BVT Mens is not taken here for animaphysica, according to Aristotle, which is forma, vel natura hominis: The forme or nature of man; but this facultie or gift of God, called Mens, is taken for prima vis animi, the principall strength of the minde, or soule, cuius actus est perpetua veritatis contemplatio; whose act, exercise, or office, is the perpetuall contemplation of [unspec 20] truth; and therefore it is also called intellectus diuinus, intellectus contemplatiue, & * 1.1 anima contemplatiua, A diuine vnderstanding, and an intellect or minde contemplatiue. Est autem mens nostra (saith CVSANVS) vis comprehendendi, & totum virtuale ex-omnibus* 1.2 comprehendendi virtutibus compositum: Our intellectuall minde (saith hee) is a power of comprehending, euen the whole, that is in this kind powerfull, compounded of all the powers of comprehension: vnto which Mercurius attributeth so much (if his meaning accom∣pany his words) that he esteemeth it to be the very essence of God (which was also the errour of the Manichees and others) and no otherwise separate from God (sayth hee) then the light from the Sunne: for this Mens or vnderstanding (sayth MERCV∣RIVS) est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in hominibus: Is God in men, or rather (and which I take to be his mea∣ning) [unspec 30] * 1.3 is the image of God in man. For as the Sunne is not of the same essence or na∣ture with the diuine light, but a body illightned, and an illumination created; so is this Mens or vnderstanding in men, not of the essence of Gods infinite vnderstanding, but a power and facultie of our soules the purest; or the lumen animae rationalis, by the true and eternall light illightned. And this Mens others call animam animae, The soule of the soule, or with S. Augustine, the eye of the soule, or receptacle of Sapience and diuine knowledge, quae amorem sapientiae tanquàm ducem scquitur, Which followeth after the loue of sapience as her guide (saith Philo) betweene which and reason, betweene which and the minde, called anima, betweene which and that power which the La∣tines call animus, there is this difference. Reason is that facultie by which wee iudge [unspec 40] and discourse; Anima, by which we liue. Hereof it is said, Anima corpus animat, id est, viuificat; anima, or the soule is that which doth animate the body, that is, giueth it life: for death is the separation of body and soule; and the same strength (sayth Philo) which God the great Director hath in the World, the same hath this Anima, or mind, or soule in man. Animus, is that, by which wee will and make election; and to this Basil agreeth, which calleth this Mens, or diuine vnderstanding, perspicacem animae par∣tem, the perceiuing part of the minde, or the light by which the Soule discerneth: dor∣mientium mens, non anima, sopitur, & in furiosis mens extinguitur, anima manet, In men that sleep it is this (mens) or vnderstanding, and not the minde or soule, which resteth, during which time it is but habituall in wise men, and in mad men this (mens) is extinguished, [unspec 50] and not the Soule: for mad men doe liue, though distract.
Therefore this word being often vsed for the Soule giuing life, is attributed abu∣siuely to mad men, when wee say that they are of a distract minde, in stead of a bro∣ken vnderstanding, which word (mind) we vse also for opinion, as, I am of this mind,