The history of Polybius the Megalopolitan The fiue first bookes entire: with all the parcels of the subsequent bookes vnto the eighteenth, according to the Greeke originall. Also the manner of the Romane encamping, extracted from the discription of Polybius. Translated into English by Edward Grimeston, sergeant at armes.

Of Hannibal and the Carthaginians.

ANd therefore who will not wonder at the gouernment,* 1.1 ver∣tue and power of this man, in his valiant exploits of War decided in Field, hauing regard to the length of time, and knowing Hannibal as well in Battailes as encounters, as in sieges of Townes, alterations, and euents of times, and in the fulnesse of all the Enterprizes and resolutions, according to the which hee hath made Warre in Italy against the Romans for the space of seuenteene yeares, and hauing neuer broken vp his Campe, but kept it still entire as vnder a good Leader, and commanded so great a multitude either without mutiny towards him or among themselues, although he did not imploy in his Army men of one Nation, not of one Race.* 1.2 He had vnder his command Lybians, Spaniards, Phenicians, Italians, and Grecians: among the which the Lawes nor customes, nor the Language had any thing common. But the industry of the Commander made this great multitude of different Nations obedient to the Commandments of one man, according to his desire: although the Euents were not alwayes answerable, but diuers: and that many times Fortune smiled vpon him, and was sometimes opposite. These things considered, you may safely say (in wondring at the vertue of this Commander, in that which concernes this point) that if hee had first assailed the other Countries of the World, and then the Romans, he would haue preuailed in all that he had attempted. But seeing at this day hee hath begun the Warre against those which hee should haue assailed last, hee hath made both the beginning and the ending.

Asdrubal hauing drawne together the Souldiers from those places where they had wintred, prepares for his voyage, and campes neare vnto a City called Elinge,* 1.3 building a Pallisadoe on the side of the Mountaine, with plaine spaces before, fit for skirmishes and encoun∣ters. Hee had three score and ten thousand Foote, foure thousand Horse, and two and thirty Elephants. Publius Scipio on the other side sends Marcus Iunius to Lochis to receiue the Bands which hee had leiued:* 1.4 being three thousand Foote and fiue hundred Horse. In regard of the other Allies, he accompanies them, taking his way to the place appointed.

When hee was come to Catalongne, and to the places which were about Becyle, and had ioyned his Army with Marcus, and

with the Troupes of Colichante, he fell into a great perplexity for the apparent dangers. For in truth he had not a sufficient Roman Army without the forces of the Allies to hazard a Battaile. It seemed an vn∣safe thing, foolish, and rash for those which put their hope in the for∣ces of their Allies to hazard a Battaile. But as he was for a time in suspence, and that the affaires concluded that he must vse the Allies, he came to fight with the Spaniards: to the end that by this meanes he might make the Enemy imagine that hee fought with his whole Army.

This being resolu'd, he marches with all his Troups, being forty fiue thousand Foot, and about three thousand Horse. And when he was neare the Carthaginians, so as he might well be discouered, he camps about certaine little Hils right against the Enemy.* 1.5 Asdrubal think∣ing to haue found a fit time to charge the Romans in Camping, he fell vpon their Campe with the greatest part of his Horse-men, and Massanissa with the Numades, hauing a conceite to surprize Scipio suddainly. But he hauing formerly fore-seene the future, he layd an Ambush of Horse-men behinde a certaine Hill,* 1.6 equall in number to those of the Carthaginians: who charging by surprize, many in the beginning turning head, in regard of this vnexpected Charge of the Ro∣mans, fell from their Horses, others affronting the Enemies fought va∣liantly. But for the dexterity of the Roman Horse-men in fighting, the Carthaginians being troubled and discontented, after some little resistance gaue backe, retiring in the beginning in good order: But when the Romans pursued them, they tooke their flight vnder the Campe. This done, the Romans assure themselues the more to vn∣dergoe the danger: and the Carthaginians did the contrary. The dayes following they draw their Armies into the Plaine which lay betwixt them, and making skirmishes as well of Horse-men, as of their most valiant Foote, and trying one another they resolued to Battaile.

