The French academie Fully discoursed and finished in foure bookes. 1. Institution of manners and callings of all estates. 2. Concerning the soule and body of man. 3. A notable description of the whole world, &c. 4. Christian philosophie, instructing the true and onely meanes to eternall life. This fourth part neuer before published in English. All written by the first author, Peter de la Primaudaye, Esquire, Lord of Barre, Chauncellour, and Steward of the French Kings house.

THE FIRST DAEIS VVORKE of the third Tome of the French Academy. (Book 1)

Of Heauen and Earth. (Book 1)

Of the creation of Heauen and Earth. Chap. 1.

ASER.

IF all men guided by reasō (as Plato very well said) haue a cu∣stome to inuocate on God in the beginning of their work, * 1.1 whether it be great, or little; how much more conuenient is it, that desiring to despute of the Vniuers (if we retaine any iudgement at all) we should call God to our aide? It is very difficult to speak as is requisite of the celestiall bodies, and of so many diuers motions as they haue, & yet not one hinder another: but it is a much more high and intricate matter to finde out the workeman, and father of all this great world. And when we shal haue found him, it is altogether impossible vulgarly to expresse the cause & reason of his works. For though (as it is) the glory and infinite wisedome of God shineth in this admitable con∣struction of heauen and earth: yet our capacity is too too small, to comprise so great and profound effects, so much it wanteth that the toong may bee able to make a full and entire declaration thereof. And we cannot hold disputation, or argument vpon that, which doth not offer itselfe vnto our sense, and proper reason, as is the creation of the world. For therein haue we that wonderfull Architect (whom Hermes called the great and infinite sphere intel∣lectuall, whose center is all that, which is, throughout the world, created) who performing his worke, and giuing motion to all the celestiall bodies, doth himselfe continue stable. Now that which moouing, is not it selfe mooued, surpasseth all discourses & speculations humane and philosophicall, & appertaineth to a diuine knowledge, the which we ought to impetrate through praiers by Reuelation of the holy Spirit, euen in such sort as all things naturall are inuented, and comprehended by reason and demonstration, and all morall are obtained by arte and vse.

Then of the soueraigne, & true God, with his eternall Word, and holy Spirit, which three are one essence, one God in Trinity of persons, whose name is (I will be, that I will be) or (I am that I am) Almighty, Eternall, Creator & gouernor of euery soule & body, in contemplation * 1.2 of whom consisteth the onely good, the true felicity, and blessednes of man, whom he him∣selfe hath created to attaine therunto, a liuing creature reasonable by the gift of vnderstan∣ding & free wil. Who being iust, permits not his creature made according to his own image to remain vnpunished, hauing sinned; & being merciful, hath not left him without grace, who hath giuē both to the good & euill an essēce, with the stones; a life vegetatiue & full of seede with the plāts; a life sensual with the beasts, & a life intelectuall with the Angels; frō whom proceedeth all gouernāce, all goodlines, & all order; by whō all that is naturall euen frō the

highest of heauen, to the center of the earth, doth subsist; of whom are the seedes of formes, the formes of seedes. the mouings of seedes and of formes: who (being good) hath not left regardlesse not onely the sphericall and elementary world; or else the Angels and man, but euen the entralles of the most small and contemptible amongst creatures, nei∣ther the lightest feather of the birds, nor the least flower of the herbe, nor leafe of the tree; engrauing in each of all these things (the workes of his omnipotency) certaine signes of his glory, and maiestie; by the couenant and accord of euery of their parts, and as it were by I wot not what manner of peace: Of him (I say) father, and moderator of all that which is, which liueth, which hath sense, and vnderstandeth, let vs request (Companions) that with the light of his wisedome he will illuminate our vnderstandings, and by his holy spirit direct and gouerne our words, meetly to discourse of according as mans power is able, the works of his al-mighty hand in heauen and in earth, according as our intent is.

The beginning of euery thing whatsoeuer, is of such waight and importance, that on the knowledge of the same dependeth all the science thereof: for it is impossible that a man can bee skilfull in any thing, if hee bee ignorant in the principles, and first causes of the subiect which he desireth to know: contrariwise hauing well knowne them, the vnder∣standing of the effects which thereupon ensue, of the vertues and qualities which thereby redound, of the actions which thereof proceede, of the degrees which therein are esta∣blished, of the bounds and limits whereto these first causes tend to obtaine their perfection, declareth it selfe, as of it owne accord, without great difficulty and much paine. This was the cause why many sages in old time despising the care of temporal affaires, addicted them∣selues altogether to search out the cause of all nature: so that the most excellent of them would boldly discourse of the originall and making of the world. But the saying of Plato remaining euer true, that it is as hard to finde out the maker, and father of this All, as to speake properly of him beeing found out: it so falleth out, that the most part of them, who haue entreated of so lofty a matter, haue erred, straying by diuers by waies; yea euen all those whom the Sonne of Iustice, hath not fully illuminated with his supreame bright∣nesse. Thereupon it proceeded that the Philosophers haue beene diuided into diuers and contrary opinions, about this question (whether the world hath bin from euerlasting, or whether it hath beene of late, whether of necessity, or else by the free will, and motion of God.) Aristotle with all the troup of those, who beleeue nothing but that which they * 1.3 can inuent and comprise by naturall reasons and syllogismes taken from sensible things, which guide them to a certaine demonstration, not being able thereby to vnderstand, how and wherfore heauen and earth haue beene created, affirme that they were neuer made, but that they haue beene from eternitie. But Plato followed of a great number of the most cleere sighted wise men, hath confessed the generation of the world which hee tea∣cheth to bee ordered, and disposed by compleate and perfect numbers: vnder the vaile of which, and the obscure notes of hidden sense, it seemeth that hee would hide the close mysteries of the creation of the v••iuers to those which were not yet instructed in such se∣crets, which only may bee comprehended by a pure and celestiall cogitation diuinely in∣fused. For let vs know that there is no certainty at all of this doctrine, except for those to whom the minde, by a speciall and supernatural grace is sharpe, being fashioned and for∣med by meditation of the immutable substance of God himselfe, and by a secret operation of the holy Ghost, to beleeue that it is the Eternall who by his word hath made all nature. For so the Soueraigne Creator talketh with man, and establisheth a certaine testimony of his truth in the heart of him, when he hath made him proper and meet to heare him with the best and most excellent part of his vnderstanding, in regard whereof he is saide to bee made according to his owne image.

But although these things may bee knowne, beeing not farre remote from our inte∣riour, or exteriour senses, yea so that they may bee called present, and whereof no doubt * 1.4 is to bee made, especially beeing supported by authority of good witnesses, yet those things which surpasse the ordinary puissance of the minde, because by our owne iudge∣ment wee cannot credite them, must bee considered, and beleeued, according to that co∣uenant of verities, which they announce vnto vs, who haue known them, by our vnderstan∣ding, peaceful, and duely purged: so that we may adde faith to such holy personages, as God hath made capable of his light, & which instruct vs not in the things which they haue ima∣gined, but in such as they haue heard & receiued frō diuine oracles. It is then of their autho∣rity, that he must make a buckler, whosoeuer will meetly debate of God, and of his workes,

and of his prouidence in the gouernance of them. And when the wings of Nature faile vs in solofty a contemplation, we must take to those of diuine grace; and when the naturall light fadeth and is ready to die, to require an infused and supernaturall illumination. The world is greatest of all things visible, and God of all things inuisible. That the world is, we perceiue; but that God is, we beleeue. Now that he hath made the world, wee can better beleeue of no body then of God himselfe. But where haue wee heard that? In this word, whereto we must giue credite concerning those things whereof it is expedi••nt that we should not bee ignorant, and which we of our selues are not able to vnderstand. Now hee hath spoken first by his Prophets, then by himselfe in the person of our Redeemer, and lastly, by the Apostles and Disciples. Wee heare him speaking aloude, where Moses the father of diuines, and master of Philosophers saith (In the beginning God created the heauen * 1.5 and the earth.) The Prophet was not there present, but the wisedome of God, by which all things were made, and which by an incomprehensible vertue conueieth it selfe into ho∣ly minds, and doth direct them, and declare all his workes, without any noyse at all by his spirit; which can doe all, beholdeth all, encourageth all, and passeth through all purified spirits of vnderstanding, and abideth in his elect. And the blessed Angelles, who alwaies behold the face of their father, speake to them also, and announce the secrets of the eter∣nall Maiestie, to all them (I say) in such sort as it pleaseth the Omnipotent to make them worthy. One of these was Moses, who teacheth vs that God Almighty made this great Vniuers. A witnesse so excellent and worthy, that by him wee must beleeue in God, whom wee perceiue, as it were through the same wisedome and spirit, which reuealed vnto him the creation of the world: who prophecied almost two thousand yeeres before of the high mysteries of Christian faith: confirming also this whole doctrine, by miracles, prodigies, oracles, and prophecies, wherewithall his writings abound, And therefore hauing confidence in his testimony, we call God, Creator of al things, therby inferring, that he is author, principall, & first cause of all essences, which cause by manner of speech ought to be ful of al things, if this Maxime of the Peripateticks be true. (That none can giue away of that which he hath not.) And therfore the Poet the honor of our age very learnedly saith

Ere time: forme, substance, place, to be themselues attained, All God in all things was, and God in all remained.

