The philosophie, commonlie called, the morals vvritten by the learned philosopher Plutarch of Chæronea. Translated out of Greeke into English, and conferred with the Latine translations and the French, by Philemon Holland of Coventrie, Doctor in Physicke. VVhereunto are annexed the summaries necessary to be read before every treatise

OF COMMON CON∣CEPTIONS AGAINST THE STOICKS. [ 30]

The Summarie. [ 40]

HAving shewed in my former discourse, that the Stoicks are contradictory to them∣selves in all the principall articles of their doctrine, and so consequently that he needed no more but their owne words to condemne them: In this dialogue he joineth more closely to them, disputing against their rules and precepts, which he examineth and refuteth; whereas before he was content to oppugne them by their owne selves. For to make an entrance into this dialogue, he bringeth in Lamprias, requesting Diadumenus to rid him of those scruples that certeine Stoicks had 〈◊〉〈◊〉 into his head: Where unto the other accordeth, and so they enter into the matter. The summe of whose whole discourse throughout is this: That the Stoicks would by their principles abolish mans senses, and the common conceptions proceeding from thence, there by more easily to establish their owne paradoxes: whom he refuteth, dividing his dialogue [ 50] into three principall parts: in the first where of is considered, the morall; in the second, the naturall; in the third, the metaphysicall or supernaturall philosophy of the Stoicks: Howbeit, he observeth no exact order nor method, in the disposition of his matters, but entreth out of one discourse into another, accor∣ding as things were presented unto him, and came first into his minde, yet in such sort, as there is suf∣ficient to content the reader, who is desirous to know what was the sect and doctrine of the Stoicks, and the maner of the anncient Academicks in their disputations: which being referred to the true

marke and scope indeed, of all that which we may learne in the world, teacheth every man to humble himselfe before the majestie of him who is onely wise, and out of whose sacred word we ought to fetch the resolution of the questions debated heere in this dialogue, but of those above the rest, which treat of maners, religion, and divinity.

OF COMMON CONCEPTI∣ons against the Stoicks.

LAMPRIAS. [ 10]

IT should seeme verily that you Diadumenus passe not much what any man either thinks or saies of you & other Academicks, such as your selfe, in that you do philosophize cleane contrary to the com∣mon notions and conceptions, confessing as you doe, that you make no great account of the five naturall senses, from whence pro∣ceed the most part of the said common conceptions, having for their foundation and seat, the beliefe and assurance of the imagina∣tions which appeere unto us. But I pray you for to assay and goe in hand to cure me, either by some words, or charmes and enchant∣ments, [ 20] or by what other meanes and kinds of physicke that you know, comming as I doe unto you, full in mine owne conceit of great trouble and strong per∣turbation, so exceedingly troubled I have beene, and held in perplexed suspense, I may tell you, by certeine Stoicks; men otherwise the best in the world, and I may say to you, my inward and familiar friends: howbeit, over bitterly bent, and in hostile maner set against the Acade∣mie, who for very small matters uttered by me, modestly and in good sort, withall respect and reverence, have (I will not lie unto you) reprooved, checked, and taken me up very unkindly, with some hard words, and breaking foorth in heat of choler, called our auncient Philosophers, Sophisters, corrupters, and perverters of good sentences in Philosophy, yea, and seducers of those who otherwise walked in the true path and traine of doctrine surely established; with ma∣ny [ 30] other more strange termes, both speaking and thinking of them very basely; untill in the end as if they had beene driven with a tempest, they fell upon the Common conceptions, re∣proching those of the Academie, as if they brought in some great confusion and perturbation in the said notions: and one among them there was, who stucke not to say; That it was not by fortune, but by some divine providence that Chrysippus was borne and came into the world, af∣ter Arcesilaus, and before Carneades: of which twaine, the one was the great authour and pro∣moter of the injury and outrage done unto custome; and the other flourished in name and re∣nowme above all other Academicks. Now Chrysippus comming as he did betweene them, by his writings contrary to the doctrine of Arcesilaus, stopped up the way also against the powerful eloquence of Carneades, and as he left unto the senses many aides and succours, as it were to [ 40] hold out a long siege; so he remooved out of the way, and fully cleered all the trouble and con∣fusion about anticipations and common conceptions, correcting ech one, and reducing them into their proper place; insomuch, as whosoever afterwards would seeme to make new trou∣bles, and violently disquiet matters by him setled, should not prevaile nor gaine ought, but in∣curre the obloquie of the world, and be convinced for malicious persons, and deceitfull so∣phisters. Having thus (I say) by these words beene chafed and set on fire this morning among them, I had need of some meanes to quench the heat as it were of an inflammation, and to rid me of these doubts, which are risen in my minde.

DIADUMENUS.

It fareth haply with you, as with many of the vulgar sort; but if you beleeve the poets who [ 50] give out, that the ancient citie Sipylus in Magresia, was in old time destroied and over∣throwen by the providence of the gods, when they chastised and punished Tantalus; you may as well be perswaded by our old friends the Stoicks to beleeve, that nature hath brought foorth into the world, not by chance and fortune, but by some speciall divine providence, Chrysippus, when she was minded to pervert and overturne the life of man and course of the world, turning all things up side downe, and contrariwise downe side up: for never was there man better made

and framed for such a matter than he. And as Cato said of that Iulius Caesar Dictator, that be∣fore him there was never knowen any to come sober and considerate to manage affaires of state with a purpose to worke the ruin of the common weale; even so this man in mine opinion, with most diligence, greatest eloquence, & highest conceit of spirit seemeth as much as lieth in him to destroy and abolish custome. And there witnesse against him no lesse even they who magni∣fie the man otherwise: namely, when they dispute against him as touching that sophisme or syl∣logisme which is called Pseudomenos, for to say my good friend, that the augmentation cōposed of contrary positions is not notoriously false, and againe to affirme, that syllogismes having their premisses true, yea and true inductions, may yet have the contrary to their conclusions [ 10] true, what conception of demonstrations, or what anticipation of beleefe is there, which it is not able to overthrow?

It is reported of the Pourcuttle or Pollyp fish, that in winter time he gnaweth his owne cleies and pendant hairy feet, but the Logicke of Chrysippus, which taketh away and cutteth off the prin∣cipall parts of it, what other conception leaveth it behinde but that which well may be suspec∣ted? For how can that be imagined steady and sure which is built upon foundations that abide not firme, but wherein there be so many doubts and troubles? But like as they who have either dust or durt upon their bodies, if they touch another therewith or rub against him, doe not so much trouble and molest him, as they doe begrime and beray themselves so much the more and seeme to exasperate that ordure which pricketh and is offensive unto them; even so, some [ 20] there be who blame and accuse the Academicks, thinking to charge upon them those imputati∣ons, wherewith themselves are found to be more burdened. For who be they that pervert the common conceptions of the senses more, than do these Stoicks? But if you thinke so good, lea∣ving off to acuse them, let us answere to those calumniations and slanders which they would seeme to fasten upon us.

LAMPRIAS.

Me thinks Diadumenus that I am this day much changed, and become full of variety: me thinks I am a man greatly altered from that I was ere while: for even now I came hither much dismaied and abashed, as being depressed, beaten downe and amazed; as one having need of some advocate or other to speake for me and in my behalfe: whereas now I am cleane turned to an humor of accusation, and disposed to enjoy the pleasure of revenge, to see all the packe of [ 30] them detected and convinced, in that they argue and dispute themselves against common con∣ceptions and anticipations, in defence whereof they seeme principally to magnifie their owne sect, * * saying that it alone doth agree and accord with nature.

DIADUMENUS

Begin we then first, with their most renowmed propositions, which they themselves call para∣doxes, that is to say, strange and admirable opinions: avowing as it were by that name & gently admitting such exorbitant absurdities; as for example that such Sages as themselves are onely kings, onely rich and faire, onely citizens, and onely Judges: or pleaseth it you that we send all this stuffe to the market of olde and stale marchandise, and goe in hand with the examination of these matters which consist most in action and practise, whereof also they dispute most serious∣ly? [ 40]

LAMPRIAS

For mine owne part I take this to be the better. For as touching the reputation of those pa∣radoxes, who is not full thereof, and hath not heard it a thousand times?

DIADUMENUS.

Consider then in the first place this, whether according to common notions, they can pos∣sibly accord with nature, who thinke naturall things to be indifferent: and that neither health, nor good plight and habitude of body nor beawty, nor cleane strength be either expetible, pro∣fitable, expedient, or serving in any stead to the accomplishment of that perfection which is ac∣cording [ 50] to nature: nor that the contraries hereunto are to be avoided, as hurtfull, to wit, maimes and mutilations of members, deformities of body, paines, shamefull disgraces and diseases. Of which things rehearsed, they themselves acknowledge that nature estrangeth us from some, and acquainteth us with other. The which verily is quite contrary to common in∣telligence, that nature should acquaint us with those things which be neither expedient nor good, & alienate us from such as be not hurtfull nor ill: and that which more is, that she should either traine us to them or withdraw us from them so farre forth, as if men misse in obtaining

the one, or fall into the other, they should with good reason abandon this life, and for just cause depart out of the world. I suppose that this also, is by thē affirmed against common sense, name∣ly, that nature her selfe is a thing indifferent: and that to accord and consent with nature hath in it some part of the soveraigne good. For neither to follow the rule of the law nor to obey reason is good and honest, unlesse both law and reason be good and honest. But this verily is one of the least of their errors. For if Chrysippus in his first booke of exhortations hath written thus: A blessed and happie life consisteth onely in living according to vertue: and as for all other ac∣cessaries (quoth hee) they neither touch nor concerne us at all, neither make they any whit to beatitude: he cannot avoid but he must avow, that not onely nature is indifferent, but also which is more, senselesse and foolish, to associate and draw us into a league with that which in no respect concerneth us, and we our selves likewise are no better than fooles, to thinke that the [ 10] soveraigne felicity, is to consent and accord with nature which leadeth and conducteth us to that which serveth nothing at all to happinesse. And yet what agreeth and sorteth sooner to common sense, than this, that as things eligible are to be chosen and desired for the profit and helpe of this life; so naturall things serve for to live answerable to nature? But these men say otherwise: for although this be their supposition that to live according to nature is the utmost end of mans good, yet they hold, that things according to nature be of themselves indifferent. Neither is this also lesse repugnant to common sense and conception, that a well affected, sensi∣ble and prudent man, is not equally enclined and affectionate to good things that be equall and alike: but as some of them he waigheth not, nor maketh any account of, so for others againe he is prest to abide and endure all things, although I say the same be not greater or lesse, one than [ 20] another. For these things they hold to be equall, namely, for a man to fight valiantly in the de∣fence of his country, and chastly to turne away from an olde trot, when for very age she is at the point of death: for both the one and the other doe that alike which their duty requireth. And yet for the one, as being a worthie and glorious thing, they would be prest and ready to lose their lives, whereas to boast and vaunt of the other were a shamefull and ridiculous part. And even Chrysippus himselfe, in the treatise which he composed of Jupiter, and in the third booke of the Gods, saith that it were a poore, absurd and foolish thing to praise such acts, as proceeding from vertue, namely to beare valiantly the biting of a flie, or sting of a wespe, and chastly to ab∣staine from a crooked old woman, stooping forward & ready to tumble into her grave. Do not these Philosophers then teach and preach even against common sense and notion, when those [ 30] actions which they are ashamed to commend, they avow and consesse to be excellent, and no∣thing in the world better? For where is that expetible, or how can that be approovable, which deserveth not that a man should praise and admire it, but is such as whosoever doe commend and admire the same, they are reputed no better than sots and absurd fooles? And yet I suppose you will thinke it more against common sense and reason, that a wise and prudent man should not care nor regard a jot whether he enjoy or enjoy not the greatest goods in the world, but car∣ry himselfe after one and the same maner in things indifferent, as he would in the management and administration of those good things which are so singular. For we all,

As many as on fruits do feed, Which for our use the earth doth breed. [ 40]

are of this judgement, that the thing which being present bringeth us helpe and profit, and if it be away, we desire to have, and find a misse of it, is good, expetible and profitable: but that which a man passeth not for, neither in earnest nor in game, and where of he maketh no account either for his sport, pastime or commodity and ease, the same is indifferent: for by no other marke do we distinguish a diligent, painfull and industrious man in deed, from a vaine busie bo∣dy, and a curious medler in many matters, than by this, That as the one travelleth and troubleth himselfe in unprofitable trifles or things indifferent, so the other laboureth for such as be com∣modious and expedient. But these Philosophers do quite contrary: for according to their do∣ctrine, a wise and prudent man, although he meet with many conceptions and the memories of [ 50] the said comprehensions, yea and remember divers things whereof he hath a certeine and per∣fect knowledge, thinketh some few of them to concerne him; and as for the rest, making no reckoning of them, he supposeth that he neither loseth nor winneth, by remembring that hee had the other day the comprehension, that is to say, the certeine knowledge either of Dion snee∣sing or Theon playing at tennis. And yet every comprehension in a wise man, and all memory that is firme and surely setled, is presently science, yea and a great good thing, nay the greatest

that is. How then? for I would gladly know, whether a wise man were secure and carelesse alike, when his health faileth, when some one of his senses decaieth or is amisse, and when he loseth his goods, thinking none of all this to touch him; or whether when he feeleth himselfe sicke, gi∣veth unto Physicians their fees when they come unto him; and for to gaine riches, saileth to Leucon a great prince and potentate about Bosporus, or travelleth as farre as to Indathyrsus the Scythian king, as Chrysippus saith; and of his senses, if he lose some, he will not endure to live any longer? How is it then, that these men doe not acknowledge and confesse that they deliver doctrine even against common notions, who about things indifferent, carke, care and travell so much; and yet take the matter indifferently, and reake not much whether they enjoy or be with∣out great good things? [ 10]

