Solon his follie, or a politique discourse, touching the reformation of common-weales conquered, declined or corrupted. By Richard Beacon ...

THE SECOND BOOKE OF Solon his follie. (Book 2)

CAP. 1. A description of a reformation vniversall, and of the whole state and bodie of the common-wealth.

EPI:

This reformation vniversall of the whole state and body of the common-wealth, is nothing els, but a thorough and absolute mutation and change, of auncient lawes, customes, and manners of the people, and finally of the com∣mon-wealth it selfe, vnto a better forme of governement.

Sol:

It seemeth then, that this reformation respecteth three matters principally: first, the mutation of auncient lawes and customes; secondlie, the alteration and change of manners in the people; and finally, a new institution and a better forme of governement, then before, prescribed.

CAP. 2. Of the reformation of auncient lawes and customes.

EPI:

You have well observed my meaning and purpose: and to this effect, a subtile writer making mention of this reformation generall and absolute, saith, that he which shall attempt the same, must alter and chaunge all the auncient

lawes and customes, quia ne leges quidem, quae in ipso ortu reipub: à bonis viris late sancitae{que} sunt, sufficientes vtiles{que} sunt ad eos c••ves fre∣nandos, qui in eadem repub: à maiorum virtute degenerarunt, & pra∣vi facti sunt, for, saith he, where we finde, the times and people thoroughly changed, embracing now that which is found contra∣ry to their former course and manner of living, wee ought also to chaunge the auncient lawes and customes: for, contraria subiecta non debent eodem modo tractari. The Romaines may herein be vnto vs a liuely example: for after they had subdued Asia, Africa, and in a manner had reduced vnder their governemental Greece, they fell eftsoones into a corruption of manners, contrary to all their former discipline, institution, and accustomed manner of living: their auncient lawes and customes established for creating of Magistrates, they mightely abused; selling their voices of e∣lection openly in the market place for mony: in like manner did they abuse al other their auncient lawes and customes, namely the lawes and customes, which devided the common-weale and power thereof into the handes of the people and Senators, so as there could not be a reformation of that estate, without a mutati∣on made of those auncient lawes and customes, then growne by the iniquitie of those times out of vse.

Sol:

But what neede vvee search forraine examples? when Salamina doth afforde sundry proofes thereof, where we may beholde many auncient customes and privileges, granted (no doubt) at the first, for the advancement of publike services, but now turned by a generall corruption in the subiect, to the ruine of themselves and the lande of Salamina; which must of necessitie bee altered and chaunged, before any thorough reformation may there be established: all which may appeare vnto such as shall reade the Act of Absentes, which is lefte vnto vs as a register of the fall and declynation of the state of Sa∣lamina; wherein it is manifest, that the Lords of the several coun∣ties, of Carthelagh, and Wexforde, being places priviledged, maie keepe and hold all manner pleas within the same, by occasion and vnder pretence and collour whereof, the kings lawes, writtes, or other processes, be not obeyed, neither anie other lawe or iustice there vsed or administred, for the quieting and good ordering of

the subiect: so as in defaulte thereof, the kings enemies have them in servage; al murders, robberies, theftes, treasons, and other offences, remaine vnpunished; the kings wardes, reliefes, escheates, and all other his profits and revennewes are there with∣drawne; and the service, strength, and assistaunce of the saide subiect, is greatly minished; all which more at large shall appeare to such as shall pervse the saide statute: so as we may conclude, that without a mutation, made of these auncient customes and privi∣ledges now growne out of vse, and declyned from their first insti∣tution by a generall corruption in the subiect, the state of Salami∣na may never be perfitly and thoroughly reformed. For as the state of Rome, in manner as afore declined, coulde not by the lawes, sumptuarij ambitus, neither by any other new lawe be sustay∣ned and vnderpropped, without a thorough alteration made of all other the auncient lawes and customes thereof; so may we not expect in these daies a thorough reformation of Salamina, by the lawes of Captainshippe, the lawes against Coiney and Liverie, the lawes against taking of pledges, the lawes against wilfull murder, or any other new lawe whatsoever made for the reformation of Salamina, without a thorough alteration made of the auncient cu∣stomes and priviledges thereof, all which we there sometimes imployed in that service, were daily taught, rather by experience then by any learned or deepe discourse, that may be made ther∣of. In like manner if the custome of Captainshippe, the custome of Coiney and Livery, and the custome of taking of pledges, the cu∣stome of Tanistery, the custome of protecting and supporting of traitours, had not beene abolished by lawes, then all newe lawes whatsoeuer would have beene founde vnprofitable for the refor∣mation of Salamina: for in such cases it is saide by learned writers, that leges novae minus prodesse queant ad tollenda vitia quae regnant. Now sith it is evident, that a thorough reformation may not bee made without a mutation of auncient laws & customes, which are found evill in themselves, or els by mutation and chaunge of times have now lost their first vigor and force, it behoveth that we doe vnder∣stand, what order and rule herein is to be observed, for the more ready effecting thereof.

CAP. 3. Of the reformation of auncient lawes and customes, and what things therein chiefly are to be considered.

EPI:

In all mutations made of auncient lawes and customes, three matters especially fall into deliberation: first the meanes; secondly the forme and maner; lastly the subiect and matter. The meanes are in number five: the first is authority; the goodwill and consents of the people, the seconde; the thirde perswasions; a sufficient power and force, is the fourth; the fifth and the last is a magistrate, of rare and excellent vertues, which may suppresse the envie and malice of such, as shall oppose them∣selves against this intended reformation, made by the mutation of auncient lawes and customes.

Sol:

But what authority is required for the better effecting of a reformation? For this as the first mat∣ter, you have well observed to be requisit herein.

Epi:

All au∣thority herein graunted is after two sortes: the one absolute; the other limited by time, and other circumstances. This authoritie absolute, was given sometime into your handes by the Athenians; for after such time as they had well tasted of the lawe and ordi∣nance, called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they forthwith did choose you their ge∣nerall reformer of the lawe, and of the whole state of the common-weale, without limiting this power then granted vnto you, but re∣ferred all matters indifferentlye vnto your will, as the offices of state, common assemblies, voices in election, iudgments in iustice, and the body of the Senate. Finally, they gave vnto you all power and authority, to cease and taxe anie of them, to appoint the num∣ber, and what time the cease should continue, and to keepe, con∣firme, and disanull at your pleasure, anie of the auncient laws and customes, then in being. But this authority absolute, without anie limitation of the power it selfe, or of the time and continuance thereof, hath sometimes turned to the great preiudice and danger of such as formerly have graunted the same: for the Romaines af∣ter

they had elected their Decemviri, for the making of a thorough and absolute reformation of the common-weale of Rome, they forthwith gave into their handes the sole and absolute power of Rome, so as all other authorities and iurisdictions either of Consull, Senate, or Tribunes, ceasing, they wholy and only governed Rome, without any provocation or appeale to bee made to any other. Thus when no Magistrate remained, which might observe the a∣ctions of such as were founde ambitious, easily did Appius Claudi∣us, fall into the thoughtes of the principality of Rome; he doeth strengthē himselfe with friendes, & clyēts, and daily increaseth his wealth, and nowe of a Citizen is become a fearefull enemy to the state of Rome; in such sorte, as they may neither endure his pride and insolencie, neither may they safely suppresse the same with∣out their common perill and daunger. Therefore more wiselie did the Lacedemonians give great authority to their kinges; and like∣wise did the Venetians to their Dukes; but yet with certaine limits and bondes, not lawfull for them to exceede; and farther did appoint certaine watchmen, as daily beholders and observers of all their actions and doings.

Sol:

But what limitation of time, in gran∣ting this absolute authority, may breede safety vnto him that gi∣veth the same? This is the seconde and last matter, nowe remem∣bred by you, and worthie of consultation.

Epi:

The provinciall governement over the Gaules, with an absolute power given into the handes of Caesar, for the better reformation thereof, was so long proroged and continued, as at the last with the sword of the Romaines, and the money of the Gaules, he became terrible, as well to the Gaules, as to the Romaines, & returned not a Citizen now of Rome, but as a fearefull enemie, and conquerour, as well of the Ci∣tie, as of all the other territories and dominions thereof. And was not also the provinciall governement of Spaine sometimes given into the handes of Pompey with an absolute authority for the re∣formation thereof, so long proroged and continued, as with one stampe of his foote he was able, (as himselfe reported) to fill the Citie of Rome with weapons, and armed men? And did not Appius Claudius by proroging his authority but for one yeare, be∣come fearefull to the Citie of Rome? And did not the Romaines by

making a Dictator perpetuall, loose the libertye of their Citie? and doeth authority thus easily corrupt the maners of good sub∣iectes? and is the age also wherein we live free from such corrup∣tion? Nay, more then that, is there not an enemie on foote, that laboureth the corruption of the whole? Then what authoritie here may be limited so straight, as in this time may not be thought too large? what time may be so shorte, which may not be deemed too long? Therefore let every good and faithfull councellour vnto the state, with Cato resist here the proroging of Caesar his go∣vernement, least too late with Pompey they acknowledge their er∣rour: it shall not suffice here to graunt but one yeare more vnto Appius Claudius; neither is it sufficient that Caesar is holden in dis∣grace with the Citie of Rome; neither may we here safely beleeve all which shall saie vnto Pompey, Caesar is hated of the garrisons, and souldiers: for when Caesar commeth with his fortune, he shall then force, as well Pompey, as the Citie of Rome, to acknowledge their former follies and errours:

Sol.

But nowe vnto what per∣son may this authority be safely graunted, is a matter herein, not vnworthy of consultation.

Ep:

It is safely graunted vnto a man approved to be good and honest, with this caution, that he be not of such power and force, as the state may stand in feare of his great∣nes. For the best sometimes have fallen by reason of honours and dignities into a generall corruption of manners, and therefore we receive it as a proverbe, honores mutant mores.

Sol.

At no time then is it safely committed into the handes of personages of great might, power, and wealth.

Ep:

You have saide the trueth: for what daunger did arise to the state of Athens, by constituting Garralde Fitz Garralde attained, Liuetenant of Salamina? who having at once might, power, and soveraigne commaunde∣ment in his handes, did eftsoones conspire, and combine, sun∣dry treasons, and rebellions.

