Solon his follie, or a politique discourse, touching the reformation of common-weales conquered, declined or corrupted. By Richard Beacon ...

CAP. 20. The necessitie of good and profitable lawes for the better effecting of a refor∣mation of manners.

EPI:

The Aegyptians by a long space prevented this generall corruption of manners, which either peace, wealth, security, or otherwise the fertility of place might breed in the hartes of the subiectes. The like lawes did Romulus, Numa, and other go∣vernoures which succeeded them, carefully from time to time e∣stablish, as neither their long peace and rest which they enioyed in the governement of Numa, neither yet the fruitfulnesse of the soile of that empire, nor the commodities of the sea, neither their daily victories, could by the space of a long time and many ages, corrupt the manners of the people. In like manner the Germanes above all others have best continued the integritie of manners in the subiect, chiefely for that they have not onely beene most studious of profitable lawes, but also most faithful observers there∣of, the which thing above all others hath preserved their people and country, as well from this corruption of manners, as also from the servitude and oppression of others. And where it is said, that Spaine hath not fallen so deepely as Italy, and Fraunce, into a generall corruption of manners, this proceedeth not from the goodnesse of their nature, but from the strict observation of the auncient lawes and customes of that kingdome.

Sol:

I have viewed the lawes of Salamina, and I finde them no lesse profita∣ble then the lawes either of the Aegyptians, Romanes, Ger∣manes, or others whatsoever, for the reformation of manners; so as there remaineth nothing, but that vvith the Germanes wee be faithfull observers of our lawes▪ for so it may appeare

by expresse wordes contained in the statute made against mary∣ing and fostering,* 1.1 where it is related after this manner: Notwith∣standing diverse good statutes and actes of parliament made for the reformation of that countrie, wherein is contained, that eve∣ry of the kings subiectes offending the same, shoulde be a traitor attainted, yet by the default and negligence of the heads and ru∣lers of that lande vnder the kings highnesse, the saide statutes vvere not duely put in execution, so as no reformation hath fol∣lowed the same. In like manner, disorders were sometimes com∣mitted in the countries of Flamminia and Emillia, by the negligence of Magistrates in not executing the lawes, before Pope Alexan∣der the fixt had wisely displaced and removed the negligent go∣vernoures thereof; before which time, these regions were full of theft, robberies, and rebellions, the vvhich offences did not arise from the nature of the place or people, as some did then suppose, but rather from the malice and negligence of their go∣vernoures; for they beeing poore, woulde notwithstanding live richly, and sumptuously; they made lawes, and were the first that offended against the same, and by their example invited others therevnto; neither did they punish any that offended the lawes, vntill they increased to great strengthes and numbers, ac tunc demum (saith the author of this historie) non Iusticiae conservandae causae, sed praedae dulcedine permoti, paenas ab omnibus simul gravissimas exigebant; ex quare hoc sequebatur absurdum, vt expilati assiduis il∣lis mulctis homines ad paupertatem redigerentur, atque hinc impelleren∣tur ad vexandos alios, quibus existimabant se viribus esse superiores, quo quidem modo vitia non emendabantur, sed ad ea homines institueban∣tur, dependebant que haec omnia ex prava eorum regulorum natura. Lastly, the many and sundry priviledges are found to give impedi∣ment vnto the execution of profitable lawes, and to nourish a cor∣ruption of manners in the subiect, as more at large it doth ap∣peare in the act of Absentes, which is lefte vnto vs as a register of the fall and declination of the state of Salamina, vvherein it is manifest that the Lordes of the several countries of Catherlagh and Wexfords being places priviledged, may keepe and holde al man∣ner pleas vvithin the same, vnder colour whereof the kings lawes,

writtes, or other processe bee not obayed, neither any other Iu∣stice there administred, for the quieting and good order of the subiect, so as in the default thereof, the kings enimies have them in servage, all murders, robberies, theftes, treasons, and other offences remaining there vnpunished.

Sol:

But what Magistrate may be found sufficient to establish a reformation of manners?

Epi:

A severe Magistrate is herein required: for that a common-weale mightily corrupted in manners, is squared and reformed onely by the rule and line of Iustice which wee call distributive, the which for the inequality thereof, may not without great motions and sharpe remedies reforme the enormities and mischiefes of the common-weale. Lastly where the manners of the people remaine corrupted, there the lawes, De morum censura, and all other lawes are found vnprofitable, vnles by a severe and stout Magi∣strate they be supported and maintained. For if Brutus had not severely proceeded, as well against his owne sonnes, as against all other traitours, he coulde not have reformed the corruptions of Tarquine, and of other his confederates.

Sol.

He that shal in these waighty actions of reformation proceede as you have saide with lenitie and softnesse, shall never with Collatinus bee able to suppresse a corruption of manners in the subiect, but he shall by that course rather imbolden and comforte traitours in their inten∣ded purposes; therefore herein the wisedome of Ʋalerius vvas highly commended, vvho though by nature curteous, and gen∣tle, and thereof surnamed Publicola, yet by wisedome now be∣came so severe & sharpe for the reformation & good of his coun∣trie, as he most sharpely and bitterly prosecuted the treasons of Tarquine.

