The arte of reason, rightly termed, witcraft teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute. Made by Raphe Leuer. Seene and allowed according to the order appointed in the Queenes Maiesties iniunctions.

The fourth Boke of Witcraft. (Book 4)

Of Inuention or fynding out of argumentes. Chap. 1.

1 HOwe the prouing terme must lye, to the foresette and backsette of eche de∣maunde, that a necessarie reason may bée made of thrée termes, wée haue shewed afore, in our thirde booke.

2 It foloweth nowe, that wée teache a way, to get store of prouing termes.

3 For as the good and ready marchaunt prouideth store of sundry wares, and sor∣teth euery kinde by it selfe, adding special markes for his better direction, that hée may with conuenient spéede fit and serue his customer whē he calleth: So the quick and sharpe reasoner, must gather general rules together, and place them in order, that he may haue in a redinesse when néed shall be, store of reasons, for proofe or dis∣proofe of matters in doubt.

4 Therfore is witcraft wel deuided of the Grecians into two parts: wherof the firste is called in Gréeke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, in englishe, the decerning part: the o∣ther is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as muche to saye, as the finding parte.

5 This, for that by searching it fyn∣deth oute the prouing terme: The other, not only for that it iudgeth of the forme of an argument: but also for that it des∣cryeth the truth and falshode of al senten∣ces: and noteth the force, and significati∣on of wordès.

6 Some men doe thinke, that the fyn∣ding part, is first to be taught, and that by the course of nature it ought to come afore the other in order.

7 For as he that will make an house, first prouideth timber, stone, bricke, clay, lyme, nayles, pinnes, and other thinges, wherof he will haue his house to be buyl∣ded: and after hireth workemen, to sette these thinges together, and to frame them in order: which doone, his deuised house is finished and made: Euen so the cunning reasoner first findeth out (say they) by the

vse of the places, the matter whervppon he will speake: and after séeketh by the rules of a perfect reason, how to order and dispose the same.

8 This reason in my iudgemente ser∣ueth neither for him that woulde prac∣tise Witcrafte, nor for him that shoulde teache it.

9 For how can a man eyther inuent or teach any good reasons, to proue matters that lye in doubt, the nature of sentences and wordes, being not first knowne?

10 Seing eche question stādeth of them and is not thoroughly knowne, afore the force of eche woord be deepely considered, with due consideration had, how the wor∣des, agree or disagrée in a perfect sentence.

11 Now to returne this similitude, and to make it good against oure aduersaries, we saye:

12 No craftesman can fitte hymselfe of stuffe, afore hée hath cast in his mynde the shape and forme of the thing, that hee will make.

13 In lyke maner, no good reasoner can fynde out the prouing terme, by the vse of

the places, afore hée haue learned by the rules of a perfect reason, what maner of prouing terme will serue his purpose.

14 That is to say, how y^e prouing terme in the two foresayes, must be coupled or vncoupled to y^• forset or backset of y^• questi∣on, that y^• same may be directly concluded.

15 By this it is playne, that the shape of a thing that is to be made, would firste be deuised in mynde, afore the stuffe were prouided:

16 Otherwyse, it will commonly fall foorth, that there will bée eyther losse in prouiding to muche, or lacke in proui∣ding to little.

17 Wée haue therfore in our thrée for∣mer bookes, spoken of the decerning part of Witcrafte, and haue reserued the fyn∣ding parte to be intreated of in this oure fourth Booke.

18 But here I aduise thée of one thing (gentle reader) that thou looke not, that I should set foorth all the places, whereof men vse to gather arguments, and omitte none.

19 For that thing I suppose no man

hathe doone heretofore: nor shal do here∣after.

20 Neyther is it one mannes worke to begin and ende an art, in suche sort, as no∣thing can be sayd more.

21 It is well if we wryte that, whiche may profite many: neither is it fit to leaue many good things vndene, or many profi∣table things vntaught, bycause we cannot do and say, all that is good and profitable.

22 Nowe bicause the tenne storehouses are fit for inuention, I haue thought good to appoynt them for places.

23 And where as there are diuers other places besides, which can not conuenient∣ly be referred to any of the ten storehou∣ses, I haue added and interlaced them in suche order, as I iudged was fittest, either for memorie or inuention.

24 The generall places whiche I haue gathered out of sundry authors, to yelde a reasoner store of argumentes, are in number twentie and two: I thinke good to name and order them thus.

Of

• 1 Substance.
• 2 Quantitie.
• 3 Qualitie.
• 4 The cause.
• 5 The effecte.
• 6 Preparation.
• 7 Dooing.
• 8 Suffering.
• 9 Tyme.
• 10 Place.
• 11 Order.
• 12 Hauing.
• 13 The forecommers.
• 14 The aftercommers.
• 15 The withcommers.
• 16 The lykelyer.
• 17 The vnlykelyer.
• 18 The aslyke.
• 19 A similitude.
• 20 Witnesses.
• 21 Oaynsettes.
• 22 The differing terme.
• 23 Deuision.
• 24 Proportion.

25 These places maye bée reduced to a fewe generall poyntes, and diuers wry∣ters

vse so to doe.

26 Howbeit in myne opinion that hin∣d•…•…reth Inuention, and forceth further matter vppon wordes, then their vsuall sign•…•…cation doth beare.

27 Deuision doubtlesse is a necessarie meane to teache by: and it furthereth ler∣ning very much, to passe by deuision from poynt to poynt: so that you take that oc∣casion which nature or arte offereth, and kéep the propretie of y^• spéech which ye vse

28 In discoursing vppon the places, I mean•…•…o kéepe this order.

29 First I will define the place, and af∣ter deuide it: then I will set downe cer∣tayne generall rules, in eche particular place, that the groundeworke and chiefe cause of a reson may be vewed & cōsidered.

30 Fourthly, I will adde exāples y^• a be∣ginner may lern by imitatiō to do y^• like.

31 Finally I will tel how reasons held of eche place, and howe they holde not: that the diligent reader maye sée, what se∣quele there foloweth in reason vppon the groundes and principles of inuention.

32 If any one of these fiue poynts be (at

any tyme) omitted, it is eyther for that such things néede not to be spoken of (bée∣ing very playne of themselues) or for that they are sufficiētly entreated of elsewhere.

33 For that which hath bene taughte heretofore, and may séeme necessarie to be interlaced in the discourse of the places, I passe euer of purpose.

34 Poynting thée (gentle reader,) ne∣uerthelesse, by two numbres, where theu mayst at the first sight, fynd out that which else were necessarie to be here repeted.

Of the first generall place called Substance. Chap. 2.

1 He that wyll discourse orderly, and search a matter to the bottom, must be∣gin with the substāce of the thing he spea∣keth of.

2 Substance is takē here more large∣ly then it was in the first storehous•…•….

3 For there it was taken only for a thing that had his being by it selfe: but here substance is taken for any thing that is necessarily required in the •…•…scentiall

being of an other, and it is deuided into seuen partes.

4 The saywhat, the generall terme, the speciall terme, the proper terme, the whole, the parte, and the ofspring.

5 Euery one of these haue sundry rules, and argumentes gathered of them holde not all alike, therefore we will entreate of them seuerally.

6 What a say what is, and howe many sortes and kindes there are, what things haue the same order and trade of arguing that a saywhat hath, and what fiue speci∣al points do appertayne vnto it, looke side 73. Chapter. 4.

Other generall rules appertayning to a sayvvhat.

7 Whatsoeuer the saywhat doth de∣clare and set forth, the same in that respect is a kindred, and neither a selfe thing, nor a kinde.

8 The saywhat and the kindred (that is to say, the thing declared and set for the by the saywhat) differ only in words and termes, and not in substance of matter.

9 And therfore nothing (cōcerning sense and meaning) is conteyned in the one, but the same also is comprised in the other.

10 And whatsoeuer is denyed or sayd of the o•…•…e, may in like sort, be denied or sayd of the other.

Examples of argumentes dedu∣ced of a sayvvhat.

11 Eche man is mortal, for euery wight indued with reason and sense is mortall.

12 If you will set downe this reason in frame, according to the precise rules afore giuen, dot this.

Bar ba ra

• Euery wight indued with reason and sense is mortall.
• But euery man is a wyghte indued with reason and sense, therfore,
• Euery man is mortall.

13 Euery wighte indued wyth reason and sense, is the saywhat of man: so that it béeing mortall, forceth man to be mortall too, by the generall rule of the saywhat. •…•…erse. 9.

14 Again thus, death maketh an end of eche man: therfore euery man is mortall, frame this reason in rule thus.

Bar ba ra

• •…•…ch thing ended by death is mortal
• Euery man is ended by death,
• Therfore eche man is mortall.

The vse of this place.

15 The first reason is taken of the say∣what of man: the seconde of the saywhat of mortall.

16 For necessarie reasons may be dedu∣ced aswel from the sayewhat of the ende∣sayes backset, as from the saywhat of the endsayes fores•…•…t, and that to proue or dis∣proue in differently.

Of the generall terme. Chap. 3.

1 In séeking out of arguments, we take that for the general terme, which may be truly answered of many specials, whē de∣maunde is made what they are.

2 As when ye demaund what stoutnes or manhood is, the right answere must be, that manhod is a vertue: in lyke maner if ye aske what temperance is, the fittest an∣swere lyeth, that temperaunce also is a vertue.

3 Therfore vertue compared to man∣hoode and temperance, is a generall.

4 •…•…ere note that to these and such like

demaunds the nexte generall is rather to be answered then that which is further of.

