SECT. 1.

SInce we have shew∣ed that there is a Providence, and also what it is; we will now de∣clare, in what things, that providence beareth sway; whether in things univer∣sall, or things particular, or in both.

Plato affirmes that it hath government both of universall, and particular things; and he divideth his discourse of providence in∣to three parts. The first Page  608 he calls the providence of the first and supreamest GOD, and that this provi∣dence is especially over the IDEAE (that is, the most beautifull formes of things:) and in the next place, over the whole world in general, as, over the heavens, the stars, and all generall things; even over the predica∣ments of substance, quanti∣ty, and quality, with such like: yea, and over all things which are especial∣ly contained under those predicaments.

His opinion likewise is, that the providence of a se∣cond degree of gods, which (as he conceiveth) turne about the Sphaeres; hath rule over the ingen∣dring Page  609 of all the baser li∣ving-creatures, & of plants, and of all things which are subject unto generation, and corruption. Yea, and Aristotle himselfe ascribes the ingendring of such things, to the Sun, and un∣to the Zodiack circle.

That which according to Plato's opinion, is the third providence, hath pre∣dominācie over the events and ends of those things which are begun or per∣fected by us; as also over the course and condition of mans life; and over all those naturall and materiall things; and over such as are called instrument all things, whether they bee good or evill. And the prin∣cipall Page  610 agents in this provi∣dence, he supposed to bee certaine Angells (or spi∣rits) ordained to bee al∣wayes conversant upon the earth, and to have the charge over those things which men doe.

But hee affirmes that the second and the third providence also, have their whole essence from the first; so that all things are in effect, governed by the power of the chiefest God, who ordained the first, the second, and the third, to be employed in the well-or∣dering, and governing of things.

Now this is praise wor∣thy in Plato, that he refer∣reth all unto GOD, and Page  611 affirmes all providence to depend upon his will. But whereas he sayes there is a second providence, com∣mitted unto those which turne the heavens about (as he hath said) we com∣mend him not in so affir∣ming. For (if any such were) that which they per∣formed, is not a worke of providence; but rather, a worke of necessity, where∣unto they were destina∣ted. For, let them be figu∣red how they will, it must necessarily follow, that things must both be done as they were done; and that they might not be in any other maner then they are. And I have al∣ready shewed, that no∣thing Page  612 done by providence, is subject unto necessity.

[ II] Now the Stoick Philo∣sophers (who defend as an undeniable truth, that there is a destiny, necessita∣ting all things, and that some things are also in our power) doe leave no place at all for providence; and indeed they overthrow (as is before declared) by affirming there is destiny, so much of their owne opi∣nion, as averrs that things are in our power.

Democritus, Heraclitus, and Epicurus, are of opini∣on that there is no provi∣dence either of universall, or of particular things. And Epicurus hath expressed his meaning to this pur∣pose.

Page  613

The opinion of these men is conformable to the Page  614principles which are devi∣sed by themselves. For, it is no wonder if they hold opinion that there is no providence to governe any thing, who affirme that the world was made by hap-hazzard. For how should those things which had no Creator, have any providence to preserve or governe them? Seeing it is plaine that such things must be confusedly caried to & fro, by hap-hazzard, which were made by chance, and at adventure, in the beginning.

Wee must therefore withstand them in their first opinion, as wee have done already (and so dis∣prove the same) that it may Page  615 be well manifested there is a providence. And for that cause wee will refer the confutation of these men, unto a fitter oppor∣tunity; and proceed to ex∣amine the opinion of A∣ristotle; and others, who say that particular things are not governed by any providence.

For Aristotle in the [ III] sixth booke of his Ethicks to Nichomachus, hath co¦vertly delivered that par∣ticular things are gover∣ned by nature onely. For, nature being (saith he) di∣vine, and ingraffed in all things which are ingen¦dred, doth naturally ad∣minister a way unto each, to chuse which is most ex∣pedient Page  616 for it, and to a∣void such things as are hurtfull thereunto. And (indeed) every living-creature (as we have shew∣ed heretofore) maketh choice of such nourish∣ment, as is agreeable unto it; earnestly pursuing what is convenient for it; and naturally knowing what cures are pertinent unto the diseases thereof.

