. The composition betweene Athens and Sparta for command in warre against the Thebans; who againe inuade and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Pelopennesus. The vnfortunate presumption of the Arcadians.

THis journie therefore vtterly defaced the reputation of the Spartans, [unspec 20] in such wise, that they did no longer demand the conduct of the Ar∣my, which was to be raised, nor any maner of precedence: but sending Embassadors from Sparta, and from all the Cities which held league with it, vnto Athens, they offered to yeeld the Admiraltie to the Athenians, requesting that they themselues might be Generalls by Land. This had beene a composition well agreeing with the situation and qualitie of those two Ci∣ties; but it was rejected, because the Mariners and others that were to be imploied at Sea, were men of no marke or estimation, in regard of those companies of horse and foot whereof the Land-Armie was compounded, who being all Gentlemen or Citizens of Athens, were to haue serued vnder the Lacedaemonians. Wherefore it was [unspec 30] agreed that the authority should be diuided by time, the Athenians ruling fiue daies, the Lacedaemonians other fiue, & so successiuely that each of them should haue com∣mand of all, both by Land and by Sea. It is manifest, that in this conclusion vaine ambition was more regarded than the common profit, which must of necessitie be very slowly aduanced, where consultation, resolution, and performance are so often to change hands. This appeared by a second inuasion of Pelopennesus, wherein the Thebans found their enemies so vnable to impeach them, that hauing fortified Isth∣mus from Sea to Sea, as in former times they had done against Xerxes, they were dri∣uen out of their strength by Epaminondas, who forraged the Countrie without resi∣stance. But as the Articles of this league betweene Athens and Sparta did, by diui∣ding [unspec 40] the conduct in such manner, disable the societie, and make it insufficient to those ends for which it was concluded; so the example of it wrought their good, by filling the enemies heads with the like vanitie. For the Arcadians considering their owne numbers which they brought into the field, and hauing found by many trials that their people were not inferiour to others in strength of body, in courage, or in good Souldiership, thought it good reason that they should in like maner share the gouernement, with their friends the Thebans; and not alwaies continue followers of others, by encreasing whose greatnes they should strengthen their own yoke. Here∣vpon they began to demeane themselues very insolently, whereby they grew hate∣full to their Neighbours, and suspected of the Thebans in an ill time. For a motion of [unspec 50] generall peace hauing been made (which tooke not effect, because the City of Mes∣sene was not abandoned to the Lacedaemonians) the next enterprise of the Spartans and their friends was vpon these Arcadians, who relying too much vpon their owne worth, were ouerthrowne in a great battaile, their calamitie being as pleasing to their Confederates, as to their Enemies.

§. IIII. The great growth of the Theban Estate. Embassages of the Greekes to the Per∣sian; with the reasons why he most fauoured the Thebans. Troubles in the Persian Empire, The fruitlesse issue of the Embassages.

THe Thebans especially 〈◊〉〈◊〉 at the Arcadians misfortune, conside∣ring, that, without 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aide, the successe of all enterprises proued so ill; whereas they themselues had by their owne power accomplished [unspec 10] very well whatsoeuer they tooke in hand, and were become not only victorious ouer the Lacedaemonians, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ouer the Thessalians, and Moderators of the great quarrels that had risen in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, where compoun∣ding the differences about that Kingdome, as pleased them best, they carried Philip the Sonne of Amyntas, and Father of Alexander the Great, as an Hostage vnto Thebes. Hauing therefore obtained such reputation, that little 〈◊〉〈◊〉 wanting to make them absolute Commanders of al Greece, they sought meanes of alliance with the Persian King, to whom they sent Embassadour the great and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Captaine 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whose reputation drew Artaxerxes to grant vnto the Thebans all that they desired; whereof two especiall points were, That 〈◊〉〈◊〉 should remaine free [unspec 20] from the Lacedaemenians, and that the Athenians should forbeare to send their ships of Warre to Sea; only the later of these two was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 what qualified with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aduice. The other States of Greece did also send their Embassadours at the same time, of whom few or none receiued much contentment. For the King hauing found by long experience, how farre it concerned him to maintaine a sure partie in Greece, did vpon many waightie considerations resolue, to binde the The∣bans firmely vnto him; iustly expecting, that their greatnesse should bee on that side his owne securitie. The Athenians had beene ancient enemies to his Crowne, and, hauing turned the profit of their victories vpon the Persian to the purchase of a great Estate in Greece, maintained their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in such puissant manner, that (sun∣drie [unspec 30] grieuous misfortunes notwithstanding) they had endured a terrible warre, wherein the Lacedaemonians being followed by most of the Greeks, and supplied with treasure, and all sorts of aide by Darius Nothus, were not able to vanquish 〈◊〉〈◊〉, till their owne indiscretion brought them on their knees. The Lacedaemonians being victorious ouer Athens, had no sooner established their Dominion at home, than they vndertooke the conquest of Asia, from which though, by the commotion rai∣sed in Greece with Persian gold, they were called backe, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hauing renewed their power, and settled things in Greece, it was not vnlikely, that they should vpon the next aduantage haue pursued the same enterprise, had not they been empeached by this Theban Warre. But the Thebans contrariwise had alwaies discouered a good [unspec 40] affection to the Crowne of Persia. They had sided with Xerxes in his inuasion of Greece; with Darius and the Lacedaemonians against Athens: And finally, hauing offe∣red much contumely to Agesilaus when he put to Sea, they drew him home by ma∣king warre on the Confederates of Sparta. Besides all these their good 〈◊〉〈◊〉, they were no Sea-men, and therefore vnlikely to looke abroade; whereunto if per∣chance they should haue any desire, yet were they disabled by the want of good hauen townes, which they could not seize vpon without open breach of that peace, whereof they intended to become the Executors, giuing libertie to all Cities that had at any time been free. Wherefore Artaxerxes did wholly condescend vnto the requests of Pelopidas, as farre forth as he might without giuing open defiance to the [unspec 50] rest of Greece; and by that meane he purchased his owne quiet, being neuer after∣ward molested by that Nation in the lower Asia. The ill meanes which the Greeks had to disturbe Artaxerxes, was very beneficiall to the Estate of Persia shortly after these times, in that great rebellion of all the Maritime Prouinces. For had then the

