The philosophie, commonlie called, the morals vvritten by the learned philosopher Plutarch of Chæronea. Translated out of Greeke into English, and conferred with the Latine translations and the French, by Philemon Holland of Coventrie, Doctor in Physicke. VVhereunto are annexed the summaries necessary to be read before every treatise

AGAINST COLOTES, THE EPICUREAN. [ 10]

The Summarie.

WE have in many places before, but principally in two severall Treatises of the former tome, perceived how Plutarch is quite contrary unto the Epicureans, and namely, in one of those Treatises he dealeth with a certaine booke (which he now expresly refu∣teth) where Colotes endevoured to proove, that a man can not possibly live well, ac∣cording to the opinions of other Philosophers, Plutarch sheweth on the contrarie side, that impossible it is to leade a joifull life after the doctrine of Epicurus, and that it is accompanied with overweening, impudency and slanderous calumniation. And not contenting himselfe thus to have [ 20] confuted them of purpose once or twice, he setteth upon them in this discourse, and particularly he co∣peth with Colotes, whose slouth, filthinesse and impiette he heere describeth. The summe of all which declamation is this, That these Epicureans are not any way worthy the name of Philosophers: who con∣trariwise tread and trample under foot all the parts of true Philosophie, discovering in their writings aswell as thorowout all their lives, meere beastly brutalitie. But all that is delivered in this Treatise may be reduced well to two principall points: The one conteineth a defence or excuse of the doctrine taught by Democritus, Empedocles, Parmenides, Socrates, and other ancient Philosophers, stan∣dered by Colotes, who extolled farre above them, the traditions and precepts of his master. The other discovereth divers absurdities and strange opinions of the Epicureans, even by their owne testimonies: whom Plutarch refelleth soundly; handling in this disputation many articles of Philosophie, Naturall, [ 30] Morall and Supernaturall: and particularly of the Senses, of Nature, of the Atomes, of the Universall world, of the Knowledge of man, of the Opinion of the Academicks, of the Apprehensions, faculties, pas∣sions and affections of the soule: of the certeintie of things sensible, of the falsitie and trueth of imagina∣tions, of the use of Lawes, of the profit of Philosophie, of the sovereigne good, of religion, and of other such matters, the principles whereof the Epicureans abolished, bringing in paradoxes woonderfull strange, for to shuffle things confusedly, and make all uncerteine. All which is marked particularly in the traine and course of the authours owne words, and therefore needlesse it is to specifie thereof any more, because I would avoid tantologies & unnecessary repetitions. True it is, that in certeine refutati∣ons Plutarch is not so firme as were to be desired: but that may be imputed to his ignorance of the true God. As for the rest, it may suffice & serve, to know the misery & wretchednes of the Epicureans: and [ 40] that other Philosophers had many good parts, and delivered many beautifull speeches, whereof all vertuous persons may reape and gather great fruit in applying and referring the same to their right use. And for to close up all, he maketh a comparison betweene true Philosophers and the Epicureans, proving in very many places, that Co∣lotes and his fellowes like himselfe, are people not onely unpro∣fitable, but also most pernicious, and so by consequence unworthy to live in the world. [ 50]

AGAINST COLOTES THE Epicurean.

COlotes, whom Epicurus was wont (ô Saturninus) to call by way of slattering diminution, Colatar as and Colatarius, composed and put forth a little booke, which he entituled, That there could be no life at all according to the opinions of other Philosophers: and dedi∣cated the said booke unto king Ptolemaeus. Now what came into [ 10] my minde to speake against this Colotes, I suppose you would take pleasure to reade the same in writing; being as you are, a man who loveth elegancie and all honest things, especially such as concerne the knowledge of antiquity; & besides, esteemeth it the most prince like exercise and roiall study, to beare in minde and have alwaies in hand, as much as possibly may be the discourses of auncient Sages. Whereas therefore of late this booke was in reading, one of our familiar friends, one whom you know well enough, Ari∣stodemus by name, an Aegian borne, a man exceeding passionate, and of all the Acade∣micks a most sranticke sectary of Plato, although hee carie not the ferula like unto the madde supposts of Plato, I wot not how contrary to his usuall maner, was very patient and silent [ 20] all the while, giving care most civilly even to the very end. But so soone as the lecture was done: Goe to now my masters (quoth he) whom were we best to cause for to arise and fight with this fellow in the quarrell and defence of Philosophers? For I am not of Nestors minde, neither doe I greatly praise him, for that when there was to be chosen the most valiant warrior of those nine hardy knights who were presented, to enter into combat with Hector hand to hand, committed the election unto fortune, and put all to the lot: But you see also (quoth I) that even he referred himselfe to be ordered by the lot, to the end that the choise might passe accor∣ding to the dispose and ordinance of the wisest man:

The lot out of the helmet then did fall, Of Ajax, whom themselves wisht most of all. [ 30]

And yet if you command me to make election,

How can I ever put out of mind, Divine Ulysses, a prince so kind?

Consider therefore and be well advised how you may be able to refell this man. Then Aristode∣demus: But you know full well (quoth he) what Plato sometime did, who being offended with his boy that waited upon him, would not himselfe swindge him, but caused Speusippus to doe so much for him, saying withall, That he was in a fit of choler. And even so, I say as much to you, Take the man to you I pray, and entreat him at your pleasure; for my selfe am very angry with him. Now when all the rest of the company were instant with me, and praied me to take this charge in hand: Well I see (quoth I) that I must speake, seeing you will needs have it so: but [ 40] I am affraid lest I may seeme my selfe to be more earnestly bent against this booke than it de∣serveth, in the defence and maintenance of Socrates, against the incivility, rudenesse, scurrility, and insolence of this man, who presenteth (as one would say) unto him hay, as if he were a beast, and demaundeth how he may put meat into his mouth, and not into his care: whereas haply the best way were to laugh onely at him for such railing, especially considering the mildnesse and gentle grace of Socrates in such cases. Howbeit in regard of the whole host beside of other Greeke Philosophers, namely, Democritus, Plato, Empedocles, Parmenides, and Melissus, who by him are foully reviled, it were not onely a shame to be tongue tied and keepe silence, but also meere sacriledge and impiety, to remit any jot, or forbeare to speake freely to the utmost in their behalfe, being such as have advanced philosophy to that honour and reputation which it [ 50] hath. And verily our parents together with the gods have given us our life: but to live well, we suppose and that truely, that it commeth from the philosophers, by the meanes of that doctrine which we have received from them, as cooperative with law and justice, and the very bridle that doth chastice and restraine our lusts. Now to live well, is to live sociably, friendly, tempe∣rately, and justly: of which good qualities and conditions, they leave us not so much as one, who cry out with open mouth, that the soveraigne good of man lieth in his belly, and that all the vertues in the world if they were put together, they would prize no better woorth than one

crackt brasen piece of coine, without pleasure, and in case all maner of delights were quite re∣mooved from them. Also the annex heere to their discourses, as touching the soule & the gods, wherein they hold that the soule perisheth, when it is once separate from the body: and that the gods meddle not with our affaires. Moreover the Epicureans reproch other Philosophers, for that by their wisdome and sapience, they undoe mans life: and they againe object unto them, that they teach men to live loosely, basely, and beastly. And verily such matters as these be min∣gled in all the writings of Epicurus, and spred throughout his whole philosophy. But this Colotes heere having made an extract of certaine words or voices void of matter and substance, and drawen some pieces and broken fragments without reasons and arguments for to proove and confirme his doctrines, or to give light for their understanding and credit, hath made his booke [ 10] in manner of a shop full of all sort of wares; or of a table or stall representing strange shewes and monsters: which you (I say) know best of all others, for that you have continually in your hands and doe reade the works of ancient writers. So he seemeth unto me that like to the Lydi∣an, he openeth not one gate and no more upon him, but enwrappeth Epicurus in very many doubts & difficulties, and those of all other, the greatest: for he beginnes with Democritus, who no doubt received at his hands a goodly salary and reward for his apprentissage, being a thing certeinly knowen, that for a long time Epicurus called himselfe a Democritian, like as others also doe say, and namely Leonteus, one of the scholars and disciples of Epicurus, in the highest forme: who in a letter which he wrote unto Lycophron, saith, that Epicurus honored Democri∣tus, for that he attained before him to the true and sound understanding of the truth: and that in [ 20] generall the whole treatise of naturall things, was called Democritian, because hee light first upon the principles, and met with the primitive fountaines and foundations of nature. And Metrodorus said directly and openly of Philosophy, That if Democritus had not led the way, Epicurus had never arrived to wisdome and learning. Now if it be true as this Colotes saith, That to live according to Democritus and other philosophers opinions, is no life 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all, Epicurus was a very foole for following Democritus as he did, leading him to that doctrine whereby a man could not live. And first he reprooveh him, for that in saying that every thing is no more such than such, he made a confusion of mans life. But so farre off was Democritus from holding the said opinion, namely, that nothing is rather such than such: that he oppugned Pro∣tagoras the Sophister for saying so, against whom he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 many elegant commentaries, full of [ 30] good arguments concluding the contrary: which our Colotes never seeing, nor so much as dreaming of, was much deceived in the right understanding of the mans words, and namely in one place where he disertly saith and determineth that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is no more than 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in which place he nameth a body 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and voidnesse 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: meaning thereby and giving us to understand, that voidnesse had a proper nature and subsistence of the owne, as wel as a body. But he who is of opinion, that nothing is more such than such, followeth one of the decrees & sentences of Epi∣turus, wherein he delivered, that all apprehensions and imaginations that come by sense, are true. For if when two men give out and say, the one, that the wine is hard: the other, that it is sweetand pleasant, neither of them is deceived in his sense but speaketh true, why should the wine be rather harsh than sweet. And yet it is seene oftentimes that one and the same bath, some [ 40] find to be hot, & others cold: for that, as these command cold water, so those bid hot water to be powered in. It is said that a certaine dame or good wife of Lacedaemon went upon a time to visit Berronice the wife of king Deiotarus, but when they approached 〈◊〉〈◊〉 together, they turned away immediatly one from the other: the one, as it should seeme abhorring the smell of ranke butter, and the other offended with the perfume of a sweet ointment or pomander. If then the sense of one be not more true than the sense of another, probable it is and very like that both water is not more cold than hot, and that the ointment and the butter no more senting pleasantly than stink∣ing strongly. For if a man say, that it seemeth thus to one, and so to another, he affirmeth be∣fore he is aware, that they be both the one and the other. And as for these symmetries, propor∣tions and accords of the pores or passages in the organs of the senses, whereof they talke so [ 50] much: as also the divers mixtures of seeds, which they say being disseminate and dispersed throughout all savors, odors and colours, do move the sense; doe they not directly drive them to this point, that things are no more one than another? For such as thinke that the sense is de∣ceived, for that they see contrary events and passions doe proceed from the same objects, they pacifie againe and salve this objection, by teaching that whereas all things be mingled and con∣founded together, yet neverthelesse this is more sortable and fitting to one and that to another: whereby there is not the contractation and apprehension of one and the same quality, neither

doth the object move all indifferently at once and alike in all parts, but every one meeting with those qualities onely, whereunto they have all sense proportionate, they doe not well to stand so stifly upon this, that a thing is coloured or not coloured, white or not white, thinking to fortifie and establish their owne senses by destroying those of others. Whereas it behoveth neither to oppugne the senses, for they all touch and reach one quality or other (each one drawing as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a lively and large fountaine, from this confused mixture, that which is fit and sutable) nor ac∣cuse and blame the whole, in touching onely the parts; ne yet thinke that all ought to suffer the same thing, considering that one suffereth by one qualitie and power of it, and another by ano∣ther. So that now we are to consider and search, what men they be, who bring in this opinion, as touching things that be not such rather than others, rather than these who hold, that whatso∣ever [ 10] is sensible is a confused mixture of all qualities together, like unto a wind-instrument com∣posed for all kinds of melodious musicke? But they confesse that all their rules are lost, and their judgement quite gone, if they admit any object in some sort pure and syncere, and allow not ech one thing to be many.