Euripides, and Menan∣der, have in some places affirmed, that the princi∣pall parts of the minde, which is in every man, doth by providence go∣verne each man, and no GOD at all. But the minde is conversant in those things onely which are in Page  617our power; and they are ei∣ther in actions which may be done, or in the arts, or in contemplation: Whereas providence is busied in things which are not in our power; as to be rich, or to be poore; to be in health, or to be sick; wherewith nei∣ther the minde, nor nature, (as Aristotle himselfe hol∣deth opinion) have any thing to doe, in that sense.

For the workes of na∣ture are evident: and if a murtherer bee sometime punished, and sometime let goe without punish∣ment, here is that perti∣nent either to the minde, or unto nature (as it is unto providence?) except some will affirme that things Page  618 belonging to nature, and unto the minde, are perti∣nent unto providence; and that things which follow upon the choice of the minde, and operations of nature, doe afterward be∣long unto destiny; which being granted, all that should bee in our power, would be quite over∣throwne.

But the matter is not at that point. For (as hath beene already declared) every thing belonging unto the minde (whether it be for practise or contem∣plation) is all in our power. Neither doe all things which are contained un∣der providence, belong to nature; though every thing Page  619 belonging to nature, is go∣verned by providence. For many things wrought by providence, are not the workes of nature; as I have declared in discovering the murtherer; neither is nature in all points, the same with providence, though it be (as indeed it is) a part of providence. And therefore these men doe ascribe the providence over particular things both to nature, and unto the minde.

SECT. 2.

THere be some who af∣firme, that God so pro∣vides for the continuance of all things which hee hath created, that nothing shall faile which hee hath made; and that his provi∣dence extends to this thing alone, without regarding particulars, which are left by him to succeed as meer casualty shall bring them about.

Page  621 Hereupon (as they conceive) it commeth to passe, that so many inju∣ries, so many murthers, and (in briefe) that so much wickednesse, and oppression is increased a∣mong men: yea, there∣upon it commeth (say they) to passe, that some of them are punished, some unpunished, and that little or nothing is performed, either accor∣ding to right reason, or the Canons of Law.

For, how (as they think) can it be possible that God hath care of any thing, when as neither law, nor true judgement beareth sway? but where the con∣trary hath rather the chief Page  622 rule? and where the best men are for the most part wronged, oppressed, and plunged into innumera∣ble afflictions; while Ty∣rants and wicked men are advanced to offices, to powerfull dignities, to ri∣ches, and to all such things as are well esteemed of in this life?

But they who speake in this maner, are not onely ignorant of many other things, that are expressed in our discourse of provi¦dence; but estranged also to the immortality of the soule: For, supposing the soule to bee mortall they shut up all things belon∣ging unto man within the compasse of this life; and Page  623 (judging perversly of those things which are good) they imagine that such as abound in riches, and beare great sway by the places of authority, and vaunt of other such like temporall (or materiall) commodities, are the on∣ly blessed and happy men.

But of the vertues of the minde (which exceed by many degrees all bodi∣ly and externall things) they make no account at all. Howsoever those com∣modities are the best, which belong unto the best things. And in that respect, vertue as far sur∣passeth riches and health, and such like, as the soule is more excellent then the Page  624body: And therefore al∣so, vertue aswell alone, as together with other things, makes a man to be blessed.

Vertue with other things is considered according to a finite amplitude, as a thing of two ells, or the like; but alone, and by it selfe, it is considerable accor∣ding to an indefinite cir∣cumscription, as a heape. For if from a heape (which is a thing having an indefinite circumscription) you may take away two bushels (which is a finite quantity) two bushels is indeed ta∣ken from the heape: yet that which is left continu∣eth still to be an an heape.

In like maner, if from Page  625vertue (considered in its own indefinite amplitude) you take away all the good things that are bo∣dily or externall (which are but finite things) and leave the vertue onely, (which is an indefinite good) the blessednesse remaineth still intire; because vertue, even of it selfe, is perfect∣ly sufficient to blessednesse. And therefore every good man is blessed (though no externall good be left him) and every wicked man is miserable, though he hath all those things hapned together, which are cal∣led the goods of Fortune.

