The arte of reason, rightly termed, witcraft teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute. Made by Raphe Leuer. Seene and allowed according to the order appointed in the Queenes Maiesties iniunctions.

¶THE FIRSTE booke of Witcraft. (Book 1)

VVhat VVitcraft is.

1 WItcraft is a cunning to frame and to answere a reason.

The partes of a reason.

2 A reason standeth of certayn sayings, and a saying of wordes.

3 So that wordes are the firste and the least partes of a reason: and therfore first to be taught and learned.

4 For he that will kéepe a good trade in teaching, must begin with small and easy matters at the first, and by them procéede to greater and harder poyntes, so farre till at the last he attayne to the ende, which is first in purpose, and last in woorke.

VVhat vvordes are.

5 Words are voyces framed with hart and toung, vttering the thoughtes of the mynde.

The first deuiding of vvordes.

6 Wordes eyther agrée in sounde, and differ in meaning: or they agrée in mea∣ning, and differ in sounde: or they agrée in bothe: or else they dissent in both.

7 They of the fyrste sorte maye •…•…ée termed Lykesounding wordes: They of y^• secōd sort, like meaning words: They of the thyrde sorte, playne•…•…: •…•…ng wordes: and they of the fourth sorte, wordes ful∣ly differing one from an other.

Wordes

• Lykesounding.
• Lykemeaning.
• Playnemeaning.
• Fully differing.

8 Lykesounding wordes, are woordes of double vnderstandyng, whiche haue one sounde of letters, and accordyng to that one sounde, diuers say whats, expres∣sing sundrie substances.

9 For example thus: The Woodcocke hath let my woodcocke flye away.

10 Nowe thys worde Woodcocke in bothe places of thys •…•…ne sentence, for sounde of letters is one and the same:

11 But if ye séeke the true meaning of

this worde Woodcocke, as it is twice pla∣ced in this one saying: ye shal fynde in ey∣ther place, a sundry sayewhat, expressing in the first place, an vnwittie man:

12 And in the second place, a bird haun∣ting the woods, and making his flyght of pleasure onely in the twylight.

13 The double vnderstanding of wor∣des and sayings, must be warely marked, and declaration made of theyr sundrye meanings: that it may certainely be kno∣wen, in what sense they are to be taken.

14 Wordes restrayned to one saywhat ar no lōger words of double vnderstādīg.

15 Lykemeanyng wordes are one in meaning, and diuers in sound as rich, wel∣thie: colour, hue, quickning, bar•…•…e, yest:

16 Plainmeaning words haue one soūd, & according to that one soūd, one saywhat.

17 Here we vnderstand such a saywhat as declareth the substance of a thing: and not such a one as only noteth y^• force & sig∣nification of a worde.

18 Words fully dissenting are such as haue neyther one sound, nor one saywhat: as an herbe, and a trée.

The second deuision of vvordes.

19 Wordes are also thus deuided, some signifie a thing that hathe his beeing by it selfe: some signifie a thing that hath his beeing in an other.

20 The firste maye be called an Inhol∣der: the seconde an Inbeer. For example thus: Man, beast, herbe, trée, corne, grasse, stones, mettall, fire, ayre, water, earth, and all other substaunces bodyed, or bodylesse, are Inholders:

21 But length, breadth, thicknesse, wei∣ght, measure, number, power, shape, ver∣tue, cunning, sleight, vice, ignorance, heate, calde, moystnesse, drynesse, and all other wordes placed in any storehouse, (excepte the storehouse of substance) are inbeers.

an	Inholder	is called in latin	Subiectū.
Inbeer	Accidens.

The thirde deuision of vvordes.

22 There is a third deuision of wordes to be likewise considered.

23 For some wordes are common, and are affirmed of many things, as man is

sayde of many seuerall men.

24 Some are sole wordes, and are sayd but of one thing alone: as Iohn, or this man, are sayd of no moe men then one.

a

common sole

worde.

Certaine preceptes or generall rules to be learned afore ye enter into the treatise of the storehouses.

25 Ther are rules in euery arte, which authors vse as groundes and sure princi∣ples, not to be denyed or doubted of.

26 For if nothing shoulde be cleare and certaine of it selfe: then should we be dri∣uen by wranglers from point to point, to make reason vppon reason infinitely, and neuer come to issue of any one matter.

27 Therfore hath God appoynted some things to be euident and certaine of them selues, that they mighte be as stayes to mans wit, and as helpes to fynde out and to discusse things that are not so euident as they are.

28 And this is the cause why ye maye not aske of a Principle why so? yet maye principles bée opened to beginners by examples,

29 Whyche is a kynde of proofe by Experience, thoughe it bée no proofe by rule.

30 A common Inholder is sayde of o∣thers: but it hathe not hys béeing in an other.

31 A sole Inholder is neyther sayde of any other thing, besides it selfe: nor yet hath his béeyng in any thing, but in it selfe.

32 A common Inbeer is bothe sayde of others: and hathe also his béeyng in o∣thers too.

33 A sole Inbeer, hath his béeing in an other: but it is not sayde of any other.

34 Diuers kyndes, whereof one is not subiecte to an other, haue sundrye kyn∣reds, and sundrie differences, as a wight and an arte.

35 For the kinreds of a wyghte, are man and beaste: but the kinreds of arte are, The arte of numbryng, the arte of measuring, witcrafte, speachcraft, starre∣crafte.

&c.

36 Agayne, the differences of a wight are flyable, goable, swimmable, and créep∣able: For one wight differeth from an o∣ther by these meanes:

37 But the differēces of artes are, some to teache, to number: some to measure: some to speake: some to reason: some to tel things to come.

Of the ten storehouses, and of their vse.

38 There are tenne generall woordes whiche maye well be called storehouses, not onely for the store of woordes, which they conteyne (comprising all playn mea∣ning wordes,)

39 But also for the good order they kéepe in placing of wordes in their parti∣cular roumes, with bréefe rules, (as notes sette on packets,) declaring theyr nature and properties.

40 So that storehouses teach y^e nature of simple wordes as they are considered by thē selues. For there is no playnmea∣ning worde but it signifyeth eyther,

The names of the storehouses.

a

• Substance.
• Quantitie.
• Qualitie.
• Respecte.
• Dooing.
• Suffering.
• Where.
• When.
• Placing.
• Hauing.

Of the ten Demaunders.

41 There are also ten demaunders, e∣uery one peculiarlye perteyning to som•…•… one storehouse.

The names of the ten demaunders.

• 1 What?
• 2 Howe muche, or how many?
• 3 Whatkynone?
• 4 To whome, or then what?
• 5 Dooing what?
• 6 Suffering what?
• 7 Where?
• 8 When?
• 9 Howe placed?
• 10 Hauing what?