See moreover in this place, what discourse and disputation Polyaenus held with Epicurus in his banquet as touching the heat of wine. For when he demanded in this maner, How now Epi∣curus, say you not that wine doth heat? one made answere, That he affirmed not universally, that wine did cause heat: and a little after; For it seemeth that wine is not universally a heater, but rather, that such a quantitie of wine may be said to enchafe and set such an one in heat. And then adjoining the cause, he alledgeth the concurrences, compressions and dispersions of the [ 20] Atomes; the commixtions and conjunctions of others, when the wine commeth to be ming∣led with the body: and then he addeth this conclusion; And therefore generally we are not to say that wine doth heat; but so much wine may well heat such a nature, and so disposed: whereas another nature it cooleth in such and such a quantity. For in such a masse, there be those natures and complexions, of which, cold if need were, may be composed, and being joined with others as occasion serveth, may cause a vertue refrigerative. And hereupō it is, that some are deceived, saying that wine uniuersally is hot, and others againe, affirming it to be universally colde. He then who saith that the multitude and most part of men do erre, in holding that to be simplie hot, which doth heat, and that likewise to be cold, which doth coole, is deceived himselfe, if he thinketh not, that it followeth by good consequence upon that which hee hath said, that one [ 30] thing is more such than such. And afterwards he inferreth this speech, that many times wine entring into the body, bringeth with it neither a calefactive nor a refrigerative vertue; but that when the masse of the body is moved and stirred, so as there is a transposition made of the parts, then the Atomes which are effective of heat, concurre together one while into one place, and through their multitude, set the body into an heat and inflamation; but another while by dis∣persing and severing themselves asunder, inferre coldnesse.

Moreover he dissembleth not but that he is proceeded thus farre, as to say, that whereas wee take things to be, and doe call them bitter, sweet, purgative, soporiferous, and lightsome, none of them all have any entier quality or perfect property to produce such effects, nor to be active more than passive, all while they be in the body, but that they be susceptible of sundry tempera∣tures [ 40] and differences. For even Epicurus himselfe, in his second booke against Theophrastus, in saying that colours are not naturall unto bodies, but are engendred according to certeine si∣tuations and positions, respective to the eie-sight of man, saith by this reason, that a bodie is no more destitute of colour, than coloured. And a little before, word for word he writeth thus: But over and beside all this, I know not how a man may say, that these bodies which be in the darke, have any colour at all; and yet oftentimes when the aire a like darke is spred round about, some there be who can distinguish the diversity of colours, others perceive nothing at all, by reason of their feeble & dim-sight. Againe when we goe into a darke house, we see not at our first en∣trance, any colours, but after we have beene there a pretie while, we perceive them well enough: And therefore we are to say, that ech body is not rather coloured than not coloured. If then co∣lour [ 50] be a relative, and hath being in regard of some other things, white also is a relative, and blew likewise: if these, then sweet and bitter semblably: so that a man may truely affirme of every quality, that it is not more such, than not such. For to those who are so disposed, a thing shall be such, and to them that are not so affected, not such. So that Colotes doeth all to dash and be∣ray both himselfe and his master also, with the same mire and dirt, wherein he saith those doe sticke who hold that things are not more such than such. What then? doth this egregious clerke heerein onely shew himselfe, according to the old proverbe:

Aleech professing others for to cure, Whiles he himselfe is full of sores impure?

No verily: but much more yet in his second reprehension, he chaseth ere he is aware Epicurus together with Democritus out of this life: for he giveth out that Democritus said, The atomes are unto the senses by a certeine law and ordinance colour, by the said law sweet, and by the same law bitter: Also that he who useth this reason, and holdeth this opinion, knoweth not himselfe, if he be a man? nor whether he be dead or alive? To contradict these speeches I wot not well how: but thus much I say, that this is as much inseparable from the sentences and doc∣trine of Epicurus, as figure and weight by their saying from the Atomes: for what saith Demo∣critus? That there be substances in number infinite, which are called Atomes, because they [ 10] cannot be divided: howbeit different, without qualitie and impassible, which doe moove and are caried, dispersed to and fro in the infinit voidnesse, which when they approch one another, or concur and meet together, or else be enterlaced & enfolded one about another, then appee∣reth of these thus heaped and hudled together, one thing water, another fire, another a plant, and another a man: That all these be Atomes still, termed by him 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , and nothing else. For there can be no generation of that which is not; no more than that which once was can become nothing, by reason that these Atomes are so firme and solid, that they can neither change nor alter, not suffer. And therefore neither can there be colour made of those things which have no colour, nor nature or soule of such as be without quality and are impassible. Whereupon Democritus is to be blamed in that he confesseth not those things that be accident unto princi∣ples, [ 20] but supposeth those to be principles, whereto these happen: For he should not have put downe principles immutable: or at leastwise, when he had supposed them to be such, not to see withall, that therewith the generation and breeding of all qualities perisheth. And to denie an absurdity when one seeth it, is impudence in the highest degree. As for Epicurus, he saith verily, that he supposeth the same principles that Democritus doth, but he saith not, that colour sweet, white, and other qualities are by law and ordinance. Now if he confesse not that he saith, which neverthelesse he said, it is no other but an old custome of his, & that which he is woont to doe. For much like it is to this, that he will seeme to take away divine providence, and yet hee saith, that he alloweth piety and religious devotion toward God: And albeit he giveth out that for pleasure, he maketh choise of amity and friendship, yet for his friends sake he willingly en∣dureth [ 30] most grievous paines: also for all he supposeth the universall world to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , yet hee taketh not away, above and beneath. But this is not like unto the maner of drinking one unto another at a table, where a man may take the cup in hand and drinke what he will, and so give backe the rest. But in this disputation especially, it behooved to remember well the notable 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or saying of the wise man. Of what things the beginnings are not necessarie, the ends and consequences fall out to be necessary. Necessary it was not therefore to suppose, or (to speake more truely) to wring from Democritus thus much, That Atomes be the principles of the whole and universall world: or when he had supposed and set downe this doctrine, and withall made a glorious shew of the first probabilities and faire apparences thereof, he should likewise have swallowed that which was troublesome therein, or shewed how those bodies which [ 40] have no quality, could give unto others all sorts of qualities, onely by meeting and joining to∣gether. As for example, to speake of that which is next to hand, this that we call fire, whence came it, and how groweth it to these indivisible bodies called Atomi? if they neither had heat when they came, nor became hot after they met together? For the former presupposeth that they had some quality, and the latter, that they were fit to receive the same, and to suffer: But neither of them twaine ye say, fitteth well with the Atomes, in that they be incorruptible. How then? did not Plato, Aristotle and Xenocrates produce golde, of that which was not golde; and stone of that which is not stone; yea, and many other things out of the foure simple bodies called elements? Yes Iwis: but together with the said bodies there concurre immediatly at the first, the principles also, to the generation of every thing, bringing with them great contributi∣ons, [ 50] to wit, the first qualities which be in them: afterwards, when there come to meet in one and joine together, dry with moist, cold with heat, solid and firme with that which is gentle and soft, that is to say, active bodies with such as be apt to suffer, and to receive all change and alteration, then ensueth generation, which is the passage from one temperature to another: whereas this Atome or indivisible bodie being of it selfe naked and alone, is destitute of all qualitie and gene∣rative facultie; but when it hapneth to run upon others, it can make a sound and noise onely, by reason of the hardnesse and solidity thereof, but no other accident els; for strike they doe, and

are stricken againe continually: and so farre be they off from composing and making by this meanes a living creature, a soule, or a nature, that they are not able so much as to raise a round masse or heape of themselves together: for that as they jurre and beat one upon another, so they rebound and flie backe againe asunder. But Colotes verily, as if hee dealt with some king that was ignorant and unlettered, falleth againe upon Empedocles, breathing out these verses:

One thing will I say more to thee: there is no true nature Of mortall wights: of grisly death, no seed nor geniture. A mixture onely first there is of things, then after all, [ 10] The same grow to disunion: and this men Nature call.