For there is nothing produced by nature, or formed, by arte, but first it hath abiding in that which performeth it. So euery creature is e••gendred by vettue of that seede, wherein * 1.6 it was at first, by power, included: so each worke liueth in the minde of the workeman be∣fore he puts it in practise. So had the world perfect beeing, in the thought of God before it was builded, and the very Idea thereof was contained in it, by which this great ar∣chitect, when it pleased him, performed his outward worke: as Saint Augustine very lear∣nedly discourseth in a long treatise vpon this text of Scripture (All things were made by the Word, and in it was life, &c.) And thereby wee learne, that God Almightie, the vnite from which all number proceedeth, and whereto all multitude referreth it selfe, did increase him∣selfe in himselfe, before he communicated his vnitie with creatures, engendring one eterni∣tie, and by an alone vnique action neuer disturbed, his linage full of vnderderstanding, the very image of the Father, his Word, the perfect patterne of the world, and his loue and power the holy Ghost, which alieth the vnderstanding with the thought, three persons in one es∣sence and substance. Afterward this God head, though in it selfe it was soueraigne good, not hauing neede of any strange thing, yet would hee according to his owne bounty in him consisting, produce the outward worke of the world, whereinto spreading himselfe, by a kinde of processe of well ordered degrees, and disposing through admirable worke∣manship the harmonicall formes of the heauens: the Angels and men by him created to be made partakers of felicitie, contemplating these maruailes, were ranished and ca∣ried away with meditation of spirituall things, and by the beauty of his works, and ornaments of his creatures haue learned to acknowledge the father of this Vniuers. Who moreouer, performed not so great a worke in such manner as mortall men accustome to labour, who cannot doe any businesse themselues, if they haue not stuffe and tooles fit for it, nay and then cannot doe it according to their desire. But God created all of no∣thing, * 1.7 without helpe, without counsell, by himselfe, by his word, by the power of his holy spirit, in such time and manner as he hath pleased; of his owne franke and free will. There∣fore it is written (He spake, and it was done, he commanded and the world was created. Also (The Lord hath done whatsoeuer hee pleased in heauen, and in earth, and in all the depths.) And againe

(Oh eternall Lord, behold thou hast made heauen, and earth by thy great power, and by thy streehed out arme: nothing is impossible to thee.) Briefely holy writings are filled with texts to this pur∣pose, which giue vs certaine testimony, that the works of God are not subiect to any other cause, then to his onely omnipotent will, and that thereby, the word being spoken, those things which were not, haue beene created, as well the substance, as the fashion of them: and also the world Creation doth properly import so much, according to the stile of holy writers. Behold then summarily that which we learne of the originall of the world, we will consequently consider, as neere as may be, of this notable and excellent doctrine, and of cer∣taine arguments which some vse to the contrary. Wherefore AMANA, if you thinke good, you shall frame the subiect of your discourse, vpon the time, wherein this Vniuers be∣gan to be builded.

Of Time, which tooke beginning with the world. Chap. 2.

AMANA,

The matter which wee entreate of, hath alwayes beene accounted of the Sages, to bee of such depth, and profundity, that it was ordered amongst * 1.8 the ancient Hebrewes, that any, who had not attained to ripe age, and good yeeres, might not meddle with the creation. Of this prohibition doth Saint Hierome make mention. And therefore Saint Augustine vpon Genesis, searching out the deepe secrets hidden vnder the vaile of simple words therein contained, speaketh to the Reader in this manner. [Compre∣hend this if thou canst, if not, leaue it to them, which are more learned. But make profite of the Scripture, which abandoneth not thy weaknesse, but, like a mother steppeth foot by foote an easie pace with thee. For it speaketh in such sort, that in height it scorneth the proude, in depth it astonisheth those which are attentiue to it. It feedeth the great with truth, and nourisheth the small ones with milde and familiar discourse.] And in truth in each part of Moses writings, the treasures of all Philosophy are by him discouered, like as if they were closely hidden in some field, chiefely in this place which we haue intended to en∣treate of touching the creation. For of deliberate purpose he argueth in Philosophy of the originall of al things, of God, of the degree, number, & order of the parts of this great world. We neuerthelesse hauing confidence in this saying of the Psalmist, That the word of GOD doth illuminate and giue vnderstanding to the simple, and that it serueth for a light to our * 1.9 pathes, we may be bold to touch so lofty a point.

But before we proceed to consider of the precious treasures, and learned doctrine where∣with the sacred sayings of the prophet touching the creation are replenished: it wil be good that wee discourse a little of the principall arguments, whereupon many, better Philoso∣phers then good Christians, haue obiected against this doctrine of framing of the world. And I will willingly begin with this olde question of the Epicure, which the Atheists of our time haue renewed, to witte: Why in the time that Moses recordeth, it pleased the eter∣nall God to create heauen & earth, which he had not made before? If they, which say thus, * 1.10 would therby infer, that the world hath beene eternall without any beginning, and for that cause it seemeth to them that God made it not, they are too farre wide of the truth, and sicke of the mortall disease of impiety. For besides the manifolde tellings, and prophe∣ticall testimonies, which make the creation of heauen and earth vndoubtable: euen the world it selfe, by his motion, and well ordered changing, and the gorgeous shew of all things visible therein contained, not speaking one word, doe after a sort cry out, that it was made, and that it could be no otherwise formed, then by God, who is ineffable, and inuisibly glorious. For it is not to be supposed, that a thing of most exquisite order and reason, should haue bin made by chance; and that a deede most soueraigne could haue any other father then soueraigne: nor so goodlie a worke any other architect then one essentially, goodly. And therefore all the schooles of those Philosophers, which haue had any whit of diuine sense, affirme with one consent, that there is nothing which more prooueth that God hath made the world, & that it is gouerned by his care and prouidence, then the only beholding of the whole world, and consideration of the beauty and order thereof. But see heere what imagination not grounded on sense putteth into the mouths of many. What did God (say they) before he created the world? why staid he til then? or why staid he not a little longer? In these and such like doubts they inwrap themselues; making no difference between the