Moreover, this also is an opinion of theirs, even against common conceptions, That he who is a man, feeleth no joy when out of the greatest evils and most grievous calamities he entreth into a world of good things and a most blessed and happy state. And yet thus doth their wise man: for passing from extreame vice, unto exceeding great vertue; escaping also out of a most miserable life, and atteining unto the happiest condition that is, he sheweth no signe or token at all of joy: neither doth so great a change lift up his heart, or once move him, seeing himselfe how he is delivered out of the greatest miserie and wickednesse that may be, and arrived now to a most firme assured accomplishment of all felicitie and goodnesse. Againe, contrary it is to common sense, That this should be the greatest good of a man, namely, a constant judge∣ment [ 20] and immutable resolution; and yet that he who is mounted up to the heigth and pitch of all, hath no need hereof, neither careth for it when it is come; insomuch as many times he will not once put forth his finger for this assurance and stability, notwithstanding they esteeme it to be the sovereigne and perfect good. Neither do these Stoicks stay here, but stil broch more pa∣radoxes & strange opinions, namely, that continuance of time be it never so long, augmenteth not any good thing: but if a man chance to be wise and prudent but the minute onely of an houre, he is nothing inferior in felicity to him, who all his time hath lived in vertue, and led his whole life blessedly therein. Howbeit, as bravely and as stoutly as they deliver these positions, yet on the other side, they sticke not to say, that transitory vertue which continueth but a while, is worth nothing: for what would it availe or benefit him who incontinently is to suffer ship∣wracke [ 30] and to perish in the sea, or otherwise to be throwen headlong downe from some steepe rocke, if he were possessed of wisdome a while before? And what would it have booted Lychas being flung by Hercules as it were out of a sling into the mids of the sea, if suddenly he had bene changed from vertue to vice? These positions therefore savour of these men, who not onely philosophize against sense and common notions, of the whole world, but also confusedly huddle their owne conceits, making a mish-mash of them and contradicting themselves, if it be so that they thinke, that the holding and possessing of vertue a short time, wanteth nothing of sovereigne felicity, & withall, make no account of so short a vertue, as if in deed it were nothing worth. And yet this is not it that a man would wonder most at in their strange doctrine, but this rather, that they eftsoones give out and say: That when this soveraigne vertue & felicity is pre∣sent, he that is possessed of it, hath no sense nor feeling thereof; neither perceiveth he how being [ 40] erewhile most miserable and foolish; he is now all at once become both wise & happy: for not onely it were a pretie jest, and ridiculous conceit to say; That a wise and prudent man is igno∣rant even of this one point, that he is wise; and knoweth not that he is now past ignorance, and want of knowledge: but also to speake all in a word; they make goodnesse to be of no moment, nor to cary any weight and poise with it, they make it I say very obscure, enervat and feeble, in case when it commeth, a man is not able to feele and perceive it: for according to them, it is not by nature imperceptible; and even Chrysippus himselfe hath expresly written in his bookes entituled, Of the end, That good is perceptible by sense; and as hee thinketh, so hee maketh proofe and demonstration thereof. It remaineth therefore that it is long either of weakenesse or smalnesse that it is not perceived, when they who have it present, feele it not, nor have any [ 50] knowledge thereof. Moreover, it were very absurd to say, that the eie sight should perceive and discerne things that be but whitish a little, or middle colours betweene, and not bee able to see those that be exceeding white in the highest degree; or that the sense of feeling should appre∣hend that which is meanly hot or warme, and yet have no sense at all of such things, as be excec∣ding hot. But there is more absurdity in this, that a man should comprehend that which mean∣ly and commonly is according to nature, to wit, health, or the good plight of the body; and

be ignorant againe of vertue, when it is present, considering withall, that they hold it to be principally and in highest degree accordant to nature; for how can it otherwise be, but against common sense, to conceive well enough the difference betweene health and sicknesse, and to be ignorant of that distinction which is betweene wisedome and follie; but to thinke the one to be present when it is gone, and when a man hath the other, not to know so much, that he hath it? Now forasmuch as after that one advanced and proceeded forward as farre as may be, he is changed into felicity and vertue, one of these two must of necessitie follow; that either this estate of progresse and profit, is neither vice nor infelicity; or else that there is no great diffe∣rence and distance betweene vice and vertue; but that the diversitie of good things and evill is very small and unperceptible by the sense, for otherwise men could not be ignorant when they had the one or the other, or thinke they had the one for the other: so long then as they depart [ 10] not from any contrariety of sentences, but will allow, affirme, and put downe all things what∣soever, to wit, That they who profit and proceed are still fooles and wicked; that they who are become wise and good, know not so much themselves, but are ignorant thereof; that there is a great difference betweene wisedome and folly: Thinke you, that they shew a woonderfull con∣stance and uniformity in the maintenance of their sentences and doctrines?

Well, if in their doctrine they goe against common sense, and are repugnant to themselves; certes, in their life, in their negotiations and affaires, they doe much more: for pronoun∣cing flatly, that those who be not wise, are all indifferently and alike, wicked, unjust, disloiall, faithlesse, and foolish; and yet forsoorth, some of them they abhorre and will not abide, but be ready to spit at them; others, they will not vouchsafe so much as to salute if they meet with them [ 20] upon the way; and some againe they will credit with their monies, nominate and elect by their voices to be magistrates, yea and bestow their daughters upon them in mariage. Now in case they hold such strange and extravagant positions in sport and game, let them plucke downe their browes, and not make so many surrowes as they doe in their foreheads: but if in earnest, and as grave Philosophers, surely, I must needs tell them, that it is against common notions, to reproove, blame, and raile upon all men alike in words, and yet to use some of them in deeds as honest persons, & others hardly to intreat as most wicked; and for example, to admire Chrysip∣pus in the highest degree, & make a god of him; but to mocke and scorne Alexinus, although they thinke the men to be fooles alike, and not one more or lesse foolish than the other. True it is say they; and needs it must be so. But like as he who is but a cubit under the top of the water, [ 30] is no lesse strangled and drowned than he who lies five hundred fathom deepe in the bottom of the sea: even so they that be come within a little of vertue, are no lesse in vice still than those who are agreat way off: and as blinde folke be blinde still, although haply they shall recover their eie-sight shortly after; even so they that have wel proceeded and gone forward, continue fooles still and sinfull, untill such time as they have fully attained to vertue; but contrary to all this, that they who profit in the schoole of vertue, resemble not those who are starke blinde, but such ra∣ther as see not clerely; nor are like unto those who be drowned, but unto them that swimme, yea and approch neere unto the haven; they themselves do beare witnesse by their deeds, and in the whole practise of their life; for otherwise they would not have used them for their counsellors, captaines, and lawgivers, as blinde men do guides for to lead them by the hands, neither would [ 40] they have praised and imitated their deeds, acts, sayings and lives of some as they did, if they had seene them all drowned alike and suffocated with folly and wickednesse.

But letting that goe by, consider these Stoicks, that you may woonder the more at them in this behalfe, that by their owne examples they are not taught to quit and abandon these wise men who are ignorant of themselves, and who neither know nor perceive, that they cease to be stifled and strangled any longer, and begin to see the light, and being risen aloft, and gotten a∣bove vice and sinne, take their winde and breath againe. Also it is against common sense, that for a man furnished with all good things, and who wanteth nothing of perfect blisse and happi∣nesse, it should be meet and befitting, to make himselfe away and depart voluntarily out of this life; yea, and more than so; that he who neither presently hath, nor ever shall have any good [ 50] thing; but contrariwise, is continually haunted and persecuted with all horrible calamities, mi∣series, and mishaps that can be, should not thinke it fit and covenient for himselfe to leave and for sake this life, unlesse some of those things which they hold be indifferent, be presented, and doe befall unto him. Well these be the goodly rules and trim lawes in the Stoicks schoole; and verily many of their wise men they cause indeed to go out of this life, bearing them in hand, that

they shall be more blessed and happie; although by their saying a wise man is rich, fortunate, blessed, happy every way, sure, and secured from all danger: contrariwise, a foole and leawd man is able to say of himselfe,

Of wteked parts (to say I dare be hold) So full I am, that unneth I can hold.

And yet forsooth, they thinke it meet and seemely for such as these to remaine alive, but for those to forgo this life. And good cause why, quoth Chrysippus, for we are not to measure our life by good things or evill, but by such as are according to nature. See how these Philosophers mainteine ordinary custome, and teach according to common notions. Say you so (good sit) ought not he who maketh profession of looking into the estate of life and death, to search also [ 10] and consider

What rule at home in house, what worke there is; How things do stand; what goes well, what antis.

Should not he (I say) ponder and examine as it were by the ballance, what things incline and bend more to felicity and what to infelicity, and thereby to chuse that which is profitable? but to lay his ground and make his reckoning to live happily or no by things indifferent, which nei∣ther do good nor hurt? According to such presuppositions and principles as these, were it not convenient for him who wanteth nothing of all that is to be avoided, to chuse for to live: & con∣trariwise, for him to leave this life, who enjoieth all that is to be wished for and desired? And al∣beit [ 20] (my good friend Lamprias) it be a senselesse absurdity, to say that those who taste of no e∣vill, should forsake this life: yet is it more absurd and beside all reason, that for the not having of some indifferent thing, a man should cast away and abandon that which is simply good; like as these men doe, leaving felicity and vertue, which they presently enjoy, for default of riches and health, which they have not. And to this purpose we may well and fitly alledge these verses out of Homer:

And then from Glaucus, Jupiter all wit and sense did take, When he with Diomedes would a foolish bargaine make; For brasen armour to exchange his owne of golde most fine, [ 30] An hundred * 1.1 oxen richly worth, for that which went for nine.

And yet those armes made of brasse, were of no lesse use in battell, than the other of golde: whereas the decent feature of the bodie and health, according to the Stoicks, yeeld no profit at all, nor make one jote for felicity. Howbeit, these men for all that, are content to exchange wis∣dome for health, inasmuch as they holde that it would have become Heraclitus well enough and Pherecydes, to have cast off their wisdome and vertue, had it beene in their power so to do, in case thereby they might have bene rid of their maladies, the one of the lowsie disease, and the other [ 40] of the dropsie. And if Circe had filled two caps with severall medicines and potions, the one making fooles of wise men, and the other, wise men of fooles, ulysses ought to have drunke that of folly, rather than to change his humane shape into the forme of a beast, having in it wisdome withall, and by consequence felicity also. And they say, that even wisdome and prudence it selfe teacheth as much and commandeth in this wise: Let me alone, and suffer me to perish, in case I must be caried to and fro in the forme and shape of an asse. But this wisedome and prudence will some man say, which prescribeth such things, is the wisedome of an asse; if to be wise and happy is of it selfe good, and to beare the face of an asse indifferent. There is (they say) a nation of the Aethiopians where a dogge is their king; he is saluted by the stile and name of a king, and hath all honours done unto him, and temples dedicated, as are done unto kings. But men they [ 50] be that beare rule and performe those functions and offices which apperteine unto governours of cities and magistrates. Is not this the very case of the Stoicks? for vertue with them hath the name, and carieth the shew and apparence of good, it alone they say, is expetible, profitable, and expedient; but they frame all their actions, they philosophize, they live and die, according to the will, prescript, & commandement as it were of things indifferent. And yet there is not an Aethiopian so hardy as to kill that dog their king; but he sitteth upon a throne under a cloth of estate, and is adored of them in all reverence: but these Stoicks destroy this vertue of theirs,

and cause it to perish whiles they are wholly possessed of health and riches. But the corollarie which Chrysippus himselfe, hath for a finiall set unto these their doctrines, easeth me of farther paines, that I need not to stand more upon this point: For whereas (quoth he) there be in na∣ture things good, things bad, and things meane or indifferent; there is no man but hee would chuse rather to have that which is good, than the indifferent, or that which is bad: and to proove the trueth hereof, let us take witnesse of the very gods, when as we doe crave of them in our praiers and orisons, principally the possession and fruition of good things; if not, yet at least∣wise the power and grace to avoid evils; but that which is neither good nor evill, we never de∣sire for to have in stead of good; mary we can be content and wish to enjoy it, in lieu of evill. But this Chrysippus heere inverting and perverting cleane the order of nature, transposeth and transferreth out of the middle place betweene, the meane and indifferent into the last, and redu∣cing [ 10] the last bringeth it backe into the mids; giving as tyrants doe to wicked persons, the pre∣eminence of superior place, with authority and credit unto evill things; enjoining us by order of law, first to seeke for that which is good; secondly, for that which is evill; & last of all to repute that woorst, which is neither good nor evill: as if a man should next unto heaven set hell, and reject the earth and all the elements about it into the pit of Tartarus beneath:

Right farre remote, where under ground The gulfe that lies, no man can sound.