affaires of Greece beene so composed, that any one Citie might without empeach∣ment of the rest haue transported an Armie, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the reuolting 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or Vice∣roies of Caria, Phrygia, Lydia, Mysia, Lycia, Pisidia, Pamphilia, Cilicia, Syria, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, humane reason can hardly find the meanes, by which the Empire could haue been preserued from that ruine, which the diuine Coūcel had deferred vnto the daies of Alexander. But this great conspiracie of so many large and wealthy Prouinces, wan∣ting a firme bodie of good and hardy Souldiers, was in short space discussed and va∣nished like a mist, without effect: these esfeminate Asiatiques 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 with the trauailes and dangers 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to warre, forsaking the common cause, and each man striuing to bee the first, that by treason to his company should both redeeme the [unspec 10] former treason to his Prince, & purchase withal his own promotion with encrease of riches. Of this commotion, which in course of time followed someactions not as yet related, I haue rather chosen to make short mention in this place, than here∣after to interrupt the Narration of things more important; both for that it was like a suddaine storme, rashly commenced, idlely followed, and foolishly laied downe, hauing made a great noise without effect, and hauing small reference to any other a∣ction regardable; as also because in the whole raigne of Artaxerxes, from the warre of Cyrus, to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Aegypt, I finde nothing (this insurrection, and a fruitlesse journey against the Cadusians excepted) worthy of any mētion; much lesse of digres∣sion from the course of the businesse in Greece. All, or the most of his time, passed a∣way [unspec 20] so quietly, that he enjoied the pleasures which an Empire so great and wealthy could affoord vnto so absolute a Lord, with little disturbance. The troubles which he found were only or chiefly Domesticall; growing out of the hatred which Pary∣satis the Queen-Mother bare vnto his wife Statira, and to such as had bin the grea∣test enemies to her sonne 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or gloried in his death: vpon whom, when by poi∣son and mischieuous practices shee had satisfied her feminine appetite of reuenge, thenceforth she wholly applied her selfe to the Kings disposition, cherishing in him the lewd desire of marrying his own Daughter, & filling him with the perswasion, which Princes, not endued with an especiall grace, doe readily entertaine, That his owne will was the supreme law of his subject, and the rule by which all things were [unspec 30] to be measured, and adjudged to be good or 〈◊〉〈◊〉. In this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 happinesse Pe∣lopidas, and the other Embassadours of Greece, both found and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 him, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 him by so much more assured than they found him, by how much the cōclusion of his Treatie with them, being altogether to his owne aduantage did seeme to promise, if not the perpetuitie, a long endurance of the same felicity to him and his, or (at the least) a ful security of danger from Greece, whence only could any danger be feared. But such foundations of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 laied by mortall men in this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 world, like the Tower of Babel, are either shaken from heauen, or made vaine and vnprofitable, ere the frame can be raised to full heighth, by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of tongues among the buil∣ders. Hereof was found a good example in the Thebans, and other Estates of Greece [unspec 40] that had sent Embassadours to the Persian. For whereas it had been concluded, that all Townes, as well the little as the great, should be set at libertie, and the Thebans made Protectors of this common peace, who thereby should become the Iudges of all controuersies that might arise, and Leaders in warre of all that would enter into this Confederacy; the Kings letters being solemnely published at Thebes, in the pre∣sence of Embassadours, drawne thither from all parts of Greece; when an oath was required for obseruation of the forme of peace therein set downe, a dilatorie an∣swere was made by the Embassadors, who said, that they were sent to heare the ar∣ticles; not to sweare vnto them. Hereby the Thebans were driuen to send vnto each of the Cities to require the Oath; But in vaine. For when the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had bold∣ly [unspec 50] refused it, saying, That they did not neede it; others tooke courage by their ex∣ample to doe the like, disappointing the Thebans of their glorious hopes, to whom this negotiation with Artaxerxes gaue neither addition nor confirmation of great∣nesse, but left them as it found them to relie vpon their owne swords.

§. V. How all Greece was diuided, betweene the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, on the one side, and Thebans on the other. Of the great tumults ri∣sing in Arcadia.