5 For when I am asked what a peach is, I shall come néerer to the matter, if I say it is a frute, then if I answere and say it is a creature or a substance.

6 But mine answere should be furmost off from satisfying of mine hearer, if I should say it were a thing.

7 Bycause he that answereth so gene∣rally, makes no distinction in matter, but leaues the demander in as great doubt as he was in at the first.

Rules belonging to the generall terme by the vvhiche thou maist also learne the vse of this place.

8 Al things are cōteyned in the general that are conteyned in any speciall.

9 For if life, reason, sense, learning, wil, cūning, &c. be in man, the same things are also of force in a wighte, in a creature, and in a substance, whiche thrée are all ge∣neralls to man.

10 What thing soeuer may be gene∣rally affirmed of the generall, the same thing also may be generally affirmed of

euery one of his specials.

11 The generall is generally taken, when an vniuersall signe is ioyned to it, and it not diminished of his quantitie by any nayword, as when ye say, eche earth∣ly creature is mortall.

12 Upon this generall, generally gran∣ted, you may wel conclude, that euery mā is mortall.

13 But when a generall word is ioyned to a particular signe, or granted in a shew∣say to be true without any signe at al, then it maketh no sufficiēt proofe of the special.

14 As when it is alledged, that a wight or some wight is learned, these things be∣ing granted, do not of force inferre that all men or some men are learned, more then any other earthly creature that hath sése.

15 Howbeit, if the general be generally graunted, it maketh good proofe of all and euery one of his specials: for who so gran∣teth euery earthly wighte to be mortall, granteth also by good sequele in reason, that al men, and al beasts are mortal too.

16 What thing soeuer is denied of the generall, without restraint of any parti∣cular

signe, the same thing may séeme wel, to be denied of any of his specials.

17 For if it be wel sayd, learning is not gotten with ease: it is also well sayd: wit∣craft is not gotten with ease, speechcrafte, starcraft, Physike, lawe, or any other kind of learning.

18 But if any thing be denied of the ge∣neral, by restraint of the particular signe, y^• same is not therfore denied of any of his specials, but of certaine, suche as the re∣straint may séeme to limitte.

19 For though I graūt y^• som houseduck flieth not, yet am not I thereby forced to say, y^e wildduck •…•…ieth not, seing y^• restraint may séem to be made but to the tame duck.

20 No generall is affirmed of any spe∣ciall ofspringingly.

21 For it cānot be truly affirmed, y^e wit∣nesse is •…•…lored, séeing witnes is a colour, and the inholder of witnesse is coloured, be it cloath, wooll, yarne, or any thyng else that is accustomed to be dyed or coloured.

Of the special terme. Chap. 4.

1 The speciall is here taken for that wherof the generall may be sayde, when

demaund is made of the speciall, and que∣stion asked what it is.

Rules belonging to the speciall.

2 Whatsoeuer is sayd of the speciall in part, is sayd also of the general in part.

2 For if some men be learned, some wight is learned.

2 But on the other side in the behalfe of the generall this rule holdeth not.

3 For it foloweth not though some wight be foure footed, that therfore man shuld bée foure footed too.

4 Whatsoeuer is graunted to be in any speciall, must of force be graunted to be in all his generals.

5 If al the specials be graunted, they are sufficient to proue or disproue the general generally, one or many are not.

8 Al specials a•…•… partakers of their general indifferētly, •…•…out respect of more or lesse.

9 For an Egle is no rather nor no more a birde or a foule, then an Oule is, nor an Oule more or lesse then a Wrenne: but they and all other foules equally and in∣differently, are named and be in déede bir∣des, without degrée of more or lesse.

Of the proper terme. Chap. 5.

1 What a propertie is, how many kinds of properties there be, what rules may be gathered of the propertie, for proofe of a doubtfull matter: loke in the second boke, where we entreated of a propertie, begin∣ning at the 75. side, the fifth chapter, and ye shal find y^• may suffice to serue y^• turne.

The vse of this place.

2 Of that which is most properly called a propertie, necessarie reasons are made, either to proue y^e kinred, or to disproue it.

3 But of the other three kinds, the rea∣sons are not of like force, which thing may well be sene by examples thus.

4 Concerning that which is most pro∣perly called a propertie, this is a firme and good profe.

5 Here is present that which is apt to laugh, therefore a man is here present.

6 Or to disproue, here is not presente that which is apte to laugh, therefore no man is here present.

7 Thus it appeareth, that of suche pro∣perties as this is, necessarie reasons are gathered either to proue or disproue in∣differently.

8 Bycause the kinred and this kinde of propertie are necessarily annexed one to another and are neuer seuered asunder.

9 Now properties which appertaine to the first and thirde kinde, they serue well to proue the kindred, but they serue not to disproue it.

10 For it foloweth well, one cunning in Phisicke is present: or one that is gray headed, is present: Ergo a man is present.

11 But these sequels are naught, here is none that is cunning in Phisicke, Ergo here is no man.

12 Or here is none gray headed for age, Ergo here is no man.

13 For there are many men being nei∣ther cunning in Phisicke nor graye hea∣ded.

14 But there is none either cunning in Phisicke or graye headed, but that he is a man.

15 Bicause therfore these properties ap∣pertaine to self things of one seueral kin∣red, it must néedes be good in reason, that where the propertie is graunted to bée, there must be also the kinred.

16 For that onely in it the propertie hath his being.

17 The second kind of propertie serueth to disproue the kinred: but it will not al∣waies of force serue to proue it.

18 For this is a necessary reason, no two footed thing is present, therefore man is not present.

19 But to proue a man present, it is not sufficient to say, that which hath two féete is present, for manye things els besides man, haue two féete.

Of the vvhole and of his partes. Chapter. 6.

1 The whole and the parte, are like in some things to the generall and the speci∣all, in so much that it may be said (after a sort) that the generall is a whole to all his specialls: and eche speciall is a parte and portion of his generall, how be it in deede they differ much.

2 For a whole and a part are self things: and selfe things are said but of one.

3 A generall and a speciall are common things: & commō things are said of many.

4 Further the generall is affirmed of all his specials: eche speciall bearing both the name and the say what of his generall.

5 The whole is not said of his parts, but standeth of them: neither do the partes ad∣mit the apt say what of the whole, though they (somtimes) haue the same name that the whole hath.

6 For though euery parte of a bone bée called a bene, and euery part of a stone be named a stone, yet the sayewhat of the whole is one, and the saywhat of ech parte is another.

7 Let that be taken for a whole, which is a self thing deuided into sundry parts: and that for a part, which is a peece and porti∣on of such a whole.

8 The whole and the parts are respec∣ting termes: for there is no whole, but in respect of parts, nor there can be no parts but in respect of a whole.

9 Therefore in defining of the one, we must of force make mention of the other.

10 Partes are thus deuided: some are necessary parts, some are parts tending to profite, some to pleasure.

11 Necessarye partes are againe thus de∣uided.

12 Some are so necessary that the whole can haue no being without them: some are very necessary partes to the well being of an whole, and yet not so necessary but that it may haue a being without them.

13 The head, the necke, and the hart, are very necessarye partes of a man, and so is the matter and the forme of eche whole thing, bée it naturall, or artificiall: without these partes the whole can haue no being at all.

14 Hande, arme, foote, legge, and suche like partes, are very necessary for man, if he shall liue well: yet not so necessarye to any, but that he may both be named a mā, and be a man in déede without them.

15 The forme is more worthy then the matter.

16 For when the forme is atchéeued, the whole is finished, & the matter is brought to his appoynted ende, which els without forme shall lye voyde of vse, and come to no profite.

17 This may be learned at a fonde buil∣der,

who bestowing greate cost in proui∣ding bricke, timber, lime, claye, and other stuffe to builde an house, letteth all come to wast, afore he bring them in frame and adde for me to his matter.

18 Further, some partes are chiefe parts and of great importance, some are meane partes and of small value.

19 One principall parte, will weigh a∣gainst a multitude of meane partes, and such as are of small weight and value.

Examples of partes, prouing, or dispro∣uing an vvhole.

20 To proue thus: his coate is wel made for the coller is well, the body is well, the fleues are wel, and the pleates are al wel.

21 Againe, to disproue on this sort: this house is not wel builded, for the roufe wil not well auoyde water, the walles stande not righte vp, neyther is the foundation sure and fast.

22 But if the case so stande that ye can∣not alledge al, or manye chiefe partes, yet

alledge one: for one principall parte will serue for disproufe or disprayfe of the whole.

Examples of a vvhole prouing or disprouing the partes.

23 To proue: this coate is well made, therfore the coller, bodye, sleeues, and the pleates therof are well made too.

24 To disproue: this ceate is not good, therefore of force eyther the stuffe or the fashion therof is not good.

The vse of these tvvo places.

25 Argumentes holde of these places di∣uersly, some beyng necessary, some proua∣ble, some variable, and that as well when the partes are alledged to proue or dys∣proue the whole: as when the whole is a∣ledged for proofe or disproofe of his partes.

26 If all partes be recited eyther to proue or disproue: to praise or dispraise the whole, the argumēt is necessary: if many,

it is probable: if one or a fewe, it is vari∣able.

27 For though one principall parte bée good and of force, to disproue or disprayse foe whole: yet one or fewe partes of small value are not.

28 For if the head be naught, the whole body is naught too.

29 But it foloweth not, thoughe some one, or some fewe pynnes in an house be rotten or yll driuen, that the whole house shoulde bee sayd to be ill and naught ther∣fore.

