The counsellor of estate Contayning the greates and most remarkeable considerations seruing for the managing of publicke affaires. Diuided into three parts. The first contaynes the meanes to settle an estate. The secund, the meanes to perserue it. And the third, the meanes to encrease it. Written in French by one of the ancient counsellors to the most Christian kings, Henry the Fourth, and Levvis the thirteenth. Translated by E.G.

THE COVNSELLOR OF ESTATE. CONTAINING THE greatest and most Remarkeable Considerations seruing for the Man∣aging of Publicke Affaires.

PART. 1. OF THE NECESSARY MEANES to Establish an ESTATE.

CHAPTER 1. Of the Establishing and forme of an Estate; and of the diuersity of the gouernments thereof.

THe Considerations which may serue for the mannaging of publique affaires, are of two sorts. Some are drawne from generall Rules and Maximes, the which are vsually followed and obserued in the gouernment of Estates; and the others from Circumstances, which fall out in particular occurrents. For as we may not so relye vpon

the first that we not examine and exactly weigh the parti∣cularities of a busines which may be obserued, be it in the Person which must assist; or in the causes, motiues, means, place, time, and other circumstances: So we must not tye our selues so confidently to these last, as wee desist from the first. If necessity doth force vs sometimes to dis∣pe••ce, it must be in such sort, as we reserue a way to re∣turne againe, and to repaire the businesse.

Wee cannot prescribe any thing certaine for these la••t circumstances, all in particulars which are infinite, and depending principally vpon the sufficiency and particular experience of him which examines such affaires. Many haue written others, some of which suffring themselues to be transported with curiosity, haue mingled Doubts and Queres more fitting for a Schoole, then profitable to make vse of. But my designe in this Discourse is, to gather from the Ancients and Moderns, (who haue treated vpon this Subiect) that which I haue found most fitting for vse and the present Estate.

* 1.1That which they truely call an Estate, is no other thing but an order, by the meanes whereof many Families and Comminalties are gouerned, hauing for their end the good of all in generall. But we may also call an Estate, t••ese Families and Comminalties drawne together vnder o•••• gouer••m••nt, and be it in the one or the other sense, we may say that all the generall considerations, which may serue for the mannaging of publique affaires, tend either to the establishing, or to the preseruation, or to the en∣crease of an Estate.

* 1.2For an establishment many things are necessary, where∣of some must be setled among our selues, and others with strangers; as alliances, intelligences, and corresponden∣ci••s, wherein consists the care of affaires abroad. Among our selues there must be established and regulated the form•• of the Estate, Religion, Councell, the manner of commanding the force, and the Treasure, or Reuenewes

sufficient to satisfie the Charges, and supply the defence, of the Estate.

The forme of Estates is diuers, according to the number; the dependants and the right of those which Command,* 1.3 & according to the diuers qualities & distinctions of those which obey. According to the nūber of those which com∣mand, Estates are distinguished principally into three sorts.

The first is tha••, in the which one command•• alone without Companion, the which wee call Principality. The second is that where the most eminent and apparent Men (which make the least part of the Estate) haue the Soueraignty, the which we call Seignoury. The third is that, whereas the people, or the greatest part of them vn∣der the Name of people command▪ and this may be cal∣led a popular Estate, or a Common-weale.

But euery forme of Estate is gouerned d••uersly: so as of Principalities one is called Royall,* 1.4 when as some one commands according to the lawes of Nature, and the lawes of the Country, leauing the naturall liberty, and the property of goods to euery one in particular, hauing for their principall end the publique vtility:* 1.5 and in this man∣ner most of the Westerne people of Europe are gouerned.

The other is Seignouriall,* 1.6 in the which the Prince is made Lord of their goods and persons, by the right of Armes and a iust Warre, or by the Custome of the Coun∣try, gouerning his Subiects as the Master doth his slaues; yet not straying from the lawes of Nature: And this go∣uernment (although it be rough and tedious) is held law∣full, if the conquest be iust. For where there is a subiect to make Warre, they hold that the force is iust betwix•• two Soueraignes, which haue no superiour to decide their con••rouersie; and that he may prescribe what Lawe hee please to the weaker. In this manner are ruled and gouer∣ned all the people of the East and West Indies, of Affrick, and a good part of the Leuant; and euen in Europe the the Muscouites and the Turkes gouerne in this manner.

* 1.7The third is vnlawfull and Tyrannicall, in the which he that commands, hath no other ayme but his owne priuate profit, and hath no care of that of his Subiects; and for his greatnesse, reuenge, or auarice violates all Diuine and Humane lawes: so as he liues in continuall distrust of his Subiects, and intreates them with all rigour and se••erity against Iustice. I say against Iustice, for that we may not censure a Prince to be a Tyrant ••y his seuerity, the which a good Prince is sometimes forced ••o practise a∣gainst the custome of his Subiects; Neyther by his guard of strangers, which they entertaine not only for ••afety, but for the obedience, ornament, and attendance of his Ma∣iesty: Neyther by his absolute commands, the which are more to be wi••ht for of a iust Prince, then the flattering int••eaties of Tyrants, who draw after them a feare of an ineuitable reuenge.

* 1.8A Seigncury which is gouerned according to the lawes, is called lawfull; as that of Venice▪ and of many Townes in Germany. But being gouerned by few men, we call it Factions; as that of Athens, vnder the Thirty Tyrants whom Lizander established: That of Rome vnder the Ten men, and afterwards vnder Caesar, Pompey and Cr••ssus, and lastly vnder the Triumuirat.

* 1.9A popular Estate is also gouerned diuersly. For either the affaires ar•• in the hands of the common people; and then it is rather a tumult and an Anarch••, then an Estate; as Athens was gouerned', after that Pericles had taken from the Areopagites the power of iudging: Or else the pe••p••e r••ferre the gouernment to the aduice of some men whom they haue chosen amongst them; whose power and charge is limited to a certaine time, to the end that euery man should haue meanes to command in his turne; or else their Offices continue during life, to the end that by this continuation, they may make themselues the more cape∣able of affaires. In certaine places, and in certaine affaires of importa••ce, or of alliances, peace, or warre, euery one

of the people giues his voyce, being assembled altogether in Common; as in some Cantons of the Suisses; or diui∣ded by Parishes, Trades, Families, Companies, or Comi∣nalties, as in old time at Athens and Rome.

CHAP. 2. Of the aduantages and disaduantages of a Popular Estate.

EXperience hath taught vs, that wee may subsist in all these formes of Estate. But as there is nothing permanent in this World, through idlenesse and negligence the order is many times corrupted, and the State ruined, the which proceeds from the imper∣fections and defects which are found in all these Estates. Wherefore he that will settle an Estate, must consider carefully of the aduantages and disaduantages which are found in either forme.

The aduantages which they giue to a popular Estate,* 1.10 is Iustice and Equallity, or without fauour or respect of per∣sons; reducing the ciuill constitution to the Lawes of Nature, which makes vs all Equall. Thus in cutting off the auarice of some, and the arrogancy of others, loue and friendship is entertained amo••gst them, euery man enioyes the publicke good; and all being imployed in affaires, this kind of Estate is commonly most fertile in great personages: The handy-crafts man by his im∣ployment in offices makes himselfe a great Orator and a great Captaine▪* 1.11 Yet many haue held a popular Estate to be the worst, and most imperfect of all the formes of Gouernment. For this equallity which they so much e∣steeme, is against nature, the which giues more graces to some and lesse to others: And if it be well obserued, there should be neither Magistrate nor officer that should

haue supriority aboue the rest: and this inequality ru∣ines f••iendship instead of maintayning it. As for the publicke, there is no Estate wo••se gouerned then a po∣pular, there all things are sold as in a Faire (as Plato sayth) being gouerned by men bred vp and giuen to gaine. Men most commonly furious, if they be not terrified, and in their feare irresolute in all their actions, nothing secret, and difficult to be drawne together at need; and whom in many Estates, they haue bin forced to inuite them to assemble for the distribution of the publicke mo∣ny amongst them.

Their assemblies are alwaies full of disorders, varieties and inconstancy: the ordinary defects of a multitude. Wise men dare not ••peake, fearing the fury of the peo∣ple, who alwayes lay their faults vpon their Gouernors; and Fooles crying out loudest carry it. If you do not hold the people in some feare of strangers, stirring vp some Warre against them, they will forge a Ciuill; there being neuer any quarrell or enuy so great, as amongst those which are equall; be it to supplant one another; or for that the one cannot liue without the other. The need which they haue one of another, being the principall bond of ordinary friendship: and they are inconstant, be∣ing of an humour which cannot continue long in quiet; vnl••sse there be some number of Citizens, who hauing credit ••nd agreeing together, stay the violence where∣with the people suffer themselues commonly to be trans∣ported. The Suisses, which are gouerned in this forme o•• Estate,* 1.12 are assi••••ed by the Country, to the which no man hath any great desire, and which of it selfe is strong by the nature of the people, who are very grosse and no∣thing ambitious; being diuerted from dreaming of inno∣uations by t••eir d••unkennesse, wher••in they spend more of their time, then they haue remayri••g, and would be necessary to thinke of, for the most quarrelsome and bus••e: Besides going to the seruice of Princes, and by

the vnion made among the Cantons, who being separa∣ted from the Soueraignty, one cannot attempt against all the rest, for want of intelligence; and one attempting against the Cantons hee should haue to deale with them all.

CHAP. 3. Of the aduantages and disaduantages of a Seignoury.

THe Estate of many Lords, seemes to hold a meane betwixt a Principallity and a popular Estate,* 1.13 being neither subiect to the tyranny of one alone, nor to the confusion of a multitude: And the Soue∣raignty being giuen to the wisest, many see more then one, and few resoluing better then a multitude; it seemes that this kind of Gouernment should be-most desired. And if rich men haue the Gouernment, there is no doubt, but the Estate wilbe better preserued: Hauing alwaies bin held profitable, that such as receiued most losse by the ruine of the Estate, should likewise haue the greatest share in the gouernment, as hauing the same in∣terest with them of the Estate.

Yet experience hath taught vs,* 1.14 that this forme is not more assured then a popular Estate, for where there shall be many gouernours, there will alwayes be diuersity of opinions; And euery one abounding in his owne Iudge∣ment, (especially such as haue greatest authority) will finde out occasions of Disputes in their deliberations, and breed factions in the Estate. Their resolutions will be many times discouered, and being profitable to giue the gouernment to one more worthy, if in a Principality they are many times troubled to find one that is capeable, with more difficulty shall they picke out many, which

may be capeable and worthy of this Command.

And if they will say that one may supply the defect of another, this would be difficult among equals; The voy∣ces being numbred and not weighed: And admit this might be done, yet it were not good for the Councell, which must consist of a greater number th••n ordinarily the Lords are. But for the command which de••••nds vpon a resolution of diuers opinions, of men equal•• in power and credit, it cannot well be but in one head.

Likewise in a combustion and trouble, they haue found that the Command of one alone was necessary, and that it was very vnsafe in a time full of Iealousies, Difficulties, and Distrusts to impart the gouernment of affaires to ma∣ny. The Lacedemonians vpon this occasion created their Armoste; The Thessalians him whom they called Ar∣••hoes; The Mitileniens their great Achimnete; At Rome they created the Dictator; At Venice their great Pro∣uidator.

Besides all these inconueniences, a Seignoury as well as other formes of Estates, is not onely exposed to stran∣gers, but more to the Enterprises of a multitude, whom they must content or keepe them in awe by force. To content them without yeelding vnto them part of the E∣state, were very difficult, and it were impossible to admit them to offices, without danger to change the Seignoury into a popular Estate, as it happened at Rome. To retaine them by force, were no safe thing: and admit it might be done, yet the distrust they should haue of them, would be a cause that in the least warre attempted against stran∣gers, they would make vse of this occasion, to take Armes and to shake off the yoake.

In this feare the Lords durst not traine vp their Souldi∣ers to Armes; and entertaining strangers to mannage the the warre, it is to be feared they will get credit among the people. If they giue the charge of this conduct to one of their Lords, vpon the fi••st discontentment he shal haue

against the rest, or vpon the least ambition that shall creepe into his braine, he will dis-vnite himselfe from them, and make himselfe the head of a party. So as this kind of gouernment cannot safely vndertake a War, with∣out danger of ruine. So whether for the diuision which may grow among them, or for the weakenesse of power diuided among many; or be it for the difficulty to agree and resolue; Or be it that the Subiects many times know not whom to obey; Or for that affaires which ought to be kept secret, are most commonly divulg'd: This kind of gouernment is none of the safest.

And that which hath caused the Seignoury of Venice to continue so long,* 1.15 and to preserue itselfe against the En∣terprises of the people, hath not bin this order so much, as the policy which the Magistrate hath vsed; imparting some petty offices to the people, yea, and some of the grea∣test, as that of the Chancellor; contracting alliances with them contrary to the ancient opinion of the Roman Ari∣stocracy, which forbad such marriages; borrowing from them to oblige them to maintaine the Estate; disarming them wholy; giuing them liberty in all sorts of pleasure, to make them pliable; giuing vnto the rich the right of Burgoisie, and choosing some among the Cittizens to be made Gentlemen, to the end they might liue in hope one day to haue an interest in the Estate. And thus satisfying the Nobility with honours, the People with rest and commodities, inuring their Subiects to warre as little as may be, especially by Land; suppressing speedily all warre with strangers, and factions among themselues, en∣tertaining a neutrality with Princes, not wedding any quarrels; and changing party as their interest change, thus they maintaine themselues.

CHAP. 4. Of the aduantages and disaduantages of a Principality.

* 1.16A Principality hath its Defects as well as a Seignoury or popular Estate. The first is the change of Prin∣ces, which bring with them new Designes, new Lawes, new Ministers, new Friends, new E∣nemies, a new manner of liuing, and new Alli∣ances.

The second is the danger of falling into Ciuill warres by the diuision of such as aspire to the Crowne, especial∣ly if there be a right of election: and in the succession, if the Prince be an Infant, there will be a diuision for th•• gouernment betwixt the Mother and the Princes, or b••∣twixt the Princes themselues. So as they haue beene often forced to auoid this inconuenience, to giue t•••• breeding of the Child to the Mother, and the gouern∣ment of the Estate to the nearest Kinsman. And if there be a Tutor, there is danger lest he make hi••∣selfe Maister of the Estate, as hath beene often see•••• among the Macedonians: If there bee many, th•••• are reduced to the inconueniences of many Lords.

If the Prince be young, and freed from a Gouernour, young men cause him to commit a thousand disorders, and to reiect all sorts of good Councell: And if he •••• warlike, he will hazard his Subiects, his Estate, a•••• Person: If hee be subtill and wicked, hee will sett•••• a Tyranny: If he be cruell, he will make a Butchery of his Subiects: If he be luxurious, hee will troub•••• the holiest Marriages of his Estate, which is a thing which doth most passionate the people: If he be c••∣uetous

or prodigall, he will be an exacter; and if he be simple and ignorant, it will be much worse, suffring ••imselfe to be gouerned by men of no merit, who for their owne priuate interest and greatnesse, will attempt all manner of villanies vnder his authority. Yet not withstanding these inconueniences, it is most certaine, (as hath beene sayd) that a soueraigne commaund can∣not subsist, (to speake prop••rly) but in one person a∣lone; as they say that many see better then one alone: But to resolue, to conclude, and to commaund, one will doe it better then many. As for Alliances of Princes, they doe not alwayes dye with the Princes, there be∣ing treaties which are made from one Estate into a∣nother. And in regard of the Princes minority, when it happens, the affaires are not alwayes found dispo∣sed to ••nnouation; and according to the occasions they may preuent the mischiefes which happen by this defect.

The other inconueniences are rather particular vices of the Prince, then defects of the Gouern∣ment, and vices dye with the Princes person, but••not the vices and abuses of Lords in a Seignoury, nor of a multitude in a popular Estate, for that Comminalties ne∣uer dye: But contrariwise as they are perpetuated by sub∣rogation, so by contagion the abuses which enter into these companies, passe from one to another.

And in regard of liberty, which is the foundation of other Estates,* 1.17 being onely desired to hinder great men from oppressing their inferiours, this may be prouided for by Iustice, the which being duly executed in a Princi∣pality, the people hath no Subiect to desire liberty: for that this desire would onely tend to an A••a••chicall licen∣ciousnesse, which would make them mo••e miserable then a iust and lawfull subiection. But that w••ich m••kes the peo∣ple vnable to iudge of the liberty which is in a iust Princi∣pality, is that true liberty consisting in not to be wrong'd,

no man doth acknowledge himselfe bound to him that doth not wrong him.

CHAP. 5. A consideration of the setling of the forme of an Estate.

BY their defects and aduantages which are found in these three kinds of gouernments, we may afterwards iudge (adding thereunto the consideration of the in∣clination of the people) of the particular manner of li∣uing, and of the condition of the people and affaires, the which ought to be setled rather in one place then in ano∣ther. Among men that are equall and impatient of Rule, as your Sea-faring men be, and such as dwell in Moun∣taines and Forrest, by reason of the austerity and rough∣nesse of their manners and liuing, a popular Estate would be more proper then any other. Themistocles desiring to settle a popular Estate in Athens, aduanced Sea-faring men, and gaue authority to Marriners. Cato sayd that the Ma∣cedonians deserued to be free, for that they could not be restrained vnder the rule of him that would command them.

If there be an inequality, one part being richer then the other, and that wealth hath bred some dependance and respect of the meaner sort towards the great ones, a Seignoury and gouernment of few may be well establi∣shed amongst such men.

If in this inequality there be a Diuision or Discord, some being vnwilling to yeeld to others; and that there be found some one that hath more power and credit, they must of necessity settle a principality.

After a Battaile lost, or some other disgrace happened, a people being amazed, finding no Councell in themselues,

they willingly referre the disposition of their affaires to him or them which promise to preserue them. So as in such an incounter it is easie in steed of a popular Estate to settle a Seignoury or a principallity. As contrari∣wise, a multitude hauing had some good successe, and growing insolent, it fa••s out that making no a••compt of their Lords, they change the commaund of few into a popular Estate, or into a Principallity, if he by whose meanes, this good Fortune hath befalne them, hath credit, conduct, and courage sufficient to make vse of his good Fortune.

I will adde, that a fearefull and timerous people gi∣uen to their pleasures, little carefull and incapable of affaires, are better gouerned and more happily by a Prince, then by any other kind of gouernment. Where as contrarywise, a people that is rough, auaritious, pre∣sumptuous, and hardy, do vnwillingly yeild themselues vnder a principallity, if it be not very moderate, or al∣together warlicke, in the which absolute commaunds are supported by force.

It may likewise be sayd, that a Principallity is main∣tayned better in a great Estate, consisting of persons of diuers qualities; and a small Estate is more fitting for a Seignoury or popular Gouernment: for that in a great E∣state, being necessary to trayne vp the Subiects to Armes to defend it, it fals out vsually, that he which is master of the Forces, makes himselfe likewise master of the Estate; as it hath hap••ed at Rome, and in many other Common-weales.

Contrariwise, a Prince in a small Estate is many times for••ed to become a Tyrant; and so much the greater and s••uerer Tyrant, as the extent of his Tyranny, that is to say of his Country, is the lesse, hauing no meanes to draw from his Subiects (without great oppression) so much mony as he shall haue need of for his defence, to the which all his Subiects would contribute willingly

their persons and meanes, if they were reduced to a re∣publique or popular Estate.

CHAP. 6. Of the dependance of Estates one of another.

THe forme of Estates is diuers, according to the dependance of those which commaund. For al∣though we treate onely of Estates that haue all soue∣raignty ouer their Subiects; yet there are which depend in some sort of another, and others which doe not hold, as they say, but of God and their Swords, ha∣uing no dependance of any man.

* 1.18Estates depend of another by tribute, duty, honour, protection, or pension. By tribute, when as besides the tribute which they owe to some other Soueraignes, the other markes of Soueraignty remaine. By duty, when ac∣cording to some obligation they owe succours to some one, be it in money or men. By honour, when as some Soueraigne owes fealty and homage to another, yet with out preiudizing the other rights of Soueraignty. By pro∣tection, when as some one hath put himselfe into the pro∣tection of another to defend him; whereby he is sayd to depend on his protector.

As for a Pensioner, he seemes to depend no more of him that giues the pension, nor to be inferiour to him, then the other is to him. For although he seemes inferiour re∣ceiuing the pension, yet the other in giuing it, makes shew that h•• hath neede of his succours: And when as H••norius treated with the Gots, and made them his pen∣sioners. Lampadias opposing himselfe, sayd, that it was a paction of Seruitude, by the which they made the Em∣perour tributary to the Gots. Yet I hold that this ought

to be iudged by the quality and power of the Estates, and by the particular con••entions. For the succours may be so great in regard of the pension, as we might easily dis∣cerne who had the aduantage in this treaty, and in like manner if there were any necessity in the one, to doe▪ that which they had stipulated from him; and that what they desired of another, were left to his free will: wherevpon knowledge of the cause the first shall be inferiour to the last.

The markes of Soueraignty which remaine,* 1.19 not with∣standing these dependances are, to giue a law to all in ge∣nerall, and to all in particular, without the consent of a∣ny that are greater, equall or inferiour: To institute the principall Officers: to make leuies of money and men: to dispose of the principall affaires, not yeelding an accomp•• to any man: to giue pardon to condemned persons aboue the rigour of the Law: To iudge definitiuely and without appeale, to hold this power of himselfe, and from no su∣periour: To declare Warre and treate of Peace; to dis∣pose of the Treasure: to coyne Money, to cast Attillery, to build Fortresses and such like.

CHAP. 7. Of the forme of Estates according to the right of those which commaund them.

THe forme of Estates is likewise diuers, in regard of the right of such as commaund: and according∣ly their commaund is called lawfull or vnlawfull, as well i•• a Principality, Seignoury, as a popular Gouernment. The lawfull is that which belongs vnto vs, be it by the bounty of him which hath power to giue it, or by a iust conquest, or else that w••ich is defer∣••••d by the Lawes, the which hath eyther followed

Succession, Election, or Lots. The Lot is more proper for a popular Gouernment, for that all things are equall; and they seldome make vse of it in the Gouernment of a Principallity or a Seig••oury. Yet Saul was made King by Lot: And Alexanders Successours after his death diui∣ded his Empire by Lot. At Venice they draw them by Lots which are to choose the principall Magistrates. But such establishments are not ordinary.

Succession and Election are the most ordinary meanes to attayne vnto a Principallity and Seignoury, w••ereof it is necessary ••o know the aduantages and inconuenien∣ces, which we may hope for, or feare.

CHAP. 8. Aduantages and disaduantages of an Election in a Principallity.

THe Election in a Monarchy or Principallity is dan∣gerous,* 1.20 for the miseries which the interim or va∣can••y doth vsually breed, whilest they are about to choose a King, the Estate remayning in an Anarchy, without Lord or Gouernour: Like vnto a Ship without a Pylot, which owes his shipwracke to the first Wind. For in the meanetime Theeues and Ro∣bers, vpon hope to obtayne their pardon from the new King, commit a thousand Villanies: as is often seene the See being voyd at Rome, or, as in Poland, so as the pu∣nishment ought to be doubled, for the excesse which is committed during that time.

Besides this, in the pursuit of the Election, you see many factions, whereof the least is sufficient to ••uine the Estate: the which not able to be reconciled, they frame parties, which delay the Election, and continue the int••reigne, with the disorders which accompany it.

But if eyther party choose whom they thinke good, then growes a Ciuill Warre, which continues long af∣ter. This hath bin seene in the Election of Popes and Emperours: and the Empire hath bin voyd eighteene yeares, after that William Earle of Holland had bin sl••ine. For although ••hat Alphonso the tenth King of Spaine were chosen, yet he refused this quality, for t••e apparent dan∣ger, to take the charge of a•• Estate, exposed to the will of Subiects, to the enuy of Princes, and to the violence of the stranger: And in the meane time the wicked ex∣ceeded in all villany. Moreouer in the Election, an o∣uerture being made of many, if they fall to force, the most cunning and rash would carry it, and the most vertuous would not hazard themselues. If they make themselues Competitors, and will containe themselues within the ordinary bounds, he shall neuer be chosen a∣gainst the hot pursuit of others, who at need know well how to free themselues. And be the Election made of one of the Country, or of a stranger; yet there are great inconueniences of either side.

Among those of the same Country, there wilbe alwaies icalousie, and the one will neuer obay the other: And although they be not all equall in Wealth and Vertue: yet they will still presume themselues to be such. If they make choyse of a Forraigne Prince, his manners being different will not be pleasing: he will aduance those of his Country, in whom he hath greatest confidence. If there fall vnto him another Kingdome by Succession where he may commaund more absolutely, he will leaue the Electife to some Leiutenant: Or if the two Estates be neighbours, with the one he will make the other subiect. They will alwayes be in distrust, that he will aduance his Country-men, and depriue them of the right of Electi∣on▪ and he on the other side, will grow iea••ous of his Subiects, if he hath that dessigne: and to purchase their good wills, and reduce them to what he desires, he will

giue and ingage vnto them the demeanes and Reuenewes of the Estate, as some Emperours and Popes haue done. Behold the inconueniences of an Election.

* 1.21 The aduantages consist more in imagination then in Effect: for to say, that they choose the better, it is a thing which indeed ought to be, but cannot be effected, by reason of practises, Factions, and Iealousies: and with∣all I will adde, that the peoples ayme, which hath fol∣lowed this m••anes of Election, hath not bin alwayes to choose the most vertuous and wise: But some haue had respected to Nobility only; others to age, as the Arabi∣ans: others to the greatnesse of the body, as in Aethiopia: and the Scythians (if we may beleeue Aristotle) made choyse of him that dranke best.

* 1.22 Notwithstanding what defects soeuer may be in an E∣lection, yet if it be receiued into an Estate, it must be maintayned: and they to whom the charge is giuen to make the Election must among other considerations ad∣nise to make choyse of a Successour, that is vnlike in na∣ture and disposition to his Predecessour, to the end that of two diuers dispositions, there may be a well tempe∣red order in the Estate, there being no humor, how wel compo••ed soeuer it be, which bends not towards some vicious Extreamity, from the which by this meanes they retyre the gouernment of the Estate: and withall they grow wear•• to see continually one manner of proceeding, the which is neuer so Exact, as all the Subiects can rest sa∣tisfied: So as by the society of one humor some grow di∣stasted, and others are discontented, wherby a disorder may grow. It is therefore Expedient by this variety to re∣tayne the Estate. Yet it is a thing wherof they think least: and we vsually see, that although the Election be free; yet they make choyse of him who naturally should succeed, if he be of age capable to Command: And this they do to preuent the Enuies and partiallities which the choyse of o••e of another house may breed.

CHAP. 9. Of Succession, diuersly practised in Succes∣sions.

THe other meanes to come vnto the Gouernment of an Estate receiued by the Lawes, is Succession the which is diuersly practized: For the Com∣maund is referred to men and women indifferently: or to men, to the exclusion of women.

The Commaund which is referred inclusiuely to men and Women, hath for its Foundation the Law of Suc∣cessions, and the Equallity which is betwixt man and Woman; yet this is also diuersly practized: For eyther the Commaund is deferr'd to Women, according to the order and degrees of Proximity, obserued in ordinary Successions: Or only in defect of Males, aswell in the direct as the Colaterall Line, vnto the fourth degree in∣clusiuely: As it was resolued by the Cardinals for the Realme of Naples, as it appeares in the Inuestiture of Al∣phonso of Aragon, in the Yeare 1345. and of Ferdinand in the Yeare 1458:

And although that this Succession of women to the go∣uernment of Estates be receiued in a manner by all the E∣states of Christendome: Yet some haue reiected it;* 1.23 there being no question of the possession of an inheritance, but to commaund a Nation: the which seemes to be against the stayednes and modesty which ought to be in that Sex; agaynst the Lawes of nature, which hath giuen force and prudence to men; and against the Law of GOD, which hath made the Woman subiect to man. They adde here∣unto Inconstancy, Fragillity, and loosnesse, vices much to be feared in this Sex, and▪ of great consequence in an Estate, their weaknes exposed to the force of Strangers, and to the contempt of Subiects, who will not sayle to calumniate the

Princ••ss•• ••f ••he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 marry: And if she marries (the which is nece••••ary to haue an assured Successo••) it must be eyther to one of the Country or to a Stranger. She will vnwillingly ••arry to one of her Subiects, as well for that she will thinke she ••a••h dishonoured her selfe; as for f••a••e least her other Subiects, eyther Equall or greater then he with whom she hath married, would grow into some iealousie; the which would breed con∣tempt and afterwards disorder.

If she marries a Stranger, he shalbe enuied of his neighbours and suspected by his Subiects, n••ither can he hold his life assured to commaund in a strange Country, vnlesse he hath Forces & Forts whereof he is the master. He will likewise commaund the Estate; and the better to assure himselfe, he will aduance his owne, and keep backet those of the Cou••try: An insupportable thing to all Nations of the World. These are partly the Reasons for the which they Exclude Women from the Gouern∣ment in some Estates.

There are also some diuersities in Estates, where as the succession of men to the gouernment is only receiued, * 1.24 aswell for the diuision, as for the order of succeeding. For the diuision some haue allowed it: and in the first a••d second Race of the Kings of France, it was practi∣zed: But the diuision which grew thereby, taught the French, that the Commaund ought to be in one alone, and that it could not be diuided without ruine of the E∣state. The same is at this day obserued in England, Scot∣land, Spaine, and Hungary.

For the order of Succession, some haue receiued none but those that were legitimate; others for want of law∣full i••sue, haue admitted Bastards in the direct line, to the exclusion of Colaterals. And for the order of Suc∣cession amongst the Legitimate, they haue also found di∣••••••••s opinions; aswell in the direct ••ine, to know if the s••nne of th•• E••dest should succeed his Grand-father to

the Exclusion of his Vncle; as in a Colaterall Line, that is to say whether in the Succession of a Colaterall, very remote, he which is descended from the Eldest branch, ought to be preferred to others which are much neerer in degree. The which Baldus decided long since, for the Succession of this Realme, in fauour of the Bourbo••s, who represented the Eldest branch, tha•• of Vallois failing▪ God hath confirmd it, in blessing the Armes of K. Henry the 4. with a miraculous prosperity, to attaine to this estate.

CHAP. 10. Of vsurpation, or an vnlawfull Command.

AN vnlawfull Commaund is called Vsurpation, the which is eyther made by onealone, or by few men, or by the Faction of a multitude. That which is done by one alone, is eyther practized vpon a Prince, or vpon a Seignoury, or against a Popular Estate: And he which attempts is a Stranger or a Subiect. I will not lay open the manner of their proceedings, nor the meanes which an Vsurper should hold. It is too common a Science, and too much practized in these dayes, the which deserues rather to be forgotten then taught, for the miseries which it doth procure,* 1.25 not only to the preiudice of those, whom they may ouermaster; but likewise to those which are thrust on to such interprizes. For if there be difficulty to prepare the affaires, and bring them to an end, there is no lesse to maintaine himselfe. And it is most certain, that there is more difficulty for a Prince which hath vsurped the liberty of another, to preserue him selfe i•• his vsurpation, then it is for a multitude which haue recouered their liberty, to maintayn themselues. For if in a people custom to be guided makes most commonly the li∣berty where into they haue bin setv••profitable, not knowing

what gouernment mea••es, nor hauing any vnderstanding of the Estate; like vnto a sauage Beast, which had bin fed in a Serraile or Cage, being once escaped knowes not whither to goe, hauing not beene accustomed to feede like others, and not knowing whither to retire, is made a prey to the first that will captiuate him or inchaine him: Yet it is more difficult to settle a Principality, for this new greatnesse is subiect to the enuy of Neighbours, and the hatred of Subiects; who ioyning together, chase the Vsurper more easily away, then he entred into this new Estate. Whereas a multitude which hath recouered their liberty, hath no cause to feare the hatred of Subiects, see∣ing that all receiue benefit by this Enterprize: And the enuy of Neighbours is sometimes pacified by the hatred they beare to him whom the people haue expelled in re∣gard of his bad carriage.

Moreouer in a new Common-weale euery man contri∣butes freely, and thinkes that what he payes is for his owne particular profit: Yea the greatest contribute wil∣lingly, for the desire they haue to attaine vnto some ho∣nour by their contribution. Contrariwise an Vsurper hath difficulty to finde money to maintaine himselfe, and entertaine his Estate, vnlesse he vse violence, which doub••e•• the hatred of his Subiects against him. There are an infinite number of other difficulties proceeding from the new Command of a new Lord, with whom the peo∣ple cannot so easily accommodate themselues. So as for the se••ling of this new Principality, it is necessary that he reside himselfe vpon the place, to the end he may the bet∣ter see the disorders, and preuent them speedily. For by this meanes the Subiects shall haue more occasion to loue him, or to feare him if they doe ill; and he that would assaile the Estate, will resolue with more difficulty.

The vsurpations which are made by many, or by the people vpon their naturall Prince, are no lesse vniust; for that they happen not most commonly, but after the bad

gouernment of the Prince. They are in some sort iustis••∣ed by the iniustice of his actions. That is likewise as vn∣iust, which is attempted against a Seignoury by the peo∣ple, the which most commonly growes from the ••niury of the Lords against their Subiects: who being assisted by some one of the Lords, who separates himselfe from the rest to ioyne with them, preuayling in their Enterpri∣zes, they commonly change the Seignoury into a tyran∣nous Principality.

And it is necessary that in all these changes there should be Iniustice, and likewise violence: vnlesse the change were made as at Venice, the which in the beginning was gouerned by the people; and afterwards the gate being shut to those which had retired out of the City, and neg∣lected the Offices of the Estate, vnto those which had them, afterwards they made an Estate of many Lords, without any iealousie or violence. The same happens vsu∣ally in all popular Estates, which insensibly change into a Seignoury, when as they receiue Strangers, and impart no Offices vnto them. For these by succession of time e••crease and multiply: and contrariwise the Families of he ancient Inhabitants being onely imployed in the char∣ges of the Warre and State, diminish, so as the gouern∣ment is found in the hands of the smaller number.

It hath happned sometimes, that the greatest part of the Lords hauing beene defeated in Battaile, the people haue changed the Seignoury into a popular Estate: as the Tarrentins did, after the Battaile which was giuen against the lapiges, in the which in a manner all the Nobility of Tarrnetum dyed. Finally it is in him that will giue a new forme to an Estate, to accommodate himselfe according to the occurrents of affaires, and therein to follow that whereof the people may be most capeable.

CHAP. 11. Of the diuersity which is found among Subiects in an Estate.

BVt this will not be sufficient to giue forme to an E∣state, * 1.26 to regulate and prescribe the number, with the right and dependance of those which ought to commaund: You must likewise haue a care to the diuersity which is found vsually among those which must obey, according to the which they must many tunes car∣ry themselues diuersly. But for that it would be too long a s••arch to examine particularly the diuers qualities of Subiects, it shall suffice to make mention of those chiefly which serue in the gouernment.

The first distinction of Subiects is, that they are all free or Bond-men.* 1.27 The Bond-man is he whom the right of Warre hath made subiect, or that is borne of a Father that is a Bond-man. In old time the Masters had power of life and death ouer them: but the cruelty they vsed, cau∣sed this power to be cut off. In the end Christianity hath abolished it am••ngst vs, for the charity which ought to ••e among men, and by this meanes hath preserued Estates from an infinite number of dangers, whereunto they were subiect; for that Bond-men being ill i••treated, might for∣tisie an alteration, or attempt themselues, as Spartacus did. Wherefore some of the Roman Senate desiring to diuersi∣fie the habite of Bond-men from such as were free, one of the wisest Senators let them know the danger, if the Bond-men came to number themselues: For they will soone fre•• themselues of their Masters, for the facility they should haue to co••••pire by the signe of their habits:

Yet some v••der colour ••f making priuate men to be better serued, and to cut off the infinite number of Vaga∣bonds,

Idle persons, and Bankrupts, who after they haue consumed their estates, pay the world with nothing; haue held it fit to bring Bond-men into an Estate. But this is so farre from hindring and cutting off the number, as it would augment that of Theeues. For a Bond-man ha∣uing once escaped, will be alwayes forced, (not daring to shew himselfe) to retire among Theeues: and he is no wife Politician that chaseth Theeues out of an Estate, but he that keepes them from entring.

In regard of free Subiects, some are priuiledged, sim∣ple Subiects and bound to all the Lawes: * 1.28 others are pri∣uiledged and exempt from somè one: some for their Age, others for their sex; some by particular fauour, or by the prerogatiue of their charge and vocation; and others are bound to some duties of honour or assistance more then the rest; as feudataries and vassals.

Of simple Subiects, some are Originaries, * 1.29 the rest are Strangers. The Originaries are those which are borne in the Estate, enioying all the Lawes. As for Strangers, * 1.30 they are intreated diuersly in the world. For they draw some eyther to people the Country, or Townes newly built; or to weaken their neighbours, or to gaine good wits, who may serue eyther for Traffique, or in the War, or for the instruction of Youth, and in this cas•• they are most commonly priuiledged. Others come of themselues, eyther for that they are chased out of their Countrey, or with an intent to benefit their Estates. In this case they are so farre from being priuiledged, as all liberty to dis∣pose is taken from them; and dying, that which they haue accrews to the Prince and State, if they haue no Heire re∣mayning there.

Behold the diuersity of their conditions which obey, diuersifying the gouernment. But the forme of the E∣state may be also considered by the diuision they mak•• of Subiects, according to the diuersity of their vocation or profession.

CHAP. 12. Of the diuersity and distinction of Subiects, accor∣ding to their vocations and professions.

* 1.31IN many Estates the Subiects are distinguished into three orders: As in France, into that of the Clergy, the Nobility, and the third estate which is the people. This distinction is followed in a manner throughout all Europe, and taken from that of the ancient Gaules, who were distinguished into Drindes, Horsemen, and the common people. In Aegypt there were Labourers, Priests, Shepheards, men at Armes, and Artizans. The Arabians were diuided into Priests, men at Armes, and Labourers; who made three distinct bodies. In some Common-weales they haue beene distinguished other∣wise, as at Venice, into Gentlemen, Cittizens, and com∣mon people: and the Gentlemen into ancients, new and last, or more new: Yet this last distinction makes but one body. At Florence they had the great, the popular, and the populace.

But among all distinctions those are very considerable, which are reduced vnder certaine bodies, Colledges, and Comminalties, whereof some are religious, as Con∣uents, Abbies, and Chapters: Others are politicall and ciuill, ordayned eyther for Commerce, or for the safe∣ty of a Towne or Countrey, or for Councell and Iustice. Other Commina••ties are composed of Trades and Arti∣zans, diuided by Brotherhoods or Companies; the which Numa brought first into Rome, to quench the faction of the Sabins and Romans, and to re-vnite these two peo∣ple into one, taking away the first diuision by this second Distinction; which being reduced into many parts, mi••g∣led one with another, was much lesse da••gerous. And

afterwards Tarquin the proud, to take away all signes of this ancient Diuision, mingled their Ensignes.

The like course hath bin followed to re-vnite the E∣state of Genoa, afflicted at one time by many Diuisions: That is to say, by the Gnelphes and Gibelins; the Nobi∣lity and the people; and that of the Adornes and Fregoses. For to vnite the people diuided into so many factions, they made a mixture of the one with the other, in making a department of Twenty eight families, vnder the which they reduced the rest; although they carryed not the name of the family, neyther were formerly of the same party. In other Estates they haue diuided the people by Parishes or quarters: and in other by Families.

The Subiect for settling of such and the like Diuisions of the people, * 1.32 must be eyther to let them vnderstand more easily the Soueraignes command, o•• to retire from them their approbation or aduice, vpon some propositi∣on that is made vnto them: Or for that factio••s haue al∣ready brought in such distinctions, as they are forced to countenance and allow them: Or else as Numa did, to take away the name of a distinction more preiudiciall to the Estate: Or to ease the Prince of some part of his care: or to giue assurance to the people of good vsage, in ma∣king choise of a good number among them, for the man∣naging of affaires which concerne them in particular: And these diuisions are very considerable, as also their power and aut••ority with the people, and their dependance of the Prince their Soueraigne, as making a part of the forme of the Estate.

For insome Estates the Soueraigne cannot resolue a∣ny thing of importance, without these Comminalties, or some of them: as the King of Poland without the Se∣nate. In others he resolues; but his resolution must be allowed by them, to the end it may be imbraced by the people. In others he resolues in certaine things in the which the Comminalties haue but one voyce: as likewise

in certaine things the Comminalty resolue without the Soueraigne. But as the Soueraigne ought to establish this temper in the Soueraignty,* 1.33 according to the disposition of affaires and persons: so being once setled, he must haue a care not to crosse it vns••asonably; lest that in shewing him∣selfe a concurrent in some things, he make himselfe by the same meanes equall to his Subiects, whereof this Com∣minalty is composed, which will be alwayes supported by others. As in like manner he must haue a care that they attempt not any thing that is aboue their power, hin∣dring them vpon the least occasion; and in the beginning: for it is the ordinary of such Companies, to vsurpe as much authority as they can, and to grow bold by suf∣ferance.

CHAP. 13. Of Religion.

* 1.34AFter the establishing of the forme of the Estate, the most considerable is that of Religion: For it is the cause of good order and good Fortune; And Fortune the Mother of good successe: And so she is not onely the foundation, but the cause of the preser∣••ation and greatnesse of the Estate.

Although a people vnable many times to be restrayned but by feare, yet there is not any thing more naturall, nor more iust, nor of greater efficacy in the minds of men, then that which proceeds from the Reuerence which we owe vnto God. And whereas the feare of God is wanting, of necessity the Estate must run to iuine; or it mu••t be supported by the feare of a Prince, who supplies this de∣fect: who although he were such a one, (the which is difficult) yet this Prince fayling, the feare would like∣wise be wanting, and by consequence the obedience; for

for that the Successor can seldome inherite this Authority which dyes with the person.

Moreouer many things presenting themselues in an E∣state, which he must doe, or hinde••, and which can∣not be perswaded by any reasons which may be alledged, men by their insufficiency not able to satisfie themselues; and force on the other side being a dangerous instrument handle, which doth harme as soone as good, the au∣thority of man being not powerfull enough, we must of necessity haue recourse to the authority of Religion, which amongst people fearing God hath no reply. Wher∣fore most men which haue desired to effect some great and extraordinary matter▪ haue made vse of this meanes, as the most powerfull, were it for the setling of Estates, or for the reformation. Which is the reason that in most part of Religions they obserue infinite acts of policy, the which the people would easily flight ouer, were they not restrayned by the respect of Religion. This care then for the setling of Religion, is one of the chiefe in the Estate, for that it ought to be established with all purity, and without abuses: and where we shall finde any brought in already, we ought to cut them off; * 1.35 whereof the principall are diuersity of opinions, blasphe∣my, carelesnesse, and superstition.

We will first treate of the chiefe meanes which haue bin obserued in the setling of Religions.

CHAP. 14. Of the meanes held in the establishing of Religions.

THe establishment of Religion is eyther made by ex∣traordinary meanes, exceeding the discourse of man, or by humane courses. The first haue not bin imployed but to settle the true Religion; and

the latter haue serued as well to settle superstition and impiety as the truth.

The extraordinary meanes are miracles and Martir∣dome;* 1.36 euery man perswading himselfe that the Constan∣cy they seein one that suffer's, cannot proceed but from the particular assistance of God. For although that in Paganis••ne, they haue seene many Murtherers of Tyrants, and others of all conditions, which haue endured vn∣speakable torments with great patience: Yet one age of Christianity would furnish many more examples, then all the time that Paganisme continued. This constancy then which cannot be attributed but to a Diuine assistance, e∣uery man thinkes he hath reason to beleeue, that what they say that suffer so constantly, proceeds from God, and is true.

As for Miracles, some are reputed such, for that they are contrary to the common order of Nature; and others for that they are against the common opinion, who iudg∣ing one thing impossible or difficult, makes him to seeke by prayers, vowes, and promises, succours from aboue, the which succeeding according to our desire, we take the euent for a testimony of his power, whom as God we haue innocated to our succours, and begin to acknow∣ledge him for such.

Adad King of the Azimites, a people beyond Aegypt, hauing promised to make himselfe a Christian, if he wone the victory against the King of the Homerites, who for the most part were Iewes; hauing obtained it, he sent to demand Bishops and Doctors from the Emperour Iusti▪ nian, to instruct him and his people, who sent him Mar∣cionarius from Alexandria. Clouis after the Battaile wone against the Germans neare vnto Cullen, made him∣selfe a Christian, with the remainders of the French, who had not yet imbraced the Christian Faith; according to a vow which he had made before the Combat, the which he held very dangerous for him; and thus he esta∣blished

the Christian Religion among the French, dispo∣sed thereunto by this victory, the which being vnex∣pected by them, considering the great number of their E∣nemies, they could not attribute it but to his power, to whom their King had made a vow.

CHAP. 15. Humane meanes for the setling of Religion.

AS for humane meanes they depend partly vpon the disposition of the people, amongst▪ whom they meane to settle Religion, and partly of the quality of such as desire to establish it.

For the disposition of the people,* 1.37 the first considera∣tion we must make, is of their disposition. For some are barbarous; others ciuillized. We call them common∣ly barbarous which gouerne not themselues as we doe, and according to our opinion. So the Grecians, and af∣terwards the Romans, called all other Nations barbarous, although that Asia had ciuillized the Grecians, and the Grecians had taught the Lawes and Sciences to the Ro∣mans. By the like fotly there are some Italian Writers, who speaking of the Germans, French, and Spaniards, call them by this name; although there be not any of these Na∣tions that yeelds inciuility or policy to Italy.

Our meaning is not to extend Barbar if me so fatre,* 1.38 but to call those Barbarians, in whom is obserued a Bru••ish∣nesse, Ignorance, Stupidity, and an insupportable rude∣nes of manners, bei••in Religion, or in their manner of liuing, and apparrell, or in their habitation, or in the form of their gouernment.

Of Barbarians in Religion,* 1.39 some acknowledge not any Diuinity, and yet they are giuen to Enchantments and

Sorceries: As some Historians write, that anciently the Huns were, when they came foorth of their Country; and that many of those Northerne people are yet. And in America the Brasilsens and Creimeques. Others haue some kind of Religion or rather Superstition, but so farre from Reason, as it is no difficult thing to confute it. O∣thers worship a plurality of Gods, yet not acknowledg∣ing any one for the soueraigne Creator. Others acknow∣ledge a Creator, but they worship the Sunne for a Crea∣tor, or some other Creature, as in Cusco and Mexico, and these two last kinds of Barbarians haue their Cere∣monies, Feasts, and Solemnities, better Regulated then the two first. There are others which adore Idols, whose sacrifices in like manner are ordred. Besides these we may hold for Barbarians, such as haue another foun∣dation of Religion then we haue.

There is a Rabby,* 1.40 which writes that there hath bin foure Law-giuers, which haue diuided the VVorld by their opinions, from which most part of Regions at this day proceed. The first is Moses, the second Iesus Christ, the third Mahomet, and the fourth Manes: And this man supposing two principles or beginnings, the one good and the other bad, and attributing the superior part of the VVorld to the good, who can do no Euill, and therefore ought not to be prayed vnto; and the lower part to the bad, to whom they must addresse themselues to preserue them from Euill, is held to be the Author of that abhominable adoration of the Diuell, receiued in a manner throughout all the Indies, where he hath sowed his poyson. Of these foure beliefes, the Christian Faith being the only true, we may call the rest Barbarous.

* 1.41Barbarisme in the forme of liuing, is limited by vs in those which line like bruit Beasts, without any manuring of the Land; and either seed vpon wild Beasts or of Mans flesh: As the 'Popians in America,* 1.42 Barbarisme in the manner of their appa••rel••, consists in the nakednesse of the

whole Body, or the greatest part thereof as is seene in the East and West Indies, and in part of Affrica.

We hold the habitation barbarous, not onely of those which haue no certayne place of dwelling,* 1.43 creeping in∣to hollow Trees, or on the top of them, or into Caues, as they find commodity; whether they liue separated or in Company: but also of such who like vnto the Tartarians, dwell in the fields vnder Tents, or in their Wagons, changing place according to their pleasure. As for Barbarisme in gouerment, it is obserued by the want of Heads, Order, and Policy,* 1.44 where they choose no Com∣manders but in time of war, like some people of America.

By this diuersity of Barbarisme, it is easie to iudge that the manner of proceeding for the setling of Religion,* 1.45 ought to be diuers. For it is certayne, that they which by their manner of liuing are more like to Beasts then Men, ought to be made capeable of Humanity; and that to such as by their nakednesse, shew that they know not what belongs to honesty and shame, they must first teach them to know it, before they seeke to make them comprehend what Religion is. In like manner they which wander, scattered and dispersed one from another, must be drawne together into Comminalties and Policy, so farre as their Nature will beare it: And they which wander sometimes in one place, and some∣times in another, must be stayed and setled in a certayne abode, to haue commodity to instruct them.

Then comming to their superstitions, where they may confute the absurdities by serious Reasons, if they be capeable; or by iests and scoffes they shall make them grow into contempt of their opinions, falling first vpon those whose foundation is weakest. If there be any thing good in some point of their opinions, or that hath a∣ny conformity with the Religion they meane to establish, o•• i•• indifferent; they need not feare to alow of it: contrari∣wise this may serue for the setling of true Religion. S. Paul

at Athens tooke occasion to speak of Iesus Christ vpon the Altar, which was dedicated to the vnknowne God. The Apostles to gayne credit among the Pharises (who made the greatest part of the Iewes) spake dayly of the dead: the which the Pharises heard the more willingly, for that in the beleese of this Article the Sad••••es were op∣posite vnto them. It hath much auayled for the set∣ling of the Catholique Religion in America, to finde amongst those Idolaters certaine Ceremonies, which in the outward shew doe much resemble those of the Catholique.

The Nu••nes of the Sunne at Cusco, a Towne of Peru, made certayne Cakes of the flower of Mahis, ming∣led with the blood of white Sheepe, which they offered in Sacrifice, and of this Cake they gaue a peece to euery Stranger that was present, who eate it in signe of Alli∣ance, Confederation and Deuotion to the Inga; and promised neuer to doe or say any thing against the Sunne or the Inga: And this solemnity was performed twice in the yeare, in September and December. Processions at Mexico were in vse: and in Peru there were Priests, destinated to heare confessions after the manner of peni∣te tiaries. They counterfeited the Mystery of the Tri∣nity, worshipping three Statues of the Sunne, the one they call, the ••ather Sunne, the second the Sonne Sunne, and the third the Brother Sunne.

In like manner they had three Images of Cu••que ••i∣g••a, which is the God of Thunder, the which they di∣stinguished in like manner by Father, Sonne, and Brother. They likewise made vse at Nicaraqua of a Cro••••e, which was there worshipped to obtaine Raine. Finally, these exteriour confor••••ties, although ap∣plyed to a bad vse, haue beene great preparatiues to im∣p••oy them to better vse.

So must part of those which haue sought to settle some new Religion, haue desired rather to borrow

the name of the establishment from the ancient, or from the reformation, then to terme themselues Authors of a new opinion; which in a poynt importing the Sal∣uation of Man, vnder this Name of Nouilty had beene suspected. And Mahomet himselfe, although farre from the beleefe of Christians, yet ••not to discontent them, except the principall poynt which is the Di∣uinity of IESVS CHRIST) hath spoken of h••m with great Reuerence: And in regard of him, he sayth, that he was come to reforme that which his Disciples had innouated in the Law of IESVS CHRIST.

Prophesies and predictions which may haue some re∣ferrence to the setling of Religion,* 1.46 doth likewise dis∣pose the minds of those that are to receiue it. The promise of sending of the Messias, stirr'd vp the minds of the Iewes to acknowledge Iesus Christ to be he which had beene promised. And the Oracles of the Sibylles was a great meanes to make the Gr••cians and other Gentles acknowledge that he was the Sonne of God. Maho∣met falsifying the passage by the which Iesus Christ promised•• to send the Paraclet or Comforter, sayth, that it was of himselfe, that IESVS CHRIST meant to speake. In many parts of America they had many predictions and prodigies, which fore-ran the comming of the Spaniard, and prepared them to change Religion.

Heauy burthens and rigours,* 1.47 be it that they proceed from the gouernment, or from Religion, may dispose a people to a milder Religion, if they thinke to be relei∣ued by this meanes. Boni••a••••, Arch-bishop of Mentz, laboured much in preaching to them of Turnigia, to make them Christians▪ and in the end not able to win them by the hope of Eternall life; but hauing demaunded of him if making th••••••elue: Christians, they should be freed frō the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they payd the King of Hungary; he promised

and vnder his leading hauing vanquished the Hungarians, they became Christians. The yoake of the Kings of Pe∣ru and Mexico, insupportable to their Subiects, made the conquest of those Countryes more easie to the Spa∣ni••rds, and likewise the adu••ncement of Christian Re∣ligion much more mild then the superstition, to the which the Diuill had subiected those Nations.

The Hebrewes which wer in Aegypt, being miserably intreated, yeelded easily to the Religion which Moses taught them, vpon the promise he made to lead them into a Land abounding in all things: although that afterwards forgetting their misery, they return'd somtimes to idolatry.

The diuersity of opinions in the Religion rece••ned, may open a Gate to another which they would establish; for that from this diuersity growes incertainty in the mindes of men; whereby if another be presented, better accom∣panied with shew, it is more easily receiued. Nothing did so much fauour the opinion of Mahomet in Asia and Affricke, as the diuers heresies which were then crept in••o ••ll the Le••ant: especially those which concerned the Trinity, and the nature of Iesus Christ; as that of N•• Mahomet••••es, Nestoriens, and Ariens, and the do••••ts which grew of eyther side vpon this Subiect: But Mahomet ••o free himselfe from these, found no shor∣ter come, then to deny the Deity of Iesus Christ, and by 〈…〉〈…〉 to ouerthrow the beleefe of the Trinity: But that which he••pt most to the aduancement of this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was, that he did accommodate the Rule he made for man••ers to s••nsuality, o••er-ruling whatsoeuer con∣cerned Christian or Iewish authority, and forbidding nothing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that which the Arabians and Southerne peo∣ple, among whom he liued might well forbear••; as Wine.

Likewise to recei••e all sorts of of opinions indifferent∣ly,* 1.48 as they doe in China, may greatly helpe to the bring∣ing in of a ••ew Religion, for the liberty there is to treate openly without feare of blame; the which is likewise fa∣u••••red

by the incertainty of mens minds, which is ordi∣nary in this multiplicity of opinions.

Reuolts and Ciuill warre doe likewise dispose a peo∣ple to receiue a new Religion,* 1.49 as well for that force helps the establishment, as for that the head of a party may countenance his Armes with this pretext, and by an o∣pinion diuers to that of others, hold those of his party more firme vnto him, and better vnited among themselues: which is a consideration which Tacitus (speaking like a Pagan) sayth that Moses had in the settling of his Re∣ligion among the Hebrewes.

An vnrestrayned liberty among a people somewhat Ci∣uill, and to open a contempt of Religion,* 1.50 dispose them no lesse to receiue a new, then too great rigour and auste∣rity. For besides that man hath in him some certaine seeds of piety, the which he cannot long suffer to lye vn••iuit∣full, so as he degenerates sometime rather into supersti∣tion then Religion: The contempt of God brings with it so many other inconueniences in a society and ciuill con∣nersation, to the which the Magistrate cannot prescribe a Remedy; as the first which presents it selfe with a shew of Sanctity, and a desire of reformation, is well enter∣tayned and heard by a••l men: and his opinion is the bet∣ter receiued, for that the contempt of the ancient giues him place in the minds of men. So the opinion of Ho∣mer in the Law of Mahomet, being growne into con∣tempt among the Persians. Ismael Sophy setled that of Hally, fill'd with many austerities and ••eremonies. And in the Christian Religion, God hath frō time to time raised vp great personages, to restore it by the holinesse of their liues, and their good examples,* 1.51 when as it seemed most contemned and reiected.

It is likewise no small aduantage for the aduancement of a Religion in a great extent of Country, to finde it revnited vnder one Prince, as the Christians did the Romane Empire: For the Example of the

Prince and the chiefe about him, which they may gaine, drawes all the rest suddainly after him: Whereas if the Country were deuided into many Estates, there would be as much trouble in the one as in a great Empire. More∣ouer great Courts are more Ciuill, and more diuersified with men of diuers sorts of Condition, of which they may draw a good number, fit to receiue a new opinion. The facility they haue had to conuert the Mexicains, and Peruans, reduced vnder great Kings; and the difficulty there is yet to conuert the Brasilians and Cicimeques, which haue not any, witnesse it sufficiently.

These are the principal Encounters which may dispose a people to receiue a new establishment. But with this disposition the quality of those which seeke to bring it in, and the course they meane to obserue, must be propor∣tionable.

CHAP. 16. Of Parts necessary in those that will bring in a new Religion.

MAny parts are necessary in such men: but the prin∣cipall are authority and credit,* 1.52 courage, know∣ledge, or sufficiency of wisedome. The autho∣rity or credit, growes either from Dignity, San∣ctity or force; for the dignity it is certaine that the exam∣ple of Princes and Great men, strikes a great stroake in such establishments; and the more if they themselues be∣come Ministers and labourers in such actions by publique exho••tations. Ysaphat, so••ne to Asa King of Iuda, sent Priests with some of the chiefe of his Court, throughout all the Prouinces of his Estate, to make them receiue the Law of God. Osuala King of Northumberland, de∣siring to bring the Christian faith into his Estate, deman∣ded

a Pr••acher from Douvald King of Scotland, who sent him Aydan: who being ignorant of the Saxon Tongue, this King serued him for an Interpreter to his people. The like in the time of our Fathers did the King of Congo in Affricke, seruing as an Interpreter to certaine Religious men, whom Emanuel King of Portugal had sent vnto him to preach the Gospell. Godscald, Prince of the Vandales, who depended of Aldembung, deliuered vnto his people in the Country Language, that which the Priests and Bishops had preached in Latine. Iagel∣lon, great Duke of Lituania, hauing made himselfe a Christian to be King of Poland, in the yeare 1386. took such a liking to this Religion, as he himselfe preached to the Lituanians to conuert them. Some haue written, that Sicebueles King of the Visigots, conuerted by ex∣hortations fourescore and ten thousand Iewes, for the which in the decretales he is called most religious.

We must not doubt but the authority of Moses, who was a great Captaine, and had made War long against the Aethiopians for the Kings of Aegypt, did assist him much to free the Hebrewes from Seruitude, and to make them receiue the true Religion.

Holinesse of life is so corrupt and licensious an age,* 1.53 giues credit to him that makes profession. This meanes is particular to Iesus Christ and to his Apostles, who be∣ing borne of an abiect condition according to the World, haue aduanced themselues by their holy and miraculous actions, aboue the greatest powers of that time. Ismael Sophy was desirous in the establishing of his opinion, to make vse of this voyce: But force and other humane meanes, haue contributed more then his exteriour De∣uotion.

They which could not imitate his Sanctity, haue bin forced to purchase to themselues authority, to suppose Miracles and Dreames, and after the manner of Mi∣n••s, Sertorius, and other Law-giuers of times past,

make the World beleeue that they had a particular com∣munication with God, as Mahomet did, who had ta∣med a Pygeon, the which came picking in his Eare be∣fore the people, to the end he might perswade them by this shew, that the Holy Ghost changed into a Doue, did suggest vnto him the fooleries of his Alcoron. But among the demonstrations of a holy life, nothing doth so much draw the people as austerity, to the which the Commons will hardly beleeue, that any man will sub∣mit himselfe, for ambition, vanity, or lying. And yet ••here haue bin Phylosophers in times past, which with∣out any deuotion haue affected it, to giue credit to their opinions; and many times the ambition of such men is greater, then of such which openly contend for Crowns and Kingdomes: The first doing like men that Row, which turne their backes to the Ports where they desire to arriue.

As for force, it is of all the meanes by the which a man may purchase authority, the most powerfull; the rest without its assistance succeeding seldome. Yet we haue found by Experience, that it hath bin of small vse in the setling of Religion, if the force hath not bin such as it can receiue no tollerable opposition, and that the minds of men haue not bin formerly disposed to change: and yet withall this, we find not any example, vnlesse it be in some petty Estates.

Charlem••ine, who sought to imploy it agaynst the Saxon, without this preparation aduanced little, although he ioyned Prudence with Instruction to force, for the setling of the Christian Religion among those people: And after he had attempted all meanes, for his last reme∣dy, he was forced to transferre a great number of them, into Flanders and Brab••nt, and to draw from thence Christians to mingle amongst the Idolators, which remai∣ned in the Country, and continued there long after.

The Turke ••ath done the like, hauing drawne many of

his Religion which were in Asia, to plant them in Europe, and transported a great number of Christians which were in Europe into Asia. And yet we see that hitherto the Turke hath wholy expeld the Christian Religion out of his Estate, although he hath imployed many other meanes.

Hence we may conclude, that if with Force, which receiued no opposition, he could not preuaile; it is a meere madnesse for certaine men ignorant of the Affaires of the World, to propound to make vse of Force against those, who fortified with intelligence among themselues, and good Conduct, may not only defend their opinion by Force; but also indanger the sume of the Estate. But reseruing to treate more particularly of this Question hereafter, I will come to another kind of Force or con∣straint, which depends vpon the Authority of the Ma∣gistrate, and concerne•• the punishments and burthens, and the exclusion of Hereticks and Infidels from honors.

As for punishments, it workes no greater effect then armed Force, which is vsually ioyned vnto it; and some∣times these punishments borne with Constancy, produce a contrary effect to that which was expected; as we will relate more particularly hereafter the Reasons. As for heauy burthens, although they seeme more mild, yet we may well feare the inconuenience.

From the example of Martyrdome, which is in pu∣nishments, if they conuert not speedily, heauy bur∣thens ruines them by little and little. St. Gregory writing to Bishop Ianvyer, for the Conuersion of the Pessants of Sardinia, aduiseth him to charge them with Taxes and Labour. In Spaine they haue done the like with the Moores, who not withstanding haue multiplied. The Turke, besides the exclusion from honours, which is a meanes ioyned to that of heauy burthens, practizeth the like with the Christians, taking Tribute of their owne children.

Charlamaine vsed it against the Hungarians, after that he vanquished them, leauing the Idolators nothing but their Liues, and giuing their goods to such as would become Christians. Sometimes the exclusion from ho∣nours, without any heany burthen, hath preuailed much for the conuersion of great men, and of a meane conditi∣on, among a people ambitious of honour. Ingo Prince of the Vmides, receiued none to his Table but such as made profession of the Christian Religion, preferring the meanest before the greatest of another Religion.

* 1.54Sufficiency consists in the Knowledge and ability to instruct and dispute. Instruction is made eyther by word or writing:* 1.55 And that which is done by word, is eyther publicke or priuate, in such places where they feare that the beliefe, which they seek•• to establish be not allowed in the beginning; or when as they desire to winne some great man, whose example may serue for the conuersion of others. They vse priuate Instructions, as a preparatiue to publicke, the which is done by Preaching, or by pub∣licke Lectures of Bookes concerning the Diuine Seruice: As the Law of God was anciently taught by the Reading thereof before the people. And as among the Christians they Read the Epistle and the Gospell, with the Simball of the Creed; simple meanes and without affectation; and of no lesse edification (if in this simplicity they cause them to be vnderstood by the people) then the Preaching of some, who deliuer many times their owne Fancies more then the Gospell.

In times past they found it not strange to Translate the Holy Scripture into the vulgar Tongue. Netgher, a Religious man of Saint Gal, vnder the Abbot Bernard, Translated the Psalter in the French tongue, which was then but rude. Alfred King of England did the like into his Language: Hestad, also King of England, caused the Holy and Sacred Scriptures to be conuerted and tur∣ned into English: And Beda, (called the Venerable.)

Translated the Gospell of Saint Iohn into English.

In Preaching two things are necessary:* 1.56 the one to vn∣derstand the vulgar tongue, in the place where they Preach perfectly: the other is to bring some exteriour ornament to perswade. The first Iesuits that went into Iappon, for that they rashly vnder tooke this Enterprize, before they did well vnderstand the Language, in steed of instructing they were laughed at, by reason of the many incongruities and errours they committed in this Language. Disputation requires an actiue Spirit, to sa∣tisfie all difficulties that may be encountred in such mat∣ters. But order is very necessary o•• wherein two 〈◊〉〈◊〉 are especially to be considered. The one is, that it is more ease to oppose a Religion, whatsoeuer it be then to main∣tayne and defend it, for all Religions hauing in them something which is aboue the capacity of mans vnder∣standing, it is no difficult thing ••o contrad••••t such a be∣liefe by humane reason. VVherefore they must first shake the opinion receiued, before they come to plant a new. The other poynt is, in such disputations to be∣gin with things knowne, and confesse of ••yt••e•• side), to come vnto those which are contradicted and not yet re∣ceiued.

This meanes of Instruction is the mildest, and most proper to attaine to the setling of Religion,* 1.57 how much soeuer it differs from the opinion rec••iued, and amongst what people soeuer: Especially if they, beginne to teach young children, before they haue bin instructed in the old beliefe. The Iesuits, seeing they could not pre∣uayle in the conuersion of the Brastlians, a nation alto∣gether brutish and in humane, they could find no other remedy, then to draw their children vnto them by gifts; and kind vsage, and this people suffred them to go the more willingly, for that they alwayes brought backe some thing, besides instruction which they receiued. In Peru, in the beginning they made vse of poore blind

men, who being receiued by them and well vsed, went afterwards vp and downe repeating that which they had learned: and seeing nothing they deliuered it to all sorts of people indifferently, with more assurance then if they had bin cleare sighted.

The opinion of Aly in the Law of Mahomet, which hath beene imbraced by the Persians, was divulged, (as the Histories of that Country relate) by thirty thousand slaues, which Tamberlaine had giuen to Tegel, prede∣cessour to Ismael Sophy, to cause them to be instructed in that beliefe. Charlemaine, erected many Colledges and Seminaries of piety among the Idollaters whom he had Conquered, and reta••••ed twelue children of the Saxon Princes, as Hostages, to cause them to be instructed in the Christian Religion. The Turke takes the fifth of all the Christian children, and causeth them to be bred vp in the Law of Mahomet. The Xerif seized vpon Morocco and Fez, hauing by Pilgrimage, and the shew of a holy life, gotten some credit among the Moores: He bought a thousand slaues, which he bred vp in his opinion, groun∣ded (as he pretended) vpon a more pure interpretation of the Alcoran: and hauing instructed many with such Dis∣ciples; and his sonnes hauing some aduantages agaynst the Christians, turned their Armes agaynst the Kings of Fez and Morocco,* 1.58 and setled themselues in their places with their Religion.

Prudence, is next to Piety, the principall part which they should haue, which vndertake such an enterprize, and so much the more necessary, for that many times an indiscreet zeale hinders his function,* 1.59 and ruines that which he would Establish. And although that the coun∣sels of these zealous persons succeed sometimes; which notwithstanding is but seldome, God hauing giuen pru∣dence to men, to serue them for a guide; all hauing not deserued that God should daily imploy his power to worke miracles.

Ananias hauing perswaded Isates King of the Adiabones, and his mother to receiue the Iewish-Religion, held it fit that he should forbeare to cause himselfe to be circum∣cised, vntill he had disposed his people. But Eliazar the Gallilean prest him to do it, and not to preferre the feare of men to the grace of God. Which was the ad∣uice of a Diuine more zealous then discreet; the which although it succeeded well at that time, their spirits be∣ing better prepared then the Prince expected; yet it were dangerous to follow it in all Encounters. For the Apo∣stle commaunds that zeale should be guided by Know∣ledge. We know in our time, that this rash zeale hath done more harme to the Catholicke Religion then good.

I doubt, whether to this inconsiderate zeale we should not attribute that opinion,* 1.60 which some haue of the greatnes of the spirituall power, by the which and their Rules, they minister cause of Iealousie to all temporall powers, the which they submit vnto it, agaynst the ancient beliefe and the custome of former ages. A proceeding quite contrary to that of Iesus Christ; whom the Iewes desi∣ring to surprize by this meanes in the crime of high trea∣son, and to bandy the Magistrate agaynst him, declared openly, that his Kingdome was not of this world; and commaunded to yeild vnto Caesar that which was Caesars, although he were a Tyrant, and an Vsurper of another mans liberty.