42 What? demaundeth a substance: how much or how many? demaund a quantitie: whatkinone? demaundeth a qualitye: to whom? or then what? demaūde a respecting terme: doing what? demaundeth a do∣ing: suffering what? demaundeth a suffe∣ring: where? and when? demaunde tyme and place, with some circumstance either of the person, of the fact, or of the matter: how placed? demaundeth a placing: and hauing what? demaundeth an hauing.

43 For example thus. If you bée asked what is a man? ye must aunswere that which doth appertaine to the substance of a man, saying a mā is a wight indued with sense and reason.

44 But if ye be asked, howe much is a man? or howe many men are they? then must ye aunswere such matter, as pertai∣neth to the quantitie of a man.

45 And saye for his bignes, according to his length, bredth, thicknes, talnes, grosse∣nes, and so forth, and for the multitude, ac∣cording to the number they be of, more or lesse.

46 If ye be asked whatkinone is a man?

ye must aunswere, suche thynges as ap∣pertaine to the qualitie of a man, as wise, folishe, liberall, couetous, learned, ignoraunt, a runner, lame, sober, hastye swart, faire, blacke, foule, proper, yll fa∣•…•…ored or such like.

47 If ye be asked to whō? or then what? man is this or that: ye must aunswere, fa∣ther to his sonne: husbande to his wyfe: higher then this thing, or lower then that, which aunswere standeth of respectyng termes.

48 If ye be asked what doth a man? ye must aunswere that a man diggeth, plow∣eth, soweth, reapeth, buyldeth, playeth, hauketh, hunteth, rydeth, goeth, walketh, which wordes and such like are placed in the Storehouse of doing.

49 If inquirie bée had, what this man or that man hath suffered: y^• returne is made that hée hath béene spoyled, robbed, may∣med, stiefeled, killed, and these wordes doe importe a suffering.

50 If ye bée asked where thys or that man is? ye must aunswere, wythin, a∣broade, at home, from home, in the

Citie, or in the fielde, whych sayinges are referred to the Storehouse where.

51 If ye be asked when this man or that man dyd this or that: yée must aunswere, an houre, a daye, a weeke, a moneth, a yeare ago, which sayinges are ascribed to the Storehouse when.

52 If ye bée asked how is man placed? ye must aunswere, he lyeth, be sitteth, he boweth, he leaneth, he frowneth, he smi∣leth, whych woordes doe euer thsynuate a placing.

53 If ye bée asked how man is appareled or furnished: ye must aunswere, he is na∣ked, clothed, armed, weaponed, booted, shodde, frended, monyed, wyued, whych woordes doe alwayes importe an ha∣uing.

54 Here yée must take héede that euery demaunder haue suche an aunswere shap∣pen vnto it, as maye bée placed in the Storehouse, whereto the Demaunder properlye belongeth: other wayes, yée shall not aunswere directlye nor to the purpose.

Of Substaunce the first Storehouse. Chap. 2.

1 Substaunce is an inholder, the verye groundworke, stay, and vpholder, of quan∣tities, qualities, and all other inbeers.

Hovv substaunce is deuided.

2 There is a sole substance, and a com∣mon substaunce.

A	Sole	Substaunce.
Common

3 A Sole substaunce, is a substaunce pe∣culiar and proper to one selfe thing alone, as Iohn, William, this man, or that man.

4 For although many men be called by the name of Iohn, or William, yet when wée adde Iohn, William, or anye other proper name to man, or els adde this, or that to any common worde: wée meane to separate it from all other thinges, and to poynt out a sole thing: so that though these names bée referred to many men, yet the thing meant by them is one selfething.

5 A common substaunce is either a kin∣red,

or a kynd, conteyning many sole sub∣staunces, as a horse is a kinred, conteining al particuler horses: and a wight is a kynd conteyning al kinredes of beastes, flying, swymming, going, créeping, drawing, or stilstanding.

Of certayne peculiar rules vvhich belong to the storehouse of substance.

1

6 A Sole substaunce is neither sayde of another: nor yet hath being in another.

7 That a sole substaunce is not saide of another it is plaine by examples.

8 For Iohn is verified of nothing in the world, but of himselfe.

9 He is verified of himselfe when wée saye, this man is Iohn, for in this saying, Iohn and this man signifie both one sub∣staunce, though the termes be diuers.

10 And where wée saye, that a sole sub∣staunce hath no being in another, it is pro∣ued of the generall rule: which is,

11 That euery substaunce hath a being by it selfe: and not a beyng in another thing.

12 That hath beyng by it selfe, whych is knowen to stande in nature by it selfe, and to haue néede of no other thyng, to supporte and beare vp his beyng, as an horse, an Oxe. &c.

13 But that hath beyng in an other thyng, and no staye of it selfe, whych is in an other not as a parte, and yet can not bée wythout the thyng in whych it is.

14 As learning is in man, as no part 〈◊〉〈◊〉 man, and yet can not bée wythoute man, or some other substance apt for the same: as for substaunces they haue beyng of themselues, and néede no other thing to support them.

2

15 Sole substaunces occupye at one tyme, but one place. Common substances are in no place properly and fitly.

16 Wée saye properly and fitly, because they are sayde, vnfitly and after a sorte, to bée in manye places at once: by reason, all their partes (which are Sole substan∣ces) doe at one moment of tyme, eche one occupy his seuerall roume.

3

17 A part of any sole substance is no sub∣stāce: but if it be cut of frō his whole, thē is it no lōger a part, but a substāce by it selfe.

18 For if the partes of a Sole substance shoulde be substaunces: then shoulde there •…•…ee no diuersitye betwéene a common and a Sole substaunce.

19 For they differ in this, y^• a Sole sub∣stāce conteineth but one substance where a cōmon substāce conteyneth many: now where euery whole conteyneth many par tes, it shoulde folow, y^• if euery parte of a Sole substance were a substaunce: the•…•… should Sole substaunces conteyne manye substances, as common substaunces do.

20 How bée it, in very deede a Sole sub∣staunce conteyneth many partes and is but one substaunce in the whole.

4

21 Sole substances are most properly called substaunces: among common sub∣staunces that alwaies which is nerer to a Sole substaunce is mere properly called a substaunce, then that which is further of: as kinred rather then kynd: yet substāces

of like condition and sort, do admit no de∣grées of more or lesse.

22 As one man is no more a substaunce, nor no lesse a substaunce then an other mā is: this man rather then this horse.

23 For though this man bée greatter or lesser, worse or better then that man is: yet they are not so saide, in respect of sub∣staunce: but in respecte of quantityes and qualities.

