Solon his follie, or a politique discourse, touching the reformation of common-weales conquered, declined or corrupted. By Richard Beacon ...

CAP. 6. The meanes to withstande all occasions of de∣clining, growing vnto the com:+mon-wealth by the great∣nesse of the nobi∣litie.

SOL:

Sith this seemeth to be a matter of so great importance, to defende the multitude from the oppression of the mighty, it shall be convenient that we now proceede vnto the meanes whereby we may in such cases, as well abate the greatnes of the Lordes and Nobles, as also deliver the multitude from their op∣pressions and wrongs.

Epi:

The meanes are sundry.

Sol:

What be they?

Epi:

First we are to establish lawes, wherby as well the dig∣nity of the Nobles, as the liberty of the people, may be preserved and defended, according to the example of all common-weales well governed.

Sol:

Herein Salamina is found inferiour to noe na∣tion, especiallie for lawes, which respect the liberty and welfare of the people, the which is the matter nowe in deliberation.

Epi:

What be they?

Sol:

The lawes against Coiney and Livery, the lavves against Captainship, the lawes against taking of pledges contrarie to the common law, with many other lawes prohibiting vnlawfull customes and exactions; so as it seemeth that good lawes are not sufficient to render a common-weale, happie and prosperous.

Epi:

Noe surely, no more then a medicine well prepared may cure the diseases of the body, if the same be not rightly applied: it re∣steth therefore, that governoures provinciall, doe diligently in∣tend the observation of these lawes, in such sort, as they be inviola∣ble, whereby in a short time they shall confirme the mindes of the multitude, and render them secure, quiet, and contented.

Sol:

This which you haue saide, by sundry actes and recordes, nowe extant for Salamina, maie appeare: for there it is saide, that the people

were not onlie drawne from rebellions and vnlawfull attempts, by the extirpation of this exaction of Coiney and Livery, but they were sometimes by the due exaction of that lawe, stronglie indu∣ed to affect and imbrace iustice and peace, so as al commaunde∣mentes by waie of iustice are there obeied. Naie that vvhich is more, in place of cursing and rebellions, there is founde ioie, io∣litie, and blessing of that goddesse Minerva, the protectour and defendour of Athens, by whose providence so great an evill was remooved. So as we maie conclude, that nothing doeth so much induce a nation or people, be they naturall subiects or gai∣ned by conquest, to imbrace that governement which is prescri∣bed vnto them by those which have rule, power, & authority over them, there is nothing (I say) so availeable to render thē loyall sub∣iectes, & willing embracers of governement, as a iust defence given by due execution of profitable lawes from all oppressions and wronges.

Epi:

You have saide the trueth: for a nation con∣quered desire their former libertie; for no other cause so greatly, as thereby to possesse that which is their owne freelie and secure∣lie; so as enioying the same, they have attained the ende of their desires, and rest for the most parte contented with the governe∣ment. But on the contrarie, with the oppression of the mighty, the thoughtes and desires of their former libertie are daily kindled, in such sorte, as they sticke not to practise with forraine enemies the restitution thereof. It is necessary therefore in such countries, that the lawes for the defence of the multitude against oppressions bee holden inviolable, in such sort as everie one maie▪ confidentlie saie with the governoures of Darius, it is the lawe of the Medes and Persians which maie not be broken.

Sol:

But some provinciall go∣vernoures of Salamina, have beene founde more studious with Savanorola in making of profitable lawes, then faithfull observers thereof, whereby the whole countrie of Salamina hath vvell neare perished: but I could vvish, that with Savanorola at the least they might loose their honour and estimation amongest the Florentines: for much evill ariseth vnto Salamina, not onelie from the malice of the people, but by the negligence of Magistrates, in that they holde not their lawes inviolable; for the vvhich causes they maye

never confirme the mindes of the multitude vnto the state, nor render them quiet, and contented. But what other meanes is now left vnto vs to deliver the multitude from oppression?

Epi:

Com∣missioners in every of the several Provinces are to be constituted, which as iudges shall restraine and suppresse the ambition of the nobles, and shall carefully defende the people from oppressors. Therefore wisely the king of Fraunce hath constituted a iudge or arbitrator, which as a third person sine regis invidia proceres caederet, & tenuiores tueretur. Nihil melius, nihil sapientius hoc decreto esse potuit: nec regni aut ipsius regis potior securitatis causa.

Sol:

But what num∣ber of iudges may suffice herein?

Epi:

You say well: for if one iudge bee ordained, the mighty and great personages shall more easily corrupt him, then manie. Therefore the Florentines ha∣ving entertained but one iudge for the suppressing of the ambi∣tion of the nobility, whom they called Capitaneū, seeing him sedu∣ced by the nobilitie, in his place constituted eight iudges or Com∣missioners.