After him his Apostles haue spoken of the ciuill Ma∣gistrate with honour and respect, commaunding to obay him; and it cannot be found, that by vertue of the Spi∣rituall power, they haue aduised to attempt any thing a∣gaynst the Magistrate. It is true, that among Christians, the Spirituall power hath beene alwayes much respected; but only when it hath bee••e practized in matters which are meerely Spirituall, the which looseth the dignity and grace, which is due vnto it, when it deales in matters which are temporall terrien.

These be the bounds which haue alwayes beene set in France, betwixt the Ecclesiasticall lurisdiction and a Regall power: and with this distinction the Christian Religion, hath beene preserued aboue a thousand yeares in France, without any blemish. But inconsideration or ambition, which is vsually blind, hath proceeded further, to breed a Iealousie among all Christian Princes. For by a consequence altogether absurd and foolish, they would make the VVorld beleeue, that the obedience of the Subiect towards his Prince, the which being a tem∣porall thing, cannot be reputed but temporall, may be prohibited by the Spirituall power, the which notwith∣standing hath no power nor Iurisdiction ouer temporall things. The which is a meanes not only to hinder, that such Princes as are distracted from the ancient beleife; do not re-vnite themselues, seeing they cannot do it without dimunition of their authority and power: but also makes others, which are not yet separated (to free themselues from this subiection) leaue it, or fauour all which op∣pose themselues to this Doctrine, neuer insisting vpon the errors, which they may adde thereunto.

There is as little wisedome to ••rosse the Rules of a receiued pollicy,* 1.61 if they were not altogether impious: neyther must they presse to change the Religion of the conscience, if without impiety this apparence may be preserued. The ancient Christians, made no difficulty to apply vnto the Diuine Seruice, many of the Iewish and Pagan ceremonies. In diuers changes of Religion hapned in our time, Luther in Germany, and Peter Martyre in England, haue carried themselues more discreetly, hauing retayned the greatest part of the ceremonies of the Ca∣tholicke Religion, approoued therein; then they which haue made their Religion bald, and destitute of all orna∣ment; and to make it the more sauage, and to seeme more different from the common beleife, they haue changed the names and termes by an in••ise••ee•• vanity.

Behold part of the principall considerations which they must obserue in the setling of a Religion. Let vs now see how we are to carry our selues to preserue the anci∣ent beleife; amidst the diuersitie of other Religions which are crept into the Estate.

CHAP. 17. That the diuersity of Religion is dangerous in an Estate: how they ought to carry themselues to preserue the ancient Beleife, in the diuersity of Re∣ligions crept into the Estate.

IN old time the Kings of Aegypt, entertayned this di∣uersity in Religion among their Subiects: Some wor∣shipping a Dogge, others a Bird, and some a Croca∣dile with other things according vnto their fancies: which was a tyrannicall practize; to the end their Sub∣iects might not agree to controule and reforme their Actions.

But it is certayne that if in the Concord of an Estate, consists the good and quiet of the Subiects,* 1.62 it is more expedient to re-vnite themselues all in one Religion when they may. For Religion is the cyment which binds the Quick-siluer, that drawes together all the members of the Estate into one perfect vnion: And con∣trariwise there is nothing that doth more dis-unite a peo∣ple, then the diuersity of opinions, or the vse of diuers ceremonies in matter of Religion. Hence haue procee∣ded the most violent and furious passions, that cuer trou∣bled an Estate, and the life of men:* 1.63 And in this poynt all other interests are so implyed, as it hath drawne with it all that, which makes a part of the honours, goods, and fortunes of men. For Religion the children haue left the Fathers cause; seruants haue denied their masters seruice,

and subiects their fidellity to Princes. Finally all natu∣rall rights and offices of humanity haue ceased, whereas Religion hath resisted: Euery man esteeming that which he followes to be the most pure, and the true manner of worship, and condemning all that which is not conforma∣ble to his beliefe.

* 1.64VVherefore we must flye this diuersity, euen in light things: for that a multitude being vncapable to iudge of things by themselues, nor by reason or motion in Religi∣on, suffring themselues to be carried away by chance and apparent shewes, contrary to that which Faith should perswade them, aboue the perception of their vnder∣standing: when they haue once shaken some opinion which he had in Reuerence, he presently falls into the like vncertaynty of the other peeces of his beliefe; which haue no more authority nor ground with him, then those which they haue already shaken.

* 1.65Finding then this diuersity in an Estate we must consi∣der whether it be little or great. If it be small, and the parties of the new opinion weaker then that of the anci∣ent Religion, be it in number of men, or in retreats of intelligences, it wilbe no difficult thing to suppresse them: No more then if in a great Estate, this opinion had not taken footing but in one corner, or in one or two Prouinces; as that of the Albygeois had done in France. For the rest of the Estate being secure, it is easie for the greater party to suppresse the lesse, by the conquest of these Prouinces. But if this opinion hath crept into all the parts of the Estate, although they that follow it make the lesser number, yet we must consider if we are in the beginning,* 1.66 or in the strongest fit of the disease.

In the beginning such weeds are to be pulled vp as soon as they grow, the which must be done by secret Execu∣tions, and not as they ••aue vsually practized by publicke punishments; if it be not of some opinion that is very dif∣ficult to perswade: For that the Example of Martyr∣dome

mooues many to pitty, makes others obstinate, and drawes some to be more curious to examine the reasons, for the which a new Preacher, who hath nothing in shew but what is holy, suffers so constantly: and few will perswade themselues, that any man will for so small a matter loose his life with so much dishonour; and so by this gate many enter into that Comminalty: so as instead of retyring the people by the example of punishments, they inuite them: as being certayne that the terrour there∣of, workes a contrary effect in a new opinion, which ha•••• a shew of sanctity, and of the truth and falshood whereof they may doubt, then in other crimes, the which are generally condemned in all men. For to search the bot∣tome of euery mans conscience, were to kindle a fire in the Estate, add to discouer a mischiefe, which were more expedient to hide, and whereof the scandall were dange∣rous. We haue seene many Realmes and Principallities pre∣serue themselues in peace,* 1.67 with the exercise of two diffe∣rent Religions; but there was neuer any but hath bin rui∣ned by the course and continuance of Ciuill wars: and the conditions by the which they may make two Religions a∣gree together, would not only be lesse hurtfull to an E∣state, but more supportable to priuate persons, then the lest ciuill war, which shal be attempted vpon this subiect. For although there may be some found amongst Hereticks, who, eyther for want of Instruction in their new opiuion, or for want of courage, thinke to be perswaded by Force, that they do meritoriously suffer the paynes which they endure, and therefore were easie to reduce: yet I will say that in such affayres, for that a firme perswasion must preceede the resolution which such men haue taken to change their first manner of liuing, in a poynt which doth wholy import their saluation; it is dangerous to imploy Armes. For some striking sayle, and continuing amongst vs, serue vnderhand to those of their party by many meanes; if it were but only in giuing aduice or dispersing

of bruits, which may assist their affaires. Others which haue more generosity, perswaded of the iniustice of the harme which they cause them to suffer, continue reso∣lute and obstinate: being the ordinary of the spirite of Man, to grow more resolute the more it is resisted, and giues way when there is least opposition. For the more that that man loues his liberty, and yet abuses it, the more he hates seruitude and constraynt, in the which not∣withstanding he carryes himselfe better then in the enioy∣ing of his freedome.

All men tend naturally to the contrary of that which is desired of them,* 1.68 and affect more willingly that which is forbidden. Feare and necessity maintayne men best in their Duties. They force them to know themselues, to resume courage, to allie themselues together, and in the end to frame a party within the Estate; which vpon the least good successe which shall befall it, (Fortune not alwayes assisting the greater number) it fortifies it selfe, as it proceeded from the Iustice of their cause, and that GOD fought for them, so as by this good successe many being perswaded to follow it, they en∣crease the number of their partizans: and it falls out most commonly, that the discontented, and such as desire to worke their owne ends, ioyne with them. Moreouer, this Sect, as I haue sayd, being dispersed o∣uer all the Prouinces of an Estate, and the Prince not able to haue Armies in them all, whilest that he assailes them on the one side, they attempt vpon another, sur∣prizing some place of importance; or standing vpon their defence, they cause an Army to ruine itselfe most commonly before some paltry place.

I will adde hereunto, that if they be the weaker in number, they will be found in effect the stronger by their vigilancy and intelligences which they haue one of another: For that Vnion is most commonly stronger in a meane number, then in a greater; and in an opinion re∣ceiued

by their owne choice and election, then in that which is receiued by custome, in the which man shews himselfe vsually more negligent. Besides this, the intel∣ligence is better obserued amongst man that are assayled, or that feare to be so, by reason of the necessity of the defence, then among the assailians. For to assayle pro∣ceeding from a free will, they are sooner wearied then the defendants.

Moreouer, there is nothing more dangerons for a Prince, then to make tryall of his forces against, his Subiects,* 1.69 if he be not well assured of the successe. This were to arme and shew the Lyon his pawes to fight against his Master, to make himselfe the Head of a party, making the head of the contrary faction equall to his power. And it hath bin alwayes held a Rule of State, that the most powerful should neuer make an Enterprize vpon the weaker, with∣out assurance of the euent, For the weaker is alwayes in feare, that the stronger can doe any thing, vntill he hath made tryall of the contrary; and when they finde how far the forces of the stronger may extend, he falls in his re∣putation. Wherefore in this case the best aduised Prin∣ces haue done like wife Pylots,* 1.70 who flip their tacklings in a storme, knowing that the res••stance they should make, would be the cause of a generall shipwracke. But if he forced of necessity to goe to Field vpon this quarrell, and that their courages puft vp too much, cannot be humbled but by Armes; he must before they haue gotten any ad∣uantage, graunt them tolleration of their Religion, in places where they may giue the least scandall, to such as are opposite vnto them, and in all other things make them inferiour: The which they will yeeld the more easily vnto, for that in this first beginning, there is no∣thing but the conscience that doth threaten them; and hauing found their owne weaknesse, they will be con∣tent to haue gotten this point, neuer refusing places out of the way for their exercise: for that by this

meanes they shall bee more assured, lesse exposed to the view of their Enemies, and by consequence lesse subiect, to their surprizes.

* 1.71As for the ambition of Commanders, it will bee easie to preuent, for that they will bee vsually few in number, in entertaining them by promises, presents, and hopes; hauing a watchfull eye ouer them, and imploying them abroad in honourable charges and affaires, yet where they may neither get credit, nor doe much harme; and therest which desire to bee aduanced to honours, and yet haue small power of themselues, they may feede them with hope, that in changing their opinions, they may attaine to that which they desire. This being done, the rest will bee easily maintained, in hauing a care that they which follow the Princes Religion, and are fauoured by the Prince, may not doe them any wrong or iniury in hatred of their opinion.

* 1.72They may by the same meanes, erect Seminaries, to breed and instruct a good number of persons in the true Religion; Out of which they shall choose such as are most sufficient and capable, and whose liues may serue for an example of well liuing, to place them in E∣clesiasticall dignities.

* 1.73In certaine Realmes they haue vsed to make orders of Knight-hood, whose chiefe profession was (when it was necessary to vse force) to maintaine their Reli∣gion by Armes, and they had for their recompence ma∣ny benefices, which wee affected vnto them; which in∣stitution is not to bee neglected, for that there are two sorts of those which stra••e from the true Religion. The one agree vpon the foundations, but they contend vpon the interpretation; and these may bee instructed: The others doe absolutely done the grounds, whereby the Doctrine of Religion is supported. These not able to bee drawne by the instruction of the true Religion, there rem••n••th nothing but miracles,

and a Diuine Interpretation, which are Supernaturall meanes, whereof God doth not make vse to all persons: and force amongst humane meanes. Wherefore these Millitary orders of Knights, may profit much in an E∣state, and may also inuite those of a new opinion to sub∣mit themselues vnto the old, to the end they may be parta∣kers, or their children, of these honours and Recom∣pences.

Moreouer, it will not be inconuenient, that a Prince which raignes in an Estate deuided in Religion,* 1.74 should labour by presents and promises, to draw vnto him the most learned and capable of such as are contrary vnto his Religion: And in case they will returne, to aduance some of them to great dignities, to the end he may bind them the more by the preseruation of their dignity to mayn∣tayne the Religion, and to giue experience to others, who wilbe inuited by this Example. For what ambi∣tion soeuer they shall discouer in him that shalbe aduan∣ced, hauing gotten Authority, the Example of his ad∣uancement, will make others thinke of it. And if the Prince can, deuide them in opinions, or otherwise he shall do well; for that the weaker the body of this Sect shalbe, the lesse cause the Estate shall haue to feare; and there growing some diuersity of opinions amongst them, he shall fa••our that which approacheth neerest to his Religion; or by this deuision he shall endeauour to make them weaker, and more resolute what they should follow.

But when he shall see a Sect grow old,* 1.75 and that the abuses should begin to distaste most part of them which follow it: He may do like vnto Theodosius, who seeing the Temples of the Pagans in a manner all abandoned, he caused some to be beaten downe, and the rest to be appli∣ed vnto the deuotion and seruice of the Christian Re∣ligion.

Mahomet had found a remedy to preserue his Religion* 1.76

from these innovations, forbidding them to Preach or dispute: the which if it had beene well obserued, there had beene such a diuersity of Sects, in the Interpretation of his Alcoron.

But a Duke of Muscouie, to keep his Religion intire and vnfoyled, the which is grounded like to ••urs in the Administration of the Sacraments, and in the Preaching of the Gospell, caused all the Homi••ies and Sermons of the Holy Greeke Fathers, to be turned into his Language, to be rep••ated publickly in the place of Preaching, and read particularly by the Subiects▪ freeing himselfe by this meanes from the ignorance of the multitude, and from the nouelties which Preachers might haue brought in, in publishing their inuentions and dreames; and by this meanes confirming his Subiects in the beleife of those holy Fathers. Wherefore the principall end must be, to keep the anc••••nt Religion, to haue but one, if it may be, to hi••der 〈◊〉〈◊〉 one from taking footing in an Estate, and in 〈…〉〈…〉 not effect it without troubling the vniu••rsall peace of the Subiect, we must gouerne our selues as I haue formerly spoken.

Let vs come to other disorders which commonly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Religion, the which w••e must fore-see in its esta••••••shm••nts, to preuent them when they shall happen.

CHAP. 18. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 disorders which happen in Religion: and of the meanes to preuent them.

* 1.77BL••tp••emy consists in periury, and inscandall, or de∣••••••ction. Periury is when we call God to witnesse of a lye, Scandall is when wee mocke at Reli∣gion.

Carelesnesse regards chiefly the seruice of R••ligion,* 1.78 and is the more to be feared, for that by this degree they mount to impiety. For Religion consisting more in af∣fection and zeale, then in discourse; when as the heat of zeale if growne cold, Religion is lost by little and little.

The third abuse is Superstition,* 1.79 withdrawing the be∣liefe made to the seruice of God, and bringing in scanda∣lous things of no moment.

As for the first, which is Blasphemy,* 1.80, they must esta∣blish rigorous punishments: and to hinder the second, which concernes Diuine seruice, it must be enioyned very strictly. But the remedy of the last, must come from the care of Prelates, who for this ••ffect ought to be chosen vigilant and Religious;* 1.81 and they must be prohibited from bringing in of any new thing, vpon pretext of Deuotio•• and Piety, neyther in the beleife nor in the Ceremonies of Religion, without exact knowledge of the cause. As for that which concernes the ground of priuate Mens consciences, we must leaue it to the duty of Ministers, who being chosen good men, there is no doubt but they whose consciences they gouerne, would be so in like manner.

CHAP. 19. Of the setling of a Councell of Estate, and of the quallities and number of Councellors.

THe forme of the Estate, and Religion being esta∣blished, there followes the setling of a Councell;* 1.82 wherein two sorts of persons are to be consi∣dered, that is to say, they which Counsell, and they which are Counselled. In those which Coun∣sell, we must know the qualities which are necessary

for them; in what number they ought to be; the power which is giuen them; and the order they are to obserue in giuing their opinions: For to examine affaires, it is done according to the ability and capacity of euery one of them.

The first quality of a Councellor of Estate, is to be old,* 1.83 and to haue experience. I ioyne these two together, for that experience cannot be but in a man that is already ancient, and age without experience would be here v••∣profitable:* 1.84 for that in such affaires the knowledge of the particular humours of Princes, of people, and of great men is most necessary: the which cannot be obtayned but by a long experience: the which although it be not re∣pugnant vnto reason, yet it hath a different meanes of vnderstanding the affaires, whereof they cannot haue a certaine light, to make a coniecture of that, which with reason would be fitting to doe vpon the point which they will put in execution, if they haue not first seene the try∣all in some other place.

Moreouer, age will adde much more authority and cre∣dit to the resolutions of a Councell,* 1.85 consisting of ancient men, then if it were composed of young, how suffici∣ent and capable soeuer they were, who cannot haue the re∣putation of good Councellours: For such as shall be as young as they, will thinke they are as well aduised; and such as are more ancient, will hold themselues to be wiser. And in matter of Estate, opinion hauing no lesse force, but many times more effect then truth; there is no∣thing more dangerous, then that the Subiects should haue an opinion, to be wiser then their Gouernours. So as the presumption being alwayes, that the older are wiser then the young, there is no doubt, but they are more propper for Councell, and more resolute for a long ex∣ercise, to heare, weigh, and resolue of great affaires.

* 1.86 There is another difference betwixt ancient and young Councellors. These last hauing their bloud hot,

and hauing neuer beene deceiued by Fortune, insist com∣monly vpon Councels, which haue more magnificence and shew then safety. Whereas on the other side, old men as well by reason of their naturall coldnesse, as of their experience, the which by the course of their life they haue gotten, to haue executed many things in vaine the which they could not bring to a good effect, they, more willingly imbrace the safest party, misfortune cau∣sing them to bandy their spirits, and to open their eyes to discouer the danger. The which young men cannot, doe so well, who haue not had experience of the varie∣ty of Fortune, nor haue obserued the circumstances of such particular accidents. A most necessary thing in a man that will giue Councell; a small circumstance of more or lesse, doth many times cause a great variation in affaires. This experience being onely found in ancient men, their aduice ought to be esteemed the better. Yet I meane not to speake of such as are come to a decrepitage. Age fit for Councell, must be strong and vigorous, to the end that the resolutions of a Councell of such men may not be too dull and timerous.

Wherefore with these ancient men that are cold and slow, it will bevery fit to mingle some of a middle age,* 1.87 approaching to 50. yeares; and that both the one and the other past their time in many imployments, in the which they haue seene diuers sorts of affaires treated and nego∣tiated, and haue therein made knowne their discretion, fidelity, and industry; and by this meanes giue assurance, that they are worthy and capable to hold this ranke,* 1.88 with∣out staggering or falling For a Councellor of Estate must be an honest man, faithfull to the Estate, and firme in his resolutions; yet without wilfulnesse and obstinacy: a most dangerous plague in a Councell, where it is neces∣sary sometimes to obey the storme, to strike sayle,* 1.89 to leaue the ordinary course, and retire sometimes into the Hauen, to the which in the end they will sayle when they

see the Wind prosperous. And although there be some one thing resolued, yet if it discouer some apparent dan∣ger, it is not against custome to change opinions. For Prudence doth not consist in an obstinate will, to doe a thing resolutely; bu•• amongst many different parties which Fortune presents vnto vs, to choose the best and the most commodious, to attayne vnto our end. Where∣fore some haue bin of opinion that they should propound that a little before, which was to be resolued vpon; least that doing otherwise, and some one hauing bin of a bad aduice, without due consideration, he should not grow obstinate vnseasonably, and striue to maintayne his opi∣nion, rather then to leaue it. Yet in affaires whereas they that haue credit, are interessed, it is not fit to make the proposition, if they be not assured to be able to resolue it speedily: otherwise it would giue them meanes to make parties and factions, and to prepare hinderances and lets.

A Councellor of Estate must likewise be without fa∣uour ••o some,* 1.90 or hatred to others, or ambition for him∣selfe; hauing no other ayme but the publique good, and that he depends not of any other Prince, be it by fealty or homage, or by obligation or by pension: but rather that he runne the same fortune with the Prince whom he serues; to the end he may know, that it concernes him to suffer the euill, and enioy the good, procee∣ding from the Councell which he hath giuen. Marc. An∣thony the Philosopher and Emperour, ordayned that the Senators of Rome, which were not Italians, should at the least haue the fourth part of their Estates in Italy, to make them more carefull, to thinke of the preserua∣tion of the Prouince, where the seate of the Empire remayned. And Pl•••••• writes that Traian the Empe∣rour had formerly decreed, that such as sued for any Be∣nefices, should haue the third part of their Lands in Italy; not holding it reasonable, that such men should

make vse of Rome and Italy, as of a retreate, and not as of their Countrey.

Yet I would not herein set a generall Rule, there ha∣uing bin many found, who although they had their re∣treate else-where then in the Estate of the Prince whom they serued, haue notwithstanding carryed themselues faithfully, vpon hope that if they should lose the goods which they enioyed in the Estate, of their Master, yet they should alwayes haue meanes to liue else-where.

And contrariwise we haue seene some which had not any retreat but in the Estate of their Prince, whom the good fortune of the Enemy hath made carefull to enter into treaty to saue their Estates; the which hap∣pily they would not haue done, if they had meanes to liue else-where. It is likewise certayne, that in affaires where we haue no interest, we iudge much better, then when as we put our interest in Ballance with our opini∣ons in Councell.

He that lookes ouer Gamesters, and is not possest neyther with the hope of gayne, nor the feare of losse, will giue a better iudgment of the carriage of the game then he that playe••: And he that in a Councell hath not any feare to lose his Estate, and who brings neyther af∣fection nor passion, will alwayes take the most honou∣rable party: And he which hath any interest preuented by his owne opinion and feare, will willingly incline to that side by the which he thinks to saue himselfe.

A Councellor of Estate must not be too suddaine and rash, for that precipitation of its nature,* 1.91 is blind and indiscreet; a good deliberation hauing need of time, to make a good resolution, being impossible in a short time to consider & weigh the inconueniences duly: and withall pr••cipitation cannot come but with indiscretion, or little iudgment; & both the one & the other hurtful in councel.* 1.92

Irresolution is another vice, into the which he must be very careful not to fal; for he must resolue vpon 〈◊〉〈◊〉 party,

and forget all the rest; lest that by remembring them, he doth not breake and dull the vigour of the minde, neces∣sary for the due execution of great Enterprizes, and with∣all the constancy which he must bring in matters that are doubtfull and difficult: neyther must he thinke that there is lesse difficulty in the party which he hath left, then in that which he hath chosen.

* 1.93In some one-ignorance to be able to examine affaires causeth irresolution; and these ought to be reiected from Councell. Others are Enemies to inconueniences: So as although that with reason they ought to imbrace the thing which is propounded vnto them; yet being amazed with the paynes and difficulty, which doe alwayes ac∣company great affaires, they remayne in suspence and doubt, whether they should endeauour to attempt it.

* 1.94Other haue such subtill spirits, that to all things that are propounded, they finde contrary reasons; and being (as often it happens) of small courage, they neuer (vn∣lesse it be vpon necessity) resolue; And they neuer want reasons to couer their fearefulnesse, the which will euer haue more power ouer them then reason, and experience to haue many times trembled in vaine. For resolution pro∣ceeds not from the spirit, but from the courage: And these men are so much the more dangerous, as they are more subtill and cunning, and haue more dexterity to couer their difficulties.* 1.95 But as he may not be resolute, so must he not be so confident of himselfe, as he stop his eares to the aduice of others; or that relying vpon our owne for∣ces, we doe not draw into consideration those of our E∣nemies, yea sometimes hazard and fortune, which hath a good share in the greatest actions, to the end we may fore-see that which may happen. For distrust is the Mo∣ther of fore-sight,* 1.96 and fore-sight the Mother of safety.

Patience is another quality, very necessary in a Coun∣cell of Estate, not onely to endure opinions contrary to his owne, but also to haue his reasons weighed, blamed,* 1.97

and contradicted, and to heare many follies which grow amidst their discourses, euen from great Personages. He must heare I say with patience, or without Iealousie or desire to be followed in his opinions, and not to doe as many which please themselues, to be the Authors of a new ouerture, who with a spirit of contradiction, full of bitternesse, trouble themselues to reprehend the reasons of such of the Councell as are their Enemies, be they ne∣uer so good. A vice altogether insupportable. Yet not∣withstanding it is not forbidden, to draw into agitation the reasons of another: but it must be done with respect; and thereby he shews that he doth not seeke to diuide or surprize the resolution, but it sufficeth him to haue his rea∣sons vnderstood, and the inconueniences of a contrary o∣pinion.* 1.98 Besides these qualities which concerne the iudg∣ment of integrity, a Councellor of Estate must know how to explicate himselfe, and to make his reasons be vnderstood: and they which of purpose obscure their rea∣sons and intention, for the vncertaynty of the euent, are bad Councellors, which vnderstand not what belongs to Councell: for that good Councell is measured by the rea∣sons, and not by the euent, no man being answerable for that which happens against all discourse and reason.

But aboue all things it is required to be secret:* 1.99 for a Councell divulged, profits no more then a Mine blowne vp.* 1.100 Wherefore it is necessary that the number of Coun∣cellors of Estate, should not be great: for in a great num∣ber this inconuenience is ordinary.

It is likewise good to charge Councellors often:* 1.101 for that being nec••ssary they should be instructed in affaires, it would fall out that their charge would end before they should be able to see those which were begun, finished, and before they should vnderstand the course and procee∣dings; the which is necessary to settle a iudgement: This course not able to be so well represented by the report which others might make, but they might faile in some

particulars, whereon they might ground their opinions. But if for the quality of the Estate it be necessary to change them; at the least they must prouide in such sort, as the Councell be not changed all at an instant: but ha∣uing ordayned a certayne time for euery Councellor to assist, their charges must expire at seuerall times, and the greatest part of the ancient must remayne to instruct the new in affaires, who growing ancient in their turnes, shall instruct others that shall enter.

* 1.102And if through the ambition of some, the Councell of Estate (which ought to consist of a small number) be too full: the which doth vsually happen in sicke and corrupted Estates, it shall not be vnfitting to imploy them else-where, attributing to the greatest part of these Councellors, some Iurisdiction which may approach in some sort the affaires of Estate; as Philip the faire King of France did of his Parliament: Charles the Eight with his great Councell, and as they doe at this present with the Priuy Councell. This meanes is not new, but hath bin anciently practized by Tiberius, Nero, and some other Emperours towards the Senate of Rome, making them to forget by little and little the knowledge of State affaires, by the attribution of a contentious Iuris∣diction, which was in the end established by Adrian in this Senate, in forme of an ordinary Iurisdiction.

CHAP. 20 Of the plurality of Councels of Estate. Of the power of Councell, and of the order of giuing their Opinions.

* 1.103IN Spaine there are many Councells of Estate, di∣stinguished according to the diuersity of Realmes and Prouinces, which are vnited to that Crowne. They

may likewise in erecting many Councels to facilitate the expedition of affaires in a great Realme, imploy the more honest men profitably, and preuent surprizes; di∣stinguishing them according to the diuers parts of the E∣state, which are, Religion, Iustice, Warre, Poli∣cy, the Treasure, the care of Gouernment, and the in∣telligences as well without as within the Estate: This last ought to be annexed to the Soueraignes person; ac∣companied with few, least that a great number should breed confusion, and discouer the secret.

As for that of Religion, it should haue care to main∣tayne Religion in Reuerence: and if there were many which they were forced to tollerate, it should serue to cause them to liue in peace one with another, and to de∣cide their differences. That of Iustice should not be im∣ployed but to order the differences of Iurisdictions, and to iudge those, whereof Iustice should be forbidden to take knowledge.

That of Warre should serue to regulate the Souldiers both Horse and Foot, prouiding for the Munitions, pla∣ces of strength, Ships of War, Garrisons, and gene∣rally of all that which may depend of a Military order and care. That of Policy should order the Commerce and Trade with the manufactures, and should make all esta∣blishments necessary, for aboundance, the safety, the beautifying of Townes, the assurance of wayes, and the commodity of Riuers. That of the Treasure should re∣gulate the leuies of money, the assignations, and all that which concernes the dispensations of the Reuenewes of the Estate.

Yet there being many affaires so vnited,* 1.104 as they seeme to belong as well to one Councell as another; to auoyde the contrarieties of Ordinances, if many Councels should take notice of one businesse, the most expedient would be, that these Councels should ••aue no other charge, but to examine that which should be propounded vnto them,

and to cause the diuersity of their opinions to be reduced to writing, with the reasons of eyther side; the which should be read in a Councell composed of the heads of all these Councels, and of two other Councellors of ey∣ther of them, chosen by the Councell it selfe, according to the quality of the businesse; All which being assembled for the readi••g of the sayd opinions, they should haue no more to doe, but to resolue the businesse thus digested and examined.

I know that in an Estate, whereas all things are ouer∣ruled by the head of one or two, who desire to gouerne the Prince, he that should attempt any thing for the good of his Estate, they would presently perswade him, that these Councels would be so many comptrollers which he should giue vnto himselfe: That he was sufficient to pro∣uide for all, and that all must depend vpon his will, and not oblige nor subiect himselfe to another mans Reason. But vnder pretext of maintayning the Princes Authority, these people seeke to continue their owne to worke their ends, neuer representing the Princes affaires but by a crosse meanes, which may serue their owne designes: they ingage him many times in Councels, which proue very preiudiciall to his honour, reputation, and Estate.

* 1.105In regard of the Councels power, it ought onely to consist in giuing Councell, and not to command, Com∣mandment being inseparable with the Soueraignty: And in Estates, whereas Councellors commaund that which they Councell, they may not onely be termed Councel∣lors but Soueraignes, and if the decree or sentence seemes to haue any command in it; yet it is certayne that without the Soueraig••••s commission, no more then the sentence of the Iudge it cannot be executed.

* 1.106In some Councels they haue receiued two kind of Lawes: and they haue giuen power to some to make an ouerture of some affaires, the which haui••g bin propounded by them, they retired, and left others to deliberate; the

which they call a consultatiue voice.* 1.107 Others had power only to deliberate, and to resolue, but not to propound.

Wherefore to take away this superioritie in a Coun∣cell, and to entertaine an equallitie among Councellors,* 1.108 the which is of great force to maintaine the libertie of opinions; it is fit that the Councellors should haue a con∣sultatiue and deliberatiue voyce. Yet forasmuch as it is necessary to propound, and to bring some order in all sorts of Companies; it is fitting that hee which hath somthing to propound, should impart it to him that holds the first place in the Councell, prouided alwayes that hee hath no interest.

There is another diuersitie for the order of opening,* 1.109 either beginning by the greatest, and of most authoritie in Councell, to the end that the younger and least capable, might more easily choose the best party, and the soun∣dest reasons: Or in beginning to take the voyces of the youngest and inferiours, and causing them of most autho∣rity to giue their opinions last; least that the libertie of aduice might not bee cut off by the authority of great men, who are factious and ambitious, and admit no contradiction.

Which two kindes of deliuering their opinions may bee practized according to the equallity, that is among the Councellors. For if they bee equall in power, it seemes most fitting that the most sufficient should deli∣uer their opinions first: Whereas contrarywise if the Councell be mingled with great Lords, and men of a means condition; they which haue least power, must de∣liuer their opinions first; yet causing them which haue only a consultatiue voice, to deliuer their censures first, who prepare the way to such as haue a deliberatiue voice, representing vnto the Councell all the reasons of either side, and propounding their owne aduice: In doing whereof if they erre, they shall bee reformed by the o∣thers without Iealousie; for that an ambition to speake,

drawes after it many times the enuy of some, and the iealousie of others. Augustus demaunded their opini∣ons without obseruing Ranke, or Age, to the end that euery man should be•• attentiue to the propositions that were made, and without staying for the aduice of next neighbour, he might be alwayes ready to deliuer his owne.

I will adde one thing, whereof we must haue a spe∣ciall care in Councell, which is to call into the delibe∣ration of some businesse of hazard, they to whom we are to giue the Execution. For it seemes that calling t••em, it will make them more cunning and aduised to a∣uoyd the dangers which may fall out in the Enterprize, the which they meane to recommend vnto them. Yet it may be of such a nature, as the difficulties which they shall ••eare, wi••l present themselues in the Execution, may dis∣courage them and make them grow cold, in danger to giue ouer the Enterprize. Behold that which ought to be principally considered in those which giue counsell.

CHAP. 21. Considerations for the Prince which is to be Counsell••d.

AS for him that is to be Counselled, we must consider his sufficiency, the manner of demaunding Coun∣sell, to receyue it, examine it, to resolue and Ex∣ecute it.

* 1.110In regard of Sufficiency, they haue alwayes held that there are three sorts of persons. Some haue such a vigour of Spirit, as they alo••e can better resolue their affayres, then a whole company would do; in the which besides the feare that the secret would be divulged, the number of good men would be so much the more rare, as they

of whom it is composed are great. Others haue not this vigour or Spirit, but a naturall docillity to heare the aduice of others, and a iudgment to discerne good from Euill: And these, as they are inferiour to the first, so are they Superiour to the last; who not able to take aduice in their owne heads, and contemning the aduice of others, know not how to make choyse of the sounder party.

And although it seemes that the first haue not any need to seeke the counsell of another; yet aswell to free himselfe from presumption, as to giue the more authori∣ty and credit vnto their Enterprizes, they must commu∣nicate them; and confesse that Sufficiency is neuer so great in any one person, but that many may adde something vnto it. And although that this Sufficiency be very commendable, yet it is dangerous in a Prince, who easi∣ly fals into presumption; and it seemes that the docillity which is found in others, yeilding an Eare to Counsell, is the more safe. Yet if these bring not Iudgment to dis∣cerne good from euill, this meane Sufficiency would be as dangerous, as if he referd himselfe wholy to the Counsell of others: which is an Instrument, whereof they haue somtimes made vse to ruine many Estates; for that where the Councell shall consist of incapable men, aswell as the Prince; a thing which vsually fals out, when as the Counsellors are chosen by him, for that euery man seekes his like; and we much acknowledge some Suffici∣ency to iudge of that of another man, to make the Ele∣ction: and in this case the Estate is the sooner drawne to its ruine, when as the number of Counsellors is greatest. But if they whom the Prince hath called to his Councell, he worthy and fit to support the burthen of the Estate; & that the Prince be not capable to make choise of good par∣ties and occasions, and to adde the conduct which shalbe necessary in the executions; this councel wilbe fruitles to him. Besides, the Counsellors of Princes are accompanied

with ••ealousie one against another; and tending all to one end, they fi••de out many times publique Councels, and make them serue to their owne priuate interests, stri∣uing by many cunning practises, to frustrate the De∣signes, and to hinder the increase of reputation one of a∣nother. Whereby it happens, that the Prince hauing not (for the little sufficiency that is in him) that authority among his Councellors which were necessary to keepe them in awe, and to hinder the course of these Diuisions; nor yet Iudgement to discouer the particular Desig••es of euery one; he remaynes among so many Councellors, ra∣ther confounded and irresolute, then counselled. Be∣sides that in such a Councell of Wise men, and full of val∣lor, which serue a Prince of little vnderstanding, there is neuer so much Friendship and Affection as were to be desired in Cou••cellors. For that seeing their Prince more inwardly then other men, and knowing his imperfecti∣ons and weaknesse better, the order of Nature beares it, t••at in the end they fall to contemne him, the which af∣terwards doth easily turne to hatred; for that the Mini∣ster which hath some merrit in himselfe, scornes to obey a man incapable of his Greatnesse, and vnwor∣thy of his Fortune, long. After hatred and contempt followes the infidelity of Councellors; so as the Prince must eyther be sold, or turned vp and downe according to the occasions of the will of those which shall be about him, who in their Councell will haue more regard to their particular aduancement, then to the greatnesse of their Master.

A P••i••ce then that desires to raigne in his Estate, must make himselfe capable to gouerne, and mannage affaires: not that I would aduise a Prince who hath sufficiency in himselfe to haue no man about him to giue him Counsel; bu•• rather I be••eeue that one of the greatest foundations of his reputation is, when they shall ha••e an opi∣nion that his owne iudgement and proper intelligence

of affaires, is assisted by a wise and faithfull Councell; which is the thing for the which he must most labour.

But this Councell how wise and adui••ed soeuer, must alwayes be surmounted by the iudgement and capacity of the Prince, so as they must rather serue for an acces∣sary; then a principall in the gouernment of the Estate: that in commaundments they acknowledge themselues inferiour to the Prince, and not carry themselues as e∣quals: that in occasions and affaires of importance, they may rather haue power to alt••r, and to make knowne the difficulties and inconueniences, but not to resolue: And in a word, the Prince hath neede of so much spirit, as his Councell may assist him to gouerne, but not teach him to raigne.

We will therefore conclude, that as a Prince hath neede of himselfe, to maintayne himselfe in life, so harh he neede of a good Councell, to maintayne the affaires of his Estate: and as without it he cannot be termed a man, so without Councell he cannot be held a Prince.

Wherefore hauing made choyce of those which may Counsell him,* 1.111 he must carefully take occasion to demand their Councell: tha•• is to say, neyther too long before the Enterprize, least it should be discouered; nor too late, for feare that the Councell should proue vnprofi∣table. And if he doubts that the businesse will not be held secret, being propounded in a full Councell, or that some of his Councellors for the interest of some great man, dare not deliuer their opinions freely; and he may receiue their aduice separately and in secret, and reiect the reasons contrary to the Councell which they haue gi∣uen him, to the end he may the better iudge what party he shall embrace; without tying himselfe to number the voices, but rather to weigh him; for affaires of E∣state ought not to be gouerned according to the plurality of voices, if the reasons of eyther part be then so strong, as they are vncertaine what party they should follow.

But aboue all t••ings a Prince mu••t haue a care in affaires of greatest importance, nor to discouer euen vnto his Councellors of what opinion he is: Least that they which counsell him should rather se••ke to furnish him with reas••ns to confirme his opinion and to please him. For Councellors ought to declare freely what they hold in their consciences honorable for him, and safe for his E∣state.

Some one would oblige the Prince to assist himselfe at all manner of Councels, asw••ll to take knowledge of all the affaires of his Estate, as to discouer the capacity of his Councellors, to hinder factions which grow in Councell, to moderate the passions and iealousies of his Ministers, to giue more Authority to his Resolutions, and by his presence to cause the affaires to be treated of with the respect and grauity that is requisite and ne∣cessary.

Yet there being many things which are treated of in the like Councels, depending of Iustice, policy, or the Treasure; besides that this would ouer-burthen the Prince, in making him to imploy the greatest part of his time in these affaires; he cannot do it without aba∣sing his Authority and Maiesty too much, by this too frequent communication; and it will suffice, that he as∣sist at most important affaires, or at those whose resoluti∣on may increase his Reputation, contenting himselfe to prouide for that which concernes Peace or Warre, with the saf••ty a••d quiet of his Estate.

An•• to p••euent the inconueniences which happen dai∣ly in Councels, where the Prince doth not assist, and to draw the same aduantages without assisting, which he should haue by his presence being there, the course ob∣serued by the Grand Seig••our is somewhat considerable. For in the place where they hold the Diuan or Counsell, there is a window, by the which (without being seene) he may heare all that is spoken and past in his

Councell: So as his Councellors vncertayne whether their master heare them or not, obserue the same respect, the same modesty, and t••e same manner of proceeding, which they will do in his presence: and after they haue held the counsell, they go and make report vnto him of what hath past; the which they dare not deliuer falsly, not knowing whether the Prince haue heard them. And thus he is informed of all that hath beene propoun••ed in his Councell. and heares himselfe if he will, or by some o∣ther, the reasons of all sides; and then after the reports which is truly and certaynely made vnto him, he presently resolues without any demunition of his Ma∣iesty.

The Prince hauing demaunded the aduice of his Coun∣cellors,* 1.112 he must receiue it from them all with an equall countenance; without hating him, which hath giuen him bad counsell: vnlesse he discouer some malice. For Councels hauing no force if they be not allowed by the Prince, he hauing found them good, it is a signe that he hath iudged, and hath beene mooued by the same reasons, like to him that gaue them: So as the errour of iudgment hauing bin common to both, the blame and the fault ought not to be imputed vnto the Councellor alone: And for that they haue neuer in any Estate established ••ecom∣pences or punishments for good or bad counsels; which are held such commonly not by the reasons, but by the euents, whereof no man can be any way answere∣able.

We must therefore diligently Examine,* 1.113 an aduice or counsell; consider the thing in its selfe, with all the cir∣cumstances and dependances; preferre the safety of the Estate to all other considerations; and then to seeke the profit by honest courses, which consist in all the the parts which we represent in this treaty, very necessary for the establishment, preseruation, and increase of the Estate.

Afterwards the Prince must duly consider of the Ex∣ecution of that which they counsell him; for the Coun∣cell being of doubtfull things, he must aduise whether Fortune may haue a greater share, in that which he meanes to vndertake, then wisdome: and if he finds that he hath more need of Fortune, he must beware how he imbarque himselfe, especially if the contrary succeed to that which he desires, he incurres more losse, then he can hope for profit, succeeding after his desire.

But if necessity reduceth him to this poynt, that he must eyther loose or hazard; it were better to tempt Fortune, the which although it did not succeed, yet at the least he should haue this contentment, to haue done what lay in him. Otherwise, he may not lightly im∣barque himselfe in a dangerous Enterprize, although that at the first sight the perill be not so neere. For be∣sides the danger that euery bad resolution carries with it, it drawes after it likewise to maintayne it, an infinite number of such like, for that things cannot remayne alone, but are bound one vnto another, and inchayned together.

Wherefore we may not haue so much respect vnto the present, as we forget the future. For althoug•• that the accidents of Fortune are in such variety, and so frequent, as they may hinder vs from a certayne fore-sight of the future: and that to haue regard to an imaginary feare of a thing which may be or not be, it seemes that this were to imbrace the shaddow, and to leaue the body or substance.

Yet the greatest part of Errours which are commit∣ted in deliberations proceeds from this, that men suffer themselues too much to be carried away with the affect••ō of the present; the which how little soeuer it be assisted by Fortune, it seemes that it hath alwayes greater force and vigour, then the strongest respect we can imagine

of the future. Wherefore he must shew himselfe very stayed in such affections, and as for the affection of the present, he may not forget the consideration of the future: but he must accustome himselfe to set that which is to come before his Eyes, with such a resentment and apprehension, as if he saw it or touch it. So he may not for a feare a farre off, forbeare to remedy a present mischiefe.

He may not likewise suffer himselfe to be carried a∣way by any Example that is alledged, if all the particu∣larities do not concurre. For although that these com∣parisons may ioyne at some corner, and that all things hold by some similitude or likenesse: yet there are very few Examples which do not hault: And the relation which is drawne from Experience, is many times defe∣ctiue and imperfect, if it be not assisted by discourse and Reason.

Then hee must examine the quality of the person which giues the aduice, especially his interest, and aboue all things he must refuse to counsell a flatterer, and inuite him that counsels, to speake freely and with courage.

If for the respect of the greatnesse of the Prince who is counselled, it be necessary to flatter him;* 1.114 the Prince shall consider, if the flattery of him that coun∣sels him, (who must sometimes vse, as they say, words of silke) proceeds from cunning and subtilty, which the Councellor doth vse to perswade him to that which is for his good; or with a designe to get credit by his pleasing, he enters into this flattery: For in this last case, the Prince must stoppe his Eares, and open them to him that speakes freely, there being no condition of men, that haue so great need of true and free aduer∣tisements then Princes, who vndergo a publicke life, and are to satisfie and content the opinion of so many people, which as they are accustomed to do any thing

that may diuert them from their course, they finde them∣selues insensibly ingaged in the hatred and detestation of their Subiects, for occasions many times which they might well auoyd, without any interest of their plea∣sure, if they had beene aduised and directed in time.

But the manner whereby most Princes liue at this day, few men are found that will practise this Trade, being the office of true Friendship towards the Soue∣raigne, in a rough and dangerous tryall; So as they must not onely haue much affection and freedome, but also courage. Flattery is far more safe; for that by pleasing, it seemes they draw nearer vnto Friendship: and for that it is more agreeable to him whom they flatter, it is also more easie for him to practise that meanes to flatter.

Contrariwise Truth and Liberty, as if they approached neare to contempt, cannot be so safely practised with a Prince.* 1.115 They haue their circumscriptions and limits: and many times it falls out, that (as the World is) they leaue truth in the eares of Princes, not onely without fruite, but with preiudice to him that speakes it.

If then the Prince will assure himselfe on that side, he must encourage one or two of those which approach nea∣rest vnto him, and whom he knowes to be best affected, and freest from contempt of him,* 1.116 to deliuer freely vnto him in what manner they receiue his actions; and he must choose such men of a meane fortune, and are notwith∣standing satisfied and content, to the end that on the one side they may haue no feare to touch their Masters heart to the quicke; least they should thereby lose the course of their aduancement; and on the other side being of a meane condition, they may haue the more commu∣nication with all sorts of people. A Prince is not to be credited, when he brags of his courage, to attend the en∣counter of his Enemy, for the seruice of his glory; if for his profit & aduancement he cannot endure the liberty of a friends words; hauing no other effect nor aime but to

pinch him by the Eare, the rest of the operation being in his owne hands.

Wee reade in the Turkes Historie, that a Bassa called by his Master to the gouernment of the Estate,* 1.117 and made Vezir, which is the first charge of the Empire next to the Grand Siegnour, holding himselfe not very capable of this charge, hee drew certaine Persons secretly vnto him, who had charge to collect whatsoeuer they heard spoken in the Citie of Constantinople touching the go∣uernment of the Estate, to relate it vnto him: And by this meanes being aduertized of all that was found good or bad, and of that which they desired to bee done or not done, hee gouerned himselfe in such sort, and without the helpe of any other Councell, all things succeeded to his desire, and accomodating his actions to the will of the people, hee was admired by them, who before held him to bee vncapable of this charge.

This may be practi••ed by the Prince; but yet hee may not forbeare to make choise of a good Councell, to ex∣amine the propositions of that which by this meanes they haue discouered, to bee desired of the people. In this manner it shall bee easie for a Prince to resolue, bee it that hee take the aduice of euery one secretly and apart; or being assembled, hee cause them to deliuer their opinions openly, to the end that by the communication of their ad∣uisoes, the resolution may bee more easie to take, either in following the greatest number of voyces, or in making choice of his opinion that seemes the best; and the reso∣lution taken, the execution must follow with all possible speede; Celeritie making all things easie, as well for that of it selfe, it is actiue and full of vigour, as for that it giues no leisure to crosse a businesse in the execution, before they can oppose it.

CHAP. 22. Of the forme of Commanding.

THe fourth establishment to bee made in an Estate, is the forme of Commanding, in the which wee must consider two things; the power of the Com∣mander, and the iustice of the commandement. The power of him which commands is either soueraigne or inferiour.* 1.118 The commandement of the soueraigne is, either generall, or particular: The generall consists in the lawes which the soueraigne establisheth, vnder which wee comprehend the ordinary orders, customes and statutes.

The law is as it were a pledge and a generall safetie, which Princes giue vnto their subiects,* 1.119 for the enter∣tainement of contracts, and their course of liuing, which ought to be maintained and obserued, especially amongst them for the generall good of the Estate. For reason a∣lone which God hath put into man, being vnable to re∣taine him within the bonds of his dutie, and custome to liue ill, hauing made so great an impression in him, as neither prayers nor admonitions are able to retire him; it hath beene needfull to imploy the authority of lawes▪ and the force of the Prince, to reduce euery man to rea∣son, for feare of punishment, and by the Establishment of certaine rules, to a sure order in the Estate, and to con∣firme iudgments in Iustice. In effect it were dangerous, to leaue all to the iudgment of men, in the multitude whereof will grow a confusion of opinions, if they had not some rule which they ought to follow, and they might more easily bee carried away by hatred or fauour: the which cannot happen to Law-giuers, who making

Lawes for the future, are not transported with any pri∣uate passion but for the publique. For although that the Iudges were wise and without passion, yet it is more easie to finde a small number of wise men which establish the Lawes, and the for me o••iudging, then to finde such a number as is necessary to be Iudges. Moreouer, the Lawes are made with mature deliberation, and Iudge∣ments are giuen suddainly according to the occurrents of affaires: so as the rule is more safe taken from the Law, then if the Prince gaue it himselfe.

The Lawes are of diuers sorts,* 1.120 according to the diuer∣sity of Subiects, for the gouernment whereof they are made. For some rule the power of Offices and Magi∣strates, as well Ecclesiasticall as Ciuill; and distinguish the function of their Charges, their Iurisdiction, honour, and preheminence one vpon another. Others rule the Treasure; others the military Discipline; others the ge∣nerall Policy; others Iustice, as well in regard of the qua∣lity of persons, of contracts, treaties, and commerce a∣mong men; as for the punishment of Crimes, the order and forme of proceeding in Iudgements by the parties and Iudges. Some are made to contayne the Subiect in his du∣ty towards the Prince and Magistrate, and to maintayne Concord and Peace. Finally, the Law must haue for his principall end the good of the Estate, and to prouide for all the parts thereof, and for the inconueniences that may annoy it, and not for any particular profit for him that hath made it:* 1.121 Otherwise the Reuerence which hath caused it to be receiued, would part and be separated f••om such commandments, and there would remaine nothing but the sole authority and power. For although they say, that the will of the Prince is a La••, yet this must not be vnder∣stood of all that comes into his fancy and will to doe; but onely of that which ••e may iustly desire: for that the Lawes ought to be made and published, to amend and cor∣rect the nature of things, for the which they meane to e∣stablish

them, and not to second the appetite of him that makes them: We must therefore consider in making of Lawes, the qualities which must concurre in a Law. The first is,* 1.122 that it be according to publique honesty, obser∣uing the dignity of persons and things: that it be iust as well for the end whereunto it ought to tend, which is the publique good onely, as for the authority of him that makes it, who in establishing it, ought not to exceed the power that is giuen him. There is another quality which concernes the forme, to the end that Equality and proportion may be kept, as in the imposition of Iudges: for otherwise it were not a Law, but a violence, to the which in conscience we are not bound to obey, but one∣ly ••o auoyd scandall and sedition. It must likewise be peace∣able and quiet according vnto Nature, and the condition of such as ought to obey, and are Subiects, grounded vp∣on naturall reason, and accommodated to the quality of affaires, and the customes of the Countrey. For there are lawes which are good in one Country, but would not be so in another. The Lawes in like manner must be fit∣ting for the time, being necessary to gouerne the Estate, as a pilot doth his ship, according to the wind that blowes, and not lightly established. Moreouer, the Law must be profitable to all, or to the greatest part; plaine, least its ob∣scurity breeds some errour; briefe, and according vnto some without preface, with the commandment onely.

* 1.123Yet others are of a contrary opinion. For although that the principall intention of the Law ought not to be to teach the reason for the which it is made, no more then the Physitian, who is not called by the sick Patient, to giue him a reason of his prescriptions, but to cure him, hauing more need of health then Doctrine: yet for that they make Lawes for men capable to vnderstand that which is ne∣cessary for the publique good, the Prince ought (as a com∣mon Father) not onely to make knowne vnto his people the end of the Law, but also the reason, that he may know

that the Ordinances of his Prince are no lesse full of reason then command. It is true,* 1.124 that when as by such mildnes••e and humanity the Prince preuayles nothing with his Sub∣iects; then he may with a sufficient excuse v••e his abso∣lute commaund: For his duty binds him t•• practise all meanes to moue and induce his Subiects▪ to well doing, yea, to imploy force, the which in it selfe is not bad, if it be well vsed. For although that the Lawes ought not to be against men, yet they are made to commaund men; and for that pleasure doth many times deceiue men, deligh∣ting in things which are pernicious and hurtfull; the Prince in making a Law, must not haue any regard to the pleasure or displeasure which his Subiects may take: but it shall suffice him, that those things which he ordaynes or commaunds, may be good and profitable to the pub∣lique. Yet this is not to say, that he should not proceede in those courses which may breed a popular contentment; but contrariwise he must haue this principal obiect after the good of the Estate. Behold what we are to follow in the establishment of a Law, let vs now see what we are to fly.

CHAP. 23. What we are to to a••oyde in the establish∣ing of L••wes.

AMong other things we must haue a speciall care not to establish any Lawes but such as are ve∣ry necessary.* 1.125 The multiplic••ty of Lawes is ra∣••••••: then a testimony of confusion then good orders: For few Lawes suffice to entertayne good men in their Duties, and to punish the wicked if they be well obser∣ued. The number of Lawes proceeds commonly from two causes, the one is the ambition and vanity of, those which cōmand, who to gaine the reputation of wel ruling,

will prouide for all, yea for matters of small moment. The which is a cause that being of this quallity, they are not obserued, and the people accustoming themselues not to obay Lawes of small importance, they afterward do easily dispence with themselues from doing that which Lawes of greater importance commaunds. Wherefore it is better to leaue the care of such great and weighty things to the Magistrate, who may prouide according to occurrents.

The other cause, from whence the multitude of Lawes do vsually proceed, is the bad inclination of the Prince, who hauing an intent to domineere ouer the Magistrates & publick, in his particular appetites and affayres, makes what Lawes he can to offend in particular, eyther those whom he feares or such as he hates: or of that, from whence he thinkes he may draw some profit for his owne particular.

I come vnto the obseruation of Lawes, without the which, the establishment were fruitlesse. To this ob∣seruation two things are necessary: the example of great men, and of those which commaund; and Seuerity. For as the Lawes prescribe vnto Subiects the rule of well li∣uing,* 1.126 so the Prince ought to giue an Example for the ob∣seruation and entertaynment of the Lawes: And the Prince is called the liuing Law of the Estate, not only for his intelligence and power to make a Law; but also for the obseruation of that, which they teach by way of commaundment, the Prince by his Example commaunds it. When I say the Example of the Prince, I speak not of his person alone, but of those of his trayne, of his neerest Fauourites, and of the greatest personages: For it would little auayle him to obserue the Lawes, if he suffer the great men of his Court to break them. Where∣fore he must haue an Eye, for that the Subiects of a meane condition cannot receiue a greater contentment then to see the actions of great persons conformable to the

common rule, conceiuing an opinion thereby to haue some equality and participation with them, in acknow∣ledging them equall in this obedience.

As the example of the Prince serues to inuite men to doe well,* 1.127 so seuerity retires and hinders those (whom impunity might abandon) from doing euill. This seueri∣ty notwithstanding doth not extend to search out and pu∣nish the most secret offences; but those which may be the cause of bad example. Likewise it is certayne that the punishments or dayned by the Lawes, are more in regard of the scandall then for the Crime, whereof God is the principall reuenger, and not so much to punish the offence past, as to strike terrour into the wicked for the future, by the rigour of punishment, not to commit the like fault. And although the intention of the Law be not to hinder a∣ny man, yet for that men sometimes commit errours,* 1.128 which deserue (eyther in regard of the person which commits them, or for some other good respect) com∣passion and mercy: in this case the Prin••e may moderate the rigour of the Law by a fauorable temper, or giue him an absolute pardon, if the Subiect deserues it; and that herein he cannot bri••g impunity in other things, or in equality which breeds scandall to good men to the preiu∣dice of the Estate.

For this effect pardons must not be too frequent, but for a Subiect that is full of merit,* 1.129 and they must be plea∣sing to the most part. But when he shall be forced to shew himselfe seuere, as it is necessary sometimes, that in the disobedience of the Subiects the Prince should be rigorous: if punishment may be called ••igour: this ••igour ingendring vsually feare, the which seldome accompa∣nied with loue, he must amidst his actious of seuerity, extend his bounty to good men: and then the feare which was full of hatred, will bee conuerted in••o Reuerence. This shall suffice for that which con∣cernes the generall commaunds of the Soueraigne, which

are made by Lawes, Ordinances, and other such kinde of commands.

CHAP. 24. Of the Princes particular Com∣maunds.

AS for the particular Commaunds which are made vpon occasions which happen dayly, the forme is in a manner equall: for that it ought to be constant in that which they haue first vndertaken to esta∣blish, and not to change vpon euery difficulty which may happen, but contrariwise they should striue to sur∣mount al•• the crosses which may present themselues. This forme of Commaund shalbe like vnto the other ac∣companied with seuerity, being needfull to p••euent dis∣obedience in small matters: for that this vice like vnto others, growes by degrees. But aboue all, hee which commaunds, must deale in such sort, as the Soueraigne commaund may depend wholy on him, and be tyed to his Person: not that the Prince should therefore draw vnto himselfe all the gouernment, and the whole man∣n••ging of th•• Estate: for besides that he should find him∣selfe ••uer-bu••thened, and that in the multitude of af∣f••ires th••re will be many ill cared for, and worse execu∣ted, ••e should cha••ge his Principality with euny; and his subiects seeing themselues depriued of the administra∣tion of Offices, would grow cold in the affections which they ought to beare him. But the Soueraigne authority ought not to be imparted to any one, nor the distributi∣on of Recompences and Offices, nor the absolute cōmand of forces; least that he to whom the Prince hath giuen this power changing his affection and will, shou••d take occa∣sion to a••tempt against the Estate, hauing the commodity

••f such an aduantage: whereof there are but too many examples Histories.

We haue treated of the Commandments of a Soue∣raigne power: Let vs now obserue the forme of their Commaund, whose power is inferiour, and to whom the charges of the Estate are distributed, to haue care and to watch ouer that part of the Estate which is committed vnto them.

CHAP. 25. Of Magistrates.

IT being necessary that of all the parts of an Estate, there should not any remayne without gouernment; one a∣lone being vnable to imbrace all; being likewise vnfit, that the Soueraigne should be troubled in matters which may be done better by those which are inferiour vn∣to him: it hath beene held necessary to giue order, that this supreme authority, yet without suffring any demuni∣ti••n, should be dispersed into many parts; and that power should be giuen to a certayne number of men, to hea••e, or∣dayne, or prouide particularly, for affaires of least impor∣tance, and the which are all so many branches of the Soue∣raignty, out of which they grow, and are supported as by their stemme, and by the which reciprocally the Soue∣raignty beings forth flowers, leaues, and fruits.

The distinction of these inferiour powers is diuers,* 1.130 ac∣cording to the diuersity of the parts of the Estate. For some are ordayned to free the Prince from the care and particular safety of the Prouinces, and to watch ouer them; as that of Gouernours: Others haue the care of Religion: Others of War••; Others of the Treasure; O∣thers of Policy▪ others of Iustice; Others of Iudgements, which must be giuen vpon the controuersies of priuate

persons, or fo•• the punishments of crimes; Others must haue an eye to the affaires abroad; as Embassadours or A∣gents; Others are destinated to assist the greatnesse of the Prince, to d••spose of his house and traine, and to s••rue him i•• his Court.

And as euery one of their parts is subdiuided into ma∣ny others; so according to these subdiuisions, the charges are in themselues distinguished into functions: and in this diuersity there are some which haue power to command, proceeding from the sole authority of the Prince, or from that of the Lawes, the which haue attributed this power to the Office. Others are erected for the seruice of the Estate; Others for the execution of commandments.

Some hauing distinguished publique Offices, a••cording vnto honour, iurisdiction, and command. For some are without honour, iurisdiction, or command; and in this ranke they place all those which are destinated for the ser∣uice or execution of the superiours commandments, as Registers, Notaries, Cryers, Sergeants, Trumpets▪ and such like. Others are with honour, yet without power to command or to iudge; as Embassadours, Councells, and Secretaries of Estate, Receiuers of the Treasure, and most part of the Officers of the Princes trayne. Others haue honour and iurisdiction, but no power to command, as Prelates. Others haue honour and power to com∣mand, but no iurisdiction, as the Consuls in old time at Rome, and at this present the gouernours of Prouinces, and the Kings Procurators. Others haue honour, iuris∣diction, and power to command, and these are properly called Magistrates.

CHAP. 26. Of the differences betwixt Officers and Commissaries.

IT were a fruitlesse thing to busie my selfe here, to Discourse particularly of the duties and power attri∣buted to euery publique office: For that it is di∣uersly practized, not only in seuerall estates, but also in the same Estate, as it is held most expedient for the publique good, to increase the power of the one, and to diminish that of another. And relating only that which is most generally obserued, I will content my selfe to adde vnto these former distinctions one ot••er, which is drawn from the forme in the which a power is giuen to those which are imployed in publique charges.

For charges are gi••en eyther by Office or by the way ••f Commission: If in an Office,* 1.131 he that hath the charge is called an Officer: If by Commission he is tearmed a Commissioner. The charge of an Officer is regulated by the Law, or by the Edict of the erection of the office: and by the letters of Commission the charge of a Com∣missioner is limitted. This difference is betwixt an Of∣ficer and a Commissioner, that the charge of an Officer is ordinary, and hath a perpetuall course, although that in regard of the person the Exercise be limitted to a cer∣tayne time▪ and the charge of a Commissioner is extraor∣dinary, and reuokable at the good pleasure of him that hath giuen the Commission.

There are foure things to be considered in a Commissi∣on: The person from whence it proceeds;* 1.132 the Directi∣on; the Charge; and the time when it is to expire. In re∣gard of the first, Commissions proceed either from the So∣ueraigne, or from his Officers, or from other Cōmissioners

deputed by the Soueraigne,* 1.133 who may commit, there happening some lawfull let, vnlesse it bee forbidden, or there be a question of State, or of the life and honour of some persons: For in this case they cannot sub-de∣ligate.

* 1.134For the direction, a commission is directed either to an Officer, or to a priuate person: If to an Officer, it is either a thing depending of his Office; and in this case, the the letters are neither Executorie of his dutie, then letters of commission, if the time or place be not changed; and differs from that which is mentioned in the Edict of the Execution of the Office. In this concurrence•• the ordi∣nary knowledge is to bee preferred before the commissi∣on; euen as the qualitie of the Officer is preferrable to that of a Commissioner, and the actes of the Officers more assured then those of Commissioners. But if it be a matter which belongs not vnto them, in regard of their Office, and that there bee a difference in some circum∣stance; then he cannot get it as an Officer, but onely in qualitie of a Commissioner.

* 1.135In the charge we must consider the end, for the which it is giuen vs; and the power wee haue by it. The end concernes either the instruction, or the knowledge of some businesse: And the power regards the decision, iudgment or resolut••••n, and the comm••ndement for the execution of that which we haue resolued. I call instucti∣on all that which is to bee done, to bring a businesse to an Estate ready to be resolued and determined. The know∣ledge giuen vnto a Commissioner, is either of factor of ••ight; or of both together, wherein hee shall carry him∣selfe, as w••e will she•• by and by, treating of the duty of the Magistrate towards the commandement of the Prince: the power to iudge is g••uen either definitiuely, & without an appeale, or without execution if there be an appeale; or els with power to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in executiō that which we haue resolued, notwit••standi••g any opposition or appelation,

and without preiudice thereof. For the power of Com∣mand, either it is giuen the Commissioner for the execu∣tion of that which hee had ordained; or the Commissioner is commanded to execute that himselfe, which another had decreed, hauing no power to command a third: And this last kind of Commission, is directed to inferior Officers, who are simple executioners of the comman∣dements of their superiors.

From the consideration of that which I haue said wee may gather,* 1.136 that the duty of a Commissioner is to r••gu∣late himselfe, according to the termes of his Commission, the which he may in no sort exceede. For although that this generall clause bee inserted to carry himselfe accor∣ding to the quality of persons, and as hee shall see mat∣ters disposed, hee may adde or diminish to the instructi∣ons that are giuen him in writing, according to his wise∣dome and discretion: Yet this must be vnderstood of the accessary of his charge, and of the smallest matters, for of those which are important hee may not dispose with∣out speciall command. For although they referre it to his wisedome and discretion; yet the ignorance of a Commissioner were not excuseable, this clause being to bee vnderstood according to the examination of an ho∣nest and sufficient man, especially when it concernes the publike good of the Estate.

It remaines now to know when the Commission ex∣pires. It ceaseth, if he which granted it comes to die:* 1.137 if the thing or person for the which the charge is giuen, bee no m••re in being: If hee which hath giuen the Commis∣sion reuokes it; if the Commissioner during the Com∣mission, obtaines an Office or Magistracie, equall to him who granted the Commission, so as the businesse bee en∣tire▪ or that being begunne it may bee left, without pre∣iudice to the publique or to priuate persons.

CHAP. 27. Considerations vpon the Establishment of Officers and Magistrates.

THese distinctions knowne, many other poynts are to be considered in the Establishment of those, to whom this power of Commaund vnder the Soueraigne, or to mannage other affaires concer∣ning the Estate is attributed, be it by Office or Com∣mission; but principally we must consider the number of those that are to be imployed: The authority of him which hath established and imployed them; the quali∣ties of those whom they put into offices; the forme of proceeding in these Establishments; the time they ought to remayne in Authority; and finally the duty of princi∣pall Magistrates, aswell towards the Soueraigne and the Lawes, as to other Magistrates that are equall or inferi∣our, and towards particular persons.

* 1.138 The number of Officers or Ministers in one charge is b••an••ed by many; and yet it is more safe to commit a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to many ••••en to one. First, for that they watch one another,* 1.139 and as it were through iealousie, euery m••nst••ies vp i•• compa••••••n to Execute his charge the better: And 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••uer it many times happens, that after they haue made E••••••tion of some, they do not answere the opini••n that was conceined of them; in which case there b••i••g many, one helpes and releiues another. The more they are, the more difficulty they wilbe corrup∣ted; and if a••y be, their corruption shall haue the lesse force to commit a bad 〈◊〉〈◊〉; ore alone, or few hauing no power to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 many, and it is a difficult thing that all s••ould agree together to deceiue.

Mor••ouer the ordinary i••conueniences, as sicknes••e

or other naturall hinderances, befalling a Minister, if he be alone, his charge (which it may be is necessary for the publique) will remay••e in suspence and without exercise, and the publique affayres by this meanes delayed, not with∣out preiudice to the Estate.

As for the plurality of Officers, which growes from the plurality of Charges, the charges being distinguished one from another, so as they cannot be confounded; so as this plurality is so farre from being hurtfull or preiu∣diciall vnto the Estate, as it is profitable. By this meanes no part of the Estate is neglected: you content and pacifi•• the ambition of many, who liuing priuately in idlenesse, would seeke to imploy themselues in some innouation: and you bind them to the preseruation of the Estate, for that they would feare that an alteration would change the order, and by consequence impayre their authority.

But as in this diuersity of charges,* 1.140 we must prouide that confusion may not trouble, neyther the Officers in their charges, nor priuate men in their businesse: We must auoyd irresolution which is ordinary in a multitude, and the tediousnesse of affayres, which happens when as many take knowledge of one thing one after another. Ir∣resolution wilbe aduoyded, not in reducing the affayres to the Knowledge of one alone, or of two, but to a competent number, according to the quality of businesse, and those must be vnequall, to the end that the plurality of voy••es may decide the businesse, and that they may not be subiect to be diuided in opinion. The teadiousnes would be auoyded in cutting off the degrees of those which are to take Knowledge one aboue another; and it seemes that two degrees would suffice. But they must a∣uoyd in the one and the other, a plurality in the charge of the treasure of the Estate, where the people is opprest, by the fees or rights attributed to Officers: the which may be done by two meanes. The first in giuing more ho∣nour vnto Offices, and lesse wages and fees: And the

other in giuing them hope to ascend by degrees vnto grea∣ter dignities.

This meanes likewise will serue to make the greatest affect and seeke the meanest Offices, making them know that they cannot come to the greatest before they passe through the others; and there will alwayes remayne a place for the Princes fauour, making choyse of one a∣mong many which are in the same charge, to rayse him vnto a greater dignity, and this order may also serue to cause the affayres to be mannaged with more Integrity. For they which desire to aduance themselues, will feare that doing otherwise they shalbe reiected when they de∣sire to rise. In like manner the Capacity wilbe greater in such, as shalbe ad••anced to more eminent charges. For that hauing past through many degrees, they will haue more knowledge, both of the affayres and of the manner how to mannage them.