For mine owne part, I doe not see how this is repugnant and contrary unto life, among them especially who are of opinion that there is no generation of that which is not at all, nor corrup∣tion of that which is and hath being: but the meeting and union of such things as be, is called Generation; the dissolution likewise and disunion of the same, is termed Death and corrupti∣on. For, that he taketh Nature for Generation, and that he meaneth so, himselfe hath declared, when he set Nature opposite unto Death. And if those live not nor can live, who put generati∣on in union, and death in disunion; what thing els doe these Epicureans? And yet Empedocles, [ 20] sodering as it were and conjoining the elements by heats, softnesse and humidities, giveth them in some sort a mixtion and composition unitive: but they who drive together the Atomes which they say to be immutable, sturdy and impassible, compose nothing that proceedeth from them, but rather make many and those continuall percussions of them. For their interlacing which impeacheth dissolution, doth stil augment their collision: in such sort, as this is no mixti∣on nor conglutination, but a certeine troublesome striving and combat, which according to them is called Generation. And these Atomes or indivisible bodies which meet together but a moment, if one while they recule and start backe for the resistance of the shocke which they have given, and another while returne againe and recharge after the blow past, they are more than twice so long apart one from another without touching or approching, so as nothing can [ 30] be made of them, not so much as the very body without a soule. But sense, soule, understanding and prudence, there is no man able to thinke and imagine, would he never so faine, how they can be formed of voidnesse and of these Atomes: which neither of themselves apart have any qualitie, nor yet passion or alteration whatsoever, when they are met together, considering that this meeting is no incorporation nor such a coition as might make a mutuall mixture and con∣glutination, but rather jurrs and reciprocall concussions: in such maner, as according to the do∣ctrine of these folke, supposing as they doe, such void, impassible, invisible, undivine and un∣helpful principles, yea & such as will not receive any mixture or incorporation whatsoever, To live and to be a creature animall, falleth to the ground and comes to nothing. How commeth it then, that they admit or allow Nature, Soule and Living creature? Forsooth, even as they do [ 40] an oth, a vow, praier, sacrifice and adoration of the gods, to wit, in word and mouth onely; pro∣nouncing and naming in semblance and outward appearance, that which by their principles and doctrines they quite abolish and anull. And even so, that which is borne, they terme Na∣ture, and that which is engendred, Generation: like as they who ordinarily call the frame of wood and timber, Wood it selfe, and those voices or instruments that accord together, Sym∣phonie. And what should he meane to object such speech against Empedocles? Why trouble we and weary our selves (quoth he) in being so busie about our owne selves, in desiring certeine things as we doe, and avoiding others? for neither are we our selves, neither live we by using o∣thers. But be of good cheere (may one haply say) my loving and sweet Colotarion: have no feare man: no man hindreth you, but that you may regard your selfe, teaching that the nature [ 50] of Colotes, is Colotes himselfe and nothing els: neither that you need or desire to use certeine things. As for these things among you, they be pleasures: shewing withall, that it is not the na∣ture of tarts, cakes and marchpanes, nor of odors, nor of love sports that you desire, but tarts and marchpanes themselves, sweet perfumes and women they be that you would have. For the Grammarian who saith, the force and strength of Hercules is Hercules, denieth not thereby that Hercules is: nor those who say that symphonies, accords or opinations are bare prolations or pronunciations, affirme not therewith all, that there be no sounds, nor voices, nor opinions:

forasmuch as there be some, who abolishing the soule and prudence, seeme not to take away either to live or to be prudent. And when Epicurus saith, The nature of things that have being, are the bodies and the void place of them, doe we take his words, as if he meant that nature were somwhat els than the things that be? or that things being, do shew their nature and nothing els? even as for examples sake, the nature of voidnesse, he is wont to call voidnesse it selfe: yea, and I assure you, the universall world it selfe, the nature of all. Now if a man should demaund of him: How now Epicurus, say you indeed that this is voidnesse, & that is the nature of voidnesse? Yes verily, will he answere againe, but this communication of names the one for another, is taken up and in use. And in trueth, that the law and custome warranteth this maner of speech, I also avouch. [ 10]

And what other thing I pray you hath Empedocles done than taught that nature is nought else but that which is bred and engendred, nor death any thing but that which dieth? But like as Poets otherwhiles by a trope or figurative speech representing as it were the image of things say thus:

Debate, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , uprore and stomacke fell, With deadly fude and malice there did dwell.

Even so the common sort of men doe use the termes of generation and corruption in things that are contracted together and dissolved. And so farre was he from stirring or remooving those things that be, or opposing himselfe against things of evident appearance, that he would not so much as cast one word out of the accustomed use: but so far forth as any figurative frawd [ 20] might hurt or endammage things, he rejected and tooke the same away, rendring againe the usuall and ordinary signification to words, as in these verses:

And when the light is mixed thus with aire in heavenly sky, Some man is made or wilde beasts kinde, or birds aloft that flie: Or else the shrubs: and this rightly is cleap'd their geneture, But death, when as dissolved is the foresaid fast joincture. [ 30]

And yet I say my selfe, that Colotes having alledged thus much, knew not that Empedocles did not abolish men, beasts shrubs or birds in as much as he saith that all these are composed and fi∣nished of the elements mixed together: But teaching and shewing them how they were decei∣ved, who finde fault with naming this composition a certaine nature or life: and the dissoluti∣on unhappy fortune and death to be avoided, he annulled not the ordinary and usuall use of words in that behalfe. For mine owne part I thinke verily that Empedocles doth not alter in these places the common maner of pronouncing and using the said words: but as before it was rela∣ted, did really as of a different minde as touching the generation of things that had no being, which some call nature. Which he especially declareth in these verses.

Fooles as they be of small conceit, for farre they cannot see, [ 40] Who hope that things which never were, may once engendred be, Or feare that those which are shall die, and perish utterly.

For these verses are thundred out and do sound aloud in their hearing who have any eares at all, that he doth not abolish generation absolutely, but that alone which is of nothing: nor yet cor∣ruption simply, but that which is a totall destruction, that is to say, a reduction to nothing. For unto a man who were not willing, after such a savage, rude and brutish maner but more gently to cavil, the verses following after might give a collourable occasion to charge Empedocles with [ 50] the contrary, when he saith thus:

No man of sense and judgement sound, would once conceive in minde That whiles we living here on earth, both good and bad doe finde, So long onely we being have: (yet this, men life doe call)

And birth before, or after death, we nothing are at all.

Which words verily are not uttered by a man, who denieth them their being who are borne and live, but rather by him who thinketh that they who are not yet borne, as also those that be alredy dead have their being. And even so Colotes doth not altogether reproove him for this: but he saith that according to his opinion we shall never be sicke nor wounded. And how is it possible that he who saith that men before life and after life, are accompanied with good and bad indiffe∣rently, should not leave for them that be alive the power to suffer? What be those then, good Colotes, who are accompanied with this immunity, that they can neither be hurt nor diseased? E∣ven your selfe and such as you are, who be altogether made of an Atome and voidnesse, for by [ 10] your owne saying, neither the one nor the other hath any sense. But no force. For I here of no harme yet. Mary here is the griefe, that by this reason you have nothing in you to cause delight and pleasure, seeing that an Atome is not capaple of such things as moove pleasure: and void∣nesse is unapt to be affected by them. But for as much as Colotes for his part would needs immediatly after Democritus seeme to interre and bury Permenides for ever, and my selfe in putting off a little and passing over the defence of Parmenides, have betweene both taken in hand the maintenance of that which was delivered by Empedocles, because me thought they did more properly adhere and hang to those first imputations, let us now come againe to Parmenides. And whereas Colotes chargeth him with setting abroad certaine shamefull sophistries yet hath the man thereby made friendship nothing lesse honourable nor, voluptuousnesse and sensuallity [ 20] more audacious and unbrideled. He hath not bereft honesty of that attractive property to draw unto it selfe, nor of the gift of being venerable of it selfe: neither hath he troubled & confounded the opinions as touching the gods. And in saying that All is One, I see not how he hath hin∣dered our life. For when Epicurus himselfe saith, that [All] is infinite, ingenerable and incor∣ruptible, that it cannot be augmented nor diminished, he speaketh and disputeth of All, as of some one thing. And in the beginning of his treatise concerning this matter, having delivered that the nature of All things being, consisteth in small indivisible bodies which he termeth Ato∣mes, and in voidnesse: hee made a division as it were of one thing into two parts: whereof the one in trueth is not subsistent, but termed by you impalpable void and bodilesse: whereby it commeth to passe, that even with you, All commeth to be but One: unlesse you will use vaine [ 30] words and void of sense, speaking of voidnesse, and fighting in vaine, as with a shadow, against those auncient Philosophers.

But these Atomes you will say, are according to the opinion of Epicurus in number infinite, and every thing that appereth unto us, ariseth from them. Beholde now what principles you put downe for generation, to wit, infinity and voidnesse: whereof the one is without action, im∣passible and bodilesse: the other, namely, infinity, disorderly, void of reason, incomprehensible, dissolving and confounding it selfe, for that by reason of multitude it cannot be circumscribed nor contained within limits. But Permenides hath not abolished either fire or water, or any rocke, no nor the cites (as Colotes saith) inhabited as well in Europe as in Asia, considering that he hath both * 1.1 instituted an orderly dispose & digestion: and also tempering the elements to∣gether, [ 40] to wit, light and darke, of them and by them absolutely finisheth all things visible in the world, for written he hath at large of Earth, of Heaven, of Sunne, Moone and starres: as also, spoken much of mans generation: and being as he was a very ancient Philosopher, he hath left nothing in Physiologie unsaid, and whereof he hath not delivered both by word and writing his owne doctrine not borrowed else where, passing over the repugnancie of other received principall opinions. Moreover he of all others first, and even before Socrates himselfe observed and understood, that in nature there is one part subject to opinion, and another subject to intel∣ligence. And as for that which is opinable, inconstant it is and uncertaine, wandring also and carried away with sundry passions and mutations, apt to diminish and paire: to increase also and growe, yea and to be diversly affected, and not ever after one sort disposed to the same in [ 50] sense alike. As for the intelligible part, it is of another kinde:

For sound it is, whole and not variable, Constant and sure, and ingenerable.

as he himselfe saith, alwaies like to it selfe & perdurable in the owne nature & essence. But Colotes like a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , cavilling at him, & catching at his words, without regard of the matter, not argu∣ing against his reasons indeed, but in words onely, affirmeth flatly, that Parmenides overthrow∣eth all things in one word, by supposing that All is One. But he verily on the contrary side abo∣lisheth

neither the one nature nor the other, but rendreth to ech of them that which is meet, and apperteineth thereto. For the intelligible part he rangeth in the Idea of One, and of That which is, saying that it is and hath being, in regard of eternity and incorruption: that it is one: because it alwaies resembleth it selfe, and receiveth no diversity. As for that part which is Sensible, he placeth it in the ranke of that which is uncerteine, disorderly and ever mooving. Of which two, we may see the distinct judgement in the soule, by these verses:

The one reteins to truth which is syncere Perswasive, breeding science pure and cleere.

For it concerneth that which is intelligible, and evermore alike and in the same sort.

The other rests on mens opinions vaine, [ 10] Which breed no true beleefe but uncertaine.