THe condition of things in Greece at that time did stand thus. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Sparta, which in former times had commanded all that Nation, and each vpon enuie of the others greatnesse drawne all her followers into a cruell intestine warre, by which the whole Countrie, and espe∣cially the Estate of these two Cities, was brought very low, did now [unspec 10] conjoyne their forces against the Thebans, who sought to make themselues Lords of all. The Eleans, Corinthians, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, followed the partie of these ancient go∣uerning Cities; either for the old reputation of them, and benefits receiued, or in dislike of those, who by strong hand were readie to become Rulers, to which autho∣ritie they could not suddenly aspire without some injurie and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 enuie. The Ci∣tie of Thebes abounding with men, whom necessitie had made 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and many vi∣ctories in few yeeres had filled with great spirits, & being so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in dependants, that shee had reduced all the continent of Greece without 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (the Region of Attica, and very 〈◊〉〈◊〉 part beside excepted) vnder such acknowledgement, as wan∣ted not much of meere 〈◊〉〈◊〉, did hope to bring all Peloponnesus to the like o∣bedience, [unspec 20] wherein alreadie shee had set good footing by her conjunction with the States of Argos, and of Arcadia. The Argiues had beene alwaies bad Neighbours to the Spartans, to whom they thought 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in ancient Nobilitie Superiours, but were farre vnder them in valour, hauing beene often beaten out of the field by them, and put in danger of loosing all: which caused them to suspect and enuie no∣thing more than the greatnesse and honor of Sparta, taking truce with her when shee was at rest, and had leisure to bend her whole force against them, but firmely ioy∣ning with her enemies whensoeuer they found her entangled in a difficult Warre. As the Argiues were, in hatred of Sparta, sure friends of Thebes, so the Arcadians, trans∣ported with a great opinion of their owne worthines, had formerly renounced and [unspec 30] prouoked against them their old Confederates and Leaders, the Lacedaemonians, and were now become very doubtfull adherents to the Thebans. In which regard it was thought conuenient by Epaminondas, and the State of Thebes, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 an Armie into Peloponnesus, before such time as these wauering friends should fall further off, and become either Neutrall, or, which was to be feared, open enemies. And surely great cause there was to suspect the worst of them, considering that without consent of the Thebans, they had made peace with Athens; which was very strange, and seemed no lesse to the Athenians themselues, who holding a firme league with Sparta at the same time when the Arcadians treated with them, did neuerthelesse accept this new Confederacie, not relinquishing the old, because they found that, howsoeuer these [unspec 40] Arcadians were enemies to the Lacedaemonians, they should hereby be drawne some∣what further from their alliance with Thebes, which without them was vnlikely to inuade Peloponnesus with a strong Armie. But this did rather hasten, than by any meanes stay, the comming of Epaminondis; who finding the way somewhat more cleare for him (because the Citie of Corinth, which lay vpon the Isthmus, and had beene aduerse to Thebes, was now, by miseries of this gricuous warre, driuen to be∣come Neutrall) tooke occasion hereby, and by some disorders among the Arcadians, to visit Peloponnesus with an Armie, consisting of all the power of Thebes. A great tumult had risen in Arcadia about consecrated money, which many principall men among them had laied hands on, vnder pretence of imploying it to publique vses. In [unspec 50] compounding the differences growne vpon this occasion, such, as had least will to render account of the money which had come into their handes, procured the Cap∣taine of some Theban Souldiers, lying in Tegea, to take prisoners many of their Countrimen, as people desirous of innouation. This was done: but the vp roare

thereby caused was so great, that the prisoners were forth-with enlarged, and the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who had in great numbers taken Armes, with much a doe scarse pacified. When complaint of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 proceedings came to Thebes, Epaminondas turned all the blame vpon them, who had made the peace with Athens, letting them know, that he would be shortly among them, to iudge of their fidelitie, by the assistance which they should giue him, in that warre, which he intended to make in Peloponne∣sus. These Lordly wordes did greatly amaze the Arcadians; who needing not the aide of so mightie a power as he drew a-long with him, did vehemently suspect that great preparation to bee made against themselues. Hereupon such of them as had before sought meanes to settle the affaires of their Countrie, by drawing things to [unspec 10] some good conclusion of peace, did now forth-with send to Athens for helpe, and withall dispatched some of the principall among them as Embassadours to Sparta, by whom they offered themselues to the common defence of Peloponnesus, now readie to be inuaded. This Embassage brought much comfort to the Lacedaemonians, who feared nothing more than the comming of Epaminondas, against whom they well knew, that all their forces, and best prouisions, would bee no more than very hardly sufficient. Forbearing therefore to dispute about prerogatiues, they (who had been accustomed vnto such a supremacie, as they would in no wise communi. cate with the powerfull Citie of Athens, till other hope of securing their owne E∣state could not be thought vpon) did now verie gently yeeld to the Arcadians, that [unspec 20] the command of the Armie in chiefe, should be giuen, for the time, to that Citie, in whose Territorie it lay.

§. VI. A terrible inuasion of Peloponnesus by EPAMINONDAS.

CErtaine it is, that the condition of things did at that time require a ve∣rie firme consent, and vniforme care of the common safetie. For be∣side the great forces raised out of the other parts of Greece, the Ar∣giues, [unspec 30] and Messenians, prepared with all their strength to ioyne with 〈◊〉〈◊〉; who hauing lien a while at Nemea, to intercept the A∣thenians, receiued there intelligence, that the Armie comming from Athens would passe by Sea, whereupon he dislodged, and came to Tegea, which Citie, and the most of all Arcadia besides, forth with declared themselues his. The common opinion was, that the first attēpt of the Thebans, would be vpon such of the Arcadians as had reuolted; which caused the Lacedaemonian Captaines to fortifie Mantinaea with all diligence, and to send for Agesilaus to Sparta, that he bringing with him all that small force of able men, which remained in the Towne, they might be strong enough to abide Epaminondis there. But Epaminondas held so good espiall vpon his Enemies, [unspec 40] that had not an vnknowne fellow brought hastie aduertisement of his purpose to Agesilaus, who was then well onward in the way to Mantinaea, the Citie of Sparta had suddenly been taken. For thither with all speede and secrecie did the Thebans march, who had surely carried the Citie, notwithstanding any defence that could haue beene made by that handfull of men remaining within it; but that Agesilaus in all flying haste got into it with his Companies, whom the Army of his Confede∣rates followed thither to the rescue as fast as it was able. The arriuall of the Lace∣daemonians and their friends, as it cut off all hope from Epaminondas of taking Sparta, so it presented him with a faire aduantage vpon Mantinaea. It was the time of Har∣uest, which made it very likely, that the Mantinaeans, finding the warre to be carried [unspec 50] from their walls into another quarter, would vse the commoditie of that vacation, by fetching in their corne, and turning out their cattell into their fields, whilest no enemie was neere that might empeach them. Wherefore hee turned away from Sparta to Mantinaea, sending his horse-men before him, to seize vpon all that might

