The whole treatise of the cases of conscience distinguished into three bookes: the first whereof is revised and corrected in sundrie places, and the other two annexed. Taught and deliuered by M. W. Perkins in his holy-day lectures, carefully examined by his owne briefes, and now published together for the common good, by T. Pickering Bachelour of Diuinitie. Whereunto is adioyned a twofold table: one of the heads and number of the questions propounded and resolued; another of the principall texts of Scripture vvhich are either explaned, or vindicated from corrupt interpretation.

CHAP. I.

Of the two first Grounds of Cases, Confession, and the degrees of Goodnes.

THe Grounds or Pream∣bles are especially foure. The first, touching Con∣fession. The second, tou∣ching the degrees of Goodnesse in things and actions. The third, tou∣ching the degrees of Sinne. The fourth and last concerning the Subiection and Power of conscience. Of these in order.

Sect. 1.

The first Ground is, That in the trou∣bles of conscience, it is meete and conue∣nient, there should alwaies be vsed a pri∣uate Confession. For Iames saith, Confesse your faults one to another, and pray one for another, * 1.1 thereby signifying that Confession in this case, is to be vsed as a thing most requisite. For in all reason, the Physitian must first know the disease, before he can applie the remedie: and the griefe of the heart will not

be discerned, vnlesse it be manifested by the confession of the partie diseased; and for this cause also in the griefe of conscience, the scruple, that is, the thing that troubleth the conscience must be knowne.

Neaerthelesse in priuate confession, these caueats must be obserued. First, it must not be vrged, as a thing simply or absolutely neces∣sarie, without which there can be no saluatiō. Againe, it is not fit that confession should be of all sinnes, but onely of the scruple it selfe, that is, of that or those sinnes alone, which do trouble and molest the conscience. Thirdly, though confession may be made to any kind of m••n, (Confesse one to another, saith Iames,) yet is it especially to be made to the Pro∣phets and Ministers of the Gospell. For they in likelyhood, of all other men, in respect of their places and gifts, are the fittest and best able to instruct, correct, cōfort, & en••orme the weake & wounded cōscience. Lastly, the per∣son to whome it is made, must be a man of trust & fidelity, able & willing to keepe secret things that are reueiled, yea to burie thē (as it were) in the graue of obliuion, for Loue coue∣reth a multitudeof sinnes.

Sect. 2.

The next Ground is touching the degrees of Goodnes in humane things and actions. Goodnesse in things is twofold; vncrea∣ted and created. Vncreated is God him∣selfe, who neuer had beginning, and

who is Goodnesse it-selfe, because his nature is absolutely and perfectly good, and be∣cause he is the author and worker thereof, in all things created. Created goodnes, is that whereby the creature is made good; and it is nothing els, but the fruit of that goodnesse, that is essentially in God. Now the degrees thereof are these. There is a generall or na∣turall Goodnesse in creatures, & a more spe∣ciall or morall Goodnesse.

Generall Goodnesse is that, whereby all creatures are accepted and approoued of God, by whome they were both created & ordained. Thus euery creature is good, part∣ly by creation, and partly by ordination. By creation it is, that the substance of each crea∣ture, as of the Sunne, the Moone, the Earth, Water, Meate, Drink, &c. is good, hauing the beeing thereof from God. Hence also the es∣sentiall properties, quantities, qualities, mo∣tions, actions and inclinations of the crea∣tures, in themselues considered, with all their euents, are good. By the same generall good∣nesse also, euen the Deuill himselfe and his actions, as he is a substance, and as they are actions, hauing their beeing from God, are good. Things againe doe take vnto them the condition of Goodnesse, not onely by crea∣tion, but also by Gods ordination, whereby they are directed and appointed, to some certen vses & endes. Thus the euill Consci∣ence, Hel, & Deathare good, because they are

ordained of God, for the execution of his iu∣stice, howsoeuer in themselues & to vs they be euill.

Besides this generall and naturall good∣nesse, there is also a speciall or morall goodnes properly so called: and it is that, which is a∣greeable to the eternall and vnchangeable wisdome of God, reuealed in the Morall Law, wherin it is commanded; and things as they are therein commanded to be done by God, are good morally. Now of actions mo∣rally good, there be two degrees: for they are either good in themselues alone, or good both in themselues, and in the doer. In them∣selues alone some things be morally good: for example, when a wicked man giues an almes, it is a good worke onely in it selfe, but not good in the doer, because it is not done in faith, and from a good conscience: and so are all the vertues of the Heathen, moral∣ly good in themselues, but they are not good in heathen men: for in them they are but * 1.2 beautifull sinnes. The next degree of good∣nesse is, whereby things and actions are both good in themselues, and in the doer also. Of this sort were the praiers and almes of Corne∣lius good in themselues, and in him also, be∣cause * 1.3 he was a beleeuer.

Now opposite to things and actions mo∣rally good or euill, are actions and things of a middle nature, commonly tearmed Indiffe∣rent, which in themselues being neither good

nor euill, may be done or not done without sinne; In themselues I say, for in their cir∣cumstances, they are and may be made either euill or good. And here we must remember, to put a difference betweene conueniencie, and inconuenience, which ariseth from the nature of indifferent things. Conueniencie is, when a thing or action is so fitted to the cir∣cumstances, and the circumstances fitted to it, that thereby it becomes a thing Conueni∣ent. On the other side, Inconuenience is, when the thing or action is done in vnmeete cir∣cumstances, which bring some hurt or losse to the outward man, or stand not with de∣cencie: and therefore doe make it to be In∣conuenient. And by this that hath been said, we may discerne, when an action is good, e∣uill, indifferent, conuenient, or inconuenient.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Iam. 5. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.2

  Splendida peccata.
• * 1.3

  Act. 10.