Sol:

The recordes of Salamina doth witnes so much as you have saide, for there it is alleadged, that he did conspire with the French king and Emperour, for the inva∣ding and possessing of Salamina: he did also in proper person in∣vade the Countie of Kylkennie, there burning, destroying, & mur∣thering the kinges subiectes: he did invade also with Oneyle, and

his forces, O Coner, and other of the saide Earle his friends, alies, and servants, by his commandement the County of Vriell; where∣in he was aided, and assisted by Sir Iohn, brother vnto the saide Earle. The like or greater daunger did growe vnto the state of Athens, by constituting Thomas Fitz Garralde, sonne and heire to the saide Earle, Lieutenant of Salamina: who succeeding in the place of his father, having the like might, power, & forces lent vn∣to him by his friends, alies, and servantes, and soveraine authoritie given from the king, did eftsoones revile that famous Citie of A∣thens, and his lawfull soveraigne, and moved all rebellions against them; and did therewith also addresse his letters vnto the Bishop of Rome, & the Emperour, for the invading of Salamina: and farther did put to death, and cruelly murthered all those which were re∣sident within the lande of Salamina, being borne Citizens of Athe∣ns, and amongst others did put to death that reverende father and faithfull counceller Iohn Allin Archbishoppe of Deublin, and primate of Salamina. More then this, he constrained with his pow∣er and forces, the subiectes of Athens, to give vnto him an oath of obedience, & forthwith besieged the Castle of Deublin, where with his whole armie by the sea coast he incamped, for the better resisting, destroying, and murthering the army of Athens,* 1.1 as they landed. No lesse dangers then these formerly rehearsed, appeared at such times, when as the Duke of Yorke pretending himselfe Live∣tenant of the saide lande, did with his power, and forces, occupie and possesse all the territories and dominions thereof. Therefore of late daies, hath the Counsell of Athens most providently com∣mitted this soveraine authority vnto such, as may not be able with forces and power to vsurpe the same. But if vnto this authoritie thus given, to effect a reformation, the consentes and good-wils of the people be founde agreeable, no doubt the ••am•• shall migh∣tily further that action.

CAP. 4. The good-will and consent of the people is a readie meanes to effect a reformation.

EPI:

You have saide the truth: for where the good-will of the people is first wonne and obtained, there the mutation is made, without difficultie and daunger. All which may live∣ly appeare in the history of Tarquine, who having lost as well the good-will of the people, as of the Senate, by changing the aunci∣ent lawes & customes of the Citie of Rome, was easily expelled that kingdome.

Sol:

It is true that you have said; for he did drawe vnto himselfe all the authority, as well of the Senate, as also of the liber∣ty of the people, which sometimes they inioied vnder their former kinges, and for this cause chiefely, he failed of the good-will of the people, in this his mutation and alteration of thinges. But Brutus on the contrary, having wonne the good-wil of the people, for the effecting of a reformation, and expelling of Tarquine, did chaunge the state of the common-weale, without anie difficultie, daun∣ger, or iniurie sustained by anie other, then the expelling of Tar∣quine. Likewise, when the Medicei Ʋrbe Florentinorum Anno salutis M.CCCC.XL.IIII. pellebantur, the chaunge was made without daunger and difficultie, for as much as the same was effected by the good-will and consentes of the people. Sith therefore the consente of the people, doth give so great furthe∣raunce vnto this action of reformation, it seemeth a matter verie necessarie, that everie Magistrate shoulde retaine the arte, skill, and knowledge, of perswading and inducing the multitude, as you have in the first chapter of this booke well remembred.

CAP. 5. The force of perswasions, and how necessarie the same is to effect a reformation.

EPIMEN:

So it is indeede, for the good-will and con∣sente of the people, doeth promise no small security vnto the Magistrate which intendeth this action of reformation: and therefore not without cause, Pythagoras was of all sortes of persons greatlie honoured, for his singular arte and knowe∣ledge in winning the affections of the multitude, and in perswa∣ding, and disswading the people, all which Plutarch witnesseth after this manner,

Pythagoras which lov'd to dwell, In highest dignitie: And had a heart to glorie bent, And past in pollicie: Much like a man which sought, By charming to inchaunt: Did vse this arte to winne mens mindes, Which vnto him did haunt. His grave and pleasant tongue, In sugred speech did flowe, Whereby he drewe most mindes of men, To bent of his owne bowe.

Though Lycurgus vvas the eleventh which descended from the right line of Hercules, though a man of great authoritie, of great force, of long continuance a king, yet indevoring a reformati∣on of many disorders, which did chiefely arise in that estate, by the inequallitie of landes and possessions, therein (as Plutarch witnesseth) he vsed more persuasions, then force: a good vvit∣nesse thereof was the losse of his eie. You Solon also altered and

reformed that in the common-wealth of Athens, vvhich you thought by reason you shoulde perswade your citizens vnto, or els by force you ought to compell them to accept.

Epi:

The Romaines therefore well vnderstanding the force of persuasions, in all actions of reformation, did institute the holy order of the Fae∣ciales, vvho retayning the art of perswading, and disswading the people, did much further the common-weale of Rome; for they went many times in person to those that did the Romaines iniurie, and sought to perswade them with good reason to keepe promise with the Romaines, and to offer them no wrong: they did also perswade the people, to deliver Fabius Ambustus, vnto the Gaules, as one that had violated the lawes of armes, and farther proved by manie reasons, that a present reformation made of that disorder and iniustice, woulde deliuer Rome from many ca∣lamities, then like to insue by the power of the Gaules. By this art and skill of persuading, did Camillus appease the great sedition and mutinye, raysed sometimes by the people of Rome against the Senators, for that they had not their full minde and libertie, to inhabite the citie of Vies. By this art and skil, you Solon have now of late induced the Athenians to make warres with the Megari∣ans for the possessing of Salamina, contrarie to their former liking, publike lawes, and proclamations made in that behalfe: and the like honour did you sometimes winne by your oration, made in the defence of the temple of Apollo, in the citie of Delphos, de∣claring, that it was not meete to bee suffred, that the Cyrrhaeians should at their pleasure abuse the sanctuarie of the oracle; by force of which persuasions, the councell of Amphictions was tho∣roughly mooved, so that they sought a present reformation thereof. By this your art and skill, you also perswaded those which in Athens they sometimes called the abiectes and excom∣municates, to be iudged, whereby you did quench and appease two mighty factions, the one supported by the issues of the rebels, that rose with Cylon, and the other by the ofspring of Megacles.

Sol:

I acknowledge this your friendly reporte, not as a testimo∣nie of anie art or skill, but of the office and duetie which I beare vnto the citie of Athens. But after this manner sometimes a no∣table

mutinye and sedition raysed by the citizens of Salamina, a∣gainst the Iustices of assizes and iayle deliverie, in my presence was happely appeased. But nowe sith the necessitie of the art and skill of perswading is sufficiently made knowne vnto vs, there remaineth, that you describe vnto vs the art it selfe, with the partes and members thereof.

CAP. 6. The art and skill of perswading, worthely knowne and observed of all publike Magistrates.

EPI:

The art and skill of perswading, consisteth in the know∣ledge of two matters especially: first we must know hovve to commende the matter, or person of such as vve intende to perswade; then how to moove, winne, and dispose the affecti∣ons of the people. For the first, the Poet saith truly, that he singeth most sweetely, that singeth my praise and commenda∣tion.

Sol:

This which you have saide, did manifestly appeare after the battaile of Xerxes fought with the Graecian army, for then all the Graecian Captaines being in the straight of Peloponne∣sus, did sweare vpon the altar of their sacrifices, that they vvould give their voices after their consciences to those they thought had best deserved it, where every one gave himselfe the first place for worthines, and the seconde vnto Themistocles. After this manner, did Publicola winne the good-will of Appius Claudius, a man of great strength and reputation among the Sabines, in gi∣ving honour vnto him, by the way of an embassage, whereby he gave Claudius to vnderstande, that he knevv him right well to be a iust man, and hated vvithout cause of his citizens; and there∣fore if he had any desire to provide for his safetie, and to repaire to Rome, leaving them which causelesse wished him so much evill, they would publikely and privatly receiue him vvith due honour; by vvhich meanes, Publicola did not onely winne Ap∣pius Claudius vvith those of his faction, which were great and ma∣nie in number, but also staied and turned the warres from the

Romaines, then intended by the Latynes and Sabines.

Sol:

There remaineth now, that you disclose vnto vs the knowledge, howe to vvinne, move, and dispose the affections of the people, as the second part and member, of the art and skill of perswading.

CAP. 7. The skill and knowledge how to winne, moone, and dispose the affections of the people.

EPI:

Herein three matters especially are founde worthy of consideration: first the affections what they be; secondari∣lie the subiect and matter, wherewith they vsually are moo∣ved, and carried awaie, as with the violence of some tempest; thirdly the waies how to winne, moove, and perswade the peo∣ple, according to the example of the worthiest and wisest in times past. The affections which be the first, are in number these; love, hatred, hope, feare, dispaire, and such like; the matter and subiect which is the second, is parentage, consan∣guinity, friendes, goods, possessions, landes, the custome and manner of living, honours, libertie and life; the presence whereof wee loue and imbrace, and with their absence wee are soone carried away vnto wrath, hatred, revenge, hope, feare, and dispaire: therefore from hence as from a fountaine, have the wise governours in former ages, drawne all the force of per∣suading; by the same have they induced the people to imbrace matters profitable to the common-weale, even against their wils. And hovv mightely these transitory thinges haue alwaies appeared in the eie of the multitude, it may appeare by the aun∣swere given from the Athenians vnto Themistocles, whereas he perswaded the people to leave their citie, goods, possessions, and landes, and to get them to the sea for the better eschewing of the Barbarian forces, vvhich then were so mighty, as the same might not vvell be withstoode by the proper forces of the Athe∣nians: In vaine (saith the people vnto Themistocles) doe we then seeke the preservation of our lives, vvhen wee shall forsake the

graves of our fathers and auncetours. Such vvas the love they bare vnto those transitory thinges: and therefore one amongest the rest, spake in choler vnto Themistocles after this manner; The∣mistocles, for a man that hath neither citie nor house, it is an e∣vill part to will others that haue, to forsake all; but Themistocles turning to him, replied, vve have willingly forsaken houses and walles (saith he) cowardly beast that thou art, because vvee vvill not become slaves, for feare to loose thinges that have nei∣ther soule nor life.