be found without the Citie. The Mantinaeans (according to the expectation of Epaminondas) were scattered abroad in the Countrie; farre more intent vpon their haruest-businesse, than vpon the warre, whereof they were secure, as thinking them∣selues out of distance. By which presumption it fell out, that great numbers of them, and all their Cattell, being vnable to recouer the Towne, were in a desperate case; and the Towne it selfe in no great likelihood of holding out, when the enemy should haue taken all their prouision of victuals with so many of the people, as had not ouer-dearely beene redeemed, by that Cities returning to societie with Thebes. But at the same time, the Athenians comming to the succour of their Confederates, whom they thought to haue found at Mantinaea, were very earnestly entreated by [unspec 10] the Citizens to rescue their goods, and people, from the danger whereinto they were fallen, if it were possible by any couragious aduenture to deliuer those who otherwise were giuen as lost. The Thebans were knowne at that time to bee the best Souldiers of all the Greekes, and the commendation of good horsemanship had al∣waies beene giuen to the Thessalians, as excelling in that qualitie all other Nations; yet the regard of honour so wrought vpon the Athenians, that for the reputation of their Citie, which had entred into this warre, vpon no necessitie of her owne, but onely in desire of relieuing her distressed friends, they issued forth of Mantinaea, not abiding so long as to refresh themselues, or their horses with meat, and giuing a lu∣stie [unspec 20] charge vpon the enemie, who as brauely receiued them, after a long and hote fight, they remained masters of the field, giuing by this victorie a safe and easie re∣trait to all that were without the walls. The whole power of the Boeotians arriued in the place soone after this battaile, whom the Lacedaemonians and their Assistants were not farre behinde.

§. VII. The great battaile of Mantinaea. The honourable death of EPAMI∣NONDAS, with his commendation. [unspec 30]

EPAMINONDAS, considering that his Commission was almost now expired, and that his attempts of surprising Sparta and Mantinaea, ha∣uing failed, the impression of terrour which his name had wrought in the Peloponnesians, would soone vanish, vnlesse by some notable act he should abate their courage in their first grouth, and leaue some memorable character of his expedition; resolued to giue them battaile, whereby he reasonably hoped both to settle the doubtfull affections of his own Associates, and to leaue the Spartans as weake in spirit and abilitie, as he found them, if not wholly to bring them into subjection. Hauing therefore warned his men to prepare for that battaile, wherein victorie should be rewarded with Lordship of all Greece; and [unspec 40] finding the alacritie of his Souldiers to be such as promised the accomplishment of his owne desire; he made shew of declining the enemie, and intrenching himselfe in a place of more aduantage, that so by taking from them all expectation of figh∣ting that day, hee might allay the heate of their valour, and afterward strike their senses with amazement, when hee should come vpon them vnexpected. This opi∣nion deceiued him not. For with very much tumult, as in so great and sodaine a danger, the enemie ranne to Armes, necessitie enforcing their resolution, and the consequence of that daies seruice vrging them to doe as well as they might. The Theban Armie consisted of thirtie thousand foot, and three thousand horse; the La∣cedaemonians and their friends were short of this number, both in horse and in foot, [unspec 50] by a third part. The Mantinaeans (because the warre was in their Countrie) stood in the right wing, and with them the Lacedaemonians: the Athenians had the left wing, the Achaeans, Eleans, and others of lesse account, filled the bodie of the Ar∣mie. The Thebans stood in the left wing of their owne battaile, opposite to the La∣cedaemonians,

