The encounter against M. Parsons, by a revievv of his last sober reckoning, and his exceptions vrged in the treatise of his mitigation. Wherein moreouer is inserted: 1. A confession of some Romanists, both concerning the particular falsifications of principall Romanists, as namely, Bellarmine, Suarez, and others: as also concerning the generall fraude of that curch, in corrupting of authors. 2. A confutation of slaunders, which Bellarmine vrged against Protestants. 3. A performance of the challenge, which Mr. Parsons made, for the examining of sixtie Fathers, cited by Coccius for proofe of Purgatorie ... 4. A censure of a late pamphlet, intituled, The patterne of a Protestant, by one once termed the moderate answerer. 5. An handling of his question of mentall equiuocation (after his boldnesse with the L. Cooke) vpon occasion of the most memorable, and feyned Yorkeshire case of equiuocating; and of his raging against D. Kings sermon. Published by authoritie

SECT. I.

The summe of the xv. charge, in the point of Equiuocation.

M. PARSONS Reckoning.

HEe quoteth Sotus, but all is treacherie, falshood, * 1.1 and lying in this Impugner of Equiuocation, for first by subtle Doctor all vnderstand Scotus, and not Sotus.

The Reuiew.

1 I Called your Sotus the subtle Doctour: you say that this epithet belonged vnto Scotus. I haue heard that two Gentlemen, the one English, the other Scotish, met toge∣ther, the one sitting on the one side of the table, and the o∣ther * 1.2 on the other side. And when the English man asked, Quid interest Scotum & Sotum? What therewas betweene a Scot and a Sot? The Table, quoth the Scot. There was wit in this. But if we aske M. Parsons what oddes there is be∣tween their Scotus the Franciscan Frier, and Sotus the Do∣minican? hee will answer vs, Subtletie. Is not this a great * 1.3 piece of learning for M. Parsons to vaunt of? And yet, if we may beleeue Sotus, euen Scotus also will condemne your maner of Equiuocating for a lie.

M. PARSONS his Reckoning, & summe of his charge in the point of Equiuocation.

He will neuer be able to shew out of Sotus, that all Equiuo∣cators * 1.4 are liars; this assertion is an incredible impudencie, be∣cause Sotus saith, that in some cases it is lawfull to equiuocate, * 1.5 as where hee teacheth a man, that is asked vniustly, to answer, Nescio, Qui iure intelligitur, Nescio, vt dicam, aut Nescio eo modo, quo iure debeam dicere, &c. * 1.6 This wrote I in my former booke, and bauing conuinced so euident falsifications, as heere haue been laid downe, quite contrary to the meaning and sense of the Author alleaged, I maruel that some little place had not been allowed for somepiece of Answer to this also among the rest. But belike M. Morton was not readie.

The Reuiew.

2 I was as ready then, as now, to tell you that heerein you play a kinde of Scotus and subtle Sophister with mee, wilfully abusing both your owne knowledge, and your Rea∣ders

ignorance, by not acknowledging the principall point in question, which was not against Verball, but only against that Mentall Equiuocation, which hath been described by your selfe to be lawfull, whensoeuer the speaker shall reserue any thing in his minde, which according to his vnderstanding doth agree with the outward words of his mouth, be the clause of re∣seruation whatsoeuer it pleaseth him to imagine; As to say, I am no Priest, meaning, with purpose to tell it you. All such kinde of mixt propositions you in your Treatise of Mitigation do absolutely defend: Which (I say againe & againe) is by So∣tus reiected as meere lying; which I shall easily prooue out of Sotus his positions and examples, from the same booke wherein you haue insisted.

3 If we would know what kinde of Equiuocation Sotus will allow, let vs consult with him in his positions. First, a 1.7 He that is iniuriously examined may vse all kinde of Amphi∣bologies, or doubtfull speeches, so as they may be vnderstood in some vsuall sense withont a lie. He admitteth not Equiuocating in any sense, which is not by the vse signified in the outward speech it selfe: and of this kinde is (in his iudgement) the * 1.8 word, Nescio, in the cause before mentioned, whereof Sotus saith, b 1.9 Words doe carrie that signification which the people ap∣prehend; and Christian people, when they heare a Priest (who is asked whether he know such a mans sinne) answer, Se ni∣hil scire, do vnderstand his meaning to be, that he knoweth it not extrà confessionem: which maketh a verball Equiuocation, or Amphibologie, the knowing of a Priest being of two sorts, In confessione, and Extrà confessionem. So that the man which is asked, whether he knoweth that which he heard only by relation from another, may (in the opinion of Sotus) answer c 1.10 NESCIO, because a man properly knoweth that which hee comprehendeth by strong reason. And this Amphibologie is verball, for Nescio hath a double sense in it selfe, according to the vnderstanding of men, properly signifying that which I do certainly not know; and vnproperly that which I know but vncertainly, and by report: And thus, saith Sotus, d 1.11 the Priest may answer, NESCIO, because he had it but by relation