CHAP. 28. Of the creation and nomination of Magistrates, and Officers.

THE Magistrate or Officers, euen the principall ought to be made by the Soueraigne,* 1.141 being one of the greatest markes of Soueraignty. The which I meane not only for the creation and erection of offices, but for the choyse of persons: there being no greater errour (although ordinary in Princes) then to re∣lye vpon some other, for the choyse of a man to aduance him to so••e Office.

And we must not wonder if they be ill serued, al∣though their intent be good; nor if the Lawes be so ill executed: For that hauing no will to take the

Paines, to search out and examine the merite of their principall subiects; they cannot dispose of Offices pro∣portionably to their Natures and capacities. For besides that there is a difference,* 1.142 in regard of the vnderstanding betwixt affaires of importance, and those of lesse moment in the Execution: there must be more courage in the grea∣ter, and lesse subtilty in the lesse: which are two prin∣cipall parts which seldome ioyne together: no more then in Iron tooles, where we see that a knife for that it hath the edge finer, will doe an effect that a Hatchet cannot doe; and he that will imploy a Hatchet like vnto that of a knife, he shall make it vnprofitable to cut any hard sub∣stance, wherein they imploy it vsually: so as they must imploy euery toole to the vse for which it is made.

For although that affaires ought to be mannaged by discretion, and not by inclination: yet it behoues the wis∣dome of the Prince, to know that most part of the affaires of this world are gouerned more by inclination then o∣therwise. Wherefore he must cunningly make vse of this defect. For Nature hath giuen to euery mans condition some good thing in exchange of some defect which is found in him: if it hath giuen to some one a flownesse to begin, it hath likewise imparted an obstinacy to conti∣nue and finish the worke, ballancing his negligence with pers••uerance. To those which by Nature shalbe suddaine and hasty, and who in regard of their impatiency, striue to doe things out of season; she hath giuen hardi∣nesse, by the meanes whereof they haue effected great matters.

These Defects being common among men, the Prince shall accommodate himselfe, and distribute the charges according to euery mans humour and inclination; and to treate a businesse, it shall suffice to informe him whom he meanes to imploy, of the grounds and substance of the bu∣sinesse, and to leaue the rest to him to mannage according to his naturall inclination, be it graue, modest, seuere, or

otherwise: for that they may vse diuers meanes tending to the same end; and if it be forced, the businesse wil not succeed. But in making choyce, he must consider, that the humour and sufficiency may be proportionable to the businesse, and to the humour of those with whom he is to treate. The same must be obserued for all those whom they imploy in charges and publique affaires.

And although it were to be desired that in the manna∣ging of affaires,* 1.143 they might haue men that were discreet, and of great sufficiency▪ yet for that these two qualities doe seldome mee••e together in so high a degree as were to be desired; it were better to choose them of a meane vn∣derstanding, so as they be honest men: for that his sharp subti••ty proceedes from choller, to the which such men are subiect to suffer themselues to be tran••ported for a smal matter; And moreouer hauing a good conceipt of them∣selues, and a bad of others, they can hardly agree with any man. Besides they are vsually of small fore-sight, for the little leasure their promptnesse giues them; and for the passion which blinds them, they are many times desi∣rous of nouelties. For neuer allowing those orders which are made with a mature deliberation and their quicknesse of spirit, furnishing them with others, which in their o∣pinions seeme better; they striue to purchase beleefe, and in this attempt they sometimes cause trouble.

They which are of a meane vnderstanding, support the accidents which happen more easily; and when as they finde themselues in an Estate well ordred, and gouerned by good lawes, they maintaine themselues long. Such men most commonly are inclined to Fleagme. And if by a breeding contrary to their nature, they haue not beene stirred vp to ambition, they obey more willingly then the rest; for that their humour being grosse, the impression which nature hath bred, is more firme, and the desires and appetites stronger.

* 1.144 But in choosing Magistrates and Officers, they must not

onely consider the vertues of Men, but also the vices and naturall defects, which they may haue; and to obserue if these defects be so powerfull, as they may hinder him in the exercise wherein they meane to imploy him. As for example, in a Iudge, there is no doubt but a iust Man for his Iustice ought to be chosen; but if hee be fearfull, assure your selfe, if hee be to giue sentence against some great man, he will leaue Iustice to adhere to safety. More∣ouer a Magistrate must loue and vnderstand the Lawes: For louing them hee will obserue them; and louing and vnderstanding them, hee will make others capable to ob∣serue them.

But to make the choyce of Officers easily,* 1.145 the meanes would bee (as wee haue formerly said) to make many degrees, and to choose out of the last degree, him whom they meane to aduance to the next, and so from degree to degree: For they should know by their actions what they would bee before they make choice of them.

This shall suffice for the principall qualities of Magi∣strates and Officers. Let vs now come to the forme of making them.

CHAP. 29. Of the forme and manner to Create and make Magistrates and Officers: And of the time of their Charges.

THey are made either by election or by lot,* 1.146 or by both together. The election or choice is referred to one alone who names and chooseth whom hee pleaseth, which is the ordinary manner in all prin∣cipallities; or else it is referred to many; and is done either by voice, or in lifting vp the hand and voice;* 1.147 or by billets or by beans. The Lot is cast, either vpon certaine

Citizens, out of which they will choose some one to im∣ploy in some charge; or vpon all those which are of the same age or the same condition, out of which they will likewise by Lot draw one or two to aduance them to some Office. The Lot and choyce concurres together di∣uersly. For either they choose a certaine number by voices, out of which afterwards they desire to draw one to bee an Officer; or hauing drawne many by Lot, they giue them power to choose one amongst them,* 1.148 which is held most capable.

In this difference it is to be obserued, that the discon∣tent of those which are not chosen is the lesse, when the Lot proceeds the choyce, then when the choyce goes be∣fore the Lot. Wherefore in places whereas hatred is ir∣reconcilliable, it were better to make vse of this last kind, then of the first.

Let vs now see what time Officers ought to remaine in the exercise of their charges. This is diuersly obserued. In some Estates they continue them during life: In others they are limmited to a certaine time.* 1.149 In some for a yeere; in others for two; and in others, although they were continued in their places during life, yet being many in the same charge, they made them serue alternatiuely one after another.

They which haue beene of opinion to make Officers temporary,* 1.150 and not to continue them during life, had for their principall consideration to abate the insolence and pride which a long command brought with it; as also to haue meanes to call Officers to an Accompt, hauing giuen ouer their charges, fearing they should not bee able to draw them so easily, being still in authority: In like man∣ner to preuent the impunity of those, which had transgres∣sed in their Offices. To make many pertakers of the E∣state, not onely to satisfie the ambitious, to cut off discont∣ments; but also to recompence many good men, & to make more capable of affairs, & to stir them vp to the care of the

publique. Some also haue beene of this opinion, to hin∣der that the gouernment might not bee vsurped by few men, who would make the rest subiect: hauing beene of∣ten seene by many examples, that the continuance of com∣mand hath made vsurpations easie, not onely vpon popular estates, but also in principalities and seignouries; the Offi∣ces and charges for life hauing beene made hereditary and patrimonicall in many estates.

They which would perpetuate them,* 1.151 haue had other consideration: For that making the Magistrates Annall, or for a short time they leaue their Offices before they are informed of their duties; so as the Estate falls alwayes in∣to the hands of vncapable men, and by these suddaine and frequent changes, most part of affaires remaine vndeci∣ded, Warrs begunne left vnperfit, Suits and differences laid by, and punishments and executions delayed. There is another consideration, which is, that the time being short, the Merchants study to doe their businesse speedily: and this change brings nothing, but new starued hors-lea∣ches, which must be filled; whereas they which are already full by their offices, might giue more ease vnto the people.

And as from new seruants growes the enuie of Families, so from new Magistrates proceeds the fall of Estates, which bring new Councells, new designes, new Lawes, new Customes, new Edicts, new kinds of liuing, and new Iudgements. Tiberius to withdraw the greate men of Rome from the knowledge of publique affaires, and to assure those the more whom he imployed in Offices, hee continued them during life. Wherefore to auoid the greatest part of the inconueniences which are found in either party; you must consider the forme of the Estate, and the humour of the subiects.

Popular Estates are maintained by the continuall change of Magistrates,* 1.152 to the end that euery one according to his qualitie may haue his part, as they haue in a soue∣raigntie, and that equallitie (the nurse of a popular

Estate) may be the better entertayned by the annual succes∣sion of Magistrates; least that the custome of commaun∣ding long, should cause some one to desire to seaze vpon the Soueraignty: the which is a consideration which they ought to haue in Seignouries, and Estates gouerned by few persons.

In Principallities it is not needfull to teach Subiects to Command, but to obay. And being necessary to retayne them in their duties, they cannot assure themselues but of few to maintayne the rest.* 1.153 Yet to preuent that the conti∣nuance of a great charge should not make some one dream of the vsurpation of the Estate, they may in continuing o∣ther Officers in their places, ballance the power of great men, in giuing them companions as great as themselues: or after the expiration of some time, to cause them to passe from one charge to another, which hath more honour but lesse power. Wherfore some haue held it fit, to distinguish the charges whereon the force depends, from those to whom they wil giue authority; and to make others aboue them, who shall haue more honour then authority or power.

This course is obserued by the Pope and the Seignoury of Venice.* 1.154 The gouernments depending on the Church, the authority is giuen to a Clergy-man for the gouernment, but the force is committed to another, who depends im∣mediatly on the Pope; yet hauing charge, in that which shal concerne the gouernment, to assist the resolutions of him that hath the authority. In gouernments depending on the Seignoury of Venice, a Gentleman of the Common∣weale commaunds: and for the Forces a Captayne of the Seignoury, who hath charge to assist him. But in neyther of these Estates, the Gouernour and he which commands the Forces, are not linckt together, as the one would fauour the vsurpation of his Companion. For as the Gouernour would not allow of his vsurpation that commaunds the Forces, for that it cannot be done but against his authority:

so he cannot expect and assistance from him, fearing that hauing made this ouerture, and the other making shew to yeeld vnto it, being Master of the forces, the authori∣ty of the Estate and gouernour being weakned by this en∣terprize, he would chase him away, and make him∣selfe Master of the gouernment. And these charges be∣ing not the most honourable in an Estate, but there be∣ing others more eminent, those which enioy them, ay∣ming at the honour of the others, study not to settle them∣selues there; but contrariwise some affect to be made Cardinals, and to be drawne from those places, and the others to attaine vnto the chiefe Offices of the Seignoury.

Kings who haue but one sort of people to imploy in gouernments, make vse of other meanes,* 1.155 some make gouernments triennall, and not onely the gouernments of Prouinces, but also of Cittadels and Forts, cau∣sing that these depend not on the others: but in certaine things, and accompany the Gouernour with forces; which are not particularly at their deuotion, but one∣ly ••o farre forth as the Gouernours shall contayne them∣selues in the Princes seruice. But if the Gouernours cannot be changed, they may change the forces which ought to assist them.

But forasmuch as the Prince ought to be Master,* 1.156 and dispose freely of great places, it seemes that hee might giue them for a certayne time; and the affaires so requiring it, they might continue them to the same persons, if he thought it fit; if not hee might take them into his hands, and deliuer them to others, with∣out any cause of discontentment to those from whom he had taken them. For this expresse limitation of time would worke two effects: The one that they which are aduanced to these places; entring into them, would resolue to leaue them: the other, that being certayne they must goe forth, they will neuer thinke

to become Masters, and settle themselues: whereas the time not being limmited, euery one will striue to continue in his place, and there to build his designes; but also will desire to bring in after him some one of his Children or Kinsmen. And if the Prince desires to retire him, he must buy his place of him, or cause it to be bought by some other; which is to bring in a venality, more shamefull and dangerous in an Estate, then any other abuse that can bee imagi∣ned. We will therefore conclude, that this change in the gouernment of Prouinces, and the command of great Troupes or Companies, be it of Souldiers or others which haue great authority in the Estate, is necessary for the safety of the Soueraigne, and the peace of the Subiect.

But for that in doing this altogether, they which would desire to continue in their charges,* 1.157 might plot together and trouble the Estate, to maintayne them∣selues; he must change them one after another, cau∣sing the time of their charges to expire at diuers termes.

* 1.158 There is another consideration which hath beene discreetly and wisely made in great Estates, not to giue great commands in a Prouince to those which are Natiues, not onely to auoyde the Iniu••tices which such persons may commit as well in fauour of their Kinsfolkes and Friends, as in hatred of their Ene∣mies; but also to auoyde the contempt of his Au∣thority which giues these charges, which proceeds commonly from the Iealousie of those of the Coun∣trey, who hold themselues equall, and sometimes greater then he that is aduanced. But if he that is made Gouernour bee so great, as they neede not feare this Iealousie, yet the Prince must make vse of this meanes, to auoyde the swelling authority which hee may get in the Prouince by his owne meanes, or by that

of his Kinsfolkes and Friends, to the preiudice of his Master. Our ancient Ordinances conformable there∣in to those of the Romans, had therein very well pro∣uided, especially in regard of Bayleifes and Seneshals, who were the ancient Gouernours: But they haue beene and are yet very ill gouerned and obserued.

It auayles not to say, that to facilitate the obe∣dience of Subiects, they haue beene forced to take this course; the Subiect obeying more willingly one of his Prouince, who hee thinkes would haue the same affection like himselfe for that which concernes the good thereof, the which a Stranger and vnknown vnto him would not doe, whom he imagines to be vnlike in humour and will. For this were to make the Prince subiect to his Officer, and to make the obe∣dience of the people depend more on the credit which the Officer hath, then of the Authority which the Prince ought to haue ouer his Subiects, who obey not the Prince, but so farre forth as it shall please the Officer; and the Officer losing his credit, the Prince shall be no more obeyed.

But if in a new Estate to settle himselfe, it is very fitting to make vse of those which haue most credit with his Subiects, the Princes authority hauing not yet taken roote in their minds; but I will not thereby inferre that he must continue it: but contrariwise this authority being acknowledged, to settle it absolutely, the obedience must immediately depend, and they must obey the Officer so farre forth as he hath authority from the Prince, and not for the particular credit he hath among the people.

CHAP. 30. Of the duty of the principall Officers and Magistrates.

AS for the support of the body, it is not sufficient that the Head be in good Estate, but the other members in like manner must doe their functi∣on: So in an Estate, it is not sufficient for the Prince to doe his Duty, but the Officers, and especi∣ally the principall Magistrates of the Estate, should like∣wise doe theirs.

But I should be tedious, if I would relate here all the whole Duty of euery Officer: onely I will deli∣uer in generall termes that which concernes the Duty of such as haue Iurisdiction and command together, or the one and the other diuided; as those which are more considerable and worthy of obseruation in the man∣naging of the Estate. Their Duty is considered in foure diuers Subiects: eyther towards the Lawes, or towards the Soueraignes Commandments;* 1.159 or towards the o∣ther Magistrates; or towards priuate persons. Vn∣der the Name of the Lawes we comprehend the Or∣dinances and Customes, which oblige the generall. For the regard of Ordinances, the Duty of the prin∣cipall Magistrates is,* 1.160 to examine those which they will make, in that which belongs to Iustice, de∣cency, and publique profit and commodity; and from the consequence to make their remonstrance vnto the Soueraigne before they declare or publish them, if they finde any thing to bee reformed and amended.

As for those which are already receiued, they must cause them to be strictly obserued, and restore the

old abolished for want of vse, before they put them in execution: otherwise it would be a very vniust thing, and resenting tyranny, after they had for a long season contemned an Ordinance, to proceed suddain∣ly against those who hauing not obserued it, had made a breach: The common errour being not onely ex∣cusable, but also held for a Law, if the Law of Na∣ture doth not resist.

But for that the Lawes are not sufficient to gouerne an Estate, for that they ordayne onely in generall, the Law-giuer, or Prince being vnable to fore-see an infi∣nite number of particularities which happen in affaires: For this cause the Magistrate is established, to exa∣mine the particularities, and to accommodate the Law thereunto by a iust and vpright interpretation; the which is taken eyther from the words of the Law, or from the intention of him that made it, or by the induction or conclusion which may bee drawne from it.

In regard of the words of the Law,* 1.161 you must ob∣serue these Rules: First, not to take them nor inter∣pret them contrary to the intention of the Law-giuer: Secondly, you must see if the other clauses of the Law doe correspond and agree with the interpretati∣ons which we giue. But if by reason of ambiguity, and the diuers significations of words, there be ob∣scurity, they must seeke the proper signification either from the common manner of speaking, or from that which was peculiar to him that drew the Law; if it did not plainely appeare, that the intention of the Law-giuer had beene wholy contrary to the proper signification of words.

If there bee found a double interpretation, taken from the propriety of words, and the common vse of speaking; they shall follow the mildest; and if the words bee obscure, they must haue recourse

to custome, and to that which is practised in that regard. But if the interpretation be notwithstanding doubtfull, they must follow that which shalbe most proper for the matter, to the which it must be referr'd. And if notwith∣standing all this they cannot draw any interpretation suit∣able to the businesse, or to reason; he must cause it to be interpreted by those who haue made the Law; or cause a declaration to be made by the Soueraigne. Thus the Ma∣gistrate must carry himselfe in the interpretation of the words of the Law.* 1.162 But in the interpretation of the inten∣tion of the Law, there are other Rules: eyther they re∣strayne the Ordinances to certayne ••ases, or they extend them to many others then those which are specified. They restrayne the ordinances commonly, when as the reason which seeme to haue beene the cause of the ordinance, doth not extend but to certayne cases, and ceaseth in all the rest, in regard of certayne circumstances; for the rea∣son of the Law fayling, the disposition can take no place.

But to seeke out the reason of the Law, we must con∣sider, whether it be exprest by the Law it selfe, or gathe∣red by the Interpreters; and to draw from thence the con∣dition of things whereof the Law speakes, or if it be vn∣certayne. For if it be exprest by the Law, eyther the Law is formall in the case that it is in question, and then without doubt the Law must be followed; Or if it be not altogether formall, you must consider whether there be not some contrary Circumstances which hinder the rea∣son of the Law, that it takes not place in the businesse that is in questi••n: And they shall doe the like, if the reason be not exprest in the Law, of the execution whereof they treate, but in another fact vpon another subiect. But if the reason be gathered from Interpreters, you must see if they can yeeld no better: And then you must follow it, restrayning it; if it be particular, and extending it if it be generall. But if it be doubtfull, and ordaynes generally, you may not in this doubt in any sort restrayne the effect

of the Law, vnlesse it be in things that are odious and hurt∣full: And whereas the Law shall bee limited in certaine cases, they must not easily extend it to others vpon pre∣text of equitie, vnlesse there were an Identite of reasons, especially in things which concerne the rigour of the Law, whereas the case not exprest is held for omitted. But in such occurrents, they shall gouerne themselues ac∣cording to the common Law, to the which all the Ordi∣nances, if it may bee, must bee referred; to the end that in all the Lawes of the estate, vniformitie may bee obser∣ued, and naturall equitie followed, whereby all the acti∣ons of men should bee gouerned, and regulated.

Wherefore the case not being expressed in the Law,* 1.163 but onely the reason being knowne whereon the Law is grounded▪ It shall be easie to examine if this reason may take place, in that which presents it selfe, in concluding from the generall to the particular, from the principall to the accessary, and by the other meanes of induction. Thus allowing one of the contraries which haue no meane, wee may induce that the other is forbidden: And in like manner, if the Law forbids one thing to auoid a mischiefe which may follow; wee may induce that it likewise forbids all other things, which may breed the like mischiefe, although they be not exprest. And so ma∣ny consequences may bee drawne from the Lawes, and referred to diuers examples, whereof the reason would be easie to applie from one to another.

Wherefore to recollect my selfe,* 1.164 and to explaine more at large what I haue said, as long as the Law is certaine, wee must stand firme to its authority, and make no sub∣tile distinctions vpon equitie: For that the Laws are pub∣lished to be obserued in their termes and tenor, and not to bee disputed of: I say so farre foorth as it is plaine and not obscure. But if it bee obscure, they shall follow the interpretation that is most receiued by vse; so as it bee not altogether contrary to naturall reason. But if vse

failes vs, wee must in the diuersitie of opinions, follow that which is supported by example: yet wee must exa∣mine the example duly, to see if they agree in the cause, and principall circumstances.

When as vse and examples faile, they shall choose the opinion which shall approach neerer to naturall equitie then to rigour; and that which shall bee more conform∣able to the intention of the Law, then that which shall be drawne from the subtile interpretation of words: And that which shall bee taken from the true Interpretation of words, then from similitudes and coniectures: For that all similitudes halt; and coniectures neuer conclude di∣rectly: Or from that which shall bee receiued, or most conformable to that which the ancients haue held, for that we may not slightly leaue the opinion of the ancient. But when wee cannot iudge which opinion is the most iust, wee must consider which is the safest, and that which is approued by most men, and by the wisest, more sortable to the businesse that is in question, and which hath in it lesse inconuenience.

Behold how the Magistrate ought to carry himselfe, in the interpretation of the Lawes.* 1.165 The other part of the Maiestrates duty is the execution, for the which he must enter into other considerations: And first from what time the Law or ordinance ought to take place; when they bind the Subiect; and who they are that are bound. For the first, you must vnderstand that the last ordinances, be∣ing contrary to the precedent,* 1.166 derogate from them: But the last cannot take place, but for differences to come, and not for those which are decided, or hanging in iudge∣ment by appeale. And the ordinance is in force from the day of the publication, and from that time it binds euery man for the future, which is for the second point.

* 1.167For the third, the Princes law doth not bind the subiects which are gone to reside in the territory of another Prince. Yet if the ordinance be prohibitiue, they must consider if

the prohibition or defence bee made in regard of some∣thing, which is in the territory of him which hath made the ordinance: For then a stranger or the subiect of ano∣ther Prince should be bound. But if it bee in regard of persons, that the prohibition is made and in fauour of the subiects; the Princes subiect is bound not to contradict it, although hee remaine in the territory of another Prince. But if it be in hatred of the subiect, hee that is out of the territory of the Soueraigne, which hath made the ordi∣nance, is not bound. If the prohibition be made for solem∣nitie, which they desire to haue obserued in some acte, it doth not oblige the subiect out of the territory of his Prince, for that in the obseruation of solemnitie, they re∣gard the place where the act is made.

As for other persons whom the ordinance may bind, they must distinguish whether they bee named in the ordinance by their names, or specified by their quallitie and condition, or if there be no designation. The name or the condition being specified, the ordi∣nance doth not extend to those which are of another name, and another qualitie. But if there be no qualitie spe∣cified, the ordinance bindes not only all those which gaue consent to the publication, but also such as remaine in the place where it is obserued, were they strangers: whence this distinction proceeds, that in things that are personall, proceeding from contracts, solemnities, and acts of voluntary Iurisdiction; they must follow that which is obserued in the place of their abiding, but in that which is of the realitie of things; they shalbe bound to that which is receiued in the place where the thing is scituated.

Ordinances are in force,* 1.168 not for that they are written or iust, but in regard they are commanded and made by the Soueraigne. For hee that should obey the Law onely for that it is iust, should not obey it as hee ought, this Iustice being subiect to debate. So customs haue the force of law, for that they are re••eiued and alowed by the Iudgment of

the people: And although there may be some exception, so as it be not against the Law of Nature, the Magistrate is bound to obserue them, and to cause them to be obser∣ued by others.

* 1.169 But it is lawfull for the Magistrate to extend or restraine the Law with the reason in certayne cases. Yet he hath not the same power with a custome, the which consisting more in fact then in Law, and in the particular vse then in reason, he must obserue it with the circumstances, with the which it hath beene receiued. To make a custome to haue the force of a Law, three things are required.

* 1.170 The first, that it hath beene brought in from the begin∣ning to be obserued for the future. For you cannot au∣thorize by this name that which some, (ayming at ano∣ther thing, or by the indulgence or conniuency of the Magistrate) haue sometimes done: For that a custome cannot take its beginning from a casuall or rash vse, but from an vse continued by a common obseruation.

The second point necessary to authorise a custome, is the reiteration of many the like acts; not so much to en∣dure a plurality of examples, as a consent of opinion, by the frequency of these acts; and by this consent two Acts suffice to confirme a custome.

The third and last thing required for the approbation of a custome, is the time of tenne yeares at the least; some hold thirty yeares that the consent in this manner of liuing should continue: And that Custome shalbe of the more authority when it is fortified by the longer prescription of time.

CHAP. 31 Of the duty of the Magistrate towards his Soueraigne.

THe Duty of the Magistrate towards his Soueraign••, consists in the respect and obedience he owes,* 1.171 not onely to the Princes person, in whose presence all the power of Magistrates is held in suspence, as the Stars lose their light in the presence of the Sunne, (the Magistrates being not brought in, what power soeuer they haue, but to supply the presence of the Prince, their So∣ueraigne) but also to the commandments of the Soue∣raigne: the which as they are of diuers sorts, so the du∣ty of the Magistrate••, is to carry himselfe diuersly for the enrolling or ver••fying thereof.

For eyther the cōmandment consists in the knowledge of the Cause,* 1.172 and in this case the power of the Magistrate remaines entire: Or the commandment giues him know∣ledge of the right, but not of the fact: and in this case the Officer ought notwithstanding to enquire of the fact, al∣though the Prince had assured him to be well informed of the truth: vnlesse he had expressely forbidden him to take notice: For then the Magistrate may not proceede: One∣ly he may (the fact being notoriously false) acquaint his Soueraigne with the truth, and yeeld to that which hee should reply vpon his remonstrances. But if the Letters did onely giue him knowledge of the fact, and not of the right and merite of the graunt; the Officer ought to o∣bey, so as it be nothing against the right of Nature: If notwithstanding if it be against the Lawes and generall or∣dinances, or that it may bring some inconuenience or pre∣iudice to the Estate, or to a part thereof; he may make his remonstrances, not once onely but twice or thrice.

* 1.173But if notwithstanding the Prince will haue the Officer proceede to th•• verification, hee must doe it, although the matter were vnlawfull. For although it bee certaine, that the Prince may not command any thing that is vniust, nor that is subiect to scandall or reprehension, or which may bee reiected by his Officer: Yet for that by the constraint, which the Soueraigne is forced to vse, the ignorant multitude is moued to disobedience, and to contempt of his Edicts and commaunds, as be∣ing published and receiued by force: The duty of the Magistrate is, not to bandy himselfe against his Prince, what errour soeuer hee commits: For this were a Rebellion in the Estate, and to bandie the Feete against the Head. It were much better to yeild vnder the Souera••gne Maiestie with obedience, then in refusing the commaundement of the Soueraigne, to giue an example of Rebellion to the subiects.

There are some which proceeded farther, and hold, that if the Prince commandes the Magistrate to excuse some wicked acte to his subiects, it were better to obey, and thereby to couer and bury the remembrance of a wickednesse already done; then by refusing to irritate and incense him to doe worse,* 1.174 and to cast, as they say, the helme after the hatchet: As Papinian did, who refu∣sing to excuse the Parriside committed by Caracala, on the person of Geta, caused this Emperour to exceede in all sorts of cruelties; whereof hee felt the first fury: This resistance hauing preuailed nothing, but brought an irre∣parable los••e to the affaires of the Emperour, as well by reason of his death,* 1.175 as of that which followed.

The Magistrate is not allowed to leaue his Office, ra∣ther than to publish the vniust will of the Soueraigne, for that it would bee a dangerous ouerture to all the subiects, to refuse and reiect the edicts and will of the Prince, if euery man in his charge might leaue the Estate in danger, and expose it to a storme, like vnto a Ship without a

helme, vnder colour of an opinion of Iustice, which it may bee would bee affected by some fantastique braine, without reason, but to crosse a contrary opinion. Where∣fore in all Councels, they hold this rule, to make the Coun∣cellors range themselues to the two greatest opinions. For although it seemes strange, to force the conscience of those, to whose Wisedome and Religion they haue refer∣red a businesse, to be examined, and to giue their aduice: yet for that the varietie of opinions might hinder the con∣clusion, it hath bin held most reasonable, yea necessary, to vse it in this manner: The rule of wise men which can∣not faile, is, that of two vniust things they follow that which is most iust, and of two inconueniences to auoid the greater: Otherwise there would neuer bee an end of humane actions. If the command be so vniust, as with∣out wronging their conscience, they cannot passe it; some Magistrates to auoid the disobedience, and not to charge their consciences in verifying it, haue incerted; by the expresse commaundement of the Prince, many times re••terated.

The manner of verifying the Edicts,* 1.176 ordinances, and commands of Princes by the Magistrates, hath beene brought in, in some estates, to make the people more willing to obey them: Who hauing not capacitie to iudge of things by themselues, and being more inclined to di∣strust, and to calumniate the will of the Prince then ap∣proue it: And the Prince on the other side being i••••ro∣ned by importune Courtiers, who without any regard of duty, or of iustice, nor to the good of the Estate, seeke by new inuentions to worke their owne ends, and to get them authorized by circumuenting the Prince: It hath beene held conuenient for the Prince, to cause his will to passe by such solemnities, to the end they might bee receiued by the people; and that being examined and found contrary, or preiudiciall to the publique good, they might be refused by humble remonstrances; which

wipe away the disgrace of the deniall: and serue the Prince for an excuse, to free himselfe from the importu∣nitie, and iniustice of great men.

It remaines now to know, how an Officer ought to carry himselfe in executing a command, if there comes vnto him a reuocation, the businesse being begun. Some hold opinion,* 1.177 that if the execution be so much importing the Estate, as not being finished there would happen some inconuenience, that notwithstanding the reuocation hee ought to proceed: If not, hee must leaue the businesse as it is. But for the first, it is necessary that the danger of the Estate be euedent and knowne to all Men, and not to the Magistrate alone, who might bee suspected to haue proceeded lightly, or with spleene, passing on after the Reuocation.

CHAP. 32. Of the duty of Magistrates one to∣wards another.

THe duty of Magistrates, and the manner of procee∣ding which they ought to hold one towards ano∣ther, is regulated according to the power which they haue, whereof in most Estates they make three degrees.

The highest is of those, who in some part of the Estate, haue power to determine without appeale.* 1.178 The Prince only may command them; the middle sort obeyed these, and commanding those which are of a lower degree, who haue not any command ouer the Officers, but only ouer particular persons. Wee may call the first superiors or principalls; the second middle or subalterne; and the last inferiors. The first haue power to command all Magi∣strates and Officers, without exception; or only certaine

Officers subiect to their Iurisdiction. They which haue power to command all in generall without execution, ought not to be brought into the Estate, for the change that such a power might vsually cause. For there being but one degree to climbe, and to make themselues Masters, ambition doth teach it speedily; and euery man doth the more easily indure it, for that all men are accustomed to obey them.

The dutie of a Superiour or principall Magistrate is,* 1.179 to containe those that are vnder him in the termes and du∣ties of their charges; of whom he may be Iudge, and not they of him in qualitie of a Magistrate; but as a priuate per∣son. And as for the Soueraigne, although they may iudge in their owne cause, to whom God hath giuen power to dispose without Iudgment, as Xenophon saith; yet it is much more fitting for the Soueraigne,* 1.180 to suffer the Iudge∣ment of his Magistrates, then to make himselfe Iudge in his own cause; prouided alwayes that the businesse doth not concerne the Soueraignty, or his particular person; but to the end that Maiestie may not suffer diminution of its greatnesse, or that the splendor of a Royall Name may not dazell the eyes of the Iudges: It hath bin wisely aduised in some Estates, that the Soueraigne should not plead but by his procuratour, and would neuer assist in Person.

And as in the power of the Prince, the power of Magistrates is held in suspence; so in the presence of su∣perior Magistrates,* 1.181 the power of Inferiors hath no effect. The which is vnderstood, not only of superiour heads and Magistrates, but also of their Lieutenants who are therein held the same thing, as being but one power distributed to two. Wherefore the Lieutenant cannot de∣termine any thing, his chiefe being present. Yet the Ma∣gistrate may take notice of an iniury or wrong done by his Lieutenant.* 1.182

But that which hath bin spoken of the power of Superi∣or Magistrates ouer their inferiors, must be vnderstood in

their territorie, their seats, and in the limits of their Iu∣risdiction, out of which they are but priuate men, with∣out power or command.

Magistrates which are equall in power, or haue no dependance one of another,* 1.183 cannot bee commanded nor corrected one of another. But if there bee question to execute the decree or Iudgement of one in the territory of another, they must vse honest intreaties and clauses of request. Yet where there shall bee question of the inter∣pretation of a decree made by one Magistrate, another that is his equall may not take knowledge: For e∣uery one ought to bee the interpreter of his owne will.

And in regard of the sentence giuen by the Officer of a Forraine Prince,* 1.184 for the execution whereof in the ter∣ritory of another, there should be a Commission of intrea∣tie: The iudges of this Prince to whom the Commission is directed, may not examine the Iudgement, least the stranger bee induced another time to doe the like, an•• to dissolue the Iudgements whereof they should demand the execution; the which would bee done more through iealousie of the Estate, then for any iniustice in them. Yet if there bee question of honour, or life, they may not exe∣cute the Iudgements of forraine Magistrates, if they haue not knowne the merrite of the cause, and seene the infor∣mations. And Princes owe this respect one vnto ano∣ther, for the good of Iustice, not onely to punish the wicked, which slie from one Estate into another; but also for the Exemplary punishment, which ought to be made vpon the places, are bound to yeeld the naturall subiect to his naturall Prince, vnlesse the Prince to whom the fu∣gitiue is retired, ••indes that hee is vniustly pursued; for in this case, he ought not to yeeld them: Yea he is for∣bidden by the Law of God, to restore a Bondman which is fled into another Mans house to auoid the fury of his Master.

But a••t••ough the Magistrate may not command his Equals,* 1.185 yet in a body or colledge consisting of many equall in power, the greatest part may command the lesse. For in this case they that are superior in number, are likewise superior in power. So as the lesser part can∣not command the greater, nor yet hinder it. Yet one Tribune at Rome opposing, might hinder the acts of all the rest: the Romans making a difference betwixt oppo∣sition and command;* 1.186 for that hinderance and opposi∣tion is lesse then a command, and doth not induce any superi•••••••••• like vnto a command.

But Colledges hauing no superiority one ouer another, they cannot haue any command,* 1.187 but they may well hinder one another; this hinderance growing rather from a contrariety in an equall concurrence, then from any superiority. This may be grounded vpon the gene∣rall Rule of all those which haue any thing in Common, amongst which he that hinders, hath more force, and his condition in this case is better then his that seekes to proceede; and among many Lawes, that which forbids, is of greatest force. But if before the Act, a Magi••trate may hinder his Equall by opposition; yet after the Act he cannot doe it by any other meanes, but by appeale to the Superior.

CHAP. 33. Of the duty of Magistrates to priuate Persons.

THe duty of Officers or Magistrates,* 1.188 to particular person hath two principall foundations. The one is grounded on the power which is giuen to the Ma∣gistrate by the Edict or Letters of Commission: the other vpon the seemlinesse which consists in the particular

carriage of the Magistrates person, to be able to maintaine himselfe in credit, reputation, and authority, with those ouer whom he is to command.

* 1.189And although that the power of all Magistrates regards generally the execution of the Law, the which with∣out the Magistrate were idle: Yet the power of some is more strictly limited then that of others. For some are bound by the Lawes and Ordinances to command and vse the power that is giuen them, in that forme and man∣ner that is prescribed them, without adding or dimini∣shing any thing: And in this case they are but simple Ex∣ecutioners of Lawes. To others they giue more liberty, and leaue many things to their discretion and iudgement. Wherein notwithstanding they must so gouerne them∣selues, as they doe not any thing that is extraordinary without a speciall command, or that may not be easily re∣quired,* 1.190 that they are not forced by some strong and pow∣erfull necessity, or an apparent danger. But in these things where the diuersity of circumstances is a hinderance that he cannot specifie, or set downe in particular the power, as in the arbitriment of Princes, the Magistrate may according to his conscience decree without a speciall command. But therein he shall auoyde to affect the repu∣tation of pittifull as well as of cruell: For cruelty although it be blameable, yet it retaynes the Subiects in the obedi∣ence of the Lawes: But too much Clemency causeth the Magistrate to be contemned, with the Lawes and the Prince which hath made them. Wherefore the Law of God forbids them to take pitty of the poore in Iudgement: But one of the things most requisite in a Magistrate, is to make the grauity of offence knowne, as well to make of∣fen••ers vnderstand what they haue deserued, as to induce them to repentance: And in doing so the punishment will haue lesse bitternesse and more profit. Wherefore the prin∣cipall Rule of the duty of a Magistrate to priuate persons,* 1.191 is to vse the power that is giuen him, well; and priuate

Men, reciprically owe him all obedience, in executing his charge, bee it right or wrong, so as he exceeds not the termes of his power or Iurisdiction: For then they may contradict his ordinances by appeale or opposition; and if he proceeds, he must make a distintion, whether the grieuance be irreparable or not. If it may be repaired, they shall not oppose by fact, but by course of law: but if it be ir∣reparable, they may oppose by fact, yea with force; not to offend the Magistrate, but to defend the innocent.

As for iniuries which priuate men doe vnto Magistrates, it is certaine that the Magistrate being wronged hee can∣not be Iudge in his owne cause;* 1.192 vnlesse it bee for some vnreuerence or iniury done vnto him publiquely, in exe∣cuting his Office. For in this case it is lawfull for the Ma∣gistrate being wronged to punish such Men, for the of∣fence done vnto the particular person of the Magistrate. For this reason if a Body or Colledge of Iudges hath bin wronged, they may censure and condemne those which haue done the offence, not to reuenge the iniury done vn∣to them, but to the Estate, whose Maiesty is wronged by the contempt they haue made of them.

As for obedience, it seemes requisite,* 1.193 that the Magi∣strate should carry himselfe to priuate persons with all mildnesse and patience; yet in such sort, as the dignitie of his place be not vilified; as it would be if he should indure any indiscreete words in his presence, and not take exception: Or a countenance of little respect.* 1.194 But espe∣cially, as hee ought not to shew himselfe rough and difficult of excesse: So he must not grow familiar, laugh, or ieast with priuate men; but to speake little, with dis∣cretion, without making shew of any passion of choller, Enuie, Iealousie, or such like, which may diminish the opinion which they haue of him.

Wherefore to collect in few words that which con∣cernes the duty of Magistrates,* 1.195 they must learne to obey the Soueraigne, to bend vnder the power of their su∣periors,

to honour their equals, to command the Sub∣iects to defend the poore, to make head against great men, and to doe Iustice to all.

CHAP. 34. Of the Iustice of Commanding.

AS the forme of commanding is diuers, so is the Diuersity of power, which according vnto Iustice, obserues diuers Rules to make the com∣mandments iust. For in certayne things accor∣ding to an Arithmeticall proportion, it makes all the Subiects equall:* 1.196 In others it enters into consideration of the quality, and followes a Geometricall proportion: In others according to an Harmoniacall proportion, it neither follows an equality altogether, nor a similitude; but taking a consideration of other differences, it mingles the one with the other by a certayne temper and accord.

* 1.197And as that which they seeke most in the settling of an Estate, is Concord, which cannot be without some harmony or correspondence of the parties one with ano∣ther: This last proportion is followed in many things; as in the forme of gouernment, in the distribution of Of∣fices, honours, dignities, and recompences, in the establish∣ment of punishments, and for the peace and greatnesse of families, in Marriages and diuisions of successions.

* 1.198But in contracts and treaties betwixt man and man, and in that which concernes the performance of promises, which they make one vnto another, or the Iudgement of that which belongs to euery man, whereas Faith and Integrity ought to be equal in all men, of what quality and condition soeuer they be; they must obserue an Arithmeti∣call proportion: and not to imitate Cyrus, who condēned a little man that had too long a Robe, to giue it to a tall man,

and to take the tall mans which was too short, insisting more vpon seemelinesse then to Iustice.

But in the imposition of charges which are burthen∣some, and necessary for the support of the Estate,* 1.199 they must obserue a Geometricall proportion, charging the rich, who haue more to lose by the ruine of the Estate, then the poore: the which in a manner is generally obser∣ued. For although that the Nobility seemes therin to haue more priuiledge in some Estates then the Country-man, by reason that he payes no Subsedies, and doth not con∣tribute any thing by way of imposition: yet the personall seruice which he doth many times performe at his owne charge, is much more then that which hee should pay by way of Subsedy, if it were imposed vpon him; be∣sides his person which he doth imploy, the which the Countrey-man doth not. And in this particular, a Geo∣metricall proportion is obserued, in that they leaue vnto the Gentlemen (who haue honour more in recommen∣dation then the Clowne) honourable charges, the which giues them meanes to approach nearer vnto the Prince, and haue some honour in them: which is the reason which makes them more willing to endure the burthen, discom∣modity, and charge, which is farre greater then that which is imposed vpon the Country-man. But as I haue formerly sayd in other parts of the Estate, they must ap∣proach as neare as may be to a harmoniacall proportion, from whence proceeds that mixture which they make in most parts of Estates, of the Law, with the will and opi∣nion of the Magistrate. The Law is made for all in gene∣rall, and all are equally bound to the obseruation thereof▪* 1.200 but the Law not able to foresee all the circumstances, the will of the Prince or Magistrate in its execution, must adde such a temper, as there may not follow any in∣conuenience or absurdity; and to bend according to the Circumstances of the businesse, and to regulate it according vnto naturall Equity, which is the soule of

the Law, the which in a Prince extends to declare and c••rrect the Law according vnto reason; and in the Magi∣strate, to extend or restrayne it as the case shall require. And he that would haue the Law only take place in an Estate, he should fall into an infinite number of inconue∣nie••ces and absurdities. For eyther he must make a Law vpon euery particular Fact that may happen; the which is vnpossible, and admit it were Feazable, i•• would breed a confusion of Lawes: or else he must leaue many things vnprouided for, and in others commit many I••iustices, neuer insi••••ing vpon the circumstances, which are some∣times contrary to the rea••on of the Law.

There ••i be n••••esse inc••nuenience, if they suffered the will of the P••i••ce or Magistrate to wander vncertainly,* 1.201 without any establishm••nt of the Law, whereon as vp∣on a Rule they might ground themselues. For besides the variety, diuersity, or contrariety of ordinances, or Iudgments which might grow, the which in the end would make them to be contemned, they should open a Gate to all violences and In••ustice. But as two Simples in extreamity of cold and heate, are so many poysons; and yet composed and tempered one with the other, make a wh••••es••••n•• Medicine. So by the mixture of the Arith∣metica••l and Geometricall proportions, which separated would 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••he Estate, grows a harmoniacall accord and prop••r••i 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which serues to maintayne it.

In the distribution of Offices and dignities, an equal∣lity cannot be obserued,* 1.202 without Iniustice and preiudice to the E••••ate; all being not of one quality and capacity: And it mig•••• so ••a••l out, that the most important and difficu••t ch••ge migh•• fall vpon him that is least capable; and a•• Office of no moment to him that is sufficient. More∣ou••r if you will c••oo•••• tho••e of one quality only, to giue them the cha••g••s, ••e••old the rest that are excluded wil be discontented; i•• a•••• would be well satisfied, if they see, that the Gate be n••t shut against them: and they

would not take it ill, that as the Capable ought to be pre∣ferred before t••e incap••ble: so the Gentleman finding himselfe as capable as the Plebeian, should be preferred, and the rich before the poore, in Offices where there is more honour then gayne: and the p••ore before the rich, in those where there is more profit then honour. And if the Offices be associated or doubled, to make a harmony of the one with the other, they must mingle those that haue where-withall to supply in one sort that which they want in the other, otherwise there wilbe no more harmo∣ny then if they should separate the accords that are n time, the which would make no pleasing found if they were not together.

Yet in this Subiect we haue a regard to merite, which is the bond, which may make the poore and Country∣man equall, to the rich and Noble, being without me∣rite. And therefore they must accordi••g to ••ue••y mans desarts, g••ue the purse to the most Loyall: Armes to the most Va••liant: Iustice to the Honestest: Censure to the most Entire: Toyle to the strongest; the Gouernment to wisest; and the Prelateship to the most deuout: notwith∣standing preferring in the equality of merite, such as are best qua••lified to them that are lesse.

We may say asmuch of Rewards and Punishments, weighing not only the merite of the Fact,* 1.203 and the qualli∣ties of persons; but also the circumstances of time and place, or such like. In regard of Peace of the marriages of Families, and the preseruation of Houses, it is like∣wise very necessary to supply the defect which is in the one, with the Excesse and abundance of the other. So there is no better M••rriage (as the ancient sayd) then of Riches with Pouerty: And among Marchants there is no society more safe, then of a rich idle man, with a poore man that is diligent. And in the inequality of the conditions of persons, if there be not some quality to supply the defect of the meaner, there can be no accord. The mar∣riage

of a rich Country Woman, with a poore Gentleman would hold firme, but of a poore countrey Woman with a poore Gentleman, they will easily disagree.

* 1.204In like manner in the diuision of successions, it seemes this harmony ought to be kept. For as many inconueni∣ences follow, leauing the disposition of goods to the will of the Man; who most commonly disinherits his Children vpon the first motion of choller, or makes choise of the most incapable to preferre him before the rest: So the Law which requires that the succession should be equally deuided, is vniust; for that the dignitie of families is lost, and a great succession deuided into many parts, comes to nothing. And the Law which hau••ng too much regard to the dignitie of families, adiudgeth all to one, or little to the rest, without doubt is nothing iust. But that which hath regard to the quality of goods, distinguishing those that a••e ••ropper and hereditary to the house, and those which are newly purchased, giuing some aduantage to the elder aboue the younger, and to the Males aboue the daughters, regulating this aduatnage according to the number of his Children, and leauing something in the free disposition of the Father, seemes to bee more iust, and more ap••roaching to this harmoniacall proportion, which ought to be followed as much as may be, in all sorts of commands and Establishments. And this shall suffice for the forme of Commaunding, as well in that which de∣pends of power, as of Iustice.

CHAP. 35. Of the Establishing of the forces of an Estate.

THe order which ought to bee entertained in the set∣ling of the forces, being more Military then polli∣tique, shall bee treated here succinctly.

The forces whereof wee meane to speake, are those by the which wee may repulse the attempts of our enemies; the which if the Estate bee Maritiue, would be of two sorts, to the end wee may resist both by Sea and Land.

The prouision of armes and ships,* 1.205 is the first part of the force; some hold it the greatest treasure of a Prince; and Iu∣stiue writes that Phillip of Macedony▪ made himselfe there∣by fearfull of his enemies. I know that many haue held, that in a great Estate, there might inconueniences happen by this great prouision of Armes; for that hee that hath a will to mutine, to arme those of his faction, and to depriue the Prince of the meanes to make vse of this prouision, will make a designe to sease vpon the place where it is kept. But by the same reason, wee must not draw to∣gether any treasure, to supply vs in an vnexpected ne∣cessity; nor to fortifie any places, least that comming to loose our money and our places, our enemy should grow the stronger, and wee the weaker.

But Wisedome preuents these inconueniences, the which wee must imploy to keepe these aduantages, and to make vse of them before the enemy comes to seaze of them: And if hee doth seaze of them, wee may not therefore conclude, that the prouision ought not to haue beene made; but that it is his fault that hath made it, not to bee able to keepe it. It is certaine, that a Sword or a Knife would cut him that knowes not how to handleit, but wee may not therefore say, that wee must neither make Sword nor Knife. So in all sorts of parties, there are inconueniences: But those which by foresight may be preuented, should not hinder vs from doing that, which may otherwise serue vs.

Vnder the name of Armes wee doe not onely apprehend that which serues a Man to couer him,* 1.206 and to assaile his enemy; but all carriages and necessary munitions for the Warre, bee it Offensiue or Defensiue; as Engines,

Artillery, Powder, Ladders, Bridges, Cordage, and such other things, whereof they haue need in many mil∣litary Exployts, and which it concernes the wisdome o•• the Prince or Soueraigne to prouide, in such quantity, a•• when he shalbe assailed, or would inuade another, ther•• may be nothing wanting, for not able to prouide such things in a short time, it were to be feared, that before he should recouer that which is necessary, his Enemy would get such an aduantage ouer him, as he shall hardly after∣wards recouer it.

* 1.207But laying aside the discourse of the diuersity of Armes and Engines of Warre, I will only propound some gene∣rall considerations for the Armes fit for men, whereof those which are defensiue ought to be light of carri∣age, (those that be heauy or pondrous commonly hin∣dring more then they serue) difficult to pierce, and pro∣portioned in such sort, as they may not hinder the neces∣sary motions for a Combat.

* 1.208Many relying too much vpon their Vallour, haue con∣temned this kind of armes, as fit for men that were af∣fraid. Yet the Roman Armies, in the time of Gratian, hauing demanded leaue to abandon their Cuyrasses, and then their Head-pieces; found themselues so weak when they came to fight with the Goths, as they were cut in peeces: whereby it appeared that armes make a part of the force, and I will adde, of courage. For besides, that Iron is more hard to 'peirce then the flesh, he that finds himselfe couered, takes more courage to ioyne with his Enemy, for that he is not so much exposed to blowes. They reproacht a Captaine; who armed himselfe compleatly, that he seemed to be affraid: No sayth he, but I arme my selfe that I may not feare.

As for offensiue Armes, they must be light, to the end they may not tyre or weary those that vse them,* 1.209 and likewise easie to mannage; sharpe and well steeled, to pierce the better,* 1.210 and withall to continue the longer.

Some demaund them long to strike a farre off. Philop••∣mon caused his men to vse the Pike ••e o•• And Iphicrates made his Souldiers to carry them twice as long then they had formerly done. They attribute the victory of Gosta∣••us agaynst Christian King of Denmarke, to the length of the Swedish pikes, which were three foote longer th••n those of the Danes. And Gui••hard•••• writes, that Vitelosi Vrsi••o, with pikes a foote and a halfe longer then those which the Souldiers of Pope Alexander the sixt carried, wonne the battaile ag••inst them betwixt Sarra and Bassan. Others haue better allowed of short Armes, being of better vse in a strait or a throng; as Cyrus and the Lacedemonians.

Besides this, there are two sorts of offensiue armes:* 1.211 some to shoote, cast, or dart; and others which they hold continually in their hands; of both which kinds they must make good prouision, being all necessary in an Army. The Parthia••s haue many times vanquished the Romans with their Bowes, fighting •• farre off: And the Romans as Vegetius writes, haue many times gotten great victories, by the meanes of certayne long darts, called Marciobarbaz.

There is another quality, which some haue desi••ed in Armes, that they should be faire, gilt, and enricht, so as they may be pleasing vnto the Eye, thinking that this giues courage to the Souldiers; the which Xenopho•• and Caesar haue allowed. Others holding that this was of no vse, but to kindle the auarice and courage of the enemy, haue thought it better to haue the armes with∣out any ornament and bare, as those which strike more terrour.

To resolue the most expedient in this quality and con∣trariety, we must know those whom we meane to arme,* 1.212 and those against whom we are to fight. If the first by this vanity of ornament, are to be the more encoura∣ged, and that the same vanity may breed admiration

and amazement in the Enemy; it shall be fit to vse it. But if we haue to deale with men which know what be∣longs to Warre, we must rather seeke horror then orna∣ment in our Armes. Wherefore a Prince making proui∣sion of Armes, he shall doe better to choose those that are good then faire, and simple and plaine, rather then enricht, as well to auoide the charge in so great a proui∣sion which it behoues him to make; as for that they are more durable, and no lesse profitable then the other.

CHAP. 36. Of Fortresses, and of their profit for the preser∣uation of an Estate.

FOrtresses doe also make a part of the force of an E∣state: and they which haue beene of Opinion, that they should not build any, haue beene confuted both by reason and vse: so as there haue beene few found, vnlesse they were some petty popular Estate, that will follow their Councell. The Grecians and Romans who had lesse neede during their Empires, then any other E∣state, for that all submitted themselues vnder their yoke, entertayned Cittadels at Corinth, Tarentum, and Rhegi∣um: And if the Capitoll had not beene strong, the Em∣pire of Rome had beene smothered in the Cradle by the Gaules.

The Estates in which are no strong places, are conque∣red by one Battaile. England hath testified it; and the Persian, relying onely in the great number of his Men, hath lost in one battaile a great extent of his Countrey, the which the Turke hath since preserued by Forts. For al∣though that Fortresses alone cannot much assist an Estate, yet being seconded by Armes, they make it invincible; and there being no Armies on foote, they giue you leasure

to raise them, and after a Route, to Rally your Men toge∣ther to ••enew the Warre. Yet this is not to say, that the estate which hath most sorts is the strongest: For it is im∣possible to guard many w••ll; and some being ill guarded, they proue more preiudiciall to the Estate, then profitable for the defence. It must therefore haue few, but well furnished with Men, Victuals, and Munition of Wa••re.

They must likewise bee in a necessary situation or at least profitable.* 1.213 Necessary situations are those which be∣ing vnfort••fied, make the Countrey to lie open, and ex∣pose it to the inuasion of Enemies. Profitable situations are those, by w••ose meanes they may guard a rich Towne and well inhabited, and may serue for a retreat vnto the people. They must likewise be remote from the heart of the Estate;* 1.214 to keepe the Enemy and danger farre from it, to the end that whiles the Enemy bu••••es himself•• in assailing them, the rest of the Countrey may bee in peace, and wee may haue means to prepare our selues to resist him. And if the forts be not only farre off, but at the entrie of the Enemies Countrey, they will bee the more safe: For they will not only giue vs meanes to defend our selues, but also to annoy our Enemy in his owne Countrie.

Besides this,* 1.215 forts ought to be strong both by situa∣tion and by fortification. Forts strong by situation, are those which are built vpon high and sharpe Mountaines, and of hard accesse, or which are ••uironed with La••es, the Se••, Pooles, Ri••er••, and Marishes, and haue all commodities necessary for the entertainement and succour of a Garr••son. Those are strong by hand, which are flancked to purpose, with a good Wall, a large and sound rampire of Earth, with abroad and deepe ditch, and they must make more account of the rampire then of the Wal••, and of the ditch then the rampire. A fort must likewise bee great▪ to the end it may bee capable of many M•••• for the defence, and to annoy the Enemy the more▪ 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be able to intrench themselues within.

* 1.216It must in like manner be situated in such sort, as it may be relieued, for soone or late they take that place by force or obstinacie of a siege which is not relieued. Wherefore they haue held those places strong, which haue a Port of the Sea, hard to stop vp, and is not commanded. For this backe doore makes them as it were impregnable, hauing meanes dayly to receiue refreshing of Victualls, Munition, and Men, and to discharge themselues of their wounded and vnprofitable Mouthes for defence.

And although that the situation of a place be strong for defence; and such in some part as they hold it inaccessable; yet they may not forbeare to adde what they can to make it stronger: For wee haue seene that many places haue beene taken, by those parts which they had neglected to fortifie, for that they held them inaccessable. So Car∣thage was taken by Scipio towards the Poole. Antiochu•• the great, tooke Sardis, by that part which was the strong∣est, where he found there was not any Sentinel, s••ing birds to build their nests there without any disturbance.

CHAP. 37. Of the Warre-like Discipline.

THe third part of the force of an Estate, consists in the warlike discipline, that is to say, in Souldiers of good experience and well disciplined. And herein wee must obserue that the force doth not alwayes consist in the number, but in the resolution of the Souldier, and in the experience or conduct of the Commander. In all the battells which haue bin giuen, it is obserued, that few men haue fought; and those few, accor∣ding to the resistance that was made, haue won or lost the battell; and as the kinds of armes make the Souldier stron∣ger or more feeble, so they haue demanded what force is

most beneficiall; eyther that on Horsebacke or on Foote.

Polybius sayth,* 1.217 that it were better that our foote were a Moietie lesse then that of our Enemie, so as wee bee stronger in Cauallerie, then if wee were e∣quall in all: The which may be true in a Combate; ha∣uing bin often seene, that when as the horse are routed, the foote seeing themselues farre from any retreate, hau•• beene forced to yeild sometimes in grosse, without striking stroake: But in all the course of the Warre, it is most certaine that the Footmen do the greatest seruice, were it but at sieges and defences of places, and that they may fight in all places, which the horsemen cannot doe.

Those Nations which haue made vse of Horse∣men only, haue sometimes gotten great Victories; as the Partbyans haue done: But when they were to besiege or defend a place, they aduanced little. Also those people which put all their forces in horsmen, do•• it, for that they cannot keepe their rancks and order which is ne••essary for Footmen. And to recompence this defect, they make vse of the violence of Horse in a Combate, and of their swiftnesse, and readinesse in En∣terprizes of War, which are executed more speedily with Horse then Foot, who march heauily.

But the better is,* 1.218 that the Armies of an Estate should consist both of the one and the other, that is to say, of Footmen to serue for the body of an Army; and Horsmen, for armes and leggs. Wherefore the Prince besides the prouision of Armes, and other necessa∣ries for War, must be carefull that the Cauallery may be well mounted, & prouide that they may haue horses in his owne Countrey; for he cannot be termed strong and po∣werfull in horse, if he be cōstrained to haue recourse in that regard to his neighbour, who in time of war may faile him.

I haue said formerly that the force did not consist in the number, but in the bounty and courage of the souldiers; yet

for that they are not all borne such, wee must chooseas neare as we can, those which promise so much; and by Discipline make them such, and indeauour to instruct and trayne vp others.* 1.219 For the choyce many haue made a question, whether we should draw them out of our Sub∣iects, holding that the Prince, which innures the Subiects to Warre, thrust himselfe into danger to receiue a Law from them, and haue held an opinion, that it was more safe to imploy Strangers. But there haue beene Princes which haue not imployed their Subiects indifferently, but onely the Nobility of the Country, as the Kings of Po∣land and Persia: the which haue made them strong in Cauallery, but weake in Foote. Some others hauing a distrust and iealousie of the Nobility, would make no vse of their seruice; but to make head against them, haue armed and put forces into the hands of some of the Com∣mon people. The Turke hath put his forces into the hands of Subiects of the Countries which hee hath con∣quered; but this hath bin in making them Turkes by Edu∣cation. For causing the Children of Christians to be taken in their younger yeares, and to be instructed time∣ly in the Law of Mahomet, breeding them vp to toyle and labour, vntill that they come to an age fit to beare Armes, they continue as naturall Turkes, not knowing other Fathers then the Grand Seignour, who haue cau∣sed them to be sed and brought vp; nor other Countrey then that, for the guard whereof they are entertayned.

* 1.220To decide this question, we must vnderstand that eue∣ry Estate is weake which cannot subsist of it selfe, and whose force depends of another: And he that supports himselfe wholy vpon forraigne forces of a Soueraigne and independant, he makes himselfe as it were a Subiect and dependant of another; and exposeth his Estate, not onely to the inuasion of the Stranger of whom he depends, (be∣ing often seene that most part of those which haue called Strangers to their Succours, haue beene a prey to those

which succourd them:) But also the stranger fayling him either for that he is troubled to defend himselfe, or for some other occasion, he remaines at the mercy of his E∣nemy.

Besides this, the stranger fights more for gaine and his owne priuate interest, then for any good will hee beares him. As gaine drawes him, the same gaine may diuert him, and draw him to the Enemy. The Celtiberians sub∣borned first by the Romans, abandoned the Carthagini∣ans; and afterwards corrupted by the Carthaginians, left the Romans. Imploying none but Strangers, the Enemy not able to hinder the leuie, may slacke and stay it in the greatest necessity of the Prince: The which hath fallen out too often in Suisser-land, to the preiudice of France. And the Enemy inuading the Nation, from whence you draw your Souldiers, many times in your greatest neces∣sity, these Strangers are forced to abandon you, to goe and serue their Country; as the Grisons did, who were in the seruice of King Francis, when as Iean Iaques do Medices inuaded their Country. Finally, the treason the Mutiny, ruine, and as I haue sayd, the vsurpation of an Estate is more to be feared by the succours of Strangers, then we can expect any aduantage.

Adde to all these considerations, that they are in fight, their Companies ill filled, fearefull, rude, and oppressors of the Subiects; to the great charge of the Prince, consu∣ming in the Leuie, and before they can ioyne with vs, much time and much money. But I doe not hereby in∣ferre that we should altogether reiect Strangers: For they may serue with our owne Souldiers; whom by this means we shall spare, and vppon whom we may settle our chiefe force; and not as some Estates doe, cause them to vnder∣goe all the toyle, expose them to assaults, and to all dan∣gerous exploits, and dispence with the Strangers.

CHAP. 38. Of the number of Souldiers in their ordi∣nary trained Bands.

IT rests to know what number of Souldiersought to be entertained in an Estate. This cannot be truely re∣gulated. For we must haue regard to that which the Estate may beare, and to his forces that may assaile vs. Onely I will say,* 1.221 that in many Estates they haue establi∣shed two sorts of traine bands. The one ordinary, con∣sisting of men raised and bred vp to the War, hauing no other vocation or profe••sion. The other is subsidiary, com∣posed of Men which haue sometimes followed that pro∣fession, or are capable to do it, with the which at need they may fill the Companies, or raise new, and who in time of peace shall imploy themselues in their particular affaires, being sometimes practised in Military exercises, when as the Commanders shall draw them together.

Returning then to the first, they must not be in great numbers; but the number must be such, as they may resist, as well to auoyde the charge of their entertaynment,* 1.222 as the mutinies and reuolts, which happen among such men, when they feele themselues strong and in great numbers. And in a meane Estate sowe haue ruled it to 6000. Foot, and 1200. Horse; in a greater, double the number. But if they must diminish any thing, it were better to doe it in the Foote, which may be easily fill'd againe, then in the Horse, which cannot be so soone raised, being necessary to spend money for their furniture, and time for the exer∣cise both of Man and Horse.

* 1.223As for Subsidiaries, some haue thought that they ought rather to be retayned vnder some priuiledges, not preiudi∣ciall to the publique, then entertayned with pay whilest

they doe dot serue. But it would seeme more expedient, to make them serue one after another three Moneths in the yeare,* 1.224 neare vnto the Gouernour of the Prouince where they shall liue, in giuing them pay for that time: During the which they shalbe practised in all sorts of exercises, seruing to their profession: and going out of seruice after their Quarter is ended, they shall leaue their Armes in the Towne where the Gouernour remaynes, euery man returning to his owne home, leauing the place to such as are to succeed them. Being thus practised three Moneths yearely, you shall keepe them still in Allarme, and they will be alwayes ready to march. And making them to leaue their Armes after the seruice, you shall haue no cause to feare any Mutiny: The which they may make more feeble in diuiding these Subsidiaries into no greater troupes then of foure and twenty Souldiers, which troupes shall not depend of any Commander but the Gouernour, or of him whom the Soueraigne shall at times commit: yet euery one hauing his Captaine apart, to trayne the Souldiers; and when as they meane to imploy them, they may reduce them into Companies of hundreds or two hundred men, as they shall thinke good; and may giue them a Captaine to command them,* 1.225 during the expedition. By this meanes for the full pay of a yeare of 6000. men, you may enter∣tayne in your Estate 24000. Subsidiaries, trayned, practi∣sed, and ready to march, and assure your Prouinces against all sorts of Mutinies. And if you will traine vp more with∣out any charge,* 1.226 they may giue commandment vnto the Youth of the Towne where they shall practise, and there∣abouts, vnto a certaine age, to come at the time, and to the place of the sayd Exercises, where they may giue them Armes to practise with the rest.

This were, some one would say, to make too ma∣ny Souldiers in an Estate, which might fau••••ur a ••e∣uolt. But being disarmed and reduced into small t••oupes,* 1.227 their Captaines hauing taken an Oath to the Soueraigne

onely, and the Souldiers not depending on them but for the Disciplin••, and not for the pay: And moreouer, be∣ing disarmed, but when as they enter into seruice, there being but one fourth part that enters at a time in the Pro∣uinces, the other three parts may serue to oppose against such as being armed, would attempt any thing. So as with a little fore-sight which they may vse in this con∣duct, it will bee easie to diuert the inconueniences which they may conceiue of this order. There remaines now the forme which they ought to hold in leuies.

CHAP. 39. Of the forme how to make leuies es Souldiers: Of the Place, Age, Stature, & Vocation.

* 1.228THe Romans who could not haue their Souldiers depend wholy vpon the Captaines, obserued a par∣ticular forme; which was that of a great number w••ich were enrolled, the Captaines did choose one after another in th••ir turnes: And in this manner the Companies were as it were equall both in force and va∣lour of Souldiers. But the Captaines hauing little credit a∣mong••t them, they saw many mutinies fall out among the L••gi••ns. The which was the cause that they found it ex∣pedient that euery Captaine should make choyce of those whom he was to command; being likely that they which present themselues to be enrolled vnder a Captaine, would be more obedient vnto him, then they whom they shall enroll against the•••• will.

The same inconu••nie••ce of a mutiny happens, when to a troupe consisting of o••d Souldiers,* 1.229 they giue another Cap∣taine, t••en him vnder whom the Souldiers haue bin accu∣stomed to fight: For t••••s ••ew Captain hauing no meanes to get credit suddaiuly, the least subiect that presents itselfe

to the Souldiers to mutine, they imbrace it, being not re∣strayned neyther by the respect nor feare of their Cap∣taine. Yet an exact Discipline will easily helpe and re∣medy this.

Wherefore it seemes more safe, that euery Captaine make choyce of those whom he is to command.* 1.230 I say choyce, to make a difference from the greatest part of the leuies which are made at this day, into the which they receiue all sorts of men. The which ought not to be; and no man ought to be admitted without an attestation from the place of his dwelling,* 1.231 of his quality and how he hath liued; to the end they may exclude all Theeues and Robbers, which creepe into the Troupes; and that the Souldier offending, they may punish him in his per∣son or in his goods, when he returnes into his Coun∣try. And to this effect the choyce being made, the Soul∣diers ought to be presented to the Officer, or Commissary of the War, to see if they be of the quality required.

And, although wee may finde good Souldiers euery where; yet it seemes that not onely the ordinary,* 1.232 but also the subsidiary ought to be chosen and taken rather out of the Country then in Townes; for that in the Fields they finde them stronger and more rough, be it to strike, or to endure the discommodities of the Warre: And the Subsidiaries which are not in continuall practice of the Warre, being dispersed here and there, they cannot so easily draw together to make a mutiny; as they might doe if there were many in one Towne.

As for the Age, they must choose them young,* 1.233 a∣boue Seuenteene or Eighteene yeares, and vnto Thir∣ty or Forty, as well to haue the more agility, force, and courage, as to be more venturous, pliable, and o∣bedient to the Commandments that shall be giuen them. For the stature,* 1.234 the greatest and most manlike make the greatest shew: But if in a little body they finde a strong complexion and courage, they may not reiect him.

* 1.235But for that by their manner of liuing, they may settle a Iudgement of the complexion and force both of body and mind: They must haue a care not to choose Soul∣diers (but as little as may be) which are accustomed to some sitting Trade, that is soft and effeminate; but ra∣ther to choose them out of Trades, in the which they must be exposed to heate, and cold, to raine, winde, Sun; Or which are accustomed to bloud, to strike, to march, and to labour. The Leuies of men of Warre thus made, they must be trayned and gouerned. And thus much for the forces at Land.

CHAP. 40. Of the forces at Sea.

THe like shall be also followed in the forces at Sea; In the which besides the order they must obserue for the building of ships, they must also haue a care to prouide a good number of Pilots and Mar∣riners; and for the Gallies, to furnish and exercise their Rowers, whether they consist of Galley-slaues or volun∣taries. For the which they must prouide in good time to accustome the Slaues to doe their duties, and to make the Souldier get firme footing at Sea.

These forces at Sea are so necessary in an Estate that is Maritine, as without them the Prince cannot be termed strong nor powerfull. For besides that in a short time they may seaze vpon his Ports, before he shall haue any aduice of the Enterprize; and these being seazed, this Port being hard to stop vp the Enemy will keepe it long: He must make an accompt not to recouer any thing by the Commerce at Sea, but from the hands of his Neighbours, who will prescribe him a Law, and intreate his Mer∣chants ill. Let vs now come to that which is necessary for the setling of the Re••enewes of the Estate.