Having then said in his third booke of Nature: That it is better for a man to live in the state of a foole, yea though he never should become wise, than not to live at all; he addeth thus much moreover word for word: For such are the good things of men, that even the evill things after a [ 20] sort are preferred before those which are meane and in the mids betweene; not that these go before, but reason, with which jointly to live, availeth more although we should continue fooles all the daies of our life: yea and to be plaine, albeit we should be wicked, unjust, breakers of the lawes, enemies to the gods, and in one word, wretched and unhappie; for all these concurre in those that live fooles. Is it better then to be unhappy, than not unhappie; to suffer harme, ra∣ther than not to suffer harme; to commit injustice, than not to commit injustice; to transgresse the lawes, than not to transgresse the lawes: which is as much to say, as is it fit and expedient to do those things which are not fit and expedient; and beseemeth it to live otherwise than it be∣seemeth? Yea forsooth: For worse it is to bee without reason and senslesse, than to be foolish. What aile they then, and what takes them in the head, that they will not avow and confesse that [ 30] to be evill, which is woorse than evill? And why do they affirme that we are to avoid folly alone, if it be meet to flie no lesse, nay rather much more, that disposition which is not capable nor susceptible of folly? But wherefore should any man be offended and scandalized hereat, if hee call to mind that which this philosopher wrote in his second booke of Nature, where he avou∣cheth: That vice was not made without some good use and profit, for the whole world? But it will be better to recite this doctrine, even in his owne words, to the end that you may know in what place they range vice, and what speech they make thereof, who accuse Xenocrates and Speu∣sippus, for that they reputed not health to be an indifferent thing, nor riches unprofitable. As for vice (quoth he) it is limited in regard of other accidents beside: for it is also in some sort accor∣ding to nature; and if I may so say, it is not altogether unprofitable in respect of the whole, for [ 40] otherwise there would not be any good; and therefore it may be inferred, that there is no good among the gods, in as much as they can have none evil: neither when at any time Jupiter having resolved the whole matter into himselfe, shall become one, & shall take away all other differen∣ces, wil there be any more good, considering there will be no evill to be found. But true it is, that in a daunce or quier, there wil be an accord & measure, although there be none in it that singeth out of tune & maketh a discord: as also health in mans body, albeit no part thereof were pained or diseased: but vertue without vice can have no generation. And like as in some medicinable confections there is required the poyson of a viper or such like serpent, and the gall of the beast Hvaena; even so there is another kind of necessarie convenience betweene the wickednesse of Melitus, and the justice of Socrates; betweene the dissolute demeanor of Cleon, and the honest [ 50] 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Pericles. And what meanes could Jupiter have made, to bring foorth Hercules and Lycurgus into the world, if he had not withall made Sardanapalus and Phalaris for us? And it is a great marvell if they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not also, that the Phthisicke or ulcer of the lungs, was sent among men for their good plight of bodie, and the gout for swift footmanship: and Achilles had not worne long haire, unlesse Thersites had beene bald. For what difference is there betweene those

that alledge these doting fooleries or rave so absurdlie; and such as say that loosenesse of life and whoredome were not unprofitable for continence, and jniustice for justice? So that we had need to pray unto the gods that there might be alwaies sinne and wickednes,

False leasing, smooth and glosing tongue, Deceitfull traines and fraud among.

in case when these be gone, vertue depart and perish withal. But will you see now and behold the most elegant devise and pleasantest invention of his? For like as Comoedies (quoth he) carrie otherwhiles ridiculous Epigrams or inscriptors, which considered by themselves, are nothing woorth, how be it they give a certaine grace to the whole Poeme: even so, a man may well blame and detest vice in it selfe, but in regard of others it is not unprofitable. And first to say that vice [ 10] was made by the divine providence, even as a lewd Epigram composed by the expresse will of the Poet, surpasseth all imagination of absurditie: for if this were true, how can the gods be the givers of good things, rather than of evill? or how can wickednes any more be enemie to the gods, or hated by them? or what shall we have to say and answere to such blasphemous senten∣ces of the Poets, sounding so ill in religious eares, as these:

God once dispos'd some house to overthrow, Twixt men some cause and seeds of strife doth sow.

Againe:

Which of the gods twixt them did kindle fire, Thus to contest in termes of wrath andire. [ 20]

Moreover, a foolish and leawd epigram doth embelish and adorne the Comedie, serving to that end for which it was composed by the Poet, namely, to please the spectatours, and to make them laugh. But Jupiter whom we surnamed, Paternall, Fatherly, Supreame, Sovereigne, Just, Righteous, and according to Pindarus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the best and most perfect artisan, making this world as he hath done, not like unto some great Comedie or Enterlude, full of vari∣etie, skill, and wittie devices, but in maner of a city common to gods and men, for to inhabit to∣gether with justice and vertue in one accord and happily, what need had he, to this most holy and venerable end, of theeves, robbers, murderers, homicides, parricides and tyrans? for surely vice and wickednesse was not the entry of some morisque-dance or ridiculous eare-sport, carry∣ing a delectable grace with it and pleasing to God; neither was it set unto the affaires of men [ 30] for recreation and pastime, to make them sport, or to move laughter, being a thing that carrieth not so much as a shadow, nor representeth the dreame, of that concord and convenience with nature, which is so highly celebrated and commended. Furthermore, the said lewd epigram, is but a small part of the Poeme, and occupieth a very little roome in a Comedie: neither do such ridiculous compositions abound overmuch in a play, nor corrupt and marre the pleasant grace of such matters as seeme to have beene well and pretily devised: whereas all humane affaires are full thorowout of vice: and mans life even from the very first beginning and entire as it were of the prologue unto the finall conclusion of all and epilogue, yea and to the very plaudite, being disordinate, degenerate, full of perturbation and confusion, and having no one part thereof [ 40] pure and unblamable, as these men say, is the most filthy unpleasant and odious enterlude of all others, that can be exhibited. And therefore gladly would I demaund and learne of them, in what respect was vice made profitable to this universall world: for I suppose he will not say it was for divine and celestiall things: because it were a mere reciculous mockery to affirme that unlesse there were bred and remained among men vice, malice, avarice, and lesing, or unlesse we robbed, pilled and spoiled, unlesse we slandered and murdered one another, the sun would not run his ordinary course, nor the heaven keepe the set seasons and usuall revolutions of time, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 yet the earth seated in the midst and center of the world, yeeld the causes of winde and raine. It remaineth then, that vice & sin was profitably engendred for us and for our affaires: and hap∣ly this is it which they themselves would seeme to say. And are we indeed the better in health for being sinfull? or have we thereby more plenty and aboundance of things necessary? availeth [ 50] our wickednesse ought to make us more beawtifull and better favoured, or serveth it us in any stead to make us more strong and able of body? They answere No. But is this a silent name onely, and a cretaine blinde opinion and weening of these night-walking Sophisters, and not like indeed unto vice which is conspicuous enough & exposed to the view of the whole world, in such sort as it is not possible that it should bring any detriment or ought that is unprofitable, and least of all, ô good god, of vertue, for which we were borne. And what absurdity were it to

say, that the commodious instruments of the husband man, the mariner or the carter, should serve their turnes for to attaine unto their purpose and entended end: but that which hath bene created by God for vertue, should corrupt, mar, and destroy vertue? But peradventure it is more than time now, to passe unto some other point, and to let this goe.

LAMPRIAS

Nay I beseech you good sir of all loves and for my sake doe not so: For I desire to know and understand how these men bring in evill things before the good, and vice before vertue.

DIADUMENUS.

You say well, and certes my friend this is a point worth the knowledge: much vaine jangling and prittle prattle verily doe these men make, but in the end they come to this conclusion, that [ 10] prudence is the science of good things & evil together: for that otherwise it could not stand but must needs altogether fall to the ground: For like as if we admit that there be truth, it cannot otherwise be but that falsity and untruth should be likewise hard by: so it is meet and stands to good reason, that if there be good things, the evill also must have their being.

LAMPRIAS

To grant the one of these not to be amisse said, yet me thinks I see of my selfe, that the other is cleane contrary. For I discerne very well the difference: because that which is not trueth, must immediatly be false: but that which is not evill, is not by and by good: For betweene true and false there is no meane: but betwixt good and evill there is: to wit, indifferent. Neither follow∣eth it necessarily, that both good and evill things should have their substance together, and that [ 20] if the one be, the other likewise should ensue. For it may be that nature had good, and required not the evill, so that it might have that which was neither good nor evill. But as touching the former reason, if your Academicks say ought of it. I would gladly heare from your mouth.

DIADUMENUS.

Yes mary (quoth he) much there is alledged by them, but for this present relate I will, that which is most necessarie. First and formost, a mere folly it is to thinke that good things and e∣vill have their subsistence for prudence sake. For contrariwise, when good and evill was before, then prudence followed after: like as physicke ensued upon things holsome and breeding disea∣ses, which are supposed to have bene before. For surely the good and the evill came not up nor were brought forth, to the end that there should be prudence: but that faculty or power whereby [ 30] we judge and discerne betweene evill and good is called prudence: like as the sight is a sense which serveth to distinguish blacke from white, which colours had not their being first, to the end that we should have our seeing, but contrariwise need we had of our seeing for to discerne the said colours. Secondly when the world in that generall confiagration, which they hold and talke of, shall be all on a light fire and burnt, there will remaine behind nothing that evill is, but all shall then be wise and prudent: And therefore confesse they must, will they nill they, that there is prudence although there be no evill, neither is it necessary, that if wisdome be, evill also should have a being. But say it were absolutely so, that prudence were the science of evill and good, what harme or absurdity would follow, if upon the abolishing & annulling of evill things there were no prudence any more, but some other vertue in lieuthereof, which were not the [ 40] science of evill and good together, but onely of good? Like as among colours, if the blacke were quite perished and gone for ever, who will force us to confesse that the sense of seeing is likewise lost? And who would impeach or debarre us for saying that sight is not the sense of discerning blacke and white? Surely if any man would force upon us the contrary, what inconve∣nience and absurdity were there to answere him thus, Sir if we have not that sense that you speake of, yet we have another sense and naturall power insteed of it, whereby we apprehend co∣lours that be white and not white. And verily for mine owne part I doe not thinke that if there were no bitter things in the world, our taste should be therefore utterly lost, or the sense of fee∣ling in case all dolour and paine were gone: no more am I perswaded that prudence should be a∣bolished, if all evill were rid out of the way. But like as those senses would remaine to appre∣hend [ 50] sweet savours and pleasant objects of feeling, so this prudence also would continue to be the sciences of things good and not good. As for those who are of another opinion, let them take the name to themselves, so they leave us the thing indeed. But over and besides all this, what should binder us to say, that the evill is in cogitation and intelligence; but good in reali∣ty and essence? like as, I suppose the gods enjoy the reall presence of health, where as they have the intelligence of the fever and pleurisie: considering that we also, albeit we were pestred with

all the evils in the world, and had no affluence at all of good things as these men say, yet we want not the understanding what is prudence, what is good and what is felicity.

And this is a woonderfull thing, if there being no vertue present, yet some there are who teach what vertue is, and enforme us in the comprehension thereof; whereas if there were no such thing, it is impossible to have the intelligence of it; for doe but consider what they would perswade us to, who reason philosophically against common conceptions, namely, That by foolishnesse and ignorance, wee comprehend wisdome and prudence; but prudence without follie and ignorance, cannot conceive so much, as ignorance it selfe. And if nature had neces∣sarily need of the generation of evill, certes, one example or two at the most of evill were suffi∣cient; or if you will have it so, requisit it was that there should be brought foorth ten wicked [ 10] persons, or a thousand, or ten thousand, and not such an infinit multitude of vices, as the sands of the sea, the dust, or the feathers of divers plumed birds, could not affoord so great a number: but of vertue not so much as a bare dreame or vaine vision. They that were the wardens and ma∣sters at Lacedaemon, of those publike halles or dining places called Phiditia, were woont to bring foorth and shew openly unto their youth, two or three of their slaves called Helotae, full of wine, and starke drunken, that they might know thereby, what a shamefull and foule thing it was to be drunken, and so take heed of that vice, and learne to be sober. But in this life there be many such examples of vice in our actions; for there is not so much as one sober unto vertue, but we all trip and stumble, nay we wander as if our braines turned round about, living shamefully in misery; and so farre foorth are we intoxicate with our owne reason and selfe conceit, filled with [ 20] so great perturbation and folly, that wee may be well and fitly likened to those dogs which as Aesope tels the tale, seeing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 skinnes floting above the water, gaped so greedily for to have them, that they would needs drinke up all the sea before them, for to be sure of the said skinnes; but ere they could come by them, they drunke so much as they burst againe: and even we hoping by reason to acquire glory and reputation, and thereby to attaine unto vertue, are spoiled, marred, and destroied therewith, before we can reach thereunto, being before hand loden with a mighty deale of meere, heady, and bitter vice, if it be so, as these men give it out, that even they who have made good progresse and proceeded to the end, feele for all that no ease, no alteration, no remission or breathing time at all from folly and infelicity. But marke I pray againe, how he who saith, that vice was not produced and brought foorth into the world [ 30] unprofitably, depainteth it unto you what maner of thing hee describeth it to be, and what an heritage it is for him who hath it? For in his treatise of Duties or Offices he saith: That the vici∣ous and sinfull person, hath no want nor need of anything; that nothing is profitable, nothing meet and convenient for him. How then is vice commodious, wherewith neither health it selfe is expedient, nor store of money, ne yet advancement and promotion? And hath a man no need of those things, whereof some are precedent, preeminent, and to be preferred, yea, and beleeve me, very profitable and commodious; others according to nature, as they themselves terme them? And of all these doeth no man finde need, unlesse he become wise? And so by this reckoning, hath the leawd and foolish man no need to become wise; neither be men thirsty or hungry, before they are made wise? So that if they be dry, have they no need of water, nor if [ 40] hungry, bread?

Resembling right those gentle guests, who nought else did require, But under roufe to shrowd their heads, and warme themselves at fire.

And so belike he had no need of covert nor of mantell, who said:

Give Hipponax a cloke his corps to fold, For why, I shake and shiver hard for cold?