The multitude not know∣ing [ II] thus much, doe think that they onely are blessed,Page  626 who have all things at will, for their bodily de∣light, and abound in ri∣ches; and they can oft finde fault with providence which governeth our af∣faires, not with respect unto those things onely which are apparent unto us, but with regard unto those also, which are ac∣cording to the fore-know∣ledge of GOD.

For GOD foreseeing, that it would be expedi∣ent for him to bee poore, who is now honest and good, (and that riches com∣ming fast upō him, would corrupt his minde) doth keep him in that poverty, which is most convenient for the chiefe good of that Page  627 man. And in regard God foresaw also, that the rich, man would be grievous to others in the want of ri∣ches (by committing rob∣beries, murthers, and o∣ther great outrages) hee suffered him to enjoy ri∣ches.

Poverty hath been ma∣ny times profitable also, in making us to beare the losse of our children with more contentednesse; and in preventing the vexati∣ons which might happen by wicked servants; and perhaps their lives would have beene more bitter to us then their deaths, if our children had lived to bee wicked; or if wee should have had false and thee-vish Page  628 servants. We foresee∣ing nothing that is to come; but beholding only the things present, cannot judge rightly of that which may fall out; but unto GOD all future things are as evident as those which are present.

Thus much wee have spoken against those who have presumed to blame GODS providence; and a∣gainst whom this part of Scripture may well be ap∣plyed, Shall the clay say to the potter, why hast thou made me thus? For it is an arrogance to be abhorred, that he who dares not finde fault with an earth∣ly Law-giver, should pre∣scribe lawes to GOD, and Page  629 object against the workes of his providence.

But we will forbeare to meddle further with such extravagancies, (or to speake more properly, with such impieties) and proceed in disproving them, who say, that parti∣cular things are not gover∣ned by any providence, and yet allow that universall, and generall things, are go∣verned by a providence. For no man can alleadge more then these three causes, to prove that there is no providence of God over particular things.

Either it must bee be∣cause GOD knoweth not that it is good to take care for such things; or because he Page  630will not; or because he can∣not. But nothing is more estranged from that bles∣sed Essence, then ignorance, and unskilfulnesse: For It is knowledge, and science, and wisdome it selfe. Nay, there is none among men, so ignorant (if he be in his wits) but knowes, that if all particular things should be destroyed, the generall things could not possibly consist; seeing universall things, are made up of par∣ticulars. Yea, all the par∣ticular things, and the gene∣rall things are equall, and converted, & destroyed, and preserved together. If ther∣fore particular things pe∣rish, the universall will al∣so perish. And there is no Page  631 reason why wee should imagine that all singular things could escape de∣struction, if no care were taken of them from above.

Now whereas to avoid this objection, they grant that GODS providence ex∣tendeth to this onely; that individualls shall bee pro∣vidently preserved, so far forth as may conduce to the preservation of gene∣rall things; they have said enough (though they bee not aware thereof) to prove that there is, also, some providence over indi∣vidualls. For (as they themselves have said in effect) GOD by preser∣ving the species, preserveth also the kindes.

SECT. 3.

SOme there be who (al∣though they confesse that GOD is not ignorant how to provide for parti∣cular things) doe affirme, Page  633 that he will not assume the care of them. Now every one that will not doe a thing; either will not doe it, because of sloth, or else for that it is not comely for him so to doe.

No man will be so mad as to impute sloth to GOD; For sloth is bred of these two; pleasure, and feare; and every one that is slothfull, is thereby drawn away by the love of some ease (or pleasure) or else discouraged by feare: and to cōceive either of these to be in GOD, were an impious absurdity.

If they that will not be so prophane to lay sloth∣fulnesse to GODS charge, shall say it is undecent for Page  634 GOD, and unworthy the majesty of so high a blessed∣nesse, to descend so low and unto such vile & smal things (or to be as it were prophaned by the absur∣dities, and obscenities of those materiall things which depend upon the will of man; and that there∣fore he will not take upon himselfe the government of such matters) they (not heeding it) impute unto GOD, in so saying, two very faulty things, pride, and impurity.