of the partie confitent, who might (peraduenture) haue lied. e 1.12 Except the matter be manifest, and so he proceedeth to ap∣proue f 1.13 Nescio, in such a case to signifie, by the intendment of the law, Non scire, vt dicam, or, vt debeam dicere. To con∣clude, e 1.14 Sotus neuer alloweth any other Equiuocall sense, which is wholly infolded in the clause of Reseruation, but that only which the outward speech it selfe may (in his opi∣nion) carrie in the common vse, according to the apprehen∣tion of the discreet hearer: which, in the opinion of Sotus, is a verball Equiuocation. And this matter may be demon∣strated by his examples.

4 First, g 1.15 If a Tyrant aske a Priest, whether Peter killed Iohn, which the Priest knew in confession. whether he may answer, He killed him not, reseruing, That I may tell you, So∣tus * 1.16 resolueth that this answer cannot free the Priest from a lie: for (saith Sotus) It were a most foolish exposition to say, * 1.17 Non occidit, Vt dicam, because facta ordinom immediatum non habent ad hoc, quod est, Dicere. Let vs compare our new AEquiuocators with Sotus. M. Parsons admitteth any Reser∣uation, which being mixed with the outward speech, ma∣keth a true proposition, as, I am no Priest, conceiuing in my minde, To tell it: which differeth not from that of Sotus, He murdered him not, reseruing, That I may tell it you: which Sotus cannot excuse from a lie. A second example. When a party is Vniustly, demanded, concerning a fact which he had committed, Whether he may answer, Non a concerning a fact which he had committed, Whether he may answer, Nonfeci, I did it not: Scotus (saith h 1.18 Sotus inclineth to the negatiue part, And I (saith Sotus) cannot be perswaded that it is lawful to answer, Non feci, neither can I perceiue, how it can be excused from alie: for if any way this might be, then especially by vnderstanding in his minde, Vt dicam, That I may tell you. But this sense were most vio∣lent: for the fact hath not any such order to the speech. Yet doth this mixt speech make a true proposition, which vttered in part with the mouth (in the iudgement of Sotus) cannot be excused from a lie: and consequently M. Parsons his art of AEquiuocating is an art of starke lying. * 1.19

5 An other example: we haue often heard of the story

of S. Francis his sleeues, which for the time we will suppose to be true: He, when a malefactor was pursued by ossi∣cers, being asked whether he saw the malefactor passe by, or no? Answered, Non transiuit hàc, that is, He passed not this * 1.20 way, (meaning, as Sotus readeth it, per sinum, as others, per manicas) through his sleeue: This example our AEquiuocators vse to vrge, to the end that they may couer their lying deuice with S. Francis his sleeue: but if we beleeue Sotus, that sleeue is too short to hide so long a lie: for i 1.21 This deuice (saith he) will not content me, because although he that is vniustly asked a question, be not bound to answer vnto the intention of the deman∣dant, yet is he bound to hide a secrecy in such words, which are true in a sense which is receiued either among the people, or else among wise and discreet men. Heere Sotus iudgeth a Mentall Reseruation, agreeing with the minde of the speaker, to be no better than a lie, euen because the outward speech will not carry the secret sense, in the vnderstanding of discreet hearers. Which is the whole and onely point, which in my dispute against the Romish AEquiuocation I vndertooke to prooue. And lest that any might thinke that their AEqui∣uocating deuice were any way sanctified by touch, as it were, of S. Frances his sleeue, Sotus opposeth against that a contrary example out of S. Augustine, as followeth.

6 An other example. k 1.22 S. Augustine reporteth another example: There was a Bishop (saith he) whose name was Firme, * 1.23 but himselfe was firmer in his resolution, who hiding a man that was pursued by officers, and being asked, who it was, answered onely thus: I may neither lie, nor yet betray the party: and there∣upon he himselfe was carried to be tortured, who suffered tor∣ment, yet through his patience he obteined fauor of the Emperor for the deliuerance of the man that had fled vnto him. This be∣ing by Sotus opposed vnto the former example of S. Fran∣cis doth teach vs that he would not allow our AEquiuoca∣tours pretense, who would haue readily answered that que∣stion by saying, No-body, meaning, To tell it vnto you: and S. Augustine his Firmus in these daies would be hissed out of their schooles for a simple and witlesse fellow euen as our

AEquinocatours would (if they had liued in these daies) been driuen out of Christendome for gracelesse mont-bankes. But heare what followeth.