condition of God, and our owne; betweene his eternall essence, and that of those things, which haue once had a beginning. But with a discreete, and pleasant answer Sain•• Augustins resolueth those, which demand what God did before the fabrication of the world. Hee was busie (saith he) cutting downe wood in the forrest, to burne the rash and curious, who re∣member not what they themselues did yesterday, and yet dare inquire what God hath done of eternity. But that I may speake to the most subtile, let the best learned among them tell me, what they intend by this worde (before) whereof they inquire? If they meane the pas∣sing * 1.11 away of time, they deceiue themselues, because time tooke beginning with the world. And if by the word they imagine something concerning eternitie, they abuse themselues also, for therein is neither before, nor after. For eternitie is an entire beeing at once alto∣gither, without any proceeding. Whereby it is euident that their question is nothing. Time therefore cannot accorde with eternity, nor bee eternall, seeing eternall hath no processe. It is therefore a foolish question, why before time was, God created not the tem∣porall world, as if there had beene some succeeding seasons, before any succession did con∣sist: for one cannot with any reason imagine any time before the stablishing of the vniuers. Yet Aristotle, whom the atheists will rather beleeue then the word of truth, prooueth no o∣ther thing, when he enforceth himselfe to declare the eternity of the world, then that time was neuer without the world, nor the world without time, which the Sages say, march in equall pace with the place. Wherefore as there is nothing beside place, appartaining to place; so there is nothing beside time, belonging to time. And for those which aske why the creator made not his world latter: I againe request them that setting a part the worke of the vniuers, they would assigne mee their before, and after, and then I will render them a reason why God created not the world sooner, or later: It is most certaine that they shall be constrained to confesse, that before the order and entercourse of the Spheres, there was neuer any before or after, which are the conditions of time. And therefore their rash demaund deserueth no other answere, except we recount vnto them the pleasant saying of Democritus, which is not vnfit for our purpose in this place (No man regards that which is before his feete, and yet wee see many sound the secrets of heauen, and curiously seeke after the myste∣ries of God.) There are others also who disputing more subtilly of these matters, agree very well that the world was made, but they will not allow that it had a beginning of time, but * 1.12 of his own creation, so that it hath alwaies had a being in some sort, which they cannot vn∣derstand. Those found their opinion vpon this pretext to defend that God should not do any action new, or of chaunce, for feare least men should beleeue, that that came sudden∣ly into his minde, which before he had not determined, to make the world, and that hee, who it immutable in all things, should create it, through a new-sprong thought. Now as they make doubt, concerning the time, which they would not haue begun with the vni∣uers: let me aske them also, why the world was set in that place where it resteth, rather then any other where? For if they suppose infinite spaces of time, before the generation of the vniuers, in which it seemeth not that God could rest from worke: they may aswell be∣leeue many spaces of place out of the worlde: wherein if any could affirme that the Om∣nipotent hath not beene idle, they should bee forced to dreame with the Epicures of innu∣merable worlds. But if they answere me that the thoughts of men are vaine, by which they suppose of infinite places, sith there is no place out of the world: I may tell them also, that they are ill grounded in the cōsideration of time, sith there was neuer any before the world. And therefore as it is no consequence, that God framed the vniuers, rather by aduenture, then by diuine reason; not in any other place, but in that wherein it is; though mans ca∣pacitie cannot comprise the same diuine reason, by which it was so made: So is it no conse∣quence, that we should denie that it happened to God by chance, or by a new imagination when he created the world, rather in one certaine time, then before, seeing that the times precedent how long soeuer we may imagine them, should bee equally past away, comparing them with eternity, by an infinite space at once: and there should bee no difference why an auncient time should be preferred, before a latter. Wherefore we must all beleeue, that the world was made with the time, and that time tooke beginning with the world, and that notwithstanding, in making it, God chaunged not his eternall counsell, nor his im∣mutable will: but according to his inscrutable prouidence and bountie innate, hee would * 1.13 when he pleased, compose the large frame of the vniuers, full of his image. And here the definition which Aristotle maketh of Time, serueth to our purpose, to wit, that it is the mea∣sure of motion. For if immutable eternitie is easily discerned from Time, who perceiueth

not, that time had neuer beene, if some creature had not beene made, who might chaunge the created species by moouing? For that which giueth time his course, is the chaunging of things, when they giue place one to another, and one succeed another, because they cannot consist all at once together. Let vs conclude (therefore) seeing that the holy and most true writings expresse that: (In the beginning God created heauen and earth (we may assure our selues there was nothing before then, & that doubtles the world was not made in time but with it. For that which is done in time, is done both before, and after some time: after (I say) that which is past, & before that which is to come. Now before the world, there was no creature, by the chaungeable motion of which, time might haue proceeding. Where∣fore the world and time haue the same beginning, by the will of almightie God, and accor∣ding as is declared vnto vs in his word: against which, there is no other reason of Sophists, which can conclude any reasonable apparance, as you ARAM may amply declare, in the processe of our discourse.

Of the nullitie of reasons, framed concerning the nature of the world, against the creation thereof. Chap. 3.

ARAM.

THis sentence of Simonides, the ancient Poet, is well worthie to bee celebrated by the mouth of euery Christian man, (God alone hath the glorie, to bee supernatu∣rall.) For what other cause can we inuent of his workes, but his onely free-will? But what rashnes rendreth man so audacious, as to enquire the cause of Gods will, seeing it is, and by * 1.14 good right must be the cause of all things, which subsist? For if it had had any cause, then must that cause haue preceded, and the will of God attended thereupon, which were vnlaw∣ful to be imagined. Wherfore when it is asked, why did God so? we must answere; because it was his will. If proceeding farther, any enquire, why it was his will? they demand after a thing greater, and higher then the will of God, which cannot bee found. Yet neuerthelesse haue we sufficient in his word wherewith to satisfie our mindes, in meditation of his secrets with all reuerence. For they, which haue declared them vnto vs, penetrating into most hidden mysteries, by the light of the holy spirit, haue sufficiently reuealed them vnto vs, with most splendant cleerenesse. But the way of truth is shut vp to the wise of the world, and cannot be attained but by the directions of it selfe. So that (which is greatly to bee deplo∣red) it often commeth to passe, which this lambicke relateth, (That the vnderstanding of things giuen by God, in long tract of time, is confounded by mens opinions, retaining very little diuinitie, and truth, by reason that it agreeth not with those things, which fall within the compasse of our sense.) The Philosophers therefore, attributing too much faith to themselues, haue blinded themselues through their vaine discourses, and haue become guides to the blinde: so that falling into the ditch, they haue drawne many after them, by false arguments, and apparant reasons, whereof our subiect shall here be to insert the most principall.

They then, who esteeme that nothing is stable, or can be stable, in such sort reasoning, and arguing by sensible things, prooue it by the same demonstration that Aristotle hath deliue∣red, * 1.15 yea and as he hath obserued in his whole discourse, and naturall progression (conside∣ring that all his consequences proceede from certaine maximes, which hee supposed to bee perfect true) and amongst the most powerfull inuentions, by which they pretend to ouer∣throw the creation, and framing of the world, these Peripateticall reason of the nature of the world, are produced. First, they beholde the heauens altogither differing from contra∣rietie: whereupon they conclude, that it is not corruptible, and by consequence not made. * 1.16 They finde moreoeuer, that those things which haue a beginning, doe get vnto themselues a new place: now heauen not being able to get it selfe a new place, they cōclude that it could not bee created at any time. They consider also that all things which are mooued, passe in∣to a new place, or are mooued round about something, which remaineth firme (as all the spheres are about their center) to the end that all disorder might be brought to some vnifor∣mitie. Likewise they suppose euery new thing to be reduced into the olde: so that all genera¦tion and corruption is made according to the old substance, and all motion is gouerned by the firme and stable earth, or the vnmooueable center, by which principles they could not perceiue how the newnes of the world could any way come to passe. And forasmuch as the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and that nothing which should bee corrupted might preceede the world, thereupon they ground that it is eternal without a be∣ginning. Proceeding farther, they suppose that euery thing which is produced, bad a fore being

in the matter thereof. Therefore (they holde) that of necessitie the matter must be eternall. But the most principall and substantiall argument, which they bring, and most generally receiued, is. That of nothing, nothing is created; whereupon they conclude, that the world could not be made, because nothing did proceede it,