For either the Creator despiseth to take on him∣selfe the government and administration of indivi∣dualls through haughtiness: (which is most absurd to Page  635 affirme) or else through feare of being defiled, as they speake. And that is no lesse absurd then the other. For if they know the nature of the Sunne-beams to be such, that they can exhale naturally all moisture, even from dung-hills when they shine up∣on them, and that neither the Sunne, nor his beames are any whit contamina∣ted, or defiled thereby, but keepe neverthelesse their owne purity: how can they conceive that GOD should be polluted, by those things which are below? Surely these can∣not be the conjectures of men, that have any know∣ledge of what is pertinent Page  636 unto the nature of GOD.

For the God-head is un∣touchable, uncorruptible, not possibly to be contamina∣ted, and above all altera∣tion: But pollution and such like things are the workes of change, and be∣token alteration.

[ II] And how can it bee counted other then most absurd, that an artificer (of what art soever) and espe∣cially a Physitian, taking care of generall things, should heedlesly passe o∣ver things particular? with∣out caring to shew his art in them (though things of the least consequence) see∣ing hee cannot chuse but know that every part stan∣deth in some stead unto Page  637 the whole? much more ab∣surd were it for any man to be of opinion; that God who is the Creator of all, should be more unskilfull then an artificer; and what else can be alleaged, if he be willing, but that hee cannot take the care of particulars? And what can be affirmed more ma∣nifestly repugnant to the nature of GOD, then to say he is weak, and lacketh ability to doe well?

For two other causes, GODS providence is by some judged not to be ex∣ercised in particular things. The one is, because the nature of God (as they thinke) serveth not there∣unto; the other is, for that Page  638 they conceive particular things to be incapable of his providence.

But that it is agreeable to the nature of GOD to governe by his providence, they themselves (who have denied it) doe im∣plicitly confesse, when they affirme that his pro∣vidence ruleth universall things; especially seeing the inferiour things are not able to mount up, unto such as are much above them; whereas the power of those which are superi∣our, descendeth even unto the lowest, (even to things insensible) for their pre∣servation: yea, all things depend upon the will of GOD, and draw from Page  639 thence, their continuance, and well-being.

And that the nature of individualls (though infi∣nitely multiplyed) is ca∣pable of being governed by Providence; it is plaine by those living creatures which are ordered by Rule and Authority. For, some of them, as Bees and Ants, and divers others, which being assembled together, are continued under certaine Captaines (or guides) whom they obediently follow: But this is best perceived if we looke into the govern∣ment of common-wealths▪ and the conversation that is amongst men: For it is plaine, that it admits the Page  640 administration and care, both of Lawgivers, and al∣so of subordinate magi∣strates; and how can that which is capable of such things, be unfit, to receive an orderly government from the providence of the Creator?

[ III] This also is no small ar∣gument, that there is pro∣vidence over particular things, even that the knowledge thereof is na∣turally ingraffed in men: which is evident, when wee are brought to any great extremity; for wee then slie immediately un∣to GOD by prayer, as if without teaching, it were naturally written in our hearts, that help were to Page  641 be sought of GOD.

Nature except it have beene taught, cannot of it selfe lead us unto that, the doing whereof is not ac∣cording to nature: nei∣ther doth it move us to fly thither for assistance, where none is to be had: yet when any great affli∣ction, or feare suddenly op∣presseth us; we cry out un∣to GOD before we be a∣ware; and before we have had time to bethinke our selves what wee have to doe. Now, every naturall consequence, is a forcible evidence admitting no contradiction.

SECT. 4.

THe occasions & ground of their error who say there is no providence over particular things, are these. First, they conceived the soule to bee mortall, and that it perished with the body. And secondly, be∣cause Page  643 these men could not comprehend by their understanding and rea∣son, how there should bee any providence ruling indi∣vidualls.

But that the soule is not mortall, and that all things pertaining unto man, are not shut up within the compasse of this life, it ap∣peareth (even to heathen men) both by the opini∣ons of the wisest among the Grecians, who taught the transmigration of soules from body to body; as also by the places which they affirmed to bee allotted out, unto the Soules de∣parted, according to their good or evill course in this life; and by those pu∣nishments Page  644 wherwith soules are (as they hold) puni∣shed by themselves, for the offences they have committed.