Sol:

Novv you are to give vs to vnderstand, of the sundry vvaies and meanes, hovv to vvinne, mooue, and dispose the affections of the people, vvhich is the thirde and last matter by you remembred, worthy of every publike magi∣strate, vvhich shall indevour the knovvledge and art of per∣swading.

CAP. 8. Perswasions are after two sortes; the wales, and meanes, how to perswade, and induce the multitude; the art and skill required in all perswasions ordinary.

EPI:

The vvaies and meanes how to vvinne, mooue, and dispose the affections of the people, are vsuallie after tvvo sortes: the one ordinary; the other extraordinary. The ordinary vvaies and meanes, are in number three: First you shall vvisely observe the affections of such persons, as you intende to perswade; secondarilie, you shall vviselie acquit, and deliver, as vvell the matter, as the person of him that perswadeth, from all suspition of fraude and guile; lastly you shall dravv the people vnto a particular consideration of the matter you intende to per∣swade. We must diligently observe their affections; for so Pha∣nias Lesbian vvriteth, that the mighty and daungerous faction sometimes entertained betwixt the rich and the poorer sort of the citie of Athens, vvas by you Solon easelie pacified, in that you dili∣gently observed the affections of either, and did secretly pro∣mise the poore to devide the landes, vvherewith they remained

highly pleased, to the rich you promised the confirmation of their contracts, which was the matter they chiefely desired. Also you did not let to feede their humours and affections with the dailie publishing of this sentence, equality doth breede no strife; the which did please as well the rich and wealthie, as the poore and needy sorte; for the one conceived of this worde equality, that you woulde measure all thinges according to the quality of the men, and the other tooke, for their purpose, that you would mea∣sure things by the number, and by the poule onely; thus both be∣ing pleased with you, for that you well observed their humours and affections, they gave into your handes soveraine authoritie for the ending of all quarrels, whereby that mighty faction was happely appeased, to the generall good of Athens. You also well observed the affections of the people, when as you clothed things bitter and vnpleasant, with pleasing names; calling taxes, con∣tributions; garrisons, gardes; prisons, houses; and such like: by the which pollicie, you made even things odious, pleasing and acceptable to the people, and easily thereby perswaded the em∣bracing thereof. In like manner Themistocles indevouring like a wise generall to augment his strengthes by the aide of the Ioni∣ans, in his warres against the Persians, did wisely observe the affe∣ctions as well of the Ionians, as of the Persians then his enemies: for passing by some places, where he knewe the enemie must of necessity fall vppon that coast for harborough, hee did in∣grave certaine wordes spoken vnto the Ionians, in great letters in stone, which he founde there by chaunce, or otherwise brought thither for that purpose; these were the wordes, that the Ionians should take the Graecians part, being their first founders and aun∣cetours, and such as sought for their liberty; or at the least they shoulde trouble the army of the Barbarous people, and doe them all the mischiefe they coulde, when the Graecians shoulde come to fight with them: by these wordes thus in graven, and dispersed in fitte places, where the enemy was likely to harborough, he hoped either to induce the Ionians to take their part, or at the least, that therby he should make the Barbarous people, ielous and mistrust∣full of them.

CAP. 9. How that the Magistrate which intendeth to perswade the mul∣titude, must wisely acquite himselfe of all suspicion of fraude.

SOL:

Nowe you have sufficientlie discoursed of the first meanes, whereby the multitude doe rest perswaded, the se∣cond nowe remaineth, namely, the knowledge howe to deli∣ver the matter and person of him that perswadeth, from all sus∣pition of fraude and guile; for then all perswasions move migh∣tily, and make a deepe impression in the heartes of the people, when like vnto cleare waters, they descende from the pure foun∣taine of integrity. Therefore when Alcibiades perswaded the people of Athens to invade and occupie the empire of Sicilia, wel hoping that the people woulde assigne him general of that armie, Niceas a man of rare and excellent virtues, rather regarding the publicke good then his privat profit, disswaded the contrarie; and to the ende the people shoulde be throughly perswaded of his in∣tegritie herein, he spake vnto them after this manner: in times of peace, the Citie of Athens affordeth many Citizens, which shall have place before me, but in times of warre, I nothing doubt but to be the chiefe and first among them; and therefore be you confident in this, that I nowe disswade the warres, for that it standeth more with the publicke good, then with my private pro∣fitte. In like manner Numa, the better to deliver himselfe from the suspicion of fraude, in all matters wherein he laboured to in∣duce and perswade the people, hee observed two matters especi∣ally: first he perswaded them, that he did worke t••e reformati∣on of that common-weale by the meanes and helpe of the Gods, in which action no fraude may receive place, for that they be for the most parte, alwaies accompanied with integrity and since∣rity of minde; secondlie hee perswaded nothing vnto the peo∣ple, but that which himselfe performed in person: for Numa iudging it no light enterprise (saieth Plutarch) to plucke downe

the hautie stomackes of so fierce and warlike a people, did paci∣fie their fierce courages to fight, with daily sacrifices, prayer, and devotion, wherein he ever celebrated himselfe in person. In like manner, when you Solon were to publish your lawe called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the better to perswade the people of your integrity here∣in, you were the first that followed your owne proclamation, and clearely released your debters of fifteene talentes then due vnto your selfe.

Sol:

So I did, though it stoode with my losse and hin∣derance. But nowe there remaineth the thirde and last meanes, vvherewith the multitude is mightely induced and perswaded, formerly by you remembred, vvorthy of consultation, namely, that vve drawe the people vnto a particular consideration of such matters as vve intende to perswade.

CAP. 10. The magistrate which intendeth to perswade the multitude, must draw them vnto a particular consideration of such matters as he endevoureth to perswade.

EPI:

You have remembred that which I could not well for∣get, the fame being alwaies founde the most assured vvay to induce the people: for in consulting and disputing of mat∣ters in generall, they greatly erre, iudging all thinges to pro∣ceede from other causes, then from the true causes thereof. Ther∣fore vvisely Camillus, vvhen as he indevoured to perswade the people of Rome, from the inhabiting of the citie of Ʋies, then for the same cause being fallen into a mutinie, he descended vn∣to particulars with the multitude, and pointed vvith his finger vnto the graves of their fathers, and auncetours, saying, will you needes inhabite the citie of Ʋies? And will you forthvvith forsake the graves of your fathers and auncetours? And will you now leave the holy temples dedicated to the Gods, and sanctified by Numa and Romulus? And wil you suffer the holy fire now new∣ly kindled, now once againe to bee put out? And finallie, vvill you leave this your naturall citie (pointing with his finger vnto

the citie of Rome) to be inhabited by straungers in time to come, or els to be a common pasture for vvilde beasts to feede on? By vvhich manner of perswasion he eftsoones appeased the mutinye, and quenched their ardent desire for the inhabitinge of Ʋies. Af∣ter this manner, did Pacuvius proceede in pacifiyng and subduing the peoples affections from killing their Senatours; which matter by them was fully determined, vntill such time, as he conven∣ting the people and Senatours, as for the hearing and determining of some publike and waighty cause, did proceede with them af∣ter this manner: now my friends and Citizens (saith he) that which you have even with an ardent desire and affection long wished, namelie the punishment and correction of this detestable and wicked Senate, the same hath fortune now given into your powre and handes, freely to dispose of them at your pleasure, being nowe altogether naked, and closed in on everie side with walles, where, without tumult of the Citie, and perill of your persons, you may freely dispose of them; but least you shoulde preferre the desire of private revenge, before the common safety of al here gathered together, it behooveth before you give sentence of these Senatours, whom you doe mortallie hate, that you proceede first to the choice of others; for of force you must either have Sena∣tours, which alwaies have bene the most wise and fit councellors of free estates; or otherwise you must of necessitie fall into the hands of a Lorde or King, which free estates haue ever hated; proceede therefore to the election of new, and make choice of better men, which may supply their places: this matter appearing vnto the people doubtfull, did hold them long in silence, but at the last one among the rest beeing nominated, their clamour and noyse farre exceeded their former silence, some affirming they knewe him not, some accusing his person, others despising his base art and science; and much more in the choice of the second, and third, this dissension was increased, they being more base and obscure, then the first: then beholdinge the grounde, vvith shame fastnes they confessed their former errour, sayinge, they did chuse rather to tollerate an old evill, then a new, which might farre exceede the olde. In like manner the people of Rome, con∣sulting

at large, founde that they sustained in all warres the grea∣test force of the enemie, they found themselves also to be called to all labours and workes, whereby the common-wealth was to be preserved or augmented, and so forthwith they iudged them∣selues as worthy of the office and dignity of the Tribuneship, and Consulship, as any Patrician whatsoever: and therevppon con∣tended, that the Tribunes should be equally elected, as wel of the one as of the other sorte; the which beeing vnto them graun∣ted, and descending to make election, could finde none in particu∣lar worthy of that honour, or at the least so worthy as the Patrici∣ans and nobles were; then forthwith they did acknowledge their former errour, and made choice of the Patricians only. After this manner, the people generallie consulting of the delaies and cunctation, which Fabius vsed in repelling the forces of Hannibal, forthwith they condemned him to be a cowarde and faint harted; but afterward they waighing that their councell by the severall e∣vents and overthrowes they received by the rash and over-hasty proceeding of Ʋarro the Consull, and of Marcus Senteinius, with others, they did soone after adiudge the wisedome of Fabius to be some rare and divine influence received from the Gods. In like sort the people of Rome, after such time as Brutus and Cas∣sius had fully executed the conspiracie then intended against the person of Caesar, generally consulting of that action, remained for a time, as indifferent beholders thereof, neither accusing, neither yet making allowance thereof; but no sooner did Caesar his friendes shevv forth his testament, his severall legacies vnto the people, his manie and cruell woundes, and those every where freshly bleeding and increasing like a running streame, the peo∣ple as possessed with some furie or frencie, every vvhere in the market place, every where in the corners of the streete, in pri∣vat houses, in the fieldes, and in the vvoodes also, cruelly mur∣dred all such, as vvere partakers vvith Brutus in that action. After this manner, the auncient Tirantes of Athens, contending some∣times to perswade the people to labour, and especially to til and ploughe the grounde, thereby to render them more obedient vnto their governement, did give out a certaine fable; they

tell of the Goddesse Pallas, that shee contending vvith Neptune about the patronage of the countrie of Athens, brought foorth and shewed to the Iudges the Olive tree, by meanes whereof she obtained the preheminence: by vvhich particular demonstra∣tion made, the people vvere mightily induced to labour and till the land. After this manner the people of Rome, generallie con∣sulting of the division of landes gained by conquest, did fall in∣to mutinies and seditions against the Senators; then vvisely the Senators deducted forthwith certaine colonies out of the confines of Italie, vvhereby eftsoones the multitude vvere given to vn∣derstande, of the particular charge, travell, and other sundry in∣conveniences, that did arise by possessing of lands gained by con∣quest, vvherewith all mutinies vvere appeased. Thus the magistrate that intendeth to perswade the people, must not ge∣nerally consult of matters, but must descende vnto particulars vvith them; and therefore that oratour shall most readilie per∣swade, vvhich shall dravv his argumentes and the force of his perswasion, ab effectibus, ab exemplis, or such like: and these be the ordinarie perswasions.

