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10. COncerning a Syllogisme, for the which M. Parsons a 1.1 hath beene charged with
intollerable arrogance and ignorance;and now he commeth to reckon for this, but so miserably, that the Reader will pitty his perplexity, both in charging me, and in discharging himselfe. First of the summe of his charge.
P. R. (saith T. M.) called that a Syllogisme which I named in a more ge∣nerall * 1.2 terme a Reason, and not a Syllogisme: now there be many formes of Reasons, besides Syllogismes, neyther did I indeed in∣tend to make an exact and formall Syllogisme, but only such an argu∣ment, which by due inference and deduction might prooue my Con∣clusion good. So he. And is not this a strange euasion in him that professeth such skill in Logike? for that the art of Logike, to my know∣ledge, admitteth but foure kinds of reasoning, to wit, Syllogismes, Enthy∣memes, Inductions, and Examples: but this of Mr. Mortons can be none of the latter three sorts (as himselfe, I suppose, will confesse) Ergo, it must be the first, which is a Syllogisme, and consequently it is a meere shift * 1.3 to say here, when he is taken tripping, that he called it not a Syllogisme but a Reason: — For there are three distinct propositions, and the first is called the Maior.
11. Although there be but foure generall and ordinary heads of arguing, yet ought you to haue remembred that Lo∣gicians doe acknowledge a kinde of Reasoning, which they cal a Prosyllogisme, hauing the premises consisting of superflu∣ous termes, which notwithstanding may serue to make new Inferences, and is neyther right Syllogisme, Enthymeme, Indu∣ction, or Example, albeit all Schollers do hold it to be a toller∣able manner of arguing, and yet admitteth a Maior.