7 An other example. Before he deliuereth this exam∣ple, * 1.24 he propoundeth a Conclusion, which is principally to be obserued. In the case of a man who is wrongfully questio∣ned about a most secret fault, l 1.25 If (saith Sotus) he cannot finde words, whereby, through an Equiuocation, which is in the com∣mon vse of men, he may couer his fault without a lie, he ought ra∣ther to die than lie. Still we finde, that whatsoeuer the AEqui∣uocation be, it ought to be such as consisteth in the common vse of the words themselues. And therefore where the que∣stion is, concerning a guilty person, who killed Peter and is examined thereabout, Whether he may answer, I haue not kil∣led him, conceiuing in his minde another man of the same name Peter, being one whom indeed he killed not: Such an answer (saith Sotus) cannot be without a lie, because according to the receiued vse of all men, an affirmation and negation in pro∣per names are so taken for the same man, as if this onely had been therby signified, viz. for that Peter, of whom the question was asked. How then shall their AEquiuocating Priest auoid the guilt of a lie, who being asked, whether he were a Priest, An∣swered, No, meaning, A Priest of Apollo, the heathenish God. And being demanded whether he were euer beyond the Sea, answered, No, meaning, the Adriatique Sea. We see that heere also their Sotus meeth with their AEquiuocator, to prooue him alier.

8 The last example. m 1.26 But what shall the guilty misera∣ble * 1.27 woman doe, when her husband shall constraine her by violence to confesse whether she had committed Adultrie, or no, and shee cannot finde any amphibologie, to hide herselfe in? I answere (saith he) That the iniquities of men are more than that wee can preuent them: therefore in such a case it is better to die, than to transgresse by lying. This had beene but a fond Resoluti∣on, if he had thought that Nescio, vt dicam, would haue ser∣ued the turne, which to free the speech from a lie, notwith∣standing is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the profession, and practise of

our Equiuocators, and whereby it is most easie to preuent all guiles of the most subtle Interrogatories. In briefe; in the shutting vp of this Treatise hee granteth that Words which haue not a true sense, according to the signification, which is receiued into common vse, cannot bee excused from a lie. Which conclusion, with all these premisses, I leaue as a Glasse vnto M. Parsons, and other Professors of Mentall Equiuocation, to looke their faces in, and at their leasure to tell mee what they see. From the Spanish Doctor Sotus, hee goeth to a Flemmish Doctor Cunerus.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Reck. pag. 442.
• * 1.2

  A Similitude.
• * 1.3

  His vaine vaunt.
• * 1.4

  Reck. pag. 444.
• * 1.5

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib. de le∣gend. secretis, nu. 3. q. 3. con∣clus. 4.
• * 1.6

  Reck. pa. 445.
• a 1.7

  Sotus de le∣gend. Secret. memb. 1. q. 3. concl. 1. pag. 295.
• * 1.8

  Sotus falsly and grosly abused by M. Parsons.
• b 1.9

  Ibid. conclus. 2. pag. 299.
• c 1.10

  Ibid. pa. 300
• d 1.11

  Ibid. pa. 301.
• e 1.12

  Ibid. Conclus. 4. pag. 304.
• f 1.13

  Ibid. pa. 307.
• e 1.14

  Ibid. Conclus. 4. pag. 304.
• g 1.15

  Ibid. Conclus. 4. pag 314.
• * 1.16

  Sotus his ex∣amples.
• * 1.17

  M. Persons falshood in not acknow∣ledging the iudgement of Sotus by whom his AE∣quiuocation is prooued a starke lie.
• h 1.18

  Sotus ibid. Conclus. 5.
• * 1.19

  Another ex∣ample.
• * 1.20

  S Francis his lying sleeue.
• i 1.21

  Ibid. p. 318.
• k 1.22

  Ibid.
• * 1.23

  Another ex∣ample out of S. Augustine.
• * 1.24

  Another ex∣ample, confu∣ting Romish AEquiuoca∣tors.
• l 1.25

  Ibid. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 7 P. 319.
• m 1.26

  Ibid. pa. 322
• * 1.27

  The last ex∣ample to the same purpose.