The philosophie, commonlie called, the morals vvritten by the learned philosopher Plutarch of Chæronea. Translated out of Greeke into English, and conferred with the Latine translations and the French, by Philemon Holland of Coventrie, Doctor in Physicke. VVhereunto are annexed the summaries necessary to be read before every treatise

PLATONIQVE QVE∣STIONS. [ 10]

The Summarie.

IN these gatherings, Plutarch expoundeth the sense of divers hard places, which are found in the disputations of Socrates, conteined in the Dialogues of Plato his disciple, but especially in Timaeus; which may serve to allure yoong students to the reading of that great Philosopher, who under the barke of words, hath delivered grave and pleasant matters.

PLATONIQUE QUESTIONS. [ 20]

1

What is the reason, that God other-whiles commanded Socrates to do the part of a Midwife, in hel∣ping others to be delivered of child-birth, but for had himselfe in any wise to procreate children? according as it is written in a treatise entituled Theaetetus. For we ought not to thinke that if he had 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 to cavill, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or to speake ironically in this place, he would have abused the name of God. Besides, in this selfe same treatise he attributeth many other high and magnificall speeches unto Socrates, & namely this among many others: Certes (quoth he) there be many men [ 30] (right good sir) who cary this minde to me-ward, that they are disposed plainly to carpe and bite me, in case at any time I seeme to rid them of any foolish opinion that they have, neither thinke they that I do it of good will and meaning well unto them; shewing themselves herein far short of this doctrine, That no God beareth evill will to men: no more verily do I this unto them upon any malice: but surely I can not otherwise chuse, neither doe I thinke it lawfull for me either to smoother up and pardon a lie, or to dissemble and suppresse a trueth.

IS it for that he tearmeth his owne nature, as being more judicious and inventive, by the name of God? like as Menander doth, saying:

This minde, this our intelligence. [ 40] In trueth is of divine essence.

And Heraclitus:

Mans nature we must needs confesse, Is heavenly and a god doubtlesse.

Or rather in very trueth, there was some divine and celestiall cause, which suggested and inspired into Socrates this maner of philosophy; whereby sifting as hee did continually, and exami∣ning others, he cured them of all swelling pride, of vaine errour, of presumptuous arrogancy; likewise of being odious, first to themselves, and afterwards to those about them of their com∣pany: for it fortuned about his time, that a number of these sophisters swarmed over all Greece, [ 50] unto whom yong gentlemen resorting & paying good summes of money for their salary, were filled with a great weening and opinion of themselves, with a vaine perswasion of their owne learning and zelous love to good letters, spending their time in idle disputations, and frivolous contentions, without doing any thing in the world, that was either good, honest, or profita∣ble. Socrates therefore, who had a speciall gift by his maner of speech and discourse, as it were by some purgative medicine, to argue and convince, was of greater authority and credit when

he confuted others, in that he never affirmed nor pronounced resolutely any thing of his owne; yea, and he pierced deeper into the soules and hearts of his hearers, by how much he seemed to seeke out the trueth in common, and never to favorize and mainteine any opinion of his owne: for this begetting of a mans owne fansies, mightily empeacheth the facultie and power to judge another, for evermore the lover is blinded in the behalfe of that which he loveth: and verily there is nothing in the world that loveth so much the owne, as a man doth the opi∣nions and reason whereof himselfe was the father; for surely that distribution and partition among children which is commonly said to be most and equall, is in this case of opinions and reasons most unjust; for in the former every one must take his owne, but in this hee ought to chuse the better, yea, though it were another mans: and therefore once againe, he that fathereth [ 10] somewhat of his owne, becommeth the worse judge of other mens: And like as there was some∣time a sophister or great learned man, who said: That the Elians would be the better umpires and judges of the sacred Olympick games, in case there were never any Elian came in place to performe his prizes; even so, he that would be a good president to sit and determine of divers sentences and opinions; no reason there is in the world that he should desire to have his owne sentence crowned, no nor to be one of the parties contending, and who in truth are to be jud∣ged by him. The Grecian captaines after they had defaited the Barbarians, being assembled in counsell to give their voices unto those whom they deemed woorthy of reward and honour, for their prowesse; judged themselves all to have done the best service, and to be the most valorous warriours. And of philosophers I assure you there is not one but he would doe as much, un∣lesse [ 20] it were Socrates and such as he, who confesse that they neither have, nor know ought of their owne: for these in truth be they who onely shew themselves to be uncorrupt, and compe∣tent judges of the truth, and such as cannot be chalenged: for like as the aire within our eares if it be not firme and steady, nor cleere without any voice of the owne, but full of singing sounds, and ringing noises, cannot exactly comprehend that which is said unto us; even so, that which is to judge of reasons in philosophie, if it meet with any thing that resoundeth and keepeth an hammering within, hardly will it be able to understand that which shall be delivered without foorth: for the owne particular opinion which is domesticall and dwelleth at home, of what matter soever it be that is treated of, will alwaies be the philosopher that hitteth the marke, and toucheth the truth best; whereas all the rest shall be thought but to opine probably the trueth. [ 30] Moreover, if it be true that a man is not able perfectly to comprise or know any thing, by good right and reason then did God forbid him to cast forth these false conceptions as it were of untrue and unconstant opinions, and forced him to reproove and detect those who ever had such: for no small profit, but right great commoditie comes by such a speech as is able to deli∣ver men from the greatest evill that is, even the spirit of error, of illusion and vanitie in opi∣nion:

So great a gift as God of spectall grace, Gave never to Asclepius his race,

For the physicke of Socrates was not to heale the body, but to clense and purifie the soule, feste∣stered inwardly and corrupt. Contrariwise, if it be so, that the trueth may be knowen, and that [ 40] there be but one truth, he who learned it of him that found it not out, hath no lesse than the in∣venter himselfe; yea, & better receiveth it he, who is not perswaded that he hath it: nay, he recei∣veth that which is simply best of all: much like as hee who having no naturall children of his owne body begotten, taketh the best that he can chuse, for to make his adopted childe. But con∣sider heere with me, whether other kinds of learning deserve not haply to have much study im∣ploied in them, as namely, Poetry, Mathematicks, the art of Eloquence, and the opinions of Sophisters and great clerks: Therefore God of that divine power whatsoever, forbad Socrates to engender them; but as touching that which Socrates esteemed to be the onely wisedome, to wit, the knowledge of God and spirituall things, which hee himselfe calleth the amorous sci∣ence, [ 50] there be no men that beget or invent it, but call the same onely to remembrance: whereupon Socrates himsele never taught any thing, but proposing onely unto yoong men cer∣teine beginning of difficulties and doubts, as it were the fore throwes of child-birth, stirred up, awakened, and drew foorth their owne naturall wits, and inbred intelligences: and this was it that he called the midwives art, which brought nothing into them from without, as others would make them beleeve, who conferred with them, that they infused reason and understan∣ding, but shewed onely and taught them, that they had already within themselves a minde and

understanding of their owne, and the same sufficient to nourish, though it were confused and unperfect.