30 One or many parts, whether they be principall or of small importance, are not alwayes of force to proue or to prayse a whole.

31 For a song that standeth of foure parts, that is to saye of the base, the meane, the triple, and the contratenor, is not therfore fine and good, because two or thrée partes be excellently well song.

32 For in such whole things as song and melody are, all the partes are necessarily required to be good, otherwise there shalbe a discorde and a iarre in the whole.

33 Neither is it a good reason to say this image is wel painted bycause the haire of the head and of the beard, the nailes of the fingers and of the toes be liuely expressd and set forth.

34 For if many or one principall parte bée omitted, a let maye bee in it or them, why the sequele is not good.

Rules belonging to an vvhole or to a parte.

35 Euery whole is bigger then any one of his partes.

36 A whole is equall to all his partes.

37 One parte is not equall in quantitie nor comparable in worthinesse with hys whole.

38 A corruptible parte in time may be both afore and after his whole.

39 As the timber and nailes of a shippe maye haue a being bothe afore the shippe be made, and after it is taken asunder.

Of the ofsprings. Chap. 7.

1 An ofspring is properly taken, eyther for a nowne adiectiue deriued of a nowne substantiue: or for the aduerbe y^• groweth (as it were) and springeth therof.

2 As of vertue is deriued a vertuous man, a vertuous thing, and vertuously: of health, healthfull, and healthfully.

3 But ofsprings here are taken as well for the nowne substantiue, which is the o∣riginall: as for the nowne adiectiue and aduerbe which are the deriuals.

4 For arguments are gathered indiffe∣rently as well of the deriuals to proue or disproue the originall: as of the originall to proue or disproue the deriuals: bothe kinds properly appert•…•…ining to this place.

Hovv of springs are deuided.

5 Some are ofsprings in meaning and not in name, as goodnesse and wel: some in name and not in meaning, as sleep•…•… and sleepingly: some in bothe, as vertue and vertuously.

Rules belonging to an Ofspring.

6 Ofsprings haue like sequele in reaso∣ning.

7 For as one originall is affirmed or de∣nied of another: so is one deriuall, affir∣med or denied of another.

8 And contrarywise, as one deri•…•… all is affirmed or denied of another: so is one ori∣ginall said or not said of another.

9 For example thus: if wealth be a good∣nes, thē things procuring wealth are good things: & to liue wealthely is to liue well.

10 Againe, if to iudge erroniously, bee to iudge falsely, then is errour falshood.

11 Or if erroniously, be not falsely: then is not errour falshood.

12 Erroniously to iudge, & falsly to iudge, differ in this, for that he y^• iudgeth falsely, hath alwayes a purpose to deceyue: when as he that iudgeth erroniously, swarueth from the truth, & yet not for lacke of good will, which thing when it chaunceth, the partie can not properlye be called a false iudge, nor his errour falshood.

13 This rule holdeth not in those of∣springs which are ofspringsonly in name: for it foloweth not, though sléepe be a good∣nes, and though those things that procure sleepe, be good things too, that therfore, that which is sleepingly done, should be saide to be well done: neither is he properly to bee called a sléeper, that sleepeth: but hee that sléepeth to much.

14 So that sléep, a sléeper, and sléepingly, being ofsprings in terme and name, and not in sense and meaning, folow not one vppon another in reasoning, as the other two sortes of ofsprings do.

Example.

15 I am an huswife, therfore huswifenes should appertaine vnto mée.

Of Quantitie. Chap. 8.

1 After that consideration is had of so muche as pertaineth to the substance of a matter, it foloweth next inorder, to consi∣der that, which belongeth to the quantitie thereof.

2 Quantitie consisteth in number, weight, and bignesse.

3 Of quantitie we haue intreated in one •…•…rite booke side. 20. chap. 3. vnto the which place the diligent reader muste haue re∣course, if he doe not well remember what was saide there.

4 It shalbe sufficient for vs to set down here certaine examples, thereby to teache the ignorant how reasons are gathered of this place.

Examples of reasons vvhich consist in number.

5 If you will builde with spéede, hire ma∣ny laborers: for many handes make radde woorke.

6 And againe, striue not against many: for force lieth in a multitude.

7 Item, pardon mée this fault: it is the firste.

8 Item, forgeue this second trespasse: for twice is not often.

9 The force of these and suche like rea∣sons consist in number.

Examples of reasons vvhich consist in bignesse.

10 My shooes are euer ill made: for they

neuer fit mée, but are alwayes eyther to long, or to short, to wide, or to streight.

11 These arguments are framed onely of bignesse.

12 But sometimes bignesse and num∣ber runne ioyntlye together, sometymes number and weight, as in these.

13 It is past your handreache, being thrée yardes highe.

14 Or it is more then you can spanne, being twelue intches broad.

15 Or it is more then you can fatham, being a yard square.

16 Or it farre passeth your lift, being an hundreth weight.

Of Qualitie. Chap. 9.

1 There is greater varietie of the quality of eche thing, then of the quantitie.

2 What qualitie is, and howe it is deui∣ded ye may learne in the. 4 Chap. of oure first booke.

3 But here, in deuiding of qualitie, I mind to folow that deuision, which experience hath taught to be moste agreable to com∣mon

practise.

4 For they that do throughly fift the qua∣litie of a thing, vse to conūder.

the	Power	therof.
Will
Disposition
Sensible qualities
Affections
Passions
Shape

Of Povver.

5 No déede is atchieued, excepte power and will concurre, and méete together: it either want, the worke ceaseth.

6 It is to bee considered, whether the power lye in one, or in many: whether it be néere or far of: what it can do by it self, and what, if it beioyned and coupled with others.

Hovve argumentes holde of povver or vvant of povver.

7 Argumentes taken of the want of po∣wer, are good and necessarye to disproue: for this reason is of force. Hee had no

strength or power to doe this déede: Ergo he did it not.

8 But argumentes grounded vpon po∣wer, that he could do such a facte, and con∣cluding thervpon y^• he did it, are not good: for many good men can do ill deedes, which they will not doe: and ill men can do good déedes, which they do not.

9 Thoughe power bée not sufficient to proue a fact to bée done: yet is power pro∣fitable to perswade, and to exhorte, that a thing maye be done. And the reasons ga∣thered therof, are probable.

10 For if you would perswade a man to take warre, building, or any other enter∣prise in hand: your purpose shal be greatly furthered, if ye proue that the matter once begon, maye be well accomplished, eyther with ease or with honour.

Of VVill.

11 Will is a desire of the minde, to doe, to speake, or to thinke.

Hovv VVill is deuided.

12 There is a good will, and an ill will.

13 A good wil in our english tong, is not alwayes taken for a will to worke that which is good: but for a readines, when the person is prest of himself, not needing any forraine occasion to pricke him forward.

14 An euill will is a will constrayned, and vrged by some outward meanes.

15 The first is called a freewill: and the second, a forced will.

The vse of this place.

16 If the will of the doer be forced, and not frée, he loseth the praise of his weldo∣ing in vertue, but not in arte.

17 For no deede can be good or vertuous on the doers behalfe, except it be done vp∣on a good intent: the intent can not be good, if the will be constrained.

18 But in deedes that are wrought by arte, wee praise the cunning of the craftes man, nothing considering with what good will he wrought his worke.

19 If a man be constrained to doe ill a∣gainst his will, there is a double conside∣ration to be had: one of the force, another of the harme.

20 If the harme be small, and the force great, the partie is to be holden excused: but if the facte bee haynous, no con•…•…raint can make the doer vnblameable, muche lesse if the force were smal, or suche as he myght haue withstand without any great perill.

21 Thoughe will bée not sufficiente to proue an acte to be done: yet may wil de∣serue prayse or dispraise, euen in them that want power to doo good or yll.

22 For this reason is not good, he wold haue done wrong, therfore he did wrong in deede.

23 But these are good, he would fayne do well, therfore he deserueth thankes: or he would fayne do harme, therfore he de∣serueth blame.

Of dispositions.

24 Consider whether they be good or ill: and whether they be settled and rooted in the partie, that he cannot soon leaue them: or that they be subiecte to sodeyn chaunge, and without continuaunce.

25 They of the firste sorte serue to en∣large, or to increase a matter, eyther in praise of the good, or disprayse of the badde: they of the second sort, are rather fit to extenuate, then to amplifie.

26 Here we haue to cōsider the maners of the partie, his entertaynment, the vsage of himselfe, his vertues, his vices, his cun∣ning, his knowledge, his ignoraunce, his craft, his sleyght, his trickes, his knacks, his prankes, his touches. &c.

Examples of disposition, or manners.

27 Place not this fellowe in any office: for he is negligent, and a riotous person.

28 B•…•…ie not this gelding: for he is restie.

29 Commit not your lyfe into this Phy∣sitians handes: for hee is ignoraunt in his booke, and lacketh experience.

30 Laye no wager vpon the running of this greyhound: for he vseth to lye off.

Of sensible qualities.

31 The vse of this place is very common,

and yeldeth many argumentes, some gathe∣red of the colour, which the eye séeth: some of the voyce, whiche the eare heareth: some of the fauor, which the nose smelleth: and some of the tast, which the toung decerneth: some of hotnesse, coldnesse, moystnesse, dry∣nesse, hardnesse, softnesse. &c. whiche féeling iudgeth.

Examples.