For that it is conversant in such things as receive al maner of changes, passions, & mutabilities. And verily how possibly he should admit and leave unto us sense and opinion, and not withall allow that which is sensible and opinable, a man is not able to shew. But forasmuch as to that which is existent indeed, it appertaineth to remaine in being, and for that things sensible, one while are, and another while are not, but passe continually from one being to another, and alter their estate, insomuch as they deserve rather some other name than this, of being: This speech as touching All, that it should be one, is not to take away the plurality of things sensible, but to shew the difference betweene them and those that be intelligible, which Plato in his treatise of Ideae minding to declare more plainly, gave Colotes some advantage for to take holde of him. [ 20] And therefore me thinks it good reason to take before me all in one traine, that also which he hath spoken against him. But first let us consider the diligence, together with the deepe and profound knowledge of this Philosopher Plato, considering that Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theo∣phrastus, and all the Peripateticks have followed his doctrine. For in what blinde corner of the world unhabitable wrot he his booke? that you Colotes in heaping up together these crimi∣nations upon such personages, should never light upon their works, nor take in hand the books of Aristotle as touching the heaven and the soule: nor those compositions of Theophrastus against the Naturalists, nor that Zoroastres of Heraclitus, one booke of Hell and infernall spi∣rits, another of Doubts and questions Naturall: that also of Dicaearchus concerning the soule. In all which books they are contradictory and repugnant, in the maine and principall points of [ 30] Naturall philosophy unto Plato? And verily the prince of all other Peripateticks, Strato, accor∣deth not in many things with Aristotle, and mainteineth opinions cleane contrary unto those of Plato, as touching Motion, Understanding, the Soule, and Generation. And in conclusion, he holdeth that the very world is not animall: and whatsoever is naturall is consequent unto that which is casuall, and according to fortune. As for the Ideae for which Aristotle every where seemeth to course Plato, and mooveth all maner of doubts concerning them in his Ethicks or morall discourses, in his Physicks, in his Exotericall dialogues, he is thought of some to dis∣pute and discourse with a more contentions and opinative spirit than became a Philosopher, as if he propounded to himselfe for to convell and debase the Philosophy of Plato, so farre was hee from following him. What impudent and licentious rashnesse therefore is this, [ 40] that one having never knowen nor seene what these learned clerks had written, and what their opinions were, should coine and devise out of his owne fingers ends, and falsly charge upon them, those things which never came into their heads, and in perswading himselfe that he re∣prooveth and refuteth others, to bring in a proofe and evidence written with his owne hand, for to argue and convince himselfe of ignorance, or rash and audacious impudence, saying, that those who contradict Plato, agree with him, and they that repugne against him doe follow him? But Plato (quoth he) hath written: That horses are in vaine counted by us horses, and men likewise. And in what odde corner of Platoes works hath Colotes found this hidden? As for us wee reade in all his books, that horses be horses, and men be men, and that fire even by him is esteemed fire; for hee holdeth every one of these things to be sensible and opina∣ble, [ 50] and so he nameth them. But this our trim man Colotes, as though hee wanted never a jot of the highest pitch of sapience and knowledge, presumeth forsooth and taketh it to be all one and the same, to say, A man is not, and A man is that, which hath no being. But Plato thinketh that there is a woonderfull great difference betweene these termes, Not to be at all, and To be that which is not: for the former importeth a nullity and abolishment of all sub∣stance; and the other sheweth the difference of that which is participated and that which doth

participate: which distinction and diversity they who came after, have reduced onely unto a different raunge, of kinds, formes, and of certeine common and proper qualities or accidents, but higher than so they mounted not, falling downe upon some doubts and difficulties more reasonable: for the same reason and proportion there is betweene the thing participated and participating, as is betweene the cause and the matter, the originall and the image, the power and the passion. Wherein principally differeth that which is by it selfe, and ever the same, from that which is by another, and never keepeth one state: for that the one never shall be, nor ever was not existent: and for this cause, it is truely and altogether subsistent; whereas the other hath not so much as that being constant, which it hapneth to participate from another, but doth de∣generate and grow out of kinde, through imbecilitie; in that the matter doth glide and slide a∣bout [ 10] the forme, receiving many passions and mutations bending toward the image of substance, in such sort, as continually it mooveth and shaketh to and fro. Like as therefore he who saith, that Plato is not the image of Plato, taketh not away the sense and substance of an image, but sheweth the difference betweene that which is of it selfe, and the other which is in regard of it: even so they abolish not the nature, the use nor sense of men, who say, that every one of us by participating the Idea of a certeine common substance, is become the image of that which gi∣veth similitude and affinity unto our generation. For neither he who saith, that iron red hot is not fire, or the Moone, the Sunne, but (to use the very words of Parmenides)

Aflame that beares a borowed light, Wandring about the earth by night. [ 20]

doth take away the use of a burning gleed, or the nature of the moone: but if he should affirme, that it were no bodie nor illuminate, then he went against the senses, as one who admitted nei∣ther body nor living animall, nor generation nor sense. But he that by opinion imagineth these things to have no subsistence but by participation, and withall, how farre they are short and di∣stant from that which hath alwaies being, and which gave them the power to be, considereth not amisse the sensible, but is dim-sighted in the intelligible: neither doth he annihilate and o∣verthrow the passions which arise and appeare in us, but sheweth unto them that are docible and follow him, that there be other more firme and stable things than these, as touching essence, for that they neither are engendred nor perish, nor yet suffer ought: but teacheth more cleerely & purely, noting and touching the difference by the very termes and names, calling the one sort [ 30] existent, & the other breeding or ingendred. The same usually befalleth also to our late 〈◊〉〈◊〉 writers, who deprive many great and weighty things of this denomination of subsistence, as namely, Voidnesse, Time, Place, and generally, the whole kinde of those speeches wherein are comprised all things true. For these things being, they say are not; and yet they say some are; yea and use the same aswel in their life as their doctrine and philosophy, as having subsistence & being. But I would gladly demand of this accuser of ours himselfe, whether he and his fellowes in their affaires perceive not this difference, whereby some things be permanent and immuta∣ble in their substances, like as they affirme of their Atomes, that they be at all times and conti∣nually after one and the same sort, by reason of their impassibility and stiffe soliditie? whereas all things compounded and compact of them, be flexible, pliable, mutable, breeding and perish∣ing: [ 40] for that an infinite number of images doe passe and flow from them evermore, yea and an innumerable sort of other things, by all likelihood, from out of the ambuent aire do reflow and have recourse unto them, for to supply and fill up the heape still, which masse is become much altered, diversified and transvased as it were by this permutation, in that the Atomes which are in the bottome of the said masse can never cease nor give over stirring, but reciprocally beat one upon another, as they themselves affirme. So there is in things such a difference of sub∣stance as this: and yet Epicurus is more wise and learned than Plato, in that he tearmeth all things equally subsisting, Voidnesse impalpable, the Body solid and resisting, the Principles, things composed: and for that hee thinketh that the eternall doeth not so much as participate in the common substance with that which is ingendred; the immortall with that which doth perish; [ 50] the natures impassible, perdurable, immutable, which never can fall or be deprived from their being, with those which have their essence in suffering and changing, and never can continue in one and the same state. Now were it so, that Plato had most justly of all men in the world deser∣ved to be condemned for his error heerein, yet my good friend, there should no imputation be charged upon him by these our great masters heere, who speake purer and finer Greeke and more exquisitly than he, but onely for confounding some words and speaking improperly; nor

to be blamed for abolishing the matters themselves, or taking us out of this life, because he ter∣med them ingendred, and not existent, as these men do.

But seeing wee have passed over Socrates after Parmenides, wee must now take his defence in hand. Colotes then began directly at the first (as we say in the common proverbe) to remoove him from the sacred line or tribe: and having related how 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had brought an answere from the Oracle at Delphos, as touching Socrates, which we all know to be so, saith thus: As for this discourse and narration (quoth he) of Chaerephon, for that it is altogether odious, captious, sophisticall, and full of untrueth, we will overpasse. Then is Plato likewise (to say nothing of others) odious and absurd, who hath put the said answere downe in writing. Then are the Lace∣daemonians more odious and intolerable, who keepe that Oracle delivered, as touching Lycur∣gus, [ 10] among their most ancient writings and authenticall records. Semblably, the discourse and narration of Themistocles was a sophisticall and counterfeit device, whereby he perswaded the Athenians to abandon their citie, and so in a navall battell defaited the barbarous prince Xerxes. And even so all the noble lawgivers and founders of Greece are to be counted odious and into∣lerable, who established the most part of their temples, their sacrifices and solemne feasts, by the answere from the Oracle of Apollo. But if it be so, that the Oracle brought from Delphi as touching Socrates, a man ravished with a divine and heavenly zeale to vertue, whereby he was declared and pronounced wise, were odious, fained and sopsticall: by what name shall we truely and justly call your cries, your shouts, your hideous noises, your applauses and clapping of hands, your adorations and canonizations wherewith you exalt and celebrate him, who incited [ 20] and exhorted you to continuall pleasures one after another, who in one of his letters sent unto Anaxarchus hath written thus: As for me, I invite and call you to continuall pleasures, and not to these vaine and unprofitable vertues, such as have nothing but turbulent hopes of uncerteine fruits. And yet Metrodorus writing unto Timarchus, saith thus unto him, Come on (quoth he) let us do some goodly and honest thing for those who are faire and beautifull, so that we be not plunged in these semblable and reciprocall affections, but retiring anon out of this base and terrestriall life, let us advance our selves to these true, holy and divine ceremonies and myste∣ties of Epicurus. And even Colotes himselfe hearing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 one day 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Naturall things, fell downe at his feet immediatly, and tooke holde of his knees, as if hee had beene a god. And Epicurus likewise taking no small pride and glorie heerein, writeth thus unto him a∣gaine: [ 30] For as if you adored that which then was delivered by mee, there came upon you sud∣denly a desire and zeale proceeding from no cause in nature, to come toward mee, to pro∣strate your selfe upon the ground, to clip and claspe my knees, and to use those gestures unto me, which ordinarily they doe, who worship the gods and pray unto them: So that you have (quoth he) made mee also reciprocally to deifie and adore you. Certes I could finde in my heart to pardon them, who say they would not spare for any cost, but give they cared not what for a table or picture, wherein they might see lively represented to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 this story depainted; namely, how the one lieth prostrate at the others feet, and embraceth his knees: who mutu∣ally againe adoreth him, and maketh his devout praiers unto him. And yet this devotion and service of Colotes, how well soever it was by him ordered and precisely observed, rea∣ped [ 40] not the condigne fruit thereof: for he was not by him declared A wise man: onely this blessing he had from him againe, Goe thy waies and walke immortall, and repute us also sem∣blably immortall. These men knowing full well in their owne consciences that they use such foolish words, ridiculous jestures, and fond passions, yet forsooth they are so bold as to call o∣ther men odious. And Colotes verily having given us a taste of his goodly first fruits, & wise po∣sitions as touching Naturall senses, namely, That we do eate our viands and cates, not hay or forage, and that when the rivers be high, wee ferry over them in botes, but when they be low and passable, we wade easily on foot through the fourd, exclameth and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 out after∣wards: You use ô Socrates vaine speeches, you interteine those who come and speake unto you with one thing in word, and do practise others cleane contrary in deed. And say you so Colotes? [ 50] First I would gladly know wherein the words of Socrates were vaine & arrogant, considering that he was wont ordinarily to say, that he knew nothing at all, but was a learner continually, and went to search and finde out the trueth? But if haply you should light upon such speeches from Socrates his mouth, as those were which Epicurus wrote unto Idomeneus, send us then the first fruits, for the furniture of our sacred body, for us (I say) & our children: For thus it comes upon me to speake, what more insolent and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 words could you devise to speake? And yet, that Socrates never said otherwise than he did, he hath given us marvellous proofes in the battell of