Sol:

There remaineth nowe the other sote, tearmed by you perswasions extraordinary,

CAP. 11. Perswasions extraordinary, and when or at what time they be requisite and necessarie.

EPI:

Such were they which Themistocles sometimes vsed, for (saith Plutarch) vvhen all other perswasions failed, and coulde not worke that publicke good which he then inten∣ded, hee did threaten the Athenians with signes from heaven, and with Oracles, and aunsweres; and when as he coulde not per∣swade the Citizens of Athens, no not for the safegarde of their lives, to departe the Citie at the comming of Xerxes, vvhose for∣ces they were not able to withstande, hee pollitiquely caused a brute to be spread abroade among the people, that the Goddesse Minerva, the protector and defender of the Citie of Athens, had

forsaken the Citie, pointing them the vvaie vnto the sea; and againe, he vvonne them with a prophesie, which commaunded them to save themselves in walles of woode, saying, that the walles of woode, did signifie nothing else but ships; and for this cause Apollo in his Oracle, called Salamina divine, not miserable and vnfortunate, because it shoulde give the name of a most hap∣pie victorie, vvhich the Graecians shoulde gette there; by vvhich extraordinarie perswasions, hee did induce them at the last to leave the Citie of Athens, and to betake themselves to the sea: by occasion vvhereof, they did not onely deliver themselves from the handes of their enemies, but became at the last conquerours, and victours over them. In like manner, when all ordinarie meanes of perswading failed to effect the re∣formation sometimes intended by Numa, he made his recourse to these extraordinarie helpes and meanes, laying before the peoples eies a terrour and feare of their Gods, bearing them in hande, that they had seene straunge visions, or that he had heard voices, by vvhich their Gods did threaten them with some great troubles and plagues: whereby hee did pull downe and humble their hearts (as Plutarch witnesseth) and made thereby a thorough chaunge and reformation, aswell of the common-weale, as of the manners of the people. Therefore Plutarch not without iudgment affirmeth, that the multitude in matters vvaightie, and difficult, rest satisfied and perswaded, rather by extraordinarie, then by or∣dinary meanes: all which he doeth lively manifest, vvhereas he induceth the multitude exclaiming vppon Themistocles, for not sacrificing the three young prisoners, in so much as Themistocles for∣ced by their rage and clamour, did sacrifice at the last the three pri∣soners; wherewith the people remained fully perswaded, that the victorie shoulde be given vnto them over their enemies. Againe, sometimes it fareth vvith the multitude, as with the sicke patient, vvhich being overcome with the greatnesse of his malady, is ther∣by become so impatient, as he refuseth all wholesome medicines, vvhich may breed his health and safety; the vvhich malady some∣times possessed the people of Athens, when as they reiected your counsell for the vvithstanding of the tyranny of Pisistratus, ha∣ving

then newly vvith his forces entered the castle, and forte of A∣thens, vvherewith the people stoode so amazed, as they shewed themselves more vvilling to suffer that evill, then able to pre∣vent the same by your counsell.

Sol:

This happeneth oftentimes, when the people with the suddennes or waightines of the matter, are found dulled, mazed, and oppressed, and thereby as with some great malady remaine overcome; or otherwise, when they finde themselves formerly deluded, by the like matter, or by the same persons, & dare not, or wil not nowe give confidence, though for the present he perswadeth nothing, but that which is expedient & profitable for thē: the which matters, the people of Rome obie∣cted sometimes against the Senators, when by the feare of forraine warres, they went about to frustrate the lawe of division: and in these cases as Danta reporteth in his Monarchie, even with open voice, they embrace their ruine, and abhorre their safetie and welfare. But now let vs proceede vnto the fourth way and means, namely, sufficient forces which in such cases are to bee prepared, whereby the Magistrate with greater safety and assurance may ef∣fect a reformation.

CAP. 12. Howe strength, power, and forces, are necessarie for the better effecting of a reformation, and how in good time, the same ought to be applied.

EPI:

In the reformation of Athens, you Solon found the ne∣cessity of forces, when neither the good-wils and consents of the people, neither the absolute auctoritie which they gave into your handes, neither yet the art and skill of perswading vvhich then in the highest manner you retained, vvas found suf∣ficient to suppresse the ambition of Pisistratus, or to confirme the reformation which you had newly established, for that you wan∣ted sufficient power and forces, for the better effecting thereof. Therefore this magistrate which shall intende this action of re∣formation,

must with Publicola have sufficient powre to execute his vertues and well disposed minde: for by this meanes especial∣ly did hee alter, chaunge, and reforme a mighty kingdome, vvhich had continued a long time, and vvas thoroughly establi∣shed.

Sol:

For this cause chiefely, I must confesse, that I was alto∣gither vnprovident in taking vppon me the function and office of a king, to decide all controversies and broyles, at the instance of my friendes and citizens, and yet refused the kingly name and powre, the which then vvas offred vnto mee, and vvithout the which I founde by experience, that I coulde never safely execute that which seemed to me then profitable for the beter reformation of the common-weale of Athens.

Epi:

So it appeared; for soone after you well vnderstoode your former errour, the vvhich you did sometimes liberally confesse, saying after this manner, that with the authoritie and power then committed into your handes, a man possiblie

Could not controll the peoples mindes, Nor still their braines that wrought like windes.

Sol:

You have saide the truth: and for the same cause also at ano∣ther time, I coulde not appease the sedition vvhich did some∣times arise in Athens by reason of the inequality of landes and possessions after the example of Lycurgus, by making an equall division thereof, for that I had not then the power, forces, and authority of Lycurgus. Howbeit I performed that which possi∣blie I might vvith the small power and forces then given into my handes by the Citizens of Athens.

Epi:

Surely this occasion of reformation is full of difficulties, as you have saide, and manie will still be founde, which shalbe discontented therewith; the which hath beene espied by men of wisedome, and such as have beene experienced in such cases, and sometimes your selfe not without iust cause did acknowledge in these verses follow∣ing.

Full harde it is all mindes content to have, And speciallie in matters harde and grave.

Many and vniust are the accusations and attemptes of the mul∣titude, against such as have authority and commaundement o∣ver them; great and many be they in number, especially in com∣mon-weales corrupted in manners, vvhich doe labour and tra∣vel so with envy against all excellent men, as that they rather wish their countries destruction, then by them a prosperous reforma∣tion thereof; by the which occasions, the faith and services of men, are oftentimes sinisterly interpreted, sometimes by opinion, some∣times by malice, as well to the overthrowe of great and profita∣ble actions, as also of worthie and faithfull servitors.

Sol:

There∣fore Moyses, before he coulde establish the lawes, which God vnto him had delivered, and commaunded, founde it necessa∣rie, vvith forces to remove such, as being pricked forwarde with envie, did oppose themselves against his intended reformation, And Hieronymus Savanarole vvanting sufficient forces, was soone oppressed by the envie of others, and fayled of his intended re∣formation, as it may appeare by his sermons, Contra sapientes hu∣ius mundi.

Ep:

Neither is it sufficient in these cases to have for∣ces, but as necessarie it is to make vse thereof, and in due time to applie the same to the better furtheraunce of this action of reformation: vvhereof Lycurgus fayling, did establish his refor∣mation with the losse of his eie, and with no small daunger vnto his person, for that he contended rather with perswasions then with forces, to establish a reformation of auncient lawes and cu∣stomes, and of the landes and possessions of the Citizens. In like manner Peter Soderin, having sufficient forces that might well have overcome the envy and malice of such as were founde to oppose themselves against him, did not in time applie the same, and make vse thereof, but rather contended with benefites and with a iust and honest course of life, to overcome the envie and

malice of such as vvithstoode his reformation; whereby in a short time, he did not onely perish and vndoe himselfe, but also did o∣verthrowe his country and regiment; forgetting that which now is everie where in experience, that the malice of the envious man, may neither with offices nor benefites be pleased and reconciled.

Sol:

If the necessity of forces be great to effect a reformation, (as it plainely appeareth by that which hath bene saide) in such com∣mon-weals especially where the manners of the people are found corrupted, then much greater is the necessity thereof, when re∣formation is to be made of a common-weale, gained by the sword and conquest, as also corrupted in manners; for that the people having here sustained many iniuries by force and violence, where∣unto the conquerour is drawne oftentimes by their disobedience, maie not at anie time after with newe benefites, offices, and re∣wardes, be reconciled and pacified: neither shall we finde here profitable lawes, or any sufficient meanes to effect a reformation, without sufficient forces, to repell all daungers, and difficulties: all which Salamina may well witnes vnto the worlde; for when as the governour there, did contende to suppresse by publike pro∣clamation thorough out the whole province of Mounster, that detestable custome of Coiney and Livery, and other extortions, which had then consumed the marrowe and fatnesse of that com∣mon-weale of Salamina; then it was founde not sufficient to have the same established by late lawes, whereunto the whole par∣liament had agreed and consented; neither vvas it sufficient, that the same tended to the vniversall good of the common-weale; but forces herein also were requisite, to suppresse the But∣lers, and Garroldines, which then on every side did arise in the mainteinaunce of that detestable custome of Coiney and Livery: all which Sir Warram Sentlenger, then provinciall governour, can well witnes: by whose care and diligence togither with the aide and as∣sistaunce of the forces and garrisons of Salamina, they were soone suppressed. Forces being thus necessarie for the effecting of a re∣formation, into whose handes the same is to be given, is the fifth and last meanes worthy of consultation.