32 Take thys cloth, the colour is good.

33 Choose this boy querister, for his voice is swéete and pleasant.

34 Get some gréene herbs and Mayflou∣res, for a good smell is comfortable.

35 Dippe youre meate in vineger, and it shall taste the better.

36 This grounde is waterish, therfore it is not good to be sowen.

Of affections.

37 There are diuers opinions cōcerning affections: some men hold, that all affections are euill, and that no good man will vse or nourishe any of them: some hold, that many of them are good, and that they are giuen of God vnto man, for sundry good purposes.

38 Doubtlesse mercie, pitie, loue, anger, spite, disdayn, hope, affiance, hate, distrust, contempt, enuie, malice, mirth, gladnesse, greefe, and feare, &c. are oft alledged as good matter to proue or disproue, to exhorte, or dissuade.

Examples of affections.

39 I will not be his seruant, he is too testie: he will not long dwell in one opi∣nion, for hée is fickle headed: this bitche will not hunt, for she is proude.

Of passions.

40 Some take passions for any affecti∣on, be it greate or small: but in oure En∣glish speeche we vse this terme, when wée would expresse a vehement pang, eyther of the bodie, or of the mynde.

The vse of this place.

41 If a fault be committed, through any passion or pang, eyther of the mynde or bodie, the pang shall excuse the fact, if the pacient himself were no cause herof at al.

42 If he were some occasion, yet not the chiefe occasion therof, then it shall ex∣tenuate

the facte:

43 But if he was the onely cause, or the chiefe cause of his owne maladie: then the passion procureth to the partie, neyther pardon nor pitie: for it is commonly and truely sayde: He that will kill when he is drunke, shall be hanged when he is sobre.

Examples of Passions.

44 This mans déede of gifte, is not good in the lawe: for he was straughte, and be∣sides himselfe, when he sealed it.

45 Take héede of that Dogge, for he is madde.

Of Forme.

46 Forme, fashion, shape and making: are counted of some, as parte of a thyng, and so they be in very deede, if the matter bée narrowly considered: howebéeit, a parte (by the iudgement of the common sorte) is taken onely for a bodyed portion of a sole substaunce: and manye reasons are gathe∣red of the forme of a thyng, by them which neyther thinke forme or fashion any parte at all.

47 Wée will therefore make forme a

place by it selfe, folowing that in arte, which we learne to be common in practise.

48 Fairenes and fauour appertaine to this place, they differ in this, that fairenesse •…•…∣sisteth chiefly in colour, and fauoure in pro∣portion.

The deuision of forme and fashion.

49 There is a newe fashion and an olde fashion: a straunge fashion, and an vsual fa∣shion: a trimme fashion, and a rude fashion: a commodious fashion, and an vnprofitable fashion. &c.

Examples of Forme.

50 My yong Lord will loue my lady his wyfe righte well: for she is bothe faire and well fauoured.

51 This horsse and this greyhounde can not choose but be good: there is such trimme making in them both.

Of the causes. Chap. 10.

1 No man is saide to knowe anye thyng throughly, afore he know the causes therof.

2 A cause is a meane, wherby any thing is made to haue a being.

The deuision of causes.

3 There are foure causes: the matter, the forme, the workman, and the ende.

The

• 1 Matter.
• 2 Forme.
• 3 Woorkman.
• 4 Ende.

4 Matter is the stuffe, whereof a thing is made.

5 Formeis the sh•…•…e and fashion, which added to the matter, maketh the thing per∣fect, and yeldeth both •…•…ame and béeing ther∣vnto.

6 Woorkmen are doers, from whence mouing first commeth.

7 An ende is the vse of a thyng that is made, causing the workman to take the en∣terprise in hande.

8 Of this it is playne, that matter with∣out forme is vnprofitable stuffe: and that forme is not added to the matter withoute a workeman: nor that any thing worketh, ex∣cept it be moued by some profitable ende.

9 Therfor do authors knit these four causes

togyther, which knowledge are very pro∣fitable: and reasons are gathered of them very orderly.

Examples of the causes.

10 As if I say: My bootes are good, for they keep out wete wel: Myne argument is taken of the matter: for the cause is the goodnesse of the leather, whereof my boo∣tes are made:

11 But if I saye, I lyke my bootes wel, for they are fit for me, and well shapen: my reason is taken of the forme, whiche consisteth in the fashion of the boote.

12 If I say, My bootes are well made: for he that made them is a cunning shoe∣maker: my reason taketh his force of the workeman.

13 If I say, I make my bootes thus, for I mynde to ryde drye: my reason taketh his force of the ende, whiche is the vse, I purpose to haue of my bootes.

14 Thoughe forme and matter maye well for bréefenesse sake, bée reckened as partes, and so be referred to the first ge∣nerall place whiche we called substaunce, bicause the cause séemeth to be without the

thing, where as these haue their béeing in the thing: nay rather the thing it selfe is nothing else but the forme and matter ioy∣ned together, and taken as one: yet in com∣mon speach, we neuer séeme otherwise to consider of a part, then as it is a bodied por∣tion of some whole.

15 Therefore haue I made Matter and Forme, places by themselues.

16 If any man be contentious, and say, that it is but that, to teache one thing often: I aunswer, that it is no inconuenience, that one argument (vpon sundry respects) be re∣ferred to sundrie places.

Rules appertaining to the Matter and the Forme.

17 The matter may be good of a thyng, though the forme 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ill: as the golde in the ring may be good, and the fashion of the ring nought.

18 Agayne, the forme may be good, and the matter nought: as the shoe maye bee well made, and yet the leather kéepe oute no water.

19 So that nothing can be ill, whose form and matter are both good: nor nothing can be good, if eyther his matter or his forme be ill.

Hovve vvorkmen are deuided.

20 There are thrée kyndes of workers: some things doe worke as nature teacheth them: some as reason guydeth them: and some at aduenture.

21 The first worketh of necessitie, the se∣conde of fréewill, the third by chaunce.

22 Workemen are also many sundrye wayes deuided: for some do worke thinges in common, and some do things alone: some worke more in short tyme, and do it ill, and some work little in long tyme, and do it wel: some worke for pleasure, and some for pro∣fite: some of force, and some of fréewill. &c.

Generall rules belonging to vvorkmen.

23 When there are naturall and neces∣sarie workemen, there muste néedes be ne∣cessarie and naturall woorkes.

24 And againe, where the worke is ne∣cessarie, and naturall, there the workeman must bée so too.

25 One workeman alone can not doe a common worke.

26 He worketh fast inough, that worketh that well, which he doth.

27 And he worketh ouerfasic, that doth any thing ill, or amisse.

28 He worketh well, that worketh with aduisement.

29 And he ofte faulteth in his work, that hasteth to muche.

30 He is a singular workeman that will ridde much in shorte tyme, and doe it well withall.

Generall rules and principles gathe∣red of an ende.

31 If the ende of a thing be good and law∣full, then is the preparation, and all things tending to that ende, lawfull too.

32 For if it be lawful to fight in defence of of a mannes countrey, then is warre, and

the vse of a mans weapon lawfull:

54 But if the ende be vnlawfull, and ill, then are all thinges ill, and vnlawfull, that are appointed to that ende.

Of the Effect of things. Chap. 11.

1 After wée haue searched out the causes of thinges, it behoueth vs to consider their effect: which is nothing else, but the work∣mans déede.

Hovve vvorkes and effectes are deuided.

2 Some workes are doone only with the bodie: some only with the mynde: some by helpe of them both: some are workes that tende to profite: some to pleasure: some are vaine, tending to no good vse at all: there is a long woorke, and a short woorke: a slowe worke, and a quicke worke, an ill worke, and a good woorke. &c.

Rules gathered of an effect, or of the vvorke that is done.

3 If the worke be well done, the cost that

is made therevppon, is well bestowed, and the workeman deserueth his praise.

4 If the worke be not more worth, then the coast that is bestowed vppon it, there is laboure lost.

5 That worke is good, whiche commen∣deth the workeman, and that a naughty worke which putteth the doer to shame.

6 The worke of the mind in good things is alwayes more excellente, then the worke of the body: but in il things, it is farre worse.

An example of an Effecte.

7 Fuchsius was a good Phisitian: for hée hath done many notable cures.

8 If ye will set downe this reason at large, do thus:

Da ri i

• Whosoeuer hath doone many nota∣ble cures was a good Phisitian,
• But Fuchsius hathe done many no∣table cures, therefore
• Fuchsius was a notable Phisitian.

Of preparation. Chap. 12.

1 As the efficient cause doth alwayes re∣spect an effect: so doth the end or finall cause require a preparation.

2 By preparation I understande not on∣ly the acte of prouiding: but the things also y^• are prepared, as meanes to bring a purpose or deuise to passe.

Hovve preparation is deuided.

3 Preparation is eyther greate or small, sumptuous or meane: open, or secrete: law∣full or vnlawfull: to muche, to little, or in a meane.

Rules belonging to preparation.

4 If preparation be made, there muste néedes be an ende purposed: but contrary∣wise it followeth not, that yf there bée an ende purposed, there shoulde bée by and by preparation made, bycause the ende is in purpose, afore the means can be gotten, that are prepared for an ende.

5 Agayne, if preparation be not made▪

nor things prouided that are necessarily re∣quired for an ende: it foloweth that the end is not obteyned.

An example of preparation.

6 There will be warre, for there is a generall muster taken through the whole realme: a number of souldiers are prest in∣to wages, the Quéenes Ships furnished with men, vitayle, and shot: and greate pro∣uiding of armoure.