hauing by them the Arcadians; the Eubeans, Locrians, Sicyonians, Messe∣nians, and Thessalians with others, compounding the maine battaile; the Argiues held the right wing; the horse-men on each part were placed in the flancks, only a troupe of the Eleans were in reare. Before the footmen could joyne, the encounter of the horse on both sides was very rough, wherein finally the Thebans preuailed, notwithstanding the valiant resistance of the Athenians: who not yeelding to the enemie either in courage or skil, were ouer-laied with numbers, and so beaten vpon by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 slings, that they were driuen to forsake the place, and leaue their in∣fanterie naked. But this retrait was the lesse disgracefull, because they kept them∣selues together, and did not fall backe vpon their owne foot-men; but finding the [unspec 10] Theban horse to haue giuen them ouer, and withall discouering some Companies of foot, which had beene sent about by Epaminondas, to charge their battaile in the reare, they brake vpon them, routed them, and hewed them all in peeces. In the meane season the battaile of the Athenians had not onely to doe with the Argiues, but was hardly pressed by the Theban Horse-men, in such wise that it beganne to open, and was readie to turne backe, when the Elean squadron of Horse came vp to the reliefe of it, and restored all on that part. With farre greater violence did the Lacedaemonians and Thebans meete, these contending for Dominion, the other for the maintenance of their ancient honour, so that equall courage and equal losse on both sides made the hope and appearance of victorie to either equally doubtfull: [unspec 20] vnlesse perhaps the Lacedaemonians being very firme abiders, might seeme the more likely to preuaile, as hauing borne the first brunt, and furie of the on-set, which was not hitherto remitted, and being framed by Discipline, as it were by Nature, to excell in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, whereof the Thebans, by practice of a few yeeres, cannot be thought to haue gotten a habite so sure and generall. But Epaminondas perceiuing the obstinate stiffenesse of the Enemies to bee such, as neither the badde successe of their owne horse, nor all the force of the Boeotian Armie, could abate so farre, as to make them giue one foote of ground; taking a choise Companie of the most able men, whom hee cast into the forme of a Wedge, or Diamond, by the aduantage of that figure against a squadron, and by his owne exceeding vertue, accompanied [unspec 30] with the great strength and resolution of them which followed him, did open their rancks, and cleaue the whole battaile in despight of all resistance. Thus was the honour of that day wonne by the Thebans, who may justly bee said to haue carried the victorie, seeing that they remained Masters of the ground whereon the battaile was fought, hauing driuen the Enemie to lodge farther off. For that which was alleaged by the Athenians, as a token that the victorie was partly theirs, the slaughter of those Mercenaries vpon whom they lighted by chance in their owne flight, finding them behinde their Armie, and the retaining of their dead bodies; it was a Ceremonie regardable onely among the Greekes, and serued meerely for ostentation, shewing that by the fight they had obtained somewhat, which the [unspec 40] Enemie could not get from them otherwise than by request. But the Thebans ar∣riued at the generall immediate end of battaile; none daring to abide them in the field: whereof a manifest confession is expressed from them, who forsake the place which they had chosen or accepted, as indifferent for triall of their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and prowesse. This was the last worke of the incomparable vertue of Epaminondas, who being in the head of that Warlike troupe of men, which broke the Lacedaemo∣nian esquadron, and forced it to giue back in disaray, was furiously charged on the sodaine, by a desperate Company of the Spartans, who all at once threw their Darts at him alone; whereby receiuing many wounds, hee neuerthelesse with a singular courage maintained the fight, vsing against the Enemies many of their [unspec 50] Darts, which hee drew out of his owne bodie; till at length by a Spartan, called Anticrates, hee receiued so violent a stroke with a Dart, that the wood of it brake, leauing the yron and a peece of the tronchion in his brest. Hereupon hee sunke downe, and was soone conueighed out of the fight by his friends, hauing by his

fall somewhat animated the Spartans (who faine would haue got his bodie) but much more inflamed with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 indignation, the Thebans, who raging at this heauie mischance did with great slaughter compell their disordered enemies to leaue the field; though long they followed not the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, being wearied more with the sadnesse of this 〈◊〉〈◊〉, than with all the trauaile of the day. Epaminondas be∣ing brought into his Tent, was told by the Phisicians, That when the head of the Dart should be drawne out of his bodie, hee must 〈◊〉〈◊〉 die. Hearing this, hee called for his shield, which to haue lost, was held a great dishonour: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was brought vnto him. He bade them tell him which part 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the victorie; answere was made, that the Boeotians had wonne the field. Then said he, it is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 time for mee to die, [unspec 10] and withall sent for Iolidas, and Diophantes, two principall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Warre, that were both slaine; which being told him, He aduised the Thebans to make Peace, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with aduantage they might, for that they had none left that was able to discharge the office of a Generall. Herewithall he willed, that the head of the weapon should be drawne out of his bodie; comforting his friends that lamented his death, and want of issue, by telling them, that the victories of Leuctra and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were two faire Daughters, in whom his memorie should 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

So died 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the worthiest man that euer was bred in that Nation of Grecce, and hardly to bee matched in any Age or Countrie: for hee 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all o∣thers in the seuerall vertues, which in each of them were singular. His 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and [unspec 20] Sinceritie, his Temperance, Wisedome, and high Magnanimitie, were no way inferiour to his Militarie vertue; in euery part whereof hee so excelled, That hee could not properly bee called a Warie, a Valiant, a 〈◊〉〈◊〉, a Bountifull, or an In∣dustrious, and a Prouident Captaine; all these Titles, and many other, being due vnto him, which with his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Discipline, and good Conduct, made a perfect composition of an Heroique Generall. Neither was his priuate 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sation vn∣answerable to those high parts, which gaue him praise abroade. For he was Graue, and yet very Affable and Curteous; resolute in publique businesse, but in his owne particular easie, and of much mildnesse: a louer of his People, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with mens infirmities, wittie and pleasant in speech, farre from insolence, Master of his [unspec 30] owne affections, and furnished with all qualities that might winne and keepe loue. To these Graces were added great abilitie of bodie, much Eloquence, and very deepe knowledge in all parts of Philosophie and Learning, wherewith his minde being enlightened, rested not in the sweetnesse of Contemplation, but brake forth into such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as gaue vnto Thebes, which had euer-more beene an vnder∣ling, a dreadfull reputation among all 〈◊〉〈◊〉 adjoyning, and the highest com∣mand in 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

§. VIII. [unspec 40] Of the peace concluded in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 after the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉〈◊〉. The voiage of AGESILAVS into Aegypt. His death, and qualities; with an exa∣mination of the comparison made betweene him and POMPEY the Roman.