Delium, and in that of Potidea: That which he did during the time of the thirty tyrants against Archelaus and against the people of Athens: his poverty; his death; his cariage and demea∣nour in all these times and occasions, be they not answerable every way to the sayings and doc∣trines of Socrates? This had beene a true proofe indeed, to have shewed that hee lived and did otherwise than he spake and taught, in case he had proposed the end of man to be a joifull and pleasant life, and then lived as he did. Thus much as touching the reprochfull termes that hee hath given Socrates. Moreover, he perceiveth not how himselfe is attaint even in those points which he reprooveth and objected as touching things * 1.2 evident and apparent. For one of the positions and decrees of Epicurus is this, That no person ought irrevocably to beleeve or be perswaded to a thing, but onely the wise man. Now seeing that Colotes became not one of the [ 10] Sages, for all that adoration & worship which he performed unto Eptcurus, let him demand first and formost these questions, How it is, that he falleth to cates, and not to hay, when he hath need of victuals? and why he casteth a robe about his owne body, and not upon a pillar? consi∣dering that he is not assuredly perswaded, that cates be cates, or that a robe is a robe: But if he doe so, namely, feed upon viands, and weare a robe: if he venture not to wade through rivers when they be risen and high; if he flie from serpents and woolves, being not in a sure be∣leefe that any thing is such as it seemeth, but doing every thing according as it appeereth unto him; the opinion as touching senses, would not hinder Socrates at all, but that he might like∣wise use that which seemeth not him. For bread seemed not bread unto Colotes, nor hay to be hay, because he had read those holy canons and sacred rules of Epicurus which fell from heaven [ 20] out of Jupiters lap: and Socrates upon a vaine arrogance of his owne, conceived an imaginati∣on of bread that it was hay, and of hay that it was bread. For these wise men heere, have better opinions and rules to goe by than we. But to have sense, and to receive an impression in the imagination of things evident, is common as well to ignorant persons as to Sages, for that it proceedeth from causes that need no discourse of reason. But that position, that our naturall senses are not certeine nor sufficient enough to proove a thing, and cause beliefe, is no hinde∣rance, but that every thing may appeere unto us: but when we use the senses in our actions, ac∣cording to that which appeereth, it permitteth us not to trust thē, as if they were every way true and without error: for that sufficeth in them, which is necessary and commodious for use, be∣cause there is nothing better. As for Science, knowledge, and perfection, which the soule of [ 30] a Philosopher desireth to have of every thing, the senses have just none. But of these matters which Colotes hath charged upon many others, he will give us occasion else where to discourse thereof.

Furthermore, that wherein he doth vilipend and mocke Socrates most, in that he demaun∣deth the question, What is man? and in a youthfull bravery, and childishly as he saith, affir∣meth that he knoweth not, it is evident that even hee who derideth him, never came himselfe where it was, nor atteined thereto: whereas Heraclitus contrariwise, as one who had done a great and worthy matter, said thus, I have beene seeking out my selfe. And of all those senten∣ces which are written over the gates of Apolloes temple at Delphos, this was thought to be most heavenly and divine, Know thy selfe: which gave unto Socrates occasion first to doubt and en∣quire [ 40] thereof; according as Aristotle hath set downe in his Platonique questions. But this for∣sooth seemeth unto Colotes to be a foolish and ridiculous thing. I marvell then why he mock∣eth not his master likewise for doing so, as often as he writeth and discourseth as touching the substance of the soule, and the beginning of that confused masse: for if that which is compoun∣ded of both, as they themselves doe teach, to wit, of such a body & soule, be man, he who sear∣cheth the nature of the soule, searcheth consequently the nature of man, even from his prin∣cipall & chiefe principle. Now that the same is hardly by reason to be comprehended, but by the outward sense altogether incomprehensible, let us learne not of Socrates, a vaine glorious man & sophisticall disputer, but rather of these wise men here, who doe forge & frame the substance of the soule so farre onely as to the faculties extending to the flesh, whereby she giveth heat, [ 50] softnesse & strength to the bodie, of I wot not what heat and aireous spirit, never wading so far as to that which is the principall, but faint & give over in the way. For that faculty whereby she judgeth, whereby she remembreth, whereby she loveth or hateth, and in one word, that reason which wisely foreseeth & discourseth, he saith, is made of a certaine quality which is namelesse. Now that this nameles thing is a mere confession of shameful ignorance, in them that say they cannot name that, which indeed they are not able to comprehend and understand, we know well enough. But this also may well deserve pardon, as they are wont to say. For it seemeth that this

is no small and light matter neither a thing that every one can finde out and reach unto, being deeply settled in the bottom of some by-place far remote and in some obscure and hidden cor∣ner, seeing that among so many words and termes which be in use, there is not one significant enough and sufficient to declare and explaine the same. And therefore Socrates was no foole nor lob, for seeking and searching what himselfe was, but they rather be dolts who go about en∣quiring after any other thing before this, the knowledge whereof is so necessary and hard to be found. For hardly may he hope to attaine unto the knowledge of any other thing, who is not able to understand the principall part of himselfe. But say we should graunt and yeeld thus much unto him, as to confesse that there is nothing so vaine, so unprofitable and so odious, as for a man to seeke himselfe, we will be so bolde as to demaund, what confusion of mans life this [ 10] should be, or how it is that a man cannot continue in life, when he comes to discourse & reason thus with himselfe, Who and what mought I be? Am I after the maner of some composition, confected and mingled of soule and body? or rather a soule making use of the body, as the hors∣man doth of his horse? and not a subject composed of horse and man? or whether the princi∣pall part of the soule whereby we understand, we discourse, we reason and doe every action, is every each one of us? and all the parts besides both of soule and body, be nothing but the or∣gans and instruments serving to this puissance and faculty? Or to conclude, whether there be no substance of the soule apart, but onely a temperature and complexion of the body, so dispo∣sed, that it hath power to understand and to live. But Socrates herein saith he doth not over∣throw the life of man, considering that all naturall philosophers doe handle this argument, [ 20] Mary they be those monstrous questions that trouble the common-wealth, and turne all upside downe, which are in the Diologue Phaedrus, wherein he thinketh that he ought to examine and consider himselfe, namely whether he be a beast more savage, more subtill, cautelous and furi∣ous than ever was that Typhon: or rather some animall more tame and gentle by nature, and endued with a portion more divine, and a condition nothing proud and insolent. But yet by these discourses and reasonings he overturneth not the life of man, but he chaseth out of it pre∣sumption & arrogance, proud and puffed up opinions and vaine overweenings of a mans selfe: For this is that fell Typhon, which your good master and teacher hath made to be so great in you, warring as he doth both against the gods and all good and godly men.

After he hath done with Socrates and Plato, he falleth in hand with the Philosopher Stilpo. [ 30] As for the true doctrines and good discourses of the man, whereby he ordered and governed himselfe, his native country, his friends, & those kings and princes who affected him and made good account of him, he hath not written a word: neither what gravity and magnanimity was in his heart and the same accompanied with mildenesse, moderation, and modesty: but of those little sentences or propositions which Stilpo was wont to use & cast forth in meriment against the Sophisters, when he was disposed to laugh and play with them, he made mention of one: and without alledging any reason against it or solving the subtilty thereof, he made a tragoedie, and kept a foule stirre with him about it, saying that by him the life of man and the whole course of this world was subverted: because he said, that one thing could not be affirmed and ve∣rified of another. For how should we live (quoth Colotes) if we may not say a good man, or a [ 40] man is a captaine, but we must pronounce apart, man is man, good is good, and captaine is a captaine: neither ten thousand horsmen, nor a fensed city, but horsmen be horsmen, ten thou∣sand be ten thousand, and so of the rest? But tell me I pray you, what man ever lived the worse for saying thus? And who is he who having heard these words and this maner of arguing, did not conceive and understand straight waies that it was the speech of a man disposed to make some game and disport learnedly, or to propose unto others this Logicall quillet for exercise sake? It is not Colotes, such a greivous scandall and hainous matter as you would make it, to say man is not good or horsmen be not ten thousand: marry to affirme that god is not god as you and the rest doe, who will not confesse that there is a Jupiter president over generation, or a Ce∣res that giveth lawes, or a Neptune superintendent over plants, is a dangerous point. This is the [ 50] separation of names and words that is pernicious, this filleth our life with contemptuous impie∣ty, Athisme & dissolute audaciousnesse: For when you plucke from the gods these attributes & appellations that essentially be linked & tied to them, you abolish there with all holy sacrifices, divine mysteries, sacred processions and solemnefeasts: for unto whome shall we performe the nuptiall sacrifices called Proteleia; unto whom shall we offer the oblations for health named So∣teria? How shall we accomplish the rites of Phosphoia, the Bacchanals, and the ceremonies go∣ing before mariage, if we leave not any priests of Bacchus, if we admitte not Phosphori 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ,

and the saving gods Soteres? For I tel you, this toucheth the maine & principal points, this bree∣deth error in the things themselves & not about certaine bare voices in the Syntaxes and con∣struction of words or use of termes. Now if these be matters that trouble and subvert this life of ours, who be they that offend and be delinquent more in their phrase & language than you? who making prepositions to be the only substance of speech, abolish altogether all simple voices, & admitting such as come next hand, you abolish in the meane while the things by them signifi∣ed; whereby all discipline, doctrines, erudition, anticipations, intelligences, inclinations and as∣sents are performed, and holde generally that all these be just nothing. But as for Stilpo thus the case standeth: If we affirme of an horse, to runne: he doth not say that the thing affirmed which the Logicians call Predicatum, is all one with the Subjectum, of which it is affirmed; but [ 10] that the essential definition of a man is one, and that of good is another; as also, to be an horse is different from to be running: For if we asked the definition of the one and the other, we will not give the same for both, and in that regard, they doe amisse who affirme the one of the other. For if a man and Good were all one: likewise, an horse, and to runne were both one: how com∣meth it to passe that the terme Good is affirmed of some meate, drogue, or medicine, and to run likewise, of a lion and a dog? But if the Predicatum or thing affirmed be different, then we doe not well, to say, Good man, or the horse runneth. Now if Stilpo in these matters doe exorbitate and be fouly deceived, admitting no copulation at all nor connexion of such things as are said to be in or about the subject, together with the said subject itselfe: but every one of them if it be not absolutely the very same with that unto which it hapneth, hee thinketh not that the same [ 20] ought to be said and affirmed thereof as an accident: and if therein he be offended with some termes, and go against the ordinary custome of speech, he doth not therefore streightwaies sub∣vert and overthrow mans life, nor humane affaires, as all the world may see well enough.