Of doing. Chap. 13.

1 No doer, or efficiente cause, can make any worke: nor no preparation will serue to obteyne any ende without doing. There∣fore in mine opinion, the storehouse of do∣ing followeth right aptly in this place. For doing is the laboure that is taken in making of a worke, which bringeth the workeman by meanes (as by steps and degrées) to hys appointed end.

Hovv doings and laboure are deuided.

2 Some dooinges leaue a woorke which

remayneth to be séene after the labor is en∣ded, as the doing that is bestowed in buil∣ding an house, leaueth an house to be vew∣ed and séene when the worke is finished.

3 Some doings leaue behinde them no suche worke, as may be séene with eie, and yet a worke too, as the trauaile and payne that is taken in getting of learning.

4 Learning is the worke that remay∣neth of the laboure, which though it cannot be vewed by the eie, yet maye it not there∣fore be called no worke, or sayde not to re∣maine.

5 For learning remayneth in déede in the minde of man, and differeth much from the paine that was taken in getting of it.

6 Agayne, there is a sharpe laboure, a softe laboure, and a meane laboure: the firste serueth for spéede, the seconde for ease, the thirde for continuance.

Rules of Laboure.

7 That laboure is well bestowed that bringeth forth a good worke.

8 That is lost labour, and in vaine, that faileth of his appointed ende.

9 Haste in doing maketh waste in the woorke: as the common saying is: haste •…•…keth waste.

An example of Doing.

10 These are ill men: for they sweare, they dice, they rauishe, they robbe, they kyll.

Of Suffering, and of his diuision. Chapter. 14.

1 We must consider, whether the suffe∣ring be in the body, in the minde, or in ex∣ternal things: as what losse the party hath sustained, what domage, what pain, what sicknesse, what griefe. &c.

An example of Suffering.

2 He loueth mée entirelye: for hée hath ventured his life, and sustained great dys∣pleasure for my sake.

Of time and place. Chap. 15.

1 What place and time are, loke in our first booke the. 24. side, and. 27. 28. verses.

2 And for the deuision of time looke. 41. •…•…de, beginning at the. 6. verse, and so forth till ye come to the twelfth.

3 And to knowe howe places are deui∣ded, looke the. 43. side, and the. 22. verse.

An example of place.

4 I had no libertie this moneth to bée where I woulde: for I was all this time in prison.

An example of time.

5 Aristotle was not king Alexanders scholemaister: for Aristotle was deade a∣•…•…ore king Alexander was borne.

Of the vse of these tvvo places.

6 Necessarye argumentes maye be ga∣thered

of time and place to disproue: but to proue or perswade, they are but proba∣ble.

7 For this reason holdeth of force: the partie that is accused, to haue done thys murther, was not in that place, where the fact was don, or had no being at that time: Ergo he is not giltie of that crime.

8 Nowe if you reason, he was there at that time, and none sene there but hee: it argueth a probabilitie, that he should haue bene the doer, but it forceth no necessitie.

Of Order. Chap. 16.

1 Order is a thing very necessarye in all matters. For no armie is of force, excepte the men be in araye and in order: no house can stand except the timber and stone bée laide in due order: no fire will burne, ex∣cept the stickes and the coales lie in order: no writing can be red except y^• letters be set in order: no talke can bée vnderstan∣ded, except the woords be spoken in order: to conclude, nothing is weldon, that is not

done in order: and nothing is ill done, but that is done out of order.

The vse of this place.

2 This place yeldeth manye probable argumentes, to perswade or disswade, to praise or dispraise.

3 But necessary reasons to proue a facte to be done or not done, it yeldeth fewe.

4 Thoughe placing, of it selfe (narowly sifted) admit no degrées of more or lesse: yet when the ordering of one thyng is compared to the ordering of another, cō∣mon speache vseth to make degrées, and to saye one thing is better ordered, then an∣other.

5 For we vse to say: the armie is in bet∣ter order nowe, then it was afore: or the common weale is better gouerned now, then it hath bene heretofore.

An example of Order.

6 The state of the common weale must

néedes soone change, all things are so farr•…•… out of order.

Of Hauing. Chap. 17.

1 Argumentes are taken of Hauing, when the force of the reason dependeth of the Hauing of a thing, and not of the thing that is had or possessed.

2 As when it is said: come not neare this beare: for she hath whelpes.

3 The force of this reason lieth not in the whelpe: but in hauing of a whelpe.

4 This place is very common, and argu∣mentes rise thereof very rifely.

5 As if I saye: he hath a weapon, take héede of him.

6 Item, he hath good frendes, much mo∣ney, and an hautie stomacke, therfore me∣dle not with him.

7 Item, he hath corne of his owne, what néedes he to borow, or bie in the market.

Of Commers. Chap. 18.

1 Commers are a generall place, con∣taining

forecommers, aftercommers, and withcommers.

2 For some things comming afore hand, are signes and warnings of that which is to come: some things folowing after, are remembrances and monumentes of that which hath bene: and diuers things vsing to chance at once, are witnesses and assu∣rances one of another.

Of the vse of these places.

3 Forecommers serue to proue that a thing shal be, or shall not be: and they ap∣pertaine to the time to come.

4 Aftercommers, serue to proue, that a thing hath bene, or hath not bene: and they appertaine to the time past.

5 Withcommers serue to proue that a thing is or is not: and they pertaine to the time present.

6 If the commers chance alwayes after one sorte: then are the reasons deduced therof necessarye.

7 If they chance often, or for the more parte: then are the argumentes taken of

them likely and probable.

8 If they chance but seldome, and misse as oft as they hitte: then the reasons ga∣thered of them are coniecturall, and prog∣nosticallike, as oft false as true.

Examples.

9 Of forecommers we reason thus: whē those things come to passe, then doe these and these things folowe: but these fore∣things are come, therefore the aftercom∣mers will folowe.

10 For example thus: if it be a ruddie eue∣ning, & a gray morning, thē the day folow∣ing shalbe faire: but yesternight was rud∣die, and this morning is graye, this days therfore will be faire.

11 Of aftercōmers we reason thus: these things cannot be, but such and such things went before: seing then the aftercommers are past, the forecommers are past also, as for example: this woman geueth milke, Ergo she hath had a childe: for geuing of milke commeth after hauing a childe.

12 Of withcommers thus: the sword was solemnly caried abrode in the court: Ergo.

the Quéenes maiestie was there.

13 Item, if you will haue warre, looke for cost, trouble, and daunger, for these are incident, and cleaue to euery person, that will liue in warres.

14 He hath a cough, a stitch, and an ague: Ergo, he hath the pl•…•…uresie.

Of comparison. Chap. 19.

1 When two or moe are compared to∣gether in any one thing: eyther they are equall, and of like force concerning the matter in which they are compared: or vnequall, and of vnlike force therin.

2 If they be equall, and of like value: then they serue indifferentlye turne for turne, one to proue, or disproue another.

3 But if one excéede another in anye de∣grée of worthinesse: then the reasons that are taken of the likelier, holde well to dis∣proue: and the reasons taken of the vnlik∣lier, hold well to proue: but contrarywise, the reasons are not good.

4 For the likelier will not proue the vnlikelier: nor the vnlikelier will not

proue the likelier.

5 For it is no good reason to say, the lord of the soyle may sell the wood of this Lord∣ship, Ergo the tenauntes may sell it: or the tenauntes may not sell principall timber, Ergo, the Lord may not.

6 Nowe the Lorde is the likelyer to make suche a sale: and the tenauntes the vnlikelier.

Rules belonging to the equall.

7 Among equal things this is a general rule, looke what is good or lawfull in one, the same shalbe good or lawful in another: and what is ill or vnlawfull in one, the same shalbe ill or vnlawfull in another.

8 Item, looke what one can or cannot: the rest in like manner can, or cannot: o∣therwise they are not equall.

9 With thine equall thou shalte haue e∣quall lawe and portion: like labour, like wage: like paine, like reward: like fault, lyke punishement: and generally like re∣quireth like.

Rules of the likelier.

10 That the likelier cannot, the vnlike∣lier much lesse can.

11 That will please the worthier, maye content the meaner.

12 Loke what wyll not fit the lykelyer, the same will not fit the more vnlike.

Rules of the vnlikelier.

13 That which the vnlikelier can com∣passe, may be compassed of the likelier.

14 Loke what will serue the vnlikelier, the same will serue the likelier.

15 That which will not please the mea∣ner, will ill please the better.

16 They that take the likelier to be that which is more: and the vnlikelier to bée that whych is lesse: and the aslyke to bée that which is equall in quantitie, and so terme these places, places of y^• more, of the lesse, and of the equall, are foulye decey∣ued.

17 For likelier, vnlikelier, and aslike, consiste in other things, as well as in quantitie: wheras more, lesse, and equall,

(if they be properly considered) consist on∣lye in quantitie.

18 Further, often times the argument that is taken of the likelier is grounded vppon the lesser quantitie, and that argu∣ment that is taken of the vnlikelier, vpon the greater quantitie, which thing should neuer be, if their supposition were true.

19 For if I say, two are likelier to spéede then thrée, therefore sende not thrée, but two:

20 The reason is grounded vppon two, the likelier to disproue thrée the vnlike∣lier, yet are two in verye déede the lesser number, and thrée the bigger.