It seemed then that Scipio had practised a double stratagem. For when he saw Asdrubal slow in ordring of his forces, and to put the Lybians in the midst, and the Elephants vpon the two wings: Then as hee was accustomed to obserue the opportunity of the time,* 1.7 and to make head against the Lybians by Romans, and to mingle the Spa∣niards vpon the wings, on the day which hee resolued to fight, hee doth now the contrary, giuing by this meanes great comfort to his forces for the Victory, and weakning the Enemy. Presently at the Sunne-rising he giues all the Souldiers notice by men appointed, that all they which were to fight armed, should stand before the Pallisa∣doe. This done, when they had obeyed him cheerefully, for the hope they had conceiued for the future, he sends the Horse-men be∣fore, and the ablest Souldiers, giuing them charge to approach the Enemies Campe, and that in skirmishing couragiously they should be∣gin the Battaile. For his part, he marcheth at Sun-rising with the Foot∣men. And being come into the midst of the field, he drew his Army in Battaile after another forme then he had bin accustomed.* 1.8 For he put the

Spaniards in the midst, and the Romans vpon the wings. When as the Horse-men approacht the Pallisadoe, and that the rest of the Army was in sight and ready, the Carthaginians had scarce time to arme.

Asdrubal being then forced to drawe the valiantest of his men to field against the Romans,* 1.9 being yet fasting without preparation and in haste both the Foot-men and Horse-men: and to plant his Army of Foot-men not farre from the Mountaines, and the Ordonance in the Plaine as they had beene accustomed. The Romans stayed some time: but for that the day was well aduanced, and that the Combat of either side was vncertaine and equall, and that there was danger that they which should be prest, turning head, would retire vpon their Battalions, then Scipio retiring the Skirmishers by the space betwixt the Ensignes, he diuides them vpon the wings after those which had beene formerly ap∣pointed. Then he giues order to assaile the Enemy in Front, first to the Iauelings, and then with Horse-men: and being a Furlong from the Enemy, he commands the Spaniards which were in Battaile, to march in the same order, and that they should turne the Ensignes vpon the right hand, and they of the left doing the contrary. And when he began on the right side, Lacius Marcus and Marcus Iunius led three braue Troups of Horse-men on the left hand, and before were those which were lightly armed and accustomed to the Warre, with three Bands of Foot-men (the Romans call a Band of Foot-men a Cohort) to whom the Targetteers ioyned on the one side, and the Archers on the other.

In this sort they marched against the Enemy, making by this meanes an attempt with effect, considering the continuall repaire of those which ioyned with them by files. As by chance these men were not farre from the Enemy, and that the Spaniards which were on the wing were farther off, as they which matched a slow pace, they make an attempt vpon the two Battalions of the Enemy, drawne in length with the Roman forces, according to that which had beene re∣solued in the beginning. The following alterations (by the meanes whereof it happened that they which followed, ioyned with the for∣mer, encountring the Enemies in a direct line, had betwixt them di∣uers orders) so as the right Battalion had on the left side the Foot-men mingled with the Horse. For the Horse-men which were on the right wing, mingling with the Iauelings of the Foot lightly armed, laboured to inclose the Enemies. The Foot-men on the other side couered themselues with their Targets. They which on the left hand were in the Troups charged with their Iauelings, and the Hors-men accompanied with the Archers with their full speed. By this motion there was a left wing made of the right wing of the Horse-men, and of the most valiant Souldiers of the two Battalions: But the Com∣mander made no great accompt, being more carefull to vanquish the en∣emy with the other Battalion: wherein he had good iudgement. We must know things as they are done, and vse a fit obseruation according to the occasion offered.

By the charge of these men the Elephants assailed by the Archers,* 1.10 and the Horse-men with Darts and Iauelings, and tormented of all sides were wounded, making as great a spoile of their Friends as of their Enemies. For they ran vp and downe and ouer-threw men of all sides, breaking the Carthaginian Battalions. In regard of that of the Lybians which held the middle part, and was of great seruice, it stood idle vnto the end. For not able to succour those which on the wings abandoned the place, by reason of the Spaniards charge: nor re∣maining in their station, doe that which necessity required: for that the Enemies which they had in Front, did not giue them Battaile.

It is true that the wings fought for a time valiantly: Considering that all was in danger. And as the heare was vehement, the Carthagi∣nians brake, seeing that the end of the Combate succeeded not accor∣ding to their desire, and that their chiefest preparation was hindred: The Romans on the other side had the aduantage both in force and cou∣rage: and in that principally, that by the prouidence of the Generall the best furnished among the Carthaginians were made vnprofitable. Wherefore Asdrubal being thus prest, retired in the beginning with a slow pace from the Battaile: Then turning in Troupe, he recouered the neighbour Mountaines. And when as the Romans pursued them neare, they posted to their Pallisadoe. If some God had not preserued them, they had suddainly lost their Fort. But for that the disposition of the Aire changed, and the raine fell continually with violence, the Romans could hardly recouer their Fort.