Epi:

They which shall live and governe Sparta, where the people are in manners corrupted, must with Cleomenes sharpely prosecute and punish offendours; but where the man∣ners of the people be not corrupted, there a milde course of go∣vernement doth worke his office, and carrieth with it allowance and commendations. For this cause it is said, that the patience of Peter Soder••n was profitable as well to the common-weale as to himselfe, so long as the age and time continued milde and gen∣tle, but after the times were chaunged into an iron age, the

same then required a greater severitie then could be found in Pe∣ter Soderin, which by no meanes nor occasions, nor by the change of times, could be ledde from his accustomed patience, by the which he did not onely overthrow himselfe, but did also perish his whole countrie. Therefore very well saith a learned author, for the better reformation of manners corrupted in the people, and for the better reviving of the force of auncient lawes, a severe Magi∣strate is requisite.

Sol;

But great is the hatred which in such cases followeth the person of a severe Magistrate, and it draweth with it sometimes perill and daunger vnto Princes.

Epi:

This que∣stion admitteth one other distinction: for an absolute Prince is to imitate the humanity of Cyrus described by Xenophon, but such as shall governe by way of deputation, are rather to follow the seve∣ritie of Manlius Torquatus, least otherwise with Peter Lawredane, we doe not onely make the Venetians ielous, but also disable our selves by our lenitie and softnes, to performe this difficult acti∣on of reformation, wherein severitie is required. To conclude, it must be that grave and severe Tymasicheus, that shall reforme the licentious citie of Lyparensis, and drawe them from spoiling, praying, and rebelling. Lastly, wee must make a continuall succession of severe Magistrates, as before I have remembred. For Epaminondas with a iust severitie may reforme a corruption of manners in the Thebanes, but if he once fortune to dye, the The∣banes shall eftsoones returne to their former corruptions.

Sol:

Nowe fith you have at large discussed of the two partes and members of this vniversall and absolute reformation, name∣ly the reformation of auncient lawes, customes, and lastly the cor∣ruption of maners in the people, there remaineth nowe a newe and better institution then before prescribed, as the third and last member of your generall division.

Epi:

I will proceede then vnto the institution it selfe, wherein forme matters are found worthie of consideration: first, the soveraintie and commaundement; se∣condly, the forme of governement; thirdly, the forme and man∣ner of the institution it selfe: lastly, the severall endes and scopes of this institution? For the first, which is the soverainty and com∣maundement, the same is given sometimes into the hands of one,

sometimes in the handes of fewe, and sometimes into the handes of all in generall. This one is termed a Democratia, or a popular estate; the other an Aristocratia; the last a Monarchie, Thus be common-weales properly distinguished by the soveraintie and commaundement, and not by the diversity which sometimes appeareth in the forme and governement thereof: for all insti∣tutions are made after the one of these kindes, and all other are but corruptions of these estates, and no proper or distinct com∣mon-weales.

Sol:

But which institution is to be preferred above others?

Epi:

The institution no doubt of the Monarchie, is the most firme and durable, and freest from al dissention, mutinies, and sedition. And the wise men of Rome vvere not deceived, when beholding the market place filled with bowes, slings, and swordes, and the pulpit for orations sprinckled with bloud, they said, there remaineth nowe no other way to give helpe and re∣medie to these troubles of our common-weale, but the authori∣ty of one man onely, that may commaunde vs all. And as this estate is freest from trouble, as you have saide, so is it of all others most honourable and glorious, and even the very lively image of God and nature, as Artibanus did sometimes faithfully deliver vnto Themistocles. The next manner of institution in account, see∣meth to be the Aristocratia, for that it acquiteth it selfe best of al o∣ther common-weals, from corruption & errours in their censures and iudgements: for as the large and running waters, are not so easily corrupted, as the standing poole; so many wittes, and mindes, are not so easily deluded and corrupted, as one. But worst of all others doeth this common-weale acquite it selfe of en∣vie, dissention, and emulation amongest themselves, which like vnto a mothe or worme, gnaweth a sunder the heart and intralles of that common-weale, and at the last confoundeth and destroi∣eth the same. But yet the popular estate is of all others least per∣manent, especially where the common-weale is mere popular, as∣well in regard of the soveraintie and commaundement, as of the forme & manner of governement; wherof the common-weale of Athens maie be vnto vs an example, which was instituted by you Solon, and after in the same age confounded by Pisistratus:

Solo:

So it was: for wanting sufficient power and forces, I was forced to make such lawes for the instituting of that common-weale, as they vvere willing to receive, and not such as I was willing to give: for I must confesse, that popular institution, which is equallie tempered, and compounded of the three sortes and formes of go∣vernement, after the maner and institution of Rome, to be more firme and durable; and this forme of governement also doeth give a perfection and continuance to all other estates before re∣membred. Therefore Romulus after the death of Remus, and Tatius Sabinus, did ayme at that forme of government in the insti∣tution of the common-weale of Rome; for he reserved vnto him∣selfe the sole and kingly auctority over the armie onely, and to convent the Senators for the affaires publicke, the which forme of governement, in his person was kinglike, and after the forme of a Monarchie; but in the person of the Senators, who had auctoritie to consulte, and publikely to perswade and disswade the attempts for wars, and to discusse all other civill causes, as the state of that common-weale required, the forme of an Aristocratia, was right∣ly by him observed; and in the other partes of his governement, as in framing of his lawes and such like, he rather affected a popu∣lar liberty, then a Monarchie.