Colotes now having done with the ancient Philosophers, turneth himselfe to those of his owne time, and yet he nameth not one. Howbeit, he should have done better to have argued aswell against these moderne as those ancients, by name, or not at all to have named those of old time. But he who so often hath pricked Socrates, Plato & Parmenides with his pen, sheweth plainly, that it was for meere cowardise that he durst not be seene to deale with the living; and not upon any modesty or reverence that he spared their names, considering that he used them, who were farre more excellent than they, in no good sort and respect. His meaning was as I [ 30] suspect and guesse, to assaile the Cyrenaiques first, and then in a second place the Academicks, sectaries of Arcesilaus: for as these were the Philosophers who doubted of all things and yeel∣ded their assent in nothing at all; so the other reposing passions and imaginations in them∣selves, thought that the beliese proceeding from thence, was not sufficient to assure & confirme things, but faring like unto those who are besieged within a citie, abandoning and forsaking all without, they keepe themselves shut within their passions, using this word ordinarily, It seemeth: and of things without, affirming and pronouncing, It is. And therefore (quoth Colotes) they cannot live nor have the use of things. And then, playing his part as it were in a Comedie: These men (saith he) denie that a man, a horse and a wall are; but they say, that they become walles, horses and men; abusing first and formost cautelously and wickedly these termes, like [ 40] slanderous and foule mouthed sycophants: for surely this is an ordinary cast and usuall with these men. But it behooved to declare the thing it selfe, according as they teach: for they af∣firme, that things become sweet, wax bitter, prove lightsome, or grow darke, when ech of these hath the proper efficacie of these passions in it selfe naturally inbred, and such as can not be di∣stracted from it. But if home be said sweet, an olive branch bitter, haile colde, meere wine hot, the aire of the night darke; there be many beasts, many things, and many men, that will testifie the contrary: whiles some are offended with honie and abhorre it, others are delighted with the taste of the olive branch; some are burnt and sindged by haile, others cooled with wine; some can not abide the light of the Sun but their sight there with is dazled and dimmed, others againe see well enough by night. And therefore opinion persisting still and abiding in the passions, [ 50] keepeth it selfe from offence and errour: but going foorth once, and busily judging or pro∣nouncing of things exterior, it troubleth many times it selfe, and repugneth with others, who of the same objects receive contrary passions, and different imaginations. And as for Colotes, he resembleth for all the world yoong children who newly begin to learne their A. B. C. for be∣ing used to pronounce and name the letters which they see engraven in their owne battleders, when they finde them written elswhere, they sticke at them, and are much troubled: and even so the very words and sayings which he approoveth, praiseth and embraceth in the writings of Epi∣curus,

hee will not understand nor acknowledge, when they are uttered by others. For when there is presented unto us one image round and another broken, they who say that the sense ve∣rily is truely informed and hath a true impression, but will not suffer us to pronounce that the tower is round, but the oare broken, surely they confirme thereby that their passions be their owne fansies and imaginations, but they will not avow and confesse, that the things without are so affected. But as they before are to say, that they be not horse or wall, but become horse and wall; even so of necessitie we must say, that the sight is imprinted with a round figure or triangu∣lar with three unequall sides, but not that a tower is necessarily either triangular in that sort or round: for that the image wherewith the sight is affected may well be broken, but the oare from whence proceedeth the image is not broken. Seeing then there is a difference be∣tweene [ 10] the passion and the subject without, either we must say that the beliefe abideth in the passion, or els that the being which is affirmed by the apparence is convinced of untrueth, and not found to be so. And whereas they cry out and be offended and angry about the sense, they doe not say that the thing without is hot, but that the passion in the sense is so: is it not all one with that which is spoken as touching the taste, as if one should say, that the thing without is not sweet, but that it is some passion and motion about the sense, that is become such? And he who saith, that hee apprehendeth the imagination of a mans forme, but perceiveth not that it is a man, whereupon hath he taken occasion to say so? Came it not from them who say that they receive an imagination and apprehension of a bowing forme and figure, but the sight doth not affirme that it is bowing and bending, neither that it is round, but some imagina∣tion [ 20] and impression about the sense is become round? True it is will some one say: but as I approch neere unto a tower, or else touch an oare, I will pronounce and assirme, that the the one is streight, and the other hath many angles and many faces: But he when he shall come neere, will confesse and say that it seemeth so and that it appeareth such unto him, but no more. O yes good sir, and more than so, when hee seeth and observeth the conse∣quence heereupon, namely, that every fantasie and imagination is semblably of it selfe suffi∣cient to procure beleefe, and none at all, in regard of another, but be all of equall condition. But this your opinion is come just to nothing, namely, that fantasies be all true, and none false and incredible, in case you thinke that these ought to pronounce affirmatively of that which is without, and beleeve not the other a farre off no farther than in that which they suffer: [ 30] for if they be of equall condition and beleeved alike, when they are neere, and when they be far off, meet it is and just, that either all indifferently or else not these, should have the affirmative judgement following upon them, to pronounce, that a thing is. But if there be a difference of passion in things that be nere, & those which are farther off, then is it false that neither imagi∣nation nor sense is one more expresse and evident than another: like unto those which they call attestations which are nothing to the sense, but unto the opinion: so that in following thē, they would have their followers to affirme and pronounce of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 things, attributing to opini∣on the judgement, that a thing is, and to sense, the passion that appereth: whereby they trans∣port the judgement from that which is alwaies true, unto that which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 often times to be so. But what need is there at this time to shew, the confusion and contradiction that is herein? But [ 40] it seemeth that the reputation of Artesilaus, who of all Philosophers in his time was best belo∣ved and most esteemed, was no small thorne in Epicurus his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , but troubled him beyond all measure: For he giveth out of him, that delivering as he did nothing of his owne invention he imprinted in the minds of ignorant and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 men a certaine opinion and conceit of him, that he was a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and very well seene in all kinde of literature. But so far was Arcesilaus, from affecting any glorie & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the world by broching novelties or strange opinions and derogating from the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ascribing anything of theirs to himselfe, that the Sophis∣ters in his daies reprooved and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 him for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 upon Socrates, Plato, Parmenides and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the opinions as touching the retention of assent and the incōprehensibility of things who indeed never sought nor 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so much at his hands, onely because he would referre the [ 50] same unto such famous 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to be confirmed by the authority of their name. How be it for this; thanks be to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and everyone who saith that the Academicke doctrine was more ancient than 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 derived from others before his time unto him. But as for the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of assent, & the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of all things, not so much as they verily who have greatly travelled in the matter and have strived to that purpose for to write many great bookes and large treatises, could ever remoove or overthrow: but bringing in at the last out of the ve∣ry schoole and doctrine of the Stoicks, the cessation from all actions, as it were the fiend

Gorgon to scare folke withall, were weary and gave over in the plaine field, after they saw once, that what attempt soever they made, & which way soever they turned themselves their instinct and appetition was never so obeisant as to become a consent and approbation, neither received sense for the beginning of propension and inclination, but seemed to present it selfe to actions, as having no need to be joined with others. For surely with these men the combate is lawfull and the conflict just.

For looke what words thou doest to others give, The like thou maist be sure to heare, believe.

And verily to speake unto Colotes, as touching instinct and appetition, is all one as to sound the harpe before an asse. But this point of learning would be delivered unto those who can give [ 10] eare and conceive, that there be in our soule three kindes of motions, Imaginative Appetitive and Assenting. As for the Imaginative, we cannot take it away, would we never so faine; for as things approch and objects be presented, we cannot chuse but be informed and receive as it were an impression and suffer by them. The Appetitive being stirred up by the imaginative, moveth a man effectually to those things which are proper and convenient for him, as if in the principall and reasonable part thereof there were some propension and inclination. And verily this motion do not they overthrow and anul who hold off, and keepe in their assent, doubting of every thing, but make use of this appetition or instinct, conducting naturally every man to that which is proper and meet for him. What is the onely thing then that the Academicks flie and avoid? even that wherein alone there is engendred leasing, deceit and falshood, to opine, to [ 20] apply the assent, which is ayeelding through imbecillity to that which appeareth, and hath no true profit. For our action requireth two things, to wit, the apprehension or imagination of that which is convenient and familiar: and the instinct or appetition driving unto the same: whereof neither the one nor the other is repugnant to the cohibition of assent. For the dis∣course of reason withdraweth us from opinion, and not from appetition or imagination. When as therefore that which is pleasant and delectable seemeth unto us to be proper for us and familiar, there is no need at all of opinion for to move and carry us to it, but appetition im∣mediatly presenteth it selfe, which is nothing else but amotion and incitation of the minde. Now for that there must be a sense as it were of these things, and the same consisting of flesh and blood, the same pleasure and delight likewise will appeare good. And therefore it will sem∣blably [ 30] seeme good unto him who holdeth off his assent, for surely he hath senses, and is made of flesh, blood and bone, and so soone as he hath apprehended the imagination of good, he hath an appetite and desire thereto, doing all that ever he can, not to misse it nor leese the fruition thereof: but as much as is possible to cleave and adhere continually to that which is proper un∣to him, as being driven and drawen thereto, by Naturall and not Geometricall constraints. For these goodly, pleasant, gentle and tickling motions of the flesh, be of themselves without any other teacher attractive enough, as they themselves forget not to say, and are able to draw and traine him whosoever he be, that will not confesse nor be knowen, but stoutly denieth that he is made soft and pliable by them. But paradventure you will aske me how it comes to passe that one of these that are so retentive and deinty of their assent, climeth not up some hill, but to [ 40] the baine or hot house: or when hee riseth and purposeth to goe into the market place, why hee runneth not his head against a post or the wall, but taketh his way directly to the dore? And aske you me this question indeed, you that holde all fenses to bee infallible, the appre∣hensions also and imaginations to bee certaine and true? Forsooth it is because the baine seemeth unto him a baine and not a mountaine, the dore also appeareth to be a dore, and not the wall: And so is it to be said likewise of such otherthings everie one: For the doc∣trine delivered as touching this cohibition of assent, doth not pervert the sense, nor worke in it by strange passions and motions any such change and alteration as may trouble the ima∣ginative faculty. Onely it taketh away and subverteth opinions, but useth all other things, according to their nature. But impossible it is not to yeeld consent unto apparent eviden∣ces. [ 50] For to denie those things which wee are verily perswaded of and doe beleeve, is more absurd, than neither to deny nor affirme any thing at al. Who be they then that deny such things as they beleeve, and goe against things evident? even they who overthrow divination, and de∣nie that there is any government by divine providence: they who say that neither the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ani∣mall nor the moone, which all men honour and adore, to which they make their praiers and of∣fer sacrifice. As for you, doe yee not anull that which is apparent to the whole world, to wit, that naturally infants & yong ones, are conteined within their mothers and dams? and that be∣tweene

paine and pleasure there is no meane, even against the sense and experience of all men? saying that not to be in paine, is to have pleasure; and not to do, is to suffer; as also, not to joy, is to be sorowfull? But to let passe all the rest, what is more evident, and so fully believed gene∣rally, than this, that those who have their braines troubled, and their wits distracted, or otherwise sicke of melancholicke diseases, weene they see and heare those things which they neither heare nor see? namely, when their understanding comes to be in such sort affected and transported, as to breake out into these speeches?