24 The lyke reason may serue for kin∣reds and for kindes.

5

25 Sole substaunces receyue contraries by a certaine chaunge that is in them sel∣ues, as one man some times good, some times bad, some times hote, some tymes colde.

26 Certaine other things may receyue contraryes as well as sole substances do.

37 For this saying: Socrates is sicke, maye bee bothe true and false at diuers tymes.

28 Yet is there this diuersitie, that whē sole substaunces do receyue contraries, it is euer by a certayne chaunge, which is in

•…•…e substaunces themselues: but when a saying receyueth contraryes, there is no chaunge in the saying, but in the matter expressed by the saying.

6

29 One substance is not contrary to an other substance, neither is there any other thing contrary to a substance at all.

30 For contraries are two inbeers which driue by course one another oute of their inholder▪ as hote and cold driue one an o∣ther out of some bodied substance.

31 Thoughe water driue aire, and aire water out of some vessell: yet these and such like driue eche other as out of a place, being inholders, and not as out of an in∣holder being inbeers.

32 Euery Sole substaunce standeth of one inholder and many inbeers, in suche sort that neither the inholder coulde haue any being, if all inbeers were taken from it: neither could the inbeers, haue their be∣ing alone by them selues, without some inholder, to support and beare them.

33 The thing that standeth of one inhol∣•…•…er,

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

and many inbeers, is called a sole sub∣staunce: for example thus.

34 Any one man is a Sole substance, hys inbeers are length, grossenes, talnes, yeares, vertue, vice, learnyng, igno∣raunce, sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, féelyng, sowernesse, swéetenesse, color, shape, beautye, doyng, suffering, office, Lordship, and other thyngs in manner in∣finite: hys inholder is that Sole nature, that beareth all these.

35 Now as quantities, qualityes, and other inbeers can not bée but in some sub∣staunce: so Sole substaunces should haue no beyng in deede, if all inbeers were se∣que•…•…red and taken from them.

36 Further if all Sole substaunces were taken awaye, then shoulde both all common substaunces be taken away, and all inbeers too.

Hovv Substance is deuided.

37 Substaunce doth admit manye deui∣sions accordyng to hys manyfolde and gaynse•…•… differences, as. 1. a bodyed sub∣staunce,

a bodylesse substaunce. 2. a mor∣tall substaunce, animmortall substaunce. 3. a naturall substaunce, an artificiall sub∣staunce, or a substaunce partlye artifi∣ciall partly natural. 4. a lyuing substance, a lyuelesse substaunce. 5. a féelyng sub∣staunce, a substance voyde of sense. 6. a reasonable substaunce, a wytlesse sub∣staunce. 7. a moueable substaunce, an immoueable substaunce. 8. a tame sub∣staunce, a wylde substaunce. 9. an earth∣lye substaunce, a watery substaunce, an airye substance, a •…•…yerye substance. •…•…c.

Here foloweth the table of Substaunce.

Of the seconde Storehouse cal∣led Quantitie. Chap. 3.

1 Quantitie is that whereby all thinges are knowne, how many or how fewe, how much or how litle they are.

Hovv Quantitie is deuided.

2 Some quantities stand of seuered and •…•…ncoupled partes: as number, speach: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of partes that are •…•…ed and •…•…ed toge∣ther by some common bounder: as a line, an ouershew, a body, time and place.

3 A common bounder is the end of one thyng and th•…•… beginnyng of another, and •…•…et part of neither.

The cō∣mō boū∣der of a	Lyne	is a	Pricke
Ouershew	Lyne
Body	Ouershew
Tyme	Moment
Place	Lyne

4 That the partes of number are not ioyned or knit together 〈◊〉〈◊〉 anye common boūder it is plain by particular examples.

5 For thrée and fiue being the partes of eight▪ are not coupled together by any cō∣mon bounder: neither can one shew in a number any common bounder where the partes do meete and ioyne together.

6 The like may be said of speech, for though sillables and words haue some more time in pronouncing, & some lesse, yet are they not ioyned one to another, without pause at all, for then there should be no distincti∣on in speache.

7 That speache is placed in this store∣house, it is plain, bicause it is measured by sillables short and long.

Another diuision of Quantitie.

8 Quantitie admitteth also this diuision that some stande of partes which haue a placing one by another, some stand of parts which haue no placing at all.

9 A line, an ouershew, a body and a place stand of parts that haue a placing, for that their parts are séene to lye somewhere.

10 But in number no mā can shew how his partes are placed one by another, or where they are set, or how they are ioyned

or coupled together.

11 The like may be saide of tyme, for sée∣ing the partes of tyme stay not, howe can they admit any placing.

12 Yet there is an order among the part•…•… of time and number: bycause one tyme commeth before, and another time cōmeth after, and in the natural rewe of numbers one is reckned afore two, and two afore thrée, but placing of partes are not eyther in number or time.

13 The like maye be said of speache also, for eche worde and syllable passeth away as it is spoken, so that the partes of speach tarye not, nor stay not to haue anye pla∣cing.

14 The least thing that can be imagy∣ned in a number is one: and the least thing that can be imagyned in a lyne is a pricke: here note that one is a parte of eche num∣ber, but a pricke is a bounder of a lyne and therfore no part therof.

15 A number is a multitude of ones.

16 A lyne is length without bredth.

17 An ouershew is length, and bredth, without thicknesse.

18 A body is length, breadth, and thick∣nesse.

19 No man can mount by adding to the greatest number: nor come by diuidyng to the smallest bignesse.

20 For as number is able euer to ad∣mytte some number to bee added to it, to make it bygger: so is bignesse able euer to admit some bignes to bée taken from it to make it lesse.

21 For euerye bodye is deuisible and hable to bée deuyded into many bodyes, and euerye ouershewe into manye o∣uershewes, and euerye lyne into manye lynes: and all bygnesse consisteth in these thrée.

23 All kynde of measures which are consydered in respecte onely of length, are referred vnto a lyne, as an intch, a foote, a pace, a fatham, a myle. &c.

24 And those that are consydered in respecte of Length and breadth, are referred vnto an ouershewe, as a try∣angle, a foursquare, a circle, a r•…•…de, an aker. &c▪

25 And those that are considered in respect

of length, bredth, & thicknesse, are referred vnto a body, as a foote of tymber, a tun•…•… of timber, or any other measure where re∣spect is had to these thrée kinds of bignesse.

26 All other measures & weightes which haue no respecte to length, bredth or thick∣nes, are referred vnto nūber, as an ounce, a pound, a stone, a pynt, a pottle, a peny, a •…•…rote, a shilling &c.

27 Tyme is a space or number measu∣red by the course of the heauens, as a my∣nute, an houre, a day, a wéeke, a moneth, a yeare, an age, a world.