CAP. 13. Howe a Magistrate of rare and excellent vertues is required in this action of refor∣mation.

EPI:

This action of reformation with sufficient forces, for the better effecting thereof, is to be given into the hands of some man of rare and excellent vertues, by whose constancy and integrity, the envy and malice of the enemy may be quenched. Therefore the Florentines did not a litle erre, which in the times of their difficult warres, helde Antonie Iacomine above all others in greate estimation, for that onely he had taught the Florentine ar∣my, as it were with his finger, to fight, conquer, and commaund: yet in milder times, when as the warres by his industrie were growne easie and placable, they little regarded those his vertues, in such sort, as when three Captaines were propounded to be cho∣sen for the suppressing of the Pisans, he was not accepted to be one of that number; from the which errour this mischiefe did arise vn∣to the Florentines, that the Pisans, which by the industry of Antonie might easily have beene reformed, and forced to have obeyed the Florentines, made eftsoones head against those vnskilful Captaines so strongly, as the Florentines were forced dishonourably to pur∣chase their obedience with money. Againe Phillip of Macedonie, after he had behelde the affaires of the Athenians to be given into the handes of Molosses, Caridemus, and such other vnskilfull Cap∣taines, he conceived a great hope to overcome them. In like man∣ner, the weakenes and facilitie of Collatinus the Consull, did much encourage the traitours, in such sorte, as he had never prevailed against the Tarquines, nor reformed the state of Rome, if the great vertue and severitie of Brutus had not governed at that time the helme and sterne; whereby the courage and boldnes of the traitours, raised by the suffrance and lenitie of Collatinus, as a tempest was suddenly calmed and pacified.

Sol:

Therefore pro∣vident

were the counsel of Athens in committing this actiō of the reformation of Salamina, sometimes into the handes of the L. Gray, sometimes into the handes of Sir William Russell as vnto another Iacomine, by whose rare skill and knowledge in militarie discipline, the Pisans have and will be forced at the last to obey the Floren∣tines. But let vs nowe proceede vnto the forme and manner of al∣tering of auncient lawes and customes, as the second parte and member of your generall division, worthy of consultation.

CAP. 14. The forme and manner of altering the auncient lawes and customes of common-weales.

EPI:

The forme and manner of altering auncient lavves and customes, is vsually after two sortes: either simulac statim; or othervvise, s••••sim panlatimque, antequam ab omnibus id a∣nimadvertatur. After this first manner, you Solon reformed the citie of Athens: for you did not straight plucke vp the mischiefe by the rootes, but by little and little you chaunged their lawes, cu∣stomes, and manner of living. After this manner, did Numa alter and chaunge the accustomed manner of living, and the manners of the citizens of Rome, from a warlike liberty to a life peaceable and obedient, and that by little and little as (Plutarch witnesseth.) But others led with the opinion and reason of Plato, say, that to re∣forme a mischiefe after this manner, is no other but to cut of one of the Hydraes heads, of the vvhich came afterwardes seven in the place: and therefore Agis and Cleomenes toke vpon them to make a chaunge and innovation even at once, and as it vvere with one constant stroake of the hande, to cut of all the mischiefes of their country, so as wee may conclude, that the formes and maners of reforming of mischiefes in the common-weales, be sun∣dry and diverse, the which proceede sometimes of the diversi∣tie of meanes and occasions, which diverslie doe offer themselves; as also from the diversitie of the subiect and matter, which being

diverse in it selfe, requireth a different forme of governement.

Sol:

You have saide the truth; and therefore a vvise governour doth governe diverslie according to the meanes and occasions offred, taking every thing in his best time vvherein hee meanes to deale, the which commendacion was sometime given not vndeservedly vnto Publicola.

Epi:

You Solon did sometimes reforme the citie of Athens, not as you might have done, neither yet as the necessi∣tie of that common-weale required, as well in respect that the first institution thereof was meere popular, corrupt, and not du∣rable, as also for that it vvas declined by many and infinite dis∣orders, so as it could not for these causes rehearsed have long con∣tinuance, vvithout making a thorough reformation of auncient lawes, customes, and governement, and vvithout pulling vp the mischiefes even by the rootes; the which with that small powre and meanes then left vnto you, you durst not attempt, least by turning vpside-downe the vvhole governement, you might af∣terwards have never beene able to settle and establish the same a∣gaine: for these defectes chiefely in that reformation, it hath beene observed even of the wisest, that you Solon have already seene the overthrowe of your common-weale of Athens, and the tiranny of Pisistratus.

Sol:

Yes verily, I did well foresee the same, but yet having neither meanes nor power to resist so hard destinies, I was forced to sustaine the person, rather of a sorrow∣full beholder, then a reformer of so great calamities: but more happie and fortunate was Lycurgus, Publicola, and Cleomenes, and such others, though nothing superiours to my selfe in that care and love which every citizen beareth vnto his Countrie, for that they had sufficient power and meanes left vnto them (as Plutarch wit∣nesseth) to execute their vertuous desire, vvhereby they made a thorough chaunge and reformation of their common-weales, by cutting vp all mischiefes by the rootes, by reason whereof the state of their common-weales continued long, happy, and pros∣perous.

Sol:

But what difficulty ariseth from the diversitie of the subiect and matter?

CAP. 15. The consideration of the subiect and matter of all reformations, and howe the same is divers in it selfe, and con∣sequently requireth a different forme of governement.

EPI:

The matter and subiect of all reformations is diverse in it selfe, and therefore admitteth the sundry formes of refor∣mation aforesaid: for sometimes the matter or subiect which is to be reformed, is a mischiefe or evill by long continuance in∣veterate, and growne to the height of his strength and perfection, and there the same shalbe more wisely sometimes indured, then hastily rooted out, to the overthrow of the common-wealth: the which caution if Tiberius Gracchus had sometimes well observed, the citie of Rome had not so hastily declined, and fallen to her last ruine and destruction.

Sol:

But Plutarch led with a contrarie opinion, commended the law Agraria, as the worthiest act that ever Tiberius performed.

Epi:

Therein he erred much: for this law was not vnworthy onely of a wise citizen in those times, and in that manner as he then preferred the same, but farther was the overthrow of the common-weale.

Sol:

It seemeth also requi∣site, that so often as the subiect or matter of this reformation commeth in question, that we make a difference in the manner of reforming of a free and popular estate, from the Monarchy; for in this one, we shal wisely make a thorough alteration and change, without leaving any resemblaunce or shadow thereof; but in the other, we are to chaunge the substaunce, leaving in the place onely a shadowe and resemblance of that which is chaunged, for the better contentment of the people; for they discerne all things by the outward sence, and not by the sounde discourse of reason, iudging thinges to be such as they seeme to be in outwarde appea∣rance. This order did the Romaines sometimes obserue in institu∣ting of there popular governement, and in reforming of auncient lawes and customes, after they had expelled their kings; for they

altered the substaunce, and left in place thereof onely a shadow and resemblaunce of the thinges altered; for in place of their kings they produced two Consuls, sed vnum tantum faces habere vo∣luerant, & quidem totidem numero quot reges vsurpare solerent: and whereas their kings in person did perfourme certaine publicke sa∣crifices, regem sacrificulum creant qui hisce sacris praeesset, vt ne∣quaquam apud eos regum desiderium esset. Thus by retayning the shadowe onely of auncient lawes and customes, the people re∣maine thereby perswaded, that nothing of the substaunce there∣of is taken away or diminished: in like manner, they carefully observed this rule of pollicie in the creation and election of Ma∣gistrates and officers, for although they assigned vnto them newe offices & functions, yet they did wisely holde the auncient names, stile, and number with their former magistrates, that the people might deeme thereby nothing to be altered and chaunged.

CAP. 16. Of the right institution and reformation of a monarchie.

BVT otherwise wee are to institute and reforme a Monarchy, by making there a thorough alteracion and chaunge of aunci∣ent lawes, customes, and governement, yea and of the honours, ti∣tles, and dignities also, not leaving any shadow or resemblaunce in place thereof. For after this manner did king David establish an vniversall reformation. In like manner Lysander, did pull downe the pride of the citie of Athens, and tooke from them the libertie of a popular governement, vvhereby in former times it was ru∣led and governed, and established there sharpe and severe ma∣gistrates. But some others carried with a contrarie disposition of minde, have not attempted a thorough and generall reformation of the common-wealth, but reserved onely vnto themselves a principalitie and commaundement, the which forme of governe∣ment was observed by Sylla; for when he had taken the citie of A∣thens, after the citizens had made fierce warres with him, yet hee

lefte it free vnto them, enioying their owne laws. The same coun∣sell did other of the Romaines followe, as it appeareth by the wordes of Camillus vsed vnto the Senate after he had conquered the Latines: Dij immortales ita vos potentes huius concilij fecerunt, vt sit Latium an non sit, in vestra manu posuerint, si vultis crudelius consulere in deditos victos{que}; sed si vultis exemplo matorum augere rem Romanam vi∣ctos in civitatem accipiendo, materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppe∣tit. It seemeth therefore by the wordes of Camillus, that the Ro∣manes made not at al times a thorough and vniversal reformation of common-weales which they gained by conquest, but embra∣cing rather the counsell of Sylla, reserved onely a prncipalitie and commaundement; for by this meanes, they did easily nourish the ambition which they had in conquering: for such as have a pur∣pose to performe great actes, and to winne fame and glorie, ha∣ving a mighty power to effect the same, they maie safely follow the steppes of Sylla, and other of the Romaines, they may say with Camillus, let vs exemplo maiorum augere rem Romanam victos in civitatem accipiendo, materia crescendi persummam gloriam suppetit: but such as shall contend to make continuance of their conquest, being not of great forces and power, should imitate Lysander, and make a thorough and absolute reformation of the whole com∣mon-weale. For Plutarch erred not, when he saide that Sylla did performe the greater actes, but Lysander committed the few∣er faultes, and did possesse with greater securitie that which he conquered. Phillip of Macedonie, followed the steppes of Lysan∣der, whereby, possessing at the first but a small kingdome, he be∣came in a shorte time a mighty commaunder of all Greece.