For these things, al∣though they be erroneous in other circumstances and respects; yet in this they are true, and their authors do all agree there∣in, that the soule remai∣neth after this life, and shall come to Iudgement.

[ II] But if wee cannot at∣taine unto the reason of that governance which pro∣vidence hath over particu∣lar things; which indeed we cannot, as is implyed by this text: How unsearch∣able are thy judgements, and thy wayes past finding out!Page  645 Let us not therupon con∣clude, there is no such pro∣vidence: For no man ought to affirme there is neither sea, not sand, be∣cause he is ignorant of the limits of the Sea, and of the number of the sands: seeing by the same rule, they might aswell say that there is neither man, nor any other living-creature, because they know not the number either of the men, or of the living-creatures.

Particular things are to us infinite: Things which are unto us infinite, and al∣so unknowne unto us; and therefore, though univer∣salls may be (oftentimes) comprehended by our un∣derstanding, Page  646 yet indivi∣dualls are not possibly comprehensible thereby.

There is in every man a double difference; one in respect of other men; and another in respect of him∣selfe: yea, there is in eve∣ry man great differences, and alterations even in re∣spect of himselfe. Every day; as, in the maner of his life; in his actions, (or af∣faires) in his necessities, in his desires; and in all things which doe happen, or per∣taine unto him.

It is not much other∣wise with an irrationall-creature; for according to the manifold necessities, and occasions thereof, it is very speedily caried hi∣ther Page  647 and thither; and soon altered againe as other opportunities require.

These things conside∣red, that Providence which is able to keep a continu∣all course with every one of those infinite and in∣comprehensible particu∣lars (which are so differing also, so changeable, and of so many fashions) must needs be such a Providence as is agreeable to all, and every one of those indivi∣dualls: and extended more infinitely then those things are, whereunto it should reach.

And if this Providence must be so fit, and so infi∣nite in regard of the infi∣nite difference of indivi∣dualls:Page  648 no doubt but the reason and method of this Providence is as infinite; and if it be infinite, it can∣not possibly bee compre∣hended by us. And it be∣comes not us to deny that gracious providence which governes all things, be∣cause our ignorance is una∣ble to comprehend it. For those things which wee suppose to be amisse, are knowne well enough un∣to the wisdome of the Cre∣ator, to be well ordered.

Because wee are igno∣rant of their occasions, we causelesly judge many things to be imprudently done; and that which chanceth unto us in other things, by reason of our Page  649 ignorance, falleth out al∣so in the workes of provi∣dence; for we doe after the same sort cōceive of those things which belong to providence; receiving by obscure likelihoods, and by conjectures, certaine formes or shadowes of the workes thereof, by such things as we have seene.

Wee say therefore, that [ III] some things are done by Gods permission; and this permission is of many sorts: For he sometime permits that even the just man shall fall into misery, to declare unto others, that vertue which is concealed as in Iob.

Hee doth also permit some absurd things; that Page  650 by the act which appea∣reth to bee absurd, some great and wonderfull mat∣ter may bee brought to passe, as the salvation of men by the Crosse.

Hee permits likewise the blessed Saints to be af∣flicted for another end; as that they might not fall from a sincere conscience, and that the loftinesse of the minde might be aba∣ted; as when S^t. Paul was buffetted by Satan.

Sometimes also, one man is rejected, and left as desolate for a time; that others considering his case, might be instructed, and amended thereby. As in the example of Laza∣rus and the rich man; for, Page  651 when we see any man af∣flicted, our hearts are na∣turally touched there∣with, according as Menan∣der hath very well ex∣pressed:

Otherwhile, again, one man is afflicted for the glory of another; and nei∣ther for his owne sin, nor the sinne of his Parents: as, he that was blind from his birth, for the glorify∣ing of the Son of man.