Now we may easily answere these reasons, & trie whether they cōclude, or not: but first let vs suppose (as it is most certaine) that there be three sorts of works & 3. kinds of workers. * 1.17 For there is the Artificer, who presupposeth the nature, to wit, the stuffe, fashion, and all the cōpound. There is the natural agent, which requireth before hand, the effect of God, to wit, the subiect, or the matter. And there is God the soueraigne worker, who hath no neede of any other thing, because he is perfect, retaining in himselfe al maner of vertue. Which three kindes of workers do fitly accord by a certaine anagolie and proportion, but doe much dif∣fer in comparison one with the other: and at the bounds and limits of the one worker, cannot be concluded the power of the other. For it were an error to proceede from art to nature, as if one should say: The arte doth first require the compound, the Goldsmith gold, the Founder mettall, the Carpenter wood, and the Mason stones and cement: there∣fore the naturall agent doth also require the compound. And likewise the Philosophers deceiue themselues, when they imagine that the soueraigne Creatour hath neede of a sub∣iect, or matter to worke on, as is requisite for the naturall agent. Also they abuse themselues to teach, that forasmuch as herein there passeth a certaine proportion from one contrarie * 1.18 to another, it therefore followeth, that God & nature doe proceede by one & the selfe-same way. But where (I pray) haue they learned to inuent such cōclusions, when thēselues teach, that art is distinguished frō nature, & that natural things appertaine to one kind of doctrine, & the eternal, and free frō motion belong to another? For the artificer giueth the artificiall forme, & requireth the naturall; and the naturall agent fashioneth the substantial, and requi∣reth the material, which is the worke of the soueraigne. But if God should require any thing before hand to worke with, he should also require a former God which must haue produced it, and by that reason there should be I wot not what former thing before the first. What are then these shewes of arguments? They conclude & accord badly, when because of the passi∣on of a new place, which demandeth that which is newly performed, they would therby ex∣cludethe world frō generation, because it getteth not a place. But what absurditie shal they finde it, if granting them that it hath obtained a place; I say it is the same wherein at this present it remaineth? For it subsisteth about the center, or aboue that of the earth, or of the whole vniuers, or of the sphere intellectuall, whose center (as Hermes saith) is all that which is euery where created. In that which they farther inferre, that euery new thing must be reduced to an olde, we grant it them. But that olde, is the diuine cogitation, wherein all things are contained, before they be displaied in their proper formes: which being created by itselfe, it alone doth gouerne and preserue them afterwardes. What they moreouer ad∣ioyne, that all naturall transmutation is made of one matter transposed into another, wee consent to them. But this is not requisite in the primitiue production, free from all lawes of nature, whereto by right the prince thereof is not obliged. And wee agree also that euery thing: which is produced, must first be included in some other power, before it be effected: but we say that naturall things remained first in the matter; and the world and diuersitie of substances, were comprised in the Ideas, or exemplaries resident euerlastingly in God. And so doe the Platonists mainetaine, who mounting much higher then the Peripateticks, agree with that which Saint Iohn saith. That all things were made by the word, and that in it was life; which brought foorth all things, and that in it the world before was by power compri∣sed. * 1.19 Wherefore these be no dreames (as Aristotle calleth them) but the Ideas of Plato: but those are sighted like the bat, who see not the things most manifest in nature, thereby to acknowledge the author of nature. And to the end that we loosē the strongest knot of their arguments, to wit, That of nothing nothing is created: I would desire them to expound me their * 1.20 sentence, because it is doubtfull, and ambiguous: for if the sense bee thus, that of nothing, by arte, or nature nothing is made, because they require the matter whereupon to worke: wee willingly accord. But what is this to purpose concerning the supreme and almighty architect, whome nature doth follow after, as farre as arte doth nature, as all Philoso∣phers confesse: For according as the naturall agent, bounded and subiect to motion, time, and succession, is lesse and more disable in essence, so is ••it lesse in performance then hee, who is free, and at libertie from all lawes of nature. But if they meane, that of nothing (to wit) after it hath no being, nothing is created: then haue they left it to this present to dis∣cusse,

and to all posteritie for euer. Wherefore we haue a spacious field, to deny them that which is neither prooued, nor euident in it selfe. If they inferre, that this nothing reiecteth all manner of causes: then we consent to them in this point. But in the creation, or genera∣tion of the world, we presuppose (as truth requireth) a working and soueraigne cause, who in the infinite vertue of it selfe, containeth the matter, subiect and fashion, to bestow the meanes, the disposing qualities, and all that, which is requisite to reduce, and bring to per∣fection any businesse. Behold then, how all these arguments conclude nothing against the doctrine of the worlds creation, no more these other reasons deriued from the motions, & their bounds, which the Peripateticks doe farther induce against the same, as pursuing this matter (ACHITOB) we may heare of you.

Of the Reasons taken from motion, and the mooing Intelligences, against the Genesis of the world, and of the nullitie of them, Chapter 4.

ACHITOB.

THE Peripateticks, whereof now adaies many may be found, perseuering in their naturall speculations, and considering that motion consistethin * 1.21 that which is mooued, or ingendred: or else in the subiect of transmutation, and because no substance did precede the primitiue production of the world, thereupon they conclude, that it was neuer created. But it is no maruell if they be greatly abused, seeing they would neuer swarue from their sense, and sensible things: whereof no pure and sincere truth can be gathered, because that by them, or by the reasons on them founded, wee cannot attaine to the knowledge of diuine mysteries, which are intellectual, far remote from any substance, moouing succession, or other sensiblenesse. And therefore they much deceiue themselues, when they, in such sort, argue of these grosse, and materiall generations, comparing them with the diuine master peece of worke, which surpasseth all meanes of nature. They maine∣taine that all direct (or forward) motion cannot be perpetuall, because it requireth infinite space which nature is not able to endure: but circular motion, because it passeth nothing in∣finit, may be perpetuall. Now in eternall things, the consequence is good from the power to the being. One may then (say they) thereby assure himselfe of the eternitie of the world. But see a goodly reason to presuppose that to be perpetuall and infinite, which they pretend to prooue. Auerrois proceedeth farther, and saith, that it is impossible for the world to haue had any other disposition, then such as at this present it hath, & that being exempt frō all contrariety, it followeth, that in no wise it is corruptible, & therfore was not engendred. * 1.22 But who reuealed vnto him that which he supposeth of the state of the world? With what measure pretendeth hee to meat out the puissance of the soueraigne workeman? By what authoritie dares he limit out the power of the infinite, so, that he may not destroy, and build vp at his good pleasure? I say then that the passing away of heauen hath another kinde of bound and limit then the earth, and the very rest it selfe, whereto (as with one minde all Philosophers teach) all motion doth tend. But forasmuch as motion begetteth time, and * 1.23 time it selfe is the measure of motion, thereby it commeth, that forging their arguments vpon one part of time, they misse and faile in reason, when they dispute thus: If the world was not before it tooke beginning, seeing this (before) is an appendix of time, then it fol∣loweth that time should precede motion, which is his cause, and progenitor. Againe, they say [In euery instant and moment assigned, is the beginning of time to come, and the ende of time past: then time hath beene before this first instant, and consequently motion and the world.] But the cause of these errors proceedeth from the misvnderstanding of wordes, when they would barre that this word (before) should signifie any thing else then some part of time. For aswell in the diuine as prophane writings of all authors, who can speake fitly and properly, we may finde that this particle (before) signifieth more then a part of time, for sometimes it denoteth the extreme: as is said in the Prouerbs, [The Lord hath possessed me in the beginning of his way, before hee created any thing, I haue had * 1.24 principality from euerlasting, and before the earth.] And in Ecclesiasticus, [He created me from the beginning, and before the world.] Ouid himselfe in his Metamorphosis vseth this manner of speech, [Before the Sea, the Earth, and Heauen which couereth all things,] though that being of a fine and subtile spirit, he was not ignorant, that time slideth away by reason of the turning of heauen. Moreouer this word (Ante) signifieth among the La∣tins,