Solo:

The Gaules in like manner following the steppes of Lysander, did securely possesse for a long time the partes of Italie, called Longo∣bardia: some others have beene found neither to imitate Sylla, nor Lysander, but have helde a meane course betwixt both, in establi∣shing their governement. Such were the Florentines, which in suppressing the rebellion of the Aretines, did remove some of their principall commaunders from their place and offices, others they bannished, manie they condemned, but they did not resume in∣to their handes the landes, which might have afforded sufficient

maintenaunce vnto their citizens, neither did they destroy the principall citie, but preserved the same; whereby they lost the opportunitie of confirming their empire and governement, and of augmenting their common-weale. This meane course hath never as yet beene founde happy and prosperous: For not throughly con¦quering our enemy, neither by sworde, neither yet by our boun∣tie and liberalitie, vve may not long holde them, either as sub∣iects or friendes. Therefore such as shall contend to be prosperous, and make continuance of their state, and governement, must with the Romaines, so suppresse and sharpely punish the Latines, as at no time they be able to rebell, or with bounty and goodnes so winne the affections of the privernates, as at no time they should be willing to rebell. The meane course in times past hath beene holden for the governement of Salamina by a long space; In which times they were never founde happy and prosperous in their governement.

Sol.

Now sith we have discoursed at large, of the reformation of auncient lawes and customes, and of the helps meanes and other rules therein to bee observed, as the first and principall matter in all reformations absolute and vniversall to be respected, there remaineth now a reformation of manners in the people, as a second matter worthily considered.

CAP. 17. Of the reformation of manners, and how that this vniversal and absolute reformation maie not be effected without the same, and how that the corruption of manners may be discerned by his fruites and effectes.

EPI:

The reformation of manners, doth mightily advance all common-weales, and doth render them prosperous, and fortunate, of long continuance.

Sol:

Therefore not vvith∣out cause did the Romanes, constitute Iudges, and Censors of the manners of the people, which did carefully from time to time, execute all the lawes, De morum censura. Neither was the place

of the Censores holden to be sacred, without due consideration of the common-wealth: Neither were they without cause above all other officers honoured in that common-wealth, in such sort, as they did depose, and displace, sometimes the Consuls, some∣times their Dictator, at their pleasure; for no doubt, what by the refomation made by the industry of their Censors, and by their skill and knowledge in militarie discipline, they quietly gover∣ned at home, and fortunately conquered abroad in all partes of the world. Therefore since the reformation of manners, is a matter of so great importaunce vnto estates and common-weales, it shall bee convenient, that you doe describe at large vnto vs what you intende thereby.

Epi:

We intende nothing els by a corruption of manners, but a departure from the feare and reve∣rence of God, from the honour and obedience due vnto Princes governours and Magistrates, from the love which wee owe vnto our Country, and generally a declining from a iust care and re∣garde of publike affaires, and all heroicall vertues, vnto plea∣sures, wantonnesse, vices, and other such private respectes and regardes.

Sol:

You have exactly described the same; for as the fatnesse and goodnesse of the earth, is easily discerned by the large profit and benefite it yeeldeth to the labouring hande; and the goodnesse of the tree by his pleasaunt fruite; so the corrupti∣on of manners in the people, by his infinite evils, miseries, com∣mon calamities, ruines, and destructiones of states, which eve∣ry where it begetteth and bringeth forth, as by his several fruites and effectes may be discerned. For it breedeth in men a base opi∣nion and estimation of vertues, and a contempt of magistrates, it offreth in open market the sale of offices, the voices of election, yea even Iustice it selfe, it enableth Caesar with the money of the Gaules to purchase not onely favour, and offices, but even the libertie of Rome. From this fountaine springeth ambition, desire of revenge, mutinies, sedition, treason, and rebellion, final∣lie it leaveth no place, no not the Senate house of Rome, nor the pulpit for orations, nor the image of Pompey, no not the o∣pen & publicke market places vndefiled and free from bloud, no not the pallace of princes, Ʋte Galbae & Pertinaci accidit, both which

most vertuous kings were killed by their subiectes; the which mischiefe did arise vnto them, chiefely for that the manners of their subiectes and souldiers were corrupted by the malice and e∣vill governement of their predecessors, so as generally it may be reputed the mother, and nourse of al common calamities.

Epi:

That detestable custome, and more detestable confirmation thereof, for receiving and supporting of traitours, rebels, and evil disposed persons, comming and arriving into the lande, did first occasion so generall a corruption of manners in Salamina,* 1.2 as more at large the same may appeare in the act of repeale thereof made by king H. the 7.

Sol.

Sith then this generall corruption of manners doth draw with it so many publicke miseries and calamities, as are before remem∣bred, we can not, except men be altogither voide of humanity and reason, but abhorre even the remembraunce of these lamen∣table times, and be forthwith kindled with a desire of reforma∣tion.

CAP. 18. The severall occasions which breede in the heartes of the people or nation, a generall corruption of manners.

EPI:

That we may the better effect this reformation of man∣ners, it behooveth vs to vnderstande the severall occasions which doe nourish the same, and lastly the sundry waies & meanes which may be found for the better reformation there∣of.

Sol:

First let vs vnderstand the occasions as you have saide.

Epi:

Sometimes we remaine corrupted in manners by ease, wealth and security, with the Romaines after their severall conquestes of Asia, Africa, and the greatest partes of Greece, and vvith the in∣vincible army of Hanniball, by the pleasures of Capua; sometimes by bitter adversities, with the Athenians we become haters & des∣pisers of vertue, and we make vnto our selves that hatefull lavve of Ostracismus, whereby we banish and put to death men of rare and excellent vertues, with the Hectomarij and Hiereling; some∣times

we mutine, and rise in armes against the rich, and other times with the poorer sort of the oppressed factiō of Marius, we cōpasse the Senate house, and demaunde the delivery of Caesar; sometimes by the malice and practises of forreine enemies with the Ile of Eu∣boea and the other partes of Greece, by corruption of Phillippe of Macedonie we depart from our obedience; sometimes by contēpt and neglect of religion and the professors thereof with Samaria & the citie of Ninivie, we fall into a generall corruption of manners, lastly either by our lightnesse or incredulitie with the Ʋandales, sometimes in Africa of the Arrian sects we dismember the body of the Church by sects and factions, so as either with the Churches of Greece, Rome, and Ravenna, we rise in armes one against another, or at the least the common people amiddest so great variation of sectes and opinions, finding no an core or place of rest, that may quiet their troubled soules and consciēces, die and live for the most part in great anxietie and incredulitie.

Sol:

Nowe you have at large discussed the occasions vvhich maie draw the people into a generall corruption of manners, it shall not be impertinent, to intreate of the severall remedies which may be found to resist so great an evill, vvhich worketh the ruine of states and common-weales.

CAP. 19. The readie waies and meanes to reforme and resist a generall corruption of manners.

EPI:

The chiefe and principall remedies are found to be in number three: namely a secret prudence and wisedome; secondarily good lawes well executed; thirdly a succession of severe Magistrates: for no doubt like as the wilde olive and figge tree, by the continuall addressing of a skilfull husbandman, is made at the last kindely, profitable, and fruitfull, and not in∣feriour to the naturall braunches; so a common-wealth over∣growne with a generall corruption of manners, and thereby become savage, barbarous, and barren, like vnto the vvilde

olive and figge tree may by the continuall pruning and addres∣sing of a skilfull magistrate, be made obedient, civill, and profita∣ble vnto that prince, whom God hath constituted to be the labou∣rer in that vineyarde; the which is to bee effected by the three waies and meanes before remembred: the first whereof is a secret prudence and vnderstanding, wherein two matters principallie are found worthy of consideration: first the subiect and matter; se∣condarily the time; for as the infirmities in our naturall bodies, growing vppon contrarie causes, receive not their cure by one selfe same councell, and medicine, for the which cause we ende∣vour, to cure the frenzie by rest, and by motion the lethargie; so it fareth with the infirmities of a pollitike body; for where the corruption of manners in the multitude groweth by wealth, rest, and securitie, there it receiveth his present cure with the lethargie by motion, dispersing the humours, and finally by sharpe corre∣ction and discipline: but otherwise it is where the same procee∣deth from extreame aduersitie for there it receveth a happy cure, with the frenzie by ease, pacience, and sufferance, for Contraria sub∣iecta non debent eodem modo tractari: Wherein Charles the fift hath lefte vnto vs an example, when as he stoode before Meats in Loranie with his army, vvhich vvas then so distressed by extreame sicknesse and famine, as they openly railed on him, especiallie his Spanish woulde call him the sonne of a mad woman with all the vile wordes they could devise, yet he would not heare them, but threw crownes amongest them, saying to his nobilitie, harken these knaves, yet if I call the worst by his name, he will not refuse to doe anie thing for me though it cost him his life. The like wise∣dome was shewed in the like matter by Caro, and other Senatours of Rome, at such time as when the poore and needy persons which at that time had reposed all their hope and confidence in Caesar, had compassed the Senate house and called aloude for Caesar then accused before the Senatours, bidding them to let him out, Ca∣to then to acquite the common-weale of the insurrection of the poore and needy persons, did not severely correct them, but con∣trariwise perswaded the Senate to make a francke distribution of corne amongst them for one moneth the which amounted to one

