Varieties: or, A surveigh of rare and excellent matters necessary and delectable for all sorts of persons. Wherein the principall heads of diverse sciences are illustrated, rare secrets of naturall things unfoulded, &c. Digested into five bookes, whose severall chapters with their contents are to be seene in the table after the epistle dedicatory. By David Person, of Loghlands in Scotland, Gentleman.

A GENERALL INTRODVCTION AND INCITEMENT To the studie of the METAPHYSICKS: Wherein the most excellent ends and uses thereof are illustrated, and how neces∣sary it is to be understood by Christians.

SECT. 1.

Of the severall titles and appellations that have beene given by Heathnick and Christian Philosophers to Mataphysick; the reasons wherefore every of those names were attributed unto it; and finally whereof it principally treateth.

THe high and sublime Science, which we call Metaphysick, hath divers titles and styles attributed unto it, partly by A∣ristotle himselfe, and partly by other Authors, as is observed by Suarez in the beginning

of his first Metaphysicall Disputation,* 1.1 and by Fonseca in his prooemium, prefixed to his Commen∣taries upon Aristotles Metaphysicks cap. 8.

For first, this Science is called Sapient••a •• Me∣taph. c. 1. & 2. because it disputeth of highest and most hard matters, and of the first and most gene∣rall causes of things.

Secondly it is called Philosophia 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or by way of excellencie,* 1.2 4 Metaph. cap. 2. because it ex∣ceedeth all other parts of Philosophy in dignity very farre, and as a Queene it hath Soveraignty, and royall prerogatives above them all, prescri∣bing unto every particular Science the bounds and limits of it, confirming or establishing the princi∣ples of them all.

Thirdly,* 1.3 it is called prima Philosophia, 6. Me∣taph. cap. 1. & lib. 2. cap. 6. because it treateth of most excellent matters, as of God and of the An∣gels, in so farre as they may be knowne, by the light of Nature: for as they are knowne to us by divine revelation, the consideration of them belon∣geth to Divinity.

In the same respect it is called Philosophia Theo∣logica,* 1.4 6 Mataph. cap. 1. and Scientia Theologica, 2 Metaph. cap. 6. and by Christian Philosophers, who know another Theologie above, for distinctions cause, it is called Naturalis Theologia.

Last of all,* 1.5 it is called Metaphysica, which word occurreth not in Aristotle himselfe, but is used by his Interpreters and followers; yet it is grounded upon the titles of Aristotles Bookes of Metaphy∣sicks,

which after by Aristotle himselfe, or by Theophrastus, who is thought to have collected A∣ristotles Workes, and to have digested them in or∣der, are intituled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, idest, post naturalia aut transnaturalia, and that, either because this Sci∣ence was invented after Naturall Philosophy, for the knowledge of the natures of bodily substances, (which is called Physiology) or else because the things considered in it, are beyond and above the order or ranke of naturall things; that is, of grosse and bodily substances, for it doth treate of spiri∣tuall and invisible substances,* 1.6 viz. of God and of the Angels; as also it treateth of the attributes and notions or conceptions of entity or beeing, which are common to all things, which have a reall being, whether they be bodily substances, or spirituall, yea whether they be substances or accidents.

SECT. 2.

The Reasons why Aristotle added Metaphysick to the other parts of Phylosophie; and how it is distin∣guished from the other Sciences.

ARistotle, who is thought to be the first author of this sublime and almost divine Science,* 1.7 added it to the rest of the parts of Philoso∣phy, chiefly for two causes, as Fonseca well obser∣veth in the 6. chapter of the Preface to his Com∣mentaries

upon the Metaphysicks.

First,* 1.8 because in the Physicks these substances are considered, which are composed of bodily matter and forme; and in the Mathematicks, they are said to be accidentia abstracta à materia secundùm rationem; yet truely and really in their beeing or existence they have a necessary dependencie from bodily matter, and therefore are called Accidentia materialia, because they have their beeing in, and from grosse and bodily substances. Now besides these, there are some things meerely immateriall, that is, neither composed of bodily matter and forme, nor yet any way depending from bodily matter, (which therefore are in the Schooles said to be abstracta à materia & secundùm rem & secun∣dum rationem) as God, the Angels, spirituall acci∣dents & caet. And therefore, as materiall substances are considered in the Physicks, and materiall acci∣dents in the Mathematicks; so it was requisite, that there should be a third kinde of Science, to wit, the Metaphysicks, for the consideration and handling of things meerely immateriall, and independing from bodily matter.

Secondly,* 1.9 there are some generall degrees and conceptions of entity or beeing, as also some attri∣butes, properties, principles, and some divisions or distinctions, which are common to all things, whether they be bodily and materiall, or spirituall and immateriall, as ens, essentia, existentia, unitas, veritas, bonitas, and the divisions of ens, in comple∣tum, & incompletum, finitum & infinitum, necessa∣rium

& contingens, permanens & successivum, abso∣lutum & respectivum, principium & principiatum, causam & effectum, subjectum & adjunctum, signum & signatum, mensuram & mensuratum, actum & po∣tentiam, &c.

Now these things are transcending, and doe ex∣ceed the limits of particular and inferiour Sciences,* 1.10 as Physick, Geometry, Arithmetick, and the Sci∣ences which are subalternate and subordinate to them; wherefore they cannot be handled in them, but for the handling of them there must bee some generall and transcendent Science, whose specula∣tion is not limited to any particular species entis, but comprehendeth and taketh in all things under the capacity and amplitude of the object of it. And this is Metaphysick, of which we are now speaking.

SECT. 3.

Three Reasons conducing to the praise of Metaphy∣sick, inducing all men to the study of it; and set∣ting downe some principall ends and uses thereof.

BY this, every man may cleerely see the neces∣sity of this Science for the perfection of Phi∣losophy. But it may be, that some will thinke, the consideration of these immateriall or spirituall things, of which I did speake in my first reason, as also these attributes, properties, and distinctions

which are common to things materiall and imma∣teriall, and of which I did speake in my second rea∣son, some, I say, will thinke the consideration of them not to bee necessary,* 1.11 but to be more curious than profitable. But I perswade my selfe, no wise or judicious man will thinke so.

For first,* 1.12 without the knowledge of these ge∣nerall and transcendent Metaphysicall tearmes and notions or conceptions no solide knowledge can be had, for the subjects which are handled in inferiour Sciences.

Secondly,* 1.13 seeing man in respect of the constitu∣tion of his nature, is participant, both of things bo∣dily and materiall, as also of things immateriall and spirituall, (for which cause by Philo Iudeus in his Booke de op••ficio mundi, he is called nexus Dei & mundi, and rerum materialium & immaterialium hor••zon) were great sottishnesse or stupidity in man, to labour for the knowledge of materiall and bo∣dily things, with which he symbolizeth in respect of his baser part, that is his body, and not to care for knowledge of spirituall and immateriall things, to which he is like, and as it were of kinne in respect of his better part, to wit, his soule.

Thirdly,* 1.14 seeing the happinesse of man, I meane his contemplative or speculative happinesse, stan∣deth in the knowledge and contemplation of these things, which are most excellent and most sublime, he would come very farre short, of that happinesse, if he were ignorant of these things, which are han∣dled in the Metaphysicks: for they are spirituall

and immateriall, and consequently are most excel∣lent, and also most sublime and difficult, in respect they doe farre exceede the reach of all sense and sensitive knowledge.

SECT. 4.

The excellencie and dignity of the knowledge of Me∣taphysick; that onely free and sublime mindes, not distracted with worldly cares are fit for this stud••e; and the Reasons wherefore.

I Have spoken already of the divers names and titles of this Science, of the reasons wherefore it was invented, as also of the necessity of it: Now in the last roome I will speake something of the excellencie and dignity of it. Aristotle in the 1. Booke of his Metaphysicks 2 chapt. saith, two things which serve very much for manifesting or declaring the excellencie of this Science, first hee saith, that it is a Science more fit and suitable for God than for men; or to give you it in his owne words, that ejus possessio non existimari debet humana, that is, that man is not sufficiently worthy to pos∣sesse or enjoy this Science, and that because this Science,* 1.15 of all Sciences, is most free; yea it onely is free from all subjection to other Sciences, and from all reference to any higher or more eminent knowledge: for all naturall knowledge can equall,

and much lesse exceede the sublimity of Metaphy∣sicall speculation; and therefore this Science re∣quireth a minde free and sublime, that is, a minde not depressed with base cogitations,* 1.16 nor distracted with worldly cares, as ordinarily the mindes of men are, in respect of the manifold wants and ne∣cessities into which they are subject in this life. Seeing then God only is free from such distracting and depressing cares, therefore in Aristotles judge∣ment, this Science is more suitable for him than for men. Secondly hee saith, that this Science is a∣mongst all Sciences the most honourable, because it is most divine:* 1.17 And that it is most divine, hee proveth by two very forcible reasons, first because this Science versatur in rebus divinis, it contem∣plateth divine and heavenly things: and this hee proveth, because it considereth God himselfe as he is the first principium, and the supreame cause of all things. Secondly, because Haee Scientia maximè à Deo habetur, the perfect and exact knowledge of this Science most truely and properly is attributed to God: for this Science in a manner, vieweth and considereth all things, it hath an especially eye to spirituall and invisible substances, and amongst these it especially and chiefly contemplateth God himselfe, as the highest degree of entity, and the su∣preame cause of all things.

Now to take a full view of all the rankes, orders, and degrees of things to have a positive and distinct knowledge of that invisible world, the world of Angels, and above all, to have a perfect and com∣prehensive

knowledge of that boundlesse Ocean of beeing and goodnesse which is in God, it requi∣reth not a finite ingine or understanding, but an infinite capacity and an unspeakable sharpenesse of wit.

SECT. 5.

For three respects the Metaphysick is called the most excellent Science, and the most necessary to be un∣derstood by Christians.

BY these things which are said by Aristotle in that chapter, and in other parts of his workes, for the commendation of this Sci∣ence, wee may see this Science to be most excellent in three respects.

First, because of the universality and amplitude of the object or subject of it; for in the Spheare or circuite of it, all rankes, orders, and degrees of things are comprehended, so that looke how farre the knowledge of the whole celestiall Globe ex∣ceedeth the knowledge of one constellation,* 1.18 and the knowledge of the universall Mappe or table of the whole Earth exceedeth in dignity the know∣ledge of the Mappe of one Province or Countrey, as farre doth Metaphysick (which is as it were one universall Carde or Mappe, presenting to our view all rankes, orders, and degrees of beeing) exceede

in dignity these particular delineations and descrip∣tions of things, which are set downe in inferiour Sciences.

SECT. 6.

The first respect, for the universality.

SEcondly, because of the dignity of the subject of it; for, not onely is this Science exercised about the speculation of the highest and most generall causes,* 1.19 principles, and attributes of things, but also it descendeth into a speciall consideration of the most noble and excellent things of the world, that is, of God and of his Angels: for, not onely doe Christian Philosophers now in the Me∣taphysicks dispute of them,* 1.20 but also Aristotle him∣selfe in his Metaphysicks, especially in his 12 Booke, doth most excellently discourse of them. And truely it is more than marvellous, that an Heathnick or Pagan-philosopher should, by the light of Nature, have penetrated so farre into the knowledge of God. For to passe by that which he writeth in the 10. chapter of that Booke De unitate Dei, proving and demonstrating, unum esse princi∣pium & gubernatorem universi; and concluding his discourse with that saying of the Poet:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

To omit, I say, this discourse of his De unitate primi motoris, or (as he calleth God in that Booke) primi moventis immobilis, in the 7 chapter of that Booke, he sheweth, that God is primum intelligibile & primum appetibile, that is, he is ens omnium ap∣tissimum & dignissimum quod intelligatur & appe∣tatur, as Fonseca,* 1.21 commenting upon that place, doth expound it: that he necessariò existit, & caetera om∣nia ab co pendent: that perfectissimam & beatissimam vitam degit; that ejus beatitudo est perpetua, & sine intermissione aut alteratione; that Dei beatitudo ex sui contemplatione nascitur; that ejus contemplatio est 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, jucund••ssimum quid & optimum; that not onely vivit vitam beatissimam, but hee is ipsa v••ta beata; or as he speakes himselfe, vita sem∣piterna & optima.

Truely this Pagan Philosopher hath found a wonderfull joy and delight in this his speculation of the essence and happinesse of God,* 1.22 (as Suarez no∣teth writing upon this place, in his Index locupletis∣simus in Phisicam, lib. 12. cap. 7.) yea he seemeth to have beene ravished with the sweetnesse of this heavenly contemplation. It is no wonder, that Da∣v••d in the 104 Psalme vers. 34. said, My meditation of him (that is of God) shall be sweete, aud •• w••ll bee glad in the Lord. For if Aristotle found such sweet∣nesse in the contemplation of God, as hee is Pater mund, or Pater entium; what sweetnesse, yea what heavenly, what ravishing joy may a man living within the Church have in the contemplation of God, as he is Pater Ecclesiae, and Pater misericordia∣rum? 2 Cor. 1. 3.

SECT. 7.

The seco••d Respect, for the dignity. That the conside∣ration of the soule of man belongeth to the Meta∣physicks, with severall Reasons for the proofe thereof.

THere are some who thinke, that not onely the contemplation of God, and of the An∣gels doe belong unto the Metaphysicks, but also the contemplation De anima humana seu ratio∣nali; and that, because it is a spirituall or immateri∣all substance. Suarez in the first Tome of his Meta∣physicks, Disput. 1. Sect. 2. Parag. 18. most justly condemneth this opinion; and that 1. because consideratio totius, & consideratio partium ejus ad unam & eandem scientiam pertinet.

Now the consideration of man himselfe belong∣eth not to Metaphysick,* 1.23 but to Physick; and there∣fore the consideration of the soule of man, which is a part of man, belongeth also to Physick or naturall Philosophy. 2. Albeit the soule of man be an im∣materiall substance in it selfe, and although in the reall beeing of it, it hath not a necessary dependen∣cie from bodily matter, yet God hath appointed, that the ordinary and naturall existence or beeing of it, as also the operation of it, should be in mate∣ria corporea.

It is farre more probable, that which is affirmed by Ruvins and Conimbricenses in the Frontispiece of their Treaties de anima separata à corpore,* 1.24 and in their first questio prooemialis, before their disputes de anima, that the consideration of the beeing and operation of the soule in statu separationis à corpore, after death untill the day of the generall resurre∣ction, doth belong not to Physick, but in some re∣spects to Theologie, and in other respects to Meta∣physick.

For the handling of these questions, [An status separationis à corpore, sit animae rationali naturalis; an anima à corpore separata habeat naturalem appeti∣tum redeundi ad corpus; an anima separata specie ab Angelis differat, & quas facultates seu potentias, quas species intelligibiles, quos habitus, & quem mo∣dum cognoscendi habeat anima separata à corpore:] the handling, I say, of these questions doth belong properly to Metaphysick; neverthelesse these same Authors, whom I have now cited, as also Suarez in the place already spoken of, affirme, that the Tra∣ctatus de anima separata, may most commodiously be added to the Bookes de anima, not as a proper part of the Science de anima, but as an Appendi•• to it.

SECT. 8.

The third Respect, for the Vsefulnesse. Of the great use Metaphysick is towards the furthering of all Divines, in Controversies, and other things: A Conclusion.

THirdly and lastly, this Science exceedeth all the rest indignity, in respect of the great use it hath in all other Sciences and Arts, espe∣cially in Theology it selfe; I neede not to insist in the confirmation of this: for it is very well known, that by the grounds of Metaphysick,* 1.25 wee may de∣monstrate against Atheists, that there is a God; a∣gainst Pagans, that this God is one; against Cerdon, Marcion, and the Manichaean Hereticks, that there are not duo principia, but unum summum & primum principium; against the Stoickes, that there is not such a fatall necessity in all events as they dreamed of, against that damnable and detestable Heretick Conradus Vorstius that Deus est infinitus,* 1.26 immensus, indivisibilis, simplex, totus in qualibet re in qua est; aeternus, & quoad substantiam suam, & quoad ejus decret a immutabilis, & omnium accidentium expers; for that wretched and madde Doctor denied all these things. In many other Questions and Contro∣versies, which the Church hath against Hereticks ancient and moderne, there is great use of Meta∣physick.

But I feare to weary the Reader with these Ge∣neralls, For I intend hereafter (God willing) to put forth a small Treatise of Metaphysicks, where∣in you shall finde that noble Science more perspicuously delineated.

FINIS.

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Notes

• * 1.1

  Metaphysick first called Sa∣pientia.
• * 1.2

  2 Phylosophia 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.3

  3 Prima Phi∣losophia.
• * 1.4

  4 Philosophia Theologica.
• * 1.5

  5 Metaphysica and why.
• * 1.6

  Whereof it treateth.
• * 1.7

  Two causes why Meta∣physick is ad∣ded to the o∣ther Sciences.
• * 1.8

  The first.
• * 1.9

  The second cause.
• * 1.10

  Metaphysick excelleth o∣ther Sciences.
• * 1.11

  A supposition resolved.
• * 1.12

  First Reason.
• * 1.13

  Second Rea∣son.
• * 1.14

  Third Rea∣son.
• * 1.15

  That Meta∣physick is free from all subjection to other Scien∣ces.
• * 1.16

  Reason.
• * 1.17

  Why the Sci∣ence of Meta∣physick is most honou∣rable.
• * 1.18

  Comparison.
• * 1.19

  Christian Philosophers.
• * 1.20

  Aristotle.
• * 1.21

  Fonseca.
• * 1.22

  Suarez.
• * 1.23

  That the con∣sideration of mans soule, and not him∣selfe belon∣geth to Me∣taphysick.
• * 1.24

  Ruvins his opinion.
• * 1.25

  The benefit of the know∣le••ge of the Metaphy∣sick••.
• * 1.26

  Controver∣sies.