the highest degree, wherof is deriued (Antistes) he which is principall, & cheese among others. Sith therefore this particle (before) hath diuers significations, why will our Peripate∣tickes restraine it to denote any other thing, but onely a portion of time. Would they not grant me this, that by a certaine order the matter was before the forme, and yet preceded it not in time? So is it that God was before the world, by a certaine order of eternity. What they farther inferre [That the instant is the end of time past, and the beginning of time to come:] We answere them, that as the point is to things cōtinued, so is the instant to things succeeding. Now the point is sometime the extreme of one part of a line, & the beginning * 1.25 of another part: & sometimes also it is the beginning of the whole line, and not the end of any part precedent. So the instant & moment wherein the world had being, was the begin∣ning of the time to ensue, & not the end of any past. They adde another argument against this doctrine, [That (say they) which passeth on hath something both before, & after it] But Ile proceede farther, and grant them more, to wit, that all that which passeth on returneth to the same point, from whence it began to passe. For the water returneth to the sea from whence it had an originall. The bodie returneth to the earth from whence it was bor∣rowed. The soule, and other intellectuall things created of God (I except that which the Scirpture teacheth vs of the reprobate) returne to himselfe, of whome they were en∣gendred. * 1.26 And all essences produced from the diuine thought, make a full circle beginning in God, & finishing in God himselfe. So must time returne into the same eternitie, wherout it proceeded, and which shall remaine (this same ceasing) in such sort as it consisted before it. And therefore wee answere those who demaund how the creatour coulde precede the fabrication of the world, that hee proceeded it by an eternal enduring. Wherefore they conclude iust nothing against the Creation of that which then was, and is after the genera∣tion of things. Others which reason vpon the point, which we haue deliuered concerning the opinion of Auerrois, that the world is not corruptible, and therefore not engendred, ar∣gue thus. [That which is dissolued into another thing, is diuided: but cōsidering that beside the world, there is nothing, into which it can be dissolued, it must therefore endure euer la∣stingly.] To which we may answere them, that the world is dissolued according to his parts * 1.27 to the end that it may remaine in a better estate. But now wee dispute not of the disso∣lution, but onely of the originall thereof. And it may seeme nothing contrarie to Chri∣stian religion, that the worke of God may alwaies haue a beeing: but farre otherwise then as wee see it, and which shall bee then, when wee, most blessed, shall inhabite the new heauens and new earth, in life euerlasting. And herein doe wee concurre with sundrie great Philosophers, who esteeme, that it is ill done to suppose, that those thinges which immediately proceede from the blessed God, can perish. And therefore wee affirme that the soule is immortall, because it was produced, and inspired by God: and that the bodie it selfe shall obtaine eternitie, when afterwardes in the resurrection it shall bee reuested with the nature of the soule: which subiect wee haue amply discoursed vpon in the second part of our Academie. But it is ill concluded, to take away all beginning from thinges, by reason of the perpetuall enduring of the same. For (as we haue declared) it were to argue by naturall generations, of the diuine master peece of worke, which surpasseth all sensible con∣sideration. * 1.28 And sith wee are in this talke of the enduring of the world, wee may further note, that those, who haue thereupon imagined to take away the originall thereof, haue taught, that the spirits moouing the spheres, should obtaine felicitie in the eternal recourse of the heauens: which point Aristotle enforceth himselfe to demonstrate, in his most lofty part of Philosophie, where repeating diuers considerations more loftie then in any other place, he sharply contendeth for this eternity of the world. And Iohn Lescot seemeth to grant him more then he requireth, when hee saith, that the spirits are blessed, not onely moouing the spheres, but for so much as by such reuolution, seruing God, they communicate per∣fection to things here heneath. To which, agreeth that which Plotin, entreating of heauen, and of the soule of the world, saith, [It is an absurd thing, & discordant, to suppose that that soule, which did for a time cōtaine the heauen, shold not alwaies do the same, as if by violēce it had cōtained it.] And therupon he cōcludeth that the world shold endure for euer, because the principal part of the soule therof, cānot be dissolued, not the nature therof empaire. Aristo¦tle also amongst his other cōsideratiōs inserteth this,] That the prince of this worldly palace being eternal, not receiuing any vicissitude, or chāging it is most likely that his palace shold also be eternal, & that his ministers, or celestial spirits, beeing altogether addicted to perpe∣tual motiō, should neuer take rest. But that we may vnty this knot, we wil say that it is an er∣ror of comparison, to argue of that which hath his beginning immediately from God, in

respect of the creator, and of that, which is below, in regard of things aboue, and of the im∣mediate ende of euery thing in comparison of his last ende. For the immediate end of vn∣reasonable creatures, is to liue, and feede themselues; but their finall ende is to serue mans * 1.29 vse: which according to the minde of sundry wise men, is the ende of all things here below. And the immediate ende of man is to gouerne his house, and familie, or the common wealth to contemplate, trafficke, and such like businesses: but his latest ende is to attaine to God, or to felicitie, be it, as one would say, through a Stoicall vertue, or by a Peripateticke contem∣plation, or by Academicke purifying, or (which is most certaine true) through faith, and grace according as our religion doth import. And also wee affirme that the immediate end of the spirits separated from God, and of the corruptible matter, is to gouerne the heauens, and man, and such other things, as haue bin committed to their charge. But their last ende is their onely contemplation of that first essence, from which they deriue their felicitie (as Aristotle himselfe testifieth in his Ethickes.) Suppose then that they cease to mooue, & from their immediate end, yet shall they neuer cease to be blessed: no more then man shall be lesse happie, when he shall cease to gouerne the common wealth, or to performe his other tem∣porall businesses. And certainely it is maruellous that any can thinke, that the Angels, and celestiall spirits should obtaine their happines, by moouing the heauens continually about, seeing that all moouings (as the Philosophers teach) do tend to a resting. But none can say that the spirits shall not cease: because they still labour; but when they haue accomplished, and performed their worke, and deliuered such a fauour to terrestriall things, as they were charged with. And for the soule, whereof Plotin makes mention, one may likewise affirme that it shall not cease to giue life to the Vniuers, when it shall cease to mooue. For (as wee haue alreadie heard) we maintaine not the annihilating of the elements, of the world, or the parts thereof; but rather the resting after the motion: in such sort as all nature must bee, in the end, after sundrie reuolutions reduced to the rest of the Sabboth, vnknowne to many learned men. Let all those then, who trouble thē selues without meane, or measure to search out the end of the worldly frame, or contend about the originall thereof, here fixe their foote, least running without ceasing in their fantasies after this perpetuall moouing, they neuer rest, and least by no light, they can beholde their repose, being alwaies troubled with a continuall course. Now then ASER, I leaue to you to prosecute the confutation of diuers o∣ther arguments, vpon this matter of the Creation.

Of many other deuises, which they inuent, who pretend to ouerthrow the doctrine of * 1.30 the Creation of the world performed by the Creator thereof. Chap. 5.

ASER.

BEsides that, which we haue hitherto heard, concerning the reasons and argu∣ments, whereupon many depend, who deny that the world had a beginning, * 1.31 I finde that such are willingly induced to thinke, that by reason of this newe creation, or generation of the Vniuers, there might seeme to arise some new deuise in the Creator, be∣cause of the newnesse of the worke, and by consequence an alteration of his minde or wil: which cannot happen to the most perfect, and immutable, neither within himselfe (for no∣thing can mooue it selfe) nor outwardly without himselfe (for then that should consist and encrease which was without him by the empairing and wearing away of the most infinite.) These are the termes, which Aristotle, Auerrois, Moses of Egypt, and their disciples vse, al∣ledging many other considerations, which Cicero in the person of the Epicure, enueighing against Plato, in his fluent and eloquent speech hath collected in the discourse of an orati∣on. [With what eies (saith he) could your Plato behold the Art, and composion of so great * 1.32 a worke, by the which he saith the world was builded, and composed by God? What in∣uentions of buildings? What iron Workes? what lifting leauers? what engins? what mi∣nisters had he in so great a businesse? How is it that the arie, fire, earth, and water could obey to the workemaster? whence issued the fiue formes, whereof all the rest are formed, falling out fitly to compose the soule, and produce the sense?] And a little after he procee∣deth: [I would faine aske these fellowes, why vpon a sodaine these builders of the world started vp, who had beene a sleepe by the space of innumerable ages? For although there was then no world, yet were there certaine ages, although they were not such as are made

of a number of daies, and nights by course of yeares (for I confesse that those could not come to passe without the turning of the world: but there was of infinite time a kinde of eternity, whith no terme, nor circuit of time did measure. Neuerthelesse none can diuine of what space it hath beene, because it falleth not into humane sense, that there could be any time then, when time was not. Then in such an vnlimited space, why should the pro∣uidence be idle? why should he flie labour? and what cause was there, why God like the Shiriffe of a citie should desire to adorne the world with signes, and lights? If it were to them that God might the better dwell at his ease, he had then an infinite time before dwelt in darknes as if in an hole, or by-corner. But if we think that he hath thus beautified heauen, and earth, because he delighted in the diuersitie thereof; what may this pleasure of God be, whereof he was so long time before depriued? May it be for loue towards man, as you might inferre, that God made all these things? But hath this loue been for wisemen, or for fooles? if for wise, then to small purpose (God wot) hath this so exceeding great compiling of things beene made. If for the foolish, first there was no occasion why God should seeke to deserue any thing of the euill; then what hath he gotten when euery one being a flat foole is most miserable, in that he is not wise? For what can we name that is worse then folly?] hitherto Cicero. Alicinois speaking like him doth farther adde: That sith there is nothing beside the world which may do it violence, it can suffer neither malady, nor consumption, nor any dis∣solution at all. For asmuch then as it must perpetually endure, it followeth also that it hath beene without beginning. Auicen according with him, saith [He which negotiateth by the power of another, may instantly produce that, which before he could not: for he must attēd the pleasure of such as work with him: but the first that worketh by his proper power, needs not attend, but worke continually.] Behold then, how the seruāts of the world contend for the dignity of their prince, endeuouring to make him eternall, as if voluntarily subiecting themselues to a continuall reuolution, they would defeat themselues for euer retaining to any rest, wherein consisteth true felicity. But we must fight for the soueraigne Creatour, which is our peace, and true Sabboth: defending like good and valiant warriors his eternal rest whereto all reuolution of the world doth refer it selfe; and presently it will appeare (he himselfe aiding vs) how weake those engins are which our aduersaries haue planted against his worke, and against the wall of truth.