hundreth and fiftie Myriades made at the common charge of the citizens, by the which councell he quenched not onely a present great feare, but did in happy time scatter and disperse abroade the best part of Caesars force and power, at such time as hee was made Praetor, and that for respect of his office he vvas most to be feared. The same councell did Pericles sometimes imbrace, when as the people of Athens did mutine against him, for that he would not suffer them to hazarde the battaile with the Lacedaemonian army, then burning and spoiling in all the partes of their countrie; for he did not then with bitter speeches and sharpe punishmentes paci∣fie that mutinie, but contrariewise with a large distribution which he caused to be made amongst them out of the common treasure, and division of lands that were gotten by conquest, he did quench that sedition. And it is said, that when Luctatius, one of the greatest authority at that time in Rome, did inveigh against Caesar, in that he had seditiously set vppe the honoures and victories of Marius contrarie to their publike lawes and decrees, and vrged then a condigne punishment aunswerable to so greate an offence, he spake nothing for the punishment of the people which then ga∣thered themselves together for the aide of Caesar, and the rather for that they being of the faction of Marius, had bene long oppres∣sed and troden vnder foote by the authoritie of Sylla. In like manner, when we shall beholde men of rare vertues and great de∣sertes towardes the common-weale, in times of peace and libertie contemned and despised, with Narcetus that rare and excellent captaine, least thereby they fal with him into a generall corruption of manners, and combine with the king of Lombardy, for the inva∣ding of Italy, wee shall wisely vvith the Venetians in such cases, al∣waies better the fortune of those which have faithfully served, & never remoue them from their former dignity, without giving to them places of higher and greater commaundement, and vvith Themistocles not only speedily revoke the banishment of Aristides, and such others of his quality, but also to advaunce them to grea∣ter honour then before, fearing least otherwise he take part with the Barbarian nation to the ruine of the state of Greece. But herein one caution is wisely observed, that in such cases contending to

remove a corruption of manners, which may otherwise possesse the mindes of rare and excellent personages, by a contempt and disdaine vvhich followeth them, chiefely in times of happinesse, wealth, and securitie, wee doe not endaunger thereby the whole state of the common-wealth, the which vvee shall then easilie prevent, if we shal not imploy them in the greatest places of com∣maundement, least contending to acquit themselves vvith Clau∣dius Nero, of all disgraces and iniuries wrought by the deceit of Hasdruball, they desperately hazarde, and put in adventure the vvhole state thereby. Neither are wee in such cases with the Ro∣maines, to giue vnto Camillus discontented with his banishment the supreame commandement of the City and army; for after slaugh∣ter made of all other their captaines by the power of the Gawles, they vvere ledde therevnto rather by necessitie, then by vvise∣dome; neither doe all men banished and disgraced, carry vvith them that honourable minde of Camillus, and that ripenesse of iudgement, to preferre the honour and publike good of the com∣mon-vveale before his private reputation and vvelfare: But on the contrary, if vve shall labour to cure the corruption of manners that groweth by peace, vvealth, and securitie, vve are in such cases, vvith Luctatius to remove the same by sharpe discipline, whose councell if the Senatours had then followed, many miseries and publike calamities, vvhich the ambition of Caesar soone after vvrought against the citie of Rome, had beene vvisely foreseene and prevented: or otherwise in such cases, if wee shall like vnto the wise phisition disperse abroad those pestilent humours accor∣ding vnto the example of Camillus, and with him imploye the citizens of Rome, novv puffed vp with the pride and insolency of their nevv obtained victorie and conquest of Vies, and with the rich spoiles thereof, now in mutinie against the Senatours and no∣bles, novv resorting vvith great tumult about the pulpit for ora∣tions, for establishing of laws tending rather to the destructiō then to the division of Rome, as in the warres against the Phalerians, and there besiege the chiefe citie, not so much with a purpose to winne the same, but rather with him to keepe our countrie men busied, least by repayring to Rome, they should take occasion to mutine;

whereby with the wise phisition we shall disperse abroad those hu∣moures, which may trouble the quiet state at home. Lastly if wee shall wisely take holde of time, whilst she is running her swif∣test course with her force and violence, perhaps vve may be ca∣ried more then vvith an ordinary expedition vnto the height of our thoughtes and desires; for the times which shall represent vn∣to vs the shevv and face of publike calamities, as famine, plague, pestilence, povertie, and warres shall mightily advaunce this ac∣tion of reformation: for so the Senatours of Rome by an appea∣raunce of forraine warres did often pacifie the mutinies and sediti¦ons of the citizens of Rome, raised for the law of division of lands gained by conquest: and the Romaines after the battell of Cannes gave due obedience vnto Magistrates, and did severely prose∣cute their lawes against the Vestall Nuns, and finally whatsoe∣ver the Magistrates did commaunde, the people would most rea∣dily obey. The like obedience was sometimes found vnto lawes and Magistrates, after the people of Rome had received their o∣verthrow by the power of the Gawles, in such sort, as the corrup∣tion of manners that then reigned in them vvas soone quenched and reformed. The times also which did produce sundry publike calamities in Vlster parcell of the dominions of Salamina, did worke there the like effectes, as it appeareth in the statute of Attainder of Shane Oneile; where it is saide after many publike calamities sustained by the warres, they cried first for mercy, and then for Iustice, in such sort, as the reformation of that country did offer it selfe easie vnto the handes of the Magistrates that woulde laie holde thereof, as by expresse wordes of that statute more at large may appeare. Wisely therefore Plutarch in comparing the actes of Fabius with Pericles, saith, that Pericles governed the Athenians in their chiefest prosperity and wealth, whereby they were cor∣rupted in manners, and rendered insolent, and mutenous, and not easily governed; but Fabius then governed Rome, when as it was humbled by many adversities, esteeming it a matter of no great difficultie, to rule a citie all ready brought low by adversi∣tie, and which compelled by necessitie is contented to be gover∣ned by a wise man.

Sol:

But sith this matter is at large discoursed, let vs proceede vnto the other meanes which are lefte vnto vs for the better resi∣sting of a generall corruption of manners, and what force, good & profitable lawes may have therein.

CAP. 20. The necessitie of good and profitable lawes for the better effecting of a refor∣mation of manners.

EPI:

The Aegyptians by a long space prevented this generall corruption of manners, which either peace, wealth, security, or otherwise the fertility of place might breed in the hartes of the subiectes. The like lawes did Romulus, Numa, and other go∣vernoures which succeeded them, carefully from time to time e∣stablish, as neither their long peace and rest which they enioyed in the governement of Numa, neither yet the fruitfulnesse of the soile of that empire, nor the commodities of the sea, neither their daily victories, could by the space of a long time and many ages, corrupt the manners of the people. In like manner the Germanes above all others have best continued the integritie of manners in the subiect, chiefely for that they have not onely beene most studious of profitable lawes, but also most faithful observers there∣of, the which thing above all others hath preserved their people and country, as well from this corruption of manners, as also from the servitude and oppression of others. And where it is said, that Spaine hath not fallen so deepely as Italy, and Fraunce, into a generall corruption of manners, this proceedeth not from the goodnesse of their nature, but from the strict observation of the auncient lawes and customes of that kingdome.

Sol:

I have viewed the lawes of Salamina, and I finde them no lesse profita∣ble then the lawes either of the Aegyptians, Romanes, Ger∣manes, or others whatsoever, for the reformation of manners; so as there remaineth nothing, but that vvith the Germanes wee be faithfull observers of our lawes▪ for so it may appeare

by expresse wordes contained in the statute made against mary∣ing and fostering,* 1.3 where it is related after this manner: Notwith∣standing diverse good statutes and actes of parliament made for the reformation of that countrie, wherein is contained, that eve∣ry of the kings subiectes offending the same, shoulde be a traitor attainted, yet by the default and negligence of the heads and ru∣lers of that lande vnder the kings highnesse, the saide statutes vvere not duely put in execution, so as no reformation hath fol∣lowed the same. In like manner, disorders were sometimes com∣mitted in the countries of Flamminia and Emillia, by the negligence of Magistrates in not executing the lawes, before Pope Alexan∣der the fixt had wisely displaced and removed the negligent go∣vernoures thereof; before which time, these regions were full of theft, robberies, and rebellions, the vvhich offences did not arise from the nature of the place or people, as some did then suppose, but rather from the malice and negligence of their go∣vernoures; for they beeing poore, woulde notwithstanding live richly, and sumptuously; they made lawes, and were the first that offended against the same, and by their example invited others therevnto; neither did they punish any that offended the lawes, vntill they increased to great strengthes and numbers, ac tunc demum (saith the author of this historie) non Iusticiae conservandae causae, sed praedae dulcedine permoti, paenas ab omnibus simul gravissimas exigebant; ex quare hoc sequebatur absurdum, vt expilati assiduis il∣lis mulctis homines ad paupertatem redigerentur, atque hinc impelleren∣tur ad vexandos alios, quibus existimabant se viribus esse superiores, quo quidem modo vitia non emendabantur, sed ad ea homines institueban∣tur, dependebant que haec omnia ex prava eorum regulorum natura. Lastly, the many and sundry priviledges are found to give impedi∣ment vnto the execution of profitable lawes, and to nourish a cor∣ruption of manners in the subiect, as more at large it doth ap∣peare in the act of Absentes, which is lefte vnto vs as a register of the fall and declination of the state of Salamina, vvherein it is manifest that the Lordes of the several countries of Catherlagh and Wexfords being places priviledged, may keepe and holde al man∣ner pleas vvithin the same, vnder colour whereof the kings lawes,

writtes, or other processe bee not obayed, neither any other Iu∣stice there administred, for the quieting and good order of the subiect, so as in the default thereof, the kings enimies have them in servage, all murders, robberies, theftes, treasons, and other offences remaining there vnpunished.

Sol:

But what Magistrate may be found sufficient to establish a reformation of manners?

Epi:

A severe Magistrate is herein required: for that a common-weale mightily corrupted in manners, is squared and reformed onely by the rule and line of Iustice which wee call distributive, the which for the inequality thereof, may not without great motions and sharpe remedies reforme the enormities and mischiefes of the common-weale. Lastly where the manners of the people remaine corrupted, there the lawes, De morum censura, and all other lawes are found vnprofitable, vnles by a severe and stout Magi∣strate they be supported and maintained. For if Brutus had not severely proceeded, as well against his owne sonnes, as against all other traitours, he coulde not have reformed the corruptions of Tarquine, and of other his confederates.

Sol.

