The nature of man A learned and usefull tract written in Greek by Nemesius, surnamed the philosopher; sometime Bishop of a city in Phœnicia, and one of the most ancient Fathers of the Church. Englished, and divided into sections, with briefs of their principall contents: by Geo: Wither.

SECT. 1.

I. The severall and different Opinions of the An∣cients concerning the SOVL, as whether it be a Substance; whether cor∣poreall, or incorporeall, whether mortall or im∣mortall, &c. II. The con∣futation of those who af∣firme in generall that the SOVL is a corporeall-substance. III. Confuta∣tions of their particular Arguments, who affirme that the SOVL is Bloud, Water, or Aire.

EXceeding great va∣riance is discovered among the old Phi∣losophers in their discourses

of the SOUL; insomuch that almost all of them dif¦fer one from another in that matter. Democritus and Epicurus, and the whole sect of the Stoicks doe peremptorily affirme that the SOVL is a Bodie; and those very men who affirme the SOVL to be a Bodie, dissent one from a∣nother in declaring the Essence of it.

The Stoicks affirm, that it is a certain Blast, hot and fiery. Critias holds, that it is bloud. Hippon the Philo∣sopher, will have it to be water, Democritus thinks it is fire; and his opinion is, that the round Formes of indivisible-bodies or Atomes being incorporated, by

ayre and fire, do make up the Soul. Heraclitus con∣ceives that the Soul of the whole frame of the World is a certaine breathing out of the vapours, from moist things; and, that the Soul which is in living-crea∣tures, doth proceed both from exhalations without themselves, and from exha∣lations, also, within them; and being of the same kind, of which they them∣selves are.

Againe (on the contra∣ry part) there are almost innumerable disagree∣ments among them who say that the SOUL is not a Body, or Bodily-substance. Some of them affirm that the SOUL is a substance

and immortall; Some, that it is without a Bodie, and neither a substance nor im∣mortall.

Thales, who was the first of that opinion, held that the SOUL was alwaies in motion, and had that motion from it selfe. Pythagoras thought that it was a NUMBER moving it selfe. Plato affirmed that it was a substance (to be conceived in mind) that received mo∣tion from it self, according to NUMBER and HAR∣MONY. Aristotle taught that it was the first continu∣all-motion of a BODIE-NATURALL, having in it those Instrumentall parts, wherein was possibility of life. Dinarchus took it to

be an Harmony of the foure Elements; not a Harmony made of sounds, but as it were a tunable tempera∣ture and agreement, of hot & cold, moist & dry things, in the Bodie. But, it is without doubt that all the best of these doe agree in this, that the SOUL is a substance; Aristotle and Di∣narchus excepted, who af∣firme that it is no substance at all.

Besides all these, some were of opiniō that there was but one and the same SOUL belonging to all things; which was by smal portions distributed to all particular things; and, then gathered into it self againe: of which opinion

were the Manichees and certain others. Some like∣wise imagined the Soules were many, and of differing sorts; Some affirmed that there was both one uni∣versall, and many particu∣lar SOULS; and there∣fore it cannot be, but that my Discourse must be drawne to a great length, seeing I am to disprove so many opinions.

[ II] Therefore, to confute in generall all those toge∣ther, who affirme that the Soul is a corporeall essence, it shall be sufficient to al∣ledge that which hath been heretofore delive∣red to that purpose by Numinius the Pythagorist, and by Amonius the Ma∣ster

of Plotinus, who thus affirme:

All Bodies, being by their proper nature muta∣ble, and such as may be ut∣terly dispersed and divi∣ded into innumerable parts (and having nothing remaining in them which may not be changed and dispersed) have need of something to close them in, to bring them toge∣ther; to knit them into one; and (as it were) to hold them fast united: And, this we say is done by the SOUL.

Now if the SOUL be corporeall, (let it be what Body you please) yea, though it be a body con∣sisting of the most thin

and subtile parts, what will you say holds that to∣gether, as that knitteth the Bodie in One? For, as we declared before, every Bodily thing hath need of some other thing to fasten the parts of it together; yea the Bodie of this SOUL, that knits together our visi∣ble BODIE, (if we should grant the same to be a corpo∣reall SOUL) and the next to that also, infinitely, it would still have need of some other thing to knit and fasten its own parts together, untill an incorporeall-essence were found out.

If they answer, as the Stoicks doe, that, there is a certaine motion pertaining unto Bodies, extending

both to the inward and outward parts of the Body: That the motion tending outward, effects the quanti∣ty and the qualities of the Body; and, that the motion tending inward, is cause both of uniting the body and of the essence thereof; wee will then aske them (seeing every motion doth proceed from some power) what kinde of power it is, which that motion hath? in what consisteth it? and what gives essence there∣unto?