First we will consent to Aristotle, and to the defenders of his doctrine, that there came * 1.33 to God, by the framing of the vniuers, a new imagination; but full of reason, and without any alteration in his nature, or will, and moreouer the same new minde was properly reall, and all one with his eternall will, towards the generation of the world, to performance whereof, he also proceeded according to his good pleasure. But I wonder at so many instan∣ces, as they intend to found vpon this new thought, seeing we behold, how assidually many new things are produced, whereof returneth a new thought either towards God, framing, or gouerning, or at least (as they say) so, as may be towards their wished and desired end. I de∣mand then why should they the new thought of creating the world, make more against the maiesty of God, & not the inuentiō of the new parts therof, euery moment arising? Argazel Sarasyn holds it not vnmeet, that the most perfect agent, hauing all conditions therto con∣cording, deferred neuerthelesse to produce his work in effect, solong as he pleased, and that then he performed it, without any motion in him of him in nouelty. And there is no Phi∣losopher which proueth the contrary, by any demōstration, concerning this newnes, which they presuppose in God, but do ful oftentimes contradict themselues. And so is it that Ari∣stotle in his book of the world, after hauing in the beginning declared God, Prince, gouernor & creator of this Vniuers, doth afterwards deny it, proceeding by reasons deriued frō sense. For therby be endeuoreth, to demonstrate the eternity of the world, & amongst other ar∣guments he vseth this same. [It is most certen, that the agent either of deliberate porpose, or by nature, if he be good, putteth the good in practise, as much as in him possible lieth, if there be nothing to hinder him.] Certenly we confesse that the good is naturally addicted to com∣munity. But we hold that although the agent, by his labor & industry, endeuoreth with all his power to get the good, & obtaine it, yet neuertheles in the distributiō therof, he bestow∣eth it in such maner & sort, as he pleaseth. Why should we not thē affirme, that the supreme Creatour, through his immutable and omnipotent will, hauing from euerlasting the good for his obiect, to the end to put it in practise, doth according to his good pleasure pro∣ceede to the performance thereof? But if any passing farther, will argue that the good doth naturally become common: hereto, mounting much higher then Philosophy doth require.

we answer; That for euer God, who is the soueraigne good, doth encrease himselelfe in his son, and spirit coeternall, by which son, and through which holy spirit, one sole essence, and substance, he produced of eternity, and continually the exemplaries, and Ideas of all things by an eternall measure alwaies present, being the worke and possession altogether. Wee told thee then, O Epicure, that God remained not in sloth, and idlenes before the creation of the * 1.34 world, he that by the testimony of Iesus Christ, doth alwaies worke, wherof none knoweth but the Creator, saue onely the sonne, and he to whom the sonne shall haue reuealed him. And he which is most blessed in himselfe slept not, O Cicero, no more then hauing no need of any thing beside himselfe, he framed not this worldly tabernacle for his owne vse, with so great beautifulnes; but rather for man: not foolish, or wicked, but iust, and wise, or at least, * 1.35 that in this terrestriall habitation he might learne wisedome, and goodnes, to bee made at length a worthy citizen of the celestiall palace. This is the delight, and pleasure which his sapience receiued in the compasse of the earth, and in the sonnes of men (as the wiseman saith.) But neither Aristotle nor Auerrois, nor Cicero, nor the Epicures, and Atheists of o••r our time, haue attained to such supreme Philosophy, as to vnderstand this language of the holy Ghost. Excellent well did that thrise worthy Mercury, the prince, and most auncient of all Philosophers acknowledge, as the whole worke of his Pymander doth testifie, & himselfe also when he saith, that God, whom some call Nature, mixing himselfe with man, performed a wonder, surpassing the reason of all wonder: wherein beholding his owne image, he smiled vpon him through great loue, and gratifying him as his owne sonne, gaue him all his worke to serue him: to the end to reduce to himselfe all things by him, with whom he was mixed, but himselfe before any thing else, because that being purified, and acknowledging his di∣uine race, he might be made most worthy of God. The eternall omnipotent then had no need of tooles to frame the world with: he, I say, that by his onely commandement perfor∣meth al things. Neither had he need of helpe to produce formes, who is himselfe the Archi∣type, and giuer of all formes, and replenished with all fecundity. Neither is it a strange thing, that the elements should obey him, which by his word onely haue beene setled in their pla∣ces. Neither dwelthe in an hole, or a corner, nor in darkenes, whom heauen, and earth can∣not containe nor comprehend, and who is all light; but within the ample temple of this im∣mense, and intellectuall sphere, whose center is all that which euery where subsisteth. There he inhabiteth those euerlasting ages, which no thought, except himselfe, can comprise. It is no maruel therefore, if humane reason be so often deceiued in the search of that which is in∣closed in the closets, and cabinets of the soueraigne worke master, and reuealed but to very few. And for the saying of Alcionis; that there is nothing beside the world; whereinto the world can be dissolued: I answer him, that we teach not that it must be consūed, & brought to nothing, though it hath had a beginning of enduring. But say it is so? God shall haue no need of any thing, for this businesse, no more then he had neede of a subiect, to make and compose his worke of: by reason that his creation, or dissolution is free, and deliuered from the lawes of naturall generation, and corruption, as we haue heretofore already declared. Neither had he need of helpe, O Auicen, who through his proper power, and according to his owne good pleasure, performeth of his owne liberality all things not by nature, and ne∣cessity, as those imagine, to whom the eternall power of God, and his loue, for which he cre∣ated the world, are hidden, as in the processe of our discourse, we may more amply declare. But first let vs heare of AMANA, concerning those things, which haue caused the Philoso∣phers to erre from the truth.

Concerning those causes which haue made the Philosophers to erre from the knowledge of truth, and of their ignorance con∣cerning God and his workes. Chap. 6.

AMANA.

VVE may by our precedent discourse easily vnderstand what the strongest engins, which the Philosophers haue planted (but in vaine) against the wals of supernall verity, in this point concerning the creation, and we neede not thinke it strange that they be deceiued; for it is a doctrine, not vsurped by humane arrogancy, but infused into the hearts of the small ones & humble, through illumination by the holy spirit, which mocketh such as thinke thēselues wise, & scorne all others; leading them in the dark∣nesse

