The history of the world

§. V. How the Lacedaemonians hardly, and to their great disaduantage, obtained a peace, that was not well kept.

THerefore they indeuoured greatly to obtaine peace; which the Athe∣nians would not harken vnto. For they were so puffed vp with the [unspec 20] continuance of good successe, that hauing sent a few bands of men in∣to Sicilie, to hold vp a faction there, and make what profit they might of the Sicilians quarrells; when afterward they heard that the diffe∣rences in that Ile were taken away, and their bands returned without either gaine or losse, they banished the Captaines, as if it had beene meerely through their de∣fault, that the Ile of Sicilie was not conquered; which (besides the longer distance) was in power to offend others, or defend it selfe, no whit inferiour vnto Peloponne∣sus. Yet was this their ouer-weening much abated shortly after, by some disasters receiued, especially in Thrace, where in a battaile which they lost at Amphipolis, Cleon, and Brasidas, Generalls of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian forces, were both [unspec 30] slaine; which two had most beene aduersaries to the peace. As the Athenians by their losses were taught moderation; so the Lacedaemonians, who not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 felt the like wounds, but through the great Nauie which they had receiued at Pylus, were faine to proceede lamely in the warre, against such as, through commoditie of their good fleet, had all aduantage that could be found in expedition, were feruently de∣sirous to conclude the businesse, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Fortune by any new fauour should reuiue the insolence, which was at this time well mortified in their Enemies. Neither was it only a consideration of their present estate, that vrged them to bring the treatie of peace to good and speedy effect; but other dangers hanging ouer their heads, and ready to fall on them, which vnlesse they compounded with the Athenians, they [unspec 40] knew not how to auoide. The estate of Argos, which had ancient enmitie with them, was now, after a truce of thirtie yeeres well-nigh expired, ready to take the benefit of their present troubles, by ioyning with those who alone found them worke enough. Argos was a rich and strong Citie, which though inferiour to Sparta in valour, yet was not so vn warlike, nor held such ill correspondence with the neighbouring Estates, that the Lacedaemonians could euer farre 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vpon it, when they had little else to doe. This was a thing that in the beginning of this Warre had not beene regarded. For it was then thought, that by wasting the Ter∣ritorie of Athens with sword and fire, the quarrell should easily and in short time haue beene ended, whereby not only the Athenians should haue beene brought to [unspec 50] good order, but the Corinthians and others, for whose sake the warre was vnder-ta∣ken, haue beene so firmely knit to the Lacedaemonians, that they should for loue of them haue abandoned the Argiues, to their owne fortunes. But now the vanitie of those hopes appeared, in that the Athenians abounding in ready money, and meanes

to raise more, were able to secure themselues by a strong 〈◊〉〈◊〉, from any great harme, that the Peloponnesians wanting wherewith to maintaine a Nauie, could doe vnto them, yea as Masters of the Sea, to wearie them out, as in effect alreadie they had done. As for the Confederates of Sparta, they could now endure neither warre nor peace; their daily trauailes, and many losses had so wearied and incensed them. Wherefore the Lacedaemonians were glad to vse the occasion, which the inclination of their enemies did then afford, of making a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 peace, which with much a-doe they procured, as seemed equall and easie; but were indeede impossible to be per∣formed, and therefore all their trauaile was little effectuall.

The restitution of prisoners and places taken being agreed vpon; it fell out by [unspec 10] lot, that the Lacedaemonians should restore first. These had won more townes vpon the continent from the Athenians, than the Athenians had from them; but what they had wonne, they had not won absolutely. For they had restored some Towns to such of their Allies, from whom the State of Athens had taken them; some, and those the most, they had set at libertie (as reason required) which had opened their gates vnto them, as to their friends and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & not compelled them to breake in as Enemies. Now concerning the Townes which were not in their owne hands, but had beene rendred vnto their Confederates, the Spartans found meanes to giue some satisfaction, by permitting the Athenians to retain others, which they had got∣ten in the warre; as for the rest, they promised more than afterwards they could [unspec 20] performe. The Cities which they had taken into protection, could not endure to heare of being abandoned, neither would they by any meanes yeeld themselues in∣to the hands of their old Lords the Athenians, whom they had offended by reuol∣ting, notwithstanding whatsoeuer articles were drawne, and concluded, for their securitie, and betterance in time to come. This dull performance of conditions on the side of the Spartans, made the Athenians become as backward in doing those things which on their part were required; so that restoring only the prisoners which they had, they deferred the rest, vntill such time as they might receiue the full satisfaction, according to the agreement. But before such time as these difficul∣ties brake out into matter of open quarrell, the Lacedaemonians entred into a more [unspec 30] straight alliance with the Athenians; making a league offensiue and defensiue with them. Hereunto they were moued by the backwardnesse of the Argiues, who be∣ing (as they thought) likely to haue sued for peace at their hands, as soone as things were once compounded betweene Athens and Sparta; did shew themselues plainly vnwilling to giue eare to any such motion. Thinking therefore, that by cutting from Argos all hope of Athenian succour, they should make sure worke, the Spartans regarded not the affections of other States, whom they had either bound vnto them by well-deseruing in the late warre, or found so troublesome, that their enmitie (if perhaps they durst let it appeare) were little worse than friendship. It bred great jelousie in all the Cities of Greece, to perceiue such a conjunction betweene two so [unspec 40] powerfull Signories: especially one clause threatning euery one, that was any thing apt to feare, with a secret intent that might be harboured in their proud conceipts, of subduing the whole Countrie, and taking each what they could lay hold on. For besides the other articles, it was agreed, That they might by mutuall consent adde new conditions, or alter the old at their owne pleasures. This impression wrought so strongly in the Corinthians, Thebans, & other ancient Confederates of Sparta, that the hate which they had borne to the Athenians their professed Enemies, was vio∣lently throwne vpon the Lacedaemonians their vnjust friends: whereby it came to passe, that they who had lately borne chiefe sway in Greece, might haue beene aban∣doned to the discretion of their Enemies, as alreadie in effect they were, had the E∣nemies [unspec 50] wisely vsed the aduantage.