It is permitted also that some should be persecu∣ted, to be a pattern of con∣stancy unto others; and that when their glory is Page  652 exalted, others might be incouraged to suffer in the like case, in hope of the glory to come; and for the blessednesse which is expected after this life; as in the Martyrs, and in those who have yeelded up their lives for their Country, for their kinred, or for their masters.

SECT. 5.

Page  653 NOw, if any one thinke it against reason, that one man should be affli∣cted for the amendment of another; let him know that this life, is (not the per∣fection of mans happinesse) but a place of wrestlings, and of striving for maste∣ry, in respect of Vertue: And the greater the la∣bours and sufferings are, the more glorious Crown of Glory shall be obtai∣ned: because the recom∣pence of Rewards, is accor∣ding to the measure of Patience.

Page  654 Saint Paul was conten∣ted to undergoe the mani∣fold afflictions and tribu∣lations which he suffered, that he might obtain the greater, and more perfect Crown of a Conquerour: (which he himself confesseth to be more then all our suffe∣rings can merit) and there∣fore the works of Provi∣dence are justly and very decently performed.

A man may the better allow this to be so, (and conceive that GOD go∣verns all things, so well and so fitly, that the na∣ture of each thing cannot more desire) if he doe but propose unto himself the beleeving of these two things which are general∣ly Page  655 confessed among men: namely, that GOD, onely, is good and wise: For, in that he is Good, it is agree∣able unto his goodnesse to employ his providence over all things; and in that he is wise, he hath a regard to performe them wisely and exactly: because, if he used not his Providence, he could not be good: and if he did not use it well, hee could not be wise.

He therefore, that gives his minde to consider dis∣creetly of these matters, will not misesteem of any thing which is wrought by divine providence; nei∣ther speak evill thereof without due examinati∣on: but rather accept of Page  656 all things, as exceeding well performed: and mar∣vaile at their admirable decency and perfection, though the ignorant mul∣titude judge according to a false appearance: For in conceiving otherwise, wee bring upon our heads (besides the guilt of blasphemy) great blame for our sottish presump∣tion.

[ II] Now, in that wee say, all things are done well, wee justifie not the naughti∣nesse of men, or of such evill works as are in our power to doe, or leave undone; but, we speak it of the works of Providence which are not in our po∣wer. For, if any man ob∣ject Page  657 and say, How falls it out that holy men are put cruelly to death without desert? why, if they were unjustly condemned, did not Gods just providence hinder those murthers? and if they deserved to be so put to death, why are not they without blame who caused them to bee slaine?

To this we answer, that the murtherers of such men were injurious in slaying them; and that they which were so slain, were slain either for their desert, or their profit Somtime deservingly, for evills committed by them in secret: and sometimes for their profit: Gods Page  658 providence, thereby pre∣venting either future sins, or worse mischiefes to come; and in those re∣spects it was good for them that their life should be shortned. Thus was it with Socrates, and the Saints.

But, they who slew these men, did not slay them for any such cause; nei∣ther was it lawfully done; but out of the corruption of their owne minds, and for gain and robbery: For, the Act is in mans power; but what shall follow up∣on the Act, (as whether we shall be slain or no) is not as he will: neither is any death evill, except for sinne onely, as is ma∣nifest Page  659 by the death of the Saints.

But, wicked men, al∣though they die in their beds on a sudden, and without pain, doe never∣thelesse die an evill death, which brings them unto an evill buriall: I meane, to bee buried in their sinne; yet whosoever killeth any man murthe∣rously, doth wickedly in so doing.

If hee killeth any one for that which deserveth death; he is then to be ac∣counted among hangmen and executioners. If it be for the gaining of some profit by them that are slaine, he is to be reputed among cruell and wic∣ked Page  660 murtherers.

The like may be said of them who murther their enemies, or oppresse them by extreame servitude, or use any manner of in∣humane cruelty, against them whom they have overcome.

They also are as little to be justified, who seeke the inriching of them∣selves, by extorting other mens goods: for, though it may be expedient for those, from whom they were extorted, that they should be deprived of them; yet, they which wrested away more then their owne, were unjust, in so so doing. For, they take them out of a cove∣tous Page  661 desire of those good, and not for that it was expedient for them, whō they dispos∣sessed of such things.