CHAP. 41. Of the Riches of an Estate.

EVery one agrees that to make an Estate powerfull, it must be rich;* 1.236 Riches being the principall sinews that supports it. For although that many poore Estates haue made themselues to be redoubted: Yet this hath rather happened by the diuision of their Neigh∣bours, and the fault of some others, then for any aduan∣tage there is in the pouerty of an Estate.

The Lacedemonians in their pouerty,* 1.237 during the di∣uision of the Grecians, haue beene for a time Masters of all Greece. But when as this diuision ceased, their greatnesse (which could not long subsist with this defect) decayed presently.

The Venetians and Genois, although poore in the be∣ginning, haue sometimes held a part of Greece;* 1.238 euen that which was neare to the Archipelagus: But this happened, during the diuision which was in the Leuant for the Empire of Constantinople.

The Romans themselues in their pouerty, had no other aduantage;* 1.239 then the weakenesse and diuision of their Neighbours, whereof they could make better vse then any other, receiuing some into their City, ruining o∣thers; sending Collonies to neighbour Prouinces; allying themselues to those whom they could not easily vanquish, and making vse of their Succours and meanes; and final∣ly establishing in conquered Countries, affaires, toles, and tributes, for the pay of their Souldiers, and for to sup∣ply the other charges of the Estate. And they haue beene so carefull to enrich their Citty, as many times this care hath made them shut their eyes to an infinite number of thefts and spoyles, which were practised against their

Ministers, whom they imployed in the Prouinces. It is then most certaine that an Estate cannot be termed power∣full, vn••esse it be rich. Yet euery Man doth not agree, wherein the wealth of an Estate doth consist. Some haue measured it by the great treasures; others by the reue∣newes; and others by the fertillitie of the Countrey. But as there is no treasure so great, but a long Warre may exhaust; nor any reuenewes so abundant, but in a long and tedious enterprize, they may be forced to ingage them: so the fertillitie alone of an Estate would bee vn∣profitable, if the publique had not meanes to make vse of it, and by gentle leuies to draw succours from priuate persons.

Wherefore besides the aboundance of all things fit for the life and seruice of Man;* 1.240 the parcimony or sparing of p••iuate persons, is necessary to make an Estate rich: As also the facillitie to make vse of their meanes. For as wee doe not call a Prodiga••l man rich, who spends all he hath: So what abundance soeuer there bee in an Estate, wee will not terme the Subiects rich, who by their ••ot and excesse consume all this great abundance, ta∣king from the publique the meanes to draw any suc∣cours from them.

* 1.241Wee will therefore conclude, that the riches of an Estate consists in all things ne••essary for the life and seruice of Man; in the parcimony of Subiects; in the greatnesse of Lands and ordinary reuenewes; in the facillitie of ordinary leuies; in the gouernment of the Treasure, and in the Exchequer.

CHAP. 42. Of the causes of the abundance of the wealth of an Estate: That is to say Tillag••: Manufactures and Commerce with Strangers.

ABoundance in an Estate proceeds from three necessary things:* 1.242 From the Earth; from Ma∣nufactures, which comprehends all Manuall and Mechanicke Arts; and from the Commerce we haue with Strangers, vnder the name of Earth I com∣prehend the labour of the Land; the entertai••ment of Woods, Forrests, and Trees, which may by their fruit∣fulnesse contribute something to the vse of Man; The dig∣ging of Mines for mettall, stones, and minerall druggs.

As this point is the fountaine of all the riches of the world,* 1.243 so it ought to bee more carefully husbanded by the publique: And yet it is that which is most neglected, hauing left a libertie to euery Man to doe with his owne what he pleaseth, vnder a false proposition, that euery Man being carefull to find out that which will bee profi∣table vnto him, knowes how to husband his ground, so as nothing well bee vnprofitable: And yet experience teaches vs the contrarie. For most part of Lands being possest by the Nobilitie, Clergie, or others imployed in publique affaires, few reside vpon the Lands;* 1.244 so as they are occupied by Farmes, who enter like vnto glearers, which draw what they can, hauing no interest in the future. And of those which reside vpon their Lands, some through ignorance, others by negligence or bad husbandrie content themselues with the reuenewes of their predecessors, being loth to take the paines, or com∣playning to aduance that, that should bee necessary to plant or clense a peece of Land that lieth waste

to dry vp a Marish, to settle a Race for breeding, or to doe such like things as may better their De∣mesus.

Some one it may be of little Iudgement will say, that this care is vnworthy of a Prince and of the publique. But to this wee may answere, that all Princes haue not so held it,* 1.245 Massisusa cleansed the greatest part of Babary. And in our time we know the improuements which the Venetians haue made in Polesene of Rouigo: That of the great Duke of Tuseany towards Pysa and Areso, and that of the Duke of Ferrara, in the Valley of Comachy••, and that which the Hollanders doe daily. Wherefore some haue held it fit, that the publique should take vpon them this care to quicken the diligence of some, by the orders which might be made, according to the places; and to punish the negligence of others, by Fines, Amercements, and Seisures of the Lands neglected.

* 1.246As for Manufactures, the number of workmen giues the aboundance; but the good giue credit to the Mar∣chandize. The great number would not be vnprofita∣ble, but also hurtfull, if they were not good. To haue them such, you must seeke for them: And if wee haue them not among our selues, wee may draw strangers by Priuiledges, in giuing vnto some according to their industrie, some honest entertainement. To multiply the workmen, they may erect publique houses of all sorts of Manufactures, as hath beene propounded, in the which they may instruct the poore. And as this Establishment should bee chiefely made in their fauour, so the reuenew of these houses may bee taken vpon that whith is affected by the Cannon••, and anci∣ent Ordinances for their Entertainment.

Some one, to the end they may banish idlenesse, which is at this present in Monasteries, (many persons vnfit for contemplation and study being therein, and many

against their will) haue propounded to restore the ancient Monastique discipline, which was to imploy in certaine workes and manuall Arts, at houers of leasure: those that were not fit for study and preaching. The which did also multiply manufactures. Others haue likewise beene of opinion, to bind the Masters, who serue themselues with young Boyes to cause them to passe a certaine Age in learning of a Trade: And so by these meanes an E∣state in lesse then twenty yeares, would bee furnished with more workemen then were needfull.

The Comme••ce and Trafique which is made with the stranger,* 1.247 is the third point which produceth aboun∣dance in an Estate, for the setling whereof there are three considerations to be made. The first is of things which we are to carry, and not to carry to the stranger, The second is of things which wee must receiue from strangers, and their entry into our Estate;* 1.248 or not to receiue them and to banish the Commerce, The third is the facillity and ease of Commerce accompanied with safety.

The Marchandize which we ought to ca••ry to stran∣gers,* 1.249, with whom wee haue Comme••ce, are those whereof we haue aboundance: Of which after the Estate is sufficiently furnished, wee may allow the trade. As contrarywise, those whereof wee haue want may in no sort be transported; nor in like man∣ner those, whereof our Neighbours may make vse to our preiudice; as Armes, Horses, Sayles, and other things destinated to the••se of the Sea or Warre.

The transport of Gold and Siluer is likewise forbid∣den in all Estates;* 1.250 but these prohibitions are very ill obserued. And as they are necessary, to hinder the want of these mettalls, which are fought after by all Nations, depriue vs not of the meanes to make vse of them, for that they are hunted after by our Friends and Allies: So wee must haue a care, that it may not

trouble nor altar the Commerce. And to speake truth, these defences thus generall which they haue made, are impossible in the execution, seekeing to maintaine the Commerce with our Neighbour: Vnlesse it be, that we forbid to Negotiate otherwise then by exchange, and permutation of Marchandize. The which may be practi∣zed, in regard of the Marchandize, which is not very necessary, and not in regard of those which are necessary for vs, and whereof we cannot passe. We are forced to haue recourse to our Neighbours, and to take a law from them, in eyther giuing them other Marchandizes which may bee a•• necessary for them as theirs for vs, or in paying them ready money.

And in this last case many haue held, that the safety which might be added, was, to allow of the transport of Gold and Siluer, in giuing caution to bring backe with∣in a certaine time the quantity in Marchandizes, for the which the transport hath beene allowed, the publique hauing no interest therein; presupposing the necessity of this Marchandize, and that it cannot bee recouered by exchange from another.

* 1.251Among those things which ought not to be transpor∣ted out of an Estate, are rawe stuffes; but not manu∣factures, for that you take the meanes from your work∣men, to imploy themselues and to liue; and from your Estate the meanes to enrich it selfe by the meanes of ma∣nufactures, the which in certaine workes exceede the price of the substance. And they are so farre from suf∣fering these stuffes thus rawe to goe vnto strangers: as the Estate which knowes what belongs to husbandry, not satisfied with those which grow amongst them, draw them from their Neighbours, to put them in worke, and by this meanes to enrich themselues, selling them thus wrought euen to those who many times haue sold them the sayd rawe stuffes.

Behold the things which wee ought not to carry to

strangers, by the which it is easie to iudge of those, which we ought to desire they should bring vnto vs. For if we retaine those things for the liberty which may come vnto vs, by the same reason, if wee want them, wee must seeke the meanes to draw them from our Neigh∣bours.

And in regard of Gold and Siluer,* 1.252 the entire ought to be allowed: ut not the course of Forraigne Coyne a∣mong the people, for that there is not any assurance a∣mong Princes touching coynes, euery one seeking to de∣ceiue his companion, and to draw the Gold and Siluer out of one anothers Estate,* 1.253 in raising the price of coynes more then they are worth in their Neighbours Estate, or in weakning the allay of their coynes, the stampe, great∣nesse, thicknesse, and waight, remaineing still the same. So as giuing them entry, vpon an opinion they haue, that they are still according to the ancient standard, the peo∣ple find themselues full, before the tryall can be made, and the abuse discouered: The which if you thinke to re∣medy in decrying them, and causing them to bee car∣ryed to the Mynt, for the price of their bounty, your Subiects shall sustaine a great losse. On the otherside if you suffer this abuse to continue, they will by little and little draw all the good coyne out of your Estate, to reduce it to the weake Allay of your Neighbours, and then returne it vnto you againe thus satisfied. Wherefore to hinder this exchange of coyne, they shall hinder the course of forraigne coynes among the people, to the end that they which haue any, may carry them to the exchan∣gers appoynted for that effect, who shal giue them the va∣lue esteemed according to their interiour bounty: And they carring them to the Mynt, as they shall be charged: They shall also clipp in peeces the forraigne coyne which they shall receiue, in the presence of those that bring them, and they shal be conuerted into currant coyne. So they neede not to feare the falsifications of strange Coynes,

nor the raising of the Prince: And they shall not be able to draw your currant money out of your Estate, but in bringing Merchandize to the value.

* 1.254 The things whereof wee must stop the Entry, and the Commerce in our Estate, are those which serue for ••yot and excesse, the which is the chiefe meanes to impouerish an Estate; as pretious stones, exquisite perfumes, spices, not much necessary, and stuffes, the which serue only for Pompe and shew. But if the abuse bee so inueterate, as wee cannot hinder them by a prohibition, wee must charge them with such great customes and imposts, as the stranger may haue no desire to bring them, fearing hee shall not retire his Siluer, and the subiect to buy it, in regard of the dearenesse. For although that some times this consideration doth not restraine the subiect, from buying such Merchandizes; yet by this meanes he growes poore, the publique shall bee the more rich by the great imposts, the which shall supply the place of punishments for excesse in priuate persons.

CHAP. 41. Of the facillitie of Commerce.

AS for the facillitie and ease of Commerce, it de∣pends of many things, for the which it is needfull to prouide: And first for the commoditie of the carriage of Merchandizes by Water▪ Land, Cart, or otherwise;* 1.255 They must prouide to make the Riuers Nauigable: The Ports safe, to keepe the wayes and passages in good Estate, and due reparation, and free from Pyrats and Theeues. Not to suffer any Mono∣pole which may hinder the libertie of traffiqu••:* 1.256 And if it bee discouered to punish it rigourously; to inuite Strangers to bring vs the Merchandize which wee

cannot want,* 1.257 by the discharge of Customes and im∣posts, as much as the necessity of the Estate will beare.

To Establish such Lawes for affaires,* 1.258 as there may bee faith and assurance amongst negotiators; and in case of difference, speedy and summary Iustice, especially in that which concernes strangers, who forbeare to traffique in a place, no lesse in regard of the tediousnesse of Suits, as for the treacherie of those of the Countrey. And for that a permutation cannot bee made without a certaine price set downe vpon Merchandizes, and that they cannot Ne∣gotiate with all sorts of people by exchange, but it is needfull to make vse of Money: The price and estimation thereof must bee certaine and firme; other∣wise they should bring a confusion into the Commerce. But besides this, the interiour bounty and value of this Coine must bee easie to iudge of,* 1.259 not only by the waight, but by the eye and sound if it may bee. The which may bee done, if they resolue to make vse of the mixture of mettalls, no farther then it is necessary for a remedy; gold and siluer suffizing to make all sorts of Coine.

For in regard of the Coine, if they will not diuide the marke of Siluer into eight thousand peeces, as they haue sometimes done in Lorraine, for the Angeuines, which Rene Duke of Aniou and Lorraine caused to bee coined, whereof the two hundred were worth but sixe pence, and forty a souse of base French Money; they may reduce them to a third part thereof, to make the peeces more solide; which may bee stampt with a bodkin; ma∣king no vse of the Copper, whose price is vnequall and variable in all Countries, and moreouer is subiect to rust.

Contratiwise the price of gold & siluer,* 1.260 hath changed lit∣tle, & they haue inmpt'vsually in proportiō, as one or two, little more or little lesse; & the marke of gold vallewed at twelue marks of siluer. Herodotus writes, that in his time a pound of gold was worth thirteene pound of siluer. I do

not say, but there hath beene some Ages and some Pro∣uinces, in the which Gold hath beene dearer: But this hath not beene generall, nor of long continuance. Wherefore makeing the coynes of one Mettall, and of a certaine waight, greatnesse, thicknesse, and well coyned in the forme of a medaille that is cast; as the Grecians, Latins, Hebrewes, Persians and Egyptians, in old time did: It would be a hard thing to be deceiued.

There is another thing, the which doth greatly de∣cay trading,* 1.261 which is, the contempt they make in many Estates of those which deale in it, holding this vocation to be sordid and base. So as they which haue gotten a little wealth, retire themselues speedily, to imbrace an other vocation, to the which the people carry more re∣spect and honour, then to this.

In truth wee must confesse, that there are certaine af∣faires which should be left to the poore and common people,* 1.262 to enrich them. But there are others which they only can execut that are rich; as that at Sea, which is the most profitable in an Estate, and to the which they should attribute more honour then they doe here: For i•• in all Estates they haue thought it fitting to inuite the Subiects by honour to the most painfull and dangerous Actions, the which might be profitable to the publique; This being of that quality, they should propound and at∣tribute more honors to those that shall deale in it. And if Nobility hath taken its foundation from the courage of Men, and from their valour; there is no vocation in the which there is so much required as in this. They are not only to encounter and striue amongst men, but some∣times against the foure Elements together; which is the strongest proofe that can bee of the resolution of a Man. This hath beene the occasion, that some hath beene of opinion, that they should open this doore to Marchants to attaine to Nobility, so as the Father and the Sonne hath continued in the same trade; and to suffer Noblemen

who are commonly the richest in an Estate, to practise themselues (without preiudice to their condition) in this commerce at Sea, which would be more honourable vn∣to them, then to bee vsurers, or Banckers, as in Italy; or to impouerish themselues, in doing nothing but spend, and neuer gather. Hence will grow many aduantages both to the publike and priuate. To the publike,* 1.263 For that they that should deale in the commerce, hauing meanes, courage, and sufficiencie for this conduct, it would bee farre greater, putting more Ships to Sea and better armed, whereof the Estate at need might might make vse for its safety, and would carry the reputation of their Nation farre. The which they cannot doe, who beeing poore, and hauing no stocke but from others, haue not the cou∣rage to hazard themselues in a great enterprize. And for the particular, this commerce being wisely mana∣ged, what hazard soeuer they run, there is more to be gotten then lost: And if the Gentlemen apply themselues, without ruining themselues in expences, or importu∣ning the Prince with demaunds, they shall doe more in one yeere at Sea, then in tenne at Court. It availes not to say, That a Gentleman will sooner turne Pyrate then Merchant. For holding that order which may be prescribed in their Imbarquing, they may so mingle them one with another, as it would bee a difficult thing that all should agree to commit a villany. Finally experience hath taught, and doth daily, that where the richest haue dealt in this Commerce, it hath enrich both them, and the Estate vnder which they liued: And at this day the examples of the Venetians, Portugalls, Spaniards, and Hollanders haue made it knowne vnto vs.

These last being lesse rich then the others,* 1.264 but not lesse couragious and hardie, haue setled an order for the con∣tinuance of this commerce to the East Indies, which de∣serues to be knowne, which is, that after they haue found by many voyages, which some priuate Men haue made,

that they ruined one another by this concurrence; they aduised in the yeere 1602. to craue leaue of the generall Estates, to traffique into those parts before all others, du∣ring the space of one and twenty yeeres. The which was granted them, in regard of fiue and twenty thousand Florins, which they promised to pay vnto the Estate du∣ring the first tenne yeeres. Thus reduced all into one Company, Amsterdam had a Moietie, Middleburg in Zeland a fourth part; Delphe, Rotterdam, Horne, and Enehusen had either of them a sixth parth: And the whole stocke of this vnion amounted to sixe Million of Liuers, or six hundred thousand pounds sterling.

For the direction of this trade, and the interest of the Associats, they haue established in either of these Townes a certaine number of Administratours: At Amsterdam twenty, at Miadleburg twelue, and in either of the rest s••auen. And if any one dies, the Chamber of the place names three, of which either the Estates generall, or the Magistrate of the Towne chooseth one.

These Chambers, choose seuenteene among the admi∣nistratours: that is to say, Amsterdam eight, Midleburg foure, Delphe, and Rotterdam two, Horne and Enchusen two; and the seuenteenth is chosen alternatiuely, some∣times at Middleburg, and sometimes at North Holland: The which are called together to resolue ioyntly, of how many Ships, and with what Equipage and furniture, they shall make the fleete which they meane to send, and to what Fort or Coast they should goe. This assem∣bly is held six yeeres together at Amsterdam, and after∣wards two yeeres at Middleburg, and then againe at Amsterdam. By the conditions of the accord, the Ships must returne to the same Port from which they parted; and the spices which are left at Middleburg, and other Chambers, is distributed amongst them by the waight of Amsterdam; and the Chamber which hath sold her spi∣ces, may buy from other Chambers.

By this order they haue hither to continued this Com∣merce with reputation, not as simple Merchants onely;* 1.265 but as if they were Soueraignes, they haue made in the name of the Estates an alliance with many Princes of those parts; As with the King of Sian, Quadaen, Patam, Io∣hor, the Heire of Malaca, Bornean, Achim, Sinnatra, Baretan, Iocotra, and other Kings of Iatta. They haue made themselues absolute Maisters of the Iland of Am∣boyne, where they haue setled a president which gouerns in their name. At Banda they haue a Fort for a retreate, where they must deliuer them the Spices at a certayne price. In Ternate they haue another, a Mile distant from that of the Portugals. At Magnien•• they haue three: At Motire one: At Gilolo they haue taken that which the Portugels had built.

From this example we will conclude,* 1.266 that the onely meanes to settle the commerce at Sea in a Nation, in the which the best purses will not hazard themselues in these Enterprizes; is to force the Merchants which trade at Sea in certaine places, to ioyne one with another, and not to make their traffique a part. For although that nego∣tiating a part the gaine would be the greater, when the Enterprize succeeds happily: yet we must consider, that the losse which may happen, would wholy ruine him that attempts alone: And if in making a Company the gaine be the lesse, yet it is more assured; and the losse being borne by many, it is lesse to euery one that is inter∣essed.

Thus diuiding the Trade according to the Coast and places where it is made, they may make diuers Com∣panies; that is to say, one for the Trade of Ginnee; A∣nother for the Leuant by the Mediterranean Sea; One for the East Indies; Another for the West Indies beyond the line; Another for that on this side the line; And one for England, Noruage, Sweden, and other Northerne Countries: forbidding them to attempt one vpo•• another,

and to all other priuate Subiects which shall not be of the company, to negotiate in those places vpon great pen••lties.

CHAP. 44. Of Parsimony or sparing,

* 1.267AS aboundance is the sourse and fountaine of the riches of an Estate, so parsimony is that which pre∣serues it, consisting in the cutting off of superflu∣ous and vnnecessary things, part whereof come from abroad: so as hindering the Entry of those, they shall prouide in that regard for sparing. Eor if excesse creepe not in among the Subiects, the Stranger shall not grow fat, to the preiudice of the Estate, but the o∣ther Subiects shall taste of the aduantage. Yet this is not to say, that excesse is tollerable, although that nothing goe out of the Estate, to the which the extreame pouer∣ty of some, and the great wealth of others may breed much trouble. But if some growing poore by excesse, that which is lost, is diuided into so many purses, as the publique shall not be able to make vse of the increase of their meanes, which ••eceiu•• the aduantage by this excesse; this would be likewise worse: For the others remayning poore, it would be so much aduantage lost for the Estate. Whereas if he that spends, retayned his expences within the bounds of necessity, and conuenience without excesse, he should be alwayes found to haue meanes to succour the publique a•• ••eed.* 1.268 But this moderation doth likewise im∣port much for the safety of the Estate. For great men be∣ing they which vsually runne into these expences af∣ter they haue ruined themselues, they are eyther a charge to the publique to bee maintained and entertay∣ned by it: or receiuing nothing from the publique,

they abandon themselues most commonly to many inno∣uations and enterprizes preiudiciall to the Estate. And therein some Princes are deceiued, who hold it a great∣nesse to entertaine this excesse in their Courts.* 1.269 It is one∣ly meere vanity which ruines those which follow it, and depriues them of the meanes to continue the Seruice, which the Estate might expect from them, if they go∣uerned themselues otherwise: For that at the end of ten yeares at the most, a Gentleman growes so poore, as he is forced to retire, and to hide himselfe in his house, and most commonly much indebted, being no more able to shew himselfe in the Equipage of others of his conditi∣on. Whereas if Princes restrayned them, so as no man might spend more then his Reuenewes will beare, they should be serued longer by their Nobility, and should not bee so often importuned with demands, re∣compences, and reproaches, that they are ruined in their seruice. Wherefore be it in regard of Strangers, or inconsideration of the Estate, they must cut off ex∣cesse, but especially that which brings with it the ruine of people and of great families.* 1.270 This Excesse is principal∣ly in great and sumptuous buildings; in moueables, appar∣rell, and ornaments of the person; In the traine of seruants and attendants, in shews; in Banquets and Feasts, in Playes of shew and hazard. For the first, it seemes that the great∣nesse and sumptuousnesse of buildings,* 1.271 turnes in some sort to the benefit of the publique, and that they ought not to forbid it, but rather inuite euery man to build for the orna∣ment of Cities and Townes. But as a generall prohibition would be something preiudiciall to the publique; so the free and indifferent tolleration of this expence, is hurtfull not onely to the publique but to the particular. It ought to be allowed to a great man, and a rich Subiect, who hath few or no Children, to spare his Crowns, to imploy them in the Ornament of the publique. This cannot be termed Excesse. Neither would I hinder many Treasurers

and partizans, who haue done their businesse with the publique, and profited largely, to make the like expen∣ces. But if in stead of building of priuate houses, they will raise some publique Edifices, I would esteeme them the more: But yet I would desire to adde two restrictions; the one, that they should not build with any Materialls, but such as are found in the Estate where they liue: The other to forbid them guilding and enriching with Gold or Siluer, which ought not to be allowed, yea, rather in publique buildings, there being nothing that doth so much decay Gold and Siluer in an Estate, as the like workes.

As for the common and priuate buildings, they may without this great expence prouide in building for the ornament of the publique,* 1.272 after the manner which they obserue in many Townes of Flanders and the Iowe Coun∣tries: where the order is such, that he which meanes to build, takes not onely the plot from those which are deputed to that end by the Magistrate, but also the pro∣iect of the front, or face of the building, the which must answere vpon the streete: The beauty whereof consists more in a certayne proportion, then in any enriching ey∣ther of stuffe or workemanship: And it shalbe most com∣monly made according to the front of some neare house, of small charge, according to the which they shall rule them selues for the height and fashion of the Doores, and other exteriour parts. So as in succession of time all the houses of a Streete (building according to this proiect,) are found alike, and by this resemblance and proportion, they are very pleasing vnto the eye.

From this policy there redounds vnto them another aduantage, which is, that the workemen by the establi∣shing of this order, being aduertised of the forme how they are to make the Doores and other parts which must answere vpon the Streete; they haue them ready long be∣fore: So as priuate men that will build, they haue

presently raised their houses, which are for the most part of bricke, finding that little stone that shall be necessa∣ry ready cut. It is therefore easie to cut off this excesse, and to prouide for the ornament of Town••s, in restray∣ning euery man in his buildings according to his meanes, that the front may be answerable to the nearest houses, if there be obserued in them any proportion or pleasing pro∣spectiue: Making the publique places spacious, the Streets large, straight, and long; yet in such sort as nei∣ther the great heate, nor cold may annoy passengers: for therein chiefly consists the beauty of a Towne.

The excesse of moueables, Apparrell, and other Or∣naments of the person, must in like manner be cut off;* 1.273 as pretious Stones, Enamell, Embroideries, Stuffes of Gold and Siluer, and all strange Manufactures of great price. If they will adorne themselues with Gold, they may allow it in chaines without Enamell; in the which the losse cannot bee great: For the which the Ordi∣nances of France haue well prouided, and the Magistrates very ill.

That excesse which consists in a great traine of atten∣dants, is excused vpon two considerations:* 1.274 The one which regards the commodity of those that will be at∣tended, the other vpon the feeding and imploying of many men, the which being poore, and hauing no im∣ployment, would be forced to steale or to dye for hun∣ger, if they had not this retreate. In regard of the first consideration, if the number of Seruants were regulated according vnto the commodity, it were no excesse: But to feede many vnprofitable Mouthes, which wee might well spare without any want, it is vanity that makes vs doe it. As for the second, which is to imploy many pro∣fitable persons to all other things, this is so••farre from doing good to the publique, as by this retreate they in∣uite many to be idle: which if they wanted, they would fall to learne some trade, or thrust themselues

into the Warre and serue the publique The Ven••∣tians,* 1.275 haue better then any other prouided for this point. For not able to regulate the number, which was necessary for the commodite of priuate persons, they haue cut off that which serued only for shew, which is the a∣tendants in publique: Not suffering a Gentleman, how great and rich soeuer hee be, to be followed with a∣boue two seruants, giuing him libertie to haue as ma∣ny in his house as hee shall thinke good. The which is the cause, that not able to make vse of this vaine traine in pub∣lique, euery man keepes but wh•• he▪ needs in his house.

But as the ordinance is more easie to execute in a Towne, then in a Princes Court, whore, for that the discommodities are greater, they haue need to be serued by a greater number, and must likewise satisfie the vanitie of the Court: The Italians and Spaniards, who are in this regard good husbands, seeing themselues forced to this traine for a time, make vse of Men whom they retaine with them, for daily wages; and knowing how much they are to giue them by the day, they are not tied to seede them, nor to keepe open house for them, as they doe in France and Germany: And going from Court, this troope is dismist, there remaining none but the ordinary traine; and thus they satisfie vanitie and good husbandrie altogether. I confesse that this point would bee hard to reforme in France, euery Man des••••ing to eate his meanes in good Companie. Yet there might be some course taken that might di∣minish their disorder.

The excesse of Banquets and Feasts, is that which is most esteemed,* 1.276 especially among the Northerne Nati∣ons: But in effect it is the most superfluous and beastly. I doe not say but vpon some occasion, as in publique re∣ioycing & marriages, it is fit to make more expences then we doe in our ordinary cour••e of liuing; but yet we must fly superfluity, & prouide principally for neatnesse, order,

and seemelinesse, which must bee regulated according to the number and qualitie of persons whom you treate. Wherefore it imports the Estate and priuate Men much, that this should bee reformed.

In regard of Playes, those of hazard are forbidden in all Estates: But the defences are so ill obserued,* 1.277 as many great families ruine themselues thereby. As for Playes of show, as Tilting, Turneyes, and Masques; those that may quicken the courage to Vertue, as the two first, ought not only to bee allowed, but the Nobility should bee inuited vnto it; yet so, as the expence may not seeme greater then the vallour; carrying such a mo∣deration, as it may not ruine any Man; and in regard of those which haue no other ground then vanitie or loue, and being apish followers, whereof most part of those which haue imployed themselues therein, haue beene afterwards ashamed; they deserue not only to b••e for∣bidden, but scor••ed at as ridiculous. Wherefore these doores being shut, by the which the faculties and meanes of priuate Men flow away incensably, there is no doubt, but those streames which runne from this abundance, whereof wee haue spoken, will so swell, that when the publique will make vse, they may well doe it with∣out drawing priuate Men into necessitie.

These two foundations being laid, of the abundance of all things necessary, and of the parcimony of Subiects, wee must now speake of the setling of the Finances, or ordinary Reuenewes, the which haue beene diuers according to the diuersitie of Estates.

CHAP. 45. Of the Establishment of the Finances, or ordinary Reuenewes of an Estate.

MAny haue Established the principall reuenew of an Estate, or publique demesus, which is the most honest,* 1.278 the most iust, and the most safe, there hauing beene certaine Lands and Demesus reser∣ued, to bee let out to farme, and giuen to particular men for a time or in perpetuity, in paying the Rents and Re∣uenewes, wherewith they had beene charged towards the Prince. In some Estates this reseruation hath beene of a Moietie, in others of the third part of the territory, and in others of lesse.

This Establishment is hard to make•• vnlesse it be by the meanes of a full and absolute conquest, by the which it is lawfull for the Victor to prescribe what Law hee plea∣seth to the vanquished; but being once made, hee must bee maintained without any alienation; But likewise an ingagement and no alienation,* 1.279 for that the ingagement in the end growes to be an alienation, by meanes of the ne∣cessity which the Prince hath alwayes to be releiued vp∣on new affaires which happen. So as he is so farre from being able to redeeme it, as he is prest to make new in∣gagements, the which being made for a farre lesse value, then the alienation would be, the Prince findes himselfe depriued of his Reuenewes for a small relesse; and it may be sayd, that it had beene profitable to sell, then to ingage. But to doe better, wee must not allow neither to one nor the other: And if hee cannot find money o∣therwise, hee must not ingage but the vse of it for a cer∣taine time, the which expired, the Prince may re-enter in∣to his Demesus.

The second meanes, which they make vse of to raise a stocke of Treasure, are the entries,* 1.280 and going forth to Marchandize, Hauens and Ports, aswell vpon strangers as the Subiects: An ancient and generall course, iu••t, lawfull and most profitable, with the conditions which we haue mentioned speaking of Commerce; which are not to suffer the tra••ique of things which are necessary for life, vntill the subiect bee furnished, nor of raw stuffes, to the end the subiect working them, they may draw profit from the manufactures: To suffer the trafique of those which are wrought, and the bringing in of that which is raw by strangers: But they must moderate the imposts, of necessary things, which are brought vnto vs from aboad.

Some likewise haue esteemed Tributes, Gifts,* 1.281 and Pensions, which they receiue from strangers, for an ordi∣nary Reuenew. But this being not sufficient for the en∣tertainment of charges, it cannot bee called a stocke of Treasury; although it may serue to increase the stocke.

The fourth meanes is in trafique which they may make in the name of the publique or Prince.* 1.282 As there are many trades vnworthy of a Prince or publique, so there are some which require a great stocke, the which may well bee allowed them. Yet it would seeme more pro∣fitable, in regard of the theft which Factors doe commit, to giue the money which they haue in reserue, to those which trafique,* 1.283 vpon good cautions and sufficient assu∣rance, with a meane interest (as they say Augustus did) then to trafique. Hence would grow three or foure ad∣uantages. The first it would increase the publique money. The second, it would giue meanes to priuate men to pro∣fit and gaine: And the third, that they should saue by this meanes the publique money out of the hands of impor∣tune beggers, flatterers, and fauorites;* 1.284 and preuent the facility of a prodigall Prince. There is another kind of

trafique which is vsed in some Estates, the which is the sale of offices and publique charges, which is not onely dishonest, but most pernitious: And yet this abuse is gone so farre, as this trafique Is not onely receiued but carefully handled, as an ordinary stocke of the Treasure.

* 1.285To preuent it, it is necessary to know vpon what pre∣text this abuse is crept in. As all new inuentions are grounded vpon publique necessities; so this hath beene aduanced vnder this pretext. Seeing that in regard of the multitude, of those which might aspire to charges, Prin∣ces referre themselues to courtiers, and to such as were about them, to make choyce of Officers; And Cour∣tiers hauing no other ayme, then to worke their owne ends, propounded vnto Princes, those which promise them most money vnderhand, to bee preferred before their Competitors: So as although the Prince did not sell the Offices, yet they were venall, the profit going to particular men that were about them: They found it more reasonable, seeing the abuse was such, and that grow∣ing from the ordinary carelesnesse of the Prince, it would bee difficult to reforme; that the publique should the trafique, by the meanes whereof it might be eased in some other charges, then to suffer it to bee done by priuate persons.

In trueth this mischeife is lesse then it was, seeing the publique profits something thereby; but yet not withstan∣ding it is euill, and most preiuditiall to the Estate: For the which there is more remedy, but to quicken the vi∣gilancie of the Prince, or of those which haue charge of the publique, to make choyce of those which are to bee aduanced: being more fit (for the Officers) to leaue vn∣to them the choyce and the Election, to the end that gra∣tifying him whom they hold most fit to serue, hee should be more bound vnto them, and shew himselfe more ob••∣dient then he would be, if he had obtained it by his owne

merrit, or for money. But for that it is impossible that the choyce could bee made in the confusion of so many Com∣petitors, which might pretend to one Office: the Prin∣ces seeming to haue some excuse therein, the meanes a∣boue propounded might serue for a Remedy, Establish∣ing many degrees in the Offices of euery profession, as∣well in Armes, Iustice, the Treasure; as Religion; and prescribing a certaiue time, that euery one ought to re∣maine in euery degree, before hee can pretend to mount higher; For that it would be more easie for the Prince, to choose out of the number of those which had serued their time, him whom he pleaseth, to aduance him to the next degree, there being some place voyd; then it is af∣ter the manner they now liue. And for all this they should cut off nothing of the Princes fauour.* 1.286 For hee that is thus aduanced, should be only bound to him and not to any other. Whereas hauing no meanes to bee knowne vnto the Prince but by the mediation of other persons, whose knowledge he hath bought for ready money; hee is many times more obliged to the Groome then to the Master, for the fauour hee receiueth; but much more to his purse: And by little and little the affection of Offi∣cers, towards the Prince, is lost by these courses, there being none of all those which practise these meanes, but blames them, and esteemes the Prince lesse which suffers them, then if they proceeded another way.

The Prince should bee better serued, not only with more affection and fidelity; but also with more dili∣gence and sufficiency. For the Officers comming to the highest and supreame degrees, they would be much more capable, as hath beene sayd; And euery Man desireing to make himselfe knowne to his Prince, to bee preferred be∣fore his Companion, would serue with enuy, and indea∣uour to make himselfe to bee obserued by some seruice. Whereas the Officer in this venallity, hauing no other hope to aduance himselfe then by his purse, seekes what

he can to profit, be it by right or wrong, to haue meanes to purchase some greater Office, wherein hee may benefit himselfe better. But wee will leaue this reformation to another time, when they shall be more capable.

CHAP. 46. Of Subsedies, of Extraordinary Leuies, Imports, and Loane••.

THe fist meanes to make a stocke for the Treasure, is taken wholy from the subiects; whom they haue shorne after diuers manners in many Estates, and in some they haue flead them. This meanes cannot bee excused but vpon necessity: But if it bee ne∣cessary it is likewise iust; the safetie of the people and the preseruation of the Estate being the Supreame Law.

* 1.287The most ordinary manner to leuy vpon the Subiect, is by way of Subsedy, for the goods which he enioyes; the which also hath beene diuersly practized, accor∣ding to the diuersity and condition of subiects and goods. Clergie M••n and the Nobility in some places, are ex∣empted with their goods,* 1.288 of what condition soeuer they were. In other places they made the Subsedies reall, exempting the Feodall, or noble-lands; the per∣sons aswell of Nobles as Ecclesiastiques, hauing submitted themselues to contribute for their rurall goods which they possesse▪ In some Estates and other places they haue ex∣empted the Nobles and Ecclesiastiques, & the lands which they held in their owne hands; but they haue not exempt∣ted their Farmers.

To dispute which is the most iust of all these formes of Leuies, were vnprofitable. For this Establishment

hath not beene made according to the rules of Iudge∣ment; but according to the facility and disposition which they haue found in people, to receiue one forme more th••n another. Yet if any ought to enioy an ex∣emption, it seemes that Gentlemen,* 1.289 who are bound to a personall seruice, and to contribute for the defence of the Estate, not onely their goods but also their liues, may with Iustice bee exempted from this kind of im∣position; seeing that the burthen which is imposed vpon them, is much more greiuous and heauy then that of the Cannons.

In regard of Clergie men, the respect and reuerence of Religion hath held them long exempt: But in the end in those places especially, whereas the Subsedies are personall, Iustice hath wrested out of their hands, some succours for the publique, whereof they make a great part; which succours, although they be not called Subsedy, but a chautatiue graunt; Yet vnder•• a milder name it hath the same effect. As for others, some haue beene exempted, partly to preserue the respect due vnto the Offices which they hold of the Prince; and partly to authorize and maintaine the Leuies, and to punish the disobediences. Others haue beene exempt, for the feare of some sedition and Rebellion, and for the good of peace onely: So as they vse the like pollicy with them, as they doe with the Clergie; and draw Succours from them vnder the Names of Loanes and bor∣rowing.

As for the place where the Subsedy is to bee leui∣ed, eyther at the Mans dwelling house,* 1.290 or at the place where his Lands and Goods lye: Many hold opinion, that the most iust were, to leuy the Subsedy in euery place, where the man that is subiect to the Subsedy hath goods, by reason of the fraudes which are committed vsually by such as haue goods in many places who se••ing themselues charged at the place of their abode wi••h a great Subsedy,

proportionable to the estimation of their goods, retire themselues either to a Towne that is freed from Subse∣dies, or into some place where they pay not so much; whereby their Subsedy is layd vpon others. But if the Subsedy were layd vpon their goods, they should cut off this abuse, which doth much import the poore people.

These difficulties are found in the laying of the Subsedy, as well in regard of the exemptions pretended by many conditions of men,* 1.291 as for the inequality and disproporti∣on in the laying thereof among such as are subiect: and the faculties of euery one vpon whom it should take hold, be∣ing vnknowne, it had ministred occasion to seeke many other courses, and to impose many duties sometime vp∣pon proprieties, sometime vpon Legacies, and testamen∣tory successions, left to strangers; vpon carriages as well by water as land; vpon Wine, Meale, Salt, and other Merchandize; vpon Contract, Seales, Waights, and Mea∣sures: Of which tolls euery man insensibly payes his part; the Merchant making the aduance of those which are le∣uied vpon the Merchandize, the which hee retires af∣terwards from parti••ular persons which they buy of him.

Yet some which disalow of this diuersity of poling and tributes in an Estate, holding a Subsedy the most iust, if it were well ordered,* 1.292 haue thought to bring in a certayne and setled order, whereby they might regulate themselues in drawing from euery man the number of his goods. This order hath beene practised in many Common-weales; but neuer more happily, nor with more aduantage to the E∣state, then in that of Rome.

To say that this expedient is more proper for a Com∣mon-weale,* 1.293 then for a principality, there is little co∣lour, seei••g that when it was established at Rome, the Estate was gouerned by King Seruius Tulliu••; and con∣tinued vnder all the Emperours which sought to gouerne iustly.* 1.294 And contrariwise the Tyrants which sought by

the meanes of a small number to gouerne, treade vnder foot, and oppresse others, to enrich some, and to im∣pouerish others; Finally, to turne all topsie turuey, for that they would not discouer their Iniustices, violen∣ces, and tyran••ies; haue neglected this order, laying their exactions with more impunity vpon the weake, then if they were diuided among them all with a iust proportion.

To say likewise,* 1.295 that it were a hard matter to expose the pouerty of some to scorne and contempt, and the wealth of others to enuy; it is a very bad reason to hinder a good establishment: For neuer man of vnde••standing, in that which concernes his good, made any accompt of enuy or scorne. But besides this we may say, that on the other side enuy would cease against such whom they held rich, and haue nothing; and the scorne against such as haue some wealth, who notwithstanding were held poore. It is certayne that the deceitfull Merchant, who hath a designe to steale the goods of another by playing banquerout, will say, that it is not good they should know the course, traffique, and negotiations of Merchants, which consist many times in papers and credit; nor that they should discouer the secrets of Houses and Families. But he that is an honest man, and will be knowne for such, for a good husband, and not a deceiuer, will ground his credit vpon his Discretion, and not vpon the vncertainty of his affaires; and will alwayes take delight, they should know his estate and manner of liuing: And there is no man which doth not more willingly lend an eare to a poore man, who shall be knowne for an honest man, and a good husband, then to a rich, which shall be held for a bad husband, and of little faith.

But in recompence of these imaginary inconueniences,* 1.296 an infinite number of aduantages redound to the Estate, by the establishment of this order. For thereby they should know who are prodigall, banquerouts, cozeners,

and Vsurers; how some gaine so much, and others spend: And moreouer, the penalties of Iudgements and con∣demnations, would be easie to regulate by the Iudges, ac∣cording to the ability of euery mans estate. The deceipts which are practised in Marriages, Sales, Bargaines, and in all publique and priuate negotiations, would be disco∣uered and knowne: An infinite number of frauds which are vsed touching Successions and portions, would be a∣uerred, without inquiery, or rather charges of Law; and they should preuent falshoods and false Witnesses, which are practised dayly. But besides these aduantages, to returne where we left, the facility wou••d be great in a ne∣cessity to draw succours from the Subiects without iniu∣••tice, not oppressing one more then another; as it falls out vsually, some bearing the whole burthen, and others be∣ing discharged.

This facility of extraordinary leuies is the fourth point; which may cause an Estate to be held rich.* 1.297 For we shall in vaine bragge of the abundance of an Estate, and of the ordinary stocke of the treasure: the which as wee haue ••ayd, how great soeuer it be, may be exhausted, and some∣time i••gaged, if the publique in an vrgent necessity may not be releiued by some extraordinary leuy, which may be done without Iniustice, disco••tentment, or insupportable oppression of any part of the Subiects, which would draw after it reuolts, seditions, and intelligences with the E∣nemies.

T••is numbring of their goods being vnable to be brought in, to equall euery man in such sort of contributions, they must haue a recourse to other meanes, the most iust and plausible that can be deuised, according to the quality of E∣states, and the condition of times, the which being vnable to set downe now in particular, it shall suffice to say gene∣••all, that the imposition which extends it selfe vniuersally o••e•• all the Subiects, of what condition soeuer they be, is the most gentle, the most profitable, and the most iust:

For that euery man paying, euery man payes the lesse, then if it were leuied of a lesse number; and yet it is farre greater; wherein it is more profitable to the Estate: And it is more iust, for that euery man hauing an interest in the preseruation of the Estate, euery one is likewise bound to contribute. But the principall part of Iustice would be•• if it be proportioned and layd equally among them that contribute, according to the proportion of euery mans estate; If the leuy be made without rigorous exe∣cutions, especially against the person. The contrary whereof doth vsually happen vpon leuie of the Subsedies, the which being imposed vpon view of the Countrey, as they say, and without any certaine ground, the goods of euery man being vnknowne to direct them, and leuy∣ing it vpon the poorest, they cause them many times to dye in Prison, which is a pouerty resenting Barbarisme: Or to get some delay of payment, the poore man must satisfie the Auarice of Receiuers, and Sergeants, which ruine him by such concussions, the which many times exceede the principall of the Subsedy.

But if some considerations be iust, to exempt cer∣tayne conditions of persons,* 1.298 or that making the im∣position generall, some trouble is to be feared▪; they must haue recourse to those that are casuall As after the Ciuill Warres at Rome, they setled the twenti∣eth part of Successions and Legacies, which were left to Strangers or Collaterals. And before in the time of Warre likewise, at the request of the Con∣sul Manlius, they ordayned the twentieth part of infranchised men.

In Scotland Malcolana hauing sold all the Kings De∣mesus, the Estates of the Countrey agreed, that the Fees changing hand, should pay vnto the King a certaine right of redemption.

Impositions likewise and customes may bee iustly* 1.299 layd vpon all that which may corrupt the man∣ners

of the Subiects, eyther to contayne them, or to han••sh th••m away. This re••son was the cause that in some Estates they haue charged suits with diuers duties; and in others they haue only punished them that sled from them, imposing great amercements vpon them that say∣led; and in others they haue punished rash pleaders, which lost their causes; as at Athens and Rome. Those likewise which may be established without opposition, which come from some Body vnited and of authority, may be receiued for the facility of their establishment, to the which they haue many times more regard in such things, then vnto Iustice. But if the necessity be such, as they must prouide a speedy remedy, and that they can∣not attend the time, which would be necessary for the e∣stabliment, and the leuy of an imposition: there is no o∣ther meanes, then to make vse of voluntary borrowing••, vpon those that are best able,* 1.300 whom they shall pay at a prefixed time without sayling, to the end they may main∣tayne the credit of the publique, and that whensoeuer the like necessity should happen, they might finde the pur∣ses of priuate men open to succour him. But if he can∣not finde money without interest, he must to the end to stay the course, prouide for the payment both of principal and interest by the same assignation, the which shall be deliuered into the hands of such as lend, as well being as∣sured by this meanes of their due, they might lend ano∣ther time more freely: As for feare, that this assignation remaining in the hands of those which mannage the bu∣sinesse, it should be otherwise disposed of, whereby the the Prince should not onely ••oose his credit, but should finde himselfe at the end of the time charged with great interest.

CHAP. 47. Of the mannaging and good husbandry of the Trea∣sure: That is to say, of the ordring of the expences, and the cutting it off.

THe ground of the Finances being found, we must order the mannaging, which consists in two principall points. The one concernes the hus∣banding of it, the other the quality of the per∣sons which are to be admitted to this mannaging. The husbanding hath two parts, that is to say, the order and gouerning of the expences, or if it exceeds the receipt, the cutting off part of the charges.

Touching the order of the expence, if in all things that which concernes God, is to be preferred,* 1.301 the same must likewise be obserued in the Treasure. Wherefore the first Chapter of the expence, must bee of Almes, wherein he may not be sparing.* 1.302 The Kings of France haue had goodly examples in St. Lewis, who founded and endowed Twenty eight Bodies or Colledges, as the Seigniour of I••inuille sayth; And had dayly in his traine one hundred and twenty poore,* 1.303 and in Lent two hundred and forty, feeding them with meate from his Table. So hee liued in great honour, feared of his Enemies, reuerenced by his Friends, adored by his Subiects, and after hee had Reigned Forty foure Yeares, hee left two Sonnes, whose poste∣rity haue Reigned, and doe yet ouer the French; and his Realme exceeding rich, and flourishing to his Successor, recommending especially vnto him, that hee should bee deuoute towards Almighty God, and charitable vnto those who are poore and mise∣rable. Almes doe neuer impouerish an Estate,* 1.304 nor a

family, but contrariwise they enrich them with all sorts of blessings.

The second Chapter of the expence must be the freeing of the charges of the Estate,* 1.305 but first of those which are necessary for its safetie; as the pay of Souldiers, Muniti∣ons, Artillery, Shipps and Vessells of Warre, Repayrati∣ons and Fortifications of Townes and important places, entertainment of Spies, and finally all the Expences, as∣well ordinary as extraordinary, necessary to warrant the Estate, against the inuasion of strangers, or the reuolt of Subiects.* 1.306 Next must follow the Fees of Officers, espe∣cially of those, by whose meanes they hold the rest in their duty and obedience, these making a part of the safe∣ty. Then follow the debts, which I place next to the ne∣cessary charges for the safety: For that if by the meanes of these charges, the Estate be not secure, the debts cannot be assured.

* 1.307After these come Recompences; with which they shall not charge the Treasure as little as may be, for the which the King must bestow Offices and Dignities, and accustome all the great Men not to seeke any other kind of Recompence, which is of most share and more dura∣ble, then that which is made by money. For a Prince which aduanceth some one to hon••r that hath done him seruice,* 1.308 he publisheth the merrit of him whom he recom∣penceth, and his fauour withall, the which remaines continually in the mind of him that receiues it; And it lasts as long in the minds of the people, as they see him, who hath receiued it in this degree: And moreouer the remembrance which they haue, to haue seene a Man gratified for his merrit, many by this meanes are inuited to serue, seeing seruices so honorably rewarded▪ where∣as to recompence in money, few know it, and the grace many times continues no longer then the mo∣ney lasteth.

The Prince may likewise recompence his seruants, to

the discharge of his Treasure, in procuring eyther for them or theirs, marriages and alliances of aduantage; Not thereby to force his Subiects, for that were tiranny: But he that sees himselfe debarred of the Princes fauour, is glad sometimes to approach by the meanes of the al∣liance of one, that is in grace with his Master, though o∣therwise inferiour in meanes, and family; Especially when the inequallity is not such, as hee may receiue some dis∣honor by the alliance. Knowing then how to husband these kind of recompences, the greatest part of great ser∣uices will be rewarded; and recompences of small ser∣uices will be of so little moment, as they will not greatly charge the Treasure.

After recompences follow gifts, the which must not be done at pleasure:* 1.309 But as recompences are made for seruices done, gifts must likewise be for seruices, accor∣ding to the quality and impo••tance thereof, as also to the quallity, sufficiencie, and power of the person, the Prince must moderate his bounty,* 1.310 and giue not to one a∣lone, but to many, little, and often. I say to many, for that in giuing to one alone, the enuy is great, the grace little, and the ingratitude of him that rece••ues, may one day be hurtfull. I say little and often, especially in money, which is soone consumed, for that the great expence in gifts wast the Treasure, and accustome those that re∣ceiue them, to moderate dem••unds. Small bounties of∣ten reitterated, are as it were insensible; the grace is the more durable in the minds of those which receiue them, and the desire and hope in continuing the seruice to receiue daily, bind Men the more. I except the gifts that are made to Embassadours and Forraigne Princes, the which are done for reputation, and to shew the magnificence of him that giues them, or of his Estate, and may in no sort bee omitted where they haue beene ac∣customed.

* 1.311 The expence which followes, is that which hath

beene propounded by some, for the breeding vp and in∣structing of youth, to that whereunto they shall be found fit, (especially the poore) as we haue formerly sayd, by the Erecting of publique houses, for manuall Arts, and all sorts of manufactures: Whereunto may bee added the building of Seminaries for piety, and the study of Diuini∣ty,* 1.312 and other learned vocations; and some for the excer∣cises of honor and vertue of the Nobility. In many Estates they haue prouided a great number of Seminaries, for pie∣ty and the sciences; but the greatest are so ill gouerned, as they are become vnprofitable, by the disorder which is found in them.

* 1.313 As for Seminaries of honor and vertue, I meane those places which are destinated for the instruction of the No∣bility, which are to be imployed in Armes; in long and dangerous voyages; and in the mannaging of publique affaires: Whereof hitherto they haue made small accompt. And yet the safety and reputation of an Estate, especially of a principallity, consists in those of this condition: Who, if with that greatnesse of courage, which is not na∣turall vnto them, they ioyne industry and prudence, which may be gotten by exercises and instructions, fit for their profession; there is no doubt but many would haue beene more capable to serue the publique, then they are.

* 1.314 It were a great Art both of pollicy and wisedome, if the Prince should cause the young Gentlemen of his E∣state to be bred vp in those places, whose Fathers haue not the meanes to vndergoe the charge of such an instructi∣on, as is necessary for them of this condition: And there to entertaine thē at the charge of the publique, vnto a cer∣taine Age, to ••e distributed & do seruice in the troups and garissons, affecting c••••taine places of honor vnto them, with suffi•••••••••• ••••terta••ment, to the which they may bee ad••a••ced a••••r they haue se••ued some time. For besides that these M••n, gouerning all the affaires of the Prince,

they would be more faithfull vnto him: The Gentlemen who find themselues burthened with many children, and who for feare to leaue them miserable, become house∣doues, to husband both their liues and goods, would ha∣zard the one and the other freely for the Princes seruice, and not be diuerted for the care of their Children, whom they knew could not one day faile of preferment, aswell by reason of the institution, as for the beginning of im∣ployment for the Princes seruice, which should bee assu∣red vnto them. And the charge which should be made in these Seminaries, would be recompenced by the seruice, which the whole Nobility, would bee thereby inuited to do, willingly and freely to the publique: And the troupes, especially those of Foote, would bee found with more order, discipline, fidellity, and courage, being filled with young Men of good houses, bred vp with honour and o∣bedience, then they now are, being for the most part Men of no moment, Ryotous, and drawne together from all parts.

After all these expences, come those which may serue eyther for the commodity,* 1.315 or the decoration of Townes and Prouinces; as conduits of Water, structure of Bridges, repairation of wayes, Churches, Royall Pallaces, Pyra∣mides, Tombs, Statues, Collosses, and other publique buil∣dings: But with this restraint, neuer to enter into those expenses, vntill the sparing of the sōme which is necess∣ry, be first made. For to multiply the Subsedies, to make Pallaces, more stately then necessary, were to leaue a re∣membrance of his tyranny, aad a perpetuall testimony to posterity, that they haue built with the blood of the Subiects.

Behold the principall husbandry which consists in the order of the expence.* 1.316 But the stocke of the Treasure be∣ing not sufficient, to beare all these charges, most part of which seeme necessary; they must seeke the meanes to raise the Farmes, and fall to the cutting off of debts, espe∣cially

of interests, of Fees, and of excessiue gifts, ra∣ther then to come (as they haue done in many Estates) to make new impositions. In an Estate where the Prince finds himselfe ill assured of the will of his prime Men, they haue obserued the course which Eumenes vsed, to borrow of those that were ill affected, to the end that in∣teressing them in the Estate, and the losse thereof, for feare of loosing their debt they helpe to maintaine it. But if they finde some hinderance to assure themselues else∣where, this meanes would be but weake. Wherefore a Prince must neuer borrow, vnlesse it bee in an vrgent ne∣cessity: For there is nothing that doth so much harme to a bad husband, (as the publique is many times) then credit.

* 1.317I know that many hold, that this cutting off of debts or wages is vniust: as in truth it is, if the Estate hath wherewithall to pay: But if the sparing of the ordinary Reuenew be not sufficient to satisfie, the necessity makes this cutting off necessary and iust. For to satisfie it by a new imposition, were to repaire one iniustice by another more generall, & to draw most commonly from the poore to giue vnto the rich; in which cutting off part of the in∣terest of debts, will not preiudice so much, although it be great, as a Subsedie would do the Poore. I doe not say, that among those to whom the Prince is indebted, there may bee some one found, to whom this cutting off would bee hurtfull: But for one of that quality among the Princes creditors, there would be fiue hundred of the poore re∣duced to beggery, if they should by that meanes pay the debts due by the Estate: the which I vnderstand of E∣states which are already ouercharged with great imposi∣tions, and likewise with great debts.

CHAP. 48. Of those which ought to be imployed in the gouernment of the Treasure.

AS for the quallity of those to whom the mannag∣ing of the Treasure ought to be committed,* 1.318 if Men could be knowne, there is not any one, but would make choice to deliuer it into the hands of the most loyall: But making this choyce most common∣ly by hazard, I say that although we suppose him to be an honest Man, to whom wee will giue this charge; yet we must not take neither a poore Man nor a needy, nor one that is too powerfull, nor of too great authority. The first for feare that through necessity he bee not inuited to rob vs; and the other least that he steale from vs too boldly, and hauing robbed vs, we are not able to call him to an accompt, and to punish his thefts.

There is besides this an ordinary fault which is cōmitted in this subiect in many Estates, which is, that they make a trade of it apart, and profession of the managing of the Princes purse. So as he that enters into it, instructs him∣selfe as to an Art to do his owne businesse; the which he cannot doe but with the preiudice of the publique: Thus the elder they grow, the more learned they are, that is to say preiudiciall to the Estate. I doe much commend that ancient custome of the Romans,* 1.319 to imploy young Men in the mannaging of the Treasure, before they aduan∣ced them to any other Offices: For this is to giue them occasion to shew their discretion, and for the hope to bee one day something more, to incourage them to doe their duties well, and to mannage the publique Reue∣newes. Besides, this youth is lesse auaritious then another

Age, and more innocent, and lesse hardy in deceipts, easie to be discouered:* 1.320 So as the Romans leauing them but a short time in these charges, to bee aduanced to other ho∣nors, they came forth more innocent then they en∣tred.

To say that a long experience is necessary in these pla∣ces, to mannage them well,* 1.321 this were to endeare the trade. The greatest pollicy in the Treasure to serue the pub∣lique, is to haue no other but discretion; and to know how to write downe that which hee receiues and paies; to recouer that which he receiues not, hauing charge to make the recouery, and to follow exactly the comman∣dements and ordinances of those which haue power to or∣daine. There is no factor in a shop but vnderstands this. But I will confesse, that to know how to steale from the publique cunningly, and to couer and disguise his thefts, he must haue a long experience of ill doing, be it to defend the falshood of an acquittance, of the omission of a receipt, of a false reprisall, of a disguising of parties, and a secret composition with those that are to receiue; with other courses o••dinary to those which deale in this trade; Not meaning to taxe honest Men.

Some to make accomptants more diligent to make their receipts, and to hinder them that they may not maliciously (as it often happens) make reprizes,* 1.322 or to ease some more then others, or to vse it for their owne particular, or for some other designe; haue held it fit to regulate their Fees proportionably to that which they are to receiue, and to diminish thē, according vnto that which they shall leaue in reprizes, to the end that being interessed in their owne particular, they would be more exact to make their receipts. Others haue giuen their receipt to make the a∣batments, with charge to make it good, and not to bring in any not soluable: The which would seeme more iust.

As for those which ought to heare and examine the ac∣compts,

besides the choyce that they are to make, of the honestest men for this ••ffect; it is necessary to bind them, to iudges accordi••g to certain•• formes and orders, which haue beene held fit to hinder the abus••s which accomp∣tants, or themselues might commit: And especially to draw particular Notes of the distribution of the Treasure, which they shall enjoyne the accomptant to verifie, vpon those of the receipt and expence, without any meanes of dispencing, for any occasion whatsoeuer; but afterwards he may addresse himselfe vnto the Prince, if there bee any reason to ••ase him.

But as the Prince is not alwayes at leasure,* 1.323 nor some∣times of experience to regulate & direct his owne affaires; and that moreouer, hee is importuned by an infinit num∣ber of beggers, whom if he should satisfie, his Treasure would be found too short: To free himselfe of the ha∣tred, which the deniall of so many demaunds might pur∣chase him, and to discharge himselfe of the importunity; the custome is to send such sutors to a Councell consist∣ing of rough and seuere men, more inclined to refuse then to graunt; and who know how to moderate the denialls which they make, as they doe not depriue those which are refused of all hope, to be satisfied in some other thing: For rough and contumelious denialls, may distast many, from imploying themse••ues in the Princes seruice, al∣though the Prince make not the deniall: For that as they loue the dogg for the Masters sake, it falls out often, that when the dogg bites too sharply, in the end they take ex∣ceptions at the Master.

CHAP. 49. Of the Exchequer or sparing of Treasure.

* 1.324 THere remaines to speake of the Exchequer, the which some haue held hurtfull to the publique, e∣uen that which is made to heape vp Treasure, draw∣ing apart great summs of Gold and Siluer, God forbidding it Deutr••nomy. This many times hath caused some to attempt against Estates: As the sonne of Tygranes, who besieged Sop••one, a Towne in Armenia, which Pom∣peys Army, to haue his Fathers Treasure. Moreouer this gathering together ruines the Commerce and traffique of the Subiects; and doth not hinder the ruine of the Estate, when as the affaires are thereunto disposed. Sardinapalus l••ft forty Millions of Gold to those which slue him. Da∣rius left fourscore to Alexander who vāquished him. And many times the Father, who leaues much Gold and Siluer to the Sonne, leaues him withall a speedy meanes to ruine him. For a young Man relying vpon his Treasure, thrusts himselfe into impossible enterprizes, which are aboue his fo••ces; hates peace; contemns the friendship of his Neighbours; Enters into Warre not onely vnnecessary ••nd of little profit, but also hurtfull.

Yet custome is contrary, as also reason, if we had the consideration of heaping vp of Treasure: For that to ga∣ther toget••er money when as necessity doth presse, that were too late: For that the bruit of Armes, causing traf∣fique to ••••ase, Tillage, and the gathering in of fruits, the customes and imposts by co••s••quence would decay; and the Sub••ect•• (imp••uerished by the lodging of souldiers, ••••d the holding of the Fields) will be vnable to p••y.

But there must be two considerations added for the ga∣thering in of Treasure.* 1.325 The one to make it equall to the other forces of the Estate, that is to say, of persons, whom we may imploy, and of Munition of Victualls and War, which are nec••ssary for vs; whereof wee must make a Magazine or store-house before we gather Treasure. For to hope that without it, the Treasure alone which we ga∣ther will preserue vs from ruine, were a vaine thing; and the examples aboue mentio••ed shew it sufficiently. The other considerations is, not to draw together so much Gold and Siluer, as it may incommodate the commerce and traffique of the Subiects: For this were to dry vp the spring of the Treasure. If the Sea should retaine all the waters of the Riuers which disgorge themselues into it, and not ••eturne them to their fountaines, by conduits vn∣der ground; it would dry vp the Riuers, and in the end grow dry it selfe. Wherefore they which will shew a∣ny discretion in heaping of Treasure,* 1.326 haue considered in grosse the quantity of money, which goes forth and ••nters yearely into an Estate: And if there enters more then goes forth, they haue held that a Prince might lawfully, and without any interest of the commerce, lay vp yearely in his Exchequer, as much Gold and Siluer, as the entry exceeded the going forth. But if the entry hath not ex∣ceeded the going forth, they haue held and with reason, that the Prince ought not to lay vp any Treasure.

But in this case there is another Remedy, of which we haue formerly made mention▪ which is, that af••er nec••s∣sary charges are payed,* 1.327 the Prince hauing meanes to spare somethi••g for his neede, he may distribute it vpon mode∣rate in••erest to the Marchants of his Estate, taking neces∣sary security, (as we haue sayd Augustus did) to y••ild it at a c••rtaine time. For in this manner, the assuranc••s be∣ing good, this supply would bee as ready as if it were in his Coffers: And the interest being such as the Marchan•• may gaine ther••by, the commerce is no way diminished

by this sparing, but rather augmented, and the Subiects and Prince enricht by this meanes.

But men haue beene much troubled for the guard of Treasures of Gold and Siluer.* 1.328 The Kings of Peru, kept it in great Massies, of Gold and Siluer: The Romans in Lin∣gotis in the forme of Tyles; The Kings of Morocco cau∣sed Massie Boules to be made, which set vpon the top of their Mosquees or Temples; Some (to be guarded more religiously) haue put them into Churches. As the guard in a Common-wealth is not vneasie, so in a Principality or Monarchie it is most difficult. For they haue not so much cause to guard it from theeues, as from their owne Princes, who for their priuate pleasures, or by the im∣portunity of some flatterers, scatter that in one yeare, which their predecessors haue gathered in many. So Caligula spent in one yeare, seauentie and seuen Millions of Gold, which Tyb••rius (as they write) had drawne together: And Carcalla consumed in one day, that which Seuerus his Father had spared in Ninteene yeares.

Wherefore as it is most fitting, that few men should know what is layd vp in the Treasure, least that being too much, it should prouoke some through Enuy to se••ke to get it; or being too lit••le, it should make vs to bee contemned of our Enemies: So many haue held it fit▪ to ordaine not to touch the Treasure, but in the great ne∣cessity of the Prince and State, and by the Councell of the Magistrates, of greatest autority.

CHAP. 50. Of treaties in generall, be it for the enter-view and parley of Princes, or by their Depu∣ties and Emb••ssadours.

EStates are like vnto buildings raised high,* 1.329 the which although they bee built of good m••••erials, and strong Walles, yet to subsist long, they haue neede to be supported and vnderpropt without with Buttresses, Pillars, and Arches; For that being threatned as well without as within, they must bee rampired against all forces. Wherefore the care of the affaires of Strangers, especially of his Neighbours, is most necessary for a Prince, and for any man that shall bee called to the Rule or Goue••nment of the Estate.

This Care consists in three principall points.* 1.330 The first is how hee shall gouerne himselfe with his Neigh∣bours. The second consists in gaining some credit a∣mong them, to haue a part in their deliberations. The third and last, being vnable to passe without them, to get meanes to pierce into their Designes. The man∣ner how to gouerne himselfe with his Neighbours, depends of the manner of treating with them, and of the obseruation of treaties, according vnto the which hee must gouerne himselfe. The manner of treating depends chiefly of the condition of persons and of af∣faires. Yet there are some generall considerations which deserue to be knowne.

The first is in the ouerture, which is made to treate, it many times happening,* 1.331 that of two Princes which are Enemies, the one will not seeke vnto the other for an Accord, so as the ouerture must bee made eyther

by some greater Prince, or by some Neighbour that is a Friend to both: and sometimes the Ministers of two Princes meeting accid••ntally together, if they be imploy∣ed. Argenion, and a Steward to the Duke of Man∣toua, m••eting at Creal Carragio, to condole in their Masters names for the death of Marquesse of Montfer∣rat, made an ouerture for the treaty of peace, betwixt Charles the eight and Lewis Sforse. King Ferdinand of Aragon hath imployed Monkes to that effect, Religi∣on giuing a free accesse to those of this condition, and liberty to speake and propound what they will. The Ouerture to enter into treaty being made, the Prin∣ces resolue to parley themselues, to the end the treaty may be more secret; or they depute Embassadours to that effect.

Many haue not allowed of this Enter-view of Prin∣ces, although they were Friends:* 1.332 And pa••ticularly Phi∣lip de Comiues, obserues many examples of the meeting of Princes, who being fo••merly good Friends, haue become ••nemies after this Enter-view. Yet I hold that in such affaires we cannot prescribe a certaine and g••nerall Rule; Histories teaching vs, that other Princes haue parled; and yet no hatred hath ensued: So this depends rather of the Estate of affaires, and of the conformity and diuersity of humours, and manner of li••i••g, of the Princes and their people, then of the E••t••r-view. That of Lewis the twelfth of France, and of Ferdinand of Aragon at Sauonne, past fairely: As also that of the Emperour Charles the fift, with Pope Clement the seuenth at Bolonia; and that of the same Pope with Francis the first.* 1.333

But it shall be discretion in a Prince, before he comes to that, to consider, if at this parley there may not some∣th••ng fall out that may breed iealousie or enuie against him, or that may draw him into contempt of him with whom hee t••eat••s. The Emperour Maximilian the first,

hauing appointed a place and Day to parley with King Lewis the twelfth, came to the assignation. But fea∣ring that he should not appeare so well accompanied as Lewis the twelfth, whose trayne was in better order then the Germans, he anoyded this Enter-view, which might haue bred some contempt of him and his with the French; and sought a pretext before he parted, or the King arriued, excusing himselfe vpon the Warre which the Venetians made in Friuly, whether it was necessary for him to transport himselfe speedily. The place of par∣ley is likewise v••ry considerable, as well for the safe∣ty, as for the honour which he receiues, whom they goe to finde in his owne Pallace.