28 A place is an hollow ouershew of an hollow body.

29 These things afore rehearsed, are properlie of them selues called quantities, other thynges vnfitlye, that is, not of them selues but by reason of another, to wit, respect had vnto these.

30 For wée vse sometymes to say, here is muche whyte, or here is a long worke, for that the ouershew where the white is is much: or that the tyme is long while the worke was a doyng.

Of the propreties of Quantitie.

31 One quantitie is not contrarie to an other: As for many and fewe, greate and little, they are not quantities, but respec∣ting wordes, neyther are they contraries at all.

32 Respecting words they are, for thin∣ges are sayd to be many or fewe: greate or little, in respecte of others of the same kynde: else shoulde there neuer be little hill, or greate musterséede: fewe in a Ci∣tie, or many in cribbe.

33 And contraries they are not, bicause they may be said of one thing at one time, as twentie in respect of two are many, but in respect of a thousand, they are but few: so Gogmagog hilles in respect of the So∣phisters hilles by Cambridge are greate: but in respecte of the Alpes, they are but small. These therefore and suche lyke, as hang only vpon respect, can haue no con∣traries at all.

34 One quantitie is bygger or lesser then an other is, as sixtéene is a bigger quantitie then sixe: and a shilling is a les∣ser quantitie then a pound: yet is not one

•…•…e quantitie rather a quantitie, or lesse sayde to be a quantitie then an other.

35 For sixe are as well a quantitie a•…•… •…•…xscore: and a long lyne is no more a line then a short lyne is.

36 This is a thing moste peculiar and propre to quantitie, that by it things shold •…•…e equal or vnequall one to an other.

37 As one body is equall or vnequal to an other body: one ouershewe equall or vnequal to an other ouershewe: one lyne to an other line: one time to another time: one place to an other place: one number to an other number: as for like and vnlyke they are euer sayde of qualities proprely, as one color like or vnlike to an other co∣lour: one voyce lyke or vnlike to an other voyce: one fashion ly•…•…è or vnlyke to an other fashion.

Of the thirde Storehouse cal∣led Qualitie. Chap. 4.

1 Qualitie is that wherby men are led to knowe whatkinone eche thing is.

Of the deuision of Qualitie.

2 This storehouse is parted vnto foure seuerall roomes.

3 The firste roome conteyneth those qualities which are giuen to the inholder by nature, and those also which come by reason nature is letted of hir course.

4 The second roome conteyneth those which the inholder getteth by doyng.

5 The thirde conteyneth sensible quali∣ties, and affections of the mind.

6 The fourth conteineth the shape and forme of euery thing.

Of Qualities first roome.

7 In the first roome are placed all the powers eyther of the bodye alone, of the soule alone, or of that, that standeth of thē both: to this place are added also, al weak∣nesse and want of power naturall.

8 Weakenesse and want, differ in thys, for that of Weakenesse there bothe procéede imperfecte actions: but of

•…•…ant there can aryse no action at all.

9 As blearednesse causeth a man thrugh weakenesse of sight to iudge vnperfectely of colours: but blyndnesse through wa•…•…t of sight, lettes a man to giue any iudge∣ment of colour at all.

10 Power is a gifte of nature, wherby the Inholder may the better doe, or with lesse harme suffer.

11 The common Inholder of wordes placed in this roume is very generall. For there is no substance which hath not some power.

12 Here is to be noted, that no inholder is sayde to want any power, which eyther nature hath not appointed it should haue: or else the tyme of hauing it, is not fully expired.

13 For it is vnproprely said, that either a stone, or a chylde newe borne, wanteth power to goe or to runne of it selfe. For God hath not ordeyned that a stone shuld goe or runne at all: and the tyme is not yet come, for a newe borne chylde to doe eyther.

14 But if the tyme bée fully expyred

when as nature hath appoynted, that chil∣dren should goe and runne of themselues, and that certain children at that tyme can doe neyther: then may it well be sayde, that suche children lacke power to go, and are lame.

15 Here is to be noted, that from power to want, wée may fall both by nature and by chaunce: but to returne from want to power agayne, it is impossible.

16 As from sight to blyndnesse, from speache to dumbnesse, we may fall at any tyme: but the returne from dumbnesse to speache, or from blyndenesse to sight, is a thing that can not be broughte to passe, eyther by arte, or nature, or anye other meane, (Gods extraordinarie dooings on∣ly excepted.)

17 Note further, that the power is not alwayes taken awaye where the in∣strument is hurt for a tyme, or letted: as if a mans eyes, toung, and eares, were so hurt for a tyme, or letted, that hée coulde neyther heare, speake, nor sée,

18 Yet were it not for all that to bée sayde, that the power of his seeing, spea∣king

or hearing were taken awaye or di∣minished: but rather that the action and worke of his eares, toung, and eyes, were letted for a tyme.

19 If the instrumente of sense be so hurt, that it be vncurable, and neuer able to do any part of his woorke, then do wée saye, that the power is vtterly destroyed or taken away.

20 Memorie of things past, iudgemēt of things present, forsight of things to come, & other qualities of the mynd, as they are giuen to any inholder by nature, are pla∣ced in the first roome of qualitie: but as they are increased by arte and diligence, in the seconde.

Of Qualities second roome.

21 Qualities that are gotten by dooing, are eyther déepely rooted in their inholder, and continue in it long: or else they come and goe lightly, and tarie but a short time.

22 Uertue, vice, sciēce, knowledge, arte, crafte, cunning, sleyght, vr•…•…. &c. whiche a man can not soone alter and chaunge, are

are suche dispositions, as commonly take déepe roote in their inholder, and by rea∣son of long vse, and many actions wher∣of they growe and spring, they maye bée called grounded dispositions.

23 But sodeyn anger, light displesure, small knowledge, a smattering sight. &c. for that they spring and ryse of fewe acti∣ons, come & go lightly, and therefore may be termed wauering dispositions, these béeing as it were, the first entrie into set∣led dispositions.

24 The inholder of qualities placed in this roome is not so generall, as is the in∣holder of those of the firste roome. For this inholder is but eche wight, which by practise can attayne to any good or badde trade, in dooing of things well or yll.

Of Qualities thirde roome.

25 In the third roome of this storehouse wée place all suche qualities as eyther proprely moue one of the fiue senses: as coloure moueth sighte: sounde hearing: sauours smellyng: tast tastyng: heate

colde, moystnesse, drynesse, hardnesse, soft∣nesse, and feeling.

26 Or else the affections of the mynde, as mirth, gladnesse, grief and feare, with other affections whiche spring of these in maner infinite: as mercie, pitie, loue, le∣nitie, softnesse of mynde, hope, affiaunce, trust, enuie, hate, disdayne, spyte, distrust, contempte, palenesse, blushing, trem∣bling. &c.