And although that Publius Scipio had sufficient experience of the Warre,* 1.11 yet he neuer fell into so great a doubt and perplexity, the which happened not without reason. For as wee may fore-see and pre∣uent exteriour causes and discommodities of the Body,* 1.12 as cold, heate, labour, and wounds, before they happen: and cure them when they come: being on the other side difficult to fore-see those which proceed from the Body, and are hardly cureable when they happen: we must iudge the same of policies and Armies. It is true, there is a speedy meanes and helpe to preuent the Warres and Ambushes of Strangers when they are contriued: But against those which the Enemy doth practise in the State, as seditions and mutinies, the Phisicke is diffi∣cult, and requires a great dexterity and singular industry in the gouern∣ment of affaires. But in my opinion one aduice is necessary for all Ar∣mies, Cities, and bodies politique: which is, that in that which con∣cernes the things aboue mentioned, they neuer suffer too much sloth and idlenesse: especially in time of prosperity, and the abundance of all things necessary.

Scipio as a man of excellent diligence,* 1.13 and consequently industrious and actiue to mannage great affaires, propounded a certaine course to decide the present combustions, after he had assembled the Captaines of thousands. He gaue order that they should promise vnto the Soul∣diers the restitution of the victuals and taxes: and to giue credit to his promise, they should leuie the ordinary taxes ordained in Cities diligently and openly for the reliefe of the whole Army, to the end

it might be apparent that this preparation was made for the institution of their Victuals. And that moreouer, the Milleniers should command the Commissaries of the Victuals, and admonish them to haue a care, and to take charge of the Victuals: and that conferring among them∣selues, they should make knowne, if part of them or altogether would vndertake it. He sayd, that they must consider of that which was to be done. The others thinking of the same things, had a care of the Treasure. And when as the Milleniers had made knowne the things which had beene ordayned, Scipio being aduertised, imparted vn∣to the Councell that which was to be done. They concluded that they should resolue on the day when they were to appeare: So as the people should be sent backe, and the Authors seuerely punished: who were to the number of fiue and thirty.

And when the Day was come, and the Rebels there present, as well to obtaine pardon, as for their Victuals, Scipio secretly com∣mands the Captaines Milleniers, that they should goe and meete with the Rebels, and in choosing fiue of the chiefe of the Mutiny (euery man carrying himselfe courteously at their encounter) they should bring them to his Pauillion: if this could not be done, yet at the least they should conuay them to the Banquet, and to this kind of assembly. And as for the Army which was with him, he gaue them notice three dayes before, to make prouision of Victuals for a long time: as if Mar∣cus should goe to Andobale to fight: whereof the Rebels being ad∣uertized, they were the more assured. They expected to enioy a great power, if (the rest of the Army being separated) they were admitted about a Commander, when they approacht neare the City, he com∣mands the other Souldiers, that being prepared the day following, they should come forth at the breake of day. In regard of the Milleniers and Captaines, he giues them charge that after their comming forth of the City, they should stay the Souldiers in Armes at the Gate, ha∣uing first lodg'd the Baggage: and that afterwards they should diuide themselues by the Gates, and haue a care that none of the Rebels should escape. They which were appointed to receiue them, ioy∣ning to those which came vnto them, entertained the offendors cour∣teously according vnto that which had beene enioyned them. Their charge was to seaze vpon these men, at such time as they should be set at the Banquet, and to keepe them bound: So as not any of the Company being within should goe forth, but onely he that should aduertize the Commander what had beene done, Wherefore when the Milleniers had performed their Charge, the Generall seeing in the Morning following those to be assembled in the place which were arri∣ued, he causeth an Assembly to be called.* 1.14 When the aduertisement was giuen, they all came running as of custome, whether it were with a desire to see the Commander, or to heare those things which were to be spoken of the present affaires. Scipio sends to the Milleniers which were at the Gates, and commands them to bring the Souldiers that were armed, and to enuiron the whole assembly: Then marching forth, he amazeth them all at the first sight. A great number in truth

thought that he was not well disposed: But when contrary vnto their opinions they found him sound and safe, they were amazed at his pre∣sence. Finally, hee vsed this Speech vnto them, saying, that hee wondred for what cause some of them were offended, or vnder what colour they were mooued to attempt a Rebellion.