THis battaile of Mantinaea was the greatest that had euer beene fought in that Countrie betweene the Naturals; and the last. For at Mara∣thon, and Plataea, the populous Armies of the barbarous Nations gaue [unspec 50] rather a great fame, than a hard triall to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 valour, neither were the practice of Armes and Art Militarie so perfect in the begin∣nings of the Peloponnesian Warre, as long continuance and daily exercise had now made them. The times following produced no actions of worth or moment, those

excepted which were vndertaken against fortaine enemies, prouing for the most part vnfortunate. But in this last fight all Greece was interessed, which neuer had more able Souldiers, and braue Commanders, nor euer contended for victory with greater care of the successe, or more obssinate resolution. All which notwithstan∣ding, the issue being such as hath beene related, it was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 best for euery particu∣lar Estate, that a generall peace should be established, euery one retaining what hee 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had, and none being forced to depend vpon another. The Messenians were by name comprised in this new league; which caused the Lacedaemonians not to enter into it. Their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 out 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not the rest from proceeding to con∣clusion; considering that Sparta was now too weake to offend her Neighbours, and [unspec 10] therefore might well bee allowed to shew that anger in ceremonies, which had no power to declare it selfe in execution. This peace, as it gaue some breath and re∣freshing to all the Country, so to the Cities of Athens and Sparta it affoorded leisure to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 after wealth by forraine emploiment in Aegypt, whither Agesilaus was sent with some smal forces to assist, or indeed, as a Mercenarie, to serue vnder Tachos King of Aegypt in his warre vpon Syria. Chabrias the Athenian, who had before commanded vnder Acoris King of Aegypt, went now as a voluntary, with such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as he could raise, by 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and offer of good pay, to the same seruice. These 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Kings descended from Amyrlaeus of Sais, who rebelled against Darius 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 retained the Country, notwithstanding all intestine dissensions, and [unspec 20] 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉, during three Generations of their owne race, were so well 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with the valour of the Grcekes, that by their helpe (easily procured with 〈◊〉〈◊〉) they conceiued great 〈◊〉〈◊〉, not onely to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 themselues, but to become Lords of the Prouinces adioyning, which were held by the Persian. What the issue of this great enterprise might haue been, had it not fallen by Domesticall rebellion, it is vncertaine. But very likely it is, that the rebellion it selfe had soone come to nothing, if Agesilaus had not proued a false Traitor, ioyning with Nectanebus, who rose against his Prince, and helping the Rebell with that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which the money of Tachos had waged. This falshood Agesilaus excused, as tending to the good of his owne Countrie; though it seeme rather, that hee grudged because the King [unspec 30] tooke vpon himselfe the Conduct of the Armie, vsing his seruice onely as Lieute∣nant, who had made full accompt of being appointed the Generall. Howsoeuer it came to passe, Tachos being shamefully betraied by them, in whom he had reposed his chiefe confidence, fled vnto the Persian, who vpon his submission gaue him gen∣tle entertainement; and Nectanebus (who seemes to haue beene the Nephew of Tachos) raigned in his stead. At the same time the Citizens of Mendes had set vp an∣other King, to whom all, or most of the Aegyptians yeelded their obedience. But Agesilaus fighting with him in places of aduantage, preuailed so 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that hee left 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in quiet possession of the Kingdome; who in recompence of his treason to the former King Tachos, and good seruice done to himselfe, rewarded him with [unspec 40] two hundred and thirtie Talents of siluer, with which bootie sailing homewards, he died by the way. He was a Prince very temperate, and valiant, and a good Lea∣der in warre, free from couetousnesse, and not reproched with any blemish of lust; which praises are the lesse admirable in him, for that the discipline of Sparta was such as did endue euerie one of the Citizens (not caried away by the violent streame of an ill nature) with all, or the chiefe, of these good qualities. Hee was neuerthe∣lesse very arrogant, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, vniust and vaine glorious, measuring all things by his owne will, and obstinately prosecuting those courses, whose ends were beyond hope. The expedition of Xenophon had filled him with an opinion, that by his hand the Empire of Persia should be ouerthrowne; with which conceipt being transpor∣ted, [unspec 50] and finding his proceedings interrupted by the Thebans, and their Allies, hee did euer after beare such hatred vnto Thebes, as compelled that Estate by meere ne∣cessitie to grow warlike, and able, to the vtter dishonour of Sparta, and the irrepa∣rable losse of all her former greatnesse. The commendations giuen to him by

Xenophon his good friend, haue caused Plutarch to lay his name in the ballance against Pompey the Great; whose actions (the solemne grauitie of carriage excepted) are very disproportionable. Yet we may truely say, That as Pompey made great warres vnder sundrie Climates, and in all the Prouinces of the Roman Empire, exceeding in the multitude of imploiments all that were before him; so Agesilans had at one time or other, some quarrell with euery Towne in Greece, had made a Warre in Asia, and meddled in the businesse of the Aegyptians, in which variety he went be∣yond all his Predecessours: yet not winning any Countries, as Pompey did many, but obtaining large wages, which Pompey neuer tooke. Herein also they are very like; Each of them was the last great Captaine which his Nation brought forth in time [unspec 10] of libertie, and each of them ruined the libertie of his Countrie by his owne Lordly wilfulnesse. We may therefore well say, Similia magis omnia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 paria; The resem∣blance was neerer than the equalitie. Indeede the freedome of Rome was lost with Pompey, falling into the hands of Caesar, whom he had enforced to take Armes; yet the Roman Empire stood, the forme of Gouernement only being chan∣ged: But the libertie of Greece, or of Sparta it selfe, was not for∣faited vnto the Thebans, whom Agesilaus had compel∣led to enter into a victorious warre; yet the Signiorie, and ancient renowne of Sparta was presently lost: and [unspec 20] the freedome of all Greece being wounded in this Theban warre, and after much bloud lost, ill healed by the peace ensuing, did very soone, vpon the death of Agesilaus, giue vp the Ghost, and the Lordship of the whole Countrie was seized by Philip King of Macedon, whose actions are now on foote, and more to be regarded than the Contemporarie [unspec 30] passages of things, in any other Nation. [unspec 40] [unspec 50]