27 Affections consydered as they are giuen of nature, muste bée placed in the firste roome of thys storehouse: but con∣sydered as they are gotten by dooing, in the seconds: and béeyng taken as they moue the outward or the inward sense, in the third: we sée, heare, smell, tast, & feele,

28 By receiuing a certaine influence, and suffering of an action that doeth pro∣céede from the thing séene, hearde, smelt, tasted, or felte, into suche partes of eche wightes bodie, as hath in it those foresayd senses.

Of Quantities fourth roome.

29 In this roome are placed the forme & figure, shape, and fashion of euery thing.

30 The inholder of words in the third or fourth roome of this storehouse, is the same that is of those whiche are placed in the first roome.

Of Qualified things.

31 There are certayne wordes whiche do signifie qualified things, relation had, bothe to the qualitie, and to the inhol∣der thereof.

32 As a iust man, a liberal man, a craf∣tesman, a lame man: or iust, liberal, lame, withoute adding the inholder in whyche they are. These are to be placed in the roomes of the qualities, wherof they are deriued.

Of the propreties of qualities, and of qualified things.

33 Some qualities and qualified things haue contraries, and some haue none: as right is contrarie to wrong: and a righ∣teous man is contrary to an vnrighteous man.

34 But qualities and qualified things whiche are placed in the first and fourthe roome: yea and many of those which are

placed in the seconde and thirde roome, of this storehouse, admitte no contraries at all.

35 Qualities and things qualified, ad∣mit degrées of more and lesse, as among many learned men it is commonly seene that one is more or lesse learned then an other.

36 This rule taketh place not in all. For among many circles, triangles, and squares, one is not sayde to bée rather a circle, then an other: or rather a triangle, or a square.

37 Here is to be noted, that qualities considered as they are in fome inholder, admitte degrées of more and lesse: but if ye in minde seuer them from their in∣holder, and consider them apart, (as ye define them and tell what they are) then doe they admitte no degrées of more or lesse.

38 For all and euery arte of Physike doe equally and indifferently agree to the say what of Physike: but Hippocrates physike, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 physicke admit de∣grees, the one béeyng more and the other

lesse, and so dothe Fuchsius physicke alone considered, when he had great experience, and when he had small.

39 To make things lyke or vnlyke, is a worke belonging only to qualitie.

40 If any man gaynsay this rule, af∣firming that it is commonly and truely sayde, howe that one man is lyke or vn∣like to an other, in going, ryding or spea∣king: which things béeing deedes and no qualities, the foresayde rule maye séeme vntrue:

41 It may be answered, that the lyke∣lynesse standth not in the action it selfe proprely and in very déede: but in the ma∣ner of dooing, which is referred to the store house of qualitie.

42 For the murtherer and the hang∣man doe both kill and committe one ge∣nerall action: yet the maner of dooing in them is diuers, whiche causeth the one to be guiltie, and the other guiltlesse.

43 For it is not the déede, but the ma∣ner of dooing, that maketh the cryme.

Of Respecting vvoordes. Chapter. 5.

1 Respecting wordes be of two sortes, some are called respecting words propre∣ly: some are termed respectyng woordes in parte.

2 Respecting woords, proprely so called, are two yokefelowes, whose nature and being is, the one to depende and haue his béeing vppon the other, as a husbande, a wyfe, a maister, a seruaunt.

3 Respecting words in part depend not so straightly eche vpon other, that of force they must bée and cease to be both at once: but the one may be though the other were not at all: as knowledge and knowable:

4 For though there were no reasonable creature in the whole world, (which thing presupposed there could be no knowledge) yet should many things remain to be kno∣wen, whiche maye be termed, and are in déede, knowable.

5 Though one husbande haue manye wyues: one father, manye sonnes and daughters: one frend, many frendes: one

king, many kingdomes: yet these béeing many in numbre, beare no other respect to their yokefellowes, nor their yokefelo∣wes to them, then if they were but one a péece.

6 For he is as wel a husband, a father, a frende, a king, that hathe but one wyfe, one chylde, one frende, one kingdome, as he that hath neuer so many: so that many and fewe in this case, haue all one respect in reason.

The propreties of respecting vvordes.

1

7 Respecting wordes proprely so called are and cease to bée bothe at once: but re∣specting wordes in parte doe not so.

2

8 He that knoweth and is able to saye what one of the respectyng woordes is: muste of force knowe and be able to saye what the other is also.

3

9 There are degrées in some respec∣ting wordes, but not in all:

10 For one man beeing lyke to many

men, may be lyker to one man than to an other: but one father can be no more, nor no lesse a father to one chylde than to an other.

4

11 Some also haue cōtraries, some none at all, as bondage is contrary to libertie: riches to pouertie: but single, double, thrée∣folde, father, mother, and suche lyke, haue no contraries at all.

5

12 Respecting wordes depende and hang eche vppon other: and so that one of them is not afore or after an other in tyme.

13 In this storehouse are placed al wor∣des that signifie any comparison or pro∣portion, any equalnesse, or vnequalnesse, any lykelynesse or vnlykelynesse, anye office or officer, anye cause or effecte, anye whole, or any parte, any ende, or meanes tending to anye ende, anye age, any degrée, anye diuersitie of kynde, a∣nye kinrede or affinitie, any societie or fellowshippe, and other moe in manner infinite.

14 If ye doubte in what storehouse to place any word, the surest way is to place it here.

15 For many kynds and kinreds which considered by them selues alone, are to be placed in some other storehouse, may (vp∣pon respect had with others) be also right well assigned vnto this.

Of dooing and sufferyng. Chapter. 6.

1 Dooing and sufferyng are respectyng wordes, and differ not in matter, but in respecte.

2 For they bothe are but one mouyng, whiche considered as a thing being in the inholder from whence it commeth, is cal∣led a dooing: But if the same mouing or action be referred to the inholder whyche receyueth it, then it is called a suffering. For example thus.

3 The murtherer and the murthered, cōmunicate in one mouing or deed: which deed or mouing considered as it commeth from the murtherer, is an action or doing: But consydered as it is receyued of the

thing that is murthered, it is a suffering.

4 Of this it is playne, that dooing is a mouing, procéeding from the dooer: and suffering is a mouing receyued of the suf∣ferer.

Of the propreties of dooing and suffering.

1

5 Dooing and suffring are both at once, and one is not afore nor after an other.

2

6 Doing and suffering are in two dy∣uers inholders: yet may two bodies mee∣ting togither in one acte, be bothe doers and bothe sufferers at once: as when two cuppes doe pushe together, eyther putting force vnto other, and eyther receyuyng force from other.

7 They admitte degrées of more and lesse: and some haue contraries, and some haue not.

Of the tvvo Storehouses, VVhere, and VVhen. Chapter. 7.