There are three causes for the which men presume to fall into a mu∣tiny against their Princes and Country: VVhich are,* 1.15 when as they blame their Gouernour, and indure them vnwillingly; or when they are offended with the present Gouernment; or vpon a conception in their opinions of a greater and better hope. I demaund of you, sayth he, which of these three hath mooued you. Are you angry with me that I haue not deliuered you Victualls? It is not my fault. For you haue not wanted any Victuals vnder my Leading. It is the errour of the Romans which haue not yeilded that vnto you now, which hath beene formerly due vnto you? Should you then accuse your Country, so as you should Rebell and become its Enemy, then being present to speake vnto me, and to intreate your friends to assist you? The which in my opinion had beene much better. It is true, a pardon may bee gi∣uen vnto Mercenaries, if they abandon those from whom they receiue pay: But it is not fit to pardon such as carry Armes for themselues, their Wiues, and their Children. For it is euen like as a man should come vnto his Father, and charge him that he had villanously cozened him in matters of money, and kill him from whom hee holds his life. Haue I opprest you more with toiles and dangers then the rest, giuing them more Commodities and profites then vnto you? In trueth you dare not speake it, neither can you conuince me although you durst at∣tempt it.

I cannot coniecture the cause for the which being incensed against me, you haue attempted this Rebellion. I would vnderstand the oc∣casion from your selues. I thinke there is not any man among you that can alledge or pretend any thing. You cannot, in trueth, be sad for the present. When was there euer greater abundance of all things, nor more prerogatiues of the Citty of Rome? When was there euer greater hope for Souldiers then there is at this day? Peraduenture some one of these desperate men will thinke that at this day the profits are greater in shew, and the Hope better and more firme with the Ene∣my. Which are they? Is it Andobale and Mandonin? Which of you doth not know that as they first falsified their Faith with the Carthagi∣nians comming to vs? And that now againe they declared themselues our Enemies, inviolating their oath and Faith? Were it not an honest and commendable thing, that in giuing them your Faith, you should become Enemies to your owne Country? And yet you haue no hope in them to enioy Spaine. You were not sufficient being ioyned to An∣dobale to fight with vs, neither yet alone. Whereto then did you aym••?

I would know it from your selues, if you haue put your confidence in the Experience and Vertue of the Captaines which now are appoin∣ted you, or in the Rods and Maces which march before them, where∣of

of there is no honesty to vse any longer Discourse. But in truth there is nothing of all this; neither can you inuent any thing against me nor your Countrey. Wherefore I will answere for Rome and my selfe, pro∣pounding those things which seeme reasonable to all men, which is this, the People and all the Commons are such as such as they are easily de∣ceiued and moued to any thing.* 1.16 Wherefore it happens to them as to the Sea. For as the Sea of it selfe is without offence, and safe to those which make vse of it: And if it be tormented with the violence of the Winds, it is such vnto Saylers as are the Winds wherewith it is beaten: The Commons in like manner are made like vnto those which gouerne them, which are their Commanders and Councellors. And therefore now I suffer all your Leaders vnpunished, promising that hereafter I will quit all reuenge: But as for those which haue beene the Authors of the Rebellion, I beare them an implacable hatred: for this cause we will punish them conueniently for the crimes which they haue committed against their Countrey and vs.

And when he had vsed this Speech, the Souldiers that were in Armes and round about, made a great noise with their Swords in the Proches, and presently the Authors of the mutiny were brought in naked and bound. Finally, the multitude grew into a great amazement for the horror of the Executions which were done in their sight:* 1.17 so as when as some were whipt, and others executed, they moued not an eye, nor any man spake a word, remaining all amazed and terrified by these accidents. The Authors of these mischiefes being whipt and slaine, and drawne through the midst of them: the rest were assured in common by the Commander and Princes, that no man hereafter should be punished by any man for the remembrance of this fact. Wherefore they came all to the Milleniers, and sweare absolutely to obey the Commandments of the Princes, and not to consent to any thing against the City of Rome.

When as Scipio had corrected the Mischiefe newly growne,* 1.18 hee settles his Army in its former estate. Then suddainly drawing it toge∣ther within Carthage, he made his complaints of the rashnesse and wic∣kednesse of Andobale towards them: and after he had made a long speech of his disloyalty, he incensed the hearts of many against the sayd Potentate. Finally, he put them in minde of their encounters against the Spaniards and Carthaginians, whilest they were vnder the Cartha∣ginian Commanders: Of whom (as they had beene alwayes victo∣rious) there was no cause he sayd, to be in doubt or feare, but that comming againe to fight with the Spaniards vnder Andobale, they would be defeated. Wherefore he sayd he would make no more vse of the Spaniards to fight, and that hee would vndergoe the danger with the Romans alone: to the end it may be manifest to all the world, that wee haue not chased the Carthaginians out of Spaine with the helpe of Spa∣niards: but by a Roman vertue, and that by our owne dexterity wee haue vanquished them with the Celtiberians.