Notes

• * 1.1

  Ezech. c. 1. v. 2. c. 3. v. 11. & 15
• * 1.2

  Mac. 1. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.3

  Ioseph. ant. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.4

  Math. 24. 15.
• * 1.5

  Mark. 13. 14.
• * 1.6

  Dan. 12.
• * 1.7

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 29. 10.
• * 1.8

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 29. v. 16. 17. & 18.
• * 1.9

  2. Chron. 36. 19.
• * 1.10

  Dan. 9. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.11

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 1.
• * 1.12

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. Cyro∣pag. lib. 1. & 1. 3
• * 1.13

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 27. v. 7.
• * 1.14

  Iosephus 〈◊〉〈◊〉. lib. 10. cap. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.15

  Ios. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Ap∣pian. lib. 1.
• * 1.16

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. libr. 4.
• * 1.17

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉. verse 1. & 27.
• * 1.18

  Dan. c. 5. v. 11, 12, & 13.
• * 1.19

  Dan. 2. 49.
• * 1.20

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 52. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 33. & 34.
• * 1.21

  Dan. 8. 20.
• * 1.22

  2. Kin 2. 5. 8. & Ierem. 51. 12.
• * 1.23

  2. King. 24. 12.
• * 1.24

  2. King. 25. 27. & 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 52. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.25

  Dan. c. 8. v. 1. & 27. &c. 5. v. 11, 12. & 13.
• * 1.26

  Ierem. 27. 7.
• * 1.27

  Ezech. 26. 2.
• * 1.28

  Ier. 25.
• * 1.29

  Esai. 23. 15.
• * 1.30

  Ezech. c. 2. v. 8. 10. 11.
• * 1.31

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 29. 18.
• * 1.32

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 25. 12. & 15.
• * 1.33

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 25. 3.
• * 1.34

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 49. 1.
• * 1.35

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 40. 14. & 41. 2. & 10.
• * 1.36

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 28. 27. &c.
• * 1.37

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 16. 14.
• * 1.38

  Herod. l. 2. &. l. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.39

  Diodor. Sic. lib. 1. ca. 2.
• * 1.40

  Esa. 20. ver. 4, 5. &. 6.
• * 1.41

  Ezech. 29. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 20. &c. 30.
• * 1.42

  Ezech. 32. v. 31.
• * 1.43

  Ierem. 44. 30.
• * 1.44

  Ierem. 43. 10.
• * 1.45

  Ierem. 46. verse 25, &. 26.
• * 1.46

  Iun. in Ierem. c. 44. verse 30.
• * 1.47

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 de An∣tiq. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 10. c. 11.
• * 1.48

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 29. 13. 14. & 15.
• * 1.49

  Esay 19. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.50

  Ezek. 29. 9.
• * 1.51

  Ioseph. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Iud. libr. 10. c. 11.
• * 1.52

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 52. 30.
• * 1.53

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 30. v. 13. & 14.
• * 1.54

  Dan. c. 1. & 2.
• * 1.55

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 3. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.56

  Dan. 4. 27.
• * 1.57

  L. 2. de Reg. pri.
• * 1.58

  Med. l. 2. de re∣cta in Deum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cap. 7.
• * 1.59

  Dor. in Synopsi. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vit. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.60

  Dan. 4. 1. 32. c. 34.
• * 1.61

  Xenoph. Cyro∣paed. l. 1.
• * 1.62

  Xenoph. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 8.
• * 1.63

  Herod. l. 1.
• * 1.64

  Cap. 13. v. 17. 51 v. 11. & 28.
• * 1.65

  Lib. 16.
• * 1.66

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 1. c. 19.
• * 1.67

  Ios. an. l. 10. c. 13
• * 1.68

  Xeu. l. 8. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.69

  Euseb l. 6. c. 8. d. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Euan 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.70

  Gen. 10.
• * 1.71

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 11. 21, 22.
• * 1.72

  Iere. 25. & 29.
• * 1.73

  Ezecb. 32.
• * 1.74

  Dan. 8.
• * 1.75

  Esd. 4.
• * 1.76

  2. Mac. 9.
• * 1.77

  1. Mac. 6.
• * 1.78

  Gen. 10.
• * 1.79

  Strab. l. 15.
• * 1.80

  Plut. in 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.81

  Herod. l. 1. p. 3. 4 & 5.
• * 1.82

  Her. l. 5.
• * 1.83

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 14. c. 17.
• * 1.84

  In 〈◊〉〈◊〉 calamitate suam quisque habet 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.85

  Memoriam me∣tus perimit: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vocis est in∣citamentum, &c.
• * 1.86

  Solin. c. 7.
• * 1.87

  Homo qui in homine calami∣toso 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est, 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉, Cass.
• * 1.88