21 Therfore likelier and vnlikelier, are not alwayes more and lesse in respecte of quantitie, but likelier is that which is of more possibilitie in reason: and vnlikelier that which is of lesse possibilitie, and that in any respect whatsoeuer.

Of a similitude. Chap. 20.

1 A similitude is properlye no place but a kind of reasoning, when the liklines

of one thyng argueth (as it were by ex∣ample) the lyke sequele in reason of ano∣ther thing: for example sake, thus.

2 As the frée postyng horse maye not long together galloppe vpon the spurre: so the sharpe and pregnant wytte, maye not muche wythout intermission, bée for∣ced to muse vppon difficulte and harde matters.

3 Learned men in arguing, make small accompt of any similitude.

4 For by a similitude you maye as soone proue a wrong matter, as a righte: yet doe men of great iudgement vse it, but ra∣ther to perswade and leade the simple and the ignoraunt, then to force and ouercome the wittie aduersarie.

5 For a good and a shamefast nature, yeldeth in that, whych he séeth so liuelie expressed in another thing, that by no shift of reason, he can make any resistance.

6 It is good for makyng or aunswe∣ring of a similitude, to learne wherein thyngs agrée or disagrée.

7 A similitude is well answered, when an vnliklinesse is shewed in that matter,

wherein diuers things were sayde to bée like.

Of VVitnesses. Chap. 21.

1 Witnesse is the worde, writte, or déed of a credible person, prouing a matter that lieth in doubt.

Hovv VVitnesse is deuided.

2 The witnesses vpon whose authoritis proofes are grounded, are either heauen∣ly, earthly, or infernall.

3 Gods word, his wonders, his miracles, and his message, sent to men by angels, and Prophetes, are alledged as heauenly witnesses:

4 Law, custome, othe, bargain, writings, sayings, and so forth, are accompted as hu∣maine witnesses, and such as are taken of the credite of man:

5 Coniuring, witchcraft, appearing of ghostes, oracles and answeres of diuels,

are infernall and vngodlye witnesses, vsed onelye of the wicked, and suffered of God for a punishement to deceyue them, that will not beléeue the true meanes that god hath appoynted.

6 Witnesses are not so muche founde out by the arte and cunning of the spokes∣man: as they doe arise of the matter it selfe, and are ministred to him by the in∣formation of others.

7 Therfore, arte teacheth not so muche to finde oute witnesses: as to vrge them forceablely for prouse of the matter that lyeth in question.

Of Gaynsets. Chap. 22.

1 I thinke it néedlesse, here to repeate, how many kindes of gaynsettes there bée: what eche kind is, wherin they differ one from another: or what els hathe bene spoken of them in oure former Bookes: bycause it may suffice the diligent reader, to be referred by oure marginall note, to those places where these things are in∣treated of at large.

Of respecting termes and yokefelovves.

2 Respecting termes may well bée na∣med yokefelowes, for that they are knit, and coupled together with a certain band of societie.

3 For the maister, and the seruaunt: the parentes, and the children: the goodman and the goodwife: the landlorde, and the tenaunt: the guest, and the hoste: and all other respecting terms, are alwaies coup∣led and ioyned together in some kinde of felowship.

Hovve reasons doe holde of yokefelovves and respecting termes.

4 When reasons are gathered of yoke∣felowes to proue the being, or not being the one of the other, they are necessary: but when they are taken of the duetie and af∣fection, that is or should be betwene them, then are they but probable.

Examples.

5 He is a father, therefore he hathe a sonne: he is not my guest, therefore I am not his hoste: these and suche like are ne∣cessary reasons.

6 But if I saye, the iudge will take my parte, for he is my frende: or if I saye, he wyll iudge against me, bycause he is my foe: or els my matter shall haue good suc∣cesse in the lawe, for I pertaine to the Courte: these and suche like reasons, take their force vpon respecte, and are but pro∣bable reasons, not necessary argumentes, and such as holde of force.

Of depriuing termes.

7 Naturall power and want of natu∣rall power, compared together, and one proued or disproued by another, are taken for depriuing termes.

8 Wée vse to reason vppon them in this sorte: he séeth, therefore he is not

blynde: or agayne, hée is blynde, therfore he seeth not.

9 This kinde of reasoning alwayes folo∣weth of force, that where the power is, ther can not be the want: and where wante is, there can not be the power.

10 Wee may also reason vpon the depri∣uing termes, on this sort and maner.

11 If lack of sight be a lack of some sense, then must sight it selfe néedes be a sense: or if sight it selfe be a sense, then must lacke of sight, be a lacke of sense too.

12 Here is to be noted, that this place ser∣ueth as well to proue the wante by the po∣wer: as contrarywise to proue the power by the want.

13 Now for contraries this is to be noted: that arguments gathered of them, take their force, sometyme of contrary termes, some∣tymes of contrarie sayings.

14 Contrarie sayings are here taken not only for two generall shewsayes, which dif∣fer in qualitie, and make no chaunge at all, eyther of foreset or backset (as was sayde in 3. verse of the. 88.. side) but also those are con∣trarie sayings, whiche stande of contrarie

termes, and doe appertayn to contrarie ma∣ners, be the sayings particular or general.

Hovve to decerne contrarie sayings, vvhich are contrarie by reason of termes, and not by reason of qualitie.

15 When the foresette and backset of a shewesay, haue eyther of them a contrarye terme, then those foure contrarye termes, may two seuerall wayes bée coupled togy∣ther, to make contrarie sayings:

16 Eyther when the forset is one in both the shewsayes, and the backsets be contra∣ries: or else when the backsette is one, and the foresets contraries.

17 But and if bothe the foreset and back∣set in two shewsayes be contrary eche to o∣ther: then those sentences stande of contra∣rie termes, but they are not contrarie say∣ings: bicause suche are of lyke ioyce in rea∣son, neyther is there any resistance in the sayings, but a contrarietie in the termes.

18 They that think this rule obscure and strange, may by this example that foloweth and suche lyke, make it to themselues fami∣liar and playn: as thus,

19 Uertue is worthie prayse: the foreset of this shewsaye, hath vice to his contrarie, and the backsette, hath blame. Nowe these foure contrarie termes, Uertue, vice, prayse, and blame, are two seuerall wayes coupled together in shewesayes, to make contrarie sayings.

20 Either when the foreset remayneth one in both the shewsayes, the backsets be∣ing contraries: as,

Uertue is

• worthy prayse,
• worthy blame. or,

Uice is

• worthy prayse,
• worthy blame.

Or else when the backset is one, and the foresets are contraries: as,

Uertue	is worthie prayse. or,
Uice
Uertue	is worthie blame.
Uice

21 But and if the foresayd foure terms be coupled any third way togither, to make two shewsayes: the shewsayes themselues shall not be contrary, though the termes wherof they stand be contrarie, as they are cōpared one with another: For example thus:

Uertue	is worthie	prayse
Uice	blame. or,
Uertue	is worthie	blame
Uice	prayse.

22 For the two firste are bothe true and good: and the other two are both false and ill. Nowe for the two firste, it is reason good inough, to say, they are both true and good, ergo, they ar not contrary sayings. For one true saying is neuer contrary to an other true saying: nor one good thing, is neuer con∣trary to an other good thing.

23 But for the two seconde sayings, it is no sufficient argument, to say, they are both false, or both ill, ergo, they are not contrary sayings: bicause an ill thing, may be contra∣ry to a good thing, and to an ill thing too: and a false saying may be contrary, as well to a false saying as to a true. Therfore it beho∣ueth to adde this withall, that they are both of like choice, and may bothe at once fall to be in one man.

24 For a man may both praise vertue & blame vice, and yet vse therein no contrari∣etie of speach at al, which thing could not be, if they were contraries in déede.

Of the vse of this place.

25 Of this place wée maye gather bothe probable and necessary arguments, to proue or to disproue.

26 For if I argue thus: Socrates is sick: Ergo he is not in health: or say, this lyne is not streight, Ergo it is crooked: the reasons are necessarie, and doe inforce the one a bée∣ing, the other a not béeing.

27 But and if I reason on this wyse, and say, The lawe alloweth mée to prayse well doers, though I can not proue they did wel, Ergo the lawe suffereth mée lykewyse, to disprayse ill dooers, thoughe I wante wit∣nesse to proue they did yll: My reason may séeme probable: for that it standeth wyth reason, that contrary maners should haue contrarie fame and report.

28 Yet is it not necessarie, séeing it doth not generally holde: neyther is it lawfull in a good common wealthe: for one man a∣lone without sufficient proufe to disprayse, though to prayse it be lawful, bycause there ryseth no suche stryfe about prayse, as doth commonly aboute disprayse: therefore •…•…or

quietnesse sake, the law forbiddeth the one: and for an incouragement to well dooing, it alloweth the other.

Of those that are termed more then contraries.

29 Arguments gathered of those whiche we terme more then contraries, are always necessarie, eyther to proue, or to disproue, taking their force, somtimes of the worde, sometymes of the saying.

30 Of the worde, bycause the yeaword and nayeworde are of suche propretie and force, that if one of them be sayde of any thing, the other can not be sayd of the same.

31 And againe, if the one be not, the other is: he therefore that proueth the one, doth consequentely disproue the other: and he that doth remoue the one, inforceth the o∣ther.

32 Of the saying, bicause that more then contrary sayings, are euer one true, and an other false,

33 Therefore, if this saying (All fayre women are good) be false: then this saying,

(Some faire women are not good) muste néedes be true: and againe, if this saying (some faire women are good) be true, then is this saying (no faire women are good) false.

24 This place shall yelde necessarie ar∣gumentes also of the worde, when wée change the termes, and argue thus: If man be a creature, then that which is no creature is no man: and againe, if no creature bée no manne, then is euery manne a crea∣ture.

25 This kind of arguing is alwayes ne∣cessary, excepte the backset be a chanceable inbeer to the foreset, and then the argumēte is not necessarie, bycause the chanceable in∣béer may be saide, and not saide of his inhol∣der: and therefore this reason holdeth not, man is iust, Ergo he that is not iust, is no man.

26 Those argumentes that driue men to an impossibilitie in reason, are com∣monlye gathered of this place: and the rule wherevppon they bée grounded, is moste certayne, in so muche that some Authoures laboure to proue all

principles by it, and makes it an only stay▪ why wranglers cānot proceed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to an endlesse worke.

Of the differing terme. Chap. 23.

1 Thinges differ one from an o•…•…her by thrée seueral degrées: the first, is by kynde: the seconde, by kinred: the third, by spec•…•…all béeing.

2 Specials whiche are not comprysed vnder one next generall, differ in kynde: as a man and an oke: for the nexte generall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 man, is a wight: and the next general to an oke, is a trée: therefore a man and an Oke differ in kynde, bycause they are conteyned vnder diuers kyndes, whereof one is not comprised of an other.

3 Selfe things conteyned vnder dyuers kinreds, and also the kinreds them selues conteyned vnder one next kynde, differ in kinred: As this horsse and this asse: or an horsse and an asse: for notwithstanding that these agrée in their kynde (by reason that eche kynde is indifferently sayde of things that are vnder it) yet notwithstanding they

playnely differ in kinred, an horsse and an asse béeing diuers kinreds themselues: and this horsse and this asse béeing selfe thinges conteyned vnder diuers kinreds.

4 Diuers selfe things conteyned vnder one lowest kinred, though they agrée bothe in kinde and in kinred: yet do they differ in speciall béeing: as Iohn and William, this man and that man. For Iohn is as well a man and a wight as William is: and Wil∣liam as well as Iohn: so that they neyther dissent in kinred nor in kynd: neuerthelesse they dissent much in speciall béeing: for one of them hathe not the same speciall beeing that the other hath.

5 Looke howe many wayes there are for things to dissent: and so many wayes are there also for them to assent: for gaynsettes haue one order and trade of learning.

6 Things that dissent in kind, dissent also in kinred, and in speciall béeing: and things that agrée in special béeing, agree also in kin∣red, and in kinde: But it foloweth not that those things which dissent in speciall béeing: should also dissent in kinred, or in kynd: nor that those thinges which agrée in kynde or

in kinred, shoulde therefore agrée in speciall béeing. So that they dissent most tha differ in kynde: and they agrée néerest that agrée in speciall béeing.

7 When thinges vpon dyuers respec∣tes are ryghtely sayde, eyther to agrée, or disagrée: then vse this distinction of agrée∣ing, or dissenting, as may best serue youre present purpose.

Of the vse of this place.

8 Thys place yeldeth necessarye argu∣mentes to disproue, as when ye argue and saye: Yonder is a skarcrowe, and there∣fore no man: or an Horsse, and then no Asse: Or it is Wyllyam, and not Iohn.

9 These reasons and suche lyke, are of force, bycause of thinges whiche dissent in generall or specal béeing, it cannot be, that one of them shiould be that thing, which an other of them is.

10 But to proue this place, yeldeth no ne∣cessarie arguments, except it be vpon some graunted supposition: as when it is suppo∣s•…•…d and iudged of the gaynesayers, that

the thing whereabout they striue, is eythe•…•… an Horsse or an Asse: then if one of the gaynsayers proue the thing in controuersie, to be no horsse: it followeth by force of the supposition graunted, that it is an Asse.

Of Deuision, the 24▪ Chap.

1 That Deuision is a place by it selfe seuered from other particular places, and that specyall Argumentes are gathered thereof, it is manyfeste, in as muche as certayne generall Rules for proufe or dis∣prou•…•…e of doubtfull matters belong, vnto it, whyche can not fitly be referred to any o∣ther particular place.

2 Wée will therefore intreate of De∣uision héere among the places: And for that there is greate and necessarye vse thereof, we will speake of it at large.

3 For besydes that it serueth for In∣uention, and fyndyng oute of Reasons to proue matters, the whyche lye in doubte: it hemmethe in the sp•…•…aker

with certayne listes and boundes, that hée can not lightly digresse from his purpose: it occasioneth the hearer to marke howe eue∣rie parte of the Deuision is prosecuted and handeled in order: it amplifyeth and ser∣ueth well to dilate and laye foorth a matter at large: It sharpeneth our memorie, and makes vs better able to call things too re∣membrance, by reason that in a Deuision things are layd foorth by number and order: it lyghteneth oure vnderstandyng, making an •…•…asie and spéedy entrance into the cause: Fynally, an Oration withoute a deuision, maye well bée compared to a stragglyng Armye: For as those men of warre, bée they neuer so experte o•…•… couragious of them selues, are of no force to giue battell, whyles they wander out of battell araye: euen so, wordes and sentences be they neuer so apt, picked, or trimme, are of no strengthe to persuade, when they are vttered withoute a deuision, cast (as it were) on heapes, with∣out order, and tending to no speciall issue.

Hovve deuision is deuided.

4 There is a deuision of matter: and a

deuision of wordes.

5 Matter is deuided, when a discourse is reduced and brought vnto certayne speciall poyntes.

6 The deuision of woords, is thrée wayes considered: when a woorde of double vn∣derstanding is deuided into his seuerall sig∣nificatiōs: or when an whole is deuided in∣to his partes: or else when a generall is de∣uided into his specials.

7 Here note, that thoughe euerye one of these foure wayes bée in common spéech na∣med and taken for a deuision, yet for lear∣ning sake, and to make a diuersitie amongst them, eche one hath his seuerall and propr•…•… name. The first béeing called an ordring of the cause: the seconde, a distinction of wor∣des: the thirde, a partyng of an wholé: and the fourth, a deuiding of a generall.

8 Deuision differeth from partition, for that in a deuision, the generall is alwayes verified of his specials: where as in a par∣tition the whole is not truely sayde of hys partes. Distinction diffreth from them both: for they deuide matter, and it deuideth wor∣des or termes onely. The ordering of the

cause differeth from them thrée: for it in∣treateth of compounded matter: and they of thinges, as they are consydered withoute composition not coupled together in anye perfect sentence.

Rules belonging to this place.

9 A deuision ought to be playne, perfect, and briefe.

10 For playnnesse, ye oughte to séeke v∣suall termes, and to auoyde borowed spéeche as much as conueni•…•…ntly ye can.

11 For perfectnesse, ye must sée that ther•…•… be in the membres, neither too much, nor too little: that is to say, that nothing be reckned amōg the membres, which is not comprised in the whole: nor any thyng cōteyned of the whole, whyche is not set foorth among the membres: that one membre bée not com∣prehended of an other membre: nor that any one thing be found to be vnder dyuers membres.

12 And for briefenesse, yée muste bryng your Deuision into as small a compasse as

may be: yet so, that if ye can not come to your purpose by your firste deuision: ye ef•…•…∣soone deuide the partes, and that so o•…•…e as néede shall require: But here ye muste be∣ware, that yée doo not euercharge or con∣founde the memorie of youre hearers, with many or confused deuisions.

Examples.

13 Your sugred talke wanteth one chiefe poynt of cunning. For in manye of youre Orations, eyther yée make an vnperfecte D•…•…uisyon: or else yée vse too make none at all.

14 The matter wée stryue for, is con∣teyned vnder the firste parte of the Deui∣sion: therefore ye doe wrong (the Deuision béeing good) to say, that it is conteyned vn∣der the seconde parte.

15 This thing is within the compasse •…•…f the principall: therefore of force it muste eyther bée a membre thereof: Or at the leaste be conteyned vnder one of the mem∣bers.

Of Proportion. Chap. 25.

1 There are thrée sundry kyndes of pro∣portions, taking their names of thrée seue∣rall artes, Arithmeticall, Musical, and Geo∣metricall.

2 As for the two first, they serue nothing for oure purpose, bycause no good reasons can be gathered of them: wée will therefore intreate onely of the thirde:

3 Which Aristotle bréefly defineth thus, expressyng it to bée an equalitie of reason: But to make thys sayewhat somewhat playne to them that are ignorant in Geo∣metrie, It is to bée noted: that Geometri∣call proportion standeth alwayes in foure termes at the least: whereof the first hath that respect to the seconde, that the thirde hath to the fourth.

4 As. 2. 4. 8. 16. for loke what respecte two beareth to four: and the same respect eight beareth to sixtene, either of them be∣ing an halfe part of that number, where vnto they are referred.

5 Now then, he that will be perfecte in Geometricall proportion, must first learn the fiue generall respectes that all num∣bers beare one to another, and howe by the knowledge of these fiue generall re∣spectes, he maye come to know the name and value of all particular respectes what soeuer: whiche thing ye maye doe wyth small payne, thus:

6 Euerye bigger number compared to a lesser number, doth either, 1, contayne it certaine times exactly, and neither more nor lesse: 2, or els but once and one parte more: 3, or els once and many partes moe: 4, or els many times and one parte more: 5, or els at the vtmost it containeth it ma∣ny times, and many partes m•…•…e.

7 The first is called manyfolde: the se∣conde an whole with one parte more: the thirde, an whole with many partes m•…•…: the fourth manyfolde with one part more: and the fift is termed, manyfold with ma∣ny partes m•…•…e.

8 Agayne, deuide these generall respec∣tes into certayn of their seuerall kyndes, and ye shall sée, as it were, howe to fynde

out the proper name of any respect what∣soeuer: I meane of two vnequall num∣bers compared together.

9 Manyfold is deuided into

twofolde	as	2	to	1	or as	4	to	2
thréefold	3	1	6	2
fourefold &c.	4	1	8	2

10 Here may ye sée, that foure hath that respecte vnto two, that two hath to one: and that the proper name of this respecte is termed twofold.

11 Againe that sixe do beare themselues so to two, as thrée doe to one: and that the speciall name of this respecte is called thréefolde.

12 And also that eight do so often tymes force two, as foure do one: and that their particular respect is fourefold.

13 Now then if I argue and say that sixe must yéelde thrée, for foure do yéelde two: mine argument taketh his force of the rule of proportion: bycause sixe beare that equalitie in reason to thrée, that foure doe to two.

14 And so of anye foure numbers in all

these examples, which stand in rewe one against another: ye may gather necessarye reasons as well to proue as to disproue.

15 And consequently thus may ye doe, with any other foure things whatsoeuer, when two, to two, beare like equalitie of reason eche to other.

16 An whole with one part more is deui∣ded into an whole with an

halfe parte	as	3	to	2	or as	6	to	4
third parte	4	3	8	6
fourth part &c.	5	4	10	8

17 An whole with many partes m•…•…e, is deuided into an whole with

twothird pts	as	5	to	3	or as	10	to	6
threfourt pts	7	4	14	8
fourfift parts &c.	9	5	18	10

18 Manyfold with one part more, is deuided

into

• ...

  twofolde with a	halfe parte more	as	5	to	2	or as	10	to	4
  third parte more	7	3	14	6
  fourth part more &c.	9	4	18	8

• ...

  thréefold with a	halfe parte more	as	7	to	2	or as	14	to	4
  third parte more	10	3	20	6
  fourth part more &c.	13	4	26	8

• ...

  fourefold with a &c.	halfe parte more	as	9	to	2	or as	18	to	4
  third parte more	13	3	26	6
  fourth part more &c.	17	4	34	8

19 Manyfold with many parts moe, is deuided

into

• ...

  twofolde with	two third partes moe	as	8	to	3	or as	16	to	6
  thre fourth parts moe	11	4	22	8
  foure fift partes moe &c.	14	5	28	10

• ...

  thréefold with	two third partes moe	as	11	to	3	or as	22	to	6
  thrée fourth parts moe	15	4	30	8
  foure fifte parts moe &c.	19	5	38	10

• ...

  fourefold with	two third partes moe	as	14	to	3	or as	28	to	6
  thre fourth parts moe	19	4	38	8
  foure fifte parts moe &c.	24	5	48	10

20 I haue set •…•…oorthe these particular re∣spectes, for that by them, and suche lyke, ye maye solute all suche questions, as are wroughte in Arithmeticke by the rule of thrée, or as some doe terme it, by the golden rul•…•…: which in verye déede is the rule of proportion.

21 But there men are taught to worke by multiplication and deuision, whyche make the matter harde to them, that are ignoraunt in that arte, and hide (as it were) the grounde and cause, why vp∣pon suche woorkyng it should so fall forth: but here yée shall at the fyrste sighte, d•…•…∣cyde the matter, perceyuing withall the reason thereof.

22 For if it be demaunded and said. ii•…•…. s̄ in one yeare doe gayne xv•…•…. s̄. howe ma∣nye shillings shall. v•…•…. s̄. gayne: ye maye aunswere and saye: seyng. ii•…•…. s̄. are fyue tymes in. xv•…•…. s̄. wyth two thyrde partes moe, I know that the summe demaunded muste contayne. v•…•…. shillings fyue tymes and two thyrde partes moe of. v•…•…. s̄. nowe then. xxxv. s̄. contayning. v•…•…. s̄. fiue times, and •…•…ourtene groates beyng two thyrde

partes of. v•…•…. s̄: I sée playnely that. v•…•…. s̄. doe gayne in one yeare. xxxix. s̄. vi•…•…. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. and that the reason thereof is, for that. v•…•…. s̄. are iuste, so ofte in. xxxix. s̄. vi•…•…. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. as. ii•…•…. s̄. are in. xv•…•…. s̄.

A generall lesson for Inuention, teaching the vse of our third and fourth booke. Chap. 26.

1 Aristotle in shewing a meane how to finde the prouing terme, maketh but thrée places, the place of the foreset, the place of the backset, and the place of the biset.

The place of the

• Foreset
• Backset
• Biset.

2 Foresets are called in Latine Antece∣ilentia, bicause they come alwaies in a sen∣tence afore y^• verbe: backsets are termed

Consequentia, because they come after: bi∣sets are named in Greeke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by∣cause they are neuer knitte together in a yeasay: but alwayes sundred by a naysay.

3 Doubtless•…•… this deuision is very trim and natura•…•…l: •…•…or when the prouing terme is taken in the foresayes with the gene∣rall or special terme, it is either coupled to them by a yeasaye, or seuered from them by a naysay.

4 If it be coupled to them in a yeasaye, it is either placed afore or after the verbe: if it be placed afore, it beareth the name of a •…•…oreset: if it be set after the verbe, then •…•…oth it take the name of a backset: but if it be sundred from them by a naisay, then is it termed a biset, whether it be placed a∣fore or after.

5 So that the prouing terme, compared eith•…•…r to the generall terme, or the special term, must needes beare one of these thrée generall respectes: that is either to be a foreset, a backset, or a biset.

6 And bycause the prouing terme is repeted in euery reason by rule, twice, it followeth that it muste alwayes beare a

double respect, one to the generall terme, and another to the speciall terme, these two termes beyng euer extant, and plaine to be sens in the question it selfe.

7 This thing is set forth in our thyrde booke, both by rules and examples, and that both plainely, and at large: bicause it is a thing most necessary for a reasoner to be •…•…nning and expert in.

8 Thus ye must euer marke, that where a reason by rule standeth but of three termes, two of them are euer contained in the conclusion, and therefore •…•…uident to bée seene in the question at the firste, the thirde terme is that which we call the pro∣uing terme, & which we vse as a meane, whereby to conclude the matter that lieth in question, and so bring oure purpose to passe.

9 Nowe, howe the prouing term•…•… must lye to the other two termes, that the ques∣tion in controuersie maye be concluded ye muste learne by the fouretene seates set foorth at large in our third booke, conside∣ring with your self, what maner of shew∣say the question doth containe, and in how

many particular seates, the same maye b•…•… concluded, and so shall ye plainely learne the double respect, that the prouing terme must beare to the other two termes, I meane the generall terme, and the speci∣all terme.

10 This done, ye must drawe your qu•…•…s∣tion through the places, that is to saye, yée must drawe the wordes of your question through the plac•…•…s, and when ye find any worde in any particular place, which bea∣reth that respect to the generall and speci∣all terme, that the rules of the third booke require, know ye of a certaintie, that that is the prouing terme, & the meanes wher∣by ye may worke your feate.

11 So that ye muste conne by hart, and haue on your fingers endes, the fourtene seates expressed in our third booke: and the 44. particular places set forth in this oure fourth booke▪ I thinke it good to name and order them thus:

• ...

  1 Saywhat.	Substaunce.
  2 Generall terme.
  3 Speciall terme.
  4 Propertie.
  5 Whole.
  6 Partes.
  7 Ofspring.

• ...

  8 Number.	Quantitie.
  9 Weight.
  10 Bignesse.

• ...

  11 Power.	Qualitie.
  12 Will.
  13 Dispositions.
  14 Qualities perceiued by sense.
  15 Affections.
  16 Passions.
  17 Forme.

• ...

  18 Matter, or stuffe.	Causes.
  19 Forme.
  20 Workman, or doer.
  21 Ende.

• 22 Effect, or worke.
• 23 Preparation and meanes to obtaine an ende.
• 24 Doyng.
• ...

• 25 Suffering.
• 26 Time.
• 27 Place.
• 28 Order.
• 29 Hauing.
• ...

  30 Forecommers.	Commers.
  31 Aftercommers.
  32 Withcommers

• 33 Likelier.
• 34 Unlikelier.
• 35 Aslike.
• 36 Similitude.
• 37 Witnesses.
• ...

  38 Respecting termes, or yokefelowes	Gainset•…•….
  39 Depriuing termes
  40 Contraries
  41 More then contraries, or denying termes.

• 42 Differing termes.
• 43 Deuision.
• 44 Proportion.

Hovv doubtfull Questions and demaundes are to be handeled. Chap. 27.

1 Nowe that we haue sufficientlye in∣treated of words, of sentences, of reasons, and of the places: it remayneth that wée also intreat of a probable demaund, shew∣ing an easye trade and way, howe doubt∣•…•…ll questions are to be discussed.

VVhat a Question or de∣maunde is.

2 A question or a demaunde is a shew∣saye, requiring a yea, or a nay: as, do fishes breath in the waters, or no?

3 If you aunswere this demaunde, and make your choise, saying: either that fishes doe take breath vnder the water: or that they do not: ye make of a question a shew∣saye.

4 But if ye procéede further, and adde a reason why ye so saye, in concluding of

〈1 page missing〉〈1 page missing〉