He that shal in these waighty actions of reformation proceede as you have saide with lenitie and softnesse, shall never with Collatinus bee able to suppresse a corruption of manners in the subiect, but he shall by that course rather imbolden and comforte traitours in their inten∣ded purposes; therefore herein the wisedome of Ʋalerius vvas highly commended, vvho though by nature curteous, and gen∣tle, and thereof surnamed Publicola, yet by wisedome now be∣came so severe & sharpe for the reformation & good of his coun∣trie, as he most sharpely and bitterly prosecuted the treasons of Tarquine.

Epi:

They which shall live and governe Sparta, where the people are in manners corrupted, must with Cleomenes sharpely prosecute and punish offendours; but where the man∣ners of the people be not corrupted, there a milde course of go∣vernement doth worke his office, and carrieth with it allowance and commendations. For this cause it is said, that the patience of Peter Soder••n was profitable as well to the common-weale as to himselfe, so long as the age and time continued milde and gen∣tle, but after the times were chaunged into an iron age, the

same then required a greater severitie then could be found in Pe∣ter Soderin, which by no meanes nor occasions, nor by the change of times, could be ledde from his accustomed patience, by the which he did not onely overthrow himselfe, but did also perish his whole countrie. Therefore very well saith a learned author, for the better reformation of manners corrupted in the people, and for the better reviving of the force of auncient lawes, a severe Magi∣strate is requisite.

Sol;

But great is the hatred which in such cases followeth the person of a severe Magistrate, and it draweth with it sometimes perill and daunger vnto Princes.

Epi:

This que∣stion admitteth one other distinction: for an absolute Prince is to imitate the humanity of Cyrus described by Xenophon, but such as shall governe by way of deputation, are rather to follow the seve∣ritie of Manlius Torquatus, least otherwise with Peter Lawredane, we doe not onely make the Venetians ielous, but also disable our selves by our lenitie and softnes, to performe this difficult acti∣on of reformation, wherein severitie is required. To conclude, it must be that grave and severe Tymasicheus, that shall reforme the licentious citie of Lyparensis, and drawe them from spoiling, praying, and rebelling. Lastly, wee must make a continuall succession of severe Magistrates, as before I have remembred. For Epaminondas with a iust severitie may reforme a corruption of manners in the Thebanes, but if he once fortune to dye, the The∣banes shall eftsoones returne to their former corruptions.

Sol:

Nowe fith you have at large discussed of the two partes and members of this vniversall and absolute reformation, name∣ly the reformation of auncient lawes, customes, and lastly the cor∣ruption of maners in the people, there remaineth nowe a newe and better institution then before prescribed, as the third and last member of your generall division.

Epi:

I will proceede then vnto the institution it selfe, wherein forme matters are found worthie of consideration: first, the soveraintie and commaundement; se∣condly, the forme of governement; thirdly, the forme and man∣ner of the institution it selfe: lastly, the severall endes and scopes of this institution? For the first, which is the soverainty and com∣maundement, the same is given sometimes into the hands of one,

sometimes in the handes of fewe, and sometimes into the handes of all in generall. This one is termed a Democratia, or a popular estate; the other an Aristocratia; the last a Monarchie, Thus be common-weales properly distinguished by the soveraintie and commaundement, and not by the diversity which sometimes appeareth in the forme and governement thereof: for all insti∣tutions are made after the one of these kindes, and all other are but corruptions of these estates, and no proper or distinct com∣mon-weales.

Sol:

But which institution is to be preferred above others?

Epi:

The institution no doubt of the Monarchie, is the most firme and durable, and freest from al dissention, mutinies, and sedition. And the wise men of Rome vvere not deceived, when beholding the market place filled with bowes, slings, and swordes, and the pulpit for orations sprinckled with bloud, they said, there remaineth nowe no other way to give helpe and re∣medie to these troubles of our common-weale, but the authori∣ty of one man onely, that may commaunde vs all. And as this estate is freest from trouble, as you have saide, so is it of all others most honourable and glorious, and even the very lively image of God and nature, as Artibanus did sometimes faithfully deliver vnto Themistocles. The next manner of institution in account, see∣meth to be the Aristocratia, for that it acquiteth it selfe best of al o∣ther common-weals, from corruption & errours in their censures and iudgements: for as the large and running waters, are not so easily corrupted, as the standing poole; so many wittes, and mindes, are not so easily deluded and corrupted, as one. But worst of all others doeth this common-weale acquite it selfe of en∣vie, dissention, and emulation amongest themselves, which like vnto a mothe or worme, gnaweth a sunder the heart and intralles of that common-weale, and at the last confoundeth and destroi∣eth the same. But yet the popular estate is of all others least per∣manent, especially where the common-weale is mere popular, as∣well in regard of the soveraintie and commaundement, as of the forme & manner of governement; wherof the common-weale of Athens maie be vnto vs an example, which was instituted by you Solon, and after in the same age confounded by Pisistratus:

Solo:

So it was: for wanting sufficient power and forces, I was forced to make such lawes for the instituting of that common-weale, as they vvere willing to receive, and not such as I was willing to give: for I must confesse, that popular institution, which is equallie tempered, and compounded of the three sortes and formes of go∣vernement, after the maner and institution of Rome, to be more firme and durable; and this forme of governement also doeth give a perfection and continuance to all other estates before re∣membred. Therefore Romulus after the death of Remus, and Tatius Sabinus, did ayme at that forme of government in the insti∣tution of the common-weale of Rome; for he reserved vnto him∣selfe the sole and kingly auctority over the armie onely, and to convent the Senators for the affaires publicke, the which forme of governement, in his person was kinglike, and after the forme of a Monarchie; but in the person of the Senators, who had auctoritie to consulte, and publikely to perswade and disswade the attempts for wars, and to discusse all other civill causes, as the state of that common-weale required, the forme of an Aristocratia, was right∣ly by him observed; and in the other partes of his governement, as in framing of his lawes and such like, he rather affected a popu∣lar liberty, then a Monarchie.

Epi:

After this manner the king of France hath reserved vnto himselfe a kingly name, stile, honors authority, and commandement over the Senate, and to assemble them for the affaires publicke, and a sole absolute and royall au∣thority over the armie for making or finishing the warres, lastly an authority for the levieng and receiving of the revenews belon∣ging to the crowne, but the execution of lawes he leaveth to the Senate, and Iudges, who governe by such lawes as respect a po∣pular liberty and free estate, in the making of which lawes, the people have also their voices, like as in popular estates, where the people holde the soverainty and commaundement; so as by this forme of governement as well to the king, and the nobles, as also to the people, such power is graunted, with so iust and equall pro∣portion, as either the dignitie of the one, or the liberty of the o∣ther may iustly require; in the well tempering wherof, all the skill, arte, and pollicie of governement is wholy contained, and he that

shall holde the best and most iust temperature herein, commeth nearest to the perfection of nature; who by how much more equal∣ly shee doth temper the foure humours and elements in our natu∣rall bodies, by so much we receive a more perfit strength, & a lon∣ger being & continuance.

Sol:

This is the best forme of instituting of common-weales, the which you have now described; but in this institution some are founde to ayme at peace, some at honour, as the butte and scope of all their actions; so as their ende and scope being divers, it seemeth they may not imbrace one forme of insti∣tution.

Epi:

You say well: for they which shall aime at a common-weale peaceable & permanent, it behoveth them to seclude stran∣gers, not to traine their people and subiectes in militarie discipline, according to the example of the Lacedaemonians, and to possesse a place or fort, as well by nature and the situation thereof, as by art rendred invincible, according to the example of the Venetians. But such as shal ayme at honour and glory, as the butte & scope of their institution, must entertaine straungers, they must indevour to render the common-wealth populous, they must daily traine and exercise the people in military discipline, and they shal wise∣ly deliver the feble, and weake, from the hands of the oppressour, they must entertaine many associates & friends, by the which pol∣licies they shall render themselves every where invincible accor∣ding to the example of the Romanes.

Sol:

But what manner of in∣stitution is most permanent and to be preferred?

Epi:

Neither the one nor the other may be founde so happy and permanent, but at the last, with the apple in his fulripenes, they fall with their owne weight and poyse to the ground; the one by discord and mutinies of the soldiours, for that their citizens are rendred bold by the con∣tinual vse and trayning in military discipline; the other by effe∣minacie, ease, rest, and security, hasteneth in like maner vnto muti∣nies and discords, as to his last ruine; so as either by a fatall desti∣nie (as it were) imbraceth there owne confusion: but not after one manner; for the one like vnto a flowre, or the pride of youth, in the height of his glory, vanisheth, away, and leaveth the image of true glory, as a lively picture, to invest a perpetuall memory of a worthy and excellent Institution. But the common-weale

which in his first Institution aymeth only at peace and permanen∣cy, with effaeminacy, discorde, and mutinies, bredde by long ease, rest, and security, embraceth with the other his final & last destruc∣tion, but leaveth not the like memory of his Institution.

Sol:

It see∣meth thē by that which you have said, that the institutiō of that cō∣mon-weale, which aymeth at vertue, honour, and glorie, is to be preferred before the other, & of princes much more to be desired. But may not one selfesame common-weale, ayme at the one and the other?

Ep:

No verily: for as the tree which hath but a slen∣der roote, may not long support waighty and mighty braunches, against the furie and violence of the winde and tempest; so com∣mon-weales which ayme at peace, having but a slender roote, and foundation, laide for the supporting thereof, as before I have remembred, may not be long victorious, and hold themselves vp∣right in actions of great importance: and if they fortune to be so with the Venetians, which have much regarded this manner of in∣stitution, they shal no sooner winne, but eftsoones for want of pro∣per forces to defende, they shall loose the same againe: so as for free estates and common-weales, this manner of institution see∣meth not to be the best, but for servile common-weales, and such as have lived alwaies subiect to others, as Pisa sometimes to the Flo∣rentines, Cremona to the Venetians, and Salamina to Athens, it may be holden for the safest: for by this maner of Institution, they shall more easily retaine the subiectes in their obedience and subie∣ction.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Statutes of Ire: 35. H. 8. ca. 3. fol. 11.
• * 1.2

  Anno. 10. H. ••.
• * 1.3

  Act. 28. H. ••. c. 13. fo. 1.