1 Where and when, differ from place and tyme, for that they haue alwayes re∣specte

vnto some matter that was menti∣oned afore: where as time and place are knowen and defined as they are conside∣red by themselues, without respect had to any other thing.

2 For if any man should heare one saye where? (no talke had afore hand) he would straight way thinke with him self, where what? looking for some person, fact or mat∣ter, that he might appoynt to some place, thereby to aunswere the question.

3 Therefore where, is not a place but a declaring of things which shal be, are, or haue bene in place.

4 And when, is not a time, but a shewing of things done or to be done in time.

Hovv, vvhere and vvhen, are deuided.

5 As time and place are deuided, so are where and when.

6 Tyme is deuided into tyme to come, time present, and time past.

7 It may also be many other wayes de∣uided, by reason of the manifold varietie of matters that chaunce in it.

8 As the time of warre, y^• time of peace,

the time of dearth, the tyme of plenty, the tyme of sicknesse, the time of health, the time of shutting in the dores, the tyme of opening of the dores.

9 Furthermore, spring, summer, haruest, winter, are seuerall seasons and tymes of the yeare.

10 Likewise a minute, an hour, a day, a wéeke, a moneth, a yeare, an age, a world, are common wordes, vsed of men to note and set forth particular times.

11 There are sixe differences of place, as aboue, beneath, on the right side, on the left side, afore, and behind.

12 These are two wayes taken, eyther as they are placed in respecte to vs warde: or els as they are appoynted by nature.

13 Althoughe aboue and beneath: on the ryghte syde, and on the lefte: afore, and behynd: in respect to vs warde, bee not al∣wayes one and the same, but alter as wee are altered: yet in nature they are alwayes certayne.

14 For aboue, by nature is that where vnto light things ascend.

15 Beneath, that where vnto heauye things descend.

16 The right syde, which is toward the Weast.

17 The left side, which is toward y^• East.

18 Afore, which is towarde the South.

19 Behind, which is toward the North.

20 For trées and plantes haue héeles, which whiles they growe in the earth, are alwayes toward the North.

21 Aboue and beneath, are the begyn∣ninges of length: the right side, and the lefte syde, are the beginnings of bredth: a∣fore and behind, are the beginninges of thicknesse.

22 Places are thus deuided, some are na∣turall, some artificiall, some fained, some neare, some farre of: some holy, some pro∣phane: some common, some priuate: some healthful, some contagious: some fertill, some baren: some hote, some colde, some temperate.

23 There are manye other deuisions of time and place, and they in maner infinit: but of these fewe anye meane wit maye with ease finde oute manye moe to serue

his purpose as he shal be occasioned.

Of the ninth Storehouse, called Placing. Chap. 8.

1 This Storehouse conteineth al words that signifie any placing, setting, or orde∣ring of a thing, as to hang, to sit, to lye, to bowe, to bend, to compasse, to mowe, to fleare, to frowne, to bée scattered, to be im∣baulmed, to be inrolled. &c.

2 Here is to be noted, that frowning ta∣ken for a mouing, is an action: but beyng taken for the browes knit and drawne to gether: it is a placing.

3 Words placed in this Storehouse, haue no contraries at all, some admit degrées of more and lesse, and some do not.

Of the tenth Storehouse called hauing. Chap. 9.

1 Some take hauing onely for an appa∣relling, howbeit, it is much more larglye taken.

2 As for an apparelling, it is but eyther when one thyng is hanged vpon another, as when a horse is trapped,

3 Or when one thing is set to another, as when a shaft is fethered,

4 Or els when one thing compasseth an other in part, or in whole, as when one is ringed or armed.

5 But hauing, is of anye thing whatso∣euer, whether the thing had be a substance a quantitie, a qualitie, or els referred to any other of the Storehouses, or of things exempted out of the Storehouses.

6 And therfore this storehouse teacheth vs not so muche to consider the nature of the thinges that are had: as to marke what commeth of the hauing of suche and such things.

7 Many men thinke, that many wordes placed in this Storehouse, admit degrées of more and lesse: and that some haue con∣traryes also.

8 Bicause it is commonly said that some men are better monyed then others, better frended, better weapned: and that thys man is armed, and that man vnarmed: that he is frended, and he foed.

9 Howbeit, if the matter bée throughly •…•…ted, the increase and the contrarietie

standeth not in the hauing of these things: but in the things that are had.

10 Though euery plain meaning worde haue his proper place in some one Store∣house alone: yet may the same indirectly & after a sort be also referred to some other.

11 As a father is properlye a respecting word: but indirectly he may bée taken for a substaunce, bicause a father is a man, which is properly a substaunce.

12 The cause is, for that thinges which directly perteine to an inholder, are so•…•…e tymes in common speach indirectly sayd•…•… of hys inbeer.

13 And againe, such thinges as properly belong to some inbeer: are sayde of hys inholder.

14 So we saye, a lyne is an inholder of straightnesse: yet indirectly, for directly a bodyed substaunce, is the proper inholder of straightnesse, and not a line.

That Storehouses helpe to inlarge a mat∣ter, and that euerye vvord may after a sorte be deduced through them all.

15 The Storehouses serue: not onely to teache vs the sorce and nature of ech plain meanyng word, as whether it doth signi∣fye a substaunce, a quantitie, a qualitie, a respect &c.

16 But they serue also to amplifie and to set for the a matter at large, and then they teache vs to séeke the substaunce, the quantitie, the qualitie, the respecte, th•…•… place, the tyme, the ordering and the ha∣uing of the thing wée speake of, and so to deduce one woorde throughe all the Storehouses. Which though it bée pro∣perly placed in some one: yet indirectlye and after a sorte, it maye be deduced and brought through them all.

Woordes exempted out of the Storehouses. Chap. 10.

1 These nyne kinde of words following, are exempted out of the Storehouses, as not properly placed in any one of them.

1

2 The words of art inuented to expresse y^• rules of any sciēce, as a nown, a pronown,

a verbe, &c. a foreset, a backset, a shew∣say. &c.

2

3 Unperfite wordes, which by them sel∣ues teach the hearers no matter, but serue onely, to helpe to furnishe out a sentence, and to make it perfite, as, or, if and, &c.

3

4 Wordes that signifie lacke or want of any natural power, as, dumbnesse, deaffe∣nesse, darkenesse. &c.

4

5 Wordes that signifie matters which are not in déede, but are fayned to bee, as Hobthrus, rawhed, purgatorie.

5

6 Wordes that signifie a parte of any whole thing, as an hand, a soote, a legge, an arme: so long as they remaine partes not seuered from their whole.