But will you pronounce a paradox indeed, such an one as is extravagant and singular by it selfe? Say hardly then; That a wise man wanteth nought, and hath need of nothing; he is rich, he is [ 50] full and fortunate, he is of himselfe sufficient, blessed, happy, & every way absolute. But what a dizzinesse & giddinesse of the braine is this to say; That he who is indigent of nothing, yet hath need of the good things which he hath; and that the lewd and vicious person is indigent of ma∣ny things, and yet needeth nothing? for this is the very assertion which Chrysippus holdeth: That wicked persons have no need, and yet are indigent, turling, shifting, and transposing the common notions, like unto cockall bones or chesse-men upon the boord. For all men deeme thus, that to have need, goeth before indigence, supposing him that standeth in need of things

which are not ready at hand, nor easie to be gotten, is indigent. To make this more plaine, no man is said to be indigent of hornes or of wings, for that he hath no need of them; but we say tru∣ly and properly, that some have need of armour, of monie, and of apparell, when in the penury and want of these things, they neither have them nor can come by them, to supply their neces∣sity. But these Stoicks are so desirous to be thought alwaies for to broch somewhat against com∣mon sense and conception, that many times they forget themselves and slip out of their owne proper opinions, so much affected they are and given to new conceits; like as in this place, if you please to cast your eie unto Chrysippus, and looke somewhat behinde, calling to minde what hath heeretofore beene delivered.

This is one of his positions, affirmed even against common sense, and vulgar opinion, that [ 10] no evill and foolish man can finde good and profit by any thing; and yet many of them by insti∣tution and teaching, proceed forward and profit; many who were slaves, become enfranchized; besieged, are delivered; drunken, are guided and lead by the hand; sicke and diseased, are cured of their maladies: but for all this forsooth, they are never the better whatsoever is done unto them; no benefits they receive, no benefactours they have, no nor neglect those who de∣serve well of them: and so vicious persons are not unthankfull, no more than are good and wise men. And thus ingratitude is not at all, nor hath any being; for that the good never inter∣vert, nor miscognize the favour and benefit which they have received; and the wicked are ca∣pable of none at all. But see (I pray you) what shift they make to salve & answer all this: They say (forsooth) that grace, favour, or benefit is ranged in the number of meane things: and that to [ 20] helpe or be helped, apperteineth onely to the wise. True it is say they, that wicked receive also a grace or benefit. What is that? Those who have part in a benefit, have not they also a part of use and commodity? and whereto a grace or benefit reacheth, doth nothing that is commodi∣ous and convenient, extend thither? And is there ought else that maketh a demerit or plea∣sure done to be a grace, than that the party who doth the pleasure should in some respect be commodious unto the needy receiver?

LAMPRIAS.

But let these matters passe, and tell us what is that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, utility, which they prise so highly, and whereof they make so great account?

DIADUMENUS.

This is a thing (I may tell you) which they reserve and keepe as a great matter and a singula∣ritie [ 30] for their Sages onely, and yet leave them not so much as the name of it. If one wise man, say they, do but put forth his finger prudently, wheresoever it be, all the wise men that are in the whole continent and habitable world find this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and utility by it. This is the onely gift and worke of the amity that is among them, and in this doe determine and end the vertues of wise men, namely, the entercourse of common profit and utility, passing to and fro betweene them. As for Aristotle, he doted, Xenocrates also doted, who taught and affirmed that men had helpe from the gods, helpe from their parents, and helpe by ther teachers and scholemasters: but ne∣ver understood they this wonderfull helpe and commoditie, which these wise men receive one from another, when they be moved to vertue, although they be not together, no nor so much as [ 40] know one another. And verily all men do thinke, that to gather, to lay up, to keepe, to dispense and bestow, is condrucible and profitable, when there is received profit and commodity by such things. And a good substantiall housholder buyes himselfe locks and keies, he keepeth his cel∣lars, his closets and coffers,

Taking great joy his chamber doore with hand for to unlocke, Where lies of golde and silver both, his treasure and his stocke.

But to gather and lay up, to keepe with great care, diligence and paine, those things which are for nothing profitable, is neither honourable, nor yet seemly and honest. If then Ulysses being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by Circe to make that fast knot, had with it tied sure and sealed up as it were, not the gifts [ 50] and presents which Alcinous gave him, to wit, trefeets, pots, plate clothes, apparell and gold; but some trash, as sticks, stones and other pelfe raked together, thinking it a great felicity for him to possesse and keepe charily such riffe-raffe and trumperie: who would have praised and commen∣ded him for it, or imitated this foolish forecast, witlesse, providence, and vaine diligence? And yet this is the goodly and beautifull honesty of the Stoicks profession in generall, this is their honourable gravity, this is their beatitude; and nothing els is it, but an heaping up, a keeping

and preserving of things unprofitable and indifferent. For such be those which they say are ac∣cording to nature; and much more those outward matters: forasmuch as sometime they com∣pare the greatest riches with fringes and chamber-pots of golde, yea and (I assure you) other∣whiles as it falleth out, with oile cruets. And aftewards, like as those who thinke they have most insolently and proudly abused with blasphemous words and polluted the temples, the sacred ce∣remonies and religious services of some gods or divine powers, presently change their note, and become penitent persons, and falling downe prostrate, or sitting humbly below upon the ground, blesle and magnifie the heavenly power of the Godhead; even so they, as incurring the vengeance and plague of God for their presumptuous follies, arrogant and vaine speeches, are found puddering and raking againe in these indifferent things, nothing indeed pertinent [ 10] unto them; setting out a throat and crying as loud as they can, what a gay matter, what a good∣ly and honourable thing it is, to gather and lay up such commodities, and especially the com∣munion and fellowship of enjoying and using them: also that whosoever want the same, and can not come by them, have no reason to live any longer; but either to lay violent hands on themselves, or by long fasting and abstinence from all viands, to shorten their lives, bidding ver∣tue farewell for ever. And these men verily, howsoever they repute Theognis to be a man alto∣gether of a base and abject minde, for saying thus in verse,

Aman from povertie to flie, O Cyrmis, ought himselfe to cast Headlong from rocks most steepe and hie, [ 20] Or into sea as deepe and vast.

themselves meane while in prose give these exhortations, and say, that to avoid a grievous mala∣die, and escape exceeding paine, a man ought (if he had not a sword or dagger neere at hand, nor a poisoned cup of hemlocke) to cast himselfe into the sea, or els fall headlong and breake his necke from some steepe rocke: yet affirme they, that neither the one nor the other is hurtfull, evill or unprofitable; nor maketh those miserable, who fall into such accidents. Whence then shall I begin (quoth he) what ground-worke and foundation of duety shall I lay, or what shall I make the subject and matter of vertue, leaving nature, and abandoning that which is according to nature? And whereat (I pray you, good sit) begin Aristotle and Theophrastus? what princi∣ples take Xenocrates and Polemon? And even Zeno himselfe, hath he not followed them, in sup∣posing [ 30] Nature and that which is according to Nature, for to be the elements of felicitie? But these great clerks verily, rested here in these things, as eligible, expetible, good and profitable; adjoining moreover unto them, vertue, which emploieth the same, and worketh by ech of them according to their proper use; thinking in so doing, to accomplish a perfect and entire life, and to consummate that concord and agreement which is in trueth sortable and consonant unto Nature. For they made no confused mish-mash, nor were contrary to themselves, as those who leape and mount on high from the ground, and immediatly fall downe upon it againe, and in naming the same things, meet to be chosen, and yet not expetible; proper and convenient, and withall not good; unprofitable, and yet fit for good uses; nothing at all pertinent unto us, and yet forsooth, the very principles of dueties and offices. But looke what was the speech of [ 40] these noble and famous personages, the same also was their life; their deeds (I say) were answe∣rable and conformable to their words. Contrariwise, the sect of these Stoicks, doth according to that craftie woman whom Archilochus describeth, to cary water in the one hand, and fire in the other: for in some of their doctrines and assertions they receive and admit nature, in ano∣ther they reject her: or to speake more plainly; in their acts and deeds they adhere and cleave unto those things which are according to nature, as being eligible and simply good; but in their disputations and discourses they refuse and condemne the same as things indifferent and no∣thing available to vertue for the acquiring of felicitie: nay, that which woorse is, they give her hard and reprochfull tearmes. And forasmuch as all men generally are perswaded in their minds, that the sovereigne good is a thing joious, exoptable, happie, most honourable, and of [ 50] greatest dignitie, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of it selfe, and wanting nothing. See now this sovereigne good of theirs, and examine it according to this common opinion: To put forth ones finger like a sage and wise Philosopher, doth this make that joious good? or what exoptable thing I pray you, is a prudent torture? who casteth himselfe downe headlong from an high rocke, so he do it with a colour of reason and honesty, is he happy and fortunate? is that most honourable and of grea∣rest price and dignity, which reason many times chuseth to reject, for another thing that of it selfe is not good? is that all-sufficient in it selfe, accomplished and perfect, which whosoever do

presently injoy, if haply they can not obteine with all, some one of these indifferent things, they will not deigne to live any longer? was there ever knowen any discourse or disputation wherein use and ordinary custome suffered more outrage and abuse, which stealing and plucking from it the true and naturall conceptions, as legitimate children of her owne, putteth in the place, ba∣stards, changelings, of a monstrous and savage kinde, and constreineth it to love, cherish and keepe them in lieu of the other? And thus have they done in treating of good things and evill, expetible and to be avoided, proper and strange; which ought to have beene more cleerely and plainly distinguished, than hot from colde, or white colours from blacke. For the apprehensi∣ons and conceits of these qualities, are from without forth brought in by the senses naturall; but the other are within vs, taking their originall from those good things that we have within us. [ 10] Now these men entring into the question and common place of sovereigne felicity, with their Logicke subtilties, as if they were to handle the lying sophisme called Pseudomenos; or that ma∣sterfull maner of reasoning named Kyritton, have not solved one of the doubts and questions which there were, but mooved and raised an infinite number of others that were not there be∣fore.

Moreover, there is no man who knoweth not that there being two sorts of good things; the one which is the very utmost end, and the other, the meanes to attaine thereto: the one is more excellent and perfect of the twaine. And Chrysippus himselfe knoweth well enough this diffe∣rence, as it may appeare by that which he hath written in his third booke of Good things: for he disagreeth with those who are of opinion, that the end of sovereigne good, is science; and [ 20] putteth this downe in his treatise of Justice: If there be any who supposeth that pleasure is the end of good things, hee thinketh not that justice can be safe; if not the finall end, but simply good and no more, he is of another minde. I do not thinke that you would heare me at this pre∣sent to rehearse his owne words, for his third booke as touching Justice, is extant and to be had every where. When as they say therefore (my friend) elsewere, that no good thing is greater or lesse than another, but that the finall end is equall with that which is not the end, and no bet∣ter than it, it is evident that they be contrary and repugnant not onely to the common notions, but also to their owne very words. And againe, if of two evils, the one maketh us woorse than we were when it came unto us; and the other hurteth us indeed, but maketh vs not woorse: that evill in mine opinion is the greater which maketh us worse: neither doth that more hurt, which [ 30] causeth us not to be the woorse. And Chrysippus verily confesseth, that there be certeine feares, sorrowes and deceitfull illusions, which well may hurt and offend us, but not make us woorse. But reade over and peruse the first of those books which are written against Plato as concerning Justice: for in respect of other causes, it were very well done and worth your labour, to note the frivolous babling in that place of this man, where he makes no spare to deliver all matters and doctrines whatsoever indifferently, even those aswell of his owne sect as of other strangers, slat opposit to common sense: as for example, That it is lawfull to propose two ends and two scopes of our life, and not to referre all that ever we do unto one end. And yet more than that, is this also a common notion, That the end verily is one, but every thing that is done, ought to have a relation to another; and yet of necessitie, they must abide the one or the other. For if [ 40] the first things according to nature be not expetible for themselves and the last end; but rather the reasonable election and choise of them; and if every man doth what lies in him, to have and obteine those things which are first according to nature, and all actions and operations have their reference thither, namely, to acquire and enjoy the principall things according to nature: if (I say) they thinke so, it must needs be that without aspiring and aiming for to get and atteine those things, they have another end to which they must referre the election and choise of the said things, and not the things themselves: for thus will be the end, even to know how to chuse them well and to take them wisely; but the things themselves and the enjoying of them, will be of small moment, being as a matter and subject which hath the dignity and estimation: for thus [ 50] I suppose they use and put downe in writing this very word to shew the difference.

LAMPRIAS.

Certes you have passing well and woorthily reported unto us, both what they say, and how they deliver it.

DIADUMENUS.

But marke I beseech you, how they fare like unto those who will needs streine themselves to leape over and beyond their owne shadow; for they leave not behinde, but carie evermore with them some absurdity in their speech, and the same farre remote alwaies from common

sense: for as if one should say, That an archer doeth all that lieth in him, not to hit the marke, but to doe all that ever he can; he might be justly taken for a man, who spake aenigmatically & by darke riddles, and uttered strange and prodigious words: even so doe these old doting fooles, who with all their power endevour to maintaine, that to obteine the things according to nature, is not the end of aiming and aspiring to things according to nature; but forsooth to take and chuse them; and that the desire of health and seeking after it in any man, endeth not in health of ech one, but contrariwise, that health is referred to the appetite and seeking after it: saying moreover, that to walke, to read, or speake aloud, to endure sections or incisions, yea and to take purging medicines, so all be done by reason, are the ends of health, and not it, the end of those meanes. Certes, these men dote, rave, & speake idly, as well as they who should say; [ 10] let me goe to supper, that we may sacrifice, bath, or sweat in the stouph. Nay (that which more is) that which these men say, perverteth order and custome, and conteineth a confusion, shufling & turning upside downe of al our affaires whatsoever: We study not say they, to walke in due time, for to concoct & digest our meats well; but we concoct and digest our meat, because we might walke in due season. Why? Hath nature given us health for Ellebore, or rather brought foorth Ellebor for health sake? For what could be uttered more strange and absurd, than such proposi∣tions as these? and what difference is there betweene him who saith, that health was made for medicinable drogues, and not drogues medicinable for health? and another who holdeth, that the gathering, the choise, the composition and use of such medicines, is to be preferred before health it selfe? or rather he thinks that health is not in any respect expetible: but hee setteth [ 20] downe the very end in the penning and handling of those medicines, affirming forsooth that appetite is the end of fruition, and not fruition of appetite: And why not (quoth he) all while there be added thereto these termes; considerately and with reason. True will we say againe, if a man have regard unto the obteining and enjoying of the thing which he pursueth; for other∣wise that considerate reason is to no purpose, in case all be done for to obteine that, the fruition whereof is neither honorable nor happy.