If this power bee a cer∣taine matter (which the Greekes call Hylen) wee will use the same reasons against them, which wee objected before. If they

say it is not matter, but a materiall thing, (for matter and materiall things thus differ; That which hath matter in it, is called a mate∣riall thing) wee then aske them, whether that which hath matter in it, be like∣wise matter, or void of mat∣ter? If they say it is matter, we demand how it can be both materiall and matter? If they answer, that it is not matter, then they must grant it to be void of mat∣ter, and if it be void of mat∣ter, wee will easily prove it to be no Body; because, every body hath matter in it.

If they alleage that Bo∣dies have the three Di∣mensions in them, and that

the SOUL extending it selfe through the whole Body, hath in it also the three Dimensions, and therefore must necessarily be a Body; wee will then thus answer them; It is true, that all BODIE'S have in them the three Di∣mensions, but every thing ha∣ving the three Dimensions is not a BODY. For place, and Quality which in themselves have no Body, have accidentally, a Quan∣tity if they bee in such things as have magnitude.

In like maner the SOUL in respect of it selfe, is ut∣terly void of the Dimensi∣ons; but, accidentally it hath Dimensions; because the Body (in which it is)

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having in it the three Di∣mensions, wee so conceive it, together with the Bo∣dy, as though the Soule also had in it the three Dimensions.

We argue further, and say thus: Every Body hath his motion either from without it selfe, or from within. If the motion bee from without it selfe, it must then be void of life: if it be from within it selfe, it must be indued with life: now, it is absurd to say that the SOUL is either indued with life, or without life (one of which must necessarily be affirmed, if the Soule bee a corporeall substance) therefore the soule cannot be a corpore∣al Essence.

Againe, the SOUL, if it be nourished, it is nouri∣shed by that which is void of Body (for, knowledge is the nourishment thereof) but, no corporeal essence is norished by things bodiless, therefore, the SOUL can∣not be a Body. Xenocrates thus concluded this argu∣ment: If (said hee) the SOUL be not nourished, it cannot be a corporeal-sub∣stance; because, the Body of every living-creature must be nourished.

Thus much in generall, [ III] in confutation of all those who generally affirm, that the SOUL is a bodily thing. Now, we will treate par∣ticularly against them who are of opinion that

the SOUL is either Blood, or Breath; because, when either Blood or Breath is taken away, the living-creature dyeth.

Wee will not say (as some well accounted of have written) that, part of the SOUL falleth away when any part of the blood faileth, if the SOUL be the Blood: for, that were but a slender answer. In those things which have every part of like na∣ture with the whole, the part remaining is the same with the whole: Whether the water bee much or lit∣tle, it is every way perfect water. In like maner, gold, silver, and every other thing, whose parts do not

essentially differ from each other, are still the same, as is afore said: And even so, that part of blood which remaineth (of what quan∣tity soever) may be called the SOUL (aswell as the whole quantity) if the blood be the SOUL.

We, therfore, will rather answer them thus: If that be rightly accounted the SOUL, upon whose taking away, the death of the li∣ving creature ensues; then, should it needs bee, that flegme, and the two chol∣lers must be also the SOUL, seeing, if any one of these faileth, it brings the li∣ving-creature to his death. The like falleth out in the Liver, in the Braine, in the

Heart, in the Stomach, the Reines, the Entrails, and in many other parts, where∣of if you bereave a living-creature, it will immediat∣ly perish.

Moreover, there are many things without blood, which have life in them, neverthelesse; as some smooth and gristly fishes; some also of a softer kind, to wit, Sepiae, Teuthides, and Smyli (as the Greekes call them) and Lobsters, Crabs, Oysters, and all shel-fish, whether they have hard or soft shells. Now if these things have a living-Soule in them (as we know they have) and yet are void of blood, then it plainely followes that

blood cannot bee the SOUL.

Against those who say that water is the Soule, ma∣ny things may bee said to disprove their opinion, though water helps to quicken and nourish all things; and though it bee (as they say) impossible to live without water.

Wee cannot live with∣out nourishment, and there∣fore if their assertion bee true, wee may aswell af∣firme that all nourishment in generall, and every par∣ticular nourishment is the SOUL. And whereas they have said that no living-creature can live without water, wee finde the con∣trary to bee probable; for

it is written of some Ae∣gles, and of Partridges, that they live without drinke.

And why should water be the SOUL rather then ayre? Seeing it is possible to abstaine from water ve∣ry long, whereas wee can hardly live a moment without breathing the Aire.

And yet, neither is Aire the SOUL: For, there are many creatures which live without breathing the Aire; as all Insectae (ri∣veted creatures) such as Bees, Wasps, and Ants; as al∣so all bloodlesse creatures, all those which live in the waters, and such as have no Lungs. For, none of

those things that are with∣out Lungs can breath Aire. The proposition is true al∣so, if it be converted, There is no creature having Lungs, which doth not breath aire.