The consideration of the safety is commonly the prin∣cipall. And the distrust which King Francis the first had,* 1.334 that vnder pretext of a parley with the Empe∣rour Charles and the Pope, whereunto hee was inui∣ted during the hostage of his two Sonnes in Spaine) they would retaine him, made him refuse to come. The same consideration hath sometimes beene the cause, that two Princes being Enemies, haue parlyed vpon a Bridge, made to that end vpon a common Riuer, with barres and shuttings betwixt them; least that the Princes which parley, or those which follow them, falling into con∣testation for something, should not attempt one against the other: As it happened at the parley betwixt Charles the seuenth, then Dolphin, and the Duke of Burgun∣dy, who was slayne by Tann••quin Du Cha••tel: which was the cause that this manner of parling was obserued betweene King Edward of England and Lewis the E∣leuenth. But Lewis Sforse hauing demanded to haue the same▪ forme obserued and kept, being to parley with Charles the Eighth in his returne from Naples, they refused him, as to one who ought not to treate with the King as an Equall, to whose fidelity hee did wrong, to demand such assurances. Yet this hath no certaine

Rules: But they goue••ne themselues in such things ac∣cording to the confidence which they may take one of a∣nother.

The ordinary course is to choose for these En∣ter-viewes, eyther a neuterall place belonging to some common Friend; or a place vpon the frontire, or an I∣land; to regulate the number of those which shall accom∣pany the Princes: And if the iealousie bee great, they may specifie the Armes, which euery one may carry in these Enter-viewes.

But if of two Princes, the one goes home vnto the o∣ther, he is bound to doe him the houour of his House: And if the Prince be inferiour vnto him, hee must send forth the Chiefe of his Court to receiue him: But if he be his equall in quality, as being both Kings, although there be some debate betwixt them for precedence, if he come first to the place where the treaty is to bee ••ade, hee must goe himselfe.

In the Enter view which was betwixt King Lewis the twelfth and Ferdinand of Aragon at Sauona, which then belonged vnto the Fren••h King, Lewis the twelfth at the approach of Ferdinands Galley, (before he could land) entred into it, accompanied onely with his Guard; to ••estifie his confidence, and thereby to as∣sure King ••erdinand of that which hee should finde in h••m: And at their going to land, King Lewis left the right hand to Ferdinand, who lodged in the Castle, as the most honourable place; and himselfe went to the Bi••••••ppricke.

When two Pri••ces vnequall in quality, parley, some hold that it is for the inferiour to come first vnto the p••ace of meeting,* 1.335 there to attend the greater. Yet the contrary hath beene most commonly obserued vpon this rea••on, that the lesse ought to goe vnto the greater. So as ••e is to goe first vnto the place where the parley ••s to ••ee made: And this was particularly practi∣sed,

at the enter-view of Pope Clement the seuenth, and King Francis the first, although that Marseilles were in the Kings sub••ection.

It is presumed that two Princes doe not meete for small matters,* 1.336 the which doth many times put their Neigh∣bours in Iealousie of these Enter-viewes: they must finde out some apparant and important pretext, the which may bee pub••ished to free their Neighbours from all Iea∣lousie, vnder which they may treate what else they please. When Pope Cl••m••••t the seuenth came to Marseilles, to treate the Marriage of his Neece, with him that was afterward King Henry the second; this trea∣ty might haue beene crost, if they had knowne the De∣signe; hee borrowed the pretezt of a generall peace, and an Enterprize against Infidels, the which could not put the Neighbours in Allarme, carrying a faire shew, and hauing in it many particularities, which de∣serued to be treated by mouth, be it for the taking away of all difficulties the more easily, or for the holding the businesse the more secret.

If they hold it fit to treate by Deputies and Embassa∣dors, as it is the ordinary,* 1.337 the more safe will bee to choose a man of a meane condition, experience in Ne∣gotiations, and who vnderstands no lesse the Estate, af∣faires, and dependancies of him with whom hee treates, then the Estate and affaires of his owne Master:* 1.338 Neyther must he be interessed in the businesse whereof he treates. This was an Errour, to commit the soliciting of the diffe∣rence of the Duke of Ferraria, to Alberto Pio, Embas∣sador for France with Pope Iulio the second,* 1.339 who in steed of pacifying the sayd Pope against the Duke, he incensed and vrged him the more; fearing that if the sayd Duke were reconciled to the Pope, hee would get the other Moiety of Carpy, which the sayd Alberto Pio enioyed.

I haue sayd of a meane condition,* 1.340 for that

the great Men of an Estate are not fit, as well for the iust feare they may conceiue of them, that vnder colour of treating, they should suffer themselues to bee practised by the other side; as for that they haue sometimes interests and reasons, which concerne them in their particular, to the which they doe willingly accōmodate the affaires of their Master, and to his disaduantage: Besides there is seldome found so much patience and sufficiency in Men of this condition, as is needfull in such Negotiations. Nei∣ther may they choose men of a base condition, as Lewis the Eleuenth did who imployed his Barber; least that he with whom we treate, or his Deputies, doe not finde themselues contemned by this choyce. Yet in secret trea∣ties, they stand not much vpon the choyce, and these last are commonly most proper, as those of whom they haue least distrust: Vnlesse they hold it more fit to make vse of Embassadors, which reside with the Prince, with whō they meane to treate; of some Prisoner take•• in the War, as the treaty of the League, made betwixt Ki••g Lewis the twelfth and the Venetians, by Andrew Gr••tty then Priso∣ner to the King.

* 1.341These secret Treaties are vsually made when there is question to make a League one with another. They are made for diuers intentions: But most commonly to en∣tertaine and deceiue him with whom they treate, or to surprize his enemy, or to assure himselfe of two enemies which make Warre, treating with one secretly, and the o∣ther openly. Pope Alexander the sixt, promised King Ferdinand by a breife, to assist him for the defence of Naples, in case that Ferdinand should promise to doe the like for the Estate of the Church. The League which was treated betwixt Lewis the twelfth and the Venetians, was so secret, as neither Lewis Sforse, nor the Pope, did euer know what had beene treated, vntill the Army was ready to march. The treaty of the same French King, which Ferdinand King of Spaine, was no lesse secret, to breake

the League betwixt Spaine and England, the King of England hauing sent a Herrald to the King of Spaine, to summon him to performe their League, who arriued at the same time when as the peace betwixt France and Spaine was proclaymed.

Pope Lee the tenth. Hauing made a League with the Emperour and the King of Spaine, treated with Lewis the twelfth, not by a Publique instrument, but by a scedule vnder his owne hand, to the end the businesse might bee carried more secretly, and that hee might assure himselfe of all sides. The same Pope treated afterwards secretly with the King of Spaine, for the defence of Italy: Yet meaning to entertaine King Francis the first, to slacken the preparations continued to treate with him, sometimes demanding one thing and sometimes another, to the end that the one being de∣nied him, hee might haue a Subiect to breake when hee should see his time; and to make the French King beleeue, that necessity more then his owne free will, had induced him to treate with the Spaniard, with whom hee had long before made a secret treaty. And distrusting that the King would not yeild to that which hee should demand, hee made dluers ambiguous and irresolute answers. The same Pope made another secret League, with the Emperour Charles the fift against King Francis the first, and when he was forced to de∣clare himselfe, made shew to treate a new with the Em∣bassadour of Spaine.

It is one of the ordinary policies among Princes, and wherewith the best aduised doe sometimes suffer themselues to bee abused,* 1.342 to propound a treaty to betray his commpanion, Pope Iulio the second, to winne time to make his preparations against the Duke of Fer∣rara, he entertained King Lewis the twelfth, mak∣ing shewe that hee would agree. The proposition of peace made by Lewis the twelfth vpon the difference

for the Du'chie of ••ill••••, was a meanes to chase the F••••••ch out of that Dutchy, the generall of N••••ma••dy, hauing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vpon that Subiect to make a ••••uy of Grysons, and thinking to spare the Ki••gs money lost that Estate. The same Pope Iulio the second, to the end nee might busie the same King, sent his Nuncios to treate a peace, with power to conclude it, but with certaine limitations, which might breed a doubt of his intention. And hauing recouered his health, hee continued the same treaty, and at the same time made a∣nother offensiue League with the Venetians and the King of Aragon, against the sayd King. After these prac∣tises, the King of Aragon, and the King of Eng∣land, kept the French King in doubt, of the League made by them, to the end they might hinder his pre∣parations. The Emperour Maximillian the first, to haue meanes to reuenge himselfe of the French King, by a fraudulent reconcilliation interrupted the treaty which was made betwixt the sayd King and the Ve∣netians, and hindred the preparations of Warre which the sayd King might make, making shewe that he would treate a peace with him.

The Spaniards, to interrupt the League which was ready to bee made, betwixt the Princes of Italy and Pope Clements the seauenth, after the battaile of Pauia, propounded vnto the sayd Pope to treate an accord. The which not onely hindred the League, and stayed the preparations of Warre which he might make; but also caused him to discharge the troupes which he had drawne vnto him for his safety. Hugo de Moncada, made other prepositions of an accord to the same Pope, to make him the more negligent to thinke of his defence.

Bourb••n, leader of the Emperours troupes, entertai∣ned the Pope with an accord, whilst the Army marched towards Rome. The Goufalonier of Florence, to keepe Pope Clement from attempting any thing open∣ly

against the Citty, entertained him with hope of some secr••t pra••••ises. The Spaniard (who in matter of State make no great difficulty to breake their faith,) doe more vsually practise this pollicie then any other Nation.

Alexander the sixt, (as Guichardin saith,) to busie his enemies excused those things that he could not deny, and deuised those were doubtfull, pacifiyng some with pro∣mises and good lookes, and assuring others by diuers meanes, treating with them a part, to the end hee might breed a iealousiy among them, and disvnite them.

Gonsalue in the treaty which hee made with the Duke of Calabria, sware vpon the holy Host, that hee would send him into France to his Father Fredericke. But the interest of State preuailed more with him, then the opinion of Men, or the feare of God; so as he sent them into Spaine. Hee makes the like reckoning of the faith which hee had giuen to Duke Valentine by his safe conduct; Notwithstanding the which hee sent him Prisoner into Spaine; But Ferdinand of Ara∣gon his Master sent him backe. For hauing sent Phillip Arch-Duke of Austria into France to treate an agree∣ment vpon the difference, for the diuision made of the Realme of Naples, betwixt him and King Lewis the twelfth, in regard of the limits and bounds: Not∣withstanding that the sayd treaty had beene sworne by the French King on the one side, and the sayd Arch∣Duke on the other, as procurator for the Kings of Spaine, And that they themselues had likewise sworne, vpon the holy Euangelist, and the Crucifix to confirme whatsoe∣uer he should doe; yet vnder diuers precepts, forbare to ratifie it, to the end that the longer the French King should remaine in this su pence, the longer hee would stay to make his preparations to succour his Men: who for want of releife, hauing bin forced to abandon the coun∣trey, the said Kings of Spaine, Notwithstanding their

solemne Oath, would heare no more speech of ratifying the treaty made by his Sonne in law.

From all these examples we may gather, that during a treaty, wee must watch more carefully, and make our selues the stronger, not onely to frustrate our E∣nemies of all hope to surprize vs, but to the end that the consideration of our forces may make vs obtaine conditi∣ons of more aduantage: And wee must not hold a treaty firme and concluded, vnlesse it be ratified by the Prince with whom we treate; especially if the treaty be made with a Prince whom they detayne Prisoner.* 1.343 For the force by the which he hath beene constrayned to promise, will alwayes dispence him to re-aduise himselfe. Pope Cle∣ment the Seuenth, refused to ratifie the Conditions which the Duke of Ferrara, when the sayd Pope was a Priso∣ner; saying, that it was an vnworthy thing, that a man in life should approue of that which had beene done in his Name, whilest he was dead. And King Francis the first excused himselfe to accomplish the treaty of Madrid, vp∣pon the inhumanity which Charles the fift vsed towards him, to extort from him the Cessions which he made: All which tooke not place, although the King had giuen his Children in hostage. As in the parlies of Princes, the place where the enter-view is to be made,* 1.344 is very consi∣derable; So is it in treaties of peace, which are made by Deputies. If it be to choose a League, there must be a conuenient place, not too farre from the confederates, to the end they may haue a more speedier answere of the difficulties that may happen. When as the Kings of France and England were to treate a League with the Princes of Italy, they resolued to treate in France, to be the nearer to England. Pope Iulio the second, meaning to treate with the Emperour and the French King, desired that the Embassadours should come to Rome, to the end hee might gaine the Emperours Minister by kinde vsage, pro∣mises, and benefits, to perswade his Maister to dis-vnite

himselfe from the French King. The which he of Franc•• refused to doe, being neyther reasonable nor honorable to treate a peace in the house of his Enemy, how great so∣euer he were. So as the vsuall course is to choose a neu∣ter place.

But the question is,* 1.345 if an Embassadour hauing agreed to goe vnto the Prince, with whom he is to treate, whe∣ther the Prince be bound to treate with the Embassadour himselfe; Or depute some of his Councell for that effect. This last manner of proceeding is the most vsuall, as wel to preserue the dignity of the Prince, which cannot bee maintayned amidst the contestations which happen in conferences; as for that Princes are vsually little practi∣sed in such negotiations. And the example of the Bishop of Gurgia is not therein to be followed; who going to Pope Iulio the second vpon his request to treate with him; and the sayd Pope hauing deputed three Cardi∣nals to that effect, he deputed three Gentlemen to con∣ferre with them, excusing himselfe vpon other affaires: For therein the sayd Bishop carryed, himselfe, not as a simple Embassadour, but as Lieutenant to the Emperour, to the which quality he had beene receiued at Rome by the Pope.

The Deputies being assembled,* 1.346 their seats are conside∣rable, they hauing no power to quit any thing of the ranke which their Maisters ought to hold. The first place is at the head or end of the Table, if there be one: The se∣cond is the first on the righthand; and the third is the first on the left hand of him that is at the end. And if there be many Deputies to one Prince, they vsually sit all on one side, to haue the more facility to conferre together, if it be needfull.

The seates being resolued, the Deputies are to see the Commissions of eyther side, and to consider of them:* 1.347 For that from thence doth grow the assurance which they may haue of the proceeding of the treaty; there being

Commissions so generall, and so ambiguous, as there∣by they may easily iudge, that he which hath giuen such to his Deputies, hath no will to conclude any thing: for that vnder these ambiguous and generall termes, he hath a desire afterwards to ground a new breach. Some desi∣ring to deferre the conclusion of a treaty, whereof the motion seemed reasonable on eyther side, they haue con∣cluded in requiring the Prince of the contrary pa••ty to consent vnto them before they ratifie it. The which Pope Iuli•• the second did, seeing himselfe prest by the Cardi∣nals, to make a peace with Lewis the twelfth, who pro∣pounded certaine Articles of an Accord vnto him: where∣upon the gaue Commission to the Cardinall of Final, and to the Bishop of Tiuolly, to transport themselues to the French Court, and there to treate; promising to ratifie the sayd Articles which had beene propounded vnto him, if the King consented. But he neyther gaue them Com∣mission, nor power to conclude them, hauing no will but to gaine time, and to frustrate the instance which the Consistory made vnto him for this pacification.

As for the clauses of treaties, there can be nothing cer∣taine prescribed,* 1.348 this depending of the differences, for the which the treaties are made, the which are infinite, be it for peace or truce, for the restitution of that which they pretend to haue beene vniustly taken from them, or for the Cession of rights, or else for limits and bounds; the which if they cannot regulate, they put them in sequestration or suspence, or they make some Act which may interrupt the prescription of him that holds them; or else for a passage, with consignation of hostages, or of Forts for the assurance; Or else for an offensiue or defen∣siu•• league, or for neutrality, whereof I will treate hereafter.* 1.349

But the principall considerations we must haue, are not to vse, nor to speake for a person which is odious to them with whom we treate; not to yeeld to the first demaunds

though iust, but to resist them stoutly: And yet if the dan∣ger be emment, wee must not study so much to Negoti∣ate with aduantage, as to prouide for safety: And especi∣ally to haue a care,* 1.350 that the clauses may not be Equiuocall and of a double vnderstanding, or so generall and indefinit, as they may breed a doubt in the interpretation of the treaty. The Spaniards are Masters in such practises. Isa∣belle of Castille, and Ferdinand of Aragon, circumuen∣ted Charles the eight when hee restored vnto them the County of Roussillon, vpon condition they should not hinder him in the conquest of Naples, they adding by a∣nother clause, that they meant not to be bound to any thing that might preiudice the Church: Reseruing vnto them∣selues thereby a liberty to take Armes, if they were requi∣red by the Pope; as Lord of the Fee of the Realme of Naples. And in truth after the restitution of the County of Roussillon, they began to exhort the King rather to turne his Armes against Infidells, then to make Warre a∣gainst Christian Princes; giuing hope vnder hand to the King of Naples and to the Pope, to be releiued by them; and preparing by these e••hortations, to breake with King Cha••les, when the occasion should be ready, and the Pope declare himselfe.

The same Spaniards deceiued the French in the treaty for the diuision of the Realme of Naples, betwixt King Lewis the twelfth of France and Ferdinand of Aragon, vpon the equiuocation of the denomination of the Prouin∣ces, made diuersly and in diuers times; the French think∣ing the confines should be regulated according to the an∣cient denomination, and the Spaniards according to the new, which they caused to be exprest in the treaty: They which treated on the French party, neuer considering, that in the diuersitie of Names, they are gouerned accor∣ding to the pr••sent vse. The protection taken by King Lewis the twelfth, of Bentineth, with Bolonia, vpon con∣dition he should not preiudice the rites of the Church,

the which was interpreted with no better faith. For whilest the King was an enemy to the Pope, hee inter∣preted the rites of the Church, for that which the Church enioyed when hee tooke the protection: And afterwards being vnited to the Pope, hee restrained this protection to the person and goods of Bentineth.

* 1.351Generall clauses are alwayes captions; as those for the defence of Duke Sforse in the Dutchy of Millan, which did not free him, but that they made his proces, for that he had had a part in the practises of Moroue with the Marquesse of Pesquiere, against the Emperour Charles the fift; who in the treaty he desired to make with the Pope against the French, propounded some generall clauses, to the end that vpon the difficulties the Pope should make, he might haue time to prouide for his affaires. These are the most generall considerations, which they may haue in treaties.

CHAP. 51. Of treaties of Peace and Truce.

THe treaties which they make with Neighbours, are either with enemies, or with friends; or with persons which desire to continue Neuters with vs,* 1.352 or we with them. The treaties which are made with our enemies, are eyther for a time or perpetuall∣Perpetuall, as the peace which is made to compose all dif∣ferences, and the Warre that is vndertaken for conquest or for repairation of iniuries, or to restore the Commerce and Hospitality.

* 1.353Treaties which are made for a time with our enemies, are called truces, the which are eyther generall for all the

Estates of the one or the other Prince, for all persons, and for all sorts of Commerce: Or else they are particular, for certaine places, for certaine persons, and for the Com∣merce; and sometimes they doe not extend it but of a suspencion of Armes. And when any one is bound by al∣liance, not to make peace or truce without the consent of his Ally, and that they doubt of his consent; they adde in the treaty, that it shall take place for all those which the contracters shall name, and they set downe no prefixed time, but that it shall continue vntill he shall refuse, and some Moneths after: As that which was made betwixt King Charles the eight, and the King of Spaine, and that betwixt Pope Clement the seauenth, and Don Hugo de Moncada, Embassadour to the Emperour.

Sometimes a generall truce holds the place of a peace, as that of a hundred yeares, betwixt the Acarnaues, and the Ambracoltes; and that betwixt Castille and Portugall: And these are commonly made betwixt Princes that are e∣quall in power, and will not quit any thing of their rights by a peace; and yet desire to liue quietly in the Estate wherein they are, satisfying by this meanes the point of honour.

Such treaties are many times lesse Subiect to rupture,* 1.354 then a peace which is made perpetuall, for that he which finds himselfe greiued with a treaty that is perpetuall, seemes to haue some reason to leaue it, seeing the greiuance cannot be otherwise repaired. But if the time bee limited, he hath no cause to complaine, for that he may (the time being expired,) persue that which he thinkes ought to be granted him: And if they haue a will to continue the truce, there is nothing so easie as to renew it. And admit they were well assured of the friendship, yet time causing friendship to grow cold, they haue also need to be renew∣ed by new treaties. Seeing that treaties being grounded vp∣on the interest of Princes, which change with the time, it is needfull to change them at the end of the time, or to

breake them off wholy, and it would bee•• meanes to auoyd the treacheries and periuries, which are commit∣ted vsually in the ruptures of treaties.

A truce is likewise made to aduance a peace and to treate it.* 1.355 It is in like manner sometimes for the more honest discharge of a league which they haue made with some other Prince, whom they haue accustomed to comprehend therein: so as a peace following it, or the truce being not accepted by him, they take occasion to leaue the l••ague, it being not his fault that leaues it, that the warre was not ended. And although it seemes that a truce cannot by its condition preiudice the pretentions in the principall, yet it is most certaine, that if he which is chased out of a contentious Estate, consents that du∣ring the truce, the commerce shall be forbidden to his subiects, hee doth wholy stop that gate; as Lewis the twelfth did in the truce which he made with G••nsalu•• after the conquest of the Realme of Naples.

CHAP. 52. Of treaties of Alliance.

THe treaties which are made with our neighbours as friends, are treaties of Alliance, equall or vn∣equall: the equall is eyther of simple freindship only, for the entertainement of traffique, or for ayde and succour, that of succours is for the defensiue or offensiue, and sometimes for both together with or a∣gainst all men, or against certaine Princes and Estates, and their All••••nces are contracted, either from Estate to Estate, and for the preseruation of the Estates one of ano∣ther; in which case by the death of the Prince they may not be interrupted: or else they are contracted betwixt

Prince and Prince; and then, after the death of one of the Princes, they must enter into a new treaty to continue it, if there be not a certaine time prescribed by the treatie, to the which the alliance must continue after the death of the Prince, or else they are made from an Estate and Prince to an Estate, and from an Estate to a Prince; where after the death of the Prince, it is necessary, if not of a new treaty, at the least of some confir∣mation of the precedents: Sometimes Alliances are contracted for an Enterprize, and for one effect only, in the which the Allies are inter••ssed, and it may bee called by the name of a league.

These leagues are commonly defensiue,* 1.356 but in ef∣fect they tend to attempt against some one; and there are secret Articles for it, as in that of Cambray a∣gainst the Venetians, in the which they borrowed the pretext of Religion and the peace of Christendome. In the league which was made before against Charles the Eight, betwixt the Pope, the King of Romans, the King of Spaine, the Venetians and the Duke of Mil∣lan, they borrowed the pretext for the defence of on•• anothers Estate, reseruing a place for such as would enter, and in the secret Articles it was agreed, that the Spaniards which were in Sicily, should helpe Fer∣dinand of Aragon to recouer Naples; the Venetians by Sea should inuade the Maritine places; the Duke of Millan should hinder the succours that came from France, and possesse himselfe of Asti, where the Duke of Orleans was; and that the Kings of Romans and Spaine, should either of them in their parts inuade France, when as Lewis the twelfth and Ferdinand of Aragon vnited themselues for the conquest of Naples, they likewise tooke a pretext that they would afterwards make warre against the Turkes.* 1.357

But besides the pretext, there are many things to bee considered in the treaty of a league that is to say, the

cause why they ioyne in league, belt for offence or de∣fence: The particular interest of euery one of the Leaguers, and his intention which seekes to vnite himselfe: With what Princes or Estates they make it their courage, con∣stancy, faith, and meanes; the commodities of their E∣states to assist the League: and how they shall hinder those which present themselues to enter, which are not fit for our Designe: against whom it is made. If hee be a powerfull Prince of himselfe, assisted by Friends, ha∣uing ••acility to inuade the confederates, eyther by him∣selfe, or by the meanes of his Friends, and his courage, when they are to make the League, and how they may excuse it, and whether the time of the League be precise∣ly limited to a certaine number of yeares, or whilst the Enterprize shall last. The contribution of Allies how it should be ordered, as well in the leuy of Souldiers, as in munitions of Warre and Victuals, who must first rati∣fie the treaty among the confederates, if there be many heads, or one alone, for the execution and ordinary cau∣ses of the Common-weale of the League.

The ordinary causes for the which they make a league, are eyther to facilitate a conquest;* 1.358 as that which was made betwixt Lewis the twelfth, and Ferdinand of Ara∣gon for the Realme of Naples: Or to ballance the for∣ces of one that is more mighty, in hindring him that he grow not greater, or diminishing his power. The A∣thenians vndertooke to succour the Aegyptians, not o••ely to dimi••ish the power of the Persian, as Diodorus wri••es, but to encrease their owne by the alliance of the Aegyptians.

A defensiue League which hath no other benefit but a n••cessary def••nce, and in the which meane Estates are in a man••er equally in••eressed, last vsually longer then an of∣fensiue L••agu••, which is voluntary, and from the which eyther of the Co••se••era••es will easily part when hee hath no more interest. So as in ballancing the interest of the

one and the other, he that shall finde himselfe accompa∣nied with distrust, and an opinion to bee irreconciliable to the common Enemy, would proue the most firme in the League.

But with all this we must consider the wisdome, cou∣rage, and meanes of him with home we ioyne in League.* 1.359 And as we may not choose him so powerfull, as hauing preuayled ouer our common Enemy, he may make no subiect vnto him: So we must not choose one that is light and inconstant, and of small meanes. They write that inconstancy, irresolution, and the timerousnesse of Pope Clement the Seuenth, ruined all the affaires of his Colleagues. The Venetians would not ioyne in League with Pope Alexander the sixt, hauing had ill suc∣cesse, being ioyned in League with Sixtus and Innocent, for that Popes comming to dye, they leaue Succes∣sors which haue other intentions and designes.

But the commodity or discommodity of Estates neare or farre off, is very considerable, as well in re∣gard of those which vnite themselues, as of those a∣gainst whom they make the League. And vpon this consideration all the Leagues which they haue pro∣pounded in Christendome against the Turke, haue gone to smoake: The danger of the Turke being held by Christian Princes vncertayne and farre off, and regarding more the Estates of some, then of o∣thers: Being vnable but with much time and labour to possesse their minds with this necessary ardor to at∣tempt against him.

By the like reason a League with the Turke is of small profit to a Christian Prince, who hath his Estate re∣mote from him, vnlesse it be for the trade of the Sub∣iect; as well for the great distance, as for that the manner of liuing of the one differs so much from that of the other, as there can grow no confidence betwixt them.

But if some one seekes vnto vs to bee receiued into

our league, whom wee hold not fit for our designe; they may propound such hard conditions vnto him, as hee would lose his desire. In like sort, if we be sought vnto to enter, eyther wee excuse our selues vpon the feare of some Enemy, against whom we must reserue our forees; as the Venetians did for feare of the Turke, when as they were sought vnto by Charles the Eight, or else wee will demand conditions of such aduantage for our selues, as hee which seekes vnto vs may not yeeld vnto.

To say when we are to make a League, it cannot be precisely done▪ this depending vpon the condition of affaires:* 1.360 But we may well say, that some haue held that we must not make a League, but after that the grea∣test Prince had imposed hard conditions vpon those with whom they made accompt to ioyne in League, and had by this meanes prepared to vnite themselues for their discharge. This was a Consideration which Pope Cle∣ment the Seuenth had, to deferre the conclusion of the League which was treated against the Gouernour of France, and the Princes of Italy, during the Impri∣sonment of King Francis the first; thinking (as it hap∣p••ned) that the Emperour (seeing the vncertainty of this League) was likely to impose harder conditions vpon the King; the which the King would neuer obserue, and so he should be forced to continue in the League of Ital••, to free himselfe: Whereas if the League had beene made before his Inlargement, it would haue made the Kings Conditions more milde, and more easie for the Emperour, in freeing the King to draw him from the other Confederates. Behold how euery man doth hus∣band the necessity of his Neighbour, the which being wisely exami••••d, may serue to iudge of the time when a League is to be made.

* 1.361Fo•• the time of its continuance, the League betwixt the Florentins and Luquois, against the Pisans was limi∣ted

by the treaty at three yeares. And the first Leagues which were treated among the Suizes,* 1.362 were also limi∣ted to a certayne time. Others haue no other limitati∣on but the ••nd of the Enterprize for the which it was made. But the question is, if the Enemy taking the Countrey, for the defence whereof the League was made, whether the Confederates be bound by the League, to assist him who hath lost it in the recouery. Some haue held that the defensiue did not extend so farre. Notwithstanding if there were no treaty which had co••∣cerned this conquest, yet it would seeme more reaso∣nable to comprehend the recouery in the defensiue, if it be generall. For as it hath for its end to preserue the Allie in his Estate, and that to attaine vnto it, the for∣ces must not onely remaine in the Countrey of the Allie, to attend the Enemy, but after denuntiation of the Wa••, and other acts of hostility done by the Enemy, they must enter into his Country, to the end to preuent him or to diuert him, from attempting any thing against the Ally; the offensiue being iudged by the agression, and not by that which followes: By a stronger reason they ought to enter into the Country conquered from the Al∣ly for the recouery thereof. So most commonly these excuses are not pretended, but by such as eyther fayle in their faith, courage, or meanes to make the reco∣uery.

Contribution is one of the points of a League most diffi••ult to regulate.* 1.363 It is made eyther in men or mo∣ney. The men are entertayned by all; or by him onely that hath need. The defensiue League betwixt the Kings of France and England against the Emperour, con∣tayned a reciprocall Succours of ten thousand men, if the Warre were made by Land; and of sixe thou∣sand if it were made by Sea: And in all other oc∣casions the French King was bound to assist the Ki••g of England with twelue thousand Launces, and

the King of England him of France with ten thousand Foot, at his charge that had the need.

In the League which was made betwixt the Emperour Charles the fist, Pope Clement the seauenth with the o∣ther Princes of Italy (except the Venetians) for the de∣fence of Italy against the French King, the Emperour was to contribute monethly thirty thousand Duckets; the Pope with the Florentins twenty thousand; the Duke of ••illan fifty thousand; Ferrara ten thousand; Genoua sixe thousand; Sienna two thousand; and Luques a thou∣sand; And it was concluded, that besides this, there should be a stocke of the like summe, which might not be imployed vntill they saw the preparatiues made to inuade Italy. In the League of the Citties of Greece against the Persians, the cōtribution whereof Aristides made the taxe, mounted to eight hundred thousand Tallents. In the league which some Citties of Greece made with the Lacedemo∣nians against Athenians, the contribution came yearely to a thousand Tallents: And the order for the l••uy of soul∣diers was, that two lightly Armed should passe for a Man Armed at all peeces; and foure Men Armed at all pe••ces for a Horse-man.

The contribution concluded in money, there are diffi∣culties sometimes found,* 1.364 for the place of keeping it. The Citties of Greece thought that the custody of their contri∣butions was safe in the Temple of Dele. But the conside∣ration of Religion could not preuent it, but that vnder the pretext that Dele was not strong enough, the Athenian: found meanes to carry it away, and to imploy it to the par∣ticular vse of the Citty. That which may be spoken here∣vppon, is not to deliuer the money into the hands of the strongest, for feare they shall not be able to call him to ac∣compt, nor to lay it in so weake a place, as it may bee ex∣posed to the force and violence of the strongest, or to him that shall first take Armes.

The contribution being setled by the confederates they

must name a head of the League, if they will not assaile the enemy but of one side: If of diuers, they must name many. And herein they doe many times find themselues troubled for that the most powerfull of the confederates, desires commonly to haue it referred to him, or to some one of his, who gouerns the conduct of the Warre, accor∣ding to his Maisters affaires, and not those of the other Allies. The other head of the League of the Princes of I∣taly, with King Francis the first, would not assaile Millan after the taking of Pauia, for feare that Millan being ta∣ken with the Duke, and the Venetians, assured from the Imperialists, they should retire from the League, or con∣tribute more neg••igently: And therefore he tooke a pre∣text to goe and free the Pope who was a Prisoner. Anto∣nio De Leua, in the League which was made by all the Princes of Italy, except the Venetians, with Charles the fift against the French, was made generall, with charge to stay in the Dutchy of Millan, which depended of the Emperour.

A League concluded by the Deputies of the confede∣rates, there sometimes falls out a difficulty,* 1.365 who shall ra∣tifie and declare himselfe first. In the League which was made betwixt King Francis the first, the Pope, and the Princes of Italy, the King refused to ratifie, vntill the Pope and the Venetians had ratified before him; and wrought so that he droue the Colleagues to declare them∣selues, and to begin the Warre, whilest that hee treated secretly for himselfe, to the end he might make his con∣ditions with more aduantage: And for feare lest his Col∣leagues on their side should shew him the like prancke, he preuented them.

That kind of League which is made for an enterprize,* 1.366 succeeds seldome, according to the hope of the Allies, if the enterprize be long. For besides that the preparations be long, the opinions diuers in the pursuit, the resolutions inconstant, the interests of Princes or Estates in League,

may change with time, or by the practises of him, against whō they are in League, in withdrawing some one of thē, or making him to suffer more losse then the rest. For seeing himselfe ill defended by his confederates, as hee did hope, and that he was in more danger to loose then his compani∣ons, he studies to retire himselfe, and to make his accord apart▪ As the Venetians did with the Turke after the losse of Cypres.

* 1.367The most ordinary causes of the rupture of Leagues, are distrust, and iealousie; as if one of ••he confederates had had conference with the enemy without the consent of the rest; If that which serueth for the safety of one diminisheth the safety of another; If they find inconstan∣cy, variety, or cowardize, in any one of the confederates; If one of the confederates increaseth, and makes some vsurpation, without the consent of the rest; if he treates with the ••nemy, not com••rehending the other Al••ies, but as adherents. King Lewis the twelfth left the League of the Venetians, for that they had made a truce with him, and had presumed to name him onely as their adherent. Sometimes to breake a League, they inuent some occasi∣on, which puts the Leaguers in diuision one against ano∣ther. In which case as long as he hath hope that this di∣uision may make them dis-vnite themselues, he must haue a care not to assaile them.

* 1.368I haue sayd that Leagues which are made betwixt meane Estates for their necessary defences, are vsually most durable. Yet they are not without great defects. For they haue not any authority among them, be it Coun∣cell or otherwise, which may command them all, and re∣concile t••em in case of diuersity of opinions, or a diuision; For that holding thēselues all to be Soueraignes, they will Establish nothing aboue them: And to fall by degrees to an accord, in all their differences which may happen, it is a difficult thing yea impossible. On the otherside lea∣••ing their differences to grow old, they may bee of

such a condition as they draw after them an irreconcillia∣bl•• hatred,

Another defect is, that to the greatest part of their As∣semblies and Dyettes, they send men new in affaires, fea∣ring to giue authority to any one among them aboue the rest. So as most part of those which come to these assem∣blies, hauing little or no knowledge of affaires, their opini∣ons are to make report to their Superiours, and not to re∣solue any thing; this power being seldome giuen them. Hence grow many delayes, which in certaine encounters may bee very preiudiciall to the Estate. There is another ordinary defect among them, that they seldome agree vp∣pon the somme of the contributions necessary for their de∣fence, nor of the keeping of the common Treasure: So as when there happens any need, they find themselues troubled to prouide in time.

But behold how Princes allied,* 1.369 doe sometimes finde themselues troubled to gouerne themselues; which is when as three Princes allied, the one makes Warre against another, and demands succours from the third: In this case if the treaties of alliance bee only for friendship, it is certaine he is not bound to giue any succours. But if the treaties carrie an offensiue League, hee must succour the most ancient, allied by a precedent alliance. If the prece∣dent alliances haue beene made both at one time, hee must succour him that is allied in an offensiue and defensiue League. But if the League be offensiue and defensiue of eyther side, he may not succour any of them: but he may mediate a peace, and cause the difference to be iudged by the common Allies, as it is vsually obserued: And let him know that will not enter into arbitrament, or being en∣tred will not yeild to iudgment, that hee will succour the other. No••withstanding most commonly in such occasi∣ons, they ballance their Estate: And looking more to safe∣ty then to iustice, they succour him who being succoured may weaken the powerfull, who is more to be feared.

They may aide particular Allies, and common Allies, if they be wronged by one of the Allies.* 1.370 But he which is not comprehended in the treaty of alliance, can••ot be defended against him that is allied without breach of the alliance: That which they may doe for to suppresse it, is to write vnto the Ally: and to entreate him to vse him ••o••rteously: which is the offer which the Romans made vnto the Capuans, who complained and demanded Suc∣cours agaynst the oppression of the Samnites, allied to the Romans. But if the oppressed yeeld himselfe a Subiect, as the Capuans did; then the Prince being obliged to the defence of his Subiects against all men, he then may and ought to succour them against his Allies.

An vnequall alliance is that, which is contracted be∣twixt Princes or Estates, vnequall in honour or in po∣wer,* 1.371 and with vnequall conditions; the one acknow∣ledging the other not for Master or Lord, but by honour, as the more powerfull and the better qualified; And some for Protector: And these treaties are made with those E∣states which take or giue pension, or which put them∣selues into protection.

Wee haue formerly sayd, that a pension differs from tribute. For tribute is payd by the Subiect, or by him who to enioy his liberty,* 1.372 payes that which is agreed vp∣on to him that hath forced him to doe it. A pension is ••eld voluntary, from him that is in our protection, or from him that is in all other things equall to the treaty of alliance, to hinder the pensioner that he ioyne not with the Enemy, or to haue aide and succours from him.

The true protection is that, whereas one takes vpon him the defence of another freely without reward.* 1.373 Yet some haue ballanced honour with profit; and haue recei∣ued a pension from those whom they haue taken into their protection: And these men haue thought that by a pecu∣niary interest, they did bind the protectors more to suc∣co•••• them, then if he were o••ely bound by Oath.

By the Law of protection, hee that is protected, owes all respect and honour to his protector:* 1.374 Against whom if he attempt, or s••ayes from his Duty, it is lawfull for the protector to assure himselfe, yea, to make himselfe Maister. They of Genoua hauing submitted themselues vnder the protection of the French King, vpon certayne conditions; and being afterwards reuolted, the King changed the conditions into pri••iledges, to the end it might be in his wil to depriue them when he should think good. But if the Protector for the good of his Estate, finds it conuenient to leaue the protection of him, ouer whom another Estate hath some ••retentions; he may con∣sent that the difference may be referred to Iustice, and to Iudges to determine it: As Lewis the twelfth would doe in the difference which the Pope had with the Duke of Ferrara, whom he had taken into his protection, and whereof by this meanes he sought to free himselfe. In like manner the protector ought to defend and succour the pro∣tected, and vse him well: Otherwise if he intreate him ill, hee may withdraw himselfe from protection, and seeke another protector.

CHAP. 53. Of the differences which happen betwixt Allies and Neighbours: and of the decision thereof.

ANd for that the Alliances not onely of protection, but also those which are equall, made it with more powerfull Estates, draw after them the sub∣iection of the weaker; And that there may betwixt Equals (be it vpon this Subiect or some other) happen many differences, which may breed occasion of breach:

they must in treating prouide for the safety and the decisi∣on of differences. Some haue assured themselues of the mutuall faith simply, the which at this day is but weake in many. Others haue demanded hostages: the which ought to be of such consideration, as the Prince or Estate which giues them, may not bee long depriued of them, without preiudice by their absence. King Francis the first, being freed from Prison, and after many inhumani∣ties shewed him by Charles the fift, who let him goe not through courtesie, but for feare of the League of Italy; yeilded to giue his children in hostage, hoping hee might recouer them, either by accord, or by some other meanes, the delay of the recouery being the lesse troublesome vn∣to him, for that they were in their courage: And so be∣ing at his choyce either to giue his children, or twelue of of his principall Men of his Realme, he desired rather to giue his children, whom he might spare, then the others, which were more necessary for his seruice and en∣terprizes.

Sometimes they demand hostages of eyther part, when as eyther of them that treates,* 1.375 promiseth to put some∣thing in execution, which they doubt they would not doe without hostages: And this ought to be done accor∣ding to the distrust they may haue one of another. But if the question be, that the one executes before the other, it is for him that is to execute last to giue hostages. There was a memorable dispute betwixt the Embassadours of the Emperour Charles the fift, and those of King Francis the first, after his discharge from Prison, whether that the French King should retire his Army our of Italy, be∣fore that the Emperour had deliuered him his children. They promised on the Kings behalfe to put hostages into the hands of the King of England, for the penalty which should be imposed for want of retiring his Army, after he had receiued his children: And the Emperour made the like offers, to restore his children, when the Army should

be retired; and to giue Hostages for the sure payment of the penalty, which should be degreed for want of satisfy∣ing; Saying that there was no colour hee should trust the King, who had once deciued him. Whereunto the French Embassadours replyed, that the more he preten∣ded to haue beene deceiued, the lesse the King ought to trust him, for that this opinion might induce him to faile the King: And besides the offers were not alike; for that it imported the King more to haue his Children, then for the Emperour to see the retreate of the Kings Army out of Italy; and therefore the assurance were not alike.

It hath happened that without any precedent treaty,* 1.376 then the demand of a passage, they haue willingly giuen hostages to a Prince, which desired to passe through the Estate of another Prince, which was an enemy or susp••c∣ted vnto him. The Arch-Duke Phillip, to passe from Spaine into Flaunders; the King sent him many of the greatest Men of his Kingdome, for hostages and assu∣rance of his passage through France, the which the Arch-Duke caused to be sent backe againe, as soone as he entred into the Realme. Many haue demanded strong places, to assure the victors. And others for the safety of a passage, for a conquest which they meant to make. As Charles the Eight did going to Naples, to many Prin∣ces and Potentates of Italy. Others haue ratified the treaties by marriage.

But the greatest security,* 1.377 that the condition incer∣ted in the treaty may be pleasing to both parties, and fitting for the Subiects of the affaires which presents it selfe,* 1.378 ballancing the interest of the one with the interest of the other.

And to preuent that the alliance or protection change not into Subiection, we must be very carefull not to receiue a Garrisson, from the allie or protector stronger then our owne; and much lesse to make him Maister of our

Forts, or to make him Guardion and depositary of the Treasure of all the alliance; as the Grecians did the Athenians, who consented, the money which should be euery yeare leuied of the Generall, should be put in Ap∣pollos Temple, and afterwards carried to Athens, there to be kept. So as the Athenians, being seazed of their Allies purse, they made themselues protectors, and of protectors Mai••ers; And so they not onely became Mai∣sters of the Treasure, but they caused the appellations of all the other Citties to come before them, at whose charge they trayned vp their Cittizens and made them Soul∣diers.

* 1.379As for the dicision of differences, the ordinary course is to constitute by the treate a certaine number of Iudges, with power of eyther side, in case they should be diui∣ded in opinions, to name an Vmpire, to decide differences, and to cause the contrauentions which they should pre∣tend to be made of eyther side to cease; Or else to agree vpon some great person, to whom they might referre themselues. A thing which I confesse is very difficult, but yet if'it might be done would bee more conuenient. For his authority would mediate an accord more easily betwixt them, who being equalls, cannot directly re∣fuse Warre nor demand peace.

They haue likewise vsually had recourse vnto com∣promise,* 1.380 when as Iudges are not appointed by the treaties, or when as they are suspect to one of the par∣ties. For although the compromise doth seldome suc∣ceed, and comes to be effected, yet it workes this effect, to cause all force to cease, and holds the difference in suspence for a time, and most commonly the inten∣tion of the party is no other, who sometimes before the comp••omise drawes a secret promise from the Ar∣bitrator, not to pronounce sentence without their con∣sent: as in the compromise which was made betwixt the Emperour Maximillian, and the Venetians, in the Popes

person, who was not limited neither for time nor po∣wer, by the publque Act which was drawne; the like secret promise hauing beene formerly made by the Pope to eyther party. Yet in the end the Pope, seeing they could not agree, and that this delay was imputed to him, he gaue sentence, notwithstanding his promise: Yet with this prouiso, that if the parties did not ratifie that which hee had decreed by his sentence should be of no effect.

In this compromise made in the person of the Empe∣rour Charles the fift, for the difference which was betwixt the Pope and the Duke of Ferrara, as well for the right as for the fact, the Emperour promised the Pope, not to pronounce vnlesse he were prest by him; and to the Duke of Ferrara, that finding that he had right to Mode∣na and Reggium, he would giue sentence; and that find∣ing otherwise, hee would suffer the time of the compro∣mise to expi••e. And for assurance it was agreed, that the Duke should deliuer Modena into the Emperours hands, as sequestred. Afterwards Iudgment to the benefit of the Duke, whereof the Pope complayned much, for that the Emperour had not proceeded according to his secret pro∣mise: But the Emperour excused himselfe vpon the pursuit which his Nuntio had made vnto him to pronounce.

They seldome compromit vpon the possessory:* 1.381 For hee that is spoyled ought before all things to be re∣stored. This was the answere which the Florentins made to the Emperour Maximillian, whom he inui∣ted to compromit to his person the difference they had with the Pysans, neyther relying vpon his will, nor vppon his authority. Yet they may compromit vp∣pon the possessory, with charge to pronounce, without ad∣ding vnto it the petitory; this being cheifly ruled, by the cō∣fidence which they conceiue in the arbitrator, chosen by the compromise, who in a difference of State, is not alwayes found such, as they may wholy rely vpon him.

And as peace is generally to be desired, yet if there be betwixt Neighbours some Subiect which trouble their intelligence,* 1.382 as it would bee a pollicie to shew himselfe displeasing; so it were wisedome not to grow passionate to reconcile them. They obserue a notable indiscretion in the Cardinall of Amboise, and very preiudiciall of France, to haue mediated an accord betwixt Maximilli∣an and Ferdinand of Aragon, touching the gouernment of Castille, this accord hauing beene the cause that after∣wards they ioyned together against Lewis the twelfth: And n••thing but the vanity and ambition which this Cardinall had to attaine vnto the Popedome (in making these two Princes fauourable vnto him) made him to en∣ter into this mediation.

The cause wherein we must labour effectually to recon∣cile our Neighbours, is, when wee haue need to be suc∣coured by them. So Lewis the eleuenth treated a peace betwixt Sigismond of Austria, and the Suisses, to vse their s••ruice against the Duke of Burgundy: And Lewis Sforse dealt in the accord betwixt Maximillian and the same Suisses, to bee succoured by them. But let vs re∣turn•• to treaties.

CHAP. 54. Of the breach of Treaties: and of the constancy and assurance of the word of a Prince, in the Treaties.

TO the end we enter not into the rupture for a small business••,* 1.383 they practise in those which great Men make among them, to draw in all the rest that be lesse to be therein comprehended, as well for the assurance of their Estates, as to entertaine the greatest in an equall ballance, least that the one should rise and oppresse the other. But to make vse in such trea∣ties, the oppression must be speciall and particular: other∣wise they may haue iust cause to bee ignorant, that vnder this name of Allies, they which are not named are com∣prehended:

And although that the breach of faith bee to much practised in such affaires,* 1.384 yet there are few Princes found, which haue not sought some pretext before they breake: Some haue pretended to be circumuented by error. Others haue excused themselues by the charge of the Estate of affaires, great wrongs, or ineuitable losse, and apparant danger of the ruine of their Estates. Which are the cau∣ses, wherein some say that an oath is not obligatory; the condition by reason of the oath being impossible or vniust. To these limitations they adde,* 1.385 that they must not keepe their faith with an Enemy of the faith, nor with him that hath broken his, nor with a Subiect, nor with a Theife. But if it be not lawfull to keepe a mans faith in all these cases, it is not likewise lawfull to giue it. If it be law∣full to capitulate with such men, it is necessary to hold that

we promise. The which I vnderstand, when the word is giuen by him that may giue it; and that they ••elye vpon it. For if they take hostages, he that giues them, is freed from his Faith; for that in receiuing hostages, he that receiues them, hath relinquished the assurance which he had in the faith of him that giues them: And if the promise be made by a Captaine for his Prince with∣out speciall Warrant, this word giuen bindes not the Prince.

* 1.386 Some Lawyers would iudge of Treaties, as of parti∣cula•• Co••t••acts, and more inlarge the conscience of Princes. For as a priuate man is not bound to that which he hath promised by force or feare, they haue thought (but foolishly and maliciously) that this Maxime should take place in Treaties, which are made betwixt Soue∣raignes: which is in effect to banish faith from all such publique Negotiations. For there is no Treaty but is vsually made in Armes, by force, or through feare to lose eyther life, or goods, or liberty, or the Estate; which are causes of iust feare, and may shake the most constant.

* 1.387Some Princes desirous to shew themselues more religi∣ous in these ruptures, haue taken subiect vpon the am∣bignity of some clauses in the Treaty, or vpon equiuoca∣on, as Charles the fist did vpon these words, Ev••ig and Euig, to retaine the Landgraue the Hesse: Or they seeke some other occasions, attempting against those whom their Allie is bound to defend: To the end that drawing him to Field, hee may lay the Enuy of the ••rupture vpon him.

* 1.388But the most beneficiall course for a Prince or State is, to make himselfe to be knowne constant and firme in his word. For although such an occasion may happen, as he might get adua••tage b•• h••bre••ch of his faith: yet the opinion which they may conceiue of him by this action (which he must not trust ••nto) will make him lose many

aduantages, which a loyall Prince may haue, finding him∣selfe discharged of many securities, which they demand vsually and iustly from one of whose faith they doubt.

CHAP. 55. Of Treaties of Neutrality.

LEt vs come to Treaties of Neutrality, the which seemes naturall to Princes, who neither loue nor hate anything absolutely; but gouerne themselues in their Friendships according to their interests. And in effect Reason of State is no other thing but Rea∣son of interest.

Neutrality may be of two sorts.* 1.389 The one with Alliance of eyther part: The other without Alliance, and without any tye to the one or the other; which is that, that may properly be called Neutrality. The first Rules subscribed by the conditions of the Treaty. The second hath no Rule, but the discretion of the neuter Prince, who must carry himselfe in such sort, as he may not make shew that he inclines more to one side then to another. And for that the Affaires of Princes are not alwayes in one E∣state, the Difficulty is to know when the Prince should leaue this Neutrality, and when hee should maintayne it.

The aduantages of Neutrality are,* 1.390 that he which is Neuter, is honoured and respected of both parties, for the feare that eyther of them hath, should declare himselfe a∣gainst him: He remaines Arbitrator of others and Ma∣••ter of himselfe: He enioyes the present, and accor∣ding vnto occasions preuents the future. A Neuter is without any profest Enemy, and offends or Wrongs no man openly; so as giuing no aduantage ouer him,

they are troubled to finde a pretext to doe him harme,

* 1.391The disaduantages are, that a Neuter satisfies neither the one nor the other; and so remaines: He doth neyther purchase Friends, nor free himselfe from any Enemies; and in the end is made a prey to the Victor. And many haue held it more aduantage to hazard himselfe to van∣quish with a companion, then to remaine in an E∣state, where hee is assured to bee ruined by the one or the other.

* 1.392To resolue this point, a powerfull Prince hath no neede of Councell. For in what fashion soeuer he remains, he may maintayne himselfe, and prescribe a Law to o∣thers. Yet I hold that without great occasion he should not declare himselfe. For that whilest others ruine them∣selues by Warre, he fortifies himselfe with meanes; he may in the end make himselfe Iudge of their differen∣ces, and compounding them mildely with honour, hee preserues their Friendship, and maintaynes their Estate.

But in a weake Prince, what part soeuer hee takes, it will be hurtfull vnto him; especially if he be in the mid∣dest of two more powerfull Estates then himselfe.* 1.393 Yet I will say, that speaking generally, a Neutrality is more beneficiall to a weake Prince; so as they which make Warre one against another, bee not altogether barba∣rous and inhumane. For although a Neutrality doth not please eyther party; yet in effect it wrongs no man; and as he which is a Neuter, doth not serue, so he doth not hurt. And then the euent of the declaration which he should make, rather for the one then the other, de∣pending vpon the vncertaine issue of the Warre, he should haue no cause to say, that this part is more safe then a Neu∣trality. And to change his resolution without an assu∣rance to better his affaires, were not to carry himselfe wisely.

But if the Neuter be prest by necessity to declare himselfe,* 1.394 he must doe it for the most powerfull of the two parties, following the Councell of that Romane; that eyther he must make himselfe the strongest, or bee a friend to the strongest: Vnlesse hee saw that ioyning to the weaker, hee might ballance the po∣wer of the stronger, and by this counterpeze reduce them to reason. The safety of Estates consisting cheif∣ly in an equall counterpeze of power in the one and the other, and the greatnesse of a Prince drawing after it the ruine of his Neighbours; it is wisedome to preuent.

But power is considered in this subiect diuersly: Eyther absolute or conditionall; Absolute power is that which wee measure by the concurrence of the great∣nesse of Forces, Treasure: Munitions, and other Mil∣litary preparations. A conditionall power is that, the which although it be lesse then an absolut, yet it is more fit to suc∣cour vs, or to doe vs harme. In this the Neighbourhood is of very great consideration; for that a Neighbour Prince of meane forces, may more easily or sooner hurt or succour vs, then a great Prince which lies farre off. Neere succours are alwayes sooner ready and with lesse charge: For wee may discharge a part when as time and occasions shall serue: If he be remote, he arriues too late after the occasions to defend vs, and too soone to oppresse vs. The greatest part perish by the way; and when he is arriued he hath more need of rest then to bat∣taile; and being vnable to send them backe so farre, we must still beare the charge and oppression.

Hi••ron King of Syracuza, could well obserue these considerations, the Carthaginians being Maisters of a part of Sicily, he allied himselfe with them against the Ro∣mans: But the Romans being growne the stronger in the Countrey, he fell to their side, and continued the Warre with them against the Carthaginians, who were then

more remote from the Iland then the Roman 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ter we haue made consideration of the force, wee must likewise consider of the courage and constancy of the Prince, with whom we are to ioyne. But if hee be light and hath no stay, how powerfull soeuer he be, it is dangerous to en∣gage himselfe with him: But if with these aduantages hee knowes how to prosecute his designes with resolution, they may boldly ingage themselues with him.

CHAP. 56. Considerations for a Prince that will liue in good intelligence with his Neighbours.

THe Prince that would liue in good termes with his Neighbours, must first consider what Treaty and Capitulation he hath with him, and gouerne him∣selfe accordingly, alwayes shewing himselfe a Louer of Peace and Concord; desirous to liue in Amity, and a great obseruer of Treaties; not enduring that any breach should be made, how small soeuer; aad being done to cause it to be repaired.

If any difficult thing be required of him, he shall ney∣ther grant it,* 1.395 nor refuse it, but in ballancing their busi∣nesse, he shall labour to haue his goodwill allowed for the effect: And if he which seekes hath sent an expresse Embassadour, they shall send him backe with Presents, and promise to dispatch other Embassadours to make an∣swere, And to the end he may auoyde the discontent∣ment, they shall ballance this delay with some benefit, if may be of more importance then that which they haue de∣manded: For that the Iniury doth not moue so much as the benefit is pleasing.

If the Prince treating with his Neighbours, hath need to demand or vse any thing from them,* 1.396 hee must haue a care to maintayne his Dignity, and therefore hee may not be too hasty: for that we shew our selues to be too resolute for something; and they seeing the instance which we make, will hold our necessity to be greater then it is: The which will make them more holding, and make them beleeue, that •• we shall be the more bound vnto them, if they grant it, although they reape the like benefit themselues. But if a more powerful man re∣quires something of vs,* 1.397 which being granted doth not much preiudice vs, and being denied, may draw a warre against vs, which he had prepared against another; We must not deny it. This was an Errour which the Flo∣rentins committed, seeking in the beginning to oppose the passage of Charles the Eight, hauing not therein followed the Counsell which had beene giuen to Cos∣mo De Medicis, not to oppose himselfe agaynst Iohn of Anio••; notwithstanding that the Pope and Duke of Millan were in League with Ferdinand King of Naples, against whom Iohn of Aniou made Warre.

We must not lightly beleeue that which Princes say,* 1.398 and whereof they make shew; but consider, that their owne interest will make them forget it, and to some their faith, if they haue any collour to breake it. The Prince must likewise fauour the traffique and commerce with his Neighbours, for the good and profit which may redowne to the one and the other.

He must consider of the meanes how he may with dexterity nourish the distrusts and iealousies which are,* 1.399 or may be betwixt them; But he must be warie▪hee bee not knowne to be the Authour. And contrariwise if they haue a conceit, he must be the first that must seeke to take it away; and in all that which may breed some iealousie of him, hee must preuent it in time: And he must excuse the fault which is discouered, and deny

that, whereof the Neighbours are not, nor cannot bee hereafter assured: Hee must seeke with all diligence to mollifie the most powerfull, by faire deportuments and promises, and somtimes to pacifie the one, and som∣times the other, as well to make them the more negligent, as to labour in seeking them seuerally to cast them into some distrust one of another.

* 1.400The Priuce shall offer vnto his Neighbours that which hee cannot well refuse, before they demand it, to the end they may acknowledge his good will. Especially if there bee neede of succours, hee shall shew himselfe ready; yet without giuing cause of Iealousie to others, in making them knowe the Iu∣stice of these succours, and of his intention, raysing those whom hee succours from the shame, the which doth vsually accompany him that demands. This is the first precept to make them haue confidence in vs.

* 1.401The second, to breed confidence, is not to enter in∣to any resentment of iniuries against those, whom wee desire to make confident of vs, vnlesse it bee a mat∣ter of great importance: And wee must suffer courage to sleepe, and awake prudence: But if our honour con∣straines vs to make some demonstration of an iniury re∣ceiued, wee must lay the fault vpon the Minister, and complaine of him; so as they may not thinke we hold our selues wronged by the Master. For by the very opinion which a neighbour Prince might haue to haue wronged vs, he would enter into distrust of vs, from distrust into hatred; and hatred it may be, would draw after it another wrong, and an alliance with our Enemies, not onely to as∣sure himselfe, but to an••oy vs: The remembrance of an iniury being many times stronger in him that doth it, then in him that receiues it; especially betwixt Princes, whose spirits are very vncapable to take confidence one of ano∣ther. Aboue all wee must bee wary how wee enter

into threats. For although our Neighbour be weaker then we are, and that his timerousnesse might giue vs cause to hope for some aduantage by our threats: Yet it might so fall out, that from feare he might passe to de∣spaire, the which doth vsually guide timerous spirits, as well into desperate resolutions, as inconsiderations doth the rash. But Misfortune carrying vs to a rup∣ture, and hauing the Embassadours of our Enemies neare vs, who then may be suspect vnto vs, wee must consider of the meanes to dismisse them. Some haue therein proceeded mildly, and others ••or•• rough∣ly. Some to discharge an Enemies Embassadour, haue giuen leaue to all other Embassadours which did re∣side with him; and then calling backe those of his friends, suffered his enemies Embassadour to depart.

The Emperour Charles the fift, aduertised of the League which was made against him, would not dismisse the Embassadours of France, England, and Venice, vntill his owne were in safety▪ But hee set Guards vpon them of France, Venice, and Florence, causing them to bee conducted thirty Miles from his Court, with a prohibition not to speake vnto them, nor for them to Write: To him of Millan as his Subiect, hee was enioyned not to part from Court; And as for him of England, there was no al∣teration.

Let vs come to the third point.* 1.402 It is a great ad∣uantage to pierce into the designes of his Neighbours, and to haue gained some confidence with them: For the entire is seldome found. But not able to preuaile by this meanes, he must doe it by Discourse, by Wisedome, and by the Knowledge a Prince ought to haue of the quality of their Estates, of the defects and aduantages which are in them, of the humours, designe, and inclination of the p••ople, of great Men, and of the Prince; and principally of this last,

whose principall motions and manner of liuing hee must seeke to discouer, to iudge of his wisedome and courage; then the discontentments, diuisions, and the heads of par∣ties which are in the Estate, their pretexts, credit, of whom they depend, and how farre it may extend, the Councell, Treasure, Iustice how it is mannaged, and with what satisfaction of the people or great Men: Moreo∣uer what the forces be, and the number of Souldiers and Captaines, with the sufficiency of the cheife among them: The strong Townes and Fortresses; and to know the de∣fects there are to defend them, and the aduantages to as∣saile them: The Munitions of Warre and Victualls: wherein the commerce and traffique doth consist, and how it may be incommodated: The commodity or discom∣modity of the Entries of the Countrey: The Fertillity Barronnesse, extents or ••malnesse of the Estate: and of other Neighbours, his allian••es and dependances with other Princes, as well neere as remote: Their actions and deportments past, as well towards vs as others: Their present Estate, and whereunto they seeme most to in∣cline. In which search, we must vse diligence, wisedome, and secrecie, least we giue them cause to distrust vs. All this may be learned from friends, which the Prince may haue in the Estates of his Neighbours; or by spyes, whose intelligences he must duly examine before hee be∣leiue them; And by reason, interest, or apparance, sound if they be true.

* 1.403 But for that all these courses are full of suspition a∣mong Princes, and are dangerous for such as imploy themselues to giue these intelligences; euery Prince ha∣uing the like interest, to know what is done with his Neighbour, and desiring to shew the confidence he hath in him: Princes haue agreed to receiue Embassadours or Agents; who in effect (vnder pretext to entertaine the good intelligence betwixt their Maisters) serue many times to discouer the ground of Estates, and the designes

of Princes. Wherefore seeing that by this meanes Prin∣entertaine one another, it is fitting to know the quality, the charge, and the priuiledges of an Embassadour or A∣gent, the which we will set downe here, as they haue beene gathered by some of this Age.

CHAP. 57. Of the charge of an Embassadour or Agent.

AN Embassadour and Agent is the same thing, if we consider onely the function of their Charges:* 1.404 But they differ for the honour and respect they beare more to an Embassadour then to an Agent. An A∣gent hath charge to represent the affaires onely: But an Embassadour ought to represent the greatnesse of his Mai∣ster, and his affaires. Wherefore for sufficiency, the A∣••••nt ought to haue as much as the Embassadour: But for wealth and that which concernes shew, it is not so neces∣sary for him as for the other.

Neyther the one nor the other, for that which con∣cernes the Body,* 1.405 ought (if it may be) to haue any im∣perfection, as to haue one eye, to be pore-blind, squint∣ey'd, lame, crooked-backe, or extreamely foule and de∣formed: But contrariwise hee must be of a pleasing En∣counter, and not counterfeit, left hee be ridiculous or contemned. He must not likewise be sickely nor dainty, lest the discommodity of the wayes, or the change of the Ayre make him vnprofitable for his Maisters affaires. His Countenance must be graue and serious, yet mingled with mildnesse and a pleasing aspect. For his Age, he must nei∣ther be too young, nor too old, as well for the force and disposition of the body, as for that of the mind. For the

conditions of Fortune, he ought to be chosen of an honest condition, and Noble if it may be: Princes holding themselues contemned, when they send Men of little worth vnto them; as Lewis the Eleuenth did, who imployed his Barber to execute this charge.

As for the profession whereon he ought to be chosen, that depends of the quality of the affaires whereon hee is to treate, or of the Prince to whom he is sent. For if they treated of meanes to make Warre, it would be no more proper to send a Church-man or a Lawyer, then if they treated of some right of bounds, or made some conference of Religion, to send a man making profession of Armes. For his goods, an Embassadour ought to haue in a meane proportion. A poore or needy man how sufficient soe∣uer, is nothing fit for charges of expence and shewe. But of all things they must haue a care not to send a poore Em∣bassadour, after one that was rich, and who had made an excesse of expence; For the first hauing accustomed those of the Prouince to this expence and charge, the o∣ther comming after, and not doing the like, he will bee much lesse honoured and respected; And by consequen••s doe his Maister lesse seruice. He must not likewise be dis∣tastfull to the Prince to whom he is sent, but rather they must choose one that may be pleasing vnto him: Yet for all this he must not be a subject, nor dependant, nor tyed by oath, nor any other bond, to him with whom hee is to reside. The example of that which Duke Sforse did to the Esquire Merueilles teacheth vs, not to choose ano∣ther mans Subiect for this charge. For the sufficiency, he must haue a quicke apprehension and naturall Iudgment. He must be practised in the affaires of the world, and e∣specially in those of his owne Countrey, and of that where he is Embassadour.

And for that the life of man is too short, to attend a fit experience for the sufficiency which is necessary: hee ought to be conuersant with all sorts of Histories, which

hee ought to haue read with iudgment, waighing all the Circumstances of Actions which are there represented: To know the diuersity of the establishment of Estates, and the reasons, if it may bee, of this diuersity; to vnderstand the right of limits, and represailes, the genalogies of Prin∣ces, and the pretentions of Kings vpon the Estates of other men. Their forces, means, alliances, and manner of liuing, he must likewise be resolute & couragious in that which he hath wisely de••iberated; but aboue all hee must be se∣cret in affaires of importance, and discreete in his speech▪ Hee must not detract, nor speake euill, especially of any Master, nor of the Prince where hee remaines: Hee must speake freely of his Masters pretentions, if there bee question to maintaine them.

An Embassadour chosen with these qualities may serue worthily and profitably. Yet I will adde hereunto the manner, how some of our time haue held he should go∣uerne himselfe, but more succinctly.* 1.406 First hee must fur∣nish his Family with modest and respective Men, not inso∣lent, quarrellers, or scandalous: Otherwise he is in danger to receiue an affront, either in abandoning his seruants, or not being able to stay them from punishment. This done, hee must make an ample instruction, least hee bee disa∣uowed, the which shall follow word by word, especi∣ally in affaires whereas tearmes strike the stroake; not promising any more, although he knew he should not bedisauowed: But before the promise, he shall hold the businesse in suspence vntill he hath power. Moreouer hee shall instruct himselfe, from the Mouth of him which had gone before him in the said charge, and shall retire from him the Treaties, instructions, and papers of importance: And parting he shall giue to haue some one in the Princes Court, which may Negotiate his businesse, and giue him aduice of all that passeth; for many times the Secretaries of Estate are so im∣ployed, as they haue not leisure to satisfie all.

If hee goes for some particular affaire, hee must stay as little as may be vpon the way, as well to preuent the aduice, which might be giuen of the particular sub∣iect of his Embassie; the answere whereof hee should find ready, hauing by his stay giuen them leisure, either to illude it, or to crosse it: As for that according to the quallitie of the businesse, hee might ariue so late, as they would mocke at him. As Tiberius did of the Embassa∣dours which ariued to condole the death of his Children se••uen Moneths after: And hee in mocking lamented the death of Hector, who was dead many hundred yeeres be∣fore. The same reason requires, that they should demand audience as soone as they can, vnlesse he finds the Court in mourning, or in open Warre, or some other accident of importance which serues for an excuse. He shall from the beginning shew his grauitie, oftentation or pride in his Countenance or traine his courtesie and affability, accom∣panied with an honest carriage and modesty; hisexpence according to the places where hee is. The Northerne people desire a Table well garnished: Spaine, and Italy, looke more to followers and attendants, and to that which serues for shew; In the Leuant the greatest ex∣pence is in presents: But aboue all hee must regulate his expences according to his entertainement, and the meanes hee hath to spend. For it is vnseemely to liue of borrowing in a strange Countrey.

The manner of treating is also diuers. In Germany & Sui∣zerland, they must haue more money then words, more good cheere there then Art: In other Estates honor, com∣plements, and Orations, are better receiued; and in others the consideration of Religion hath more force. An Em∣bassadour ought to be wary, least by too much diligence and affection, he do not augment the suspition, which they may haue of the sub••ect of his comming, and discouer it by too much Art & talke; all things disguised aff••cted and amp••ified, naturally breeds suspition. They which demand

succours doe many times make their affaires so weake, (thinking to moue pitty,) as they are so farre from mo∣uing those, from whom they craue succours, as they make them affraid to embarque themselues with miserable per∣sons. In such occasions he must march himselfe discreet∣ly, and waigh his words: And the countenane in this doth sometime impart more then the thing it selfe.

Aboue all things hee must not treate with any other Prince, of that which concernes his Commission, but with him to whom he is sent. This was the answere of the Embassadours of Florence, to the Emperour Maxi∣millian, to whom they had beene sent, he hauing appoin∣ted thē to conferre with the Duke of Millan, who should giue them an answere for him: But they refused to doe it, as a thing exceeding their Commission. And although his instructions ought to be as ample as may be: Yet af∣faires being subiect to change, in a shorter time, then there is betwixt his parting & arriuall, the Embassadour must, as they say, make Warre by the eye: as if hee had beene commanded to vse mild words, and yet finds it more con∣uenient to speake boldly or to change, or omitt something mentioned in his Commission, he must gouerne himselfe with great circumspection. But he may not stray from his intention, vnlesse he see that in leauing it, he may preuaile in that which he hath vndertaken. If he be constrayned not to doe some things contained in his instructions, and that the businesse is not subiect to delay, hee shall import it to two or three of the most vnderstanding Seruants, that his Maister hath. (if happily there be any in the Countrey where he resides) to the end that the businesse succeeding ill, he may auoyd the reproach, to haue done it alone and without Cou••cell.