This Speech being ended, hee perswaded them to liue in Concord, and that they would vndertake this present danger, if euer they vnder∣tooke

any with great assurance. In regard of the meanes of the victo∣ry, he assures them that with the helpe of the Gods he will take order. The Commons conceiued so great a courage and confidence, as all of them carryed a countenance like vnto those which behold their E∣nemies, and prepare to fight. His words being ended, hee sent backe the assembly. The next day hee raiseth his Campe and marcheth: and being come on the tenth day to a Riuer, he passeth it foure dayes after:* 1.19 then he plants himselfe before the Enemies, hauing recouered a certaine Plaine betwixt his Campe and theirs. The day following he sent forth towards the Enemy vpon the Plaine, some Cattell which fol∣lowed the Army: and commands Caius to keepe certaine Horse-men in a readinesse, and to the Chiefe of the Milleniers, to prepare Ar∣chers and Slingers.

When the Spaniards had fallen suddainly vpon the Cattell, he sent certaine Souldiers that were Archers. The Combat beginning, and the Souldiers running vnto it on either side in good numbers, there grew a great Skirmish of Foot-men neare vnto the Plaine. When a fit occasion was offred to assaile the Enemy, and that Caius had his Horse-men ready as he had commanded him, he chargeth the Foot-men, and repulseth them from the Plaine, to the places neare vnto the Mountaines, to the end they might be scattred, and slaine in great num∣bers. When this happened, the Barbarians were moued, fearing that being vanquished in skirmish before they came to the Battaile,* 1.20 they should seeme to haue fainted, wherefore at the Sun-rising they drew their Army in good order to Field, preparing for the Battaile. Pub∣lius Scipio was ready to giue it: But when hee saw the Spaniards de∣scend without reason into the Plaine, and not onely to put their Hors-men in order, but also their Foot, he stayed, to the end that a greater number might assemble in this order of Battaile, hauing confidence in his Cauallery, and much more in his Foot-men, for that they should come to an equall Combat, and fight hand to hand: and that the Armes and men which he had, were more excellent then the Spaniards. But for that it seemes necessity prest him, he directed his Army against those which were in Battaile against the Mountaine:* 1.21 drawing foure Cohorts out of the Campe towards those that were descended into the Plaine.

Finally, Caius Lelyus led his Horse-men against the Enemy, by the Hils which come from the Campe vnto the Plaine, and chargeth the Spaniards Horse in the Reare, and in fighting stayes them, to the end they should not succour their Foot. The Enemies Foot being destitute of the helpe of their Cauallery, in whom hauing put their trust, they had descended into the Plaine, were forced and annoyed in the Com∣bate; the which likewise happened to the Horse-men. For when as (inclosed in the streight) they could not fight at ease, their defeate was greater then that of the Enemy: for that their Foot-men were on the side, and their Enemies in Front, and their Horse-men were char∣ged in the Reare. The Combat being after this manner, they which descended were in a manner all defeated: They which were ioyning

vnto the Mountaine fled. They were the most valiant and the third part of the Army: with whom Andobale escaped, recouering a certaine Fort. Scipio hauing ended the Warres of Spaine, drew to Tarracona, to carry a great triumph of ioy,* 1.22 and a glorious Victory to his Coun∣trey. Desiring them to be present at the Creation of Consuls, hee sayles to Rome being accompanied by Caius, deliuering the Army to Iunius and Marcus, hauing giuen order for all the affaires of Spaine.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The exellency of Hannibal.
• * 1.2

  Diuers Nations vnder the lea∣ding of Hanni∣bal.
• * 1.3

  Asdrubal camps neere to E∣linge.
• * 1.4

  Publius Scipio drawes his Ar∣my together.
• * 1.5

  Asdrubal char∣geth the Ro∣mans.
• * 1.6

  A suddaine charge of the Romans against the Carthagini∣ans.
• * 1.7

  The double po∣licy of Scipio.
• * 1.8

  Scipio puts his men in battaile
• * 1.9

  Asdrubal puts his men in Bat∣taile.
• * 1.10

  A disorder by the Elephants.
• * 1.11

  A defect in the Text.
• * 1.12

  A good Com∣parison.
• * 1.13

  The wisedome of Scipio.
• * 1.14

  Publius Scipio assembles his Army.
• * 1.15

  Three causes of the peoples mutiny against Princes.
• * 1.16

  The inconstan∣cy of the peo∣ple.
• * 1.17

  A punishment of the Mutines.
• * 1.18

  Scipio's Speech to his Army.
• * 1.19

  Scipio layes a baite for the Enemy.
• * 1.20

  The Spaniards put themselues in Battaile.
• * 1.21

  The order of Scipio's Bat∣taile▪
• * 1.22

  A defeate of the Spaniards.