Sol:

But in this second institution, they founde lesse security then in the first: for vvhere a fewe are placed for the rule and governement, there they be founde commonly ministers and pleasers of the nobility, and contemners of the people; the which the Venetians wisely foreseeing, have not onely ordained their De∣cemviri, but also other magistrates, quos Quarantos vocant, & further for the same onely they have constituted Concilium Praegium qui summus est magistratus, to this ende, that neither iudges nor accu∣sers should be wanting for the suppressing of the ambition of the nobilitie.

Epi:

As you have saide, this must needes be the best forme of governement that may possibly be ordained in such ca∣ses; for many iudges are not so easily corrupted as one: againe ma∣ny are founde to be of greater strength and integritie to resist the displeasure of the nobilitie then fewe; and like as many eies dis∣cerne more perfectly then one, and that which escapeth or de∣ceiveth one eie, maie be perceived and that without errour by ma∣ny; so many wits iudge more soundly and sincerely then one. Last∣ly, wee all obey more willingly the censures of many, then the iudgements of a fewe, or one person whatsoever.

Sol:

But vvhi∣ther are we in such cases more to endevour the favour of the no∣bility

or the multitude?

Epi:

It is saide that a Monarchie gover∣ned popularlie is then secure and voide of perill: for in the mul∣titude or people consisteth the strength and force of every king∣dome; the vvhich Nabid king of the Lacedaemonians well vn∣derstanding, endevoured wholie the love and favoure of the peo∣ple, so as with his proper forces hee was able to vvithstande and resist his enemies, vvithout the aide of forraine princes. And Appius Claudius on the contrarie, neglecting the favoure of the people, did vvholy cleave to the nobilitie, and lost there∣by the principalitie and commaundement vvhich then hee had obtayned.

Solo:

It must be confessed that in common-weales gained by conquest, you shall advance your governement more assuredly by the favoure of the people, then by the might of the nobilitie; for nature it selfe by an inforcing necessitie hath taught the weaker part to adheare vnto that which is the strongest; and for this cause the people diverse vvaies oppressed by the ambi∣tion of the mighty, are forced thereby to hasten and runne vn∣to their conquerour, as vnto a large palme tree, to bee defended from the stormes and violence of the mighty, so as delivering them from oppressions, they vvillingly yeelde their obedi∣ence; but of the contrarie the nobilitie are not so readily wonne nor so easily kept. Therefore the Romaines in all countries by them conquered, did labour nothing more then to humble and deiect the mightie, & to protect and defend the feeble & weake, and deliver the people from oppressions. The like order of go∣vernement did the Graecians observe, especially in provinces by them conquered, which differed in language and maner of living: for there the people, if they be not carefully defended from the oppressions of the mighty, by these outward differences as signes and badges of their former liberty, doe hasten for the restitution thereof vnto all rebellions, and doe provoke some forraine enemy to invade. Farther in common-weales where generally the man∣ners of the people are found corrupted, there dangerous it is to advance the Lords & chieftaines,* 1.1 as it may appeare by the statuts & records of Salamina: for there it is declared that the L: and chief∣taines of that land, in the times of iustice declinatiō, by pretext of

defending the people and their owne possessions, arrogated vn∣to themselves absolute and roiall authority within large circuites, by meanes wherof they grew vnto such greatnes, as they acknow∣ledged no superior, nor obedience vnto Athens, they held for laws their owne willes and desires, and finallie they assembled and led the people vnto the accomplishing of all actes offensive and inva∣sive, without speciall authority, as before we have at large discour∣sed. Therefore in Salamina, and in other common-weales gai∣ned by conquest, where the manners of the people remaine cor∣rupted, we are to give impediment (saith a learned authour) vnto all the meanes wherby the nobles may raise themselves vnto such greatnesse, as thereby they may become fearefull vnto the com∣mon-weale, and providently shall we favour and deliver the peo∣ple in such estates from oppression.

Ep:

For this cause wisely have the councel of Salamina suppressed and cut of al exactions and tri∣butes, by a firme and stable law before remembred, as the meanes, whereby the nobles and cheifetaines did raise themselves vnto such greatnesse, as they became daungerous vnto the common-weale. And to the same purpose have they made another sta∣tute, wherby it is ordained and enacted, that no Lorde nor gen∣tleman of the said land, retaine by liverie, wages, or promise, signe or token,* 1.2 by indenture or otherwise, any person or persons, but onely such, as be or shalbe his officers, as baylifes, stewardes, learned counsels, receivers, and meniall servantes, daily in house∣holde, at the saide Lordes proper costes and charges entertained. Thus if wisely we give impediment vnto the meanes which raise the chiefetaines and nobles of Salamina vnto this greatnes; if with Pompey we shall impeach the forces of Caesar by calling awaie two legions or regimentes; if with Pompey we shal withdrawe from Cae∣sar, Labienus, and other his friendes and commaunders; if we shall cut off all exactions, and tributes, which Caesar leavieth vppon the people; if we shall cut off all that infinite number of retainers, fol∣lowers, and men which followe Caesar more then his menial hous∣holde according to the statute of retainers; if we shall suppresse all vnlawfull authorities of Captainship and such like, which Caesar chalengeth over the meaner people; if the great and large coun∣tries

which Caesar possesseth, we shall part and dismember by draw∣ing in the custome of Gavelkinde, by the whch pollicie, Wales was sometimes reformed, and brought in subiection; then Caesar shall be no more able to rebell, and we shall rightly manage the state of Salamina,

Sol:

Doe you thinke, that the statute against Coiney and Livery, is a sufficient barre against the Lordes and cheiftaines that they raise not thēselves vnto their former greatnesse?