These women here in habit blacke yclad, hold in their hands, To dart at me and burne mine eies, torches and firy brands. [ 10]

Also:

Loe how she in her armes doth beare My mother deare, who did me reare.

These verily, and a number besides of other illusions more strange and tragicall than these, re∣sembling the prodigious monsters that Empedocles describeth like anticks, which they make sport and laugh at,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.3 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

That is to say,

With crooked shanks and winding seet, resembling rammes in pace, [ 20] In bodie made like ox or cow, like man before, in face.

And all other sorts of monstrous shapes and strange natures, mixed together all in one, fetched from troublesome dreames and alienations of the minde. But these men say, that none of all this is any deception or errour of the sight, or vaine apparition, but be all true imaginations of bodies and figures, which passe to and fro out of the inconstant aire about them. Tell me now, what thing is so impossible in nature, that we need to doubt, if it be possible to beleeve these? For such things as never any conceited maske-maker or deviser of visards, any inventive potter, glasse-maker, or curious painter and drawer of woonderfull shapes, durst joine together, either [ 30] to deceive the beholders, or to make them sport for their pastime: these men supposing verily and in good earnest that they be really subsistent; and that which more is, affirming all firme and constant beliefe, all certitude of judgement and of trueth, to be quite gone for ever, if such things have not their subsistence, these men I say be they, which involve all in obscuritie and darknesse, who overthrow all apparence, and bring into our judgement feare and terrour, into our actions doubtfull suspition; in case our ordinary and usuall actions, and such affaires of ours which are dayly ready at hand, be caried in the same imagination, beleefe and perswasion, that these enormious, absurd, and extravagant fansies: for the equalitie which they suppose in all, plucketh away more credit from things ordinary, than it addeth unto such as be uncouth and unusuall: which is the cause that we know Philosophers not a few, more willing to avouch, [ 40] that no imagination is true, than that all be true without exception; and who distrust all men whom they had not conversed withall, all things which they had not tried, generally all speeches which they had not heard, rather than beleeve so much as one of these imaginations and illusi∣ons which madde and franticke folke, fanaticall persons possessed with a furious spirit, or drea∣mers in their sleeps doe apprehend. Seeing then, some imaginations we may utterly abolish, and others not, lawfull it is to reteine our assent and doubt of things whether they be or no, if there were no other cause els but this discordant, which is sufficient to worke in us suspition of things, as having nothing assured and certeine, but all incertitude and perturbation. As for the dissensions and differences about the infinite number of worlds, the nature of the Atomes, be∣ing indivisible bodies, and their declinations to a side, although they trouble and disquiet many [ 50] men, yet this comfort there is and consolation, that in all this there is nothing neere at hand to touch us, but rather every one of these questions be farre remote, and beyond our senses; wher∣as this distrust and diffidence, this perturbation and ignorance about sensible things and ima∣ginations, presented to our eies, our eares and our hands, this doubt, I say, whether they be true or false, what opinion is it that they doe not shake and make to waver, what judgement and as∣sent do not they turne up-side downe? For if men, being not drunke nor intoxicate, nor other∣wise troubled in their braines, but sober, well in their wits and sound of judgement, professing

also to write of the trueth, and of the canons and rules to judge by, in the most evident passions and motions of the sense, set downe that for true which can not possibly subsist, and for false that which subsisteth, it is not to be marvelled nor thought incredible, if they give no judgement of such things which evidently appeare, but rather be of contrary judgements. For a man may lesse woonder at one for affirming neither the one nor the other, and keeping himselfe in a meane betweene two opposits, than for putting downe things repugnant and meere contrary. For he that neither affirmeth nor denieth, but holds himselfe quiet, is lesse repugnant both un∣to him who putteth downe his opinion, than he who denieth it; and also to him that denieth it, than he who puts it downe. And if it be possible to make doubt and sticke at these things, it is not impossible then to doe so of others; at leastwise according to you who are of opinion, that there [ 10] is no difference at all betweene sense and sense, betweene imagination and imagination: and therefore this doctrine as touching the retention of beliefe and assent, is not as Colotes saith, a vaine fable, nor a captious toy of rash and light-headed yong men, that love to jangle and prate, but a setled resolution and habituall disposition of staied men, who be wary and take heed that they mistake not any thing, and fall into inconvenience, or abandon at aventure their judg∣ment to the senses, so conjecturall and doubtfull, and not suffring them to be deceived and cari∣ed away with those, who hold that things uncerteine, if they seeme and appeare, ought to be beleeved as well as if they were certeine, notwithstanding they see so great obscurity and incer∣titude in imaginations and apparent things: But rather the infinity that you put downe, and the images which you dreame of be fables. And as for heady rashnesse and a vaine humour of much [ 20] babble, hee engendreth in yoong students who writeth of Pythocles being not fully eighteene yeeres of age, that there was not in all Greece a better or more towardly nature; as being one who with admiration was able most excellently to expresse the conceptions of his minde; and that his case was much like to the incomparable beauty of women, wishing and praying there∣fore, that all those surpassing gifts and most rare parts might not worke the yoong man hatred and envie.

But busie Sophisters they be, and vaine fellowes, who against so great and excellent perso∣nages, dare write so impudently and proudly: And yet I confesse, Plato, Aristotle, Theophra∣stus, and Democritus gainsaied and contradicted those who wrote before them: Howbeit there was never man knowen but himselfe so bold, as to make a booke against all indifferently, and [ 30] with such a proud inscription as he did: And than afterwards forsooth, like unto those who have offended and displeased the gods: in the end of the said booke, as one confessing his faults, he saith: That they who have established lawes and ordinances, who have erected roiall govern∣ments and politicke rule of cities and states, have set the life of man in great quiet, safety, and security, yea and delivered it from dangerous troubles: which if they were abrogated and put downe, we should lead a savage life like wilde beasts; one would eat another as they met toge∣ther; for these be the very words that he useth, though unjustly and untruly: For say a man did abolish lawes, and yet withall leave behind unrepealed and uncondemned the doctrines and books of Parmenides, Socrates, Heraclitus, and Plato, we should be farre for all that from devou∣ring one another, or living a savage life; for we should feare and forbeare dishonest things, we [ 40] should even for vertue and honesty, honour justice, beleeve that the gods, good magistrates, and the angels or spirits have the guarding, keeping, and superintendance of mans life, think∣ing all the gold that is both above and under the ground, not able to counterpeize vertue, and doing willingly by reason and learning as Xenocrates was woont to say, that which now we doe perforce for feare of the lawes. But when shall our life become beastly, savage, and insociable? Mary when, the lawes being taken away, there shall be left remaining, books and discourses, in∣citing and soliciting men unto pleasure: when it shall be thought and beleeved, that the world is not ruled and governed by Gods providence, when they shall be deemed Sages and wise men, who spit against honesty and vertue, unlesse it be joined with pleasure, and when they shall de∣ride and mocke such sentences as these, [ 50]

In Justice is an eie, Which all things doth espie.

And

Godneere doth stand, And sees all at hand.

As also this old said sawe; God having in his power the beginning, mids, and end of the whole world, passeth directly throughout all nature, and goeth round about, attended upon by Justice,