of their blinded presumption: •••• contrariwise the same spirit directeth, & conducteth those, whom he replenisheth with his owne vertue, to contemplate in most cleere brightnes the excellent mysteries of God, and nature. But to the end that we may partly proceed to the discouery of their ignorance, who do arrogantly assume vnto themselues the name of wisdome, abusing euen to this day many vnskilfull in the knowledge of piety, by their graue and ornate writings, being in shew and apparance like somewhat that sauoureth, as it were solide and entire, true and profitable: though being profoundly exemined, one may finde therin all cleane contrary, and a maruellous repugnancy not only generally between them all, but euen in the particular writings of each of them. I would willingly aske to be resol∣ued of them in this point, how is it that they know the most blessed God (for now I speake to such as are not very far off from religion and godlines, for as for Atheists, and such as be∣leeue not God, we will deale with them apart in the sequele of our discourse,) I doubt not but they will answer me, that they haue knowledge of God, by the motions and other sen∣sible things, which lead them by the hand to all such things as may be knowne by vs. For * 1.36 these be their common sayings. [All our knowledge proceedeth of sense. And the experi∣ence of true discoursing is, that it agree with that which is perceiued by sense: that beeing best knowne, which best agreeth with sense.] But I would entreat them to tell me if sensible things haue an agreemēt of one & the selfe same name; or of a name common to many, with the souernign God: It is most certen that they are not of one signification, or name (to the end that we may follow their own institutions, by which they teach that God, and things crea∣ted, do not agree in a selfe same proportion of substance, or essence.) And if one nominate all kinds, he shall name them (saith Aristotle) by many sundry names. But if God & his works are diuers in reason; then is it no maruell if the Philosophers proceeding by things here be∣low deceiue themselues in the knowledge of God. For how can they imagine of his high Maiesty by the motions, & these things sēsible, seeing the Eternall is altogether exempt frō sense and motion? Doth not Aristotle affirme, and after him Auerrois the Arabian, that God is altogether different from the manner of creatures? That is the first mouer, not being mo∣ued? Is it not to depriue themselues of the true knowledge of God by sensible things, whē they seperate him frō the maner of creatures? Let vs not think it strange then, if those, who admit nothing, but that which they can inuent and comprise by naturall reasons and syllo∣gismes deriued from sensible things, enforce themselues to take from the Omnipotent ma∣ny things, which are to them hidden, and vnknowne, beeing onely receiued by an holy intellect, and by a pure and celestial thought diuinely infused: as are these verities following. [That God hath created the world: that of a free, and liberall will, hee framed and ordained it, when & according as it pleased him: that it belongeth to man, the master peece of worke of his power, to consider what this great God produced according to nature, and what according to his bounty innate: How he dealt in his workes; briefly all the secrets of so wondrous a workeman.] But to returne to our purpose, I wonder how these Philoso∣phers will on one side distinguish God altogether from the creatures, and on another side will measure his almightines and power by that which they consider of things here below. I would entreat them to heare (and yet they haue no occasion heerein to doe it, for they * 1.37 know it well enough already, I speake therefore to his schollers) that which Saint Dennis first instructed in their doctrine, and afterward lightened with the beames of the holy Ghost hath said of the Eternall. God (saith he) is euery thing in excellency. For euery good thing * 1.38 which wee behold in these domesticall things, we must dedicate and appropriate the same to GOD in the most excellent sort that we can. For euery thing which appeareth faire in the worke, should flourish much fairer in the worker. And that which is in it selfe worthy of the simplest, and meanest commendation, is in him found to be the best, and most excellent of all, for good in a better is euer most good. Good is wisedome in a ci∣tizen, better in a President, and most good in a king. Good is fortitude in a souldier, bet∣ter in a captaine, but most good in a Prince. The like is to bee thought concerning cle∣mency, liberalitie, and other vertues, and ornaments. Sith then fecunditie, puissance, vi∣gor, piety, beautie, magnificence, and such other properties doe shine in things here below; much more must they in the diuine thought shoote out their beames in soueraigne bright∣nes. For in the creatures all these vertues, like borrowed colours, doe point out the soule of the world, but in the celestiall prince, they flame out in raies of his infinite essēce, which vniteth all things, being appropriated & dedicated vnto it. See then how we must speak, & beleeue concerning the Soueraigne, and how to measure his workes by his omnipotency,

and power. But forasmuch as the Philosophers doe confesse that God is the first, and best of all things; and all other things are vnder him, and subiected him, and that they praise, and commend in them, fertility, liberality, generation, and such other vertues, & faculties, which from time to time do here make manifest their effects: wherfore should they not acknow∣ledge them in the soueraigne good God, who saith in Esay, [If I giue fruitfulnes to others, shall I be barren] They may told me that they separate from God, not onely all that which feeleth his owne imperfection, but all that also, which wanteth of perfection: & therof it ari¦seth that they take from him all fertility, concerning things that are without him, least any new thing, alteration might be attributed to the euerlasting, and immutable: and likewise * 1.39 the liberty of contingence, least a•• if imperfect, he might seeme to negotiate vnder hope of reward: and yet they deny him not the liberty, by which he worketh as is conuenient for him. Certainly these besubtile, and sharpe allegations, and yet of small force. For let measts them, if all schooles teach not, that th••••hings of this world enforce themselues to their po∣wer, to represent the image of God? The Platonists in euery discourse, doe acknowledge it as well as the Theologians. Yea the Peripatetickes themselues agree in this point, as their master teacheth in the second treatise of the soule, in such words. [It is the most natural deed of all liuing things, so far forth as they be perfect, not impotent, to make another thing like to it selfe: as the beast a beast, the plant a plant, because they participate of the diuine, and e∣ternall essence, so much as they can. For all essences desire it, and all things which follow their course according to nature, worke for the loue of it: but they cannot immitate it con∣tinually and with perpetuall proportion, because no corruptible thing attaineth to bee one and the same in number.] These bee very obscure sayings, but yet by them wee may learne that all creatures tend according to their faculty, to agree with the semblance of God; and by how much more each member of this worldly body is more perfect, by so much more doth it enforce it selfe, as if in emulation, to imitate the creator of it. It is true that Auerrois doth interpret this text of Aristotle, concerning heauen. But how should the heauen be this Eternall, whom all things should enforce themselues to follow, considering that it of it selfe is eternall, in fauor of whom, the elements, heauen it selfe, & euery creature doth work? Doth not the doctrine of Aristotle resound in each point, that God is the end of all things, in desire of whō they are moued as to the thing loued & desired. But leauing this Arabian Auerrois, who studieth all his works to deface, & marre many other sentences of his master, that he may defend that which he imagineth; let vs conclude, that according as the Philo∣sophers confesse, the elements in their being, the plants in their life, & fruitfulnes, the liuing creatures in a better life, and in their condition such as it is, imitate in emulation the diuine power & perfection, and that men endued with the singular gift of libertie, & free will doth in the same imitate God, and beareth in a better estate and condition, then any other thing, his image, and semblance. By such consideration (say I) is also prooued the freedome and li∣berty of God, alwaies tending to good, according to his good pleasure, because hee contay∣neth within himselfe that which he conferreth vpon others. And briefly to answer all their reasōs heretofore alleadged, let vs hold, that the soueraign perfection, which is in God, wan∣teth not in the lowest degree, nor for the cause thereof, nor yet that his simple vnity is distri∣buted into a multitude, because that in itselfe, by infinite power, it containeth all things. Nei∣ther doth the intellectuall soule degenerate, although (as they teach) it exerciseth the power to feele, to strengthen, to cause encreasing, and to mooue according to his estate. For (that * 1.40 we may mount to higher considerations) God perceiueth with such his senses, as the holy Scriptures attribute vnto him: He moueth all other things, himselfe remaining stable, he gi∣ueth them strength, and feedeth them with the foode of his wisedome. But he performeth all these things by a meanes, by a perfection and power; which is vnknowne to humane spirits, except they be illustrated with his light. And there is in him a fertility without trauel, which is the fountaine of all other things, through which hee produceth alwaies within himselfe, but outwardly he doth it at the pleasure of his will. Which because it is the rule of contingence, it is not possible nor fit for vs to search out the cause of the first beginning. For when wee are thereto arriued, Aristotle himselfe doth charge to stay: for God hath no need of any precedent disposition, nor of helpe; neither did feare resistance, nor was hindered by space, bee, who in commaunding created all things. But the causes of things here be∣low, the instruments and subiect framed by his word, require a precedent disposition, haue need of an application, attaine succession of time, and seeke such helps, as are requisite for such a one, as negotiateth by power limited. And therfore (as we haue already said) when

they deduce their reasons from these conditional & naturall workers, to him, which is free & deliuered from all these things, they fall into diuers errors. But if by the works, which they contemplate in this Vniuers, they do enforce themselues to attaine to the knowledge of the Soueraigne Architect, then let them attribute vnto him all these things after a conuenient and perfect manner: separating from him all that denoteth feeblenes, and impotency in the worker. And then they shall see that the supreme things of the Architype, accord by a sweet and melodious consonancy to those which are more base and meane; all which are compri∣sed in the creator, as in a modell and patterne, and contemplated by vs here below, as in a shadow or trace. But this shadow and much more the trace, doth want much of him, whom they represent. And yet by them, as by a token, or priuie note, wee attaine to some obscure knowledge of the creator: although his works doe agree with him neitherin different pro∣portion or signification, nor yet in all and through all in the same reason, but onely by a certaine resemblance they represent vnto vs the perfect fashion of supernall things, by their most grosse and base nature euerie one in their degree. But this insufficient concerning this subiect: now speake we of the authority of such witnesses, as make the creation of the world vndoubtable, which we refer to you ARAM, to declare vnto vs.

Of the authority of such witnesses, as make the creation and newnes of the world vndoubted. Chap. 7.

ARAM.

