Solon his follie, or a politique discourse, touching the reformation of common-weales conquered, declined or corrupted. By Richard Beacon ...

CAP. 3. Of the reformation of auncient lawes and customes, and what things therein chiefly are to be considered.

EPI:

In all mutations made of auncient lawes and customes, three matters especially fall into deliberation: first the meanes; secondly the forme and maner; lastly the subiect and matter. The meanes are in number five: the first is authority; the goodwill and consents of the people, the seconde; the thirde perswasions; a sufficient power and force, is the fourth; the fifth and the last is a magistrate, of rare and excellent vertues, which may suppresse the envie and malice of such, as shall oppose them∣selves against this intended reformation, made by the mutation of auncient lawes and customes.

Sol:

But what authority is required for the better effecting of a reformation? For this as the first mat∣ter, you have well observed to be requisit herein.

Epi:

All au∣thority herein graunted is after two sortes: the one absolute; the other limited by time, and other circumstances. This authoritie absolute, was given sometime into your handes by the Athenians; for after such time as they had well tasted of the lawe and ordi∣nance, called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they forthwith did choose you their ge∣nerall reformer of the lawe, and of the whole state of the common-weale, without limiting this power then granted vnto you, but re∣ferred all matters indifferentlye vnto your will, as the offices of state, common assemblies, voices in election, iudgments in iustice, and the body of the Senate. Finally, they gave vnto you all power and authority, to cease and taxe anie of them, to appoint the num∣ber, and what time the cease should continue, and to keepe, con∣firme, and disanull at your pleasure, anie of the auncient laws and customes, then in being. But this authority absolute, without anie limitation of the power it selfe, or of the time and continuance thereof, hath sometimes turned to the great preiudice and danger of such as formerly have graunted the same: for the Romaines af∣ter

they had elected their Decemviri, for the making of a thorough and absolute reformation of the common-weale of Rome, they forthwith gave into their handes the sole and absolute power of Rome, so as all other authorities and iurisdictions either of Consull, Senate, or Tribunes, ceasing, they wholy and only governed Rome, without any provocation or appeale to bee made to any other. Thus when no Magistrate remained, which might observe the a∣ctions of such as were founde ambitious, easily did Appius Claudi∣us, fall into the thoughtes of the principality of Rome; he doeth strengthē himselfe with friendes, & clyēts, and daily increaseth his wealth, and nowe of a Citizen is become a fearefull enemy to the state of Rome; in such sorte, as they may neither endure his pride and insolencie, neither may they safely suppresse the same with∣out their common perill and daunger. Therefore more wiselie did the Lacedemonians give great authority to their kinges; and like∣wise did the Venetians to their Dukes; but yet with certaine limits and bondes, not lawfull for them to exceede; and farther did appoint certaine watchmen, as daily beholders and observers of all their actions and doings.

Sol:

But what limitation of time, in gran∣ting this absolute authority, may breede safety vnto him that gi∣veth the same? This is the seconde and last matter, nowe remem∣bred by you, and worthie of consultation.

Epi:

The provinciall governement over the Gaules, with an absolute power given into the handes of Caesar, for the better reformation thereof, was so long proroged and continued, as at the last with the sword of the Romaines, and the money of the Gaules, he became terrible, as well to the Gaules, as to the Romaines, & returned not a Citizen now of Rome, but as a fearefull enemie, and conquerour, as well of the Ci∣tie, as of all the other territories and dominions thereof. And was not also the provinciall governement of Spaine sometimes given into the handes of Pompey with an absolute authority for the re∣formation thereof, so long proroged and continued, as with one stampe of his foote he was able, (as himselfe reported) to fill the Citie of Rome with weapons, and armed men? And did not Appius Claudius by proroging his authority but for one yeare, be∣come fearefull to the Citie of Rome? And did not the Romaines by

making a Dictator perpetuall, loose the libertye of their Citie? and doeth authority thus easily corrupt the maners of good sub∣iectes? and is the age also wherein we live free from such corrup∣tion? Nay, more then that, is there not an enemie on foote, that laboureth the corruption of the whole? Then what authoritie here may be limited so straight, as in this time may not be thought too large? what time may be so shorte, which may not be deemed too long? Therefore let every good and faithfull councellour vnto the state, with Cato resist here the proroging of Caesar his go∣vernement, least too late with Pompey they acknowledge their er∣rour: it shall not suffice here to graunt but one yeare more vnto Appius Claudius; neither is it sufficient that Caesar is holden in dis∣grace with the Citie of Rome; neither may we here safely beleeve all which shall saie vnto Pompey, Caesar is hated of the garrisons, and souldiers: for when Caesar commeth with his fortune, he shall then force, as well Pompey, as the Citie of Rome, to acknowledge their former follies and errours:

Sol.

But nowe vnto what per∣son may this authority be safely graunted, is a matter herein, not vnworthy of consultation.

Ep:

It is safely graunted vnto a man approved to be good and honest, with this caution, that he be not of such power and force, as the state may stand in feare of his great∣nes. For the best sometimes have fallen by reason of honours and dignities into a generall corruption of manners, and therefore we receive it as a proverbe, honores mutant mores.

Sol.

At no time then is it safely committed into the handes of personages of great might, power, and wealth.

Ep:

You have saide the trueth: for what daunger did arise to the state of Athens, by constituting Garralde Fitz Garralde attained, Liuetenant of Salamina? who having at once might, power, and soveraigne commaunde∣ment in his handes, did eftsoones conspire, and combine, sun∣dry treasons, and rebellions.

Sol:

The recordes of Salamina doth witnes so much as you have saide, for there it is alleadged, that he did conspire with the French king and Emperour, for the inva∣ding and possessing of Salamina: he did also in proper person in∣vade the Countie of Kylkennie, there burning, destroying, & mur∣thering the kinges subiectes: he did invade also with Oneyle, and

his forces, O Coner, and other of the saide Earle his friends, alies, and servants, by his commandement the County of Vriell; where∣in he was aided, and assisted by Sir Iohn, brother vnto the saide Earle. The like or greater daunger did growe vnto the state of Athens, by constituting Thomas Fitz Garralde, sonne and heire to the saide Earle, Lieutenant of Salamina: who succeeding in the place of his father, having the like might, power, & forces lent vn∣to him by his friends, alies, and servantes, and soveraine authoritie given from the king, did eftsoones revile that famous Citie of A∣thens, and his lawfull soveraigne, and moved all rebellions against them; and did therewith also addresse his letters vnto the Bishop of Rome, & the Emperour, for the invading of Salamina: and farther did put to death, and cruelly murthered all those which were re∣sident within the lande of Salamina, being borne Citizens of Athe∣ns, and amongst others did put to death that reverende father and faithfull counceller Iohn Allin Archbishoppe of Deublin, and primate of Salamina. More then this, he constrained with his pow∣er and forces, the subiectes of Athens, to give vnto him an oath of obedience, & forthwith besieged the Castle of Deublin, where with his whole armie by the sea coast he incamped, for the better resisting, destroying, and murthering the army of Athens,* 1.1 as they landed. No lesse dangers then these formerly rehearsed, appeared at such times, when as the Duke of Yorke pretending himselfe Live∣tenant of the saide lande, did with his power, and forces, occupie and possesse all the territories and dominions thereof. Therefore of late daies, hath the Counsell of Athens most providently com∣mitted this soveraine authority vnto such, as may not be able with forces and power to vsurpe the same. But if vnto this authoritie thus given, to effect a reformation, the consentes and good-wils of the people be founde agreeable, no doubt the ••am•• shall migh∣tily further that action.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Statutes of Ire: 35. H. 8. ca. 3. fol. 11.