LAMPRIAS.

And since we are fallen upon this discourse, a man may say, that any thing else whatsoever, is according to common sense rather, than to hold, that without having notice or conception of good, a man may desire and pursue after it; for you see how Chrysippus himselfe driveth Ari∣ston [ 30] into these streights, as to imagine and dreame of a certeine indifference in things tending to that which is neither good nor ill, before that the said good and ill is sufficiently knowen and understood; for so it might seeme that this indifference must needs subsist before if it be so, that a man cannot conceive the intelligence of it, unlesse the good were first understood, which is nothing else but the onely and soveraigne good indeed.

DIADUMENUS.

But consider I pray you, and marke now this indifference * 1.2 taken out of the Stocks schoole, and which they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, after what maner, and whereby it hath given us the meane to ima∣gine and conceive in our minde that good? for if without the said good, it is not possible to conceive and imagine the indifference respective to that which is not good; much lesse the [ 40] intelligence of good things yeeldeth any cogitation unto them, who had not before some prenotion of the good. But like as there is no cogitation, of the art of things which be holsome or breeding sicknesse in them who had not a precogitation before of those things: even so it is impossible for them to conceive the science of good and evill things, who had no fore-conceit what were good and what were evill? What then is good? nothing but prudence; and what is prudence, nothing but science: and so according to that old common proverbe * 1.3 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, Jupiters Corinth; is oftentimes applied unto their maner of reasoning. For let be I pray you, the turning of the pestill round about, because you may not be thought to scoffe and laugh at them, although in trueth their speech is much after that maner; for it seemeth that for the intelligence of good, one hath need to understand prudence: & againe, to seeke for pru∣dence [ 50] in the intelligence of good; being driven to pursue the one alwaies for the other, and so to faile both of the one and the other, which implieth a meere contrariety, in that we must al∣waies understand the thing before, which cannot be understood apart. Besides, there is another way, whereby a man may perceive and see, not the perversion and distortion, but the very ever∣sion and destruction of all their reasons.

They hold that the very substance of good, is the reasonable and considerate election of that which is according to nature; now this election is not considerate which is directed to some

end, as is before said: And what is this? Nothing else say they, but to discourse with reason in the elections of those things which be according to nature. First and formost then, the concep∣tion of the soveraigne good, is perished and cleane gone; for this considerate discoursing in elections, is an operation depending of the habitude of good discourse; and therefore being compelled to conceive this habitude from the end, and the end not without it, we come short of the intelligence of thē both. And againe, that which yet is more, by all the reason in the world, it must needs be that the said reasonable and considerate election, was the election of things good, profitable, and cooperant to the atteining of the end. For to chuse such things, which be neither expedient, nor honourable, nor yet any way eligible; how can it stand with reason: for suppose it were as they say; that the end were a reasonable election of things which have [ 10] some dignity and worthinesse, making unto felicitie. See I beseech you how their discourse and disputation ariseth unto a trim point and goodly conclusion in the end: For the end (say they) is the good discourse, in making choise of those things which have dignity, making unto happinesse. Now when you he are these words, thinke you not my good friend, that this is a ve∣ry strange and extravagant opinion?

LAMPEIAS.

Yes verily; but I would willingly know, how this hapneth?

DIADUMENUS.

Then must you lay your eare close, and harken with great attention, for it is not for every one to conceive this aenigmaticall riddle: But heare you sir, and make me answer: Is not the [ 20] end by their saying, the good discourse in elections according to nature?

DIADUMENUS.

That is their saying.

LAMPRIAS.

And these things which be according to nature, they chuse (doe they not) as good, or ha∣ving some dignities and preferences inducing to the end, or to some other thing else.

DIADUMENUS.

I thinke not so: but surely, to the end.

LAMPRIAS

Having discovered thus much already, see now to what point they are come, namely, that [ 30] then end is to discourse well of felicity.

DIADUMENUS.

They say directly, that they neither have nor conceive any other thing of felicity, but this precious rectitude of discourse touching the elections of things that are of worth. Howbeit some there be who say that all this refutation is directed against Antipater alone, and not the whole sect of the Stoicks, who perceiving himselfe to be urged & hardly pressed by Carneades, fell into these vanities and foolish shifts for his evasion.

Moreover, as touching that which is discoursed and taught in the Stoicks schoole, Of Love, ven against common notions, it concerneth all the Supposts in generall of that sect, who have every one of them their hand in the absurdity thereof: for they avouch that yong youths, are [ 40] foule and deformed, if they be vicious and foolish: but the wise onely are beawtifull: and yet of these that are thus faire and beawtifull, there was never any one yet either beloved, or lovely and amiable. And yet this is not so absurd: but they say moreover, that such as are in love with those who be foule, cease to love them when they are become faire. And who hath ever seene or knowen such a kinde of love which should kindle and shew it selfe presently upon the discovery of the bodies deformity and the soules vice: and incontinently, be quenched and vanish away after the knowledge of passing beawty, together with justice and temperance? And verily such I suppose doe properly resemble these gnats, which love to settle upon vineger, soure wine or the fome thereof: but the good and pleasant potable wine they care not for, but flie from it. As for that emphaticall apparence of beawty (for that is the terme they give it) which they say is the al∣luring [ 50] & attractive bait of love: first and formost it carieth no probability with it nor likelihood of reason. For in those who are most foule and wicked in the highest degree there can be no such emphaticall apparence of that beawty: in case it be so as they say that the leawdnesse of maners 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the face and infecteth the visage: for there be some of them who expound this strange position as strangly, saying that a foule person is worthy to be loved, because there 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 hope and expectance that one day he will become faire: mary when he hath gotten this beawty once, and is withall become good and honest, then he is beloved of no man. For love

say they, is a certaine hunting as it were after a yong body, as yet rude and unperfect, howbeit framed by nature unto vertue.

LAMPRIAS.

And what other thing do we now, my good friend, but refute the errors of their sect, who do thus force, pervert and destroy all our common conceptions with their actions which be sense∣lesse, and their words and termes as unusuall and strange? For there was no person to hinder this love of wise men toward yong folke if affection were away: although all men and women to, both thinke and imagin love to be such a passion, as the woers of Penelope in Homer seeme to acknowledge,

Whose heat of love was such that in their hart [ 10] They wisht in bed to lie with her apart.

Like as Jupiter also said to Juno in another place of the said poet:

Come let us now to bed both goe, and there with sweet delight Solace our selves: for never earst before remember I That any love to women fatre no nor to Goddesse bright Thus tam'd my hart, or prict me so, with them to company.

DIADUMENUS

Thus you see how they expell and drive morall philosophy into such matters as these,

So tntricate and tortuous, So winding qutte throughout [ 20] That nothing sound is therein found, But all turnes round about.

And yet they deprave vilipend, disgrace and flout all others, as if they were the men alone who restored nature and custome into their integrety as it ought to be, instituted their speech accor∣dingly: But nature of it selfe doth divert and induce, by appetitions, pursuits inclinations and impulsions, ech thing to that which is proper and fit for it. And as for the custome of Logicke being so wrangling and contentious as it is, it receiveth no good at all nor profit: like as the eare diseased by vaine sounds is filled with thickenesse and hardnesse of hearing. Of which if you thinke so good we will begin anew and discourse else were another time: but now for this present let us take in hand to run over their naturall philosophy, which no lesse troubleth and [ 30] confoundeth common anticipations and conceptions in the maine principles and most im∣portant points, than their morall doctrine as touching the ends of all things. First and formost this is apparently absurd and against all common sense, to say, that a thing is, & yet hath no be∣ing nor essence: and the things which are not, yet have a being: which though it be most ab∣surd, they affirme even of the universall world: for putting downe this supposition that there is round about the said world a certaine infinit voidnesse, they affirme that the universall world is neither body nor bodilesse: whereupon ensueth that the world is, and yet hath no existence. For they call bodies onely, existent: for as much as it is the property of a thing existent, to doe and suffer somewhat: And seeing this universall nature hath no existence; therefore it shall nei∣ther doe nor suffer ought: neither shall it be in any place, for that which occupieth place is a bo∣die, [ 40] but that universall thing is not a body. Moreover that which occupieth one and the same place is said to remaine and rest: and therefore the said universall nature doth not remaine, for that it occupieth no place: and that which more is, it mooveth not at all, first because that which mooveth ought to be in a place and roome certaine. Againe, because whatsoever mooveth, ei∣ther mooveth it selfe, or else is mooved by another: now that which mooveth it selfe, hath cer∣teine inclinations either of lightnesse or ponderosity: which ponderosity and lightnesse, be ei∣ther certeine habitudes, or faculties & powers, or else differences of ech body: but that universa∣lity, is no body: whereupon it must of necessity follow that the same is neither light nor heavy, and so by good consequence hath in it no principle or beginning of motion; neither shall it be mooved of another, for without & beyond it there is nothing: so that they must be forced to [ 50] say, as they doe indeed, that the said universall nature doth neither rest nor moove. In sum, for that according to their opinion, we must not say in any case that it is a body, and yet the heaven, the earth, the living creatures, plants, men and stones be bodies: that which is no body it selfe shall by these reckonings have parts thereof, which are bodies and that which is not ponderous, shall have parts weightie, and that which is not light, shall have parts light: which is as much against common sense and conceptions, as dreames are not more; considering that there is nothing so evident and agreeable to common sense than this distinction, If any thing be not a∣nimate,

the same is inanimate: and againe, if a thing be not inanimate, the same is animate. And yet this manifest evidence they subvert and overthrow, affirming thus as they do, that this universal frame is neither animate nor inanimate. Over and besides, no man thinketh or imagi∣neth that the same is unperfect, considering that there is no part thereof wanting: and yet they holde it to be unperfect: For (say they) that which is perfect, is finite and determinate; but the whole and universall world, for the infinitenesse thereof is indefinite. So by their saying, some thing there is, that is neither perfect not unperfect. Moreover, neither is the said uni∣versall frame a part, because there is nothing greater than it; nor yet the whole: for that which is whole, must be affirmed like wise to be digested and in order; whereas being as it is, infinite, it is indeterminate and out of order. Furthermore, The other, is not the cause of the universall [ 10] world, for that there is no other beside it; neither is it the cause of The other, nor of it selfe, for that it is not made to do any thing: and we take a cause to be that which worketh an effect. Now set case we should demand of all the men in the world, what they imagine NOTHING to be, and what conceit they have of it, would they not say (thinke you) that it is that which is neither a cause it selfe, nor hath any cause of it; which is neither a part, nor yet the whole; neither perfect nor unperfect; neither having a soule, nor yet without a soule; neither moving nor stil & quiet, nor subsisting; and neither body nor without body? For what is all this, but Nothing? yet, what all others do affirme and verifie of Nothing, the same doe they alone of the universall world: so that it seemeth they make All and Nothing, both one. Thus they must be driven to say, that Time is nothing, neither Praedicable, nor Proposition, nor Connexion, nor Composition, [ 20] which be termes of Logicke, that they use, no Philosophers so much; and yet they say, that they have no existence nor being. But (that which more is) they holde that Trueth, although it be, yet it hath no being nor subsistence, but is comprehended onely by intelligence, is perceptible and beleeved, although it have no jote of effence. How can this be salved and saved, but that it must surpasse the most monstrous absurdity that is? But because it may not be thought that all this smelleth overmuch of the quirks and difficulties in Logicke, let us treat of those which are more proper unto Naturall philosophie. Forasmuch therefore, as

Jupiter is the first, the mids, the last, even all in all, By him all things begin, proceed, and have their finiall.

they themselves give out, they of all men especially ought to have reformed, rectified redressed [ 30] and reduced to the best order, the common conceptions of men as touching the Gods, if haply there had crept into them any errour and perplexed doubt; or if not so, yet at leastwise, to have let every man alone, and left them to the opinion which the lawes and customes of the coun∣treys wherein they were borne, prescribed unto them as touching religion and divinitie.

For neither now nor yesterday These deepe conceits of God began, Time out of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , they have beene ay, But no man knowes, where, how, nor whan.

But these Stoicks having begunne even from the domesticall goddesse Vesta (as the proverbe saith) to alter and change the opinion established and received in every countrey, touching re∣ligion [ 40] and the beliefe of God, they have not left so much as one conceit or cogitation that way sound, syncere and incorrupted. For where is or ever was the man, besides themselves, who doth not conceive in his minde, that God is immortall and eternall? what is more generally ac∣knowledged in our common conceptions as touching the Gods, or what is pronounced with more assent and accord than such sentences as these?

And there the Gods do alwaies joy In heavenly blisse, without annoy.

Also,

In heaven the Gods immort all ever be: On earth below, pooremort all men walke we. [ 50]

Againe,

Exempt from all disease and erasie age, The Gods do live injoy, and paine feele none: They feare no death nor dread the darke passage Over the Frith of roaring Acheron.