2

What is the reason that in some places he called the soveraigne God, father and maker of all things?

WAs it for that he is in trueth the father of gods, such as were ingendred, and also of men, as Homer calleth him, like as the maker of those creatures which have neither reason nor soule? for according as Chryisppus saith, we use not to cal him the father of the secondine where∣in the infant is inwrapped within the wombe, who conserred genetall seed, although the said se∣condine be made of the seed.

Or useth he not a metaphor, as his maner is, when figuratively he tearmeth him Father of the [ 10] world, who is the efficient cause, according to his usuall maner of speaking; as namely, in the Dialogue entituled Symposium, where he maketh Phaedrus the father of amatorious discourses, for that he it was, who proposed and set abroad the same: like as he named Callipedas in a dia∣logue bearing his name, The father of philosophicall discourses, for that there passed many beautifull speeches in philosophy, whereof he ministred the occasion and beginning?

Or rather was it not, because there is a difference betweene father and maker, as also betweene generation and creation? for whatsoever is ingendred, is made, but not è conversò; whatsoever is made, is likewise ingendred: semblably, who hath begotten, hath also made; for generation is the making of a living creature: but if we consider a workeman, to wit, either a mason or carpen∣ter, a weaver, a lute maker, or imager; certes, the worke is distinct and separate from the maker: [ 20] whereas the mooving principle, and the puissance of him who begetteth, is infused into that which is begotten; it conteineth his nature, being as it were a parcell distracted from the very substance of him who ingendred it. Forasmuch then, as the world doth not resemble a conjun∣ction of many pieces, set, joined, fastened and glued together; but hath in it a great portion of the animall life, yea, and of divinity, which God hath infused and mingled in the matter, as deri∣ved from his owne nature and substance; good reason it is therefore, that he should be surna∣med both the father and maker of the world, being a living creature as it is. These points being very conformable and proportionate to the opinion of Plato, consider withall a little, if this also which I shall deliver, be not likewise accordant thereunto; namely, that the world being com∣posed of two parts, to wit, of body and of soule: the one, which is the body, God hath not ingen∣dred; [ 30] but having the matter thereof exhibited unto him, he hath formed, shaped and fitted it, binding and limiting it according to the infinitie thereof, with termes, bounds and figures pro∣per thereto: but the soule having a portion of understanding discourse of reason, order and har∣monie, is not onely the worke, but also a part of God, not by him, but even of him, and issuing from his owne proper substance. In his booke therefore of Politiques or Common wealth, ha∣ving divided the whole world, as it were a line into two segments or sections unequall, he sub∣divideth either section into other twaine, after the same proportion: for two generall kinds he maketh of all things; the one sensible and visible, the other intelligible: unto the intelligible kinde he attributeth in the first degree the primitive formes and Ideae; in the second degree, the [ 40] Mathematicks: and as for the sensible kinde, he attributeth thereto in the first ranke, all solide bodies; and in the second place, the images and figures of them. Also to every one of these foure members of his said division, he giveth his owne proper judge: to the first of Idaees, under∣standing; to the Mathematicks, imagination; to the solide bodies, faith and beleefe; to the i∣mages and figures, conjecture. To what end then, and upon what intention hath he divided the whole world into two sections, and the same unequall? and of those two sections, whether is the greater, that of sensible objects, or that of intelligible? As for himselfe, he hath not shewed and declared it: but presently it wil appeare, that the portion of sensible things is the greater: for the indivisible substance is of things intellectuall, being evermore of one sort, and resting upon the same subject in one state, and reduced to very short and narrow roome, and the same pure and neat: whereas the other being spread and wandering upon bodies, is that section of sensible [ 50] things. Moreover, the propertie of that which is incorporall, is to be definite and determinate. And a bodie as touching the matter thereof, is indefinite and undeterminate; becomming sen∣sible, when by participation of the intelligible it is made finite and limitable. Over and besides, like as every sensible thing hath many images, many shadowes, and many figures, and general∣ly, out of one onely patterne there may be drawen many copies and examples, imitated as well

by art as by nature; so it can not chuse, but the things that here be sensible, should be more in nūber than they above, which are intelligible, according to the opinion of Plato, supposing this, that things sensible be as it were the images and examples of the originall patterns, to wit, the intelligible Ideae. Furthermore, the intelligence of these Idaees and formes by substraction, de∣duction and division of bodies, is ranged answerable to the order of the Mathematicks, arising frō Arithmeticke which is the science of Numbers, into Geometry, to wit, the skill of measures; then afterwards to Astrologie, which is the knowledge of the stars, & in the highest place above all the rest, setteth Harmonicae, which is the skill of sounds and accords: for the subject of Geo∣metrie is this, when as to quantity in generall, there is adjoined magnitude in length & bredth: of Stereometrie, when to the magnitude of length and bredth, there is added depth or profundi∣tie. [ 10] Likewise, the proper subject of Astrology is this, when to the solid magnitude there cōmeth motion. The subject of harmony or musick, when to a bodie moving, there is adjoined sound or voice. If we subtract then and take away, from moving bodies, voice; from solid bodies, motion; from superficies, depth and profundity; and from quantities, magnitude; we shall come by this time to the intelligible Ideae which have no difference among them, in regard of one and sole thing: for unitie maketh no number, unlesse it come once to touch binarie or two, which is infi∣nite: but in this wise having produced a number, it proceedeth to points and pricks, from pricks to lines, and so forth from lines to superficies, from superficies to profundities; from thence to bodies, and so forward to the qualities of bodies subject to passions and alrerations. Moreover, of intellectuall things, there is no other judge but the understanding or the mind; for cogitati∣on [ 20] or intelligence, is no other thing but the understanding, so long as it is applied unto Mathe∣maticals, wherein things intellectuall appeare as within mirrours; whereas, for the knowledge of bodies, by reason of their great number, nature hath given unto us five powers and faculties of severall and different senses for to judge withall: and yet sufficient they are not to discover all objects; for many there be of them so * 1.1 small, that they can not be perceived by the senses. And like as, although every one of us being composed of soule and bodie, yet that principall part, which is our spirit and understanding, is a very small thing, hidden and inclosed within a great masse of flesh; even so, very like it is, that there is the same proportion within the universall world, betweene things sensible and intellectuall: for the intellectuall are the beginning of cor∣porall: now that which proceedeth from a beginning, is alwaies in number more, and in mag∣nitude [ 30] greater, than the said beginning.

But on the contrary, a man may reason thus and say: First and formost, that in comparing sensible and corporall things with intellectuall, we doe in some sort make mortall things equall with devine, for God is to be reckened among intellectuals. Now this is to be granted, that the content is alwaies lesse then the continent; but the nature of the universall world, within the in∣tellectuall, comprehendeth the sensible. For God having set the soule in the midst, hath spred and stretched it through all within, and yet without forth hath covered all bodies with it. As for the soule it is invisible, yea and inperceptible to all the naturall senses, according as he hath written in his booke of lawes: and therefore every one of us is corruptible; but the world shall never perish: for that in each of us that which is mortall and subject to dissolution, con∣taineth [ 40] within it the power which is vitall; but in the world it is cleane contrary, for the princi∣pall puissance and nature, which is ever after one sort immutable, and doth alwaies preserve the corporall part, which it containeth and imbraceth within it selfe. Besides, in a bodily nature and corporall, a thing is called individuall and importible for the smallnesse therof, to wit, when it is so little that it cannot be devided, but in the spirituall and incorporall, it is so called for the simplicity, sincerity & purity thereof, as being exempt from all multiplicity & diversity: for o∣therwise folly it were to cast a guesse at spirituall things by corporal. Furthermore the very pre∣sent time which we call Now, is said to be inpartible and indivisible: howbeit, instant together it is every where, neither is their any part of this habitable world without it: but all passions, all actions, all corruptions & generations throughout the world are comprised in this very present [ 50] Now. Now the onely instrument to judge of things intellectuall is the understanding, like as the eie, of light; which for simplicity is uniforme, & every way like unto it selfe: but bodies ha∣ving many diversities & differences, are comprehended by divers instruments, & judged some by this, and others by that. And yet some there be who unwoorthily disesteeme and contemne the intellectuall puissance and spirituall which is in us: for in truth, being goodly and great, it surmounteth every sensible thing and reacheth up as farre as to the gods. But that which of all others is most, himselfe in his booke entituled Symposium, teaching how to use love and love

matters, in withdrawing the soule from the affection of beauties corporall, and applying the same to those which are intellectuall, exhorteth us not to subject and inthrall our selves into the lovely beauty of any body, nor of one study and science, but by erecting and lifting up our mindes aloft from such base objects, to turne unto that vast ocean indeed of pulcritude and beauty, which is vertue.

3

How commeth it to passe, that considering he affirmeth evermore the soule to be more ancient than the body, as the very cause of the generation of it, and the beginning likewise thereof, yea contra∣riwise he saith, that the soule was never without the bodie, nor the understanding without the soule, and that of necessitie the soule must be within the bodie, and the understanding in the soule? for it seemeth that heere in there is some contradiction; namely, that the body both is, and [ 10] is not, in case it be true, that it is together with the soule, and yet neverthelesse ingendred by the soule?

IS it because that is true which we oftentimes doe say? namely, that the soule without under∣standing, and the body without forme have alwaies beene together, & neither the one nor the other had ever commensment of being nor beginning of generation; but when the soule came to have participation of understanding and of harmonie, and became to be wise by the meanes of consonance and accord, then caused she mutation in matter, and being more powerfull and strong in her owne motions, drew and turned into her the motions of the other? and even so the bodies of the world had the first generation from the soule, whereby it was shaped and made [ 20] uniforme. For the soule of her selfe, brought not foorth the nature of a body, nor created it of nothing, but of a body without all order and forme whatsoever, he made it orderly and very obeisant: as if one said that the force of a seed or kernell is alwaies with the bodie, but yet ne∣verthelesse the body of the sig tree or olive tree is engendred of the seed or kernell, he should not speake contrarieties: for the very body it selfe being mooved and altered by the seed, springeth and groweth to be such: semblably the matter void of forme and indeterminate, having once bene shapen by the soule, which was within, received such a forme and disposition.

4 [ 30]

What is the reason, that whereas there be bodies and figures some consisting of right lines and o∣thers of circular, he hath taken for the foundation and beginning of those which stand of right lines, the triangle Isosceles, with two equall sides, and scalenum, with three sides all unequall. Of which, the triangle with two even legs composed the cube or square bodie, which is the ele∣ment and principle of the earth: and the triangle with three unequall legs made the pyramidall body, as also octaedron with eight faces, and cosaedron with twenty faces whereof the first is the element and seed of fire, the second of aire, and the third of water: and yet he hath over passed quite all bodies and figures circular: notwithstanding that he made mention of the sphaericall figure or round body when he said, that every one of those figures above named is apt to divide a globe or sphaericall body into equall parts? [ 40]

IS it as some doe imagine and suppose, because he attributed the Dodecaedron, that is to say, the body with twelve faces unto the globe or round sphaere, in saying that God made use of this forme and figure, in the framing of the world? for in regard of the multitude of elements, and bluntnesse of angles, it is farthest off from direct and right lines, whereby it is flexible, and by stretching foorth round in maner of a ball made of twelve pieces of leather, it appro∣cheth neerest unto roundnesse, and in that regard is of greatest capacitie; for it conteined twenty angles solid, and every one of them is comprized and environed within three flatte ob∣tuse or blunt angles, considering that every of them is composed of one right and fift part: moreover compact it is and composed of twelve pentagones, that is to say, bodies with five an∣gles, [ 50] having their angles and sides equall; of which every one of thirty principall triangles, with three unequall legges: by reason whereof, it seemeth that he followed the degrees of the Zodiacke, and the daies of the yeere together, in that division of their parts so equal and just in number.

Or may not this be the reason, that by nature the right goeth before the round? or rather, to speake more truely, that a circular line seemeth to be some vicious passion or faulty qualitie of the right, for we use ordinarily to say, that the right line doth bow or bend; and a circle is drawen

and described by the center, and the distance from it to the circumference, which is the verie place of the right line, by which it is measured out; for the circumference is on every side equally distant from the center. Moreover, the Conus, which is a round pyramys; and the Cy∣lindre, which is as it were a round columne or pillar of equall compasse, are both made of figures with direct lines, the one, to wit, the Conus, by a triangle, whereof one side remaineth firme, and the other with the base goeth round about it: the Cylindre, when the same befalleth to a paral∣lell. Moreover, that which is lesse, commeth neerest unto the beginning, and resembleth it most: but the least and simplest of all lines is the right; for of the round line that part which is within, doth crooke and curbe hollow, the other without doth bumpe and bunch. Over and be∣sides, numbers are before figures, for unity is before a pricke; seeing that a pricke is in position [ 10] and situation an unity, but an unity is triangular, for that every number triangular, eight times repeated or multiplied, by addition of an unity becommeth quadrangular, and the same also befalleth to unity; and therefore a triangle is before a circle, which being so, the right line go∣eth before the circular. Moreover, an element is never divided into that which is composed of it: but contrariwise, every thing else is divided and resolved into the owne elements whereof it doth consist. If then the triangle is not resolved into any thing circular; but contrariwise, two diametres crossing one another, part a circle just into fower parts; then we must needs inferre the figure consisting of right lines, went before those which are circular: now that the right line goeth first, and the circular doth succeed and follow after, Plato himselfe hath shewed by demonstration, namely when hee saith, that the earth is composed of many cubes or [ 20] square solid bodies, whereof every one is enclosed, and conteined with right lined super∣fices, in such maner disposed, as yet the whole body and masse of the earth seemeth round like a globe, so that we need not to make any proper element thereof round; if it be so that bo∣dies with right lines, conjoined and set in some sort one to another, bringeth forth this forme; Over and besides the direct line, be it little or be it great, keepeth alwaies the same rectitude: whereas contrariwise we see the circumferences of circles if they be small, are more coping, bending, and contracted in their outward curvature: conrrariwise, if they be great, they are more extent, lax, and spred, insomuch as they that stand by the outward circumference of cir∣cles, lying upon a flat superfices, touch the same underneath, partly by a pricke if they be smal, and in part by a line if they be large; so as a man may very well conjecture, that many right [ 30] lines joined one to another taile to taile by piece-meale, produce the circumference of a circle. But consider whether there be none of these our circular or sphaericall figures, exquisitely and exactly perfect; but in regard of the extentions and circumtentions of right lines, or by rea∣son of the exilitie and smalnesse of the parts, there can be perceived no difference, and there∣upon there sheweth a circular and round figure: And therefore it is, that there is not a bodie heere, that by by nature doth moove circularly, but all according to the right line; so that the round and sphericall figure is not the element of a sensible body, but of the soule and understan∣ding, unto which he attributeth likewise the circular motion as belonging unto them naturally.

5 [ 40]

In what sense and meaning delivered he this speech in his booke entituled Phaedrus, that the na∣ture of a wing, where by that which is heavy and ponderous, is caried up aloft, of all other things that belong unto a body, hath a certeine communion and participation with God?

IS it because he discourseth there of love; and love is occupied about the beauty of the bo∣dy, and this beauty for the resemblance that it hath to divinity, doth moove the minde, and excite the reminiscence thereof?

Or rather are we to take it simply without curious searching farther into any mystery there∣of? namely, that the soule being within the body, hath many faculties & powers, whereof that which is the discourse of reason and understanding, doth participate with the deitie, which hee not unproperly and impertinently tearmeth a wing, because it lifteth up the soule from things [ 50] base and mortall, unto the consideration of heavenly and celestiall matters.

6

How is it that Plato in some places saith, the Anteperistasis of motion, that is to say, the circum∣stant contrariety debarring a body to moove, in regard that there is no voidnesse or vaculty in nature, is the cause of those effects which we see in physicians ventoses and cupping glasses of swallowing downe our viands, of throwing of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 waights, of the course and conveiance of wa∣ters

of the fall of lightenings, of the attraction that amber maketh of the drawing of the lode∣stone, and of the accord and consonance of voices? For it seemeth against all reason to yeeld one onely cause, for so many effects so divers and so different in kinde. First, as touching the respira∣tion in living creatures, by the anteperistasis of the aire, he hath elsewhere sufficiently decla∣red, but of the other effects, which seeme as he saith to be miracles, and woonders in nature, and are nothing, for that they be nought else but bodies reciprocally and by alternative course, dri∣ving one another out of place round about, and mutually succeeding in their roomes, he hath left for to be discussed by us, how each of them particularly is done?

FIrst and formost for ventoses and cupping glasses thus it is. The aire that is contained with∣in [ 10] the ventose, stricking as it doth into the flesh, being inflamed with heat, and being now more fine and subtil than the holes of the brasse (box or glasse) whereof the ventose is made, getteth forth, not into a void place, for that is impossible, but into that other aire which is round about the said ventose without forth, and driveth the same from it; and that forceth other be∣fore it, and thus as it were from hand to hand, whiles the one giveth place, and the other driveth continually, and so entreth into the vacant place which the first left, it commeth at length to fall upon the flesh which the ventose sticketh fast unto, and by heating and inchasing, it expresseth the humor that is within, into the ventose or cupping vessell.

The swallowing of our victuals is after the same maner, for the cavities as well of the mouth as of the stomacke, be alwaies full of aire: when as then, the meat is driven within the passage or [ 20] gullet of the throat, partly by the tongue and partly by the glandulous parts or kernelles called tonsells, and the muscles which now are stretched, the aire being pressed and strained by the said meat, followeth it hard as it giveth place, and sticking close, it is a meanes to helpe for to drive it downeward.

Semblably the waighty things that be flung, as bigge stones and such like, cut the aire and di∣vide it, by reason that they were sent out and levelled with a violent force; then the aire all about behind, according to the nature thereof, which is to follow where a place is lest vacant and to fill it up, pursueth the masle or waight aforesaid that is lanced or discharged forcibly, and setteth forward the motion thereof.

The shooting and ejaculation of lightening is much what after the maner of these waights [ 30] throwen in maner aforesaid, for being enflamed and set on a light fire, it flasheth out of a cloud by the violence of a stroke, into the aire, which being once open and broken, givith place unto it, and then closing up together above it, driveth it downe forcibly against the owne nature.

As for amber, we must not thinke that it draweth any thing to it of that which is presented be∣fore it, no more than doth the lode stone; neither that any thing comming nere to the one or the other, leapeth thereupon. But first, as touching the said stone; it sendeth from it I wot not what strong and flatuous fluxions, by which the aire next adjoining giving backe, driveth that which is before it; and the same turning round and reentring againe into the void place, doth 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from it and withall carry with it the yron to the stone. And for amber it hath likewise a certeine flagrant and flatulent spirit, which when the out-side thereof is rubbed, it putteth forth by reason [ 40] that the pores thereof are by that meanes opened. And verily that which issueth out of it, wor∣keth in some measure the like effect that the Magnet or lode-stone did: and drawen there are unto it such matters neere at hand as be most light and dry, by reason that the substance com∣ming thereof is but slender and weake: neither is it selfe strong nor hath sufficient waight and force, for to chase and drive before it a great deale of aire, by means whereof it might overcome greater things, as the lode-stone doth. But how is it that this aire driveth and sendeth before it neither wood nor stone, but yron onely, and so bringeth it to the Magnet? This is a doubt and dificulty that much troubleth all those who suppose that this meeting and cleaving of two bo∣dies together, is either by the attraction of the stone, or by the naturall motion of the yron. Y∣ron is neither so hollow and spungeous as is wood, nor so fast and close, as is gold or stone, but it [ 50] hath small holes, passages and rough aspecties, which in regard of the unequality are well pro∣portionate and fortable to the aire, in such wise, as it runneth not easily through, but hath cer∣taine staies by the way to catch hold of, so as it may stand steady and take such sure footing, as to be able to force and drive before it the yron untill it have brought it to kisse the lode-stone. And thus much for the causes and reasons that may be rendred of these effects.

As considering the running of water above ground, by what maner of compression and co∣arctation roud about, it should be performed it is not so easy either to be perceived or declared.

But thus much we are to learne, that for waters of lakes, which stirre not but continue alwaies in one place, it is because the aire, spred all about, and keeping them in on every side, mooveth not nor leaveth unto them any vacant place. For even so the upper face of the water, as well in lakes as in the sea, riseth up into waves and billowes, according to the agitation of the aire; for the water still followeth the motion of the aire, and floweth or is troubled with it, by reason of the inequalities. For the stroke of the aire downeward maketh the hollow dent of the wave: but as the same is driven upward it causeth the swelling and surging tumor of the wave untill such time as all the place above containing the water be setled and laied, for then the waves also doe cease, and the water likewise is still and quiet. But now for the course of waters which glide and run continually above the face of the ground: the cause thereof is because they alwaies follow [ 10] hard after the aire that giveth way and yet are chased by those behinde by compression and dri∣ving forward, and so by that meanes maintaine a continuall streame that never resteth: which is the reason also that great rivers when they are full and doe overflow the banks, run with a more swift and violent streame: and contrariwise when there is but a little water in the chanell, they glide more slowly, because the aire before doth nothing so much give place, for that they are more feeble: neither is there so great an antiperistasis to urge and presse them forward; and even so the spring waters must of necessity boile and rise upward, for that the outward aire enter∣ing closely into the void hollow places within the ground sendeth up againe the water forth.

The paved floore of a darke close house, conteining in it a great deale of still aire, without a∣ny [ 20] winde from without entring into it, if a man doe cast water upon it, engendreth presently a winde and colde vapour; by reason that the aire is displaced and removed out of his seat, by the water which fell, and is thereby beaten, and receiveth the stroake and dint thereof. For this is the nature of them, to drive one another, and likewise to give place one to the other inter∣changeably, admitting in no wise any emptinesse, wherein the one of them should be so setled, as that it did not reciprocally feele the change and alteration of the other.

To come now unto the above named symphonie and consonance, himselfe hath decla∣red how it is that that sounds and voices do accord: for the small and treble is quicke and swift; whereas the bigge and base is heavie and slow. And thereupon it is, that small and shrill sounds do move the sense of hearing before others: but if when these begin to fall and decay, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and base begin to succeed and receive then the mixture and temperature of them both, by a kind [ 30] of conformitie yeeldeth a delight and pleasure to the eare, which they call a symphonie or ac∣cord. And that here of the aire is the instrument, it may evidently appeare by that which we have said already: for voice is a stroake or percussion by the aire of that which the eare doth heare; for as the aire is smitten by motion, so it striketh againe the auditorie organ forcibly, if the mo∣tion be quicke; and gently, if the same be slow: and that which is stricken forcibly with a vio∣lence, commeth first into the sense of hearing, but afterwards, turning about and meeting with that which is more slow, it followeth and accompanieth the sense.

7

What is the meaning of Timaeus, when he saith: That the soules are dispersed and sowen (as it [ 40] were) upon the ground the moone and all other instruments of time what soever.

IS it because he was of opinion, that the earth did move like unto the sunne, moone and other five planets, which he calleth the instruments of time, because of their conversions? and held besides, that we ought not to imagine the earth so framed, as if it were firme and immoveable, fast fixed and perpetually to the axletree or pole that passeth thorow the world; but that it tur∣neth round in maner of a wheele: like as afterwards Aristarchus and Seleucus have shewed; the one supposing it onely, the other affirming so much flatly. To say nothing of that which Theo∣phrastus wrote; namely, how Plato toward the latter end of his daies, repented that he had as∣signed unto the earth the center and middle of the world, a place 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unfit and unmeet for it? [ 50]

Or rather, because this is directly repugnant unto many sentences which this philosopher undoubtedly held, we ought therefore to change the writing of this place of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , by putting the dative case in stead of the genetive, to wit, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 yea, and to understand by the in∣struments of time, not the planets or starres, but the bodies of living creatures; according as A∣ristotle hath defined the soule, to be a continuall act of a bodie, Naturall, Organicall, having life potentially: so that the sentence in the foresaid place should be read thus; The soules have bene disseminated and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by time in organicall bodies, meet and agreeable for them. And yet

even this also is contrary unto his owne-opinion: for that not in one onely place, but in many, he hath called the starres, instruments of time, considering that he affirmeth that the very sunne was made to distinguish and keepe the number of time with other planets. The best way is therefore to understand, That the earth is the instrument of time, not because it moveth as doe the starres; but for that so continuing as it doeth, alwaies firme and steady in it selfe, it giveth meanes unto the starres moving round about it, to rise and to fall; whereby are limited the day and the night, which are the first measures of time: and therefore himselfe hath called it the Guardien, yea, the 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 in deed and right truely of night and day: for the Gnomons in Sun dials, not moving with the shadowes, but standing still and keeping their place, are the instru∣ments and measures of time, representing the obstacle of the earth opposite unto the Sun moo∣ving [ 10] round about it; like as Empedocles saith:

The earth set just twixt Sun beames and our sight, Shuts up the day and bringeth in the night.

And thus much for the enodation of this knot.

But haply this a man may doubt to be a strange and absurd speech, to say that the Sun, toge∣ther with the Moone & the planets, were made for distinction of times: for otherwise by it selfe, great is the dignitie of the Sun; and Plato himselfe in his books of Common-wealth, calleth him the king and lord of all the sensible world, like as Good he pronounceth to be the sovereign of the intelligible world. And the Sun (saith he) is the very issue extract from that Good, gi∣ving unto things visible, together with their apparance, being also, & subsistance; like as Good [ 20] giveth unto intelligible things this gift, both to have a being, and also to be knowen. Now, that God having such puissance and so great, should be the instrument of time, and an evident rule and measure of the difference that is of swiftnesse or of slownesse among the eight heavenly sphaeres, seemeth not very decent; no nor any consonant to reason. It remaineth therefore thus much to say, those who trouble themselves about these points, for very ignorance are deceived, supposing that time according to the definition of Aristotle, is the measure of motion, and the number in regard of prioritie and posteriority: or the quantity in motion after the opinion of Speusippus: or else the distance of motion, and no other thing, as the Stoicks describe it, desi∣ning forsooth one accident, but never comming neere unto the substance and power thereof, which as it should seeme, the poet Pindarus imagined and conceived not amisse when he said: [ 30]

In right of age, time hath this ods, That it surpasseth all the gods.

Pythagor as also, who being asked what time was? answered: The soule of the heaven: for time be it what it will be, is not some accident or passion of any motion, but it is the cause, the puis∣sance and the principle of that proportion, and order that conteineth and holdeth together all things, according to which, the nature of the world, and this whole universality, which also is animate, doth move, or rather the very same proportion it selfe and order which doth moove, is the thing that we call time:

For walke it doth with silent pace, In way where as no noise is made: [ 40] Conducting justly to their place, All mortall things that passe and fade.

And verily according to the minde of auncient philosophers, the substance of the soule was de∣fined to be a number mooving it selfe; which is the reason why Plato said: That time and hea∣ven were made together; but motion was before heaven, at what time as there was no heaven at all; for why, there was no order nor measure whatsoever, no nor any distinction, but an un∣determinate motion, like as the matter was rude without forme & figure: but after that nature once had cast this matter into a colour, and had shaped it with forme and figure, and then de∣termined motion with periodicall revolutions, she made withall, both the world and time both at once; which two are the very images of God: to wit, the world of his substance, and time of [ 50] his eternitie; for God in that he mooveth, is time, and in that he hath being, is the world. This is the reason why he saith: That both of them comming together, shall likewise both be dissol∣ved together, in case that ever there will be any dissolution of them. For that which had a be∣ginning and generation, cannot be without time, no more than that which is intelligible with∣out eternity; in case the one is to continue for ever, and the other being once made, shall ne∣ver perish and be dissolved. Time then being so necessarily linked and interlaced with the hea∣ven, is not simply a motion, but as we have said already, a motion ordeined by order, which

hath a just measure, set limits and bonds, yea and certeine revolutions; of all which, the sunne being superintendent, governour and directour, for to dispose, limit, and digest all; for to dis∣cover, set out and shew, the alterations and seasons the which bring foorth all things, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 saith: confessed it must be, that he is a workeman cooperant with that chiefe and sove∣taigne God, the prince of all, not in petie, base, and frivolous things, but in the greatest and most principall works that be.

8

PLato in his books of common-wealth, having excellently well compared the symphony of the three faculties & powers of the soule, to wit, the reasonable, the irascible & concupisci∣ble, [ 10] unto the musicall harmony of the notes, Mese, Hypate, and Nete, hath given occasion for a man to doubt, whether hee set the irascible or reasonable part, correspondent to the meane? seeing that he shewed not his meaning in this present place; for according to the situation of the parts of the body, wherein these faculties are seated, surely the couragious and irascible is placed in the middes, and answered to the region of Mese the meane: but the reasonable is ran∣ged into the place of Hypate: for that which is aloft, first and principall our auncestours used to call Hypaton: according to which sense Xenocrates calleth Jupiter or the aire (that I meane which converseth above where all things continue the same, and after one sort) Hypatos; like as that which is under the moone, Neatos. And before him Homer speaking of the soveraigne God and prince of princes, saith thus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, our soveraigne and supreme of all rulers. And in trueth, nature hath by very good right given unto the best part of the [ 20] soule, the highest place in lodging the discourse of reason, as the governour of the rest within the head; but hath remooved farre from thence to the base and inferior members, the concu∣piscible: for the low situation is called Neate, according as appeereth by the denomination of the dead, who are tearmed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, inferior or infernall: and for this cause, some therebe who say, that the winde which bloweth from beneath, and out of pla∣ces unseene, that is to say, from the pole Antarticke, is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the south. Since then it is so, that there is the same proportion of contrariety betweene concupiscible and reasonable parts of the soule, as there is betweene lowest and highest, last and first; it is not pos∣sible, that reason should be the highest and principall, and not withall, correspondent to Hy∣pate, [ 30] but to some other note in musicke: for they who attribute unto her as unto the princi∣pall faculty and power Mese, that is to say, the meane, see not (ignorant as they be) how they take from her that which is more principall, to wit, Hypate, which cannot fit well either with ire or lust, for both these, the one and the other are made for to follow, and be comman∣ded by reason, and not to command or goe before reason. Moreover, it should seeme by na∣ture, that anger ought to have the meane and middle place, considering that naturally reason is to command; and anger both to command and be commanded, as being on the one side sub∣ject to the discourse of reason, and on the other side, commanding lust, yea, and punishing it, when she is disobedient to reason. And like as in grammar, those letters which wee call semi∣vowels, be of a middle nature, betweene mute consonants and vowels: for that as they sound more than the one, so they sound lesse than the other: even so in the soule of man, wrath is not [ 40] simply a meere passion, but hath many times an apparence of duty and honesty mixed with de∣sire of revenge. And Plato himselfe comparing the substance of the soule unto a couple of horses drawing a chariot, and guided by a chariot man, who driveth them, and understandeth by the driver & guide, as every man well knowes the discourse of reason: now of the two steeds, that of lusts and pleasures is frampold, skittish, flinging, winsing, unruly altogether, and unbro∣ken, stiffenecked, deafe, hardly caring either for whip or spurre; where as the other of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , is for the most part tractable, and obeisant to the bridle of reason, yea, and ready to joine with it in execution of good things. And like as in a chariot with two horses, the driver or chariot-man is not in vertue and puissance the middle, but rather one of the horses, which is woorse than the chariot man, and better than his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that draweth with him: even so likewise hath not he gi∣ven [ 50] the middle place unto that part which doth rule and governe in the soule, but unto that wherein there is lesse passion than in the first, and more reason than in the third: for this order and disposition observeth the proportion of the irascible to the reasonable part, as is of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to Hypate; and to the concupiscible, as Dapente to Nete: also of the reasonable part to the concupiscible, as Hypate to Nete, which is Dia-pason: But if we draw reason and the discourse thereof to the meane, anger shall be farther off from lust and concupiscence, which

some of the philosophers held to be one and the selfe-same thing, for the great similitude and resemblance betweene them.

Or rather, it is but a ridiculous thing to attribute unto the places, first, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , and last, seeing (as we do) how in a harpe, lute, or stringed instrument, Hypate hath the first and highest place; but in flutes and pipes the lowest & the last: furthermore, the meane in what place soever of the harpe or lute you set it, you shal find it soundeth alwaies the same note still, to wit, smaller than Hypate, & bigger than Nete: for the very eie it selfe hath not the same situation in al crea∣tures, but in any creature, and in what place soever it is set according to nature, alwaies it is or∣deined and made for to see. Like as therefore the paedagogue or governour of youth, who or∣dinarily commeth behinde, and goeth not before his children, is notwithstanding said to lead [ 10] and guide them: And the captaine of the Trojanes in Homer:

Who with the formost in the front, sometimes appeer'd in sight, And in the reereward other whiles, his men strr'd up to fight.

As well in the one part as the other, was alwaies the chiefe, and had the principall power: even so we ought not to force the parts of the soule to any places or names, but to examine and search the power and proportion of them; for that the discourse of reason in situation should be set in the first and principall place of mans body, falleth out accidentally: but the first and principall power it hath, as being Mese or the meane, in regard of Hypate, the concupiscible [ 20] part; and Nete the irascible, by letting downe and setting up, by making consonance and ac∣cord, by taking from the one and the other that which is excessive; and againe, by not suffring them either to be let loose and slacke altogether, or to lie asleepe: for mediocrity and a com∣petent temperature, is limited by a meane; or rather to speake more properly, a principall piece of worke this is, and a singular gift and puissance of reason, to make and imprint in passi∣ons, meanes and mediocrities, if we may so say, which are called holy and sacred, consisting in a temperature of two extremities with reason, yea and betweene them both by the meanes of reason: for the teeme of two steeds hath not for the meane & in the middest, that of two which is better: neither are we to imagine, that the government of them is one of the extremities; but rather we ought to thinke, that it is the middes and mediocritie betwixt the immoderate ce∣leritie [ 30] or slownesse of the two steeds; like as the power of reason which holdeth in the passions when they stirre without measure and reason, and by composing and framing them unto her in measurable proportion, setteth downe a mediocritic and meane betweene too much, and over little, betweene excesse (I say) and defect.

9

What is the reason that Plato saith: Our speech is tempered and composed of nownes and of verbes? for he seemeth to make no account of all other parts of speech beside these two: and to thinke that Homer in a gallant youthfull humour to shew his fresh wit affected to thrust them all eight into this one verse: [ 40]

* 1.2 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

For heere you have a Pronoune, a Participle, a Nowne, a Verbe, a Preposition, an Article, a Con∣junction, and an Adverbe for the Participle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is put in stead of the Preposition 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, to: and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, to thy tent, is after the maner of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, to Athens: But what shall we answer in the behalfe of Plato.

IS it for that in olde time they called that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the first speech, which then was named 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, a proposition, and now they tearme 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, dig∣nitie: which when they utter first, they either lie or speake trueth. And this proposition is com∣pounded of a Nowne and a verbe, whereof the one is called by the Logicians, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, [ 50] the case; the other, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the predicable or praedicatum. For when we heare one say, Socrates teacheth; and againe, Socrates is turned; we say the one is true, and the other is false: and we require no more words. For it is probable that men at the first had need of speech and voice articulate, when they were desirous to explaine and signifie one unto another the actions and the persons and the doers thereof: like as the passions and the persons who suffer the same. Forasmuch then, as by the Verbe we expresse sufficiently the actions and passions;

and by the Nowne, the persons doing or suffering according as he himselfe saith; it seemeth that these be the two parts of speech that he meaneth: as for the rest, a man may well and truely say, that they signifie nothing, no more than doe the groanes, sighes and lamentations of plaiers in a tragoedie, yea, and many times iwis, a smile, a reticence or keeping silence, which o∣therwhiles may well expresse a speech, and make it more emphaticall; but surely, no necessarie and significative power have they to declare ought, like as the Verbe & the Nowne hath: onely they serve as accessary adjuncts, to vary, illustrate & beautifie the speech; like as they also diver∣sifie the very letters, who put to their spirits and aspirations, their accents also to some, whereby they make them long & short, and reckon them for elements & letters indeed, whereas they be passions, accidents, & diversifications of elements, rather than distinct elements by themselves; [ 10] as it appeareth manifestly by this, that our ancients contented themselves sufficiently to speake and write with sixteene letters and no more. Moreover, consider and see whether we doe not take the words of Plato otherwise than he delivered them; when he saith that the speech is tem∣pered of these two parts, and not by them. Take heed (I say) we commit not the same errour as he doth, who should cavill and finde fault with one for saying, that such an ointment or salve was made of wax and galbanum, alledging against him for so saying, that he left out fire and the vessell, without which a man knoweth not how to temper the said simples or drogues: for even so, if we should reproove him because he omitted the naming of Conjunctions, Prepositions and other parts of speech, we were likewise to be blamed: for in trueth, a speech or sentence is not compounded of these parts, but by them and not without them. For like as he, who should [ 20] pronounce simply these Verbs, To beat, or To be beaten; or otherwise these bare Nownes, So∣crates or Pythagoras; giveth some light (such as it is) of a thing to be conceived & understood: but he that should come out with these odde words, For, or Of, and say no more, a man can not * 1.3 imagine what he meaneth thereby, nor gather any conception either of action or of body; for if there be not some other words pronounced with them or about them, they resemble naked sounds and vaine noises without any significations at all: for that neither by themselves alone, nor one with another, it is possible that they should betoken any thing. Nay, admit that we should conjoine, mingle and interlace together Conjunctions, Articles and Prepositions all in one, minding to make one entire bodie of them all, we shall seeme rather to creake than speake: but so soone as a Verbe is joined to a Nowne, that which resulteth thereupon is immediatly a [ 30] sentence and significant speech. And therefore not without good reason some doe thinke that these two (to speake properly) be the onely parts of speech. And peradventure Homer had some such meaning, and gave us so much to understand, by saying in so many places,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. He spake the word, and with the same, Immediatly out came the name.

For by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the word; his maner is to signifie a Verbe: as namely in this other verse,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Now surely woman, much to blame thou art, This word to speake, it strikes so to my hart. [ 40]

As also elsewhere:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 good Father; guest and friend Farewell: And if some word unkind Hath bene let fall, I wish it may By winds and stormes be caught away.

For surely it is neither Conjunction, Article, nor Preposition, that can be said either unkinde or to touch the heart, but some Verbe signifying a shamefull deed, proceeding from an unde∣cent and dishonest passion. And therefore you see how we are woont to praise poets and histo∣riographers, [ 50] or otherwise to blame and dispraise them, saying in this wise: Such a poet hath u∣sed Atticke Nownes and elegant Verbs: and contrariwise, Such an historiographer hath used triviall and base Nownes and Verbs. And no man will say that either Euripides or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 wrote a stile consisting of Articles that were homely and base, or otherwise elegant and Atticke.

How then (may some one say) serve these parts to no purpose in our speech? Yes iwis say I, even as much as salt in our meats, or water for our bread and gruell. Euenus was wont to say that fire also was an excellent kinde of sauce: and even so be these parts of speech the seasoning of

our language, like as fire and salt of our broths and viands, without the which we can not well do: and yet our speech doth not alwaies of necessitie stand in need of them: for so me thinks I may very well affirme of the Romane language, that all the world I see in maner useth at this day: for the Romans take away all Prepositions, except a very few; and as for those that be called Arti∣cles, they admit not so much as one, but use their Nownes plaine, and as one would say, without skirts and borders. Whereat we may wonder the lesse, considering that Homer, who for trimme and beautifull verses surpassed all other poets, set to very few Nownes any Articles as eares unto cups and other vessels, for to take hold by, or as pennaches and crests upon morions: and there∣fore looke in what verses he useth so to doe, be sure they were of speciall marke, or els suppositi∣ons and suspected to be none of his making. As for example:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 [ 10] 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. This speech the courage most of all excited then anon, Of Ajaz, him I meane, who was the sonne of Telamon.

Againe:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. This did he that, by flying thus apace, He might escape the whale that was in chace.

And a few others besides these. But in the rest which are innumerable, although there be no Ar∣ticle, [ 20] yet the phrase of speech is thereby nothing diminished or hurt either in beautie or perspi∣cuitie. And thus we see, that neither living creature, if it be maimed or dismembred, nor instru∣ment, nor armour, nor any thing in the world whatsoever, by the want and defect of any proper part belonging thereto, is the more beautifull or active thereby, neither more pleasant than it was therefore: whereas a speech or sentence, when all the Conjunctions be taken quite away, is many times more emphaticall, yea, and carieth a power and efficacie more patheticall and ap∣ter to move and affect, as this:

One sound, unhurt, she catching fast, another wounded new, [ 30] Alive she held, another dead, in sight by heeles she drew.

Also this place of Demosthenes his oration against Midias:

For many things may he doe who striketh, whereof, some the party who suffereth, can not declare unto another, by jesture, his port, by regard, his eie, in his voice, when he wrongeth insolently in a bravery, when he offereth injurie as an enemie, when with the clutched fist, when upon the cheeke, when upon the eare: this mooveth, this is that remooveth, that transporteth men beside themselves, who are not ac∣quainted with outrages, who have not beene used to beare such abuses. And againe another place afterwards. But it is not Midias. He from this day is a speaker, he maketh orations, he rai∣leth, exclameth, he passeth somewhat by his voice: Is there any election? Midias the Anagyr∣rhasian [ 40] is propounded, he is nominated. Midias interteineth Plutarch in the name of the ci∣ty, he knoweth all secrets; the city is not sufficient to hold him. This is the reason that they who write of rhetoricall figures, so highly praise Asyndeton: whereas those who are so precise, so religious, and too observant of Grammar, that they dare not leave out one Conjunction otherwise than they were accustomed to doe:

The said rhetoricians thinke blamewoorthy and to be reprooved, as making the stile dull, enervate, without affection, tedious and irksome, by reason that it runnes alwaies after one sort, without change and variety.

Now whereas logicians have more need than any other professours in learning of Con∣junctions copulatives, for to knit and connex their propositions or disjunctives, to disjoine and distinguish them; like as waine-men or carters have need of yokes or geeres; or as Ulysses [ 50] had of osiers in Cyclops his cave to binde his sheepe together: This doth not argue, nor proove that the Conjunction is a substantiall member or part of speech; but a prety instrument and meanes to binde and conjoine according as the very name of it doth import, and to keepe and hold together not all words or sentences indifferently, but such alone as are not simply spo∣ken: unlesse men will say, that the coard or girt wherewith a packe or fardell is bound, is a part of the said packe, or the paste and glue a part of the booke; or donatives and largesses, a part of politike government; like as Demades was woont to say: That the dole of mony distri∣buted

by the poll to the citizens in the theaters for to see the plaies, was the very glew of the popular State. And tell me what conjunction is that which will make of many propositions one, by couching and knitting them together, as the marble doth unite the iron that is cast and melted with it by the fire; and yet I trow no man will say, that the marble for all that is part of the iron, or so to be called. Howbeit, such things verily as enter into a composition, and which be liquefied together with the drogues mingled therewith, are wont after a sort to doe and suf∣fer reciprocally from the ingredients. But as for these conjunctions, there be who deny that they doe unite any one thing, saying: That this maner of speaking with conjunctions is no other but a certeine enumeration, as if a man should reckon in order all our magistrates, or count the daies of a moneth [ 10] .

Moreover, of all other parts of speech, it is very evident, that the Pronoune is a kinde of Noune, not onely in this respect, that it is declmed with cases, as the Noune is; but also for that some of them being pronounced and uttered of things and persons determinate, doe make a most proper demonstration of them accordant to their nature: neither can I see, how he who hath expresly named Socrates, hath declared his person more, than hee who said. This man heere.

To come now unto that which they tearme a Participle, surely it is a very medly and mix∣ture of a Noune and a Verbe, and not a part of speech subsisting alone of it selfe, no more than those Nounes or names which are common to Masculine and Feminine: and these Participles are raunged with them both; with Nounes in respect of their cases, and with Verbes in regard [ 20] oftenses: and verily the logicians call such, tearmes reflected, as for example, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, wiisely foreseeing; is a reflexion of a wise foreseer: and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, minding sobriety, is a reflexion of a sober minded person, that is to say, as if they had the nature and power of Nounes and appellations.

As touching Prepositions, a man may liken them very well to pennaches, crests, or such like ornaments above morions or head attires, or else to bases, predstals, and footsteps under statues and pillers: forasmuch as they are not so much parts of speech, as busie and conversant about them: but see I pray you whether they may not be compared to truncheons, pieces, and fragments of words, like as those who when they write a running hand in haste, doe not alwaies make out the letters full, but use pricks, minims and dashes. For these two Verbes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and [ 30] 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, be both of them manifest clippings of the full and compleat words 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whereof the one signifieth to enter in, the other to goe foorth. Likewise 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is a plaine abbreviation of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, to be borne, or have being before. Also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, to sit downe, or cause one to sit downe. Semblable 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 men are disposed to say for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say to fling stones, and to digge through walles, when they are disposed to make haste to speake short. And therefore a man may well say, that every one of these, excepting Noune and Verbe, doe some good in our speech, and helpe well in a sentence, but for all that, they cannot be called either elements of speech: for there is none but the Noune and the Verbe, as it hath [ 40] beene said before, that maketh this composition, conteining verity and falsity, which some tearme proposition, others axiome, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nameth speech or oration. [ 50]

Notes

• * 1.1

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, some reade 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, they are so farre off.
• * 1.2

  The sense of this is altoge∣ther 〈◊〉〈◊〉 , depen∣ding of the precedent and subsequent verses, but ser∣ving the turne as it stands, it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not to be done in∣to English.
• * 1.3

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.