6

7 God for that he is infinite, and not a∣ble to be comprehended of any thing, how∣beit some men doe iudge him to be a most perfect substaunce.

7

8 Wordes that signifie all things with∣out destinction, as a thyng, a matter, a whatsicallit.

9 The Storehouses are called generall wordes, for that they containe manye, but these may be termed surmounting gene∣ralls, bycause they containe all.

8

10 Two or moe wordes expressing mat∣ter that is contained in diuers Storehou∣ses, as a white horse a righteous man.

11 For white and righteous are placed in one Storehouse: and man and horse in another.

9

12 Wordes of double vnderstanding: for these afore they bée restrayned to one say∣what, maye haue place in diuers Store∣houses: and therefore vnfit to be assygned to one.

Hovv vvordes of double vnderstanding maye be knovven. Chap. 11.

1 What like sounding wordes are, and

howe in arguing and conference of talke they are to be restrained to signify but one thing, we haue said afore.

2 Now for the better discussing of y^• mat∣ter, we shall shew a meane how one maye be sure, that this or that word is of double vnderstanding: and yelde a reason for the same.

3 But here we wil onely set forth certain rules, to discerne such as cannot easely bée perceyued of many: for those which easely shew themselues, néede no teacher.

1

4 First if anye of his gay•…•…ettes bée of double vnderstanding: then is the princi∣pall also, as:

5 Sharp, is a word of double vnderstan∣ding: for his contrarie gainset, in voyce is, flat: and in edge, dull.

6 Therefore it must folow of necessiti•…•… that it is not one sharpnesse, which is con∣trarye to flatnes in voyce, and to dulnesse in edge.

2

7 If it be found to be in many storehou∣ses, as this worde grey sig•…•…fiyng a beast

that pastureth in the night, is a substance: but signifying a colour mixed, and made of blacke and white, it is a qualitie.

3

8 If it be perceyued by dyuers senses, as clearenesse, for it is not one and the same clearenes that is sene & heard: the one con∣sisting in colour and the other in sound.

4

9 If his ofspring be diuersly taken, then is his originall also: or contrary wise if in the originall there be doublenesse, then is there dublenesse in the ofspring too, as,

10 If to iudge rightly •…•…e two wayes takē, the one to gyue sentence accordyng to the euidence broughte in: the other to gyue sentence accordyng to the truthe of the matter:

11 Then must a ryghteous iudge be two wayes taken, that is, righteous so farre as •…•…idence leadeth: and righteous so farre as truth requireth.

5

12 If a worde haue diuers saywhattes, not differyng onely in wordes, but also in meaning.

13 And here it is sometimes good to con∣sider the say whattes of wordes as they are defined and set forth wh•…•… they are coupled and ioyned with other wordes.

14 For taking so much awaye from the saywhattes, as is proper to ech worde an∣nexed to the originall: the rest in all the saywhattes, must be one and the same.

15 For example thus: if ye ioyne to this word cleare, aire, and voyce, defining a cleare aire, and a cleare voyce seuerally: and then after take so muche from either say what, as properly apperteyneth to aire and voyce: the rest that remayneth in both the saywhattes, shal be one, if cleare were a plaine meaning word.

16 Nowe the thing that remaineth▪ is not one, and therefore cleare is diuersly taken.

17 For a cleare voyce is a voyce plea∣sant to the eare, wythout horsenesse, or iarring.

18 But a cleare aire, is an aire voyde of cloudes: so that voice, and aire, taken from these two saywhattes, the rest that re∣maineth is not one in them both.

19 For pleasant to the eare, and wyth∣out horsenesse or iarring, is a thing dis∣senting muche from that which is voyd of cloudes.

20 By these meanes and suche lyke, woordes are proued to bée of double vn∣derstanding,

Of disagreeable vvordes. Chap. 12.

1 Wordes which cannot be coupled and ioyned together in a true & perfect yeasay, are either differing wordes, or gainsettes.

2 Differing wordes, are those whereof one differeth from many, in lyke manner and sort.

3 Gaynsettes are two disagréeable words wherof the one so setteth foote against the other, as against no other thyng in lyke sort: in so muche that neither the one can be affirmed of the other: neither they both of any third thing, at one time, and in one respecte.

4 These gaynsets are deuided into foure sortes: into contrarye termes, respectyng terms, depriuing terms, & denying terms.

5 What contrarie termes and respec∣ting termes are: we haue said afore.

6 Depriuing termes are taken in thys place, not onelye for wordes that note a want of naturall power: but for wante and power compared together, as Lighte, Darknesse.

7 In lyke manner denying termes are taken, both for the yeaword, which affir∣meth: and also for the nayword, which de∣nyeth: as a man, no man: a stone, no stone.

8 Here is to be noted that the nayword, which is infinite, conteyneth all thinges, saue his yeaward, which hath his limitati∣on and is certain, and as they both are said of no one •…•…hing, so the one of them is veri∣fied of euery thing.

VVhat difference there is betvvene de∣priuyng termes and contra∣rye termes.

9 Depry•…•…ing termes differ from con∣trary termes which haue no meane, for that the one of such contrary termes, must at all tymes be in his inholder: where as

the depriuing termes, may for a tyme bée both absent.

10 I meane the time, afore power com∣meth to the inholder by nature.

11 Now from contrarye termes whych haue a meane, they differ in this:

12 For that there is a time appointed by nature, when as the one of the depriuing termes must of force bee saide of hys in∣holder: but of contraryes which haue a meane, there is at no tyme anye suche necessitie.

13 For example thus. After nyne dayes that a bitch hathe whelped, hir whelpes must of force either see or bée blinde: but afore the time be expired that nature hath set and appoynted that whelpes shoulde sée in, ye can not ryghtlye saye that the whelpes are either blind or do sée.

14 As for white, and blacke, which are contraryes that haue a meane, they haue no suche force in a whelpe at anye tyme, that the one muste bée in it, and the other from it,

15 Bicause the whelpes may at all times be of some other meane colour.

Hovve many vvayes one thing is said to be afore or after another. Chap. 13.

1 The first and principall way that one thing is sayde to bée afore another, is, in tyme.

2 For that whych is more auncient, is said to be afore that, which had his being in a latter season.

3 As, King Henry the eight, was in time afore King Edward the sixt.

4 The second way that one thing is said to bée afore another, is, by nature: as when the being of the latter, inforceth, a beyng of the former, but contrarye wise, the se∣quele of the former, shall not inferre a ne∣cessary sequele of the latter.

5 The kynd and the kinred, the general and the special, are fit examples to teache the meaning of this rule.

6 For if there be a man here, it foloweth of force, that the same bée a wight: but the sequele on the contrarye parte, is not good: that if there be a wight here, the same should be a man▪

7 For there are many wightes whiche are no men.

8 Therefore wée holde, that the gene∣ral is in nat•…•…re afore the speciall, and that Iohn, William, and other seuerall men, muste firste be substaunces, creatures, bodies, and wightes, afore they come to be men.