There may peradventure be found some barbarous and savage nations, who thinke of no God at all; but never was there man having a conception and imagination of God, who esteemed

him not withall to be immortall and everlasting. For even these vile wretches called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, Atheists, such as Diagor as, Theodor us, and Hippon, godlesse though they were, could never finde in their hearts to say and pronounce, That God was corruptible. Onely, they could not beleeve and be perswaded in their minde, that there was any thing in the world not subject to corruption. Thus howsoever they admitted not a subsistence of immortality & incorrupti∣bility, yet reteined they the common anticipation of the Gods: but Chrysippus & Cleanthes, ha∣ving made the heaven, the earth, the aire and sea to ring againe, as a man would say, with their words, and filled the whole world with their writings of the Gods, yet of so many Gods, they make not one immortall, but Jupiter onely; and in him they spend and consume all the rest: so that this propertie in him, to resolve and kill others, is never a jote better, than to be resolved [ 10] and destroied himselfe. For as it is a kinde of infirmitie, by being changed into another for to die; so it is no lesse imbecillitie to be mainteined and nourished by the resolution of o∣thers into it selfe. And this is not like to many other absurdities collected and gathered by consequence out of their fundamentall suppositions, or inferred upon other affertions of theirs; but even they themselves crie out with open mouth expresly in all their writings, of the gods, of providence, of destiny and nature, that all the gods had a beginning of their ef∣fence, and shall perish and have an end by fire, melted and resolved, as if they were made of waxe or tinne. So that to say that a man is immortall, and that God is mortall, is all one, and the one as absurd and against common sense as the other: nay rather I cannot see what difference there will be betweene a man and God, in case God be defined, a reasonable animall, and cor∣ruptible: [ 20] for if they oppose and come in with this their fine and subtile distinction, that man in deed is mortall, but God not mortall, yet subject to corruption; marke what an inconveni∣ence doth follow and depend thereupon: for of necessity they must say, either that God is im∣mortall and corruptible withall; or else neither mortall nor immortall: then which a man can not (if he would of purpose study for it) devise a more strange and monstrous absurdity. I speake this by other; for that these men must be allowed to say any thing, neither have there escaped their tongues and pens, the most extravagant opinions in the world.

Moreover Cleanthes minding still to fortifie and confirme that burning and conflagration of his, saith: That the sunne will make like unto himselfe, the moone with all other starres, and turne them into him. But that which of all others is most monstrous, the moone and other [ 30] starres, being forsooth gods, worke together with the sunne, unto their owne destruction, and conferre somewhat to their owne inflammation. Now surely this were a very mockerie, and ridiculous thing for us to powre out our praiers and orasons unto them for our owne safety, and to repute them the saviours of men, if it be kinde and naturall for them to make haste unto their owne corruption and dissolution. And yet these men cease not by all the meanes they can to in∣sult over Epicurus, crying, Fie, fie for shame, & redoubling, Out upon him, for that by denying the divine providence, he troubled & confounded the general prenotion and conception mour minds of the gods; for that they are held and reputed by all men, not onely immortall and hap∣py, but also humane and benigne, having a carefull eie, and due regard to the good and welfare of men, as in trueth they have. Now if they who take away the providence of God, doe withall [ 40] abolish the common prenotion of men as touching God; what doe they then, who avouch that the gods indeed have care of us; but yet are helpefull to us in nothing, neither give they us any good things, but such onely as be indifferent; not enduing us with vertue, but bestowing upon us riches, health, procreation of children, and such like, of which there is not one profitable, ex∣pedient, eligible or availeable. Is it not certeine that these 〈◊〉〈◊〉 throw the common concepti∣ons that are of the gods? neither rest they heere, but fall to flouting, frumping, and scoffing, whiles they give out that there is one god, surnamed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the superinten∣dent over the fruits of the earth; another 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the patron of generation; ano∣the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the protectour of plants; another 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the president of physicke and divination; meane while neither is health simply good, nor gene∣ration, [ 50] ne yet fertilitie of the ground and abundance of fruits, but indifferent, yea and unprofi∣table to those who have them.

The third point of the comon conception of the gods is, that they differ in nothing so much from men, as in felicity and vertue: but according to Chrysippus, they are in this respect nothing superior to men: for he holdeth, that for vertue Jupiter is no better than Dion; also that Jupiter & Dion being both of them wise, doe equally and reciprocally helpe one another: for this is the good that the gods doe unto men, and men likewise unto the gods, namely, when they proove

wise and prudent, and not otherwise. So that if a man be no lesse vertuous, he is not lesse hap∣py; insomuch as he is equall unto Jupiter the saviour in felicitie, though otherwise infortunate, and who for grievous maladies and dolorous dismembring of his body, is forced to make him∣selfe away, and leave his life, provided alwaies that he be a wise man. Howbeit, such an one there neither is nor ever hath bene living upon the earth: whereas contrariwise infinit thousands and millions there are and have beene of miserable men and extreme infortunate under the rule and dominion of Jupiter, the government & administration wherof is most excellent. And what can there be more against common sense, than to say, that Jupiter governing and dispensing all things passing well, yet we should be exceeding miserable? If therefore (which unlawfull is once to speake) Jupiter would no longer be a saviour, nor a deliverer, nor a protectour, and sur∣named [ 10] thereupon Soter, Lysius, and Alexicacos, but cleane contrary unto these goodly and beau∣tifull denominations, there can not possibly be added any more goodnesse to things that be, ei∣ther in number or magnitude as they say; whereas all men live in the extremitie of miserie and wickednesse, considering that neither vice can admit no augmentation, nor misery addition: and yet this is not the woorst nor greatest absurdity: but mightily angry and offended they are with Menander for speaking as he did thus bravely in open theater:

I hold, good things exceeding meane degree, The greatest cause of humane miserie.

For this (say they) is against the common conception of men; meane while themselves make God, who is good and goodnesse it selfe, to be the author of evils: for matter could not verily [ 20] produce any evill of it selfe, being as it is without all qualities; and all those differences and vari∣eties which it hath, it received of that which moved and formed it, to wit, reason within, which giveth it a forme and shape, for that it is not made to moove and shape it selfe. And therefore it cannot otherwise be, but that evill if it come by nothing, should proceed and have being from that which is not; or if it come by some mooving cause, the same must be God. For if they thinke that Jupiter hath no power of his owne parts, nor useth ech one according to his owne proper reason; they speake against common sense, and doe imagine a certeine animall, where∣of many parts are not obeisant to his will; but use their owne private actions and operations, whereunto the whole, never gave incitation, nor began in them any motion. For among those creatures which have life and soule, there is none so ill framed and composed, as that against the [ 30] will thereof, either the feet should goe forward, or the tongue speake, or the horne push and strike, or the teeth bite; whereof God of necessity must endure & abide the most part, if against his will, evill men being parts of himselfe doe lie, doe circumvent and beguile others, commit burglary, breake open houses, to rob their neighbors, or kill one another. And if according as Chrysippus saith, it is not possible that the least part should be have it selfe otherwise than it plea∣seth Jupiter, and that every living thing doeth rest, stay, and moove, according as he leadeth, manageth, turneth, staieth and disposeth it:

Now well I wot, this voice of his, Sounds worse and more mischcivous is.

For more tolerable it were by a great deale to say, that ten thousand parts, through the impoten∣cie [ 40] and feeblenesse of Jupiter, committed many absurdities perforce even against his nature and will, than to avouch that there is no intemperance, no deceit and wickednesse, where of Jupiter is not the cause

Moreover seeing that the world by their saying is a city, and the Sarres citizens: if it be so, there must be also tribes and magistracies: yea and plaine it is, that the Sunne must be a Sena∣tour, yea & the evenning starre, some provost, major or governor of the city. And I wot not wel whether he who taketh in hand to confute such things, can broch and set abroad other greater absurdities in naturall matters than those doe, who deliver and pronounce these doctrines. Is not this a position against common sense to affirme, that the seed should be greater and more than that which is engendred of it? For we see verily that nature in all living creatures, and [ 50] plants even those that be of a wilde and savage kinde, taketh very small and slender matters, such as hardly can be seene, for the beginning & the generation of most great and huge bodies. For not onely of a graine or corne of wheat it produceth a stalke with an eare, and of a little grape stone it bringeth forth a vine tree, but also of a pepin, kernill, akorne or bery escaped and fallen by chance from a bird, as if of some sparkle it kindled and set on fire generation, it sen∣deth forth the stocke of some bush or thorne or else a tall and mighty body of an oake, a date or pine tree. And hereupon it is that genetall seed is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in Greeke, as one would say

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the enfolding and wrapping together of a great masse into a small quantity: also nature taketh the name of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as it were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the inflation and defusion of proportions and numbers, which are opened & loosened under it. And againe, the fire which they say is the seed of the world, after that generall conflagration, shall change into the owne seed, the world, which from a smaller body and little masse is extended into a great inflation and defusion, yea and moreover occupieth an infinite space of voidnesse which it filleth by his augmentation: but as it is engendered, that huge greatnesse retireth and setleth anon, by reason that the matter is contracted and gathered into it selfe upon the generation. We may heare them dispute, and reade many of their books, and discourses, wherein they argue and crie out a∣loud against the Academicks, for confounding all things with their Aparalaxies, that is to say, [ 10] indistinguible identities striving and forcing to make in two natures, one endued with the like quality. And yet what man living is their who conceiveth and knoweth not as much? or supposeth not the contrary, namely, that it were a mervellous strange thing & a very absurdity, if neither stocke-dove to stocke-dove, bee to bee, wheat-corne to wheat-corne, and as the com∣mon proverbe goeth, one figge unto another hath bene at all times alike and semblable.

But this in very deed and trueth is cleanc contrary to all common sense, that these men holde and affirme: how in one substance, there be properly and particularly two qualified, and how the same substance having particularly one qualified, when there commeth another to it, recei∣veth and keepeth them both, the one as well as the other. For if we admit two, I avouch it may as well have three, fowre, five and as many as one will name, in one and the same substance, I say [ 20] not in divers parts, but all equally and indifferently, though they were infinit, even in the whole. Now Chrysippus saith, that Jupiter, as also the world, resembleth a man, and providence the soule: when as then that conflagration of the world shall be, Jupiter, who onely of all the gods is im∣mortall, shall retire unto providence, and both twaine shall remaine together in the substance of the skie. But leave we now the gods for this present, and pray we unto them that they would vouchsafe to give unto the Stoicks, a common sense and understanding according with other men, and let us see now what they say as touching the elements. This first and formost standeth not with the received conceit and opinion of the world, that a bodie should be the place of a body, and that one body should enter and pierce through another bodie, considering that nei∣ther the one nor the other containeth vacuity: but that which is full entereth into that which is [ 30] full, and that which hath no distance receiveth into it selfe that which is mingled with it, but that which is full and solid, hath no void distance in it selfe by reason of continuity. And these men verily not thrusting one into one, nor two nor three, nor ten together, but cast all parts of the world cut peece-meale, into one, which they first meet with, even the least that is by sense perceptible: saying moreover that it will containe the greatest that shall come unto it. Thus in a braverie after their old maner in many other things, make of that which convinceth and refel∣leth them, one of their sentences and resolutions, as they who take for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , those things which be repugnant to common sense. And thus upon this supposall, there must needs enfue many monstrous and prodigious positions when they once confusedly mingle whole bo∣dies with whole: and among those absurd paradoxes this also may goe for one, That three be [ 40] fowre. For even that which others bring in & alledge for an exsample of that which cannot fall into mans imagination, they holder for an undoubted trueth: saying, that when one cyath of wine is mingled with two of water, it wanteth not but is equall in the whole, and thus confoun∣ding them together, they bring it so about, that one is made twaine, by the equall mixture of one with two: for that one remaineth, and is spred as much as twaine, making that which is e∣quall to a duple. Now if by the mixture with two, it taketh the measure of two in the defusion, this must needs be the measure together, both of three and of fowre: of three because one is mingled with twaine: and of fower, for that being mingled with twaine, it hath as much in quan∣tity, as those wherewith it is mingled. This fine device hapneth unto them, because they put bo∣dies within a body, and for that it cannot be imagined how they cause one to containe another. [ 50] For, of necessity it must be that bodies making a penetration one within another by mixture, that the one should not containe and the other be contained, nor the one receive and the other be received within. For so this should not be a commixion but a contiguity and touching of superficies one close to another, whiles one entreth within forth, and the other encloseth with∣out, when the other parts remaine pure and entire without mixture, and so shall be one of many divers and differing afunder. But it cannot otherwise be as they would have it, that when there is a mixture, the things mingled, should not be mixed one within another: and that one selfe