to punish those who transgresse the law divine. For they that despise and contemne these in∣structions as idle fables, and suppose that the sovereigne good consisteth in the belly and other parts, whereby we enjoy pleasure, be those who had need of the law, they ought to feare the whip, and stand in awe of some king, prince, and magistrate, who hath the sword of justice in his hand, to the end that they might not devour their neighbour by insatiable gluttony, which up∣on Atheisme and impiety, would grow to excessive outrage: For verily such is the life of brute beasts, for that they know nothing better than pleasure, they have no sense of Gods justice, they neither honour nor regard the beauty of vertue: But if nature hath endued them with any har∣dinesse, craft, and industrious activity, they employ the same, to satisfie their fleshly pleasure, [ 10] and accomplish their lusts. And therefore Metrodorus is reputed a great wise man, for saying, that all the fine, subtill, witty, and exquisit inventions of the soule, have beene devised for to please and delight the flesh, or else for the hope to obteine and enjoy the same; and looke what art soever tendeth not thereto, is vaine & to no purpose. By such discourses and Philosophicall reasons as these, downe goe holsome lawes, and in place thereof enter in lions pawes, woolves teeth, oxes paunches, and camels necks and throates: and for want of writings and speech, the very beasts doe preach and teach such doctrines and opinions as these, with their bleating, bel∣lowing, neighing, and braying: For all the voice that they have, is nothing but belly cheere, and the pleasure of the flesh, which they either embrace presently, or joy in the expectation thereof; unlesse haply there be some kind of them that delighteth naturally in gagling, cack∣ling, [ 20] and garrulity. So that no man is able to praise those sufficiently, and to their full de∣sert, who to represse such furious and beastly affections, have set downe law, established po∣licie and government of State, instituted magistrates, and ordeined holsome decrees and edicts. But who bee they that confound, yea, and utterly abolish all this? Are they not those, who give out that all the great empires and dominions in the worlde are nothing comparable to the crowne and garland of * 1.4 fearelesse tranquillity and repose: Are they not those, who say, that to be a king and to reigne is to sinne, to erre and wander out of the true way leading to felicity: yea and to this purpose write disertly in these termes, we are to shew, how to maintaine in best sort and to keepe the end of nature: and how a man may avoid at the very first not to enter willingly and of his owne accord into offices of state and government of the multitude. Over and besides, these speeches also be theirs, there is no need at all henceforth for [ 30] a man to labour and take paines for the preservation of the Greeks, nor in regard of wisdome and learning to seeke for to obtaine a crowne at their hands, but to eate and drinke, Ô Timocrates, without hurt doing to the body, or rather withall contentment of the flesh. And yet the first and most important article of the digests and ordinance of lawes and policie which Colotes so highly commendeth, is the beleefe and firme perswasion of the gods: whereby Lycurgus in times past sanctified the Lacedēmonians, Numa the Romans, that ancient Ion the Athenians, and whereby Deucalion brought all the Greeks universally to religion: which noble and renow∣med personages made the people devout & affectionate zealously to the gods in praiers, othes, oracles and prophesies, by the meanes of hope and feare together, which they imprinced in [ 40] their hearts: In such sort, that if you travell through the world, well you may finde cities without wals, without literature, without kings, not peopled and inhabited, without housen, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , and such as desire no coine, which know not what Theaters or publicke hals of bodily exercise meane: but never was there nor ever shall be any one city seene, without temple, church or chappell, without some god or other, which useth no praiers nor othes, no prophesies and divi∣nations, no sacrifices either to obtaine good blessings or to avert heavy curses and calamities: nay, me thinks a man should sooner finde a city built in the aire without any plot of ground whereon it is seated, than that any common wealth altogether void of religion & the opinion of the gods should either be first established, or afterwards preserved and maintained in that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 . This is it that containeth and holdeth together all humane society, this is the foundation, prop [ 50] and stay of all lawes which they subvert and overthrow directly, who goenot round about the bush as they say, nor secretly and by circuit of covert speeches, but openly and even at the first as∣sault set upon the principall point of all, to wit, the opinion of God, and religion: and then afterwards as if they were haunted with the furies, they confesse how greivously they have sin∣ned, in shuffling and confounding thus, all rights and lawes, and in abolishing the ordinance of justice and pollicy, to the end that they might obtaine no pardon, for to slip and erre in opini∣on, although it be not a part of wise men, yet it is a thing incident to man: but to impute and ob∣ject those faults unto others which they commit themselves, what should a man call it if he for∣beate

to use the proper termes & names that it deserveth? For if in writing against 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or Bion the Sophister, he had made mention of lawes, of pollicy, of justice and government of com∣mon weale, might not one have said unto him as Electra did to her furious brother Orestes.

Poore soule, be quiet feare none ill Deare hart, in bed see thou be still.

cherishing and keeping warme thy poore body? As for me, let them argue and expostulate with me about these points, who have lived oeconomically or politickly. And such are they all whom Colotes hath reviled and railed upon. Among whom Democritus verily in his writings admonisheth and exhorteth, both to learne military science, as being of all others the greatest, and also to take paines, and endure travels. Whereby men attaine to much renowme and ho∣nour. [ 10] As for Parmenedes hee beawtified and adorned his owne native countrey with most excellent lawes which he ordained: in so much as the magistrates every yeere when they newly enter into their offices, binde the citizens by an oth to observe the slatutes and lawes of Parme∣nides. And Empedocles not onely judicially convented and condemned the principall persons of the city wherein he dwelt, for their insolent behaviour and for distracting or embeselling the publicke treasure, but also delivered all the territorie about it from sterility and pestilence, whereunto before time it was subject, by emmuring and stopping up the open passages of a cer∣taine mountaine, through which the southern winde blew and overspred all the plaine country underneath. Socrates after he was condemned to death, when his frends had made meanes for him to escape, refused to take the benefit thereof, because he would maintaine and confirme the [ 20] authority of the lawes; chusing rather to die unjustly, than to save his life by disobaying the lawes of his country. Melissus being praetor or captaine generall of the city wherein he dwelt, defaited the Athenians in a battell at sea. Plato left behinde him in writing many good dis∣courses of the lawes and of civill government: but much better imprinted he in the hearts and minds of his disciples & familiars, which were the cause that Dion freed Sicily from the tyrany of Dionysius; and Thrace likewise was delivered by the meanes of Python and Heracledes, who killed king Cotys. Chabrtas and Phocion, worthy commaunders of the Athenians armie, came both out of the schoole Academia. As for Epicurus he sent as farre as into Asia certaine persons of purpose to taunt and revile Timocrates, yea and caused the man to be banished out of the kings court, onely for that he had offended Metrodorus his brother. And this you may read written [ 30] in their owne books. But Plato sent of those friends which were brought up under him Aristo∣nimus to the Arcadians, for to ordeine their common wealth, Phormio to the Elians Menedemus to those of Pyrrha, Eudoxus to the Cnidians, and Aristotle to those of Stagira, who being all his disciples and samiliars, did pen and set downe lawes. Alexander the Great requested to have from Xenocrates rules and precepts as touching the government of a kingdome. And he who was sent unto Alexander from the Greeks dwelling in Asia & who most of all other set him on a light fire and whetted him on to enterprise the warre against the barbarous king of Persia, was Delius an Ephesian, one of Platoes familiars. Zenon also ascholar of Parmenides undertooke to kill the tyrant Demylus, and having no good successe therein, but missing of his purpose, main∣tained the doctrine of Parmenides to be pure and fine golde tried in the fire from all base met∣tal, [ 40] shewing by the effect, that a magnanimous man is to feare nothing, but turpitude and disho∣nour and that they be children and women, or else effeminate and heartlesse men like women, who are affraid of dolor and paine: for having bitten off his tongue with his owne teeth, he spit it in the tyrants face. But out of the schoole of Epicurus, and of those who follow his rules and doctrines, I doe not aske what tyrant killer there was or valiant man and victorious in feats of armes, what lawgiver, what counsellour, what king or governour of state, either died or suffred torture for the upholding of right and justice: but onely which of all these Sages did ever so much as imbarke and make a voiage by sea in his countries service and for the good thereof? which of them went in embassage or disbursed any mony thereabout? or where is there extant upon record any civill action of yours in matter of government. And yet because that Metrodo∣rus [ 50] went downe one day from the city, as far as to the haven Pyraeaeum, & tooke a journey of five or six miles to aide Mythra the Syrian one of the king of Persias traine and court, who had bene arrested and taken prisoner, he wrot unto all the friends that he had in the world, of this exploit of his: and this doubty voiage Epicurus hath magnified & exalted in many of his letters. What a doe would they have made then, if they had done such an act as Aristotle did who reedified the city of his nativity Stagira, which had bene destroied by king Philip? or as Theophrastus, who twice delivered and freed his native city being held and oppressed by tyrants? Should not thinke

you the the river Nilus have sooner given over to beare the popyr reed, than they bene weary of discribing their brave deeds. And is not this a grievous matter and a great indignity, that of so many sects of Philosophers that have bene, they onely in maner enjoy the good things and be∣nefits that are in cities, without contributing any thing of their owne unto them? There are not any Poets Tragedians or Comedians, but they have endevoured to doe or say alwaies some good thing or other for the defence of lawes and policie: but these here, if peradventure they write ought, write of policie, that we should not intermeddle at all in the civill government of state: of Rhetoricke, that we should not plead any causes eloquently at the barre: of Roialty, that we should avoid the conversing and living in kings courts: neither doe they name at any time those great persons who manage affaires of common weale, but by way of mockerie for to de∣base [ 10] and abolish their glorie. As for example of Epaminondas they say that he had indeed some good thing onely in name and word, but the same was but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, as little as might be, for that is the very terme that it pleaseth them to use. Moreover they name him heart of y∣ron demaunding why he marched up and downe through out all Peloponnesus with his armie as he did, and sat not rather quiet at home in his owne house with a dainty chaplet upon his head given wholly to make good chere, and to sleepe with his belly full in a whole skin. But me thinks I should not for any thing omit in this place to rehearse what Metrodorus hath written in his booke of philosophy, wherein abjuring all dealing in government of state, he saith thus, Some there be of these wisemen (quoth he) who being full of vanity and arrogancy, had so deepe an insight into the businesse thereof, that in treating of the rules of good life and of vertue [ 20] they suffer themselves to be carried away with the very same desires that Lycurgus and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fell into. What? was this vanity indeed and the aboundance of vanity and pride, to set the city of Athens free, to reduce Sparta to good policy, and the government of holsome lawes, that yong men should doe nothing licenciously nor get children upon curtisans and harlots? and that riches, wanton delicacie, intemperance, loosenesse & dissolution should beare no sway nor have the commaund in cities, but law onely and justice; for these were the desires of Solon. And thus Metrodorus by way of scorne and contumelious reproch addeth thus much more for a conclu∣sion to the rest, And therefore (quoth he) it is well beseeming a gentleman, to laugh a good and right heartly at all other men, but especially at these Solones and Lycurgi. But verily such an one were not a gentleman Metrodorus, nor well borne, but servile, base, unruly and dissolute and who [ 30] deserved to be scurged not with the whip which is for free borne persons, but with that whip Astragalote, where with the maner was to whip and chastice those gelded sacrificers called Gally when they did amisse in the cerimonies and sacrifices of Cylote the great mother of the gods. Now, that they warred not against the lawgivers but the very lawes themselves, a man may heare and learne of Epicurus; for in his questions he demaundeth of himselfe, whether a wise man be∣ing assured that no man ever should know, would doe and commit any thing that the law forbid∣deth? and he maketh an answere which is not full nor an open, plaine and simple affirmation, saying, doe it I will, marry confesse it and be knowen thereof I will not. Againe, writing as I suppose unto Idomeneus, he admonisheth him not to subject and enthrall his life unto lawes and the opinions and reputations of men: unlesse it be in this regard onely that otherwise there is [ 40] prepared odious whipping chere and that neere at hand. If then it be so, that they who abolish lawes, governments and policies, do withall subvert and overthrow mans life: if Metrodorus and Epicurus doe no lesse, withdrawing and averting their friends and followers from dealing in pub∣licke affaires, and spitefully hating those who doe meddle therein, miscalling and railing at the chiefe and wisest lawgivers that ever were, yea and willing them to contemne the lawes, so that they keepe themselves out of the feare of the whip and dan∣ger of punnishment, I cannot see that Colotes hath in any thing so much belied others, and raised false imputations against them, as he hath indeed and truely accused the [ 50] doctrine and opinions of Epicurus.

Notes

• * 1.1

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. some divide this & reade 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, hath made 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the world.
• * 1.2

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, some read 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, understanding thereby the crime of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 .
• * 1.3

  Or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,
• * 1.4

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, haply 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and confu∣sion.