Epi:

No verily: for nowe they chalenge those exactions as lawfull services and reservations by the way of tenier heretofore reserved by their aūcestors, & predecessors, & by these meanes holde the subiect in servage, or otherwise they drive them to particular shiftes, vvhich are tedious, infinite, and troublesome to the state, and the vtter vndoing of the subiect; all which may well be appeased by way of composition betwixt the Lordes and tenantes: and the better to enable vs to make an equall composition herein, we are to vn∣derstande that these demaundes are of three sortes, and kindes: The one received his beginning by vnlawfull meanes, namely by force and by violence, these are commonly called by the names of blacke rentes; such were the exactions which the Obrians some∣times levied vpon the inhabitaunce of the countrie of Limbricke. Other demaundes there be, which did growe by way of giving protection and defence, from such as founde themselves oppres∣sed with the power and might of others; such exactions some∣times have beene yeelded by the inhabitants of the small coun∣trie of Limbricke, vnto the auncestors of the nowe Earle of Kildare, and such did Mac Morris sometimes yeelde vnto the late Earle of Desmond attainted. Lastly, other demaundes there be vvhich did growe by the way of tenier; these may easily bee discerned from the others, in that they be due vnto the Lorde onely, from the handes of his proper tenantes or freehoulders, and the same commonly shall appeare to be so by vvriting or indenture.

Sol:

You have vvell disclosed the meanes whereby the greatnesse of the nobility and chiefetaines may be abated, and the people de∣fended from the oppression of the mighty, in times peaceable, wherein lawe and iustice doeth prevaile. It seemeth also that it is a matter of like necessitie that the good subiect bee defended

from the oppression of the enemie or rebell: for the naturall sub∣iectes of Rome, revolted vnto Hanniball, when as they found them selves not defended from his oppression.

Epi:

We must with Fa∣bius providently from time to time sende aide sufficient to such as are our subiectes and friendes, vvhereby we shall still holde and keepe them in obedience and subiection.

Sol:

If this course had generally beene holden by some governours of Salamina, the re∣bellions had neither beene great, neither yet of long continu∣aunce; therefore wisely it is saide, Qui non defendit nec obsistit si po∣test iniuriae, tam est in vitio, quàm si parentes aut patriam aut socios deserat: and after this manner speaketh a christian Doctor, say∣ing, Fortitudo quae per bella tuetur â Barbaris patriam, vel defendit infirmos, vel â latronibus socios, plena iusticia est. By which course of governement, the Romaines almost conquered the vvhole vvorlde, as Cicero witnesseth saying, Noster populus, socijs defen∣••endis terrarum iam omnium potitus est.

Epi:

It seemeth also to bee a matter of like necessity, that the governours of Salamina doe vvith all care and indevour confirme the mindes of the sub∣iectes by having a due regarde of their merites and services to∣wardes the state, least otherwise when no estimation is had of their merites and publique services, they take occasion thereby of dis∣contentment. For the slender care & estimation the French some∣times helde of the publicke merites of such as had well deserved, gave the first occasion of their expelling out of Italy; for so much doe their Cronicles and histories witnesse, where it is saide, that the nobility were not imbraced vvith that humanity they looked for, and much lesse had recompenses equall to their merites, yea they found manie difficulties to enter into the chambers and audi∣ence of the king. There was no distinction of persons, the merites and services of men vvere not considered, but at adven∣ture, the mindes of such as were naturally estraunged from the house of Arragon, vvere not confirmed, many delaies and diffi∣culties were suborned touching the restitution of the landes and goods of those that vvere of the faction of Aniow, and of the other Barrons that had beene banished by the olde Ferdinando. And lastly favoures and graces were imparted to such as procured them

by corruption and meanes extraordinary, & not to such as had de∣served the same. Wisely therefore shall the governoures of Sala∣mina confirme the mindes of such as are estranged from the house of Arragon, and countenaunce such as were banished by Ferdi∣nando, and lastlie if they shall imparte favoures and graces to such as have deserved the same, according to the advise of Plinie, which saith, Tu largiere bellorum socijs, periculorum consortibus.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Anno: 11. Eliz. cap. 7. fol. 168.
• * 1.2

  Act Anno. H. 7. ••0. cap. 6.