same thing being within should not withall be contained: and likewise in receiving, containe a∣nother: and possible it is not, that either the one or the other should be: but fall out it will, that the two which be mingled, should pierce one within the other; neither can so much as one part of the one or the other remaine by it selfe apart, but necessarily they be all full one of ano∣ther. And heere ariseth that legge of Arcesilaus, so much talked of in the schooles, which insulteth and daunceth upon their monstrous absurdities with much laughter; for if these mixtions be through the whole, what should hinder, but that if a legge bee cut off, putri∣fied, cast into the sea, and in processe of time all diffused; not onely the fleet of Antigo∣nus might faile in and thorow it, as said Arcesilaus, but also the 1200. saile of Xerxes, yea and the three hundred gallies of the Greeks might give a navall battell within the said legge? for faile [ 10] it never will to be extended and spread more and more, nor the lesse cease within the greater, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 yet will that mixture ever come to an end, no nor the extremitie of it touch where it will end, and so pierce not thorow the whole, but will give over to be mingled: or if it be not mixed tho∣rowout the whole, surely the said legge will not affoord roome so much as for the Greekes to give a navall battell in it, but even the same must needs putrifie and be changed. But if a cyath of wine, or no more but one drop, falling into the Aegean or Candiot-sea, passe directly into the Ocean, or maine Atlantique sea, it shall not touch onely the superficiall part of the water loft, but spred throughout, in breadth, depth & length. And verily Chrysippus admitteth so much in the very beginning of his first booke as touching Naturall questions, saying that one drop of wine will not faile but be mingled throughout the whole sea. And that we should not marvell [ 20] so much hereat, he saith moreover, that the said drop by the meanes of mixture, will extend throughout the whole world: which is so absurd and without all appearance of reason, as I can∣not devise any thing more. And is not this also against common sense, that in the nature of bo∣dies, there is no supreame, nor first or last, to conclude & determine the magnitude of the body? but that which is proposed as the subject, runneth on still infinitely without end, so as whatso∣ever is added, yet somewhat more seemeth may be put thereto? for we cannot conceive or com∣prehend one magnitude greater or lesse than another, if it be incident to both parts thus to pro∣ceed in infinitum, which is as much as to take away the whole nature of inequalitie. For of two magnitudes that be understood unequall, the one commeth first short of the last parts, and the other goeth beyond and surpasseth; but if there be no inequalitie of length in them, it follow∣eth [ 30] that there will be no unevennesse in the upper superfices nor asperitie: for this unevennesse is nothing else, but the inequalitie of the superficies with it selfe; but asperitie is an inequalitie of the superficies with hardnesse. Of which qualities they allow none, who determine no bodie in an extreme or utmost part, but draw out all still by a multitude of parts infinitly: and yet who knoweth not evidently, that man is compounded of a greater number of parts, than is his fin∣ger, and the world more than a man? for all men know and thinke as much, unlesse they become Stoicks: but proove they once to be Stoickes, they both say and opine the contrarie; namely, that man is not composed of more parts than is his finger, nor the world of more than is man: for section reduceth bodies into infinitum; and in things infinite there is neither more nor lesse; neither is there any multitude that surpasseth; neither shall the parts of that which is left, [ 40] cease to be alwaies subdivided still, yea and to furnish out a multitude of themselves. How then do they wind out of these difficulties and untie these knots? certes, with great slight, verie sub∣tilly and valiantly: for Chrysippus saith, that when we be demaunded, if we have any parts, and how many there be? also whether they be compounded of other, and of how many? we are to flie unto this distinction; supposing and setting downe, that the whole entire bodie, consisteth of head, breast and legges, as if this were all that was demaunded and doubted of. But if they should proceed in their interrogatories to the extreme parts: then saith he, no such answere is to be made, but we are to say, neither that they consist of any certaine parts, nor likewise of how many? neither of infinite nor determinate. But I thinke it were better if I alledged his verie owne words, to the end you may see how he keepeth and observeth the common conceptions, [ 50] forbidding us as he doth, to thinke, imagine or say, of what parts, and how many ech bodie is compounded, and that it consisteth neither of finite or infinite. For if there were a meane be∣tweene finite and infinite, like as there is betweene good and bad, to wit, indifferent; he should pronounce what the same was, and so salve the difficultie. But, if as that which is not equall, incontinently becommeth unequall; and that which is not corruptible, presently is incor∣ruptible; so that which is not finite, is immediately infinit, I suppose, that to say, A bodie is composed of parts neither finit or infinite, is all one as to say, that an argument is composed

neither of true nor of false propositions, and a number neither of even nor odde. But after all this, vaunting himselfe youthfully, he letteth not to say, that whereas a pyramis consisteth of tri∣angles, the side sinclining to the commissure or joint, are unequall, and yet exceed one ano∣ther, in that they be bigger. Thus you see how trimly he kept and observed common concepti∣ons; for if there be any thing greater, and yet surpasseth not, there must be also somewhat lesse, and yet the same faileth not, and so there shall be also somthing unequall, that neither exceedeth nor wanteth, which is as much to say, as it shall be equall and yet unequall, not greater but yet greater, not lesse and yet lesse. See moreover I pray you a little, how he answereth unto Demo∣critus disputing and doubting physically and earnestly, if a cone or round pyramis be cut at the base thereof by the plumb or level, what we ought to conceive and judge as touching the su∣perficies [ 10] of the sections whether they be equal or unequal: for if they be unequal, they wil make the said cone or pyramis uneven; and admitting many deepe rabbotted incisions, and rough asperities in maner of steps and grees: and if they be equall, then the sections also must be e∣quall, and so it will be found that the round pyramis or cone shall have the same befall unto it that a cylinder hath, namely, to consist of circles equall and not unequall, which were very ab∣surd. Herein, making Democritus to be an ignorant person and one who knew not what he said, he commeth in with this, and saith, that the superficies be neither equall nor unequall, but that the bodies be unequall, in that the superficies be neither equall nor unequall. Now to set downe by way of ordinance and to affirme, that allowing the superficies to be unequall, it may fall out, that bodies should not be unequall, were the part of a man who permitteth himselfe to have a [ 20] woonderfull libertie to write and speake whatsoever comes into his head. For both reason and manifest evidence, giveth us to understand quite contrary, namely, that of unequall bodies the superficies also be unequall, and the bigger that a body is, the greater is the superficies, un∣lesse the excesse whereby it surpasseth the smaller, be altogether devoid of a superficies: for if the superficies of greater bodies exceed not those of the lesser, but rather faile before they come to an end, then we must of necessitie say, that a part of that bodic which hath an end, is without end, and not determinate: for if hee alledge and say that hee is driven perforce thereunto, lest the inequalitie of superficies might seeme to make unequall incisions, there is no such cause why hee should feare: for those rabbotted incisions which hee suspecteth in a cone or round Pyramis, it is the inequalitie of the bodies, and not of the superficies that [ 30] causeth them. So that it were a ridiculous follie, by taking away the superficies, for to be convinced to leave an inequalitie and unevennesse of the bodies. But to persist still in this matter, what can there be more contrary to common conception, than to faine and devise such stuffe? for if we admit that one superficies is neither equall nor unequall to another, wee we may consequently affirme, that neither magnitude is equall or unequall, nor number either even or odde; considering that we can not set downe nor conceive in our minde, any meane be∣tweene unequall and unequall, which is neuter. Moreover, if there were any superficies neither equall nor unequall, what should let but that we may imagine circles also neither equall nor un∣equall? for verily these superficies of the sections of cones or round Pyramides, be circles: and if we allow thus much in circles, then we may aswell admit so much of the Diameters of circles, [ 40] namely, that they be neither equall nor unequall. And if this goe for good, of angles likewise and triangles, of Parallelograms, and of superficies parallel or equally distant. For if longitudes be neither equall nor unequall one to another, then shall not weight, nor percussion, no nor bo∣dies be equall or unequall. Furthermore, how dare they reproove those who bring in vacuities, and certeine indivisible bodies mainteining combat one against another, supposing that they neither stirre nor stand still; when as they themselves mainteine that such propositions as these be false? If any things be not equall one to the other, the same be unequall one to the other: and these things here be not equall one to the other; neither are they unequall one to the other. But forasmuch as he saith, that there is something greater, which notwithstanding surpasseth not; it were good reason therefore to doubt and demand, whether the same be agreeable and [ 50] fitting one to the other? and if they agree, how then can either of them be the bigger? Now if it be not sortable, how is it possible that the one should not exceed, and the other come short? for these things can not hang together, to say, that neither the one nor the other surpasseth: and it agreeth not with the greater: or it agreeth, and yet the one is greater than the other. For of necessitie it must follow, that those who reteine not nor observe common conceptions, be troubled with such perplexities.

Over and besides, it is against all common sense, to say that no one thing toucheth another:

as also, that bodies touch one another, and yet do in no part touch. Now it must needs be, that they admit this, who allow not the least parts of a body, and so they suppose alwaies something before that which seemeth to touch, and never cease to passe on farther still: which is the thing that they principally object against those, who defend & maintein the indivisible parcels called 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ; namely, that there is no totall touching, but that it is a mixture, considering that such indivisible bodies have no parts. How is it then, that they themselves fall not into the like in∣convenience, seeing they admit no part to be either first or last? for that they say, bodies doe touch one another mutually in the whole by a certeine terme or extremity, and not by a part, and the said terme or point is no body. Then a body shall touch a body, by a thing which is no body: and contrariwise, shall not touch, the incorporall being betweene. And if it touch, it [ 10] shall do likewise and suffer somewhat, being it selfe a body, by that which is incorporall and no body. For the propertie of bodies, is to do and suffer somewhat mutually, yea, and to touch one another: and if the body have a touching in part by the meanes of that which is incorporall, it shall likewise have a generall and totall connexion, even a mixtion and incorporation. Againe, in these connexions and mixtures, necessarie it is that termes or extremities of bodies, either continue or not continue, but perish: but both the one and the other is against common sense. For even they themselves allow not corruptions and generations of things incorporall: and impossible it is, that there should be a mixtion or totall touching of bodies reteining still their proper termes and extremities. For it is this terme or extremity that determineth and consti∣tuteth the nature of a body: and as for mixtions (if there were no approching nor application of [ 20] parts to parts) they confound all things wholly which are mixed. And as these men say, we must admit the corruption of extremities in mixtures; and likewise againe, their generations, in the distractions & separations of them. But no man there is able to comprehend this easily: for in regard that bodies touch one another, they also are pressed, thrust and crushed one by the other. And impossible it is, that a thing incorporall should suffer or do thus; neither can we imagine so much: yet would they constraine us to thinke no lesse. For if a sphaere or boule touch a flat or plaine bodie onely by a point, certeine it is, that it may be trained and rolled along the said plaine or flat body, by a point. And if the foresaid boule be painted in the superficies therof with vermillion, it shall imprint a red line onely upon the same plaine body; and being yellow, or of a firie colour, it shall likewise give the same tincture to the superficies of the flat bodie. [ 30] Now that a thing incorporall should either give or take a colour, is against all common sense. And if we imagine a boule of earth, of Crystall or glasse, to fall from on high upon a smooth bodie of stone, it were against all reason to thinke that it would not breake the same into pieces, namely, when as it shall light upon that which is solide, hard, and able to make resistance: but more unreasonable it were to say, that it were broken by a terme or point that is incorporall: in such maner, as in every sort, their anticipations & common conceptions as touching things in∣corporall and bodies, must needs be troubled and confounded, or rather utterly abolished, in supposing thus many things impossible.

Against common sense it is to say, that there is a future time, and a time past, but none at all present; as also, that the time which was erewhile and not long since, hath a subsistence, whereas [ 40] that which now is hath no being at all. And yet this is an usuall and ordinary matter with these Stoicke philosophers, who admit not the least time that is betweene, and will not allow the pre∣sent to be indivisible; but of all that which a man doeth thinke and imagine as present, they af∣firme the one part to be of that which is already past, and the other of the future; insomuch as there remaineth and is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the mids no piece at all of the time present; in case of that which is said to be the very instant, part is attributed unto things past, and part to things to come; whereupon of necessitie one of these twaine must follow, that either in admitting the tense, It was; or It shalbe; the tense It is, must wholly be abolished, or in admitting the present time, It is, one part thereof is past, and the other to come: as also to say, that of that which is, part is yet fu∣ture, and part already past: likewise of that which now is present, one parcell is before, and ano∣ther [ 50] behinde; in such sort as present, is that which yet is not present, and not present any more; for that is not present any longer, which is already past; nor present at all, which is yet to come: And thus in dividing the present, they must also needs say, that of the yeere and of the light, part was of the yeere past, and part of the yeere to come; likewise of that which is together and at once, there is some before, and some after: For no lesse troubled are they, in hudling and confounding after a strange maner these termes, Not yet, Already, No more, Now & not now, as if they were all one; whereas other men doe conceive and thinke, that these tearmes, Ere

while, or not long since, & a while after or anon, are different parts from the present time, setting the one before, & the other after the said present. And among these, Archidemus who affirmeth that the present Now, is a certeine beginning, joint or commissure of that which is already past and neere at hand to come, seeth now how in so saying, he utterly abolisheth all time; for were it true that Now is no time, but onely a terme of extremity of time & that every part of time is as it were Now, it would seem then, that this present Now, hath no part at al, but is resolved wholy into ends & extremities, joints, commissures, & beginnings. As for Chrysippus willing to shew himselfe witty & artificial in his divisions, in that treatise which he composed as touching void∣nesse, and in other places affirmeth, that the Past and the Future of time subsisteth not, but hath subsisted; and that the present onely hath being: But in the third, fourth, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 books of Parts, he [ 10] avoucheth, that of the instant or present, part is Future, & part Past; in such sort as by this means he divideth the substance of time, into those parts of subsistent, which are not subsistent, or to speake more truely, he leaveth no part at al subsistent, if the instant & present hath no part at al, which is not either past or to come: and therefore the conceit that these men have of time, re∣sembleth properly the holding of water in a mans hand, which runneth and sheddeth the more, by how much harder it is pressed together. Come now unto actions and motions, all light and evidence is by them darkned, troubled, and confounded; for necessarily it ensueth, that if the Instant or present is divided into that which is past, and to come, part of that which now moo∣veth at this instant, should partly be moved already, and in part to remoove afterwards, and withall, that the beginning and end of motion should be abolished: also that of no worke there [ 20] should be any thing first or last, all actions being distributed and dispersed together with time: for like as they say, that of the present, some is past, and some to come: even so of every action in doing, some part is already done, and other resteth to be done. When had then beginning, or when shal have end, To dine, to write, & to go, if every man who dineth, hath dined already, and shall dine; and whosoever goeth, hath gone and shall go? and that which is (as they say) of al absurdities most monstrous, if it be granted, that he who now liveth, hath lived already, & shal live; life had neither beginning, nor ever shall have end: but every one of us as it should seeme by this reckoning, was borne without beginning of life, & shall die without giving over to live: for if there be no extreme part, but ever as one that now liveth shal have somewhat of the pre∣sent remaining for the future, it will never be untruely said; Socrates shal live, so long as it shal be [ 30] truely said, Socrates liveth; so that as often as it is true, Socrates liveth, so often it is false, Socrates is dead. And therefore if it be truely said in infinit parts of time, Socrates shall live; in no part of time shal it ever be truly said, Socrates is dead. And verily what end shal there be of any worke? & where shal any action stay & cease, in case as often as it shall be truly said; a thing is now doing, so often likewise it shall be truly said, It shall be done: for lie he shall who saith, This is the end of Plato writing or disputing; for that one day Plato shall cease to write or dispute: if at no time it be a lie to say, of him that disputeth, He shall dispute; or of him who writeth, He shall write. Moreover, of that which is done, there is no part, which either is not finished already, or shall be finished, and either is past or to come. Besides, of that which is already done, or of that which shal be done, of that which is past or future, there is no sense. And so in one word, and to speake [ 40] simply, there is no sense of any thing in the world; for we neither see nor heare that which is past or to come; ne yet have we any sense of things which have bene or which shall be; no nor although a thing should be present, is it perceptible & subject to sense, in case that which is pre∣sent, be partly to come, and in part past already; if I say one part thereof hath beene, and ano∣ther shall be: and yet they themselves cry out upon Epicurus, as if he committed some great in∣dignitie, and did violence to common conceptions, in mooving as he doeth all bodies with equall celerity, and admitteth no one thing swifter than another: But farre more intolerable it is, and farther remot from common sense to hold, that no one thing can reach or overtake another:

No not although Adrastus horse [ 50] So swift, a Tortois flow should course.

according as we say in our common proverbe: which must of necessity fall out, if things move according to Before and Behind; and in case the intervals which they passe through, be divisi∣ble into infinit parts, as these men would have them: for if the tortoise be but one furlong be∣fore the horse, they who divide the said interval or space betweene into infinit parts, and moove both the one and the other according to Prius and Posterius, shall never bring the swiftest close unto the slowest, for that the slower alwaies winneth some space or interval, before that which is

divisible, into other infinit intervals. And to say, that water which is powred forth out of a cup or boll, shall never be powred all cleane out; how can this chuse but be against common sense? & doeth not this consequently follow upon those things that these men avouch? for never shall a man comprehend or conceive that the motion of things infinitly divisible, according to be∣fore, hath fully performed the whole intervall, but leaving alwaies some space divisible, it will evermore make all the effusion, all the running foorth or shedding of the liquor, all the motion of a solid body; or the fall of a weighty poise, to be imperfect. I let passe many absurdities de∣livered in their doctrine; and touch those onely, which are directly against common sense.

As for the question touching augmentation, it is very auncient: For according as Chrysip∣pus saith; it was by Epicharmus put foorth. And for that the Academicks thought it to be not [ 10] very easie and ready all of a sudden to be cleered; these men come with open mouth against them, accusing them for overthrowing all anticipations, whereas they themselves keepe not at all the common conceptions: and that which more is, pervert the very senses. For whereas the question is plaine and simple; these men grant and allow such suppositions as these, that al par∣ticular substances flow and runne, partly by yeelding and sending foorth somewhat out of themselves, and in part by receiving other things from without; and that by reason of the num∣ber and multitude of that which comes in, or goes out, things continue not one and the same, but become altered and divers by the foresaid additions and detractation, so as their substance receiveth a change. Also that contrary to all right and reason, custome hath so farre prevailed, that such mutations be called augmentations and diminutions: whereas rather they ought to be [ 20] termed generations, and corruptions, for that they force an alteration of one present state and being, into another; but to grow and diminish are passions and accidents of a body, and sub∣ject that is permanent. Which reasons and assertions being after a sort thus delivered in their schooles, what is it that these defenders of Perspicuity and Evidence, these canonicall refor∣mers (I say) of common notions would have? namely, that every one of us should be double like twinnes, or of a two-fold nature: not as the poets feigned the Molionides, to be in some parts 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and united, and in other severed and disjoined, but two bodies, having the same colour, the same shape, the same weight and place: a thing that no man ever saw before: mary these Philosophers onely have perceived this duplicity, this composition and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ; whereby every one of us are two subjects, the one being substance, the other * * [ 30] the one of them runneth and floweth continually, and yet without augmentation and di∣minution, or remaining in the same state such as it is; the other continueth still, and yet grow∣eth and decreaseth, and yet suffreth all things quite contrary to the other, wherewith it is con∣corporate, united, and knit, leaving to the exteriour sense no shew of distinct difference. And yet verily it is said of that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , how in old time hee had so quicke and piereing an eie∣sight, that he was able to see through stocks and stones. And one there was by report, who fit∣ting in Sicily, could from a watch-tower sensibly discerne the shippes sailing out of the haven of Carthage, which was distant a day & a nights failing with a good forewind. And as for Callicra∣tes and Myrmecides, they have the name to have made chariots so smal, as that the wings of a fly might cover them: yea & in a millet graine or sesam seed to have engraven Homers verses. But [ 40] surely this perpetuall fluxion & diversity in us, there was never any yet that could divide & di∣stinguish: neither could we our selves ever find that we were double, & that partly we ranne out continually, and in part againe remained alwaies one and the same, even from our nativity to our end. But I am about to deale with them more simply and plainly; for whereas they devise in every one of us foure subjects, or to speake more directly, make ech of us to be foure, it shall suffice to take but two, for to shew their absurditie. When we doe heare Pentheus in a tragedy saying, that he seeth two Sunnes, and two cities of Thebes, we deeme of him, that he seeth not two, but that his eies doe dazzell and looke amisse, having his discourse troubled, and under∣standing cleane transported. And even these persons, who suppose and set downe, not one city alone, but all men, all beasts, all trees, plants, tooles, vessels, utensils, and garments, to be [ 50] double, and composed of two natures; reject wee not and bid farewell, as men who would force us not to understand any thing aright, but to take every thing wrong? Howbeit, hap∣ly heerein they might be pardoned and winked at, for feining and devising other natures of sub∣jects, because they have no meanes else, for all the paines they take, to mainteine and preserve their augmentations: But in the soule, what they should aile, what their meaning might be, and upon what grounds and suppositions, they devised to frame other different sorts and formes of bodies, and those in maner innumerable, who is able to say? or what may be the cause, unlesse

they ment to displace, or rather to abolish and destroy altogether the common and familiar conceptions, inbred in us, for to bring in and set up new fangles, and other strange and forren novelties? For this is woonderfull extravagant and absurd, for to make bodies of vertues and vices, and besides of sciences, arts, memories, fansies, apprehensions, passions, inclinations and assents: and to affirme that these neither lie, nor have any place subsisting in any subject, but to leave them one little hole like a pricke within the heart, wherein they range and draw in, the principall part of the soule, and the discourse of reason, being choked up as it were with such a number of bodies, that even they are not able to count a great sort of them, who seeme to know best how to distinguish and discerne one from another. But to make these not onely bodies, but also living creatures, and those endued with reason, to make (I say) a swarme of them, & the [ 10] same not gentle, mild, & tame, but a turbulent sort & rable by their malicious shrewdnesse, op∣posit & repugnant to al evidence, & usual custome, what wanteth this of absurdity in the highest degree. And these men verily do hold that not onely vertues & vices be animall and living crea∣tures, nor passions alone, as anger, wrath, envy, griefe, sorrow & malice, nor apprehensions one∣ly, fantasies, imaginations, and ignorances, nor arts and mysteries, as the shoomakers & smiths∣craft: but also over and besides al these things, they make the very operations and actions them∣selves to be bodies, yea and living creatures: they would have walking to be an animall dancing likewise, shoping, saluting, and reprochfull railing: and so consequently they make laughing & weeping to be animall. And in granting these, they admit also, coughing, sneesing and groa∣ning, yea and withall, spitting, reaching, snitting and snuffing of the nose and such like actions, [ 20] which are as evident as the rest. And let them not thinke much and take it grievously, if they be driven to this point by way of particular reasonning, calling to minde Chrysippus, who in his third booke of Naturall questions saith thus: What say you of the night, is it not a body: eve∣ning, morning, midnight, are they not bodies? Is not the day a body? The new moone is it not a bodie? the tenth, the fifteenth, the thirtieth day of the moone, the moneth it selfe, Summer, Autumne, and the whole yeere, be they not bodies? Certes all these things by me named they hold with tooth and naile, even against common prenotions: But as for these hereafter, they maintaine contrary to their owne proper conceptions, when as they would produce the hottest thing that is by refrigeration, and that which is most subtile by inspissation. For the soule is a substance most hot and consisting of most subtill parts: which they would make by the refrige∣ration [ 30] and condensation of the body, which as it were by a certaine perfusion and tincture it hardeneth & altereth the spirit, from being vegetative to be animate. They say also that the Sun is become animate, by reason of the moisture turned into an intellectuall and spirituall fire. See how they imagin the Sun to be engendred and produced by refrigeration? Xenophanes, when one came upon a time and tolde him that he had seene Eeles to live in hot scalding water, Why doe we not seethe them then (quoth he) in colde water? If therefore they will cause heat by re∣frigeration, and lightnesse by astriction and condensation: it foloweth on the other side againe, by good consequence, that by keeping a certaine proportion and correspondensie in absurdity, they make heat by colde, thickning by dissolving, and waighty things by rarefaction. As for the very substance and generation of common conception and sense, doe they not determine [ 40] it even against common sense it selfe? For conception is a certaine phantasie or apprehension: and this apprehension is an impression in the soule. The nature of the soule is an exhalation, which by reason of the rarity thereof can hardly receive an impression: and say that it did re∣ceive any, yet impossible it were to keepe and retaine it. For the nutriment and generation of it consisting of moist things, holdeth a continuall course of succession and consumption. The commerce also and mixture of respiration with the aire, engendreth continually some new ex∣halation turning and changing by the flux of aire comming in and going forth reciprocally. For a man may imagin rather that a river of runing water keepeth the formes, figures & images imprinted therein, than a spirit caried in vapours & humors, to be mingled with another spirit or breath from without continually, as if it were idle and strange unto it. But so much forget [ 50] they or misunderstand themselves, that having defined cōmon conceptions to be certaine intel∣ligences laid up apart: memories to be firme permanent, & habituall impressions having fixed sciences likewise, every way fast and sure, yet within a while after they set under al this a founda∣tion and base, of a certaine slippery substance, easie to be dissipated, caried continually, and ever going and comming to and fro. Moreover this notion and conception of an element and principle, all men have imprinted in their minde, that it is pure, simple, not mingled nor com∣pofed:

for, that which is mixed, cannot be an element nor a principle, but rather that, whereof it is mixed and composed.

Howbeit these men devising God the principle of all things to be a spirituall bodie, and a minde or intelligence seated in matter, make him neither pure nor simple, nor uncompound, but affirme that he is composed of another and by another. As for matter, being of it selfe with∣out reason and void of all quality, it carieth with it simplicity, and the very naturall propertie of a principle: and God, if it be true, that he is not without body and matter, doth participate of matter as of a principle. For if reason and matter, be all one and the same, they have not done well to define matter for to be reasonlesse: but if they be things different, then doth God consist of both twaine, and not of a simple essence, but compounded, as having taken to his intellectu∣all [ 10] substance a bodily nature out of matter. Furthermore, considering they call these fower primitive bodies, to wit, earth, water, aire and fire, the first elements, I can not see how they should make some of them simple, and others mixed or compound: for they hold, that the earth and water cannot containe either themselves or any other, and that it is the participation of spirit and fellowship of fire, whereupon dependeth the preservation of their unity: as for the aire and fire by their owne power they fortifie themselves, which being medled with the other two, give them their force vigor and firmitude of substance. How is it then, that either earth is an element or the water, seeing neither of them both is simple, first, or sufficient to keepe and preserve it selfe, but having need of another without to containe them alwaies in their being and to save them? for they have not left so much as any thought that they be a substance. But surely [ 20] this reason of theirs as touching the earth, that it consisteth of it selfe, containeth much confu∣sion and great uncertainty, for if the earth be of it selfe, how commeth it to passe that it hath need of the aire, to binde and conteine it? for so it is no more earth of it selfe, nor water; but the aire hath by thickning & hardning matter, made thereof the earth: and contrariwise, by dis∣solving and mollifying it, hath created the water: and therefore we may inferre thus much, that neither of these is an element, seeing that some other thing hath given them their essence and generation. Over and besides, they affirme, that substance and matter are subject to qualities, and so in maner doe yeeld their limit and definition: and then on the other side, they make the said qualities to be bodies; wherein there is a great confusion: for if qualities have a certeine proper substance, whereby they are termed and be really bodies indeed, they require no other substance, for that they have one of their owne: but if they have this onely under them which is [ 30] common, and which they call essence or matter, certeine it is, that they doe but participate of the bodie; for bodies they are not. For that which is in the nature of the subject and doeth re∣ceive, must of necessitie differ from those things which it receiveth, and whereof it is the subject. But these men see by the halfe; for they terme the matter 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, without qualities: but they will not name the qualities 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, void of matter. And yet how is it possi∣ble to make a body without quality, but wee must imagine a quality without a bodie? for that reason, which coupleth a body with all maner of qualities, permitteth not the thought to com∣prehend any body without some qualitie. Either therefore he that fighteth against a bodilesse qualitie, seemeth to resist likewise a matter void of qualitie; or if he separate the one from the o∣ther, hee parteth and divideth them both asunder. And as for that reason which some of them [ 40] seeme to pretend, as touching a substance which they name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not because it is void of all qualitie, but because it is capable forsooth of every qualitie; it is contrary to common notion, and nothing so much. For no man taketh or imagineth that to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, un∣qualified, which is participant of al qualities and uncapable of none; nor impassible, that which is apt to receive and suffer every passion; nor immoovable, which is moovable every way. And as for this doubt, it is not solved, that howsoever we alwaies understand mat∣ter with some quality, yet we conceive withall, that matter and qualitie [ 50] be different one from the other.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Or pieces of come having the forme of∣an ox stam∣ped upon them.
• * 1.2

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.3

  A by-word which noteth the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of fault in arguing, called 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 like as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 also of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 round within the motter.