Epi:

After this manner the king of France hath reserved vnto himselfe a kingly name, stile, honors authority, and commandement over the Senate, and to assemble them for the affaires publicke, and a sole absolute and royall au∣thority over the armie for making or finishing the warres, lastly an authority for the levieng and receiving of the revenews belon∣ging to the crowne, but the execution of lawes he leaveth to the Senate, and Iudges, who governe by such lawes as respect a po∣pular liberty and free estate, in the making of which lawes, the people have also their voices, like as in popular estates, where the people holde the soverainty and commaundement; so as by this forme of governement as well to the king, and the nobles, as also to the people, such power is graunted, with so iust and equall pro∣portion, as either the dignitie of the one, or the liberty of the o∣ther may iustly require; in the well tempering wherof, all the skill, arte, and pollicie of governement is wholy contained, and he that

shall holde the best and most iust temperature herein, commeth nearest to the perfection of nature; who by how much more equal∣ly shee doth temper the foure humours and elements in our natu∣rall bodies, by so much we receive a more perfit strength, & a lon∣ger being & continuance.

Sol:

This is the best forme of instituting of common-weales, the which you have now described; but in this institution some are founde to ayme at peace, some at honour, as the butte and scope of all their actions; so as their ende and scope being divers, it seemeth they may not imbrace one forme of insti∣tution.

Epi:

You say well: for they which shall aime at a common-weale peaceable & permanent, it behoveth them to seclude stran∣gers, not to traine their people and subiectes in militarie discipline, according to the example of the Lacedaemonians, and to possesse a place or fort, as well by nature and the situation thereof, as by art rendred invincible, according to the example of the Venetians. But such as shal ayme at honour and glory, as the butte & scope of their institution, must entertaine straungers, they must indevour to render the common-wealth populous, they must daily traine and exercise the people in military discipline, and they shal wise∣ly deliver the feble, and weake, from the hands of the oppressour, they must entertaine many associates & friends, by the which pol∣licies they shall render themselves every where invincible accor∣ding to the example of the Romanes.

Sol:

But what manner of in∣stitution is most permanent and to be preferred?

Epi:

Neither the one nor the other may be founde so happy and permanent, but at the last, with the apple in his fulripenes, they fall with their owne weight and poyse to the ground; the one by discord and mutinies of the soldiours, for that their citizens are rendred bold by the con∣tinual vse and trayning in military discipline; the other by effe∣minacie, ease, rest, and security, hasteneth in like maner vnto muti∣nies and discords, as to his last ruine; so as either by a fatall desti∣nie (as it were) imbraceth there owne confusion: but not after one manner; for the one like vnto a flowre, or the pride of youth, in the height of his glory, vanisheth, away, and leaveth the image of true glory, as a lively picture, to invest a perpetuall memory of a worthy and excellent Institution. But the common-weale

which in his first Institution aymeth only at peace and permanen∣cy, with effaeminacy, discorde, and mutinies, bredde by long ease, rest, and security, embraceth with the other his final & last destruc∣tion, but leaveth not the like memory of his Institution.

Sol:

It see∣meth thē by that which you have said, that the institutiō of that cō∣mon-weale, which aymeth at vertue, honour, and glorie, is to be preferred before the other, & of princes much more to be desired. But may not one selfesame common-weale, ayme at the one and the other?

Ep:

No verily: for as the tree which hath but a slen∣der roote, may not long support waighty and mighty braunches, against the furie and violence of the winde and tempest; so com∣mon-weales which ayme at peace, having but a slender roote, and foundation, laide for the supporting thereof, as before I have remembred, may not be long victorious, and hold themselves vp∣right in actions of great importance: and if they fortune to be so with the Venetians, which have much regarded this manner of in∣stitution, they shal no sooner winne, but eftsoones for want of pro∣per forces to defende, they shall loose the same againe: so as for free estates and common-weales, this manner of institution see∣meth not to be the best, but for servile common-weales, and such as have lived alwaies subiect to others, as Pisa sometimes to the Flo∣rentines, Cremona to the Venetians, and Salamina to Athens, it may be holden for the safest: for by this maner of Institution, they shall more easily retaine the subiectes in their obedience and subie∣ction.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Act. 28. H. ••. c. 13. fo. 1.