The whole treatise of the cases of conscience distinguished into three bookes: the first whereof is revised and corrected in sundrie places, and the other two annexed. Taught and deliuered by M. W. Perkins in his holy-day lectures, carefully examined by his owne briefes, and now published together for the common good, by T. Pickering Bachelour of Diuinitie. Whereunto is adioyned a twofold table: one of the heads and number of the questions propounded and resolued; another of the principall texts of Scripture vvhich are either explaned, or vindicated from corrupt interpretation.

CHAP. I.

Of the Nature and Differences of Vertue, and the Order of the Que∣stions.

THVS farre we are pro∣ceeded in the handling of two sorts of Questions, whereof some doe con∣cerne man as he is consi∣dered apart by himselfe, without respect vnto an∣other: some againe concerne man, as he stands in the first relation, namely to God.

Now we come by order, to speake of the third and last head of Cases, propounded by the Conscience of man, as he stands in the se∣cond relation, to man. And vnder this Head are comprehended all those Questions of Conscience, that are incident to the liues of men; and which doe belong vnto man, as

he is a member of some Societie, whether it be the Familie, the Church, or the Common∣wealth.

For the better and more orderly procee∣ding in this Discourse, some conuenient Subiect or Matter is to be propounded, whereunto all the Questions that followe may fitly be reduced. Now of all other, the most conuenient Subiect in this kind is Ver∣tue, and therefore according the differences of Vertue, we will distinguish the Questions into three seuerall sorts.

But before we proceede to particulars, it shall not be amisse to speake somewhat ge∣nerally of Vertue, so farre forth, as the knowledge thereof may giue light to the things that follow.

Touching Vertue, two things are briefly to be remembred: first, what it is; and then, what be the distinct kindes thereof.

Vertue is a gift of the Spirit of God, and a part of regeneration, whereby a man is made apt to liue well.

I call it first, a gift of the Spirit of God, be∣cause in whomesoeuer it is, whether in Chri∣stians or in Heathen men, it hath the nature of a gift that floweth immediately from the spirit of God. And this I put in the first place, to confute the receiued errour of the wisest Heathen Philosophers, which call Vertue an habite of the minde, obtained and confirmed by custome, vse, and practise.

Secondly, I call it such a gift, as is also a part of regeneration; and this is added for two causes.

First, that we may put a differēce between Christian and Heathen vertues. For, howbeit the same vertues in kind and name, are and may be found, both in them that professe Christ, and those also that are ignorant of the true God; yet they are in them after a di∣uers manner. For in Heathen men they are the gifts of God, but not parts of regenera∣tion and new birth: but in those that be true Christians, they are indeede not onely the gifts of Gods spirit, but also essentiall parts of regeneration.

That we may the better yet conceiue this difference, we must vnderstand, that the grace of God in man, is two-fold; restraining, and renewing.

Restraining is that, which bridleth and re∣straineth the corruption of mens hearts, from breaking forth into outward actions, for the common good, that Societies may be pre∣serued, and one man may liue orderly with another. Renewing grace is that, which doth not onely restraine the corruption, but also mortifieth sinne, and renewes the heart daily more & more. The former of these is incidēt to Heathen men; & the Vertues which they haue, serue onely to represse the act of sinne in their outward actions: but in Christians, they are graces of God, not onely bridling

and restraining the affections, but renewing the heart, and mortifyin▪ all corruption. And though those vertues of the Heathen be graces of God, yet they are but generall and common to all: whereas the vertues of Chri∣stians, are speciall graces of the spirit, sancti∣fying and renewing the minde, will, and af∣fections. For example, chastitie in Ioseph was a grace of Gods spirit, renewing his heart; but chastitie in Xeuoerates was a com∣mon grace, seruing onely to curbe and re∣straine the corruption of his heart. And the like may be saide of the iustice of Abraham; a Christian, and of Aristides, a Heathen.

Secondly, I adde this clause, to meete with an errour of some learned Philosophers, who taught, that the very nature of Vertue stands in a meane, or mediocritie of affecti∣ons. This that they say is true in part, but not wholly. For the mediocritie, of which they speake, without renouation of affecti∣ons, is nothing: and therefore all vertues, that are not ioyned with a renouation and change of the affections, are no better then sinnes. This point the Philosophers neuer knew, and hence it was, that they stood one∣ly vpon a mediocritie, defining a man to be truly vertuous, that did wisely obserue a meane betweene two extreames.

Lastly, I say that this gift of God, makes a man fit to liue well. In which clause standeth the proper effect of Vertue; which is, to make

those in whome it is, to lead their liues well. And by this we are aduertised, to take heede of the opinion of Philosophers, concerning some particular vertues. For in their morall discourses, they giue both the name and the nature of Vertue to those things, which are either false & counterfeit vertues, or indeede none at all. For example, Aristotle makes Vr∣banitie a vertue, which is indeede a sinne, bee∣ing nothing els, but a dexteritie in mocking and descanting vpon reens persons and names: & so it is reckoned by Paul amongst grieuous sinnes and vices, which are to be a∣uoided, Eph. 5. 4. Againe, the Philosopher calls Magna••imitie (whereby a man thinkes himselfe worthie of great honours, & there∣upon enterpriseth great things) a Vertue; which notwithstanding is to be holden a flat vice. For by the law of God, euery man is to range himselfe within the limits of his cal∣ling, and not to dare, once to goe out of it. Whereas on the contrarie, the scope and end of this vertue (as they tearme it) is to make men to attempt high and great matters a∣boue their reach, and so to goe beyond their callings. Besides, it is directly opposite to the vertue of humilitie, which teacheth that a man ought alwaies to be base, vile, & lowly in his owne eyes. The Prophet Dauid cleares himselfe of this sinne, Psal. 131. 1. when he saith, Lord, I am not high minded, mine eyes are not hautie, I haue not walked in things that be

great, and aboue my reach. Furthermore, no Vertue must make vs to forsake good life, but euery one serueth for this ende, to make vs fit to liue a godly life.

The next point to be considered is, What be the kindes of vertue.

Vertue is either in the minde of man, or in the will. The vertue of the minde, is Pru∣dence. The vertue of the will, is that that or∣ders mans will; and it is two-fold: for it re∣specteth either our selues, or others.

That which respecteth our selues, is con∣uersant about two maine things in the heart of man, the reuenging, and the lusting pow∣er. That which respecteth the reuenging power, is Clemencie; which standeth in the ordering and reforming of the raging pow∣er of Anger. The next, which respecteth the lusting power, is Temperance.

Vertues that doe respect others, are either concerning curtesie, as Liberalitie; or concer∣ning Equitie. And these consist partly in do∣ing of equitie, as Iustice; partly in defending and maintaining it, as Fortitude.

Now according to this distinction of ver∣tues, the Questions of Conscience are to be distinguished, in this sort. Some of them con∣cerne Prudence; some concerne Clemencie; some Temperance; some Liberalitie; some also concerne Iustice, and some Fortitude. Of all which in order.