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉. lib. 7.
• * 1.89

  Dan. 5. v. 6.
• * 1.90

  Orig. & Theod. in Dan. Ioseph. Ant. 10.
• * 1.91

  Dan. 5. v. 18, 19, 20.
• * 1.92

  Ier. c. 27.
• * 1.93

  Esa. c. 47.
• * 1.94

  Cap. 47.
• * 1.95

  Isai. 14.
• * 1.96

  To wit, Euil∣merodach and Balthasar.
• * 1.97

  Diod. l. 3.
• * 1.98

  Her. l. 1.
• * 1.99

  Esa. 4. 7. &. c. 13.
• * 1.100

  Vig. prim. part. Bib.
• * 1.101

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 15. hist. part.
• * 1.102

  Strab. l. 15.
• * 1.103

  Q. Curt. l.
• * 1.104

  Xen. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 8.
• * 1.105

  Zon. l. 1. c. 20.
• * 1.106

  1. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 2.
• * 1.107

  2. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 7.
• * 1.108

  〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉.
• * 1.109

  1. Esd. 2. 3. Esd.
• * 1.110

  5. Esd. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 4. & 5.
• * 1.111

  Jos. l. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 11.
• * 1.112

  Esd. 1. c. 2. v. 16.
• * 1.113

  Esd. 2. v. 16.
• * 1.114

  Esd. 1. c. 5. v. 33.
• * 1.115

  Esd. 1. c. 4. v. 5.
• * 1.116

  Esd. 1. c. 2.
• * 1.117

  Ezck. c. 29.
• * 1.118

  Chron. Krentz. fol. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.119

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 giues Cyrus but 29.
• * 1.120

  Melanct. but 20
• * 1.121

  Melanct. but 40 Melanct. 26.
• * 1.122

  Melanct. 4.
• * 1.123

  Ptol. in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib. 3. cap. 8.
• * 1.124

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 2. c. 2.
• * 1.125

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 3. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 83. 84. 85.
• * 1.126

  Neither did the Romanes euer consume their dead to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, till the time of Sylla Dictator, who caused his owne to be deuoured by that element, fearing the Law called Talionis, or like for like, because himselfe had vntombed the carkasse of Caius Marius after his death, Her. l. 3. Plin. l. 7. c. 54.
• * 1.127

  Strab. & 〈◊〉〈◊〉. L. 1.
• * 1.128

  Pag. 87. 88.
• * 1.129

  Her. l. 3. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 7.
• * 1.130

  Her. pag. 89. 90.
• * 1.131

  Zonaras Com. 3. pag. 117.
• * 1.132

  Her. l. 3. p. 100. 101.
• * 1.133

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 4.
• * 1.134

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 1. & 3.
• * 1.135

  Pag. 130.
• * 1.136

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 pag. 237. Pag. 154.
• * 1.137

  Pag. 101. & 202 Pag. 180. 190.
• * 1.138

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 6. pag. 180
• * 1.139

  Pag 180. 190.
• * 1.140

  Pag 199.
• * 1.141

  Pag. 200. 204. & pag.: 13. 285. 286.
• * 1.142

  Pag. 214. 254.
• * 1.143

  De Reg. Persar. Fol. 32.
• * 1.144

  Her. lib. 3.
• * 1.145

  Ezra. c. 6.
• * 1.146

  Ezr. 6. 11.
• * 1.147

  Ezr. 6.
• * 1.148

  Her. l. 4.
• * 1.149

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 2.
• * 1.150

  Diod. l. 11.
• * 1.151

  Her. l. 5.
• * 1.152

  A maritimate Citie of Thrace to the South of Constantinople.
• a 1.153

  Cardia, a City vpon the Cher∣sonesus of Ihrace, after∣ward 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Pto. Paus.
• * 1.154

  Paus. pag. 159.
• * 1.155

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 3.
• * 1.156

  Paus. p. 169.
• * 1.157

  Pausan. 170.
• * 1.158

  Pag. 331.
• * 1.159

  Her. l 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.160

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 a Citie of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 called 〈◊〉〈◊〉, by 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉.
• * 1.161

  Pol. 5.
• * 1.162

  Heraclid. 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉. pag. 262.
• * 1.163

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. pag 28.
• * 1.164

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 6.
• * 1.165

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 6. c. 10.
• * 1.166

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 a ci∣tie of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vp∣on the Helle∣spont.
• * 1.167

  Her. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 5.
• * 1.168

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 6. c. 1.
• * 1.169

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 op∣posite to the Ile of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which Arist. in 5. Animal. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉.
• * 1.170

  Herod. lib. 6.
• * 1.171

  Whether this Citie or People were of Peloponnesus in Sicyonia, or of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, be∣tween Thessalia and Macedon, I do not know: but those bor∣derers, & next the enemie, were more likely to com∣pound than the rest farre off. There is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a Citie called 〈◊〉〈◊〉, not farre from Aegea. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 32. 33. &c
• * 1.172

  In Herod.
• * 1.173

  Ad Att.
• * 1.174

  In vita Arist.
• * 1.175

  Her. l. 7.
• * 1.176

  Lib. 3.
• * 1.177

  Malac. c. 3. v. 8.
• * 1.178

  Ierem. c. 2. v. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & 10.
• * 1.179

  Esay. c. 37. v. 7.
• * 1.180

  Prosopites an Iland between the Riuers of Taly and Phar∣mutiacus, two of the out lets of Nilus, to∣wards Alex∣andria.
• * 1.181

  Mendesus is an Island in the mouth of Nilus, between the out-let cal∣led Busiriticus and Diolcos.
• * 1.182

  But the branch of Nilus, called Mendesium, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in to the Sea by the Citie 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.183

  Trabisond a Colonie of the Greekes, situate in the bottome of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Sea.
• a 1.184

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 a Nation of Pon∣tus Cappadocicus
• b 1.185

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 a Port Towne in the same Region.
• c 1.186

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 a Port-Towne in Leucolyria, a Colonie of the Mylesians.