Batman vppon Bartholome his booke De proprietatibus rerum, newly corrected, enlarged and amended: with such additions as are requisite, vnto euery seuerall booke: taken foorth of the most approued authors, the like heretofore not translated in English. Profitable for all estates, as well for the benefite of the mind as the bodie. 1582.

¶Of the powers of the Soule. Chap. 6.

THE Soule is one in substaunce, and hath many vertues, and ma∣ny manner of workings: thereby it néedeth to shewe diuerse parting of his might and vertues. The Soule is com∣pared to the body, and to this end, and to this act. Touching the comparison to the bodie, the Soule hath fine man∣ner of mightes and vertues. The first whereof, as Austen saith, is féeling, and by that vertue the Soule is moo∣ued, and taketh héede to the bodylye wittes, and desireth those things, that belong to the bodye. By this vertue a beast is mooued to desire the thing that is lyking, and to eschewe the thing that is grieuous. The seconde power is wit: that is the vertue of the soule, whereby shée knoweth things sensible and corporall, when they bee present. The third is imagination, whereby the Soule beholdeth the lyekenesse of body∣lye thinges when they bee absent. The fourth is Racio, Reason, that déemeth and iudgeth betwéene good and euill, truth and falsenesse. The fifte is Intel∣lectus, vnderstanding and inwit. The which comprehendeth thinges not

material but intelligible, as God, Angel, and other such. The three first ver∣tues, feeling, bodily wit, and imaginati∣on, are s••ituate in the soule, that it is coupled to the body, and giueth life and innerwit & vtter wit to perfection of the body. And these thrée vertues be com∣mon to men and to other beasts: But the other vertues, ••acio and Intellectus, be in the soule, in that it may be departed from the body, and abide departed as an Angell, and that by two manner of re∣spects. For it beholdeth the higher things and so it is called Intellectus: and be∣holdeth the neather things, and so it is called Racio. In that the soule is compa∣red to this end, it hath thrée manner of vertues, one is Racionalis, whereby it taketh héede to the thing that is true: The other is called Concupisubilis, whereby it taketh héed to the thing that is good, the third is called Irascibilis, and thereby it taketh héede y^e thing that is great and huge, and to the thing that is euerlasting. In the Rationali is know∣ledge of the truth, in Concupiscibili, wil and desire of good thing: in Irascibili is flight of contrary, that is, of euill. And so euery vertue thus considered taketh in this manner knowledge of the truth, ei∣ther that it desireth good, either indeuou∣reth to flie harme. All the wits come of that vertue Rational and apprehensiue. All affections and desire, of Concupisci∣bili and Irascibili. Which affectio••s bée foure, that is to say, Ioy, Hope, Dreade and Sorrowe. The first two come of Concupiscibili, for of the thing that we couet and desire, we haue ioy, and in ioy∣ing we hope. The other two, dread and sorrow, come of the Irascibili. For of things that we hate we haue sorrowe, and in sorrowing we dread. These foure affections be the matter of all manner vices and vertues, as it is in another place shewed, and that appereth by Au∣sten in the booke De A••••ma & spiritu, where all those thinges are decla∣red.