AS we haue seene, how weak and feeble, the arguments of Philosophers, against the creation and newnesse of the world are: so is it expedient also, that beeing ready for the combat, we march in battle against them, armed with true and strong reasons: and vnder the authority of very good, and approued witnesses, to the end to make vndoub∣ted to all, that, which we haue already declared concerning the creation of the Vniuers. And first wee will recite those, who being worthy of credite, haue taught it vs. Wee haue already * 1.41 seene how that the opinion of Plato (concerning this generatiō of the world (accordeth with the doctrine of Moses. Mercurius Trismegistus in his Pimandre deliuereth in few words the same sacred mysteries, rendring the composition of this Vniuers, and of the gouernours thereof, and of all things created, to be vndoubtable. And by the baser elements he aduer∣tiseth vs of the pure workemanshippe of nature, vnited neuerthelesse with the thought of the Creator. Which elements he affirmeth to be for this purpose, established by the will of God onely, and yet in farre worse condition, then before they were in the worker. Empe∣docles of Agrigentum, and Heraclitus of Ephesius affirme not once, but oftentimes the world to bee engendred, and corruptible. Democritus teacheth, that it hath had a beginning, that it one day must perish, and neuer againe bee renued. Hesiod and Orpheus the Poets sing that it hath been created. Thales one of the seuen Sages affirmeth, that this round frame is * 1.42 the worke of God. Pythagoras and Hieraclus his expounder, confesse God creatour, and father of all things. To which accord Auicen Arabian, Algazel Sarrasin, Philo no lesse ex∣cellent in doctrine, then in Greeke eloquence, & Alcinois the Platonist, who saith, (It is necessary for the vniuersall world to be the perfectly beautious worke of God) And many such other authors the most commended for learning, whom it would be too long & tedi∣ous to rehearse, affirme the same. But leauing the testimonies of strangers, let vs come to such as haue receiued frō diuine oracles, by supernaturall illumination, that which they haue * 1.43 taught vnto vs. We haue heard that which Moses teacheth vs concerning the generation of the world, now let vs consider how his doctrine, or rather the doctrine of the holy Ghost speaking by the mouth of so excellent a prophet, is confirmed vnto vs by miracles, prodi∣ges, oracles, & prophecies: and lastly by the consent of euery part of his writings; as also by the graue authority of those who in their interpretations of them doe confirme & approoue them. Concerning his miracles they are all most manifest to such as haue read his bookes. The rod is turned into a serpent, & againe returned into the former shape: It deuoureth the magicians rods, shewing that the sorceries of vncleane spirits, and all their puissance & force * 1.44 is consumed by the power of God, which wrought & dealt in Aaron & in Moses. He bringes forth infinite little beasts and of sundry sorts, which pricke both man and beast: he draweth water out of the stone, giueth quailes frō heauen, bringeth thunder, a cloud by day, and a pil∣ler of fire by night, and also the darke night, & doth all this by the word of the liuing Lord

who are while terrifieth, and another while comforteth his people. Hee sendeth slaughter among the Egyptiane, sudden losse and ruine to the wicked, fire among the proud, and le∣prosie to her that murmured; and preserueth for a long time a great number from sicknesse, and their garments from waxing old, and wearing. Moreouer he feedeth them with heauen∣ly foode, and giueth them victory ouer all their enemies. Such things and many such like things doth the soueraigne architect of this Vniuers performe by his prophet, to the end to approoue his doctrine, and to teach vs his truth thereby. To this end also by the word of Moses he appeaseth monsters, causeth the thunder to cease, healeth such as were empoiso∣ned: to * 1.45 the and that so much the more through such prodigies, his law, the wisedome of life and doctrine, by which he instructed his people, might be celebrated, And concerning O∣racles, they haue not bin deliuered vnto vs from a Delphicke Apollo, from a Iupiter, from a Pallas, or any fained sapience, or else from some new found godhead: but they bin giuen vs * 1.46 from the mouth of the liuingg Lord, whose voice the innumerable multitudes of Israell did sometimes heare. But if some (as there are many amongst vs) will not beleeue Moses alone, relating all these things nor his people which haue written of them as he himselfe did, yet let them at least giue credit to the many graue and sage Authors, who affirme thē for a very truth as to Berosus the Chaldee, to Ma••ethō the Egyptiā, Hierom the Phenician, king Darius, Mendesian Ptolomy, Me••ander of Ephesus, Nicolas Damascenus, Abiden the Historiographer, Estieus, Theodore, Cherilus and Ezekiell the Poets, Demetrius the Historian, Hecatè of Abdera * 1.47 the Philosopher, and aboue forty other learned, recorded for testimony by Iosephus Aristobu∣lus, Tertullian and Eusebius, who all agree in recitation of the foresaid wonders. Let vs pro∣ceed and come to the prophecies. Of them Ptolomy in his booke of fruits saith, (Those onely who are inspired by God prophecie of particular things.) If then Moses in his doctrine, and all the other Prophets which haue followed him, haue prophecied of so many particular actions to the king of Egypt, to the Tribes, to many princes & kings, as well concerning themselues as also concerning their cities, and people, who will doubt that they haue beene instructed by the spirit of God? Who can accuse them of falshood? who will make doubt of their do∣ctrine? If one read the text of Moses, all points therin are so replenished with prophecies, and future euents, that there is nothing left out there concerning that which belongeth to the mysteries of diuine and Philosophicall matters, nor of the Messias then to come, nor yet of all whatsoeuer should afterward come to passe, as is euident to those who haue the eyes of their minds illuminated, and who vnderstand the bookes of the law, to see cleane through a great many vailes, vnder which (as was most meet) the prophet did hide so many profoūd mysteries. What man then of sound iudgment that making small or no account of such and so great sacraments, will rather then to beleeue in them, haue recourse to the monuments of certain Philosophers, not approoued by so many witnesses, and whose writings sauorno whit of diuine matters? Wee may very well receiue their instructions so farre as they differ not from the doctrine of holy writ: but we must altogether reiect that which relying vpon their owne authority, or their owne inuention supported by their reasons, and indeed not in ma∣ny places ought woorth, (which) they induce besides that which is contayned in the wri∣tings af Moses and the Prophets. For if we will shew reuerence to authors, to which I pray * 1.48 you, should we shew more, either to Aristotle, Auerrois, Epicures, and such like, who only doe shine with a small light of humane doctrine, or else to Moses, to the Prophets, to Salomon the wisest of all his time, to the Euangelists, and to the Apostles, euery of which in sapience, in wisedome, in manners, in prophecies, in oracles, and in all kinde of holines do shine, and flame like burning torches? Who affirme in an vnused stile that which they speake concer∣ning diuine things, proouing them with perill of their liues, and confirming them by prodi∣gies: & speaking of things naturall, humane, & base, aboue all common capacity of men, and penetrating into most deep secrets by illumination of the holy spirit, doe with most bright cleerenesse manifest them to all those which haue eyes to see, and eares to heare. And therefore Eusebius hath excellently written to this purpose, speaking thus, (you shall finde out the errours of the Ethnicke Philosophers, not by mee, but by the contradi∣ction, and maruellous repugnancy among themselues: and when I compare them a∣mong themselues, or with other common men, certainely I cannot deny but they * 1.49 haue beene worthy personages, but when I conferre them with the Phylosophers and Theologians of the Hebrewes, and compare their doctrine, with the doctrine of those, friuolous and vaine do all their inuentions seeme to mee.) Moreouer, know wee not that by the one all things haue beene deliuered humanely, and by the others diuinely.

And that those who would taste of the first draughts of wisedome, haue beene constrained to learne of the Hewbrewes? And therfore Porphirius in his booke of Abstinence, adorneth with sundry praises the religious, or prophets among that people, calling them Philoso∣phers, and assigning them the chiefest degree aboue all other Prophets and Magi, who haue made profession of holinesse. And Orpheus in his booke which he hath written of the holy word, after hee chased away all contemners of the diuine ordinances and mysteries, confesseth that he learned out of the tables of Moses, that which he song of God, knowne onely but to his Prophet. But aboue all the foresaid testimonies, worthy to bee beleeued, to them (that which surpasseth all admitation) the doctrine of the celestiall & diuine mes∣senger * 1.50 Iesus Christ, the true Messias, annointed with diuine graces, aboue any other prophet doth accord. Who allowing and approouing the doctrine of Moses, openeth and reuealeth many secrets, which he receiued of God his father, and announceth the perfection of true religion: wherewhith his apostