Varieties: or, A surveigh of rare and excellent matters necessary and delectable for all sorts of persons. Wherein the principall heads of diverse sciences are illustrated, rare secrets of naturall things unfoulded, &c. Digested into five bookes, whose severall chapters with their contents are to be seene in the table after the epistle dedicatory. By David Person, of Loghlands in Scotland, Gentleman.

OF DIVINE PHILOSOPHY, AND MANS FELICITY.

Section 1.

The Sunne and Moone in the Heavens compared to the understanding and will in Man. Aristotles definition of happinesse: The distinction of understanding and Will; and wherein ancient Philosophers placed their chiefe felicitie.

AS there are two Lamps in the heavens which enlighten this lower world,* 1.1 the Sunne, and the Moone: So there are two principall faculties which rule in Man, the understanding and the will. For as the Sunne in the Firmament, is as Master of the rest of the Stars, giving life to the Earth by the medi∣ation

of the Ayre; so this understanding ruleth the rest of the faculties of the minde;* 1.2 and as the Moone hath little light of her selfe (as being but a diaphanous body or susceptible of light) but what it borroweth from the Sunne, as the wife hath her lustre from her husband; so should not the will obstinately will any thing, but what the cleerenesse of the understanding foreseeth to bee conducible unto us; and what hath passed and bin sifted through the judgement; though otherwise we see it oft times come to passe. The Phi∣losophers have a much disputed question, in what our happinesse consisteth, Whether in the actions of our understanding, or in those of our will (which indeed are nothing else but that which we terme contempla∣tion and action) distinctly in any one of them, or in both conjunctly.

For seeing Aristotle defineth happinesse to bee an operation of the soule according to most perfect vertue,* 1.3 and that elsewhere he calleth it, the best and pleasantest thing that is; it cannot be then but one; because, what is spoken superlatively, is peculiar but to one onely: so it would seeme, that this felicity or happinesse consisteth onely in the operation of one of them and not of both; the one and the other way being both for the object and their operation the most pleasant and perfect things we have: by the o∣peration of our understanding or intellect,* 1.4 we have the speculation and contemplating of God, and by the will his love.

Howsoever by this it would seeme, that it consist∣eth in some one of the two onely; yet if we have re∣gard to reason which enforceth the placing of it so,

or the Texts in Scriptures, where it is said, that our happinesse consisteth in the contemplation of God, or in his knowledge; we shall finde, that neither this perfect vision and knowledge of God can be separa∣ted from his love, nor his love from the knowledge of him. Wherefore it must consist of both joyntly.

But if by one of the two simply a man were made happy, then he could not totally, but diminitively be called so, which should not be thought; seeing no∣thing which is not entire ought to be attributed to fe∣licity, because it should not be defective in any thing: whereupon we may conclude,* 1.5 that the perfect felicity whereof both the Philosophers of old have treated, and here now we handle, is neither divisively an acti∣on of the intellect according to prudence and wis∣dome, nor yet of the will, according to morall vertue, as Aristotle in his Politicks alledgeth; but one combi∣ned of both according to perfect vertue.

For if the question were betwixt the two, to which of them the prerogative and pre-eminence should ap∣pertaine, the matter were very ambiguous.

Section 2.

That our felicity consisteth in the actions of our will is con∣futed: Aristotles opinion hereupon. A theologicall solution on it, seconded with a Philosophicall; and an agreement of both to solve the difference.

IT is true, that the understanding goeth before the will, whereas will must waite for information from the understanding; seeing we cannot well will a thing

we understand not, Ignoti nulla cupido. Besides this, seeing our beatitude and felicity consisteth in the ac∣quisition and fruition of the end of the thing we aime at:* 1.6 certainely that cannot be by the act of our will, al∣though it hath goodnesse it selfe for the object; con∣sidering, that Will, almost even in the most regenerate is so depraved, that without the grace of God, we cannot so much as will any good thing, without the preceding judgement of reason, in regard that Will is defined to be a rationall appetite; consequently it is, that even in those who say that their will standeth for a reason, yet in their judgement there wanteth not their judiciary election.

For S^t. Bernard in his worke of Grace and Free-will affirmeth; that Will, to what hand soever it turne it selfe, hath reason accompanying it; yet not that it is alwayes guided with true reason, but that at least it is never without its owne reasons. These considerations being had, it would appeare, that this our happinesse should be placed in the understanding, and not in the actions of our will; except we take them so, as they have a reference to reason or understanding, in which they are rooted, or (at lest) should be.

But if that be true on the otherside,* 1.7 as certainly it is, which Aristotle in his Ethicks affirmeth, that our happinesse perfecteth it selfe by the most noble ope∣ration of the most excellent part upon the excellen∣test subject; sure it is, that the noblest part of a man is his soule, the most excellent faculty whereof is his free-will; whose most lively operation is love, and whose most worthy object is God: so that from thence it would follow, that our happinesse consisteth

in the love of God, consequently in the operation of our will.

Now that the will hath the more excellent power then the understanding, is cleare; because that faculty (whose habits,* 1.8 operations and objects are more noble than the others) surpasseth the other: but so it is, that will surpasseth in all these, for knowledge and wisedome must give place to love and charity; be∣cause it were better never to have knowne God, then having knowne him not to love him.

Besides all this, seeing the actions, which are done, doe depend upon the nature of the agent, the actions of the will, are so much more noble, then those of the understanding, in how far the Intellect may be neces∣sitated by the object of it, and by forcible and convincing reasons, which it cannot withstand; whereas will is free and cannot bee forced; for then it should rather bee a nilling (to say so) then a willing.

Moreover in good Philosophy an argument taken from the nature of opposites is forcible: by the like reason I say then, if the understanding were better than the will, that then the contrary to the understan∣ding were worse than the contrary to the will; seeing contraries are the consequences of contraries: but so it is not; for the contrary of will is worse than the op∣posite to the Intellect; because the hatred of God, which is opposite to the love of God, which depen∣deth upon the action of will, is worse than the igno∣rance of him. Epist. 2. Pet. 6. 2.

Now as the actions of the will doe surpasse them of the understanding, so doth the object of it; for

goodnesse which is the object of the will excelleth verity the object of the intellect,* 1.9 as farre as deeds doe words; seeing verity is nothing else, but an adaequa∣tion or conformity of our conceptions with the words we utter.

Sect. 3.

Which of the three faculties of the soule, Vnderstan∣ding, Memorie, and Will, is the most excellent.

THe three principall faculties of mans soule, un∣derstanding, memory, and will, have their se∣verall operations: the understanding playeth as it were the Advocate, memory the Clerke, and will the Iudge; but who knoweth not that the Iudge is al∣wayes above the other two?

To say then that will cannot well make election without preceding sciscitation from the Intellect, is oft times true; but not alwayes: for sometimes with∣out the information of understanding the will wor∣keth, Et nunquam visae flagrabat amore puellae.

In a word, since the actions of the will are more noble then these of the understanding, it being true (as it is) that actions worke not but with a regard to their object: the object of the will being an universall good, and that of the understanding but a particular, under the restriction of verity; thereupon it follow∣eth, that the object and action of the will (being the better) in them consisteth our happinesse.

Sect. 4.

Liberty and compulsion defined; that the will is prompted by the understanding, and that the adequate object of it proceedeth from thence; At what the will and un∣derstanding chiefly aime, proved to bee the glory of God.

ARguments in the behalfe of will, are grounded most upon the freedome of its operations, whereas these of the understanding are coar∣cted and limited as is said. Yet when all is spoken, our understanding wanteth not its owne liberty, at least in so farre as liberty is opposed to compulsion.

For if there were nothing compelled but that which is repugnant to the inclination of the thing, certaine it is that inclination to any thing agreeth ve∣ry well with the intellect.

Now whereas it is said that the object of will which is good,* 1.10 supposeth that of the intellect, which distinguisheth the veritie of the thing: we must consi∣der; that the will of it selfe could not have willed that, except first by the understanding it had knowne it to be such; so by this meanes the will hath no fur∣ther regard to the object of it, in so farre as it beget∣teth felicity and happinesse, then the intellect hath; and although, by way of understanding, it bee made the adaequate or proper object of the will, yet it cea∣seth not to bee the object of the understanding also; as having all things that are, and which may fall un∣der

our capacity, for object; and consequently, it shold be thought nobler and freer then the will, in regard of the boundlesse object which it hath in its extent.

But to leave the decision of this question to better Divines,* 1.11 seeing it falleth neere on the controversie of faith and good workes (by which together wee at∣taine salvation, as by the operations of will and un∣derstanding we attaine felicity)

I say, that all men naturally doe desire for the well of their will, to be happy and have contentment; and for the exercising of their understanding to have a marke to ayme at, which all Philosophers allow to be true; yet few of them came ever to the just point of both. It is necessary then to have a butt, and to have that good, and to have one, because GOD hath given us an understanding whose perfection is wis∣dome, and so one; to which as at a marke our under∣standing addresseth all her powers, and bendeth per∣pectually all her forces: againe to have it good; be∣cause hee hath given a will whose perfection is good∣nesse.

And certainely, God who is wisedome and good∣nesse himselfe, had an eye unto both these in the crea∣tion of all things: For seeing the Philosophers con∣fesse, that nature doth nothing amisse, what should then bee thought of God, whom nature serveth, is but as a handmaid.

Now as GOD who is the beginning, middle and end of all things, hath had no other end in his workes But himselfe: Even so, we his Creatures, should have no other ayme nor end in our actions but him only, seeing we have both our beginning, continuing and en∣ding

from him: Naturally all reasonable creatures doe wish well to themselves, and therefore propose some marke which they ayme at as their peculiar good: which can be nought else but the end for which man was created, to wit the glory of God, who hath made all things for it: So that in striving to come thi∣ther, hee attaineth to his owne proper end and good, which is the good hee aymeth at and naturally see∣keth.

By this meanes if we find either the principle butt of mans ayme or our Soveraigne good, wee have found both, the butt hee shooteth at as the object of his understanding, and his good for the object of the will; hee therefore should apply all his endeavours to this end, and all his desires to this his good.

Section 5.

That all Philosophicall precepts have come short to demon∣strate true felicity; Philosophicall distinctions to know what is good of it selfe in Sciences; yet all weake to illustrate wherein mans true happinesse consisted; which is Philosophically agitated.

IF man had persisted in his first integrity, hee had not beene now to seeke this felicity; for then his understanding clearely perceaved truths, and his will readily desired all good things.

But since the losse of the first, the ladders of the

Philosophers in all their sciences have beene too short to lead us to the latter:* 1.12 for although their end is to know (which Aristotle affirmeth to bee good of it selfe, as by Morall Philosophy to discerne good from evill, and right from wrong; by physicke, health from sicknesse; by the Mathematicks, equall from unequall proportions: by Astrology, the course and force of the Starres, and the celestiall signes: by Geography the length and compasse of the earth; by the Physickes the naturall principles and causes of things: by Metaphysicks supreme essences, good and evill spirits) yet none of all these could leade us to that right knowledge that I intend here.

For all their sciences did conclude only to us, that a mans happinesse consisted in a quiet and pleasant life, whose tranquillity is not interrupted with feare, want, sicknesse and the like, but all these will not serve our turne; for their worth passeth no further than this life and the body, and so must perish; but true happi∣nesse never hath an end.

In the handling then of this felicity and happines it must bee remarked,* 1.13 that it is common to the whole species of mankind, and therefore as all are borne ca∣pable of that end, so all should tend to that butt.

Man feareth nothing more then his end (it being of all terrible things the most terrible) nor wisheth any thing more earnestly then ever to bee, and this Sove∣raigne good wee aspire unto is the end of man; be∣yond which we shall crave no more; for if there were any thing further to be craved, it could not be our end, because beyond the end there can be nothing; or if we craved any thing further, it could not be our Sove∣raigne

good;* 1.14 seeing the greatest property of this bea∣titude is as to crave nothing further, so not to feare the losse of that we have, and withall to be content with that which we possesse.

Of necessity then, that which must bee our Sove∣raigne good, behoved to be agreeable to the nature of man, particular to his species, yet common to all the individua of that kinde: And in so farre as it is our Soveraigne good, it must bee universall, perfect and everlasting. Thus having found out the nature of this our beatitude and felicity, let us a little run over the world, and al the Philosophers, to see, if either the one hath in her bosome, or if the other hath found it out by their curious inquiries.

Sect. 6.

That wealth and Honour cannot bee esteemed to be our su∣preme good or felicity, and the reason therefore; Phi∣losophers confuted by their difference of opinions: Opinions of severall sects of Philosophers concerning felicity instanced to that effect.

THe things of this world which should seeme to make a man most happy are these two,* 1.15 wealth and honours; but alas! the one is winde, and the other clay; they content not all men, for all men attaine not unto them, and yet they that have them are not alwayes content, seeing they who have most, doe for the most part still crave more.

Lastly they perish and decay; and the feare to lose them is more galling then the pleasure almost to en∣joy them is solid; by which meanes they cannot bee our soveraigne good, seeing these doe neither limit our wishes, nor fulfill our wills: they are not com∣mon nor permanent. Vigour, strength and beauty are but blossomes of youth, which decay with age.

As for the Philosophers,* 1.16 looke how many sects and diverse orders they had, so different were their opi∣nions. Aristotle in his Ethicks alleadgeth two sorts of happinesse; the one civill, and Politicke, which con∣sisteth in the prudency of our actions; the other pri∣vate and domesticke, which may be thought contem∣plation: but both these leadeth us not to the end we hunt after, nor yet are they the end themselves. Pla∣to indeed in his Phaedon commeth nearer the truth, when he saith, that beauty, health, strength, wit, doe corrupt and make us worse; so they cannot bee our chiefe good, unlesse conjoyned with the Gods good∣nesse, whereunto Aristotle (both in his first booke De coelo, and in his worke De mundo) agreeth. But I list not hereto fill this short Treatise, with long and tedious allegations of authorities.

St. Aug. in the 19^th. booke of the City of God, in the 1. chap. reports out of Varro, that there was in his dayes 288. different opinions upon that matter, but few or none that hit aright.

For as in Mathematicks, a little errour in the be∣ginning becommeth great in the end; as the mista∣king of one in a million in the beginning, falsifies the whole account in the end: so fared it with them; the further they went, the further they strayed. Socrates

indeed came neere (by the Oracle of Delphos thought to be the wisest amongst them all;* 1.17 in respect he con∣fessed, he knew nothing, because he knew not him∣selfe) when he saith, that if any man may be termed happy, it must be he who hath a cleere and undefiled conscience, whose tranquill and secure ignorance is not perturbed with the worlds cares, but being void of coveting and feare, which molested others, neither needeth nor craveth any more.

Solon thinketh, that no man can be happy before his death, seeing the end crowneth all; considering belike, that as a Ship which hath sailed the vast and spacious Seas, when to appearance all danger is past, may peradventure make shipwrack in the haven: so might a man whose life had beene past in pleasures and security, make a tragicall end, as monuments of all ages can beare record: and the particular example of Croesus King of Lydia, who in his dying houre cal∣led on the name of Solon, attesting this saying of him to be true: and this same Solon, hit the marke a great deale neerer than Epicurus,* 1.18 who placeth our felicity in the pleasure of the body; whom the Stoicks deride, saying, that there was no rose without its prickle, and so they setled it in the peaceable governement of morall vertues. From these againe the Perpateticks, and Academick Philosophers doe differ, amongst whom, divine Plato hath come neerest the foresaid marke.

Sect. 7.

The later Philosophers have aimed neerer the definition of true felicity than the more ancient; and their opinions specified. The finall and true scope of mans felicity, is illustrated with an exhortatory conclusion to all men for endeavouring to attaine unto it.

THE later Philosophers doe cleare this matter more fully;* 1.19 wherefore more worthy of citation, as Seneca, Cicero, Plutarch, Iamblic{que}, and Porphyre, all which have not onely refuted most wittily the Epi∣cures and Stoicks touching their opinions, but have shewen that they and all the others were onely dispu∣table opinions, and have concluded, that the beati∣tude of man consisteth in the knowledge and union of us with God: but little knew they that the first knot of our union with this God was united, and therefore the question is harder now; how we are to be reuni∣ted againe.

To cast up here the opinion of Aristippus, who pla∣ced our happinesse in Venery; or of Diodorus, in the Privation of paine; of Calypso, and Dinomachus in Pleasure and honesty together: of Herullus, in the knowledge of Sciences, esteeming that thereby we might live both contentedly and prudently: of Zeno, in living according to nature; and so forth in the rest; might bee enough to try the readers patience: seeing of these things which they esteemed happi∣nesse,

some were common to us with the Beasts; others were not common to all, and so they failed in the rules of our felicity.

This being so,* 1.20 let us now at least finde it out, and so in a word conclude. Briefly, as all happinesse at first consisted in the union of man with God; so our happinesse renewed, consisteth in the reunion of us with the same God, from whom we have fallen; by which reuniting, we shall both contemplate his face, and love him, in whom we shall have our joy accomplished, wherewith the heart of man can never here be satiated, beyond which we shall crave no far∣ther: this felicity is not peculiar to the great ones of this world above the meaner, but equally obtainable of all who in humility of heart, and uprightnesse of conversation, doe imbrace IESVS the Sonne of GOD, by whom onely we may be reunited, since he is the onely and soveraigne Mediator, blessed from all eternity.

The conscience, which hath its assurance grounded upon this foundation, and rock of verity, may call it selfe truly happy, because it hath the earnest in this life, of that great felicity which is to come, whereby it possesseth it selfe in peace which passeth all naturall understanding (one of the surest tokens of this happi∣nesse) neither perturbed with the terrors of the super∣stitious, nor yet with the carelessenesse and lulled se∣curity of the Atheist; but in a sweet harmony be∣twixt the two extremes,* 1.21 it retaineth the golden me∣diocrity.

This is that soveraigne felicity to my judgement, whereby a man liveth contentedly here, whatsoever

befalleth him; and dyeth in peaceable assurance of that happinesse which is to come; which soveraigne felicity we shall attaine unto, if by a lively faith wee embrace the Sonne, and live according to his will; and so put in ure and practise that great Canon of Re∣ligion, to live and beleeve well; espousing by that meanes our will and understanding together.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The under∣standing and reason in man, is as the Sunne in the firma∣ment.
• * 1.2

  Will, as the Moone which should have no light cut from her Sun, reason.
• * 1.3

  What happines is, according to Aristotle.
• * 1.4

  By our under∣standing we know God, by our will we love him.
• * 1.5

  What, and wherein con∣sisteth the old Philosophicall felicity, so much spoken of, being that whereof we now treate.
• * 1.6

  That our feli∣ci•••• cannot consist in the actions of our will.
• * 1.7

  It would seem that our hap∣pinesse did not co••sist in the actions of our reason and un∣derstanding, but in these of our will.
• * 1.8

  Reasons in fa∣vours of Will.
• * 1.9

  The actions of the will, the object of it seemes to bee more noble then these of the intellect.
• * 1.10

  Will and un∣derstanding how coinci∣dent.
• * 1.11

  This question of felicity con∣sisting in will and understan¦ding is coinci∣dent with that Theologicall question, of Faith & good workes.
• * 1.12

  The end of all Sciences is to know, which the Philoso∣pher saith is good of it selfe▪
• * 1.13

  The proper∣ties of our So∣veraigne hap∣pinesse.
• * 1.14

  The greatest property of our feli••i••y is, as to crave no∣thing more, so not to feare the losse of that which wee have.
• * 1.15

  Wealth and honour cannot be our happi∣nesse.
• * 1.16

  The different opinions of the Philosophers upon this pur∣pose.
• * 1.17

  Happinesse wherein it did consist, accor∣ding to Socra.
• * 1.18

  The Epicure∣ans and Sto∣icks, their opinions▪
• * 1.19

  The latter Philosophers have refuted al others establi∣shing their owne.
• * 1.20

  Finally, what our true felici∣ty is, and wherein it doth consist.
• * 1.21

  By this sove∣raine felicity, a man liveth in tranquility, and dieth in peace.