There are certaine things that are subiect to disauow; as proud & insolent words, which an Embassadour might haue vsed; or threats and practises which he attempts in the Estate where he resides, if it be without command:

And therefore he must containe hinselfe, within the termes of his charge and the modestie that is required. It is fit∣ting he should maintaine the Dignity of his Mai••ter: But it must be without contempt, or offence to him towards whom he issent, And to the end he may discouer all the passages in an Estate, hee must be frequent and daily in Court, but when as the Prince retires himselfe priuatly for his pleasures: For then he should make himselfe sus∣pect or importune. And in popular Estates, he must assist all dyets meetings and assemblies: Or if he sees that this may breed some contempt, hee should send some one of his. Besides money, which discouers the secrets of Princes, the entertainment of his Table is ofsome force. And although that all the intelligences which come from this sort of people which follow Tables, be not alwaies current; Yet sometimes he shall meete with good ones. Wherefore he must waigh them, and attend the progresse and issue before hee Iudge of them; and obserue not onely what is sayd, but what is done. He must for this ef∣fect write often, and to many parts, to the end he may be the better aduertised; and neuer respect the charge which cannot be better imployed.

He must visit the principall Councellors, the Secreta∣ries of Estate, and amongst others him, who hath the di∣uision of Forraigne affaires; he shall doe the like to those which are in credit and fauour with the Prince, although but of meane condition; applying himselfe in some sort to the custome, and manners of the Countrey, and how others haue done before him. Hee shall informe himselfe discreetly of the present Estate of the Court; and how euery Man stands in authority; wherein this authority consists, eyther in reputation and honour, or in effect and contention, euery one according to his rancke and de∣gree, winning vnto him if he may, the domestiques and fauorities of those which haue authority. Hauing newes from all parts, he shall still find occasions to discourse and

parley with the Princes and great men, with pleasing sub∣iects, to be merry with them; or if they be otherwise, and concerne them, to condole, or to aduise them to preuent it.

He must visite the Embassadours and Agents of other Princes and Common-weales, which reside in the same Court; but soberly, lest he giue them occasion of iea∣lousie. Hee must be wary not to discouer himselfe who∣ly vnto them, whatsouer they be; but rather seeke to draw from them, then to leaue any thing of his owne, to the end he may alwayes be the first to send the aduice and pleasing newes. And if the affaires which he pursues, succeedes not according to his desire, hee shall make no shew of it, nor seeme to haue any distrust or bad o∣pinion of the Prince and others, with whom hee negoti∣ates. When he shall be intreated to doe them any cour∣tesie, he shall study to value it at as high a rate as may be; yet he must doe it speedily and freely, letting them know, that he desires aboue all things to giue them con∣tentment and satisfaction. He shall commend and mag∣nifie the persons, the meanes, the greatnesse, the Coun∣trey, the Lawes, the manner of liuing, and whatso∣euer concernes the Nation; yet with such modesty and discretion, as there may be no shew of flattery. He shall likewise extoll the affaires of his Master with the like modesty and dexterity, to the end they may not grow iealous of him. When he shall finde some stop in that which he desires to doe, hee shall not insist too ea∣gerly vpon it, although he had an apparent reason: But he shall with dexterity approue the reasons in part, and by other meanes seeke to attaine his Designe. When it shall be needefull to doe or say any thing contrary to their will or liking, he shall excuse it in such sort, as they shall conceiue that it proceeds not from the Embassadour, but from such as command him, and that hee is sor••y t•• doe it, considering it doth not please him; yet ••usti∣fying the businesse by the best reasons he may, and

giuing them some hope of other things which shall be pleasing vnto them. If they charge him to car∣ry bad and distastefull words, he shall doe better to cause them to giue them in writing, rather then to pronounce the words.

And if he findes that by one meanes he cannot obtaine what he desires, hee shall leaue the businesse for a time, and referre it to some other occasion, which he shall finde they desire of him, or shall haue neede of something; and then with dexterity he shall renew his demand, and so perswade them with grace and mildnesse. When he i••to obtaine any thing of importance, he shall lose no time to cause it to be dispatcht, but shall sollicite the expedition, yet with mildnesse and modesty: And if it con••sts in a promise for the future, he shall cause them to set it downe in writing, and contrariwise he shall be carefull not to oblige himselfe nor his Master, but as late as seldome as may be. Intreating and contracting, he must cause the treaty to be set downe in plaine termes, not am∣biguous nor captious, according to the termes and clauses of precedent treaties. It is certaine that refusing flatly, or making a business full of difficulties, they offend him whom they refuse: Therefore an Embassadour not able to grant that which they demand of him, he must eyther giue them other Counsell and direction, to attaine to that which they desire; or he shall testifie his good-will by other gracious effects, and honest speeches which may palliate the deniall. An honest man, (such as he ought to be that executes this charge,) must not be found a Lyer, especi∣ally in matters of importance; for that there is nothing doth make him lose his credit more. He must therefore be wary not to deliuer doubtfull things for certaine, nor trust wholy to the word and report of others: But hee must alledge his Authour, or else say, that he had learned it from a good place, when he shall not dare to name the person. He shall doe the like for things which concerne

his Master, the which he must deliuer on his behalfe. When they are such as there is no great certainty, or else may receiue a change, he must deliuer them with all dis∣cretion and stayednesse, lest he be reproached that they are circumuented by this meanes. And if it should hap∣pen that he could not well excuse a contrariety, yet he must couer and disguise it with some pretext, in regard of his Master by all meanes possible; and for himselfe like∣wise, purging and iustifying himselfe, that he had neuer a∣ny intent to doe a bad office, nor to make a bad report, nor to be authour and instrument of deceit. The which must take place, when he is constrained either through the ne∣cessity of affaires, or by the commandement of his Master, to deliuer one thing for another. The which hee may not doe often, lest he lose all his credit. But it sometimes falls out, an Embassadour lies without thinking of it: For that when one Prince meanes to deceiue another, he first de∣ceiues the Embassadour whom hee sends, to the end that deliuering that which he holds to be his Masters intenti∣on, his reasons may be more forcible, assuring that which he speaks more boldly, hauing lesse intention and assurance of that which is dissembled. Wherein the Embassadour is not onely excusable, but worthy of pitty, in that they are distrustfull of him, and meane to make him carry the Ba∣ble, and to serue as an instrument of deceipt. Moreouer he must not rely too much on those with whom he nego∣tiates, neither yet wholly despaire for those things which happen; for that affaires change easily, and affections like∣wise according to occurrents: And many times that which seemed impossible at one time, growes easie afterwards; and so the contrary.

But one of the principall points whereof and Embassa∣dour takes care, is to maintaine the ranke and dignitie of his Master, especially with the Embassadours of other Princes. For Princes doe not subsist, but by the greatnes and opinion they haue of them: It argues a contēpt

if their ranke be contested, and an Embassadour must must rather loose himselfe, then quit any thing••: And if the Prince with whom he remaines, fauours him that makes the attempt, after that he hath made instance to be maintayned in his ranke, he ought to retire. And for this point, it is vsually obserued in many places among Embassadours, that they which come first, goe to visite those which came last, although that the first commer goe before them in ranke.

* 1.407 Let vs come to the priuiledges which the Embassa∣dours haue in a strange Countrey. The principall is, that by the Law of Nations, they are inuiolable, that is to say, in all freedome and safety: But it is in their Countrey to whom they are sent. For that if they passe through the Countrey of one that is Enemy to their Ma∣ster, although allied to the Prince to whom they are sent, yet it would be necessary to take this pasport, be∣ing not in that regard respected as an Embassadour, if he practiseth any thing against the Estate, or the Princes person with whom he resides: For hee cannot defend himselfe by the Law of Nations. And wee must not doubt but hauing violated his Faith first, wherein the Law of Nations doth chiefly consist, but the Prince neare whom he remaines, and against whom he hath attempted, may cause him to be punished. Yet for that it may be that the commandement to attempt, proceedes from the Master, and that punishing the Embassadour, it were to fall vpon the stone, and not on the Arme that cast it. Some Princes haue vsed it more discreet∣ly, content••••g themselues to seaze vpon these vnderta∣kers expecting ••he avow or disavow of the Master: And being vnable to draw eyther of them from him, to pre∣suppose a confession, and then send them to their Master. Moreouer, if the Embassadour commits any priuate outrage against one of the Princes Subiects with whom he resides, vnlesse it be to defend the dignity of his charge,

or of his Master, many haue held him iustifiable before the Prince where he liues. For there is a great difference betwixt the Dignity and Authority of a Prince, in the Countrey of another Soueraigne. Hee may well retaine his Dignity, but not his Authority. But the most safe and the more seemely were before he doe reason to the party, to demand it from his Master, who in that case would not deny it him so soone as in matters of E∣state, and it is a meanes to free the Prince from slan∣der of Iniustice towards the Ministers of another Prince.

As for his Domestickes, there is no doubt but they may be punished if they doe ill. And if they or any o∣ther hauing sayled, retire into the Embassadors house, he may be summoned to yeeld them, and to suffer Iustice to search his house: Otherwise after this deniall the Iu∣stice may doe it, for that the house of an Embassadour ought not to serue for a retreat and Sanctuary to the wic∣ked. Yet this search may not be done by simple S••rge∣ants, no more then the Summons: But it must be ex∣ecuted by the Iudge of greatest Authority in the place, accompanied with men of honour, with excuses, in∣treaties, and courteous words, as well to testifie the respect which they beare to the Dignity of the Embassa∣dours Master, as to preuent the insolency and indiscre∣tion which doevsually accompany Archers, Sergeants, and such other sorts of Ministers. But in stead of pu∣nishing the Domestickes of an Embassadour, after they haue made their processe vnto condemnation, and cau∣sed the Ciuill party to be satisfied, some haue pardoned them in his fauour whose Subiects they are, sending them backe with the processe. Or if there be no such in∣telligence betwixt the two Princes, as the one will not be beholding to his cópanion, they may procure some com∣mon Ally vnder-hand, to make the demand: To whom the Prisoners being deliuered, he may send them to the Prince whose Subiects they are.

Some Embassadours haue perswaded themselues, that they had all iurisdiction ouer their Domestickes, euen to put some to death. But this is not grounded vpon a rea∣son, if the Prince with whom he resides doth not giue him leaue; as they say the Turke tollerates it with the Embas∣sadours of Christian Princes. Yet they may detaine those Prisoners in their house, which practise against the seruice of their Master, vntill they haue aduertised him, and re∣ceiue an answer; prouided that they whom they detaine, be not admitted as Embassadours by the Prince, or Estate where they are: For in that case they are in freedome and safety. Behold how Embassadors ought to gouern them∣selues with strangers in a strang Coūtry. We must now see being in those charges, how they ought to carry thēselues to their Masters, to whom they serue as eyes and eares.

* 1.408Some haue held that an Embassadour ought to giue ad∣uice to his Master, of all that is spoken indiscreetly against him, for that the aduertisment may come from some other, then from his Embassadour, who in such things ought to be carefull not to be preuented, wherein we cannot giue a∣ny certaine Rules. Yet if the word hath escaped either in ••ho••ler, or from a passionate spirit, were it the Prince himselfe; being not spoken publiquely, it were more dis∣creetly done to conceale it from his Master, then to deliuer it. For the Master that neither would nor could breake, would seeme offended at such a report, if the Estate of his affaires will not suffer him to demand satisfaction: And on the other side sometimes, in taking exception at an iniury, he seemes to confesse it. But if the Embassadour findes it more expedient to conceale the words spoken by the Prince with whom he resides; he shall let him know, how much his Master would hold himselfe wronged, if they were related vnto him: But that knowing the good which growes to both the Estates, by the Friendship in which the two Princes haue liued, he had rather therein fayle of his duty, in not making this report, then to be the occa∣sion

of trouble, and breach for a word spoken in choller.

It is to no purpose to say, that in doing this, it were to shew himselfe wiser then his Master; or that he must de∣liuer all, and conceale nothing. For that which offends Princes, and inuites them to resentment, is not so much the offence in it selfe, as the opinion they haue, that the world knowes they haue beene wronged; and if they doe not seeke some reuenge, they should make a breach in their reputations, and inuite others to affront and contemne them. So as the wrong being not published and knowne to all Men, and the Embassadour making it knowne that for the good of peace, he would conceale it from his Master, it doth no way touch the reputation of the Prince, who otherwise being held to be couragious, they would alwayes beleeue, that if the report had beene made vnto him, he would not haue endured it without reuenge: There are many things which Princes are glad to haue con∣cealed; but those principally, for the which they cannot prouide, without greatly incommadating their affaires, these ought to be dissembled and concealed from them.

As for dispatches,* 1.409 it is certaine that they seldome know what an Embassadour doth in his charge••, but by that which he writes. He must therefore shew himselfe by his dispatches, which must be graue, short, close couched, and mingled sometimes according to the Subiects, with passages of Sentences, yet seldome: And to be the more intelligible, some hold it fit that he should articulate euery priuate action apart, not troubling himselfe with a conti∣nuance, and bond of clauses in diuers affaires, and he must acknowledge in all his letters, the reception of those to the which he makes answer. If he enforced to write ma∣ny letters vpon the same subiect, and to the same place, as it happens vsually, he shall doe well to diuersifie the terms and stile as much as may be, to the end they may not bee like vnto a Notaries Indenture, and that they which haue receiued the like letters, comming to conferre them toge∣ther,

may not thinke that he hath intreated them equally; euery man esteeming of himselfe not onely better then he is, but also more then his companion.

He must haue a care not to write any thing to his Ma∣ster for true, concerning those with whom hee negoti∣ates, if he hath no testimony by Letters, or that he know∣eth it from those in whom his master hath confidence, the which he ought to name: For that the change which may happen in a businesse, might cause a reproach and bad conceit of the minister, with his Master, either of lightnesse, or of little fore-sight. He shall be alwayes e∣steemed to doe more then to write, and to giue them good hope when he shall see day, before he giue them assurance and certainty of the businesse. As for the particu∣lar of the Embassador, as we haue said before, besides the Secretary of Estate, who is to receiue his Dispatches, he must haue some one which may giue him aduice of that which passeth. He with some other friends, must doe him all sorts of good offices, in cōmending and praising his Ser∣uices and dexterity. And the Embassadour on the other side, shall labour to haue others write; especially men vn∣knowne to commend his industry and labour, absence causing a decay of opinion, and makes them sometimes for∣get the worth of a man, if by these practises they be not re∣uiued.

THE COVNSELLOR OF ESTATE. OR, A COLLECTION OF the greatest and most Remarkable Considerations seruing for the Man∣aging of Publicke Affaires. PART. II. CONTAYNING THE MEANES how to preserue an ESTATE.

CHAPTER I. Of the parts and conditions in generall, necessary for a Prince and Soueraigne.

HAuing treated of that which is necessa∣ry for the setling of an Estate, wee must consider of the meanes how to preserue it. It is not sufficient to build a strong ship to make a long and tedious Voyage; but we must withall prouide a good Pi∣lot to gouerne it, and to seeke meanes to calke it, and trim it when it takes water, and to be able

to resist the waues of the Sea, and the violence of the Winds and stormes without shipwracke.

* 1.410That which serues for the Establishment, doth like∣wise serue for the preseruation of an Estate; but wee must likewise haue other meanes to preserue this or∣der, the which consists eyther in the authority of him that commands or in the remedy which they must find, against that which might ruine the Estate. The Authority of him which commands, proceeds ey∣ther from the loue of the people, or from his owne reputation.

* 1.411Loue alone would suffice him that hath once gotten it, were it not that hee cannot promise any thing to him∣selfe from the inconstancy of Men, who loue to day and hate to morrow, without any subiect or occasion. Wherefore hee which commands, must assure himselfe of Men long before, and not attend vntill he be reduced to the poynt of necessity. For then the danger being e∣minent, it is no more time, for that their faith is then sha∣ken, and by this search hee giues a testimony that hee feares: the which many times doth hasten the Prin∣ces ruine, and makes them fly from all reconcilment with him.

* 1.412 This Loue is gotten by many meanes. The Beauty, Behauiour, Carriage, pleasing Countenance, and Cour∣tesie, are sometimes of great force. With others Nobility, and reputation of their predecessors hath beene of great vse, although that they had not any other part that was recommendable. Among the Inhabitants of a Citty or Towne, riches may likewise doe something, if they vse it as they ought.

CHAP. 2. Of the parts necessary for a Prince to purchase the Loue of the People.

BVt to treate in generall of the parts necessary for a Prince to purchase this good-will, wee will reduce them to three, Mildnesse, Bounty, and Iustice.

From Mildnesse growes the peace of the Estate, the fidellity of the Subiects, and the Establishment of affaires,* 1.413 there being nothing that doth more force the people to honour their Lord, then the naturall mildnesse which he shewes, and practiseth to their good. Rygour makes him to be feared, and consequently not beloued, and this feare and cold Friendship lasts no longer, then the oc∣casion of feare continues. But mildnesse gouerned with discretion, remaines in the heart, and produceth its effect, whilest that Men which haue receiued pleasure and profit liue. This mildnesse is practised by the Prince principally, in three points. The first, is to pardon offences, but not those of the Estate; and to pardon those, who being dis∣couered can hurt no more, and by vsing clemency vnto them, may get some reputation; but not to those who may mutine, and who by no meanes cannot be perswaded to submit themselues to reason: Mildnesse to such is cru∣elty to all others. It is cruelty I say to pardon a wicked Man, if by the impunity which doth follow, we bee forced afterwards to dipp our hands deeper in blood.

It is a stupid bounty, and a simplicity without discre∣tion, to pardon all, and to suffer all. The excesse of cle∣mency, conuerts it selfe into a soft and effeminate nature: And if this bounty be not mingled with rigour, and facility

with authority; it is meere carelesnesse blamable in a Prince, for that in suffering one fault, it soone drawes after it another. Clemency is comendable towards an Enemy deiected and humbled: But whilest hee wauers and stands in tearmes against vs; it is weakenesse, amaze∣ment and feare, not to dare to resent it, hee must there∣fore vse mildnesse with discretion, yet in such sort, as they may alwayes find the Prince more inclined to mildnesse then seuerity.

* 1.414The second point, when they discouer mildnesse, is cheifly to cherrish great Men, and the cheife of the Estate, and according to occasions, others: For that euery Man esteeming himselfe of more worth then he is, they grow easily discontented if they make no reckoning of them. The third point, by the which he which commands may testifie his mildnesse, is in shewing himselfe indulgent in things, wherein the people take delight; Prouided al∣wayes that they fly excesse and disorder. For by this meanes they mollisie the sauagenesse of the Subiect, they diuert him from vndertaking; and make euery one more ioyfull in his vocation. Yet hee must not suffer himselfe to be carried away with this indulgence, as through neg∣ligence, and the little care hee had to prouide for his E∣state; but with a designe and discretion restr••tiue in his time. For this effect he must also prouide, (as we will shewe hereafter) for the abundance of Victualls and com∣modities, to the end that he may thereby testifie the care he hath of his people, and by this care the affection he beares them. For if the people should fall into necessity, or into a dearth of Victualls, this mildnesse and indulgence would proue vnprofitable; and the Prince would loose much of the Loue of his Subiects: there being nothing that doth so much discontent them, as such discommodi∣ties; especially when it growes eyther through the Mo∣nopoles of the Prince, or the excesse of custome.

CHAP. 3. Of the liberality of the Prince.

LIberallity is of two sorts,* 1.415 the one practised to the be∣nefit of priuate persons; and the other to the profit and aduantage of the Publique. The one and the o∣ther well husbanded, serues to purchase Loue to the Prince. For although hee cannot extend his bounty to all in particular, for that it would bee impossible his reue∣newes should suffice: Yet a liberall Prince is beloued of euery man; For that euery man hopes to taste of his boun∣ty according to his degree, making him his Friend; al∣though that the facility of giuing ruines the Estate sooner, then too great sparing. But no Man enters into considera∣tion, how much sparing is necessary for a Prince, for the generall good of his Estate: For that the number of those is small which doth in particular to hinder that which be∣longs in generall to all. And yet as excesse is blameable in all actions, so it is most preiudiciall to the Estate in this: And we haue seene in our time,* 1.416 that moderate giuing hath beene a weake meanes to purchase the Subiects loue to the Prince: For it reiects more then it gaines; and if it be imployed without respect of merit, it proues a shame to him that receiues it, and is receiued without grace.

The Subiects of a Prince excessiue in gifts, makes them excessiue in expences, and importune in demands. They gouerne themselues not according vnto reason but to cus∣tome: That which is receiued is no more accounted of: They loue not liberality but for the future. Wherefore the more a Prince doth exhaust himselfe in giuing, the p••orer he growes in Friends; and from excessiue pro∣digallity, doth vsually g••ow the pouerty of a Prince: From

pouerty exactions and hatred in like manner. For the number of those from whom he takes by exaction, being greater then the Friendship of those to whom he giues; the Prince is in danger not to command long. If then he be reduced to one of these extremities, it were more ex∣pedient for the Prince to bee poore and not hated of his Subiects, then to be hated and rich. For although that for a time he may force obedience, yet i•• cannot be dura∣ble: And although that he which spares, seemes in out∣ward shewe to doe good to few, yet not exacting from the Subiect hee doth good to all, whereas a prodigall Prince doth vsually good but to few.

We must therefore be carefull to vse this vertue well, thereby to purchase loue. For although that the gifts and benefits, be in some sort in the liberty and free-will of him that giues: yet it hath certaine distinctions and lawes which restraine it, and especially in that which concernes the Prince;* 1.417 who being but a simple dispencer of the Publique Treasure, he ought not to imploy it without hope of some profit to the Publique. Wherefore hee must consider what he giues, to whom, and when. For it is not needfull to giue to all that demands; as if the demander and des••ruer were one and the same thing: Likewise betwixt those which haue deserued, he may not giue to all that begg, for it would be found that they which haue least deserued, haue tasted of his liberality, and not the rest.

And as the payment of a Bond ought to goe before li∣berality; otherwise it would be iniustice to giue, at the charges of those to whom we are indebted: So Merit must be recompenced, before we doe good to him that hath not deserued: And before Merits, seruices ought to march; and before seruices, debts and Bonds ought to be discharged. It is the Law of Iustice, not to doe wrong to one, to gratifie another, The which is very ill obser∣ued by the most part of Princes, who therein follow the

nature of other Princes, which is, rather to doe that which proceeds from their owne will, then what is commanded them by Iustice, or that whereunto they are bound: For that in the first they acknow∣ledged themselues Superiours, and in the second In∣feriours; the recompence shewing the merit and val∣lour of him to whom it is giuen.

Wherefore the benefit or liberality of the Prince, proceeds eyther from the acknowledgment of seruice,* 1.418 or of merit, or of his owne free-will; or to inuite and draw some one to loue him, or to corrupt him, or to pur∣chase the reputation to bee liberall. Concerning the first two sorts of bounty, they are necessary, as well for the satisfaction of those which receiue them,* 1.419 as for the contentment of the Generall, who by the example would bee inuited to conforme their actions to the good of the Estate. For the acknowledge∣ment of a benefit is no lesse esteemed, then if the li∣berality proceeded from a free will: For that the good and pleasure which they doe, proceedes ma∣ny times from the abundance of wealth, and the great power which hee hath that giues, as well as from good-will: But acknowledgement cannot come but from the desire hee had to doe good, so as al∣though to giue and doe good, be more to be desired, yet the content which they feele, is peraduenture more com∣mēdable, as proceeding only frō a francke & free courage.

And it is that whereof among priuate persons wee haue experience, that the benefit which comes from a bond or debt, is more pleasing then that which comes vnto vs from the free-will of another: For that in this consists the con∣tēt of the giuer, who chargeth ys with a bond which binds vs; and which in some doth rather ingender hatred then Friendship; especially if the benefit exceeds all Satisfacti∣on. In the oth••r, besides the pleasure to receiue the benefit, we receiue content to see that we acknowledge the former good which we haue done them.

And although that they which loue vs, deserue to be requited for their good-will towards vs, as being the principall part of the benefit: Yet it deserues rather to be recompenced by a Prince, with kind vsage and good words, then by effects; the which hee must keepe to recompence effects, otherwise his Reuenewes would not ••ustice. Yet if he finds that some for want of this, with∣draw themselues from him, although vniustly and with out cause, it shall be necessary that hee retaine them by the mildest meanes he can, and rather in doing them good, then in ••mploying threats, who according to their natu∣rall disposition, might be the more incensed.

* 1.420The Prince may also bestow gifts and benefits of those, which may serue him against his Enemy; I say to those which are of a contrary party, to draw them vnto him. For as it is a vice in them to suffer themselues to bee cor∣rupted, so it is a vertue and wisdome in the Prince to cor∣rupt and gaine them. And as some haue not allowed of this expence, for that the aduantage which we expect is doubtfull, hauing to deale with traytors, who may as well betray the Prince which giues thē, as him they serue: Yet the general experience is contrary; being most certaine that the Minister which takes, sells himselfe, bee it that the money binds him, or that the shame to haue receiued, stayes him from failing of his promise; Or that the feare to be discouered makes him to be suspected of him hee serues, and to him that giues him, which were a meanes to ruine him with the one and the other, forcing him of necessity to keepe his word with him that hath corrupted him; being in his heart growne irreconciliable to him whom he hath res••lued to betray. Besides few men of qua∣lity suffer themselues to be corrupted, vnlesse they bee transported, by some hatred, contempt, or desire of Re∣uenge, which they haue conceiued against him whom they serue: Or they are not disposed in heart and a••f••cti∣on, to loue him w••ich corrupts them, there being nor••

but base spirits, or needy persons, which suffer them∣selu••s to be cor••upted for meere auar••ce.

The liberality which is vsed to particular persons, to purchase re••utation,* 1.421 extends commonly either to stran∣gers, or to Subiects, which doe not know nor frequent the Princes Court, who ought to haue in no ••••sse recom∣mendation tho••e which a•••• remote from his Court, then others which are dayly in his eye: For that the great∣nes••e and maiesty of the Prince doth not take its founda∣tion and increase to know, but to be knowne of many: And the honour and reno••n•• to aide and doe good to a∣nother, should b•• too ••uc•• ••••strained, if his succours and benefi••s s••ould proceede no farther, then to such per∣sons whom they see and know. Behold wherein vsually the bounty of Pri••ces to priuate p••rsons is imployed,

In their manner of giuing they must ob••erue three things. The first,* 1.422 not to g••ue at the request of a third per∣son, to the ••nd that he which receiues may be bound vn∣to him, and not to the other, by who••e importunity hee giues. The ma••n••rof giui••g must be in such sort, that although it be for an acknowledgment or recompence, yet they to whom it is giuen, receiue the benefit with an obligation; otherwise the gift were fruitlesse, and is held for a payment, and not a liberality; so as they en∣c••urage him that receiues, to demand g••ine, rather then to acknowledge that which they hau•• giuen him.

The t••i••d is, to giue in the view of all men, to pur∣chase reputation. For although that in a priuate lib••tali∣ty this were not commendable; yet this manner is neces∣sary in the Estate, where the Actions of Princes must be apparent and visible, neyther must they be vnfruitfull; And it sufficeth not to doe a pleasure; but you must make him that receiues it, acknowledge that it is done to such an in∣tention. As for the measure of benefits, they must be pro∣portionable to the time, and to the persons,* 1.423 as well of him that receiues, as of him that giues. And for the time,

sometimes a small succour giuen in necessity, obligeth not onely more then a great gift would doe at anot••er time; but sometimes causeth an Enemy to fo••get all the wrongs he had receiued, there being two things in concurrence in this benefit, either of which may doe much for a reconcilliation, and by consequence for loue. The one is, for the benefit and pleasure he doth him, in the best time that could be; I meane at need. The other is the assurance that he which receiues the benefit, takes of his good will that succours him so opportunely. Thus he must obserue the time to giue esteeme to his ben••fits, to the end the Debt may be the greater. As for persons, the humours being diuers, the Prince must obserue the humours of his Ministers, not onely as I haue sayd, to impart their Offices vnto them, but also▪ for his recom∣pences: For that some demand honours, others ••iches, according to the which hee must gouerne himselfe.

And for that there are more men found which affect Riches,* 1.424 then honour; and that being willing to satisfie euery mans desire, he should be forced to exhaust his t••easure: He must (as much as may be) encourage his Sub∣iects to seeke for Honours, as recompences which can not impouerish him; and yet vse it in such sort, as it may seeme that he doth not giue them without discretion and election. For when as Honour is imparted to vnworthy men, it b••gins to be contemned, and to lose this Title of Honour, as likewise he may not mingle it with pro∣fit, for that many would make more esteeme of profit, then of Honour.

If the liberalities of Princes towards priuate persons, doth get them good-will, not onely from those which taste the fruite,* 1.425 but also from all others which partici∣pate in hope: That which the Soueraigne practiseth to∣wards the Publique, as being more profitable, and ex∣••nding to more persons, should pu••chase vnto him more

generally the affection of the people: As the Succours which the Prince giues in publique calamities, in famine, plague, dearth, burning of Townes, Warre, inua∣sion of Enemies, Earth-quakes, inundations, and such accidents. For that the Prince alone may giue this re∣leife, being necessary to haue meanes wh••ch exceede the ordinary: The reason of Estate will not allow that any priuate person, although he were able to doe it,* 1.426 should enter into this kind of liberality, which it may be would aduance him in the loue of the people before the Prince. And in Common-weales and popular Estates, ••ome pri∣uate person hauing attempted to shew their bounty, haue beene punished, as men which sought by this meanes ••o seduce the people, and to vsurpe the Estate.

Seeing then that this liberality is fitting onely for the Prince, he must practise it as much as may be, and not suffer occasion to be lost. There is another sort of libera∣lity, which the Prince may practise to the benefit of the Publique,* 1.427 no lesse importing then the other: which is to aduance to vertue, by the establishment and foundation of Seminaries of Piety and Religion, of Schooles and Colledges for all sorts of Sciences which may serue the Publique: Of Houses of Honour and Vertue, for the practises and exercises which may serue in Warre; and of other places for all sorts of Worke-men and Artizans, for the bringing in of Manufactures, whereof I haue former∣ly treated.

CHAP. 4. Of the Princes Iustice.

IVstice is generally bel••ued and desired: But when they will practise it ag••••nst priu••te persons, the com∣mis••ration they hau•• o•• a con••emned man, or the colour of some contrary reasons, ioyned to interest and obstinacy, make the rigour and seuerity odious to many. Wherefore in a manner in all Estates, the exercise of Iu∣stice hath beene diuided into two parts. That which con∣cernes the punishment of crimes,* 1.428 and the deciding of con∣trouersies betwixt man & man, hath beene left to the Ma∣gistrates and inferiour Officers to the Prince, to free him from the enuy and hatred which condemnations draw af∣ter them: And that which concernes the distribution of D••gnities; honours, charges, recompences, pardons, and rewards, hath beene retained by the Prince, to gaine the loue of the Subiects. Yet the Prince, euen in that which concernes p••iuate men,* 1.429 may shew himselfe a louer of Iu∣stice, and by this meanes winne the affection of his p••o∣ple, not incurring any enuy by the establishment he shall make of Lawes, necessary to supp••esse the fraud and vio∣lence of his Age by the choise he shall make of good men to administer Iustice: And by the care he shall take to keepe them in awe, in p••escribi••g the forme of the admi∣nistrati••n o•• Iustice. The frauds most vsually practised in an Estate by priuate persons, are disloyalty, vsury, falshood, frauds, and M••nopolies; by the which some grow suddain∣ly rich, & some extremly poore; whence many times grow the despai••e of those whō they thrust into innouations; & the insol••ncy of the others which maks thē insupportable:

and from the one and the other growes trouble, and in the end the ruine of the Estate followes. Against this kind of disorder and abuse, the Prince must shew him∣selfe affectionate for Iustice, by the o••dayning of ••igo∣rous punishments against such as shall be surprised; as also in blaming them in his discourses, according to the occasions which shalbe offered, and by admonitions and exhortations to Iudges in generall, not touching any one in particular, and of persons otherwise odious.

And particularly vsury or interest,* 1.430 (which cannot bee defended) ought to be regulated at much lesse then the ordinary gaine of those which borrow, (be they Mar∣chants or Laborers) may mount vnto; to the end that the poore in borrowing of the rich, may lay, and pay that which they are forced to borrow; and thereby auoyd the ruine of the poore by vsury, and that of the rich by banquerupts whereof they are the cause. As for violence which is committed in an Estate, it is of two sorts,* 1.431 the one is of Theeues and Robbers, who by open force and Armes, trouble the safety of priuate persons: against the which the Prince hath a double reason to oppose himselfe, as well for that all force ought to be in his hands, as for that he is Established to mainetaine the peace and safety of his subiects, not onely against strangers, but also among themselues, and the Prince which comes and doth not giue order, looseth the loue of his Subiects, and expo∣seth his reputation to contempt, which makes him in the end loose all his authority; and is in danger that these Theeues seeing themselues strong, will trouble him in his Estate: But this is easily preuented in lending a strong hand to Iustice, and causing those to assist, which are a∣poynted for the apprehension of such persons.

The other so••t of violence contrary to Iustice, is the oppression of the poore by great Men,* 1.432 be it that it is made by the vnlawfull exactions of money, or of day workes, beating, or other ryotts, to preuent the which,

the Prince must n••t onely in his ordinary discourses con∣d••mne this ma••••er of proceeding, thr••atning them to be punished, without taking notice of any person in particu∣lar; but also that whic•• shall concerne the punishment of priuate men, he must l••aue free to the ordinary Iustice, to dispose accordi••g to the Lawes, without assisting the delinquents with any fauour or pardon; as many Princes vsually doe, who trouble the order of Iustice by such impunities, and ruine their Estates by maintayning such people. And we haue often seene, that a Prince hath sa∣ued the life of some such man,* 1.433 who in a combustion hath beene the first to raise the Subiects, and to draw his sword aga••nst him. This is the recompence which such Prin∣c•••• deserue. They come by degrees to pride and disobe∣••••ence, as to all other vices. He that hath dared this day to coa••••••ne the Law and the Magistrates, to morrow will co••t••••ne the Prince who hath made the Law, and ha••h established the Magistrate; and if occasion be offred will attempt against him.

I meane not for all this to tye the Princes hands, so as he may not giue a pardon:* 1.434 There are cases in which Iu∣st••ce doth allow it: But besides when as some great and publique profit requires it; as if it bee for a man, from whom the Publique hath d••awne great and famous S••ruices; or if by the punishment there will follow some trouble in the Estate: The Prince in this case for a gre••t••r good, or to auoyde a great mischiefe, may dis∣peace a••d pardon him. But before he resolue, he must examin•• duely what he intends ••o doe, and he must not flatter himselfe in his considerations, to fauour some one ••g••inst Iustice, which considerations he shall keepe se∣cret, l••••t they draw vnto a consequence: And moreouer, before he comes to that, if there be any particular interest, it must be satisfied with such contentment, as there may be nothing to be desired, nei••her from him which hath of∣fended, nor ••••om the Princes ••ustice.

Among all the violences and oppressions which great Men commit, the most dangerous to an Estate, and which ought to be lesse supported by the Prince, is that which is done against the Magistrate,* 1.435 eyther in execu∣ting his charge, ••or in hatred thereof. For this is to at∣tempt directly against the Publique, and to ouerthrow the order of Iustice, making (by the impunity of such violences) the Magistrate fearefull in t••e execution of the Princes will. He that endures these violences, not onely seemes to loue Iustice and the publique good but little, but also makes them thinke that he feares to pu∣nish them by the ordinary course of Iustice; and in such conniuences he loseth both the loue of his people and his reputation.

The second point wherin a Prince may shew his ••ffectiō towards Iustice,* 1.436 is the choise which he shal make of those which shall administer it for him: As cōtrariwise, the indif∣ferency which he shall shew, to make vse of the first com∣mer••, will discouer his carelesnesse. I meane to speake here not onely of those which are destinated to iudge the controuersies of priuate persons, but also of all such as vnder the Princes Authority, haue any power or command, according vnto which they may doe some∣thing iustly or vniustly. For Iustice is mingled and practised in all actions, be they priuate or publique. E∣uery man is a Iudge in his charge. And wee must not say, that there being good Iustice, we may not punish those who vnder the Princes Authority shall offend in other Offices. For besides the Difficulty which is sometimes found, the same may they say of Iudges. But the Princes fore-sight may passe farther, and hinder the mischiefe and iniustice as much as may be. It is the last remedy to punish; and wee must doe what possibly wee may not to come vnto it. To preuent all this, wee must vse choyce; whereof few Princes dreame, and the contempt of this choyce in some

Estate•• is p••oceeded so farre as Offices are giuen to them that wil•• o••fer mo••t. An apparent signe that these Estates are neare vnto their ru••ne.

* 1.437Some Princes haue had this care, to propound in publique the names of those whom they meant to send into Prouinces, to see what might be obiected before they sent them. Others haue made Rolles, of those that were to be imployed in Offices, causing themselues to be informed sec••etly by good men: And others haue chosen them according to the opinion of the people. But the safest meanes is that whereof we haue spo∣••en, to cause them to ex••cute the meanest Offices from deg••ee to degree, before they were aduanced to others of great importance. For then more men are able to testifie of their Experience and Discretion; and their Actions being as it were publique, and ap∣parent to all the World, it is more easie to iudge 〈◊〉〈◊〉 petty charges they will accustome themselues to doe well, for the desire they haue to be aduanced to greater: And admit they would transgresse, besides that the euill cannot be great, it may be easily corrected.

* 1.438But this is not all, to haue chosen such as must attend Iustice (although that it would bee more then halfe the worke, to haue chosen them good and cape∣able men) but man changeth; and many times amidst the malice of men which are reported vnto him to iudge, he learnes to be malicious. Wherefore the Prince must alwayes haue an open eye to maintaine them in Inte∣grity: And this demonstration which he shall make, in reproaching them for some fault which they haue committed, will in a manner suffice in an Age that is not too much corrupted: But in another, hee must according to occurrents adde to his helping hand, to pr••uent the mischiefe.* 1.439

One of the meanes to auoyde the euill, and to pre∣••erue the integrity of I••dges, is, after that h••e hath

made choise of honest men, to giue them meanes to en∣entertaine themselues in seruing the Publique: To the end he may draw them from the thought, which necessity might force them to, to gather goods by vnlawfull meanes. Others haue held Officers in awe by inquieries made from time to time. But the Commissioners of these searches being as well subiect to corruption as the rest, this cou••se hath not beene long obserued.

Moreouer,* 1.440 Princes thrust on by the harpies of the Court, haue many times made vse of these meanes, ra∣ther to gather together money, then to reforme disor∣ders: I here hauing beene (vnder the like pretext) a publique concussion drawne into many Estates, the which hath equalled (by the meanes of generall and particular compositions which haue beene made) good men with the wicked; No man how good soeuer, being desirous after a long vexation of imp••isonment, and proceeding to run the hazard of a Iudgement of Commissioners; whereof some are many times partizans, or depending of partizans for such compositions, or rewarded by the Fines and Confiscations which they make; and for a small matter would hang a man to haue his clothes.

Another mischiefe which is committed in such compositions, is, that by the meanes thereof the wic∣ked remayning still in his Office, vnder hope to be freed another time at the same rate, doe worse then they did before: And hee which is an honest man, see∣ing himselfe compell'd and forced to pay a Fine for an oftence which hee hath not committed, resolues to doe it, as well to re-embource himselfe, as to haue meanes another time to satisfie the auarice of the Authours of such searches.* 1.441

Wherefore they must eyther make no enquieries, or else they must finish them by the course of Iustice. But if in such things the Prince will shew sauour, and pardon some one mans life: At the least after hee is repre∣hēded,

he may not suffer him to continue in his place, as wel to take from him the meanes of ill doing, as not to make the charge contemptible, and himselfe ••dious, in main∣tayning a person therein, who hath beene held of a bad life.* 1.442 There are Princes which haue made vse of spyes, w••om they sent throughout the Prouinces, to inquire of the actions of officers: And these for that they were vnknowne, might easily enter into all places, and ob∣serue the actions of one and another, and sometimes doe bad offices vnseasonable for the honestest men, yet the Prince being wise and not relying vpon the report, but tying them to a secret proofe, and without any brute, may make vse of it, and ought not to neglect this meanes.

* 1.443Lewis the twelfth who was called the Father of the People, for that he held a strict hand ouer ••ustice, ma∣king his ordinary abode in Blois, examining himselfe se∣cretly, those which come to Court from all parts of his Realme, and sometimes passengers of that which was done, as they had heard spoken in the place from whence they came, and especially of great Men, and of his Officers; and finding by report of many, some aduisoes conformable, against some one, he caused him to bee put into the hands of Iustice, to informe of his life, and to punish him: And in this manner he contained euery man in his duty. Secret delations haue beene brought into Scotland, by an ancient Edict of Conan King of Scotland, the which they say is yet practised at this day, and is called Indict: But better by the ordinance of Millan, by the which in all their Townes there must bee a hollow Trunke in the cheife Church, whereof the Gouernour hath the Key, into the which it is Lawfull for any man, to cast the lybell of ac∣cusation secretly, containing the crime committed, the time, the p••ace, the offendors, & the witnesses; and this or∣dinance giues a moiety of the confiscation to the ••il••tor: which is a great meāes to facilitate the pūishmēt of crimes.

CHAP. 5. Of the administration of Iustice.

IN the forme of the administration of Iustice,* 1.444 among priuate persons, the Prince ought to haue an eye of the order, to the speedy expedition, and to the putting off of charges, and ordinary expences, which they consume in pleading, the which many times exceed the principall. Order is as it were an essentiall part of Iustice: For where there is confusion, there can be no Iustice: and to auoyd this confusion, they must prouide that no iurisdicti∣on attempt not against another. For the which they must haue a care, not onely among those which are of equall po∣wer, distinguished by places, or by certaine kinds of cau∣ses: But also betwixt inferiours and superiours. Contra∣rywise they must strictly bind the parties vpon great pe∣nalties, to follow their suits by those degrees, and in that place which is appointed for them by the Law: And the Prince must hinder, that by Euocations eyther to himselfe, or to some other of his Subiects, there may be ••o contrauention without great cause.

In the speedy expedition, the Prince shall testifie his affection to the good of ••ustice, in taking away the power of Iudges 〈◊〉〈◊〉 p••olong delayes, and fauour those that fly from tryal••, i•• shortning as much as hee may, by the ad∣nice of the m••st iudicious of his Estate, the stile, and forme of their ordinary proceeding, as well in Establish∣ing Fines and Amercements against those that faile and de••ay, as in diminishing the degrees of Iuridiction,* 1.445 and other tediousne••se in p••ediang. As for the expence, the pleader suffers in three or foure sorts. The one, when he is forced ••o goe ••arre from his house and family: For be∣sides

that he is not able to attend his domestique affaires during his absence, they perish most commonly in regard thereof; the charges as well of his voyage as of his returne, are much greater then in his house. The reme∣dy hereof is, to settle in a great Estate Iudges in euery Pro∣uince, and if it may be, in the midst, to the end that the extremities may not be too remote. I meane not only of Iudges, which may iudge in the first instance, but also of those to whō they will giue power to iudge definitiuely, for ordinary causes, and which dese••ue not the cha••ge of a iourney of a hundred, or sixe score leagues.

Another expence is for the vocations of Iudges, who as we haue sayd,* 1.446 ought to bee honestly entertained by the publique, and priuate men freed of that charge. But if they feare that their vocations being reduced to ordinary wages, many amongst them would neg'ect to labour: They may conclude that the summe appointed by the pub∣lique for the payment of their vocation, shall bee diuided amongst them according to their labour, which shall bee taxed by the whole company. There being nothing so vnseemely for a seate of Iustice, then to take money from the hands of one of the parties, yea his iust Fee; and yet there is nothing so ordinary in this age, in a man∣ner in all Estates.

Another expence is of Registers, Vshers, and such other ministers of Iustice, whose taxes they must not onely Regulate,* 1.447 but also limit the time, in the which they ought to deliuer the expeditions to the parties, and that vpo•• great penalties. For a party which sees that he may spend much, will be willing to giue vnto a Register halse that which it would cost him, besides his taxe, then to grow obstinate, to pay nothing but the taxe, set downe by the orders, and to be constrayned to consume twice as much in s••aying to attend his expedition.* 1.448

But the greatest and most excessiue expence, is that of Solicitors, Proctors, and Aduocates, which is a very

difficult thing to order: And some haue held, that we must leaue this meanes to those of this quality, to inrich themselues in seruing others, there being Groomes as they say of all prizes. Yet if they cou••d set downe an or∣der, which might be easily executed, it would be a great benefit for Iustice: But hauing not bin hitherto found, at the least it would require the fore-••••g tand Iustice of the Prince. to prouide in such sort, as poore Men de∣siri••g to recouer their owne, might be•• freed from this cha••ge.

For this effect it hath bin sometimes propounded, to ob∣lige those, which desire to come in time to great offices of this profession, before they should attaine vnto any, they should vndertake the pursuit of causes freely, and that it should not bee lawfull for them to take any Fee; vpon paine of concussion, and to be made v••capable euer to enter into any office for the future. These being com∣monly Men of meanes, desirous to winne honor and in an Age when desire is most ardent: will striue in Enuy one of another to protect the poore, when as for their recom∣pence they should propound vnto them, some place being voyd of those whereunto they aspired, to prefer••e him which had defended the greatest number. Besides the benefit which the poore should reape, the Publique should haue aduantage; in that they which should enter into these charges, had giuen some testimony of their in∣tegrity and su••ficiency: Whereas the custome is at this day, to place Schollers comming from Schoole, in the companies of Iudges, with little Learning and lesse experience, and hauing giuen no proo••es of their dis∣cretion.

There is another poynt wherein the Prince may like∣wise testifie his affection to the good of Iustice,* 1.449 when he submits his Lawes and Edicts to the iudgment of those, to whom he hath referred the last appea••es of his Iustice, before hee ••auseth him to bee executed. The Kings of

France, aboue all others, haue bin curious to bee held Iusticers: And although that otherwise, they haue made profession of Armes and Warre, more then any o∣ther Princes, yet they would bee in all places, in their Seale, and in their throne of Iustice. But aboue all others they of the last race, haue affected this Name to be great Iusticers; hauing brought in the verification of their E∣dicts, by their Courts of Parliament, before they wil cause them to bee executed; stopping the mouthes of such by this formality, as would impug••e their commandements with iniustice, in giuing more authority to the execu∣tion, and preseruing themselues from surprize and im∣portunity.

CHAP. 6. Of the Reputation of the Prince.

* 1.450THe reputation of a Prince, is the other part which giues him authority. It is gotten by many meanes. But we will begin with the principail, which are Prupence, and Vallour. Prudence serues him as an eye to see,* 1.451 and to consider all things. Vallour serues him as a hand. Without the one he should be like a blind Man, and without the other weake and vnable. Prudence giues him Counsell, and Vallour force. The one com∣mands and the other executes. The one discouers the dif∣ficulties of enterprizes; and Vallour breakes them. The one designes affaires; and this finisheth them. The one sharpens the Iudgment; and this fortifies the courage.

* 1.452Prudence to be such as it ought to be in a Prince must be accompanied, with a generall knowledge of all sorts of Sciences, not exactly, as to make a trade and profession;

but he must know as much as is necessary for him, to dis∣tinguish truth from falshood, and to vnderstand those which discourse according to occurrents. His professi∣on is not to bee an E••gineere, to build houses, to make a Bridge, or to be a good Cano••neere: But to know those that are most fit; and iudiciously to make vse of Men of all sorts of professions. Neyther must the Prince bee a∣mazed at this knowledge, which is required in him as of a thing impossible, amidst the variety of affaires and occu∣pations, which they of this quality haue vsually; nor to distrust his vnderstanding and capacity: For there is nothing therein but is most easie.

And among other meanes to get this generall know∣ledge, the principall is to haue about him a good number of Men, great in all sorts of Sciences, as D••uines, Phylo∣sophers, Mathematitians, and Captaines, for whom (be it attable or else where,) he may in few words learne that which cannot be apprehended in many moneths at schoole: To giue them a subiect of discourse, in walking, bee it on foot or hors-backe, going a hunting, and in all other oc∣casions; to keepe them prepared, so as presenting them∣selues before him, they may be ready to deliuer something that is rare and excellent. Yet he must remember, if he meanes to haue them discourse before the world in his presence, to aduertise them secretly sometime before, of that which he meanes to propound, to the end they may be prepared; for the most sufficient may bee surprized: And not to reprehend him before the world; the which would doe wrong to his reputation, and that of the Prince would likewise suffer, for that they would conceiue he had made a bad choyce. Thus the Prince imploying the time onely, which others spend in the encounters of iesters, he will in a short time be as learned as shall bee necessary for him.

Alexander, Iulius Caesar, Charlemaigne,* 1.453 Charles the wise King of France, and Alphonso the tenth King of

Castille, had not want of affaires and im••loyments: And yet they found l••isure to read, and ••ome to write. Al∣phonso the first King of Naples, who in his time had as ma∣ny affaires and c••osses as any other of his quality, sayd, that a Prince without Learning was an Asse Crow••ed.

Experience is the Mother of Prudence, for that many things seeme grounded vpo•• re••son,* 1.454 and easie in fa∣mil••••r discour••e; the which being put in execution, ••uc∣ceed not, as they conceiue: but contrariwise they haue found some impossible.* 1.455 Experience is of two sorts. For eyther we get it of our selues, by that which we obs••rue, and whereof we are eye witnesses: O•• by the report of others. The report of others, is eyther of the liuing, or such as are dead. In regard of the first, although it ex∣tends not farre, by reason of time; Yet it may imbrace many places, for that Embassadours, Spyes, Marc••ants, Souldiers, and such like persons, who (eyther for pleasure, or for affaires, or for some other subiect,) haue beene in many places, and haue found themselues in diuers Encounters, may teach vs many things for our con∣duct.

* 1.456But History passeth much farther, and with much more profit: For there is seene the life of the world, the manner▪ and fashions of Nations; the diuers Establish∣ment of Estates; the beginning, progresse, middest, and end, and the causes of the encrease, and ruine of Empires. There may bee learned the causes, for the which some Princes raig••e peaceably, and others in troubles and con∣bustion; Some in making war, and others in being pro∣digall; And some stayed in their expences with dignity. But to relate here all that is necessary to Prudence, we must make a repetition of all that is formerly spoken, this treaty tending onely to this point, wee will content our selues to propound some rules, which concerne onely the Prudence of the Prince.

CHAP. 7. Rules and necessary instructions for a Prince to be held wise.

A Prince may easily iudge by himselfe what may be the deliberations of all others of his condition. In∣terest is the part and reason which preuailes, and makes the resolutions, bend to that side where it shewes it selfe: And therefore he must neither trust to Friendship, alliance, league, nor any other Bond, if there be no interest.

A Prince must oppose himselfe against a mischiefe in its breeding, and resolutely: For that disorders grow, and fortifie the••selues in such manner with time, as they surpasse our forces. But when the mischiefe ex∣ceeds the forces of the Prince, then he shall doe wel to de∣ferre it, for that with time matters may change: & he that hath time, as they say hath life. Hee may not consent t••at they put any thing in deliberation, which may cause cha••ge or innouation in the Estate: For that the propositions which are made in the Princes Councell, giue him credit, how strange and pernicious soeuer they be It is a signe that there is some difficulty to discouer the good and euill that is in this subiect, seeing they bring it into consultation.

He must not thinke in his resolutions to be able to auoide all inconueniences: For that cannot bee. There is no generation of things in this world, how good soeuer, but a corruption hath gone before it. But he must weigh the inconueniences, and choose the par∣ty wherein there are least, and most easie to preuent. He may not imbrace many Enterprizes at once: For hee that

imbraces too much, gripes not fast: But hee must assure his Estate before hee attempts a Warre of a long con∣tinuance.

Hee may not quarrell with one more powerfull then himselfe, but dissemble the iniuries of the mighty, and the offences which cannot be punished. To yeeld som∣times to time, and rough encounters is Wisedome: And in a strong storme to strike faile, and to accommodate himselfe ••ith the strongest, yea with disaduantage, to pre∣uaile ouer the weaker. And thus the Prince shall increase the courage of his Men, and make himselfe fearefull to his Enemies: It being not Wisedome to commit himselfe to hazard and Fortune, for a light matter.

The Prince may not make any suddaine change, for that it cannot be done without violence; and violence doth seldome producean effect that is durable. Being ready for the execution of an Enterprize, he may ••ot deferre it, vnlesse hee finds an apparrant danger in the execu∣tion: For time may breede more harme then good. Hee must likewise preferre old things before new, rest before trouble, the ce••taine before the vncertaine, and safety be∣fore hazard.

Hee may not breake nor attempt agai••st power∣full common-weales, vnlesse it bee with great aduan∣tage, and in a manner a certaine hope to preuaile. For the loue of libertie to such as haue it, is so strong; as it is a difficult thing, yea impossible to roote it out: And moreouer the E••te••prizes and designes of Princes, die with them; but the resolutions of such free Estates are immortall. Hee may not likewise breake with the Church for a small matter. For that many other Princes, who would bee glad to worke their owne ends, vnder pretext of Religion, and of succouring the Church, will be glad to ioyne w••th it: And the Warres of Prin∣ces against Popes, are of great expences and little profit.

We haue spoken formerly of the election of Ministers; we will adde here, that he must haue a ••are they may be equall to the affaires, not superiours, nor inferiours. For that they which esteeme themselues capable of a greater matter, then that which is committed vnto them, neg∣lect it, and contemne it; and they which are vncapable, and cannot discharge the place, disgrace and are preiudici∣all to those that imploy them.

If his Estate be great, to discharge himselfe of some hu∣mors, hee may entertaine a Warre with some of his Neighbours: Yet hee may not continue it so long, as hee shall make his Enemy too Warrelike: But shall make a peace with him, although he himselfe were the stronger. For by this meanes hee shall giue a Law to the trea∣ty, and may preserue his aduantages, and then begin Warre with another: He shall make himselfe powerfull and fearefull to all, being still Armed, and hauing Men inured to Warre. This is the Turkes vse with his Neigh∣bours, who hath setled himselfe in his conquests by this meanes: It being a great indiscretion in a Prince, to for∣beare to make a peace, vntill hee can make no more re∣sistance. For then all the conditions are to his disaduan∣tage: And admit hee would not continue the Warre a∣gainst some one of his Neighbours; Yet hee may not wholely relinquish Armes; for that a disarmed peace is weake.

But he must haue a speciall care not to attempt a War against his subiects; and if he be prest to it, let it bee with great aduantage, and end it speedily: For the more the Warre continues, the more his subiects are incensed and estranged from him; so as they can neither obey him, nor afterwards trust in their Prince. Wherefore he must not oppose himselfe directly against a multi∣tude: For admit hee should preuaile (the which not∣withs••anding would bee difficult) it cannot be without losse of the loue which they beare him. But like

vnto good Marriners, hee shall take aside wind, when as that in the Pope is contrary; and shall make shew to giue that, which hee cannot hinder nor take from them. But aboue all hee must bee warie in diuisions of his Estate, not to r••maine partiall; and in the place of Prince to make himselfe head of a partie. The Enterprizes wherein cou∣rage is necessary, must be performed with Celeritie, the which will giue vs the aduantage which wee want, and which wee cannot haue by our owne forces. Celeritie strikes suddainely; and against force if wee haue time, wee may fortifie our selues with that which is necessary to resist.

The one puts an Enemy in disorder, and the other breaks him: And it is more easy to disorder him and then breake him; then to breake those at the first charge, that are in order. Yet there are certaine enterprizes, in the which wee must vse time and patience, not rash violence; for that delay weakens with time and occasion; and it is more easie to weaken then quite ouerthrow a businesse, then to force it suddenly.

Aboue all things the Prince must study to know the oportunity of occasions, for his enterprizes and affayres; which is no other thing but an encounter of many cir∣cumstances, which makes that easy which before see∣med eifficult. Hee may not commit the executio•• of a•• Enterprise to him, which is not of aduice, it should bee attempted; For that the will cannot bee followed by the effect, if the vnderstanding doth not incline thereu••to, and serue him for a guide: And hee which hath not held a busi••esse easy before the Execution wi•• find more difficulty in the Execution. Hee must consult naturally of Enterprises: But, as I haue said elsewhere, hee must leaue the meanes of the Execution, to the discretion of him to whom hee commits it. For the Execution depending for the ••ost pa••t, vpon oportunity and present occasions

which vary continnally, to limit it is no other thing, then to intangle the Minister, and to spoile the businesse.

A Prince must not thinke in flying to preserue himselfe in mischiefe and danger; but he must oppose against it: For that in flying, he not on••ly followes, and fa••ls vpon vs; but witha••l many other da••g••rs grow: Whereas in making head wee stay him, and then we repulse him in time; and the danger most commonly dissolues to no∣thing. In consu••ting of an Enterprize, hee must auoid sharpe Counce••l and full of subtilty; for they seldome succeed, and a few crosses make them vnprofitable: As also those which haue mo••e shew and vanitie then a good foundation. In the Estate hee must build vpon that which is solid and firme: As likewise hee m••st fly th••se which are full of expences, and aboue his forces and meanes. But hee must fo••low Councell grounded in reason vpon safety, and little subiect to be crost by acciden••s. Yet he that assailes, must ha∣zard somet••mes: But when the question is to preserue, he must commit nothing to Fortune. Wherefore slow Councels are more fitting for great Princes, which haue more neede to preserue, then to get, and those which are suddaine will bee more proper for con∣querours.

But in doubtfull occasions which are vrgent and preci∣pitate, there is nothing worse then slow and middle Councels. Courage will be alwayes more profitable, and lesse preiudiciall, vnlesse they be resolued wholy to yeeld. In affaires where the reasons are strong on all parts, and where it is in a manner impossible to see and choose that which is most commodious and profitable, (the which breeds in vs doubts and perplexities) the best is to incline to that party, where there is more honesty and Iustice. For although it miscarries; yet we shall alwayes haue a satisfaction remaining in vs, and a glory outwardly, and to haue chosen the best: Besides, no man

knowes what might haue happened, if wee had chosen t••e contrary party. Finally if wee doubt which is the best, or shortest way: Wee must hold the stra••ghtest.

We must not in difficult affaires, diue into all sorts of inconueniences, not in accords and treaties, trouble our selues wi••h nice poynts, which grow vsually in treating: But wee must looke to the maine, and to assurances. I m••ght adde here••n••o an infinite number of other rules, the which might ••e••ue a Prince to make him to be held Prudent in practising them. Yet I doe not hold that in matt••r of State, hee should so tye himselfe to rules and maximes, as he should not pe••ze and waigh the circum∣sta••ces, and particularities of affaires: For hee may en∣counter with such a circumstance, as he shall be forced to take a resolution contrary to maximes. But the greatest sig••e of p••udence in a Prince, is to be secret: Other∣wise he should betray himselfe; and none of his resol••∣tio••s would succeed.

CHAP. 8. Of Cunning or Pollicy.

ANd for that they make two sorts of prudence; the one which is guided by the ordinary maximes of honesty and Iusti••e, and the other which consists mo••e in surprizes and deceipt, which they call cunning: Many haue doubted, whether it were expedi∣ent for a Princes reputa••ion, to make vse of this last. Wherein I wi••l speake my opinion here; but I will de∣liuer that of one of our time, who hath written vpon this subiect: Who holds that Fraud, Cunning and De∣ceipt, if they be without vice or wickednesse, may bee al∣lowed

v••to a Prince for the Pub••ique good, and for his defence and preseruation; but not to offend any man. It is his duty, to procure the Publique good, and the health of the people. ••his is the foueraigne Law, by the which the Prince ought to gouerne all his ac∣tio••s.

Wicked men should haue too much aduantage, if by cu••ning they mig••t not repell their cunning. It is law∣••ul•• to ••••••e••d a•• Estate with the same Armes, with the which they a••••aile it. It is not tollerable to turne the backe to honesty and ••ustice, but sometimes to g••e about it and coast it. But the more distinctly to explicate this, we will borrow the disti••ction which he makes, of diuers sorts of cunning and deceipts: Some are light; others great;* 1.457 and some ••eane and indifferent. T••e light he not only allowes to Princes but commands them. The meane he tollerates. The g••eater he fo••bidd••.

Amo••g the light, he puts distrust and dissimulation. Distrust is as necessary in a Prince, as credulity is hurt∣full. So it hath beene called the strength of prudence; that is to say, to wa••ch, to beleeue nothing light∣ly, and to haue an eye to all things. He must there∣fore trust few Men, and ••hose lo••g knowne and of∣ten tryed. And yet hee may not so slipp the line in such sort, as hee doth not alwayes hold it by one end, and haue an eye to it: But hee must couer and disguise his distrust, yea, in di••r••••••i••g he must make a shew to haue some confidence. For open distrust offends, and inuites another as well to deceiue vs, as too much indiscreet confidence. They haue many times had a desire to deceiue him, whom they haue found fearefull to b••e deceiued: And on the other side, an open confidence bindes some to guard loyalty. From distrust they come to dissimulation,* 1.458 ••hich smothe•• the fore-head, and couers the thoughts, no lesse necessary for a Prince then the first. But he

must learne how to play this part cunningly, without ex∣cesse or foolery, making open profession of simplicity, cherishing those that are free and open, as enemies to dis∣simulation; and that in small matters the Prince p••oceede openly, to the end they may hold him for such in greater.

Another sort of deceipt, and ordinary among P••inces, are the practices and intelligences which they haue in the Estates one of another;* 1.459 drawing cunningly the hearts of their Neighbours, officers, seruants, and confidents, to discouer their secrets, and to crosse the designes of their Masters, and sometimes to lead a hand to some Enter∣prize against th••ir Masters person. This hath proceeded so farre, as it hath sometimes corrupted euen the Wiues of Princes. This is done by two meanes: Either by perswa∣sion, making vse of the discontentments which great men haue of their Masters: Or by money which is the most v∣suall course. And many haue held this manner of procee∣ding allowed against an Enemy, a rebellious or suspec∣ted Subiect, yea, against any stranger with whom they haue no alliance: But against his Fri••••ds; Allies and Confederates, it is treachery, which ought not to be prac∣tised as they doe at this day.

* 1.460There are Princes to whom all sorts of meanes are iust to gaine some ad••antage, and to attaine to their designe: who haue made vse to deceiue by Equiuocations, faire words, promises, Letters, Embassies, yea, and by lies, to obtaine that which they could not otherwise doe, by reason of the difficulty of time and affaires. Plato allowes this deceipt, so as it be for the good of the Subiects. Yet to make this proceeding iust,* 1.461 there must be a necessity; and it must be in a t••oublesome and confused time; and not onely to adua••ce the good, but to diuert some great mischiefe, and against the wicked.

There are other kinds of proceeding, frequent enough in Princes, to preserue t••emselues and their Estate f••om their E••em••••s; the which cannot be excused but by n••∣cessity:

And the Prince which is reduced to this point, m••st know that it is a misery for him to ••ee him••elfe for∣ced to leaue the ordinary course of Iustice, for the safety of his Estate, and he may not proceed but with some fee∣ling of griefe; but he must carry ••imselfe therein like a Fath••r, when he is forced to cauterize, or cu•• off a mem∣ber of his Child to saue ••is life. I will set downe here some examples: As to put those secretly to death, and without forme of Iustice, which cannot be punished without trou∣ble and danger to ••he Estate. If they deserue death, the Prince who may dispence with the other formes, may likewise dispence for the safety of his Estate. To clip the wings, and shorten the meanes of some one which mu∣tines and fortifies too much in the Estate, and makes him∣selfe fearefull before he hath a commodity to attempt. T•• diue by authority into the purses of his rich Subiects, in some necessity and pouerty of the Estate. To reuoke the priuiledges giuen to some one, or to some Comminalties, or particular men, to the preiudice of the Soueraigne and the Estate. To seaze vpon some neighbour place, for feare that another holding it, he should make Warre against vs and ruine vs.

All these things are in themselues vniust; but this in∣iustice is ballanced by necessity and publique profit. Ne∣cessity as they say, hath no Law: And the Prince reduced to these termes, must know not onely how to command according to the Lawes, but also how to command the Lawes themselues. All is, that the Prince doth not forge this necessity and constraint himselfe, for to satisfie his co∣netousnesse or ambition: For in stead of p••rchasing the re∣putation to be wise, he will cause himselfe to bee estee∣med an vniust and inhumane Tyrant.

CHAP. 9. Of the reputation of a Prince; and the meanes how to get it.

VAllour is another part which serues to reputation, and it is of such importance,* 1.462 as power is much in∣feriour vnto it. Vallour procures power; and without vallour power is lost. This is seene in ma∣ny Estates,* 1.463 the which with small forces haue beene con∣quered by valour; and others ••or want of valour haue lo••t themselu••s with their power.

And although that va••our consists chiefely in the in∣teriour and courage: Yet to maintaine this courage, he must haue care of the exteriour. A Prince may well be couragiou••, if hee be sickly and incommodated of his healt••, and that as they say, his legges fai••e him: his cou••age may be commendable, but very vnprofitable for him and his Estate. Wherefore he must haue a care of two things.* 1.464 The one to entertaine this v••g••ur of spirit, and to keepe it in action, by a desire of honour and glo∣ry, be it by the reading of valiant exploits of Warre, performed by great Princes and Captaines, or by the conuersation of couragious and wise men, putting them often vpon the Discourse of great Enterprizes, which they or others haue done; or be it by the conside∣ration of that which concernes the Duty of a Prince, and the shame and contempt which they of his quality ••un in∣to, which haue beene b••se and Cowards.

The other care which a Prince ought to haue, is to entertaine himselfe in health, and to get an able and strong complexio••. Sobriety and moderation in Meats, serue greatly to p••ese••ue ••ealth, as g••uttony and drunkennes al∣tereth much. And frō thence proceed indigestions, crudi∣ties,

gouts, and a•••• other diseases. Continency is likewise of great force; there being nothing that doth more weaken chast men, nor that debilitates the spirit and body more, then an excessiue lasciuiousnesse. The forces likewise increase with exercise, as that of Hunting, or others which consume the humours of the body. And to frame a strong and able complexion, he must in good time ac∣custome himselfe to cold, heate, watching, hunger, to water, wine, and to all courses of life: The encoun∣ters being so diuers, to the which a Prince must accom∣modate himselfe, that one failing, sometimes this defect makes ma••y things impossible vnto him.

There are yet many things to bee done,* 1.465 which may serue a Prince to get reputation: As to couer his defects and weak••nesse cunningly, is a great meanes to to preserue his credit: To make shew (yet without ostentation) of his fo••ces to those that are more weake: To flye, and shew himselfe an Enemy to vanity and much talking, but to doe more then hee speakes. To talke grauely, and with a solid Iudgement: to maintayne his word, the te∣stimony of courage and a firme Iudgement: To be con∣stant in aduersity, and moderate in prosperity. Not to hazard himselfe in enterprises, vnlesse he be assured to preuaile; and ••auing attempted one, not to giue it ouer, lest he shew himselfe to haue had little iudgement in the beginning, and of as little courage to end it. Not to bu∣sie himselfe in petty Enterprises, but to seeke occasions of great ones, especially in the beginning of his Reigne: For that thereby they settle a iudgement of that which will follow. He must not seeme to depend on the coun∣cell and will of another; for that were to establish a Su∣periour and companion, and to make his insufficiency knowne.

He may not imploy himselfe in things which are vnder the dignity of a Prince; as Nero busied himselfe in Sing∣ing, to make Verses, and to be a good Coach-man;

D••mitian spent his time in Shooting and in taking of Flyes; and Aropas King of the Macedonians, imployed himselfe in making of Lanthornes; Valentinian to make Images of Waxe; Rene Duke of Anion, and Earle of Prouence to paint, Chilperic King of France, and Thi∣bant King of Nauarre, to time; and Alphonso King of Cast••lle in Astrologie: But he shall imploy himselfe to know his Estate, and that which may serue for the good gouernment. The vn••formity of life in a Prince, and the co••stancy in his commands doth also breede him reputation.