9 The third way that one thing is said to be afore an other, is, when things goe one afore an other in order: as letters are lerned afore syllables, and syllables afore words: substance is placed afore a quanti∣tie, and quantitie afore qualitie.

10 The fourth waye that one thing is sayde to be afore an other, is, when one thyng passeth and excéedeth an other in woorthynesse: as the king is a•…•…ore his sub∣iect in honoure: the maister afore his ser∣uant, by estimation:

11 For that the King and the mayster, passe and excéede, the subiect and the ser∣uant, in worthinesse.

12 Of this it is cleare, that one thyng is sayde to be afore an other foure manner of wayes: as,

Afore in

• 1 tyme.
• 2 nature.
• 3 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• 4 woorthynesse.

13 After, is so many wayes taken as a∣fore is.

14 For gaynsettes haue lyke trade in teaching: and he that knoweth one gayn∣set, must needes know the other.

Of the beeing of things at once. Chapter. 14.

1 Those things are most proprely sayd to bee at once, whiche are doone, or haue their beeing, bothe at one tyme.

2 As twinnes are bothe at ones: or as the Eclipse of the Sunne and the direct•…•… placing of the Moone, betwéene our sighte and it, are bothe at once.

3 In nature those things are sayd to be at once, which are suche as the beeing of the one, followeth vppon the being of the other, and yet neyther of them cause of o∣thers béeing.

4 As a husbande and a wyfe, a double

parte, and an halfepart, are bothe at once by nature.

5 For if there be a wyfe, then is there a husbande: and if there be a husbande, then is there a wyfe.

6 Againe, if there be a thing that is a double part: then is there a thing, that is an halfe part to that double.

7 And yet is an husband no more cause of the béeing of a wyfe, then a wyfe cause of the beyng of an husband: nor a double parte any more the cause of an half part, then an halfe parte is cause of a double parte.

8 Membres of one diuysion are also sayd to be all at once, as,

9 Man and beaste béeyng membres of one deuisyon, are supposed by Na∣ture to bée bothe at once, and one of them not to be afore or after an other.

10 But a man and a wight are not both at once, in the respect of nature.

11 Bicause a wighte is mannes gene∣rall, and Nature alwayes supposeth the generall, to be afore his specials.

Of mouing. Chap. 14.

1 Mouing is not only taken for the pas∣sing of a bodied substaunce from place to place: but mouyng is also taken for the begetting or corrupting of a substance: for the increasing or diminishing of a quanti∣tie: or else for the altering of a qualitie.

2 Begetting or ingēoring is a mouing, making that to bée in déede, whiche afore was but in power to be.

3 Corrupting is a mouing, causing that thing not to bée whych afore had a beeing.

4 Begetting and corrutyng are but one mouing, considering the acte in it self, being in déed but one act, and done at once.

5 They differ, onely in respecte of the sundrye bodyes, wherevnto they are re∣ferred.

6 For whatsoeuer is corrupted, is cor∣rupted into some thing, that succéedeth in his place:

7 And whatsoeuer is ingendred or be∣gotten, ariseth of some thing, which cea∣seth to be, that the other may succéede in his roome. For example thus:

8 In the burning of wood or any other

matter, thys acte referred vnto the wood that is burned, is called a corrupting: for it taketh away the wood, and causeth it to haue no longer a beeing in nature.

9 But if you referre the selfe same act of burning, vnto the smoke, flame, & ashes that arise of the wood, when it is consumed by fire: it is called an ingendring or be∣getting.

10 Nowe looke howe the wood consu∣meth by little and little: and so doe ashes, smoake, and flame, arise and spring.

11 So that a man may playnly sée, that as one substance passeth away, and is cō∣sumed to naughte: an other substunce springeth vp, and succeedeth in his roome.

12 And agayne, as one substance com∣meth vp and is begotten, an other sub∣stance •…•…asseth to be, and makes (as a mā would say) roome for it: For else it coulde not haue any béeing in nature at all.

13 Ther is no space or distance of time, betwixt begetting, and corrupting: neither is the one of them before, or after an o∣ther, but both at once, euen at one instant and moment of time.

14 If this were not, ye should bée for∣ced to graunte, that eyther two bodyes myghte bée in one place at once: or else that there were a place in nature vtterly voyde of any bodie at all.

15 For whē a new thing is made, which must fill a place by it self, and no former thing taken awaye to make roome for it: th•…•…r must be either a voyd place in nature to receiue it: or else there must be two bo∣dies in one place at once, that whiche is newly made, and that which was afore.

16 Nowe neyther of these two wayes can be, as wée may learne by many expe∣rimentes.

17 Therfore it followeth of necessitie, that the bringing in of a newe bodie into the frame of nature, is a taking awaye of some former body, whiche had a beeing in the same frame afore.

18 Increasing is a mouyng that causeth a greater quantitie: and diminishing that causeth a lesse.

19 Altering is a chaunging from quali∣tie to qualitie: as when a man chaungeth from vertue to vice.

20 Many men d•…•… hold an opinion, that nothyng can be increased or diminished in quantitie: but that the same doth with∣all admitte an alteration of qualitie▪ a chaunge of place, and an ingendring of substaunce.

21 Howebéeit experience doth teach the contrarie.

22 For a square iuste compassyng the two sydes of a fouresquare platte, aug∣menteth the quantitie, and nothyng al∣tereth the for•…•…e thereof.

23 Lykewyse, when things are altered in any qualitie, they are not of force with∣all, eyther increased or diminished: ingen∣dred or corrupted: or else moued from place to place.

24 The forme of a square in numbres is this, 〈☐〉〈☐〉 〈☐〉〈☐〉 in bignesse this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

25 The forme of a fouresquare platte in numbres is this, 〈☐〉〈☐〉 〈☐〉〈☐〉 in bygnesse, thys, 〈☐〉〈☐〉

26 Mouing in oure Englishe tongue is most proprely, and in manner altogither taken for mouing in place, so that it being

but a parte, boroweth in our speache, th•…•… name of hys whole: for that it hathe no speciall name of his owne, as other parti∣cular mouings haue.

Of contrarietie in mouing.

27 Generally, rest is contrarie to mo∣uing: but particularly begetting is con∣trarie to corrupting: and increasing to diminishing: and mouing in place, to re∣sting in place: or else mouing vpwards contrarie to mouing downeward.

28 And as for alteration which is a mo∣uing in qualitie, it hath eyther rest from suche a mouing, to bée his contrarie: or else a chaunge into a contrarie▪ qualitie.