He must likewise treat his affaires with dignity, and not by men which are of a base and vi••d condition. The basenesse of Ministers doth vilefie h••s affaires, and the weaknesse ruins them; and both the one and the other makes the world beleeue that the Prince distrusts great men, or that he feares to be discouered, inferiour in af∣faires, by those which shall haue more vnderstanding, or that he hath ••o iudgement in making such a choice. But he may not suffer great talkers to approach neere vn∣to him, nor admit them to his secret affaires, for feare least they should discouer his actions and designes, by an itchi••g desire which such Monckies haue common∣ly to babble.

He must not grow familiar with all sorts of persons, nor shew himselfe to often but vpon great occasions, and with a countenance and bel auiour full of Maiesty: And in his extraordinary ioy heauinesse or choller, hee shall not shew himselfe at all; but shall passe his first motion in his Cabinet, and out of the sight of his followers: His habite must be graue and modest without extrauagancy, he s••all auoyd extremities in all his courses, shewing himselfe neither slow nor rash, but he shall rather in∣cline to the first then to the last; for the first hath a de∣pendance of Prudence and ••rauity, and the other of lightnesse and rashnesse; he must make more accompt

of truth then opinion, and haue a care that all that pro∣ceedes from him may be great, accomplished, excel∣lent and admirable, finally that he doe lesse and doe it well, that he suffer not any disobedience which may be drawne into example.

That the affaires of importance may depend vpon him alone, without imparting it to any man what fauour soeuer he beare him, as the authority to make Lawes, to giue priuiledges, to make peace or warre, to giue pardons, to make choice of his principall Ministers, to impose Taxes, Subsidies, and other leuies of Money, to fortifie places, to cast Orduance, to recompence others out of his Treasure, to aduance to Dignities or such o∣ther things as he ought to reserue.

By Mag••ificence he may likewise get reputation, as by the structure of publique Buildings, Pallaces, Churches, Fountaines, Fortifications of Townes and such like places, which redowne to the benefit of the publique. Religion likewise knowne to be in a Prince, imports him much for his reputation, for shewing him∣selfe to be full of Piety, the people will conceiue that he will be likewise iust, and that he will not vndertake a∣ny thing but with the assistance of God: Wherefore it imports him much to make esteeme of Church-men, which are knowne to haue probity and sufficiency in them, to retaine some about him, to procure a good reformation in the Church by mild and lawfull meanes, without Trouble, Schisme, or Deuision, to dispose of Benefices to capable men, to haue care of the poore, and finally to imploy himselfe in all workes of Piety.

By these last meanes a Prince may in time of Peace maintayne his reputation, hauing no neede in time of Warre to seeke for other particularities then his owne valour: The which shewing it selfe in occasions which shall present themselues, will maintaine▪ them alwayes in credit and reputation. But if in the time of Peace they

desire something more of him, there being people to whom he must giue a subiect of discourse, and busie them in the consideration of their Princes actions, otherwise they contemne them: The Prince must imploy himselfe sometimes to reforme Iustice, sometimes the Treasure, sometimes the discipline of Warre, and alwaies to make some new Establishment which may serue the Estate. Augustus hauing brought all his affaires to an end, and finding no more subiects to entertaine the people of Rome with his actions, he imployed himselfe to reforme the Callander.

So in the like encounters, the Prince must seeke all meanes to quicken his reputation in the spirits of the sub∣iects, and to make them beleeue that he is not idle, giuing them occasions to speake well of him, and hinder them from detracting and speaking ill.

Hauing discoursed of the meanes, by the which a Prince might get or maintaine his authority; Let vs see the meanes and remedies, which may bee found for that which may cause the ruine of the E••ate. To know if the remedies bee proper, wee must likewise know the disease.

CHAP. 10. Of the causes of the ruines of Estates: and of the remedies which may be found.

* 1.466 THe workes of nature faile by two kinds of causes: whereof some are exteriour, and others interiour. The exteriour are Fi••e, Sword, and such other vio∣lences. The interiour are the excesse and corrupti∣ons of the first qualities. In like manner States are ruined

eyther by forraigne force and violence, or by the corrupti∣on and disorder that is with it; but more rarely by the first alone then by the last: And we haue seldeme seene any Estate ruined by forraigne force, which was not first corrupted within it.

Yet let vs speake something of the ordinary meanes, by the which wee may preuent a forraigne force.* 1.467 Eyther the Prince that is assailed by this force, is equall in power to him that assailes him, and in all meanes and necessary ad∣uantages for his defence: Or else he is weaker either in meanes or for that hee hath not his forces ready to op∣pose. If hee be equall, he may fore-see his enemies des∣signe: And if hee hath any iust and tollerable pretext to make an offensiue Warre, he must not stand vpon his de∣fence. Among Princes which make Warre, he that layes the cloth (as the prouerbe sayes) payes the reckoning. For, besides that his countrey is ruined as welby his owne Army, as by that of his Enemies, the amazement is greater among his Subiects; And hee will not dare to hazard a Battaile, which would endanger his whole Fortune, for that loosing it, he shall not onely loose his men but also his Countrey: Whereas his Enemy may aduenture it with farre more aduantage, his Estate beiug secure, and what∣soeuer happens he can loose but men.

But if the Prince be weaker then his Enemy which in∣nades him, he must procure him some greater Enemy, or many which may effect that which he cannot doe alone. He must likewise practise factions and diuisions with his Enemy, and get intelligence with some one of his prime Councellors or great Men, and with those that haue most authority and credit with his Enemy; to the end they may diswade him from this Warre, or diuert it, or make it vnprofitable, in slackning the executions, or giuing ad∣uice of his designes, to the end hee may oppose himselfe in time.

But if the practises be such, as they may breed a feare

in his Enemy of a reuolt, Treason, Sedition, or a ciuill war; they will be much better and of greater force. Defen∣siue Leagues with his Neighbours, or with the Neigh∣bours of his Enemy, may be of great vse, who may grow iealous of his power. For the feare which his Enemy might haue, that inuading one, all the rest may goe to Armes, would retaine him.

Besides this, the Prince must keepe good guards vpon all the principall passages of his Estate, and place strong Garrissons in his Forts, who may stay the Enemy, and by a long siege cause him to loose much time, and many men; and by this meanes consume his prouisions, and waste his Army, whereby he may bee the better able to encounter him; And if he be able to raise an Army, he must choose a strong place at the entry of his Countrey, and lodge it in such sort, as he may bee neither forced to fight nor to dislodge, to the end he may hinder his Enemy from pas∣sing on. But hauing neither forces' nor forts vppon the passage of this quality; or the Enemies forces being such, as they are not to bee stayed by this meanes: Some in this case haue themselues wasted their owne Countrey, on that side where the Enemy was to enter, causing all to retire into the heart of the Estate, depri∣uing him not onely of all prouision of Victualls, but also of other commodities, Mills, Ouens, Lodgings, and o∣ther imployments, whereof an Army is seldome wholy furnished. The first against the Polonians, and the se∣cond against the Turkes forces, haue assured their Coun∣tryes for a time, in laying a great part of the confines waste. And the Muscouite being in a Countrey which doth abound in Wood, shut himselfe vp in a short time; So as Steuen King of Poland, meaning to passe into Mus∣couie, was forced to spend much time in cutting downe the Woods to make a passage for his Army.

And although that he which is assailed be the weaker, yet there hath beene some, which haue carried the Warre

into their Enemies Countrey, to make a diuersion as Ag••∣th••cles did, who being besieged by the Carthaginian•• in Siracusa, resolued to leaue a sufficient troupe to main∣taine the Siege, and to imbarke with the rest, to trans∣port the Warre into Affricke. Boniface, Earle of Cor∣segus, did the like, in the yeare 822. to retire the Sarasins out of Sicily. The which succeeded the more happily, for that the Carthaginians, the Affricans, who were the inuaders, hauing not fore-seene this policy, had not pro∣uided for their Countries. And it is a generall rule, that we must assaile an Enemy where he least suspects.

But if the Enemy be so powerfull, and hath such an aduantage ouer vs, as there is no meanes to resist him, rather then to lose all, it were better to yeeld something: And if he may be freed for ready money, in making as they say a Bridge of Gold to his Enemy, he shall escape good cheape. The which hath beene happily practised by the Florentins, Venetians, and Genois, or else he must seeke the protection of some Prince that is neare or farre off, yet so as he may be relieued in time, or the Enemies Estate annoy'd. So the Capouans finding themselues prest by the Samnites, put themselues vnder the pro∣tection of the Romans. The Genois were sometimes protected by the French, and sometimes by the Dukes of Millan. Pope Iulio the second, made vse of another policy, to diuert the French from the Siege of Ferra∣ra, selling it to the Emperour, with hope after the Warre to redeeme it againe for money: So as the French hauing no will to breake with the Emperour, gaue ouer their Enterprize.

There haue beene some Princes, who finding no meanes to resist, haue made choice rather to yeeld to Fortune, and to abandon their Countrey, then to see it ruined; ho∣ping that the affaires changing, their Subiects not who∣ly ruined, would cal them back more willingly then if they had bin chased away by an open rebellion, or that growing

obstinate to maintaine themselues, they had bin puni∣shed by the Enemy: This succeeded happily to Ferd••nand of Aragon, chased from Naples by Charles the Eight: To the Venetians when they abandoned their Townes vp∣on the firme land, to the league of Cambrag: To the Duke of Vrbin, who seeing himselfe▪ vnable to make head against Caesar Borgia, abandoned his Countrey, ha∣uing first ruined all the Forts of his Estate; hoping that be∣ing well beloued of his Subiects, vpon the first alterati∣on they will call him backe, as they did.

But for that they seeke to surprize him whō they meane to assai'e by force, and to attaine vnto it, they deuise o∣ther pretexts to arme, to the end they may circumuent their Neighbour: And in like manner, when as two po∣werfull Neighbours make Warre together, and after∣wards come to conclude a Peace, eyther of them seekes to free himselfe of his Souldiers, at the cost of some one of his Neighbours: The Prince which shall finde him∣selfe to haue such bad Neighbours, must presently arme, and stand continually vppon his guard whilest his Neighboursare in Armes.

These are the most generall and ordinary Remedies a∣gainst forraigne force, the exteriour cause of the ruine of Estates.

CHAP. II. Of the interiour Causes of the ruine of Estates.

THe interiour Causes from whence the ruine of an Estate may grow, are of two kinds: Some are neare, others are remote.* 1.468 The nearest are conspi∣racies against the Prince, or against the chiefe Ma∣gistrate, vnder whole authority the Estate is gouerned:

The treason of Townes, strong places. or Armies: The Rebellion of Subiects against the Prince; and the Diuision into factions and parties. But for that these causes grow from a precedent corruption in the Estate, being but the effects of remote causes; we must seeke the mischiefe far∣ther off to prouide a Remedy. The causes which produce these effects,* 1.469 proceede either from the defect of the Soue∣raigne, or of the Magistrates, and others which haue the chiefe charges in the gouernment of the Estate; or through the defect of other Subiects, which are conside∣red either in generall vnder the name of people, or rela∣tiuely by the reason of their subiection; Some being borne subiects to the Prince to whom they obey; others are sub∣iects by conquest, that is to say, borne vnder another Prince, but haue beene since conquered by him to whom they obey, or else they are considered according to their condition, quality, and power, which they haue to trou∣ble the Estate.

Among the defects which may be found in the Soue∣raigne Person,* 1.470 those which may breed the Subiects ha∣tred and contempt against him, are most preiudiciall. Those which ingender hatred, are cruelty and couetousnesse. Cruelty shews it selfe in the executions of such which he causeth to be punished. Auarice in the leuying of money and exactions vpon his Subiects. To remedy the first,* 1.471 he must deale as little as may be with the punishments of his Subiects: but referre the Iudgement of such things to the ordinary course of Iustice. But if for the good of the E∣state, and for the little assurance there is in Iudges, he be forced to interpose himselfe, he must doe it seldome, and make it knowne that he doth it vnwillingly, and onely in consideration of the publique good, to the end he may re∣taine good men in their duties, and diuert the wicked from their bad intentions: Neither must he shew any choller, and aboue all things he must forbeare to be present at Exe∣cutions; That the punishments must be ordinary, and not

vnusuall, and that in punishing diuers for one fact, there must be an equality of punishments obserued. But if by the death of one alone he may preserue the rest, he ought to doe it. And if there be many ••hat be put to death, he shall cause them to suffer altogether, to the end that by the con∣tinuance of execution it may not renew the hatred.

Some haue held it fit to sweeten the hatred of an Exe∣cution, to punish the Minister which hath done it, if he be of that quality that he hath deserued it. Yet I hold this manner of proceeding vniust and tyranuous; especially if it tends to death, whereof they ought not to make so flight an accompt. Yet a Prince may in necessity, hauing no other meanes to free himselfe from Enuy, chase him away, lay∣ing the fault vpon him, and making shew that ••he hates him for the same Subiect, for the which he is odious vnto the people: But wholy to abandon, him were basenesse. Moreouer he must sweeten rigorous Executions by bene∣fits, yea, by gifts out of the confiscation of the parties goods which is executed, to such as be discontented with the Executiō, to the end it may appeare that not couetous∣nesse but only Iustice hath brought the Prince vnto it. To remedy the second,* 1.472 he must make it appeare, that the le∣uies which he raiseth, are grounded vpon the necessity of the Estate▪ there being no Estates without tributs, customs or Subsedies, the which are necessary to satisfie the expen∣ces, without the which the Estate cannot subsist and be maintayned. Impositions must be made with equality, according to euery mans goods and faculties, with∣out hatred or fauour, and with moderation; not in∣supportable nor sordid; not too frequent nor new, nor vnder vnusuall names; They must be leuied with mo∣desty, without couetousnesse, cruelty, or violence, and by honest men; and he must punish those seuerely that mis-••ehaue themselues.

Finally, he must make it appeare by the expences, that the money is imployed for the necessity, good, and preser∣uation

of the Estate, and not for the Princes ryot or pro∣digallity, to aduance men of no worth, and to satisfie their pleasures.

As for the defects which ingender the Subiects con∣tempt of their Prince, there are diuers sorts.* 1.473 Some grow from weaknesse of age; as Minority or a decrepit age. Others from nature; as deformity, or a bad aspect, the naturall dulnesse of the mind, deafnesse, and other indispo∣sitions of the body. Others proceed from Fortune; as to be vnfortunate and without support; with such other de∣fects, which can be hardly remedied.

The principall remedy is, not to shewe himselfe vp∣pon all occasions, whereas these defects may bee more visible. Tyberius finding himselfe not so affab••e as Au∣gustus, would neuer come among the people to Playes and Theaters, as Augustus did: but kept himselfe close and retired, and neuer shewed himselfe but in great acti∣ons, for the which he had prepared himselfe long before. So the Prince must as much as may bee hide his imper∣fections; and not shewe himselfe in publique, but well prepared according to his dignity, and if it may be, recom∣pence the defect of nature by some aduantage of the mind.

There are other defects, which breed a contempt of the Prince in the Subiects minds,* 1.474 the which proceeds on∣ly by his owne fault, and may be easily auoyded: As irre∣solution in his Councells; lightnesse, inconstancy, and in∣iustice in his commands, negligence in his affaires, and seeming to depend of another, or tying himselfe so strictly to some priuate person, as he trusts him with all the affaires of the Estate; an ordinary indiscretion in many Princes. The onely remedy to preuent all this, is to doe the contra∣ry, and to follow that which wee say must bee done to purchase reputation.* 1.475

These are the defects which ingender hatred▪ whereof they which procure contempt are most dangerous. For contempt giues courage to those that desire to vndertake

whereas cruelty and a••rice, although they breed hatred; y••t such as a••e fearefull: And moreouer by cruelty you diminish the number of your Enemies, and amaze the rest▪ and by auarice and exactions you make them v••••ble. But the most preiudiciall defects are those which breede hatred and contempt both together: As lasciuiousnesse and d••unkennesse; the one for its beastlinesse, and the other for the scanda••l and trouble of Families, which it doth vsually draw after it. Wherefore the Prince must not onely fly from them, but auoide the suspicion.

CHAP. 12. Of the defects of Magistrates, Of∣ficers, and Ministers to the Prince.

THe defects, abuses, and disorders of those which haue any charge and gouernment in the Estate, the which may further its ruine, are of two sorts. For either these abuses proceede from corruption which is found in particular persons, of whom they haue made a bad choice, or haue beene corrupted with time; or else it proceeds from some bad custome, the which vnder pretext of good, and by a bad interpretation of the Law, or of an order made in the establishment, hath beene brought in.

To remedy the first, the best course will be, that seeing the choice w••s bad, to make another. But therein he must vse his discretion: For that all changes are dange∣rous, and that sometimes seeking to preuent a misch••efe, the remedy is found worse then the disea••e. Lewis the Eleuenth meaning to reforme France,* 1.476 changed all his predecessors Officers, whom in the end he was forced to restore, to auoide a generall reuolte.

If this corruption may be easily punished without trouble in some of the principall, and that the example of punishment may reduce the rest vnto their duties; he must doe it with seuerity. But if he cannot effect it, he must draw those which nourish these abuses from their acquain∣tance and familiars; And imploy them in some other pla∣ces with honest men, who may serue as comptrolers and examples to doe well, and to keepe them in awe.

No man is willingly bad for nothing, eyther it is to doe pleasure to some one, from whom he hopes for support; or to reuenge his owne iniuries, or those of his Friends; or for couetousnesse, the which he cannot well practise without confident mediators. Take him therefore from his acquaintance, and out of the hands of his Enemies; mantaine him against the g••eatest, to the end hee may not feare any future wrong: There is no doubt that there being no man to whom he may intrust his cor∣ruptions, nor whom hee may distrust, hee will bee indifferent in that regard, and will haue no thought but to doe well: But retire him before he may enter into strict familiarity with any man. And so of a man how corrupt soeuer, you may make good vse of him for your seruice; if he be not altogether impudent and depraued: In which case being easie to discouer his practises, it will be as easie for the Prince to cause him to be punished.

But if the abuse be in the bad administration of Lawes,* 1.477 or of the establishment which hath beene made of some order; he must eyther by interpretation, or by change, or by abrogation of the Law or order, prouide for it. But for that it would be a difficult thing, that they which made their profit by the abuse, should willingly yeeld vnto it, if they be many in number, he must make himselfe the stronger, as Licurgus did. For in such affaires they are commonly ill assisted; the partizans of the reformation being cold, and they which profit in the abuse,

(who haue the pretext of Custome and the Lawes for them) are more violent to preserue that which brings them profit.

* 1.478But the Prince must first consider duly, if that which he meanes to establish, will hold: For that abuses which haue taken a deepe roote, are hardly pulled vp; and some∣time it is mo••e fit to liue with these abuses quietly in an E∣state, then seeking to take them away, to put all into co••∣fusio••. It is a body which hath an infirmity, the which you must striue to cure, yet in such sort, as you put not the patient in da••ger of death. It is a Philme in the eye; yet the eye hath not ••wholy lost its sight: If you cannot cleare it without losse of the sight, it were better to leaue it there.

Aboue all in a reformation you may not make a Law that looks too farre backward, and makes vs enter into the search of that which is past long since; Neither must they establish an order altogether new: But you must gently and by little and little reduce them to their first institution, and not pull vp the Tree to plant another in its place; but set it by. The string which makes an Instrument out of tune, must be gently straind, vntill it be in tune, and not broken. We know the defects and inconueniences of an ancient estab••ishment; but we are ignorant of the inconue∣niences of a new.

But if t••e order were so perue••ted, as it were impos∣sible to make vse of it; yet in the establishment of a new, you must retaine the same termes, names, and qualities of the ancient•• for that the people feeding themselues more with the shew of truth, the face of antiquity in such esta∣blishments hath more authority with them; and nouelties a••e suspected vnto them, and lesse esteemed. But if you cannot retaine the ground of this antiquity, you must co∣lour the innouatiō with the names of the ancient establish∣ments, to giue it credit, and to make the people thinke that the••e is ••it••le alteration. An aduice which hath bin practi∣sed

by all such as vnder pretext of reformation haue sought to vsurpe an Estate: But this may be more iustly put in vse by a lawfull Prince, for the good of his Subiects, and to facilitate the reformatiō which he intends to make: In the which he hath great reason not to ingage himselfe, if he doe not confidently beleeue to bring it to effect. Be∣sides the disgrace which he shall receiue, he should by his weaknesse countenance the mischiefe, and despaire of the remedy: Whereof I say that he ought to make him∣selfe the stronger. The which I meane not onely of an armed force, but also of the inclination of the greatest part of his Subiects. And if it may be he must so worke vnderhand, as he may be required and solicited to prouide for it; besides that it will make his designe easie, all the honour will be due to him. And if there be any enuy, he may easily discharge himselfe vpon those which haue re∣quired him. But if the Prince doubting the euent of a necessary reformation, desires to make it rather by some one of his Ministers, then to ingage himselfe: In this case some haue aduised rather to take but one, to whom he may giue all authority, then many. For although it seemes more conuenient, that this reformation should be countenanced by many, to the end it might carry the greater waight, and be the better receiued: yet the diuer∣sity of opinions that is in many heads diuersly interessed, be it for themselues, or for their Friends and Kinsfolkes, in this reformation; the length there will bee in making them resolue; the difficulty in this plurality to make them keepe s••cret, many small surprises, policies, and cun∣ning, which they must sometimes vse, to attaine vnto this good; and in case the businesse doth not suceeed, being more difficult to dismisse many, for to free himselfe of the enuy and shame to haue attempted this reformation with∣out successe, then they may doe in one person: Wherfore it seemes more safe for the Prince to imploy but one. But the preseruation of the order established, must be left to

the care of many; For that many hauing once found the benefit, will not willingly yeild to leaue it: And a multitude being irresolute among themselues, tend rather to leaue affaires in the Estate they are in, then to change them, v••lesse they bee thrust on by some apparant pro∣fit, or by some Man of credit and authority. Hence it comes, that the companies of greatest authority in an E∣state, oppose themselues more willingly to all innoua∣tions, how good soeuer; And consent not to the change of the ancient ordinances, although they be accompanied with abuses.

But for that the same men, which made their profit of the abuse before the reformation, continuing still in those places where the abuse was committed, will finde meanes sufficient to frustrate ••••: Some haue beene of ad∣uice to change them, and to imploy them else where: and others to attribute the knowledge of the contrauen∣tions which haue beene committed to the preiudice of this reformation, to other Iudges, then those of that body which they meane to reforme. Yet therein they must gouerne themselues, according to the facility or difficul∣ties which are found in such Establishments,

These are the principall considerations, which ought to bee o••serued in a reformation; besides those which priuate occasions, and the quality of disorders may breed in our minds. Let vs now come to the disorders which proced from the Subiects, and may aduance the ruine of an Estate, if they be imbraced by the Enemy.

CHAP. 13. Of the Subiects defects in generall, which cause the ruins of an Estates

ALthough that naturall Subiects owe all obedience to their Prince,* 1.479 and it is their good so to main∣taine themselues: Yet the nature of a multitude is so inconstant, as it cannot long subsist in one E∣state. Hauing no imployment, they inuent some them∣selues, and forge a thousand designes to their owne disaduantage.

Peace and abundance, are the things which should giue a people the greatest subiect of content, and containe them, for that they cannot change this condition without impayring. But the one in the end makes them idle; and idlenesse being tedious vnto them, they imploy their spi∣rits to thinke ill; and which is worse, to doe mischeife. The other makes them stately, proud, and vntractable; who like vnto pampered Iades, kicke many times at their Masters that haue fed them. But in danger and feare, they are tractable and easie to mannage, louing after their owne pleasure, and fearing at the discretion of another, and neuer iudging but by passion. For although▪ that some one haue done euill, yet if the people loue him, they perswade thēselues that the action had some good ground: And if they hate him, although he hath done well and vertuously, yet they interpret all to a bad sence, and attri∣bute a good action to a sinister intention, and a bad des∣signe.

In all that which they affect, they looke rather to an ap∣p••rant profit, then to that which is iust and honourable; And if in shewe there be any thing to hazard, or to loose, although the end may bee happy and successefull, yet they

will alwayes be of opinion to abandon that party. They neuer imbrace affaires but by the shewe, without exami∣ning the importance, if it be any thing remote; They hate the present affaires, as those wherof they are most sensible; they forget a mischeife past, although it bee farre greater then the present; They loue those which are turbulent in their actions and of suddaine execution. They vsually slander the actions of the Prince and his Gouernours, and complaine; Yet they are easie to reduce, when they see themselues forced to obey, and that they haue no head nor any seeds of diuision. They hope more then they ought, and indure lesse then they should. They attribute to want of will and iudgment, that which proceeds from the want of power and meanes.

They are desirous of innouations, and easie to moue vpon the first wind; Credulous, increasing reports and newes, and publishing vsually that which is most for∣bidden; they follow the multitude, not knowing why; full of Enuy, Suspition, and distrust: ingratfull for the benefits they haue receiued, and reuengfull of iniuries, yea of another mans; little carefull of the Estate, and louing nothing but an vnrestrayned liberty, whereof they are soone weary: finally doing nothing by election, but all by hazard.

B••hold a part of the blemishes and defects of a people considered in generall: Whereon most part of those which haue attempted against another mans Estate, haue grounded their designes, making vse of them by many practises, according to occasion and the condition of af∣faires. And although there be many among a multitude free from these imperfections: yet being drawne together with the rest, the greatest number carries it, and most commonly they houle (as they say) with the Wolues. One foole or rash man is sufficient to stopp the mouthes of many wise, and to make them all loose the course of rea∣son. And most commonly that which they condemne

in particular, being in a throng, and with the rest they like of, and allow; bee it that wee are restrayned through feare to oppose our selues to the common way, which is vsually the worst, and sometimes composed of the most fooles, the most imp••dent, and the most mutinous; or be it that by this contagion, wee feele the like passions which transport the rest, and with the like heate wee suf∣fer our selues to be carried to the same resolutions.

The Ancients finding all these pecant humours in the peoples minds, to entertaine and busie them,* 1.480 and by this meanes to diuert them from doing euill, haue sought out diuers meanes. The Grecians entertayned them with sports, Comedies, Tragedies, Wrestlings, and Olimpique Games. The Romans added thereunto Swo••d-players, representation of Nauell Battailes, and the combats of wild Beasts. The Kings of Aegypt busied their Subiects in the construction of Pyramides and buildings, although for the most part vnprofitable. The Christians in some pla∣ces, when as they feare the peoples disposition to mu∣tine, haue imployed them in Processions, Prayers, in the visitation of Oratories and Churches, with other extra∣ordinary deuotions, as Cardinall Borromeo did often at Millan, and others in other places. But when as all these meanes haue not beene forcible enough to retaine them, they haue stirred vp a forraigne Warre, not only to diuert the peoples minds by this obiect; but also to entertayne them a little with the feare of a common Ene∣my, and to free the Estate from those pecant humours, which being still retained might ruine it.

But sometimes the Estate is so composed as it would bee dangerous to entertaine a continuall Warre, eyther for that they are weake of Men and meanes, or for feare that giuing the commandement to some one, he should get vnto himselfe the authority of Armes. The which cannot be but preiudiciall in all Estates: The Prince be∣ing vnable to bee still conductor of his Armies, without

hazarding of his person too much, and leauing a great part of his Countrey ill prouided for. In a Common-weale this would be of more dangerous consequence; if they doe not gouerne themselues in that respect like vnto the S••iffes, who desiring rather to make Warre for ano∣ther, then for themselues, send forth their most busie and turbulent Men to serue Princes, to purge the Countrey.

Behold the most ordinary remedies which are prac∣tised, to preserue themselues from these bad humours of the people, considered in generall. But there are others which are particular, according to the diuers conditions of persons, whereof the people consists; and others which must bee practised with a people Conquered.

CHAP. 14. Of diuers sorts of humours among the Subiects, according to the diuersity of their Conditions.

* 1.481IN all Estates there are three sorts of persons. Great Men who haue power, credit, and wealth: The poore and miserable who want all, and the meaner sort. These last are vsually more quiet and easie to go∣uerne: The rest are more difficult, for that great Men by the commodity which riches brings with it, doe hard∣ly abstaine from doing Euill. The miserable for the ne∣cessities wherein they find themselues, are commonly vi∣cious and capable of all parties.

The Credit, all••ances, and wealth of great Men, makes them vntractable, little obedient, and sometimes insup∣portable; and pride and presumption giues them cou∣rage to vndertake: Contrariwise the miserable, are easi∣ly moued to any insolencie. The actions of great Men

are accompanied with violence: Those of the poore and needy with fraud and malice. But the meaner sort, hauing neyther so great meanes which might make them grow proud, nor power to attempt; Neither being in such necessity, as they should be thrust into extraordina∣ry actions, they desire rather to preserue the certaine, then to runne after the vncertaine: and so they are nei∣ther transported with ambition, nor oppressed with ne∣cessity. Presupposing then that this sort of Men conti∣nue in their dutyes, let vs examine the two others.

There are seuerall sorts of great Men:* 1.482 Some are so neere vnto the Prince by alliance or kindred, as they may in time pretend vnto the Estate. Others, who being Lords of great possessions, enioy in the Princes Estate, Lordships, and Reuenewes of great consequence. The third kind is of those, who by their vallour or wisedome in the gouernment of important affaires of the Estate, haue purchased credit and reputation with the people, or a∣mong the Men of Warre. The fourth are they, to whom the Prince hath committed his forces, his gouernments, and his cheife places.

Many Princes before they had any subiect of suspition of an Enterprize,* 1.483 haue growne iealous of their neere kinsmen. Alexander meaning to passe into Asi••, put all his neerest kinsmen to death, except one of his base brethe∣ren, whom hee had no cause to feare. This villainous and barbarous course hath past for a rule of State among the Turkes. The Kings of Ormus, before they were ex∣pel'd by the Portugalls, put out the eyes of all their neerest kinsmen. The which it may be they learned from some Emperours of Constantinople. The Kings of China, & those of Aethiopia, shut them al vp into one place, from whence not any one comes forth, but he that is to succeed in the Estate.

Christendome is more happy: For although wee haue seene that Phillip the second King of Spaine hath bin

forced to put his Sonne to death, for some iealousie hee had conceiued of him; yet this is not ordinary. And the Kings entertaine themselues with their kinsmen, making much of them, and intreating them courteously, yet not trusting them with all their forces, which may giue them meanes to attempt, nor yet crushing nor disgracing them, to the end they may not dispaire: And by this honest and courteous course, they take from them both the meanes and desire to doe euill.

They which are great in meanes and Reuenewes, are the sinewes and strength of an Estate, whom they may not in any case ruine, as some Ministers of Tyranny haue conceiued, but they must bee preserued to maintaine the Estate. And those Estates where there bee not any, are exposed in Prey to the first losse of a Battaile: For that hauing no Man that hath credit to draw them againe to∣gether, being vnfurnished of support and councell, they presently resolue to yeild vpon the first amazement. The which hath beene often seene in Aegypt. Contrariwise those Estates which haue beene powerfull in Nobility, although they haue beene often ouerthrowne, yet they haue easily recouered themselues. France and Persia, the English and Spaniards, with those of Tartary and the Turkes, haue sometimes beene opprest and brought low: But by the meanes of the Nobility, who haue more cou∣rage and conduct to maintaine the Estate then the people, they haue alwayes recouered themselues.

And to say that such kind of people may trouble the Prince, this may sometimes happen, if the Prince bee a Tyrant, which seekes to oppresse them, or wants coun∣cell & courag: As they whom the Carliens, and Capets, caused to retire from the gouernment of the Estate. But neuer an able and sufficient Prince, who knew how to make vse of Men of this condition, ran any bad fortune with them. The meanes to make profitable vse of them, is to countenance them with Maiestie, to doe for them in

occasions which may be offered; to imploy them neare his person with honour and magnificence, rather then to commit his forces and all his authority into their hands: And they which shall be suspected of lightnesse and inconstancy, to cause them to be accompanied by men which may watch and obserue their actions. This is the Councell (as they write) which the Emperour Charles the fift gaue vnto the deceased Philip King of Sp••ine, to imploy great men, and to retaine them neare vnto his person in the most honourable places, and giue those of Command to men of a meaner condition: But his Sonne neglecting this aduice, in the person of Don Iohn of Austrea, drew himselfe into danger of an incon∣uenience.

As for the two other sorts of great men, they cannot be such but by the Princes meanes.* 1.484 Wherefore it is ea∣sie for him to preuent the inconueniences which this greatnesse may cause; and the fault must be imputed to himselfe, seeing it was in his power to hinder it. The meanes which may be vsed herein, are common to ey∣ther. For some haue beene made great, and haue got∣ten credit, for that they had the force and authority in their hands; And the others are great by reason of their birth. The principall meanes then to preuent the in∣conueniences which may grow, is in the choice, where∣in the Prince must obserue foure considerations.

The first is, that he commit not his forces and au∣thority to any that are borne great;* 1.485 as they of whom we haue formerly spoken: For that he cannot adde so little to the greatnesse of such men, but he shall equall them vnto himselfe. The other considerations are, that he make not choice for a great command, or to lead a great Army, of a man that is audacious and vnder••aking, or of one that is too cunning and subtile: Much lesse of a person that is inconstant and light, in∣clined to f••are and hope, and subiect to follow the En∣terprizes

of another, or to bee surprised by some¦one.

The second meanes is, not to continue great Char∣ges, as the gouernments of Prouinces, of strong places, and of a great troupe of Souldiers long in one and the same person, to the end hee may auoyde three inconue∣niences. The first, lest that gouernments by little and little be not made hereditary and patrim••nicall,* 1.486 as they haue done in all places of Fees; and in France of the ancient E••rle ••o••nes, Dutches, and Marquesats. The other i••co••uenience is, that the Prince depriues himselfe v••adu••••••ly of the meanes to make vse of a better subiect, who may i•• time discouer himselfe vnto him. The third is, t••at i•• may be he to whom he hath giuen this charge, may through indisposition grow vnable, or by Age vnfit, or throug•• pa••sion or some particular designe, be preiu∣diciall to the Estate. The fourth meanes is, neuer to giue the great command of a Prouince to any one that is borne there; lest that by the meanes of his Kindred, Al∣liances, and Friends, with the fauour he may haue from the Prince, which will purchase him many seruants, he findes not meanes to perpetuate himselfe.

But if eyther by a bad establishment, or some bad custome, the Prince findes his Estate otherwise dispo∣sed, he may gently prouide for it, in suppressing and drawing to himselfe this great authority and power; or dismembring it into diuers charges, which may depend immediately of himselfe. And if he cannot reduce the Gouernours to such termes as he holds it fit for his safe∣ty, some haue he••d opinion, that he should strip them by little and little of his forces, in prouiding for his places of strength, and causing the Garrissons to be changed eue∣ry three yeares; and in like manner to haue the Gouernor assisted by one or two of his chiefe Councellors, with∣out whose aduice he might not resolue any thing: Think∣ing that by this meanes they should not onely preuent the

Gouernours Enterprizes, but also make them more care∣full to doe that which concernes the Princes seruice, see∣ing their actions obserued.

The poore and needy are no lesse dangerous to the qui∣et of the Estate then great men,* 1.487 and great men which haue had a will to mutine, h••ue made vse of them: For that the present Estate being contrary vnto them, they desire a change, hoping to change their condition; and a. midst the disorder and violence to free themselues from the necessity wherein they liue.* 1.488 The meanes to shelter himselfe on that side, is to hinder this necessity in an E∣state; but principally excesse and vsury; for that excesse begins pouerty, and vsury brings it to extremity. Ne∣cessity may likewise be preuented,* 1.489 bringing in abundance; And especially by imploying the common people in all sorts of Manufactures, as Vopiscus writes they did in A∣lexandria, where the gouty and blind found meanes to get their liuing.

Solon in Athens bound the Fathers to teach their Chil∣dren a Trade, vpon a penalty to be depriued of all suc∣cours and respect which the Children owe vnto their Fa∣thers. In China the Children are bound to follow their Fathers Trade, and for such as had not any, they imploy∣ed them about their publique buildings; as Augustus and the Kings of Aegypt did. To conclude, they must im∣ploy such men, and not leaue the Estate in the hands of the needy, and of men which haue nothing to loose. And thus much concerning the restraint of naturall Subiects.

CHAP. 15. Meanes to containe conquered Subiects in their duty.

THe Subiects which haue bin conquered eyther by force, or by treaty, are vsually more difficult to gouerne then the naturall. Wherefore besides t••a•• whic•• we haue spoken conce••ning the Natu∣rall, we must ob••erue with these more discretion and precaution.* 1.490 The principall and most generall meanes to containe the Subiects by conquest, in the obedience of the Prince which hath conquered them, is to giue them such interest in his gouernment, as they may haue a feare to change, left they should impaire their condition: O∣therwise the peoples inclination bei••g contrary to the C••nqu••rour, the Principality will be like vnto a Tree without roots, which owes his fall to the first winde.

The mea••es which we haue sayd are necessary for a Prince to purchase loue and reputation,* 1.491 will much im∣port him with this kind of Subiects: And amongst others mildnesse and clemency.* 1.492 Hee must likewise fa∣uour Religious men, and such as be learned and vertu∣ous, which shall be found in the Countrey, for that the people doe commonly gouerne themselues to g••od or evi••••, according to the consciences of ••uch kind of men. He must in-like manner make much of great men, and imploy them in honorable charges; Y••t out of the Country of c••nquest:* 1.493 And in like manner to giue them Estates and S••ignouri••s ••••se-where: He must obserue the contracts, co••u••n••io••••, & priui••edges vnder which the Country was ye••l••••ed; for th••t one breach made by the Prince, makes them to feare the lesse of the rest. Hee must breed vp ••••ny Y••u••g men of their conquered Countrey,* 1.494 after the manner of his naturall Subiects: As Alexander did thirty

thou••and young Persians, of whom he m••de choice, to be instructed after the Macedonian manner.

The Romans erected Colledges and Seminaries, vpon pretext to ciuillize the Nations which they conquered; but in effect it was to imploy them otherwise then in the Warre, an•• to traine them vp after the Romans man∣ner. And they which were best conceipted of their in∣tentions, sayd, that it made a part of the Seruitude, vn∣der which they reduced the Prouinces which they con∣quered. The Turke holds another course in the b••ee∣ding vp of his Ianizaries, the which although it seems violent, yet it is grounded vpon reason and iudgement. For choosing them among the Christians Children, he for∣tifies his power, in weakning his Subiects which are most suspected vnto him.* 1.495 Marriages and Alliances helpe much to ioyne and vnite a conquered Prouince with the naturall Subiects. Alexander purchased much loue of the Persi∣ans, hauing married a Persian Lady. And as Titus Linius sayth, there was nothing did so much hinder the Cap••uans from accommodating themselues with Hannibal, then the priuate alliances they had contracted with the Romans.

The Romans also made vse of another meanes, hauing interessed in the preseruation of their Estate, the greatest part of the neighbour Prouinces conquered by them, re∣ceiuing them into their Citty, giuing sometimes to pri∣uate persons, and sometimes to a whole Prouince the right of Burgeois••e, and making them sharers in the honours of the Citty. But to reduce them wholy to the forme of naturall Subiects,* 1.496 by little and little they brought in their owne Language; as since the Arabians haue done in all their conquest. And William the Con∣querour, and before him the Saxons in the greatest part of England, not suffering the Lawes to be written or pub∣lished but in their languages, nor the audiences for the dis∣patch of affaires and Cōmissions for Letters patents; The contracts of priuate men were past in the same language,

to the end they might force them mildly to learne it.

* 1.497As for t••e Customes and ancient Lawes of the Coun∣trey, w••ich co••c••rne onely the ordring of priuate mens goods, and not the Estate, nor the obedience due vnto the Prince, he may not change them: Or if he doth, it must be done by degrees. For what Iustice soeuer there be in a new Law, the people being not accustomed vnto it, will suspect it. But if the change of Lawes be pre∣iudiciall to a Conquerour, the change of Religion is much more, there being nothing wherein the people grow more obstinate, then to retaine their ancient Re∣ligion. Yet this will be no hinderance, but by the e∣recti••g of Colledges and Seminaries of Piety, the Con∣querour may bring in Learning and Knowledge, by meanes whereof g••••ning dayly someone, he may by lit∣tle ro••te out t••at of the Countrey without force. And if he cannot speedily attaine to his designe, at the least he shall haue this aduantage, that those of the conquered Subiects which adhere to his Religion, will be co••fident vnto him, and making shew to fauour them, the rest will be soone reclaimed.

But whatsoeuer the Conquerour be to bring in newly among a conquered people, be it Religion, Customes, Tributes, or Lawes: the establishments must bee made whilest the amazement of the conquest last; and that the people are in feare of worse. For if you suffer them to k••ow themselues, and to grow assured; besides the dif∣ficulty you shall finde to make them taste these Innouati∣ons, it is to be feared they will make vse of it for a pre∣text of reuolt.

* 1.498But if all these meanes proue too weake, (as they will be with an vntamed multitude) to keepe such peo∣ple in awe and obedience, there is no other meanes to con∣tayne them, then to make vse of the same force which con∣quered them. The Romans haue imployed whole Ar∣mies: yet mutinies being too ordinary, and of a dangerous

consequence in these great Bodies, this example hath not beene followed by the ••i••est Conquerours: But in¦stead thereof they haue made vse of strong Forts and good Garrisons, well commanded and gouerned. And some haue therein imi••ated the Romans in planting of Collo∣nies, the which are of lesse expence, and seeme more milde;* 1.499 but in effect they are more vniust in their esta∣blishments▪ For that you must ruine many people to set∣tle them with commodity; and moreouer, they are dif∣ficult to settle, as well for the choice of men which you are to send, as for the planting of any good order amongst them, to make them, liue in p••ace. If you send of the chiefe men of your Estate, y••u vnfurnish it, if they be many in number; if few, they will make themselues Ma∣sters of the rest. If you take them all poore, as the Romans did, disorders will easi••y grow amo••gst them; and to liue at their owne pleasures, they will at neede ioyne with them of the Countrey against you; as many Roman Collonies haue done against the Romans. But if you gather them out of diuers parts of your Estate, they will hardly agree.

Yet if the conquest were of so great an extent,* 1.500 as the expence would proue excessiue, to maintaine them in their duties by force, you may make vse of this meanes with these considerations; First your Estate must be such, as sending a good number of your Subiects to that end, you may not vnfurnish your selfe: That the Warre had so vn∣peopled the conquered Countrey, as after the conquest you shoold not be forced to commit so open an iniustice, as to ruine part of the Inhabitants for the planti••g of Col∣lonies. These spoyles and vnpeoplings are excusable du∣ring the time you are in Armes: But afterwards they can admit no excuse, what considerations soeuer are brought to the contrary, and this vnpeopling made during the Warre, giues place and excuse to a Collony.

The third consideration is, that you must send Soul∣diers which haue beene accustomed to liue in discipline and order: The which must not be so old, as they can∣not accustome themselues to the place where they shall be planted; nor yet so young, as they shall be incapable of Discipline; but being mingled one with another, they may liue together with some good order and equality.

* 1.501Besides this meanes they haue added three others to containe vntamed Subiects. The first is, to abate and mol∣lifie their courages: The second to weaken them of for∣ces, and to take from them all meanes to doe euill, when you cannot make them loose the desire. And the third to keepe them from assembling together, or from ioy∣ning with their Neighbours. To attaine vnto the first, some as the Turke hath ruined the Nobility and the Prin∣ces, to take from the people all meanes to assemble,* 1.502 and make a head vnder some Commander of courage. Others haue suffered them to abandon themselues to d••unken∣••esse, and to all sorts of incontinency and pleasure. But these meanes are tyrannicall and filthy. Numa who was wis••r and more moderate, to mollifie this barbarous∣nesse, which Romulus had entertained among the peo∣ple of Rome, made vse of Religion, to the end he might retaine by the feare of the Gods, those whom the feare of men could not contayne; and for this effect he caused Statues and Altars to be erected at the Corners of Streets, to the end that the people might generally be retained by the presence of Religion which they had be∣fore their eyes. In the Christian Religion diuers sorts of Orders and Rules haue bin instituted, the which be∣si••es the good which concernes Religion, pu••ge the World o•• many sauage humours, which happily wou••d doe much m••••chiefe. Others haue inuited people to giue themselues to all Mechannicke Arts. For besides that the mind is diuerted from euill by this imployment▪ most com∣m••••ly they which are bred vp in shops, haue no desire of

troubles, nor Warre: And admit they should affect it, they should find themselues vnfit, neither would it be suc∣cesse••u••l there being more losse for them then ga••ne. O∣thers vnder pretext of priuiledges, exempt a conquered people from going to the Warre, and by little and little make them vnprofitable by this exemption.

Some haue held that imbarking them in the study of Sciences and Learning, it was a good meanes to make them desire rest. Yet in bringing in the study of Scien∣ces, you must distinguish them: For those which may serue for the Warre, must in no sort be imparted to the people, nor those which teach to command: But one∣ly such as are fitting studies, as Diuinity, Phisicke, A∣strology, or such like, the which so entertaine their minds, as t••ey ioy in no other thing when they know them, and make their spirits melancholly, depriuing them of that viuacity which is necessary for military acti∣ons. Some others haue held that busying, a riotous and contentious people in suits, was necessary, not onely to imploy their minds, but also to giue them meanes to vo∣mit out this bitternesse and bad humour, whereof euery one hath a part, without troubling the Publique: And in regard thereof they haue fill'd Estates with diuers Of∣fices, in some sort to content the most ambitious; and by the iealousie of the maintaining of their authority, to binde them to the preseruation of the Publique. But in the practice of all these meanes, they must first obserue the humour of the people with whom you are to deale; and make vse of that wherunto you shall see them inclined, and accōmodate your selfe accordingly, as occasion and time wil giue you leaue. As for the disarming of a cōque∣red people of their forces and meanes, they proceed after diuers manners.* 1.503 The first is, to take from them all sorts of Armes: And not onely the vse, but also the matter and ma∣king of them; for in a mutiny and combustion, they may make vse of it: As also the vse of Horses and of Ships of

Warre. To keepe their commanders about you, eyther fo•• Councell or vnder collour of some charge: To im∣ploy the Youth which haue beene already trayned vp to Armes, out of the Countrey: as Caesar did, meaning to passe into England, who carried with him all the Young Men, assuring himselfe by this meanes of the Gaules, and making vse of them against those of great Brittaine. He likewise vnder the collour of hostages, v••furnished the Townes of their principall Men, and of such as might ei∣ther serue for conduct or Councell. The Emperour He∣raclius to weaken the Sarasins, entertained foure thou∣sa••d Arabians, which were their principall force. We haue sayd that the Turke weakened the Christians, in ta∣king their Children to be instructed in his Religion, and by this meanes fortifies himselfe. The Desmaneling of Townes a••d strong places, which a Prince will not or cannot keepe, is also necess••ry; For fortresses in Townes haue many times incouraged the Inhabitants to a reuolt, as Tacitus writes of Ierusalem.

There remaines the third meanes, which is to hinder these p••ople from vniting themselues,* 1.504 and making a head; for their vnion will hold the place of force. Some Kings, or rather Tyrants of Aegypt, haue made vse of the diuer∣sity of Religions, to keepe their Subiects in diuision; O∣thers haue entertained iealousies and distrusts amo••g them, and sometimes hatred betwixt Neighbour Prouinces. O∣thers haue kept their Subiects in feare: by certaine se∣crets and hidden searches, causi••g him to bee punished speedily, which was found to haue any will to Mu••ine: And some haue written that the inquisition in Spaine, al∣though in shewe it were Established for R••ligio••, yet they haue sometimes made it serue for an in••••rument of Estate.

Some haue of a Conquered Prouince made three or foure; as the Romans did of Macedony, which t••ey de∣uided into foure, that is to say, Amphipolis, S••lorica, Pel∣la,

a•••• P••ll••gonia. And besides this Paulus Aemillius, commanded ••he great Men to passe into Italy with their Children, and after this diuisi••n, the Prouinces were forbidden to contract any alliances one with another. O∣thers haue forbidden a conquered people all sorts of as∣semblies, allowing them neyther publique Councell, nor Comminalty, nor Brotherhood; as the Romans did at Capoua, leauing them no forme of publique command. The Turkes in like manner hath forbidden Bells, not onely to the Christians, but through his whole Empire, fearing (as some hold) that at the sound thereof, the people should gather together for some designe then for deuotion. The Souldans of Egypt fearing the multitude of the Inhabitants at Caire, crost the Citty in many places with trenches, and broad and deepe ditches, to take all meanes from the people in a Mutinie to assemble suddenly together.

But to hinder a new conquered people, from vniting themselues with others, besides these meanes they haue restrayned them from all commerce with strangers, for∣bidding them to goe out of the Countrey without le••ue, as some write of England, Muscouie, and China, and not suffering any strangers to enter without pasport, keeping guards and secret spies vpon the Ports and passages. But if you cannot preuaile by these meanes, some haue bin of opinion to transport them to other places, as they of the mountaines of Genoua, were drawne into the plaine by the Romans. Aurelian transplanted the Daces on this side the Danowe; Charlemaigne the Saxons into Flanders, and the Turke many people of Asia into Greece.

These are the meanes, whereof they haue made vse to preuent a future mischeife, that is to say, the effects of th••se first causes of the ruine of an Estate. But if they haue beene forgotten, or proue too weake to stay the Subiects minds, and to keepe them from running to neerer courses to ruine the Estate: th••n

you must of necessity, vse remedies fit for euery one of these causes, to preserue it.

CHAP. 16. Of the neerest causes of the ruine of an Estate▪ Of a Conspiracie against the Princes person. Of the Causes thereof: Of the meanes to auoyd it: Of the discouery and Punishment.

* 1.505 AS the Prince is the Axeltree whereon the Estate turnes; so a conspiracy against his person succeeds acording to the desire of the conspirators, or drawes after it many times the ruine of the Estate, to preuent the which they make vse of foure meanes, the first is, not to doe any thing that doth vsually inuite the Subiects to such conspiracies,* 1.506 the second to cause him∣selfe to be guarded, and not to suffer any vnknowne per∣son to aproach neere vnto him, the third is to obserue the actions of his guards and of his familiars and great men, the fourth to cause such as shalbee surprized, to bee duly pu••••ished.* 1.507

In regard of the first, the causes which draw men vsu∣ally to such wicked designes are these: an iniury recei∣ued from the Prince or a feare to receiue one; the ambiti∣on of great men and of fauourites, the desire of liberty, and the zeale of Religion.* 1.508

An Iniury is of three sorts, for either it concerns life, honour or goodes; and they which haue beene thrust on through feare of their liues, haue most commonly pre∣uailed in their enterprize: for the despaire wherein they are, makes them to hazard their liues more freely, to saue it by the losse of the Princes, who seekes to take away

theirs, running no worse fortune in this hazard then to loose that which could not otherwise preserue: and therefore a Prince should not reduce any man, be he great or small in that extremity. And iniury done to the honour is great in a person of courage, and Bodille testi∣fied it, who flew Childeric which had caused him to be whipt: But of all iniu••ies, that which concernes the ho∣nour of Woemen and the Bed, is one of the most pow∣erfull in such enter••••ises, whereof there are many exam∣ples; An iniury which concernes mens Estates is not so violent, and few men to recouer their goods, or in re∣uenge of that which hath beene taken from him, will hazard their liues: and yet in a great courage, the re∣ueng of any iniury whatsoeuer is much to be feared.

As for the ambition of great men and fauourites, it doth produce more conspiracies then iniuries, for that the weake although they haue receiued an iniury from the Prince, they cannot hurt him for want of comodity and support; But great men who haue both the one and the other, and ambition withall, which is sometimes no lesse violent then reuenge, giues them more meanes to preuaile in such designes: yet there are seldome such en∣terprises, but when as the Prince hath suffred some one to grow to that power, that hee wants nothing but the Crowne.

Wherefore the first meanes to auoyd this danger, is to humble such men by degrees; as if he cannot suffer them to liue without hazard to make them away spee∣dily: As Tiberius did of Scianus, the Second is to appoint successors after him, if he hath no Childeren: be it by Adoption or Election, prouided alwayes that the Lawes of State allow it: But these successors must not be so great and powerfull, as they may haue a•• will to make the like enterprises, desiring rather to make themselues Maisters of the Estate, then attend the successi∣on; For the which Augustus knew well how to prouide

by the Adoption of successors in many degrees, sup∣porting and strengthning his Gouerment euen by this meanes.

* 1.509 The desire of Liberty doth likewise produce a power∣full and strong effect in the minds of Men, who are o∣therwise ill affected to the Prince, and he must haue a very strong bridle to restraine them, when it is once en∣tred into the minds of a multitude, who haue the more courage, when they constantly beleeue that all meanes are lawfull to dispossesse an vsurper, or a Prince whom they hold vnlawfull: This it is which hath produced in former time, so many Murtherers of Tyrants, and with the like desire they were thrust on, which conspi∣red against the Dukes of Florence.* 1.510

I am ashamed to put Religion in this number, and to make it the cause of so many wicked enterprises, as hath beene practised against Princes; there being nothing so impious, nor so contrary to Religion, as such Murthers. Yet the Iewes Bookes are full of such examples: And in truth it is contrary to Religion, to beleeue that God would punish wicked Princes, and free his people by this meanes, and that the Diuine iustice make vse of such instruments, as Men doe of Hangmen, to execute his decrees: But if for this reason the end haue beene some∣times good, and the euent to the honour of God; yet the action in it selfe is bad: They be Rods, which after the punishment are good for nothing but the fire, so the Iewes to hinder the consequence of such actions, haue represented them as done by the expresse comman∣deme••t of God: And yet certaine Diuines, fuller of malice then Piety, haue sought to draw consequences from thence: and of a Religion full of Piety and mild∣nesse, haue made an Altar of impiety, pouring for the bloud of Kings and Princes, vpon pretext of a contrary Religion, wherein they haue followed the proceeding of the old man of the Mountaine, who bred vp many yong

Men to such enterprizes, promising them another life full of vnspeakeable pleasures and ioyes: who being transported with the hope thereof, exposed themselues freely to death: And without any other Army, his E∣state (although of a small extent) kept all other Mo∣••arches and Potentates in feare to be murthered, forcing them to seeke his Friendship, and some to pay him a Tri∣bute to liue in safety: So as in the end the Kings of Ar∣menia were forced to roote out this Race of Assas∣sins.

To preserue himselfe from all these sorts of vnder∣takers, you must vnderstand,* 1.511 that all conspiracies doe not alwayes succeed, by reason of some defects, where∣of some one doth vsually fall out in such attempts. The first is, for that hauing resolued to obserue a certaine order in the execution, most commonly the particularities which they haue foreseene, doe not impe, and will doe lesse, if the Prince doth not impart to any man, whether he meanes to goe, or what hee in∣tends to doe long before; but doth so vary in his actions, as none but himselfe is able to deuine of the time when he meanes to part, nor of the place whither he intends to goe, nor where he meanes to stay, nor how he will bee accompanied. The second defect is, that many times the Executioners heart failes him, either by an amazement which seizeth on him▪ seeing the Prince to looke on him, and to obserue his countenance; or his courage failes him and grows milde by the good countenance he shews him.

Wherefore many Princes suffering all men to approach neare vnto them, doe not forbeare to obserue such as are vnknowne vnto them: So as he which hath a will to at∣tempt, is easily discouered in lifting vp his Armes, or in approaching too neare vnto him; and his constant looke would be sufficient to make him grow into distru•••• that hee was discouered, and diuert him from his En∣terprize.

Other Princes hauing suspition of some, haue purposely cast forth word•• of distrust, which notwithstanding might be interpreted in a double sence, and speaking them they haue obserued the countenance of those whom they distrusted, to the end they might discouer their hearts. The third errour is the little discretion of him that attempts, as he that meant to kill Commodus, ente∣ring into the Ampitheater; before he gaue the blow be∣gan to cry out, behold what the Senate sends thee. For these words aduertized Commodus, and gaue his guard meanes to preuent him, wherefore Guards are necessary for a Prince, not onely for a signe of his greatnesse, or that being accompanied with force he may haue the more authority: But likewise to preserue him, and to obserue the countenance of such as approach neere vnto him.

The manner of passing before Princes, although it seemes to be practised onely for honour, yet it was bene∣ficiall to Pandolpho Tyrant of Syenna, against whom Iu∣lio Belanty, his Sonne in-lawe, had laid an ambush in his house, by the which Pandolph•• was accustomed to passe, to goe and visite a Friend of his which lay sicke; But Pan∣dolpho staying in his lodging, to speake to some one, it gaue time to them of his traine to goe before; who by this meanes without thinking of it, discouered the Enter∣prize: Whereas if after his accustomed manner, hee had gone first, he had beene in danger to haue beene sur∣prized.

The fourth Errour is a false imagination, or an accident not foreseene. They which had resolued to kill Caesar, seeing Popilius one of their companions to discourse long with him, they had a conceipt that he spake of the Enter∣prize; which made them resolue to aduance their de∣signe, feareing that in staying longer they should bee dis∣co••ered. A word may sometimes diuert such Men. An accident not foreseene discouered the Treason intended a∣gainst Iames King of great Brittaine; and a letter sent by

one to a friend of his, not to be p••e••ent at the assembly of the Estates, not giuing him any other reason, made them carefull to visite all places about 〈◊〉〈◊〉 House at Westmi••∣ster, where the Prince and Peeres were to assemble: Where in a Cellor vnder the great Hall, in the which the Peeres were to sit, (where the King with the Queene and their Children, were to assist in person) they found a great quantity of Gun-powder, and Fagots, to blow vp the Chamber and the whole assembly.

Some Princes haue gone priui••y armed when they went in publique; as they say, Cosmo de Medicis did. The Turkish Princes after that Batazet had beene in dan∣ger to be slaine by a Der••is, haue not suffered any vn∣knowne person to approach neare vnto them, which is not accompanied by two Capigies, or Vshers, who hold those that goe vnto him by the Armes: And this custome is practised with the Embassadours of Princes. There are many other meanes which are diuersly practised, ac∣cording to the persons, time, and place. Yet the most ge∣nerall is, to haue a good eye to the Enterprises which may be attempted open••y. But that which is most to be fea∣red in Princes, is poisoning: the essay which is taken of his Meare and Drinke, cannot warrant a Prince. Some haue accustomed themselues to take Counter-poison, as Mitridates did. But the safest way is to haue faithfull and vigilant persons about him, to haue a care of it, besides the ordinary Officers, which are appointed to prepare the Princes Meate and Drinke: And these must not be knowne if it may be, lest they should corrupt them, as they may doe the ordinary Officers. He must likewise haue confi∣dent persons, to watch and obserue the actions of such as they may distrust, (which is the third remedy to frustrate the effect of a conspiracy) And if they be such as they ought to be, it will be a difficult thing but they will discouer what is practised. * 1.512

Conspiracies are discouered by two meanes; either by

the report of another, or by coniecture. Report pro∣ceeds either from the little fidelity, or from the little dis∣cretion of those to whom the Treason is imparted. This little faith is vsually found among men: For such a busi∣nesse cannot be communicated but to him that is a deare friend to the vndertaker, or to one that is discontented with the Prince, against whom they conspire. To find such a Friend that will willingly expose his life to an ap∣parant danger, it is very difficult: And admit you finde him, yet you cannot be assured of his Courage, although you haue tryed him in other affaires. Moreouer to mea∣sure a mans fidelity in this subiect, by the discontentment he hath of the Prince, were great indiscretion. For the vndertaker hauing discouered his intent••ons to this discontented person, he giues him meanes to recouer the Princes fauour. Wherefore the hatred hee beares vnto the Prince, must be exceeding great, or the vndertakers must haue much authority and credit with him, to make him to keepe his Faith: For the malecontent desiring nothing more then the Princes grace and fauour, he shall haue a good occasion to hope for it by the discouery of the enterprize.

By the little indiscretion which is likewise in such men, conspiracies are commonly discouered, either in speak∣ing too much, or before such as he ought not: like vnto Brutus Sonnes, who hauing conferrd with the Tarqui••s Embassadours before one of their Seruants, they were discouered by him, to haue conspired against their Coun∣trey. Cataline acquainted Fuluia with his designe, who discouered it to Cicero; Diuis discouered the Treason which he had plotted against Alexander, to a yong youth named. N••••homachus, who reuealed it to C••balinius, and ••e to Alexander.

The Treason of Sceninus against Nero, was disco∣uered by coniecture; Sceninus hauing the day before the Execution of the Enterprize, made his will and

commanded Milichus his freed man to sharpen his Dag∣ger; he enfranchised all his Bond-men, and caused many Rowlers to be made for the binding vp of wounds: So as this freed man doubting that these preparations were for some such Enterprize, aduertised Nero, who by his meanes discouered the other conspirators. In like man∣ner Spies prying vp and downe, may by the indiscretion, lightnesse, or malice of another, or by coniecture, haue some light of that which passeth; and they must especial∣ly obserue the actions of discontented persons, and of such as may better their condition by the Princes death.

It remaines now to know,* 1.513 (after the discouery of such Enterprizes) how to punish them fitly and seaso∣nably. For many times it may be done vnsitly: And instead of amazing the confederates which are not yet discouered, you shall thrust them on to effect their designe. Sometimes they shall incense and inuite others to make attempts, in stead of diuerting them by the pu∣nishment of the first. The Prince being aduertised of some Enterprize against his person, before he publish it or seeke to punish it, he must seeke to discouer it with all the particularities and circumstances, if it be possible, measuring the condition of the conspirators with his owne. If the Conspirators be strong, he must resolue vpon some other pretext to make himselfe the stronger; and in the meane time he must dissemble, bestowing fa∣uours and gifts vpon the Conspirators, left that finding themselues discouered, they attempt not openly.

In the conspiracy of the two Legions (which the Ro∣mans had left for the guard of Capona against the Sam∣nites) who had resolued to sacke the Caponans, the Senate hauing giuen charge to Rutilius the new Consull to preuent it; to kill them asleepe, he caused and com∣maunded it to bee proclaimed, that the Senate had decreed they should continue there still in Gar••isson:

So as hoping they should alwayes haue time to execute their designes, they deferr'd it. But when they saw that they separated them, sending some one way, some ano∣ther, they resolued to put it in execution as they did: The which they would not haue done, i•• after this first policy they had taken order to haue beene the stronger before they had diuided them. Wherefore a Prince that wil haue time to discouer or punish a Treason, hee must cause the conspirators to haue an opinion to finde a more fit occasi∣on to execute their designes: And he must not be rash in such things, if the danger be not apparant in staying. For the punishment is made for two principall ends. The first is to free himselfe of such dangerous persons; and the se∣cond to terrife others by the example of punishment, from attempting the like. Whereas by haste the Prince not onely looses the fruits of the punishment; but also he hazards his person.

And although that punishments seeme necessary; yet if the subiect or the condition of the businesse be such, as mildnesse and clemency may bring more reputation and safety to the Prince, then the impunity of the danger, he shall doe well to shew it in such an action. Augustus par∣doned Cunia three times, and by the last assured his life more then he had done by the punishment of all others, whom he had caused to be executed for the like attempts. The vnexpected Clemency of a Prince to some one, the which proceeds not from feare and cowardize, doth not onely binde him to be faithfull, but doth mollisie the bit∣••••rnesse of his Enemy, who grow the more incensed by punishments; the which being held vniust, by such as hold the same opinion of the Prince with the vndertakers, they thinke ••t lawfull to be reuenged, as they would be of an iniury or some violence done to the Publique, or to some priuate person.

CHAP. 17. Of the treason of Places, Townes, and Armies, and other forces of the Estate: and of the remedies to preuent the effect.

BY the Treasons which are practised vpon strong pla∣ces, or vpon Townes of importance, or vpon Ar∣mies or principall forces, Estates are brought to their ruine. The onely remedy is in the fore-sight, by meanes of the choice which they shall make of those to whom they shall giue the command: And he must haue a speciall care to choose men that are not couetous, am∣bitious, cunning, or dissemblers, light, or inconstant; or easily subiect to discontentments; or men that haue great support and credit, and are vnderta∣kers.

Hauing thus prouided for the Election you must not so ioyne the authority of command with the forces in one man, as when you would you shall not be able to sep••rate them: And not onely he which hath the Autho∣rity, but also they which command the particular for∣ces, must depend immediately of the Prince, with charge notwithstanding to obey him, to whom the Prince hath giuen the authority of command, vnlesse hee receiue a Counter command. And it is of no force to say, that if they which are to depend not wholy vpon him that is to command them, he cannot answere for that which they giue him incharge. For if the Prince trusts him, hee must likewise trust; and watching ouer the forces, aduer∣tize him if they doe not as they ought, and doe not obey that which is commanded them according to the duty of his charge.

Some in like manner (as I haue formerly sayd) haue

held it fit, not to continue great commands in owne man, especially in one place, whereby the custome of obeying him, the Subiects may tie themselues too strictly to him, and giue him meanes to dispose of the Prouince where he commands. These are the remedies to preuent the grea∣test treasons: For the rest which are made by intelligen∣ces with petty companions, as in corrupting a Centi∣nell or a Corporall that shall be in guard to seaze vpon a Port, they may easily auoide it, in drawing the guards by lot, and by the care and dillig••nce of the Captaines. And if they be aduertized of some practice which the E∣nemy makes with the Souldiers and Inhabitants of a Towne, they may cause some to make shew to be of the intelligence, who addressing themselues to those whom they haue reason to distrust, they may easily discouer the truth.

CHAP. 18. Of Rebellions, and of the meanes to pre∣uent them.

COnspiracies and Treasons are most commonly se∣cret and hidden, and are plotted by few men, the which makes them more difficult to discouer, and more easie to punish. Contrariwise Rebellions and Factions are made more openly; but as they cannot be at∣tempted without great numbers, so they are with more dif∣ficulty pacified and punished; and doe more vsually draw after them the ruine of the Estate then the former. But to know how a Prince ought to gouerne himselfe in a Re∣bellion, he must consider whether he be stronger or wea∣ker then the Rebells; and he must hold himselfe the wea∣ker, although they were equall in forces; for that he may not hazard his authority vpon a doubtfull euent, as it is

ordinary among equals. If hee bee the stronger, hee must preuent it in the beginning speedily and secretly; cut∣ting off the Heads and chiefe Commanders, before they know they are taken; and then present himselfe with cou∣rage to suppresse it, to the end he may amaze the Rebels: And if he be farre from the place where the Rebellion is made, he must approach; as the Emperour Charles the fift did, who passed from Spaine into Flanders, to sup∣presse the rebellion of the Gantois, the which succeeded happily. For to abandon the place where the Rebellion begins, or to retire farre from it is held a feare, the which blemish and impaire the credit & authority of the Prince, and encourage the heads of the party, and makes the Peo∣ple more bold and insolent. But if he findes not himselfe the stronger, and to haue some great aduantage; with∣out retiring himselfe too farre from the place where the Rebellion is made, he must make shew to haue a will to yeeld to that which the people desire of him, to giue them time to grow cold; especially if they haue no Com∣manders of credit and authority.

Sometime a small matter may be able to reduce a peo∣ple to their duty: And in such Encounters subtile and in ••entiue spirits are fit, as likewise those which are po∣pular and eloquent, to entertaine and to draw a mutinous multitude to their duty, by feare, distrust, and hope. That familiar and popular course which Menenius A∣grippa obserued with the people of Rome, by a Compa∣rison of the diuision of the members from a humane bo∣dy, succeeded better to pacifie them, then if hee had falne vpon more serious reasons. The inuention which Calaminus the Capouan made vse of, to saue the Senators of Capoua from the hands of the people, was no lesse witty: For ioyning himselfe to their party, and applau∣ding them in all things, seeing them resolute to put their Senators to death, hee propounded vnto them that they should begin first with him that was most odious

vnto them, but withall he let them know that the Estate must not remaine without gouernment, & that before they put him to death, they must make choice of some other in his place. So not able to agree, and passing from one to another, they found that they whom they mean•• to put to death, were much better then the others whom they in∣tended to choose in their p••aces: And to the people were pacified.

Sometimes i•• such mutinies and combustions, they haue made vse of the occasion of an Eclipse, or of some extra∣ordinary signe from Heauen, or of some vnexpected mis∣fortune; where with the people being toucht and amazed, suffer themselues to be perswaded to returne to their du∣ties. A Ma•• of authority and credit with the people, may preuaile much in such occasions. Soderin Arch-Bishop of Florence, comming f••••th in publique with his Pontificall Robes and his Clergie pacified the Florentins, who were in combustion one against a••other. And as in some pla∣ces Preachers haue beene the Firebrands of sedition, and the trumpets of Warre, in others they haue serued to pa∣cifie them, and they haue made good vse of them. But if the people cannot be suddenly rec••aimed, and that the po∣pular mutinie passeth into Rebellion and a setled reuolte: you must then seeke to reduce them by degrees, disvni∣ting them, and gayning some of the commanders vnder∣hand, by promises and benefits; or putting them in dis∣trust of the people, and in iealousie one of another.

If nei••her of these remedies will preuaile, hee must yeild to that which the people demand, either in all, or in part: For that loue and reputation being the foundation of the Princes Authority, if the Prince in yeilding seemes to diminish his reputation in some sort, yet thereby hee shall preserue the affection of the people, who being pacified, he may by other meanes recouer his reputation. And yet in such occurrents he may so carry himselfe, and vse such dexterity, that accommodating

himselfe mildly to the peoples inclination, he shall seeme to grant that willingly which they extort from him by force; being necessary that the Prince to maintaine his authority, make shewe to will and desire that which hee cannot hinder, and so to apply his will to his power. And to the end he may make it knowne that it is a thing which he desires, he must seeke to draw some apparant aduan∣tage for his greatnesse: There being few actions in the E∣state, from which the Pri••ce either in effect or in shew may not draw some aduantage; although in another thing he be damnified: And it shall be a part of Wisedome to shew himselfe more ioyfull of the aduantage which he re∣ceiues, then discontented for the disaduantage which his Enemies sought to procure him.

The Turkish Emperours although they be powerfull, haue beene many times constrayned to yeeld some of their Ministers to the Ianizaries to be put to death: The which a well aduised Prince should neuer doe, if his Ministers had not otherwise highly offended; but seeing himselfe reduced to this extremity, he should giue them meanes to escape, yet dissembling that it is with his consent. For besides that it were a cruell Iniustice, to deliuer an inno∣cent man into the hands of a furious multitude, the shame will redowne vpon him, with a disdaine, and a distrust of all others, whom hee should call to serue him, who will rather gouerne themselues, according to the will of those which had credit with the people, then to his desire. But if the Ministers are found to haue carried themselues ill, the Prince may take this occasion to cause them to be pu∣nished by Iustice, to pacifie a popular mutinie: Although it were more discreetly done to preuent it, then to stay vn∣till hee were vrged to doe that by force, which for his owne good he should haue formerly done.

CHAP. 19. Of Factions and of the meanes to hinder the effects.

THere remaineth now to speake of Factions, for the last and most ordinary causes for the ruine of E∣states. They are seldome framed among the people, vnlesse great men be of the party: For they grow eyther from the priuate quarrells of great men, who im∣barque the people on their sides; or from the subiect of some reformation; or for the gouernment of publique affaires. If they grow from particular quarells, the Prince must speedily force them to referre the cause to his Iud∣ges, or to Arbitrators, without making shewe to fauour the one more then the other. This was that which King Francis the first did, in the suit depending betwixt Ma∣dame Lonyse his Mother and Charles Duke of Bourbon, who reuolted vpon this subiect.

But if the controuersie cannot be reconciled, for that the proofes faile on the one side, although that by strong presumptions, the fact be in some sort apparent; or if it concernes the honour of one of the parties in the deci∣sion of the business: the Prince must separate them, imploying them out of his Estate in some honourable charges, the one farre from the other; And hee must Entertayne them thus diuided, vntill that ey∣ther their credit bee diminished with the people, or that time hath made them forget, or at the least tem∣per their hatred. If (as it happens often) to the pri∣uate quarrells of great Men, they adde some pub∣lique pretext, as of reformation, Liberty or Reli∣gion: The Prince not able to hinder the course of these factions, hee must ioyne with the stronger to

ruine the weaker: Wherein hauing once preuailed, he must free himselfe by diuers meanes (yet lawfull) of the cheife Commanders with whom hee had ioyned, eyther imploying them out of the Estate, or causing them to bee punished for their priuate of∣fences.

But if the Prince comes not in time to ruine the one nor the other, for that they are equall, and that his Counterpease cannot waigh downe the bal∣lance; hee must attend, that by the Euent of some misfortune to the one, they may find the weaknesse of that side, to ruine him wholy. Yet if in this case the heads of the Factions, and not the Prince, bee to reape the Honour and fruits of the Victory of one of the two partyes; the Prince shall doe more wisely to ballance the one with the other, and to make himselfe rather an Arbitrator or a Iudge of their pretentions, then a party: For that hee should make himselfe to those, against whom hee should de∣clare himselfe: and should not thereby gayne any Authority or credit amongst those, whose party hee should imbrace, into the which hee should not be re∣ceiued by the partizans, but to countenance their de∣signes, and not for any affection they beare him, hauing already ingaged themselues to him, who had first aduan∣ced his standard, and had presented himselfe vnto them to bee their Leader, and to assist them in their de∣signes; And they will attribute to the credit of their Commander, that which the Prince should afterwards doe for them.

The principall Remedy must bee vsed in the be∣ginning: For that when as the parties are once fra∣med, the Prince must rather study how hee may liue in this corruption of State, then to thinke of the meanes how to take it away. For if eyther of the parties haue an aduantage, hee will not abandon his Armes, vntill

he haue ruined his opposite: wherein the Prince shall haue a double losse; the one is he shall lose a great part of his Subiects; the other is, that the head of the faction be∣ing fortified with credit, he may cause him to lose the rest, and vsurpe his Estate. But if both parties be equall, they will containe themselues through the feare they haue one of another. And the Prince hath no other remedy, then to breed a iealousie and distrust among the Comman∣ders of one and the same party, making many equall in in honour and dignity, to the end they may not agree to obey any other Head then the Prince; or aduancing some of those which obey the Heads of parties, to greater dignities then their Generals, to the end they may dis∣daine to obey them. This must be practised with such as haue many followers.

THE COVNSELLOR OF ESTATE. OR, A COLLECTION OF the greatest and most Remarkable Considerations seruing for the Man∣aging of Publicke Affaires. PART. III. CONTAYNING THE MEANES to increase an ESTATE.

CHAPTER I. Of the increasing of an Estate by the en∣larging of Townes.

AN Estate is increased either by multiplying or husbanding that which is our owne, or by adding vnto it,* 1.514 and drawing vnto vs that which is another mans, by lawfull meanes. Our owne is multiplied either by manuring the land; or by enlarging of Townes, especi∣ally those which may serue for defence, and to make head

against an enemy; or in taking care of the procreation, breeding vp, and education of Children: In regard of the manuring of the Land and that which depends thereon, it hath beene recōmended formerly, in trea∣ting of the wealth and the reuenues of the Estate.

* 1.515As for the enlarging and amplifying of Townes, it is done after diuers manners, either in drawing together people disper••ed here and there in the Fields, in many scattered Houses and Villages, and reducing them into one place, as Theseus did at Athens, and as they say it is practized at Brazeele, as well to Ciuillize that peo∣ple, as to haue the better meanes to instruct them in the Christian Faith: Or else people fearing the inuasion of some strange Nation, haue reduced themselues into some place that was strong of Scituation. By this meanes Veni••e was amplyfied and built. The ancient Spaniards retired themselues to the Moun••aines of Bi••••ay and Aragon, when as the Moores held Spaine▪ The Persians flying before Tamberlaine, some rety∣red themselues to Mount Taurus▪ others to Anti-Taurus, and some to the Ilands of the Caspian Sea, where they peopled many Townes. Pisa was en••ar∣ged by the Ruines of Genoua, when it was sack•• by the Sarrasins. The comming of Attilla was the cause of the beginning and foundation of Venice, the greatest part of the best families of Italy being re∣tired into the Townes of the Adriatique Sea, to a∣uoyd the fury of so powerfull an Enemy. London and many Townes in England haue beene peopled by French and Flemmings, being chased out of their Countries in re∣gard of their Religion.

The pleasantnesse and beauty of some Townes, for their Scituation or their buildings,* 1.516 haue drawne many to frequent them. The structure of the Pyramides in Alexandria, the bounty of the Aire of Mitilene, Smir∣na, and Rho••es, made many Rom••ns resolue to leaue

Rome, and to make their abode there: The which hath beene the cause of the increase and amplyfying of those places.* 1.517 But profit is that which drawes most Men to liue in a place: The which although it bee of diuers sorts, yet it proceeds from three principall cau∣s••s, the which must concurre for the enlarging of a Towne; The commodity of the sci••uation,* 1.518 the fertility of the Coun¦trey; and the facility of commerce.

The commodity of the Scituation consists in two things;* 1.519 the one to send forth that whereof wee haue aboundance; and the other to receiue that from others which wee want, which two must concurre together in one place, to people it and make it great. Otherwise if it were but a simple passage, it would not be enlarged no more then the ••••ands of the Terceres, the which al∣though they serue the Portugalls for a passage to the In∣dies, yet are they nothing the better peopled: And Flush∣ing, although it bee a great Hauen, where many Ships ariue; Yet it is but a very small Towne. Whereas Venice, Lisbone, Genoua, and Antwerpe, hauing both Commodities ioyned together, haue made themselues great.

The fertility of the Neighbour Countrie,* 1.520 makes not a Towne to bee the better peopled, but helpes to main∣taine it being peopled from other places: For wee haue seene and see daily, many Townes Sc••tuated in a barren soile, as Genoua, who haue made and maintay∣ned themselues great: Necessity sharpening and qui••∣kening the Inhabitants spirits to labour and indu∣strie.

The facility of cōmerce proceeds from the easie trans∣portation of Marchandize, be it by water or by land,* 1.521 in a plaine Countrey or a hilly, they hauing the commodity of carriages: Yet the conduct by water is more easie & of lesse charge. A ••auigable water is either by Sea, or riuers, or la••es, or chānels, made with mens hands with some stops;

or Pooles, as that of Miree in Aegypt, which they write, had fify Mi••es in compa••se. But of al the transportation by wat••r, that by Sea is much more commodious and profitable: And the Towne which hath it, and is ac∣companied with a good Port, whereas Ships may ride safely from winds and the violence of stormes, may make it selfe great with little industrie.

* 1.522Religion hath sometimes serued to inlarge the Citty of Ierus••lem: For the Iewes sacrifice being Celebra∣ted onely there, euery Man ranne thither, and many made choice of it for their abode: And many Villages haue of late beene made Townes, in regard of the Religion which they haue tyed vnto them by Pilgrimage••.

The erecting of Schooles and Vniuersities, of all sorts of Sciences,* 1.523 haue serued ot••ers to amplyfie them, being a meanes which Princes haue p••act••••••d, not onely to stay their Subiects, who going to study ••ut of their E∣state, carry forth the money, and bring home strong manners, most commonly pernitious to their Countrey; but also to people those places where their Elections were made, by the ••ucc••••••s of their Subiects and stran∣gers.

* 1.524The Election in like manner of some Seats of Iustice, whose Iuris••iction hath a great extent, and is well peo∣pled, may also serue: Especially in that sort as it is vsed in most of the Estates of Christendome, where they must spend much time, and disburse much money to re∣couer t••eir owne. For the frequentation of those which come from abroad, with their long stay, cannot but bring g••••at meanes which remaines there.* 1.525 The Erecting also of Manufactures, if there bee any, or of stuffes, which are particular to a Towne, and sought for by o∣thers, may also increase it. Some Townes haue beene peopled by the exemptions and priuiledges of Princes, who haue drawne Inha••itants from all parts: They ••sed this mea••es to people New-Hauen; and the

Duke of Tuscany doth the like for Liuor••e. The resi∣dence and the abode of the Nobility & Gentry in Townes,* 1.526 serues likewise to enlarge and amplifie them. For besides that such Townes are commonly better built; the Nobili∣ty are more curious to haue policy entertained, then when it is composed onely of Merchants, who dreaming one∣ly of their gaine, and to doe their businesse, haue most commonly little care of the Publique, vnlesse there bee many rich men which haue theigouernment: For then the wealth and commodity which they enioy, giues them the same courage with the gentry, and they gouerne themselues after the same manner. But besides this, the Prince must assist them with some publique Reuenewes to that effect. The comparison of the Townes of Italy with those of France, shews what difference there is betwixt Townes inhabited by Gentlemen, and those which are not. And the Townes of Flanders and Germany, which are in the hands of rich Merchants, yeeld nothing in beauty to those of Italy.

The residence and abode of the Prince for a long time in one Towne, doth much encrease and amplifie it;* 1.527 where∣of the example is but too familiar in all Estates: And the reason is for that the affaires and the treasure are brought thither as to its Center; the which doth not onely draw those which are necessary for the Princes seruice, but also Merchants and Artizans, who goe where there is commodity and gaine.

CHAP. 2. Of the increase of an Estate by the Procre∣ation of Children.

BVt they striue in vaine to increase an Estate by the manuring of the Land, and peopling of Townes, if they doe not prouide to husband it, and to fauour the generation, breeding vp, and education of Chil∣dren; being the onely meanes we haue of our owne, to people both Countries and Townes. Augustus after the Ciuill warre, found this care not onely worthy of himselfe, but necessary for the Estate, propounding great priuiledges to such as had three Children, and yet to fauour a single life as much as might be.

* 1.528Some people haue thought they had prouided well by Poligamy, allowing one man to haue many Wiues; as well not to tye the fruitfulnesse of a man, to the barren∣nesse of one Wife, as to multiply generation: Yet expe∣rience hath taught vs, that whether that a man being imployed in many places, cannot commonly get Chil∣dren which liue long; or not able to extend the care of a Father to so many Children through necessity, or otherwise they cannot a••taine to ripe age; the Countrey which make vse of Poligamie, finde not themselues better peopled then others. The Turkes raise greater Armies then the Christians, but this growes from the extent of the Countrey which they possesse, for that they make ••o other profession but Armes. For he that shall compare the people which is now in Greece, with that which it was before the Turke entred, shall finde it much lesse peoled then it hath beene.

* 1.529 It is true that Celibate or a single life indifferently allow∣ed

to all sorts of men, is many times the cause of the decay of people in an Estate. Charlemaigne being borne in an Age full of deuotion, in the which the greatest Men made themselues Monckes or Clergie Men, al∣though that otherwise hee was much respectiue to that which concernes Religion, hee held it not fit to suffer any one that would, to make himselfe a Moncke. For besides that you may not allow good Men to abandon the Estate, it is a meanes in ma∣king profession of a single life to loose the race. Good Men come from good, and the valliant as they say produce their like; and therefore they must make vse of them for the good of the Estate. But as a single life is seemely for men of the Church, and that there must bee some: it seemes necessary to cut off, or at the least to hinder heereafter this infinite number, which vnfurnish the State of Men which would be very conuenient and fit for other places, and who for the most part become a scandall and reproach to the Church; Experience shewing suf∣ficiently, that such an excessiue multitude, is not ca∣pable to bee reduced to its first order and instituti∣on: And whereas a small number well entertayned may edyfie by their example, this great number in∣capable of discipline ••uines all, and are a shame to their Mother which hath brought them forth and enter∣tayned them.

But for that many times they make vse of their retreates, rather to discharge Families which are poore, then for a∣ny deuotion, for the which they were cheifly instituted; and likewise that an infinite company of poore are kept from marrying, least they should leaue their children miserable: It seemes that the erecti••g of Seminaries in all professions, (which we haue formerly mentioned) should preuēt this feare & the incōueniēces which it breeds; ••et∣ling them in such sort, as no one should want a retreate

nor entertaynment in seruing the Publike: whence would grow its encrease, and the peace of Families. These are the meanes to encrease and multiply our owne, by our owne.

CHAP. 3. Of the encrease of an Estate by the ••nion of another Mans to ours.

* 1.530 THe lawfull meanes to draw another mans, and to vnite it to our owne, are of many sorts▪ The Ro∣mans knew how to mannage them with great wisedome and dexterity. The first whereof they made vse, was to draw and vnite vnto them the people whom they had conque••••d; as they did them of Alba and the Sabins. The second was to ruine the Neighbour Citties, and by this meanes force the Inhabitants to retire to Rome. The third, to grant the right of Romane Bur∣gesses, to the greatest and most powerfull of their Neigh∣bours, vniting them by this mea••es to their Estate, and binding them to the defence ther••of. The fourth to treate equall alliances vnder the name of Society, as with the Latins; or vnder the name of Friendship; as with the Kings of Aegypt and Asia.* 1.531 They haue also made vse to increase their Estate by the protection of the weaker; as they did taking that of Capoua against the Samnites, and of Messina against Hieron and the Carthaginians.

Some Princes of our time haue made good vse of this meanes, hauing changed the protection into an absolute Seignoury, some vnder colour of the disloyalty of the A∣nones; others by the consent of the Auories themselues; Some vppon pretext, that they had not beene satisfi∣ed, certaine summes of money which they had imployed for the Defence thereof: And some for the onely

consideration of conueniencie, and to serue for a defence to their Estate.

The Romans haue also made vse for their encrease, of the benefits of Kings, their Friends, and Allies,* 1.532 who haue made them heires of their Kingdome by Testament, as A••talus King of Asia did; and A∣nichomede King of Bythinia. The Genois had Pera in gift from Michael Paleologue Emperour of Constan∣tinople. Cabo Ioanin, likewise Emperour of Constan∣tinople, gaue Metillin to Francis Cataguse, a Geno∣is. The Venetians had Veggia from Iohn Phano; Francis Forse had Sauonne from Lewis the Eleuenth. The Emperour Fredericke the third, gaue Modena and Rhegium to Borso Duke of Ferrara: The French Kings haue had Dauphinie by the Donation of Hum∣bert the last Dauphin; and Prouenc•• by the Testa∣ment of Charles of Aniou the last Earle of Pro∣uence.

Other Princes haue enlarged their Estate in pur∣chasing from their Neighbours that which lay conueni∣ent for them, there being no Traffique more benefi∣ciall, nor more honourable to a Prince, then to pur∣chase that which cannot bee valued. Pope Clement the sixt, tooke Auignon and the County of Venice, in payment of the arrerages due by Ioane the first, Queene of Naples, and Countesse of Prouence, in re∣gard of the pention which shee ought for Sicily; O∣thers haue written for the Realme of Tunis. Sforse Attendulo had Catigola from Pope Iohn the thirteenth. The Florentins had Arrezo from the Seignour of C••sse, for forty thousand Florens of Gold; and Liuorne from Thomas Fregose for one hundred and twenty thousand Duckets. They haue also purchased Cortona for Ladislaus King of Naples, and Pisa from Gabriel Visconte.

Some haue taken their Neighbours Estate in Mort∣gage,* 1.533

the which lying conueniently for them, they haue 〈◊〉〈◊〉 restored, t••e i••g••gement being past into a meere ali∣enation. The Electors of the Empire, sold their voy∣ces to the Emperour Charles the fourth, to choose his Sonne ••e••eselaus King of the Romans, for one hundred thousand Crownes a peece, the which the Emperour being vnable to pay, hee ingaged vnto them sixteene imperiall Townes, the which they haue euer since en∣••oyed with the Title of Soueraignty. Lewes the Elea∣uenth of France, held in Mortgage the County of Ro••∣sillo••, from Iohn King of Aragon for foure hundred thousand Crownes, the which King Charles the Eight yeelded vp afterwards for nothing: whereby hee lost an occasion to enlarge his Territories: But hee had a better conscience then the Florentins, who retained Borgo Di San Sepulchro, which Pope Eugenius the Fourth had pawned vnto them for fiue and twenty thousand Crownes. The Polonians retaine Liuenia by engagement, for sixe hundred thousand Crownes, which they disbursed in the Warre made for the Tenton Order, against the Duke of Musco••ie, in the Yeare 1558. But since the Warre was ended, they neyther speake of re-embur••ment nor restitution.

By Marriages and Al••iances the Prince may likewise enlarge his Estate, the house of Austria, which comes from the Earles of Asourge in Suisserland, who were about foure hundred yeares since of little accompt, ha••e by this meanes encreased in Estate, as wee see at this day: That is to say, by the Marriage of I∣tha, Heire to Raoul of P••ulendorfe; of Bergantia, with Albert of A••burge Sir••amed the Rich; of He∣t••ngis Heire to ••lrich Liburg, Landgraue of Alsa∣cie, with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 called the Wise, Sonne to Albert the Rich; of Elizabeth Heire of Aus••rea, Carnithia, Tirol, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with the Emperour Albert the ••irst; of Mary the Heire of Burgo••dy, Flanders,

Brabant, and other Prouinces of the Netherlands, with the Emperour Maximillion the first; Of Ioane the Heire of Castille, Aragon, Sicily, and Naples, with Philip Arch-duke of Austrea; Of Anne, the Heire of Hungary and Bohemia, with the Emperour Ferdinand, Brother to Charles the Fift: And of Isabel of Portugal, Mother to Philip the Second, King of Spaine, with Charles the Fift. This example shall suffice to verifie the increase of Estates in a Prince by this meanes. Adoption is another kinde of portion, by meanes whereof they of Aniou,* 1.534 and afterwards they of Aragon haue beene made Kings of Naples and Sicily, hauing beene adopted by Ioane.

The Polonians haue inlarged their Estate by the election of their Kings,* 1.535 choosing them among the neighbour Princes who had their Estate neere vnto them: and so they of the house of Iagellon being called to gouerne their Estate, they haue wrought so as they haue ioyned Liuonia vnto it, whereof they of Iagellon were Dukes, and in making the Nobillity of Prusia, and Podolia, equall to that of Polonia, they haue increased and assured their Estate with these two Prouinces; But to returne to the E∣lection, if it be a Prince which seekes by this meanes to increase himselfe,* 1.536 hee must not so much relye vpon the inclination of the people, and the consi∣derations which they may haue for their priuate ad∣uantage; but hee must bring that which may assist and helpe him in this pursuite, as Money, Force, and Intelligences: Especially if there be Competitors, who are to make vse of the like meanes, and that the affaires and persons are thereunto disposed.

The ordinary course in the Election of Popes, is to giue their voice to that Cardinall which is most in credit, ioyning thereunto the consideration of priuate Interest, of Friendship, and the remembrance of Bonds

for benefits receiued, with hope to be fauoured for the same election by him to whom he giues his voice, if he happens to fa••••e of it. But as they which run a Race, ma∣ny times hinder one another, and whilest they striue, •• third man gets to the Marke before them; so commonly we see, that they whom they thinke should be preferred before the rest, sticke fast by the way: Wherefore they must not onely relye vpon credit. Charles of Austrea, who after was chosen Emperour, to attaine vnto this Dignity, he not onely distributed two hundred thousand Crownes amo••g the Electors, (as King Francis had done for his part) but hee caused Leuies of Souldiers to bee made in Germany, and his Army being ready, he made it approach to Frankford, vnder colour to keepe the E∣lection from being forced; whereby hee encouraged his owne party, and caused them to yeeld vnto him which waue••ed, and he terrified Brandeburge, who held the party of France, so as hee durst not discouer his intenti∣ons. As for practizes, Charles carried himselfe more cun∣ningly then Francis the first, for hauing first of all laboured for the exclusion of Francis, he had thereby assured him∣selfe of the Electors, who he knew would neuer agree to choose one amongst themselues, by reason of their emula∣tio••s and dissentions; and that opposing one against ano∣ther, the•• which should be excluded, would more wil∣ling••y giue their voices to a third man, then to him that had ••pposed against them. Contrariwise the French Em∣bassad••urs labouring not for the exclusion of Charles, but feeding themselues with the hope which the Arch-bishop of Mentz, and the Marquesse of Brandeburge gaue them, that this election would succeed to the benefit of King Francis, remai••ed abused, wherein Pope Lee did in some sort helpe, yet contrary to his intention: For although he desi••ed not that King Francis should be made Emperour, no more then the King of Sp••ine, but some third person, he entertained the first with hope, to the end that when

he should see himselfe wholy excluded, despight should make him imploy his practizes against the King of Spaine in fauour of some Germans, and that hauing purchased no credit with him, he might not grow distasted, but might then fauour this designe openly.

We will therefore conclude, that in euery Election the first consideration must be, to labour for the exclusion of Competitors; being certaine that many will sooner agree for the exclusion of one, then they will for the Election of another; and yet ingaging them by this meanes to offend the Competitors, you bind them to thinke no more of them. But if many agree to reiect you, you must haue recourse to time, and delay the Election as much as may be, to the end they may grow weary and separate them∣selues.

CHAP. 4. Of the encrease of an Estate by Conquest.

BVt the most ordinary meanes to enlarge an Estate, is by Conquest: And to attaine vnto it you must know how to attempt it, to make warre and to auoide it.* 1.537 For the Enterprize of warre, you must fly two things: Iniustice and rashnesse. To the end the Warre may bee iust, he that vndertakes it must be a Soueraigne, and the cause and end must be iust. The iust causes to make War are our owne defence, and that of our Friends:* 1.538 the re∣uenge of our iniuries and theirs: The iust pretentions we may haue to an Estate, and our Diuines adde not only the defence of our Religion, but its aduancement and propa∣gation by the way of Armes, and some the extirpation and rooting out of a contrary: But others hold that Warre is a bad meanes to plant piety.

As for rashnesse he must likewise auoide it: and for this effect before he resolue to warre,* 1.539 he must see eyther some apparent profit, or that he is forced by some great necessity, but aboue all things before he vndertakes it, he must assure his Estate both within and without. With∣in, in giuing contentment to his subiects, iustifying his ta∣king Armes, and making them to allow of it, to the end that if neede be, they may assist him: without in renew∣ing the Leagues with such as may assist vs, or annoy our Enemies, or with those that may succour them, diuer∣ting them from their Friendship. They must also resolue, whether is most profitable, either to make warre by Sea, or by Land, or by both, and in what place. Wherein although there be no generall Rule, yet it would be of great aduantage to strike rather at the head, then at the armes or legges; and at the place where the Head of the State remaines, then at any part more remote. As likewise he must consider the place where the Enemy feares most to be inuaded. The which the French vnto this day, (in the Warres which they haue had with the Spaniards) haue little obserued. For by many examples it may be verified, that the thing which the Spaniards haue feared most, was left the French should inuade him by Spaine. King Ferdinand of Aragon, although he were inuaded by the County of Rou••illon, and was then stronger then the French, yet he would not en∣tertayne the Warre vpon this frontier, as Guschar∣din sayth. And the same Author writes, that the said King hauing taken Nauarre, more by the amazement which the English forces gaue, then by his owne, he would proceede no farther; holding it no discretion to begin a Warre on the other side of the Mountaines with the French King, least hee should remaine in the subiection of the people and great men of Spaine, who being armed within the Countrey, might haue sought to aduance their owne Estate: And therefore

seeing the forces of France turne towards Italy, ••ee dismist his Army which was vpon the frontier of Na∣uarre, without inuading France as hee had promi∣sed to his Colleagues, being vnited for the defence of Italy against King Francis the first.

It serues for no purpose to pretend to the contra∣ry, the bad successe of the voyages of Perpignean and Nauarre by the French: For in effect there is no History which doth not attribute that misfortune to the want of fore-sight and negligence of our Kings, and to the bad conduct of their Ministers: For ad∣mit they should not finde victuals sufficient in Spaine to entertaine their Army, yet France which ioynes to this Frontier, is not so needy, nor so farre off, but by Sea or Land they might be easily relieued, and Spaine on that side being more barren, it is certaine that the want will be greater for the Spaniard then for the French.

But to returne to generall considerations, they must fore-see and prouide for all the inconuenien∣ces which may happen in such an Enterprize, waigh∣ing exactly, and comparing our forces with those of the Enemy. And for that a Prince doth seldome conquer by force onely, hee must obserue if there be in the Estate which he meanes to inuade, any of those defects which is sayd might serue for the ruine of Estates, to the end he may make vse of them.

To make Warr••,* 1.540 hee must haue recourse to Mi∣litary wisedome and ••udgement, which deserues a more ample discourse, and therefore I will now leaue it. But to auoide Warre, one of the principall con∣siderations is, to imbrace a fit time to treate a Peace to his aduantage: And therefore hee must not haue an obstinate desire wholy to conquer a Prouince, what hope soeuer good Fo••••une hath giuen him, but hee must study how to make profit of his aduantages, and to

assu•••• that by peace which he hath conquered: In imita∣tion of the Turke who holding this Maxime hath neuer restored any thing of Importance which hee hath gotten; but all remaining in his possession, in lesse then three hundred yeares hee hath built an Empire fearefull to all his Neighbours.

But the consideration a Prince ought to haue in his en∣crease, is that hee make his profit of it; it many times falling out, that if an Estate newly conquered, be not go∣uerned with great discretion and Iudgment, it doth rather weaken, then make the new conquerour more powerfull, especially if this encrease, ministers matter of iealousie to the Neighbour Princes: For thence grow many de∣signes and Leagues against him. Thus drawing into consideration the aduantages of a conquest, he must like∣wise haue a care of the meanes to maintaine and preserue it, whereof we haue formerly spoken.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  An Estate what it is.
• * 1.2

  Of the esta∣••••ish••••nt o•• an ••state.
• * 1.3

  Of the forme of an Estate.
• * 1.4

  Diuers sorts of principali∣ties.
• * 1.5

  Royall.
• * 1.6

  Seignouriall.
• * 1.7

  Tyra••nicall.
• * 1.8

  O•• a ••eignoury
• * 1.9

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 a popular ••s••ate.
• * 1.10

  Aduantages of a popular estate
• * 1.11

  Disaduantag•••• of a popul•••• e∣state.
• * 1.12

  O•• the Suiss••s.
• * 1.13

  Aduantages of a Seignoury.
• * 1.14

  Disaduantages and inconueni∣ences of a Seig∣noury.
• * 1.15

  Of the Seig∣noury of Ve∣nice, and by what meanes it maintaines it selfe▪
• * 1.16

  Aduantages & disaduantages in a Principa∣lity.
• * 1.17

  I hat the peo∣ple haue no cause to desire liberty i•• a principality.
• * 1.18

  Wherein con∣sists the depen∣dance of estates 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to another.
• * 1.19

  The markes of Soueraignty.
• * 1.20

  Inconu••nienc••s o•• election in a pri••cipality.
• * 1.21

  Aduantages of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••ecti••n.
• * 1.22

  A conside••a••so ••n th•• ••l••ction.
• * 1.23

  Reasons for the which they exclude women fró the gouern∣ment in some estates.
• * 1.24

  Diu••••sity ••n the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.25

  Of the miseries it doeth pro∣cure, and the difficulties they encounter.
• * 1.26

  The diu•••••• con∣di••ions of ••••b∣i•••••• d••ue••i••••••s ••he ••orce o•• ••he ••st••te.
• * 1.27

  Of Bond men.
• * 1.28

  Of priuiledged Subiects.
• * 1.29

  Of simple Sub∣iects.
• * 1.30

  Of strangers.
• * 1.31

  Diuers orders of Subiects.
• * 1.32

  The subiect of the establishing of Comminal∣ties and com∣panies in an e∣state.
• * 1.33

  That the Prince ought not to crosse the Commi∣nalties, nor suffer them to attempt any thing aboue their power.
• * 1.34

  Of the ••s••icacy & necessity of Rel••gion in on Estate.
• * 1.35

  Of abuses in Religion.
• * 1.36

  Extraordinary meanes for the establishing of true Religion.
• * 1.37

  The dispositi∣on of people cōsiderable for the setling of Religion.
• * 1.38

  who are pro∣perly called barbarians.
• * 1.39

  Barbarians in Religion,
• * 1.40

  Of the Authors o•• most part of Religion at this day.
• * 1.41

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.42

  Barbar••••s in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cloa••••ing
• * 1.43

  Barbarou ••es in their habi∣tation.
• * 1.44

  Barbarous in gouernment.
• * 1.45

  That the man∣ner of proc••e∣••ing for the se••ling of ••eli∣gion ough•• to be diuers.
• * 1.46

  Prophesies d•••• pose a people to the setling of a new Reli∣gion.
• * 1.47

  Heauy cha••ges and bur••hens dispose a peo∣ple to change Religion.
• * 1.48

  〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.49

  Reuolts and Ciuill Warre dispose to the change of Re∣ligion.
• * 1.50

  As also exces∣siue liberty and coute••pt o•• Religion.
• * 1.51

  The re-vnion of a Countrey vnder one Prince, makes the establi••••∣me••t Religi∣on 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.52

  Pa••ts and qua∣lities n••cessary to the b••i••gers in of a new Re∣ligi••n.
• * 1.53

  Holinesse of life.
• * 1.54

  Sufficiency.
• * 1.55

  Instruction.
• * 1.56

  Preaching:
• * 1.57

  Instructiō a po∣werful meanes for the bring∣ing in of a Re∣ligion.
• * 1.58

  Prudence.
• * 1.59

  That the zeale of Religion must be accom∣panied with conduct and Prudence.
• * 1.60

  Of Spirituall and temporall powers, and their iurisdicti∣ons.
• * 1.61

  The obser••n∣tion of cere∣moni••s of an ancient Religi¦on, facilitates the setling of a new.
• * 1.62

  There ought to be but one Re∣ligion in an E∣state.
• * 1.63

  Diuersity of Re¦ligion dangrous in an Estate.
• * 1.64

  It must bee a∣••oyded euen in light things.
• * 1.65

  How they must gouerne them∣selues to pre∣serue the anci∣ent beliefe, in a diu••••sity of Religions.
• * 1.66

  Of the rooting out of Heresie and new Reli∣gion in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they ought to carry them▪ 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.67

  The tolleratiō of two Religi∣ons in an estate are lesse hurt∣ful then a ciuil Warre.
• * 1.68

  Warre against Here••icks 〈◊〉〈◊〉 then pat∣ty, and giue, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aduanta∣ges.
• * 1.69

  It is dangerous for a Prince to arme against his Subiects, if he be not assu∣of the euent.
• * 1.70

  A go••d aduice to weaken the party of a new Sector Religi∣on.
• * 1.71

  To draw vnto him the heads of a new Re∣ligion.
• * 1.72

  Institution of Commanders.
• * 1.73

  Orders of Knigh••s his to de••end and maintaine the an••ient Religion.
• * 1.74

  To draw vnto them the most learned & cap••table of a new Religion.
• * 1.75

  To bear downe and ruine the temples least frequenced.
• * 1.76

  Not to 〈…〉〈…〉 Religion.
• * 1.77

  〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.78

  Carelesness in Diuine seruice▪
• * 1.79

  Superstition.
• * 1.80

  Rem••dies a∣gaynst Blasphe∣my and n••gli∣gence.
• * 1.81

  Against Super∣sti••ion.
• * 1.82

  Of a coun•••••• o•• estate.
• * 1.83

  Qualities of Coun••••llors of estate.
• * 1.84

  Age and expe∣••ience.
• * 1.85

  〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.86

  A••••••ent diffe∣rence betwixt an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Coun∣cellor of estate and young, for that which con∣cernes▪ Coun∣cell.
• * 1.87

  A mixture of old and young Councellors of estate.
• * 1.88

  Di••cretion, fi∣delity, and re∣solution in a Councellor.
• * 1.89

  Wilfulnesse a dangerous vice in a Councell of estate.
• * 1.90

  Hee must be without ambi∣tion and not depending of any.
• * 1.91

  A Councellor must not bee rash and preci∣pitate.
• * 1.92

  Irresolution a dangerous vice in a Councellor and to be auci∣d••d.
• * 1.93

  The causes thereof.
• * 1.94

  Subtilty.
• * 1.95

  He must not be too confident.
• * 1.96

  Other quali∣ties necessary for a Councel∣•••• of Estate.
• * 1.97

  Patience.
• * 1.98

  Eloquence.
• * 1.99

  Secrecy.
• * 1.100

  Of the number of Councellors of Estate.
• * 1.101

  Of the change of Councellors of Estate.
• * 1.102

  Of the great number of coun∣cellors of estate to be imployde else-where.
• * 1.103

  O•• many Coun¦cels of Estate.
• * 1.104

  The meanes to auoyd the con∣trariety of Or∣dinances.
• * 1.105

  The power of a Councell.
• * 1.106

  A 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.107

  A deliberatiue voyce.
• * 1.108

  Equallity a∣mong Coun∣cellors.
• * 1.109

  Order in gi∣uing their opi∣nions.
• * 1.110

  S••ffi••••ency and Capacity 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for a 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.111

  Of the manner to demaund Councell.
• * 1.112

  To receiue counsell.
• * 1.113

  To examine.
• * 1.114

  Of the flattery of Councellors and how the Prince should auoyd them.
• * 1.115

  Of the truth & liberty which ought to be in Councellors.
• * 1.116

  Of the prime Ministers of an estate.
• * 1.117

  A Wise act of the fir••t Mini∣ster of an e∣state to dis∣charge his duty.
• * 1.118

  Of the power.
• * 1.119

  Of the law.
• * 1.120

  Diuersity of lawes.
• * 1.121

  The ayme and end of the law.
• * 1.122

  Qualities con∣siderable in the establishing of lawes.
• * 1.123

  Of the short∣nesse of the law.
• * 1.124

  Of the absolute com••and of the Prince.
• * 1.125

  Of the great number of lawes, and the cau••es thereof.
• * 1.126

  Of the obserua¦tion of lawes.
• * 1.127

  Of seuerity.
• * 1.128

  When the Prince may dis∣pence wi••h ••h•• lawes.
• * 1.129

  How he ought to gouerne himselfe i•• se∣uerity.
• * 1.130

  Distinction of Officers & Mi∣nisters of an Estate.
• * 1.131

  Of officers & Commissioners and of their difference.
• * 1.132

  Consideratiō to be made vp∣on a Cō••ission
• * 1.133

  Of the person from whence it proceeds.
• * 1.134

  Of the directi∣•••••••• a Com∣••ission.
• * 1.135

  Of the charge of a Commis∣s••on.
• * 1.136

  The duty of a Commissioner.
• * 1.137

  Of the time when a Com∣mission should expire.
• * 1.138

  •• the number o•• ••ffi••e••.
• * 1.139

  Th•• 〈…〉〈…〉 a 〈…〉〈…〉 then 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.140

  I••conueniences g••owing from the plurality of officers; and the meanes to a••oyd them.
• * 1.141

  The creation and choyse of officers, must be made by the So¦ueraigne only.
• * 1.142

  That the char∣ges must be di∣stributed pro∣portionably, ac∣cording to the nature and ca∣pacity of them.
• * 1.143

  Principall qua∣lities required in an officer & Magistrate.
• * 1.144

  The vl••es and defects are as well to be con∣sidered as the vertues, in the election of Ma¦gistrates and Officers.
• * 1.145

  An easy means to make a good choice.
• * 1.146

  Three kinds of creating and making Magi∣strates.
• * 1.147

  By election. By lott.
• * 1.148

  By lot and e∣lection toge∣ther.
• * 1.149

  The continu∣ance of Offi∣cers is either for life or a cer∣taine time.
• * 1.150

  Reasons and considerations to make Offi∣cers for a time.
• * 1.151

  Reasons and considerations to perpetuate Offices during life.
• * 1.152

  The change of Offices and Magistrates necessary in a popular E∣state,.
• * 1.153

  Meanes to pre¦uent the vsur∣pation of the Estate by the continuance of officers ingreat charges.
• * 1.154

  The practize of the Pope and Seignoury of Venice, in the disposition of great charges to preuent vsur¦pation.
• * 1.155

  The practise of Kings & Prin∣ces vpon the same subiect.
• * 1.156

  That the chāge of principall Officers & Ma∣gistrates is ne∣cessary for the safety of the Prince & peace of the people.
• * 1.157

  Prudence re∣quired in this change.
• * 1.158

  That you may not giue great commands in a Prouince to those that were borne there.
• * 1.159

  Wherein the Duty of Offi¦cers and Magi∣strates doe con∣sist.
• * 1.160

  Of the duty to∣vvards the lavves.
• * 1.161

  How the Ma∣gistrate ought to carry him∣selfe in the in∣terpretation o•• of the words of the lavv.
• * 1.162

  In the interpre∣tation o•• the in∣t••n••ion of the law.
• * 1.163

  Examinat••on of the reason of the law.
• * 1.164

  That wee must stand to the au∣thority of the law, and make no questions vpon equity.
• * 1.165

  Of the execu∣tion of lawes and ordinan∣ces.
• * 1.166

  From what time the law o•• ordinance doth bind.
• * 1.167

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.168

  Of the ••••••ce of lawes or ordinances.
• * 1.169

  Of Custome.
• * 1.170

  Three things required to giue force to a Custome.
• * 1.171

  Wherein the duty of the Magistrate to the Prince con∣sists.
• * 1.172

  Of the com∣mandments of the Prince, and how the Magi∣strate must car∣ry himselfe in the verification.
• * 1.173

  The Magi∣strate ••ught to obey the will of the Prince, although it were vniust.
• * 1.174

  The disobedi∣ence of the Magistrate to th•• will of the 〈…〉〈…〉 bad con••e∣quence.
• * 1.175

  The Magi∣strate is not 〈…〉〈…〉 the 〈…〉〈…〉 of his Prince.
• * 1.176

  Reasons why the custome of verifying the Princes Edicts hath beene brought in by the Magistrate
• * 1.177

  How the Ma∣strate ought to car••y himselfe in the execution of a comman∣dement after a Reuocation.
• * 1.178

  Three degrees o•• Magistrates and the power of either of them.
• * 1.179

  The dutie of a Superiour or principall Ma∣gistrate.
• * 1.180

  That it is fiting for a Prince to indure the Iudgement of the Magistrate
• * 1.181

  The power of a Lieutenant e∣quall to that of the Magistrate.
• * 1.182

  The power of the Magistrate is of no effect out of his ter∣ritorie.
• * 1.183

  Of tvvo Magi∣strates equall in povver and of the executi∣on of their de∣crees in one anothers terri∣tory.
• * 1.184

  Of the execu∣tion of a ••en∣tence giuen by the officer of a forraine Prince vpon another•• territory.
• * 1.185

  Of Magistrates equal in power in a body▪ or colledge, and of their com∣mand one ouer another.
• * 1.186

  The difference betvvixt ••ppo¦si••ion and com∣mand.
• * 1.187

  That they may hinder one a∣nother by op∣position before the act, or by appeale after the act, but not by command.
• * 1.188

  Foundations of the duty of Ma∣gistrates to pri∣uate p••r••••ns.
• * 1.189

  Diuers powers of Magistrates▪
• * 1.190

  Of their duties to priuate per∣sons in giuing sentence.
• * 1.191

  Of the 〈…〉〈…〉 persons to the Magistrate, executing his charge.
• * 1.192

  Of the Magi∣strate wronged when and how hee may bee Iudge in his owne cause.
• * 1.193

  Mildnesse and patience requi∣red in a Magi∣strate.
• * 1.194

  Discretion and grauitie with∣out passion.
• * 1.195

  The dutie of Magistrates.
• * 1.196

  Rules and con∣siderations in in the Iustice of comandments.
• * 1.197

  An harmonia∣call p••op••r••ion followed in ma∣ny things.
• * 1.198

  An Arithmeti∣call proportion followed in o∣thers
• * 1.199

  A Geometrical proportion in the imposition of burth••n∣some Offices for the support of the Estate.
• * 1.200

  A mixture of the law with the will of the Prince.
• * 1.201

  Of the temper a magistrate shoul•• ••dde vn∣to the law.
• * 1.202

  Of the distribu∣tion o•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and dignities.
• * 1.203

  Distribution of r••wards & pu∣nishments.
• * 1.204

  Harmony in the diuision of goods.
• * 1.205

  Prouision of Armes and Shipping.
• * 1.206

  Armes offen∣siue or d••f••n∣siue.
• * 1.207

  Quality of de∣sensiue armes.
• * 1.208

  That they ought not to be con∣temned.
• * 1.209

  Quality of of∣••en••iue armes.
• * 1.210

  O•• the Pike,
• * 1.211

  Two sorts of offensiue armes
• * 1.212

  Of the beauty & ••rnament of Armes.
• * 1.213

  The situation of Fortres••e•• n••ces••ary and proffitable.
• * 1.214

  They must bee farre from the heart of the Estate.
• * 1.215

  Forts strong by situation and Art.
• * 1.216

  They must bee situated where they may bee relieued.
• * 1.217

  Of the ••••uan∣tages of Horse and Foote.
• * 1.218

  An Army must consist of hor••e and foote.
• * 1.219

  Of the choise of Souldiers.
• * 1.220

  Wee must im∣ploy Strangers as little as may be.
• * 1.221

  Two sorts of traine Bands.
• * 1.222

  Of the number ••of Souldiers ••o•• the trayn•• ••nd.
• * 1.223

  Of Subsidiaries
• * 1.224

  Order for their exercise in time of peace: and to hinder their Mutiny.
• * 1.225

  Of the number of Subsidiaries.
• * 1.226

  Meanes to tra••ne the sub∣iects of an E∣state to Warre without any charge to the Prince.
• * 1.227

  And to hinder a reuolte and mutiny.
• * 1.228

  The parti••ular ••o••••e of the Romans.
• * 1.229

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vpon 〈…〉〈…〉 ••aptaine.
• * 1.230

  Of the choice which the Cap∣taine ought to make of his Souldiers.
• * 1.231

  A good order if it were well obserued.
• * 1.232

  Of the place whence they must take the Souldiers.
• * 1.233

  Of the Age o•• the Souldiers.
• * 1.234

  Of the statu••e.
• * 1.235

  Of his vocatiō.
• * 1.236

  That the pow∣er of an Estate depends of its riches.
• * 1.237

  Of the Lacede∣monians.
• * 1.238

  Of the Veneti∣ans and Genoi••
• * 1.239

  Of the Romans
• * 1.240

  What is nece∣sary for the riches of an Estate.
• * 1.241

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 an 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.242

  Whence the a∣boundance of necessary things proceed
• * 1.243

  Tillage w••ll husbaded cau∣seth aboun∣dance.
• * 1.244

  The cau••e of the negligence thereof.
• * 1.245

  That it is not vnworthy of a Prince.
• * 1.246

  Manufactures cause aboun∣dance in an Estate.
• * 1.247

  Commerce with the stran∣ger causeth a∣boundance in an Estate.
• * 1.248

  Three conside∣rations for the Commerce.
• * 1.249

  Of Marchan∣dize which we may and ought to carry to strangers.
• * 1.250

  Of the trans∣port of Gold and Siluer.
• * 1.251

  Of raw stuffes.
• * 1.252

  Of the begin∣ning of str̄age Gold and Sil∣uer into an Estate.
• * 1.253

  That the course of for∣ra••gne Coyne ought not to be allowed in an Estate.
• * 1.254

  Marchandize whbreof wee ought to s••op the entry.
• * 1.255

  The carriage of Merchan∣dize.
• * 1.256

  Monopolis fo••∣bidden.
• * 1.257

  Of the dis∣charge of cu∣stomes.
• * 1.258

  Faith and assu∣rance in affairs-Speedy Iustice.
• * 1.259

  That Siluer & Gold are suffi∣cient for all sorts of Coine.
• * 1.260

  The prise of Gold & Siluer in proportion one of another
• * 1.261

  To bring M••r∣chants into credit.
• * 1.262

  Trading at Sea profitable and honourable.
• * 1.263

  Aduantages which the pub∣lique and pri∣uate should re∣ceiue if the Nobility gaue themselues to the Commerc•• at Sea.
• * 1.264

  And order set∣led by the Hol∣land••rs for the continuance of the••••r 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the East Indies.
• * 1.265

  The great re∣putation which th••y h••ue got∣ten by the meanes of this Trade.
• * 1.266

  Means to setle the commerce at Sea in an E∣state.
• * 1.267

  That pa••simo∣ny p••e••e••u••s the ••iches of an Estate.
• * 1.268

  Parsimony im∣po••ts ••uch ••or the ••a••ety of an Estate.
• * 1.269

  Against exc••sse
• * 1.270

  Whe rei•• ex∣cesse deth con∣sist.
• * 1.271

  O•• excesse in buildings.
• * 1.272

  An order in the low Countries for buildings in Townes.
• * 1.273

  Of the excesse of moueables.
• * 1.274

  Excesse in a great traine.
• * 1.275

  A g••od order made by the Vene••••ans.
• * 1.276

  ••x••ess•• in Fe••st••.
• * 1.277

  Excesse of Play.
• * 1.278

  Of the ordina∣ry reuenew of the Demesus and of its Est∣blishment.
• * 1.279

  That an alie∣nationis not to be allowed much l••sse an ingagement.
• * 1.280

  Entries and go¦ing forth o•• the Estate.
• * 1.281

  Tributes, Gifts, and Pensions.
• * 1.282

  Trafique in the name of the publique.
• * 1.283

  To deliuer mo∣n••y at ••nterest to marchants.
• * 1.284

  Of the ••ale o•• Offices.
• * 1.285

  The sourse and begi••n••ng of this a••use.
• * 1.286

  Inconuenien∣ces which grow by the venallity of Offices.
• * 1.287

  Of Subsedie••.
• * 1.288

  Diuers formes of Subsedies and Leu••es.
• * 1.289

  Of those which ought to be ex∣empted from Subsedies.
• * 1.290

  Of the place wh••re they are to make the leuy of the Subsedies.
• * 1.291

  Introduction of tolles, tri∣butes, and im∣posts.
• * 1.292

  Introduction for the nūbring of goods.
• * 1.293

  Practised by the R••m••ns.
• * 1.294

  Ab••lished by Ty••ants.
• * 1.295

  Imaginary in∣conueniences of the nūbring of goods.
• * 1.296

  Aduant••g••s which will come vnto the ••st••••••▪
• * 1.297

  Of ••x••ra••rdi∣nary l••uies.
• * 1.298

  Of casuall im∣positions.
• * 1.299

  Of customes & impo••itions.
• * 1.300

  Of voluntary borrowing.
• * 1.301

  Of the order of the expences.
• * 1.302

  Almes.
• * 1.303

  Charities of the King St. Lewis:
• * 1.304

  Almes doe ne∣uer impouerish
• * 1.305

  The freeing of charges neces∣••a••y for the E∣state.
• * 1.306

  Of the Fees of officers and debts.
• * 1.307

  Recompences to the discharg of the Treasure.
• * 1.308

  Th••••e which are made by offices and dig•• ni••es are to be p••••erre•• be¦fore that which is done by ••o∣ney.
• * 1.309

  Gifts and gratifications.
• * 1.310

  A Prince must giue to many little and of∣ten.
• * 1.311

  Election of publike houses and Seminaries for instruction of youth, as∣well in the li∣berall Arts as Mecha••••ck.
• * 1.312

  Seminaries of piety.
• * 1.313

  Seminaries of honour for the instruction of Gentlemen.
• * 1.314

  The profit of th•• sayd Semi∣naries of honor ••or the Estate.
• * 1.315

  Expences for the cōmodity and decoration of Towne and Pr••uinces.
• * 1.316

  Cutting off Expences.
• * 1.317

  Of the iustice and necessity of cutting off of debts.
• * 1.318

  Of the choice they ought to make of those which are to manage the Treasure.
• * 1.319

  A commenda∣ble custome of the Romans.
• * 1.320

  Youth more fit for the mānag∣ing of the Treasure then Age.
• * 1.321

  That experi∣ence is not so much necess••∣ry.
• * 1.322

  A forme to re∣gulate Ac∣comptants.
• * 1.323

  Of Accompts and of those which are to heare and exa∣mine the Ac∣compts.
• * 1.324

  Con••iderations which makes the ••eaping vp of Treasure hurtfull to a Pu••lique.
• * 1.325

  Considerations necessary for the gathering of Treasure.
• * 1.326

  Prudence and discretion ne∣cesary for the gathering ••f Treasure.
• * 1.327

  A ••emedy to the end that sparing m••y not hinder the Commerce.
• * 1.328

  Difficultie•• for the keeping of th•• Trea••ure of Gold and Siluer.
• * 1.329

  O•• the car•• & ••••••••ging of 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.330

  How a Prince should gouern•• himselfe with his neighbou••s.
• * 1.331

  Ge••••••••ll con∣sider••t•••••••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 th•• man∣ner 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.332

  Of the ent••r∣view o•• Prin¦ces, where th••y may be a••••p¦t••••e o•• the ••••••••ndship and good 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••m••••••y 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.333

  A Prince be∣••••••chc p••••he•• ••ust h••ue a c••r•• not to p••o∣cur•• E••••y or ••••alous•••• ag•••••• h••m, no•• 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.334

  Of safety.
• * 1.335

  〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.336

  What Princes ought to, doe before their Enter-viewes, not to put their Neighbours in Iealousie.
• * 1.337

  Of Deputies & Embassadors to treate with a Prince, and of the choice they are to make.
• * 1.338

  Qualities of a Deputy or E••∣bassadour.
• * 1.339

  Not to be in∣terested in the businesse hee treates of.
• * 1.340

  Of a ••••ane condition.
• * 1.341

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••cre: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••••enti 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 made.
• * 1.342

  I hat they must stand most vp∣on their guards when they pr••pound a treaty, and ••••pecialy during the treaty.
• * 1.343

  That a treaty ought not to be held firme and assured, if it be not ratified by the Prince with whom they treate,
• * 1.344

  Of the plate where the trea∣ties of a peace ••ra league is to be made.
• * 1.345

  An Embassador going vnto a Prince to treat whether he is bound to treate himselfe with him, or by De∣puties.
• * 1.346

  Of the sitting of Embassador••
• * 1.347

  Of the power of Embassadors on either side.
• * 1.348

  O•• the clauses of treaties.
• * 1.349

  Principall con∣siderations▪
• * 1.350

  They must haue a care th••t there be no equiu••cati∣on in the clauses.
• * 1.351

  That generall clauses are cap∣tions.
• * 1.352

  T••eaties of Peace.
• * 1.353

  O•• T••uc••
• * 1.354

  That treaties of trece are lesse Subiect to rupture then th••se of a peac••.
• * 1.355

  Diu••rs intenti∣ons for t••e which they make a truce.
• * 1.356

  Of defensiue leagues.
• * 1.357

  Diuers consi∣derations for the treating or making of a league.
• * 1.358

  ••rdinary cau∣••••s o•• ••••a••ue••.
• * 1.359

  Other conside∣rations for the treatie of a league.
• * 1.360

  Of the time w••en wee are to make a L••••gue.
• * 1.361

  O•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ti••e of the ••ōtinu••nce ••o a le••gue.
• * 1.362

  That the Col∣leagu••s are bound to the r••couery of the Countrey of their Allie con∣quered by the Enemy.
• * 1.363

  Of the contri∣bution of a league.
• * 1.364

  〈…〉〈…〉 place 〈…〉〈…〉 dy•• or 〈…〉〈…〉 m••n••y.
• * 1.365

  Which of the confederates ought to veri∣sie and decla••e himsel••e first.
• * 1.366

  That an off••n∣siue league, and for an ••n••er∣priz•• ••ucc••••d•• seldo••e acc••••∣ding to ••he hope of the Allies.
• * 1.367

  O•• the causes of the rup••ure of Leagues.
• * 1.368

  O•• ••eagu••s ••etwi•••• meane ••••tate••, and of the de••••cts w••••ch a•••• ••f∣ten 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.369

  Of Succour•• one against a∣nother among confederates.
• * 1.370

  Of the defence of one that is no•• allied a∣gainst an Ally.
• * 1.371

  Of the vnequal alliāce betwixt Princes and E∣states •• that is to say of pro∣tection.
• * 1.372

  Difference be∣twixt pension and tribute.
• * 1.373

  Of protection.
• * 1.374

  Of the mutuall duty of the pro¦tector and hee that is protec∣ted.
• * 1.375

  Of Hostages.
• * 1.376

  Hostages for the assurance of a Princes passage, through ano¦thers Estate,
• * 1.377

  The assurance of a treaty.
• * 1.378

  It is dangerous for an ally to receiue a strong Ga••••i∣son from his protector, or make him Ma∣ster of his Forts, &c.
• * 1.379

  ••s••••blishment of Iudges, for the deciding o•• differences betwixt allies.
• * 1.380

  Of compro∣mise betwixt Allies, vpon differences which may grow betwixt them.
• * 1.381

  Of a••compro∣mise vpon the possessory.
• * 1.382

  When and how a Prince should deale to reconcile a difference be∣twixt his Neighbours.
• * 1.383

  Meanes to as∣sure a treaty that they may not enter into rupture.
• * 1.384

  Pretext of rupture.
• * 1.385

  Of the obliga∣tion a Prince hath to hold his word.
• * 1.386

  That force nor feare cannot di••pence a Prince of his word or pro∣mise.
• * 1.387

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 pre••••xts o•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.388

  That the con∣stancy and as∣••••••tance of a Prince •••• his w••rd is of great 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.389

  Two sorts•• of Neutrality.
• * 1.390

  The aduanta∣ges of a Neu∣trality.
• * 1.391

  Di••aduantages of Neutrality.
• * 1.392

  That a power∣full Prince should not leaue a Neutrality without cau••••.
• * 1.393

  That a Neutra∣l••••y is more be∣••eficiall to a weake a Prince then to imbrace a 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.394

  Considerations to leaue a Neutrallity.
• * 1.395

  How a Prince ought to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 himselfe in a demand made vnto him by one of his Nei••hbours o•• ••ome diffi••ul•• thing▪
• * 1.396

  To demād som∣thing of his Neighbours.
• * 1.397

  We must not refuse that which is de∣manded, if it doth not much preiudice.
• * 1.398

  We must n••t be too credulous in that which Princes say.
• * 1.399

  Politiquely to nourish dis∣trusts & iealo∣sies betwixt them.
• * 1.400

  To testifie his good will vnto them.
• * 1.401

  O•• the resent∣men•• hee must h••ue of Iniu∣••ties ••eceiued by his neigh∣bou••
• * 1.402

  To pierce into the designes of his Neighbours.
• * 1.403

  Of the intro∣duction of Em∣bassadours or Agents.
• * 1.404

  The difference betwixt an Embassadour and Agent.
• * 1.405

  Qualities and perfections re∣quired in an Embassadour.
• * 1.406

  Instructions for an Embas∣sadour, how to gouerne him∣selfe in a strange Coun∣trey.
• * 1.407

  O•• the priui∣ledges of Em∣••a••••adou••s.
• * 1.408

  How Embassa∣dours ought to carry them∣selues toward their Master.
• * 1.409

  Of their dis∣patches.
• * 1.410

  The preseruati∣on of the Estate consists in the authority of a Prince.
• * 1.411

  The Loue of the people cause the au∣thority of the Soueraigne.
• * 1.412

  Diuers meanes to gaine his good-will.
• * 1.413

  Effects of mild∣nesse in a Prince.
• * 1.414

  To cherrish great Men.
• * 1.415

  Two sorts of liberality.
• * 1.416

  The excesse of liberality in a Prince most hurtfull to the Estate.
• * 1.417

  Considerati∣ons necessary in liberality.
• * 1.418

  Diuer•• kinds of liberality.
• * 1.419

  Of the liberali∣ty which is vsed for the ac∣knowledgment of seruice and merit.
• * 1.420

  That a Prince 〈◊〉〈◊〉 shewe him 〈◊〉〈◊〉 liberall to those which may se••ue him ag••inst ••is ••nemy, be th••y o•• a con∣••r••ry pa••••y.
• * 1.421

  Of the libera∣lity of the Prince to pur∣chase reputati∣on.
• * 1.422

  The manner of giuing.
• * 1.423

  Benefits must be propo••tio∣••a••le t•• the time.
• * 1.424

  ••ecompences 〈◊〉〈◊〉 li••n••ur m••••t ••ee well 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.425

  Libe••••lity of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to∣w••rds ••h•• Pub∣l••qu••.
• * 1.426

  The Liberality of a priuate person towards the Publique is not to be allow∣ed.
• * 1.427

  Liberality of the Prince to∣wards the Pub∣lique, which consists in ad∣uancing vertue
• * 1.428

  Iustice diuided into two parts.
• * 1.429

  wherein the princ•• ought to shew himselfe a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Iustice in ••••gard of priuate men.
• * 1.430

  Against v••ury.
• * 1.431

  Two sorts of vi∣olence in an E∣state which the Prince ought to suppresse.
• * 1.432

  Of the oppres∣sion of the poor••.
• * 1.433

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 Princes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ••n 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.434

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 wherein 〈◊〉〈◊〉 may 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.435

  That the grace and sauour of the Prince not extend to haue violence done against the Magistrate.
• * 1.436

  Of the choise a Prince ought to make of Iudges & Ma∣gistrates.
• * 1.437

  I 〈◊〉〈◊〉 m••anes 〈…〉〈…〉 t••o••e which ••re to be esta∣blished in the administ••a••ion o•• Iust••ce.
• * 1.438

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 must 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ca••e to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the 〈…〉〈…〉 to do•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.439

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 meanes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.440

  Of the compo∣sitions with of∣fic••rs, misbe∣hauing▪ them∣selues in their charges, ••and of the inconu••ni∣ences which follow.
• * 1.441

  That a Prince hauing pardo∣ned an Officer, may not suffer him in his charge.
• * 1.442

  Of Spyes in cuery Prouince to inquire of the carriage of Officers.
• * 1.443

  Secret delati∣ons practised by King L••wis the ••w••lfth to containe his Officers in their du••y.
• * 1.444

  Consideration•• necessary for a Prince, for the administration of Iustice.
• * 1.445

  The expence of pleaders.
• * 1.446

  Of the vocati∣ons of Iudges
• * 1.447

  Of taxe of Re∣gisters, Vshers, and such oth••r Mi••is••••••rs o•• Iustice.
• * 1.448

  Of the expence o•• 〈…〉〈…〉, a••d 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.449

  Of the verifica∣ion of Edicts by the ••ourse of Parli••••nt.
• * 1.450

  Of the mean••s how a Prince may p••rchase repu••at••on.
• * 1.451

  Of Prudence and Vallou•• in a Prince.
• * 1.452

  That a Prince mu••t haue a general know∣••edge of all Scie••ces.
• * 1.453

  The practise of many great Princes.
• * 1.454

  Of experience.
• * 1.455

  Two sorts of experience.
• * 1.456

  The ••now∣ledge o•• histo•• ry necessary for a Prince.
• * 1.457

  Diuers sorts of cunning.
• * 1.458

  Of dissimulati∣on.
• * 1.459

  O•• the practi∣ses and intelli∣gences •••• Prin∣ces in the E∣states one of a∣nother.
• * 1.460

  Of Equiuocati∣on, faire words, promi∣ses, letters, Em∣bassies, & lies, to obtain ••o••c 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.461

  The proc••e∣ding of Prin∣c•••• to defend themselues and their Estates f••om their Ene∣••ies, ••••i••st in themselues, but ••••••••••bl•• by 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.462

  Valour the cause of a Princes repu∣tation.
• * 1.463

  How impor∣tant and neces∣sary i•• is in a Princ••.
• * 1.464

  Meanes to get and entertaine this courage and valour.
• * 1.465

  Diuers other meanes for a Prince to get reputation.
• * 1.466

  The cause of the ruine of Estates.
• * 1.467

  A remedy a∣gainst the vio∣lence of strangers.
• * 1.468

  The neare cau∣ses of the ruine o•• an Estate.
• * 1.469

  Of the remote causes which ruine Estates.
• * 1.470

  Of the Soue∣raigne de••ects which ingender the Subiects hatred.
• * 1.471

  A remedy ••∣gainst-t••e Prin∣ces cruelty.
• * 1.472

  A remedy a∣gainst the Prin∣ces auarice.
• * 1.473

  Of the Princes defects which cause con∣tempt.
• * 1.474

  Other defects of a Prince which breed contempt.
• * 1.475

  The Princes defects wh••••h breed contempt are more de••••∣gerous then tho••e which cause hatred.
• * 1.476

  A change ••n••n Estate is dan¦gerous.
• * 1.477

  A remedy a∣gainst the ••∣buse of Lawes.
• * 1.478

  Considerations necessary for a reformation.
• * 1.479

  The most ge∣nerall defects and pecant humours of a multitude.
• * 1.480

  Remedies to cure the Estate of these defects and bad hu∣mours.
• * 1.481

  Three sorts of persons in all Estates.
• * 1.482

  Meanes to containe great Men in their duties.
• * 1.483

  Of great Men allied to the Prince.
• * 1.484

  Of great me•• which haue force and cre∣dit with the people by rea∣son of his im∣ployments in great affaire••.
• * 1.485

  Considerations to aduance some one in authority.
• * 1.486

  〈…〉〈…〉 o•• ••••eat p••aces in one 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.487

  Of the poore and needy.
• * 1.488

  Meanes to con∣taine the com∣mon people in their duties.
• * 1.489

  Excesse and V∣sury the chiefe causes of po∣uerty.
• * 1.490

  To gi••e 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••••iects in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 an the 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.491

  Mildnesse and 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.492

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.493

  〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.494

  He 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.495

  You must make Marriages be∣twixt them and his naturall Subiects.
• * 1.496

  The Conque∣ror must bring his owne Lan¦guage into the conquered Countrey.
• * 1.497

  Hee may not c••ange the Law••s and Re∣lig•••••• o•• t••e conq••••••ed c••ū∣t••••y but with g••eat Iudge∣••ent.
• * 1.498

  Forc•• is a po∣werfull mean••s to containe conquered 〈◊〉〈◊〉 •••• ••heir duty.
• * 1.499

  The planting of Collonies more vni••st & difficult.
• * 1.500

  Considerations for the ••etling of Collonie.
• * 1.501

  〈…〉〈…〉 cō¦q••e••ed subiects 〈◊〉〈◊〉 •••• duties.
• * 1.502

  To mol••i••ie the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a co••quered 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.503

  To weaken a conquered people.
• * 1.504

  To hinder the v••ion of a con∣que••••d p••ople.
• * 1.505

  Conspiracy against th•• Princes person.
• * 1.506

  Meanes to pre∣uen••.
• * 1.507

  Causes of a con¦s••i••acy.
• * 1.508

  The iniu••y which they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to receiue from the Prince
• * 1.509

  The desire of liberty.
• * 1.510

  The inconside∣rate zeale of Religion.
• * 1.511

  Ordinary de∣fects in conspi∣racies.
• * 1.512

  The discou•••• of 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.513

  Of the punish∣ment of conspi∣racies.
• * 1.514

  To increase our owne by our owne.
• * 1.515

  Diuers meanes to enlarge and amp••ifie Townes.
• * 1.516

  ••he pleasant∣•••••••••• of townes.
• * 1.517

  Profit drawes Men wonder∣fully to liue in townes.
• * 1.518

  Principall cau∣ses of profit in a towne.
• * 1.519

  The commodi∣ty of the Scituation.
• * 1.520

  The fert••lity of the Coun∣••r••y.
• * 1.521

  Of the facility o•• c••••m••rce.
• * 1.522

  Religion a meanes to en∣large a Towne.
• * 1.523

  The Establish∣ment of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.524

  The 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.525

  〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.526

  Residence of the Nobility.
• * 1.527

  The residence of the Prince.
• * 1.528

  Of Poligamy.
• * 1.529

  Of Celi••ate.
• * 1.530

  Diuers 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to vnite ano∣ther mans to ours.
• * 1.531

  Protection of the weake••.
• * 1.532

  Gifts and bene¦fits.
• * 1.533

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.534

  Adoption.
• * 1.535

  Election.
• * 1.536

  Considerations necessary for a Prince which desires to make himselfe great by Election.
• * 1.537

  Of the enter∣prize of Warre.
• * 1.538

  The iust causes of a Warre.
• * 1.539

  A Warre must be vndertaken with discretion, and not ••ashly.
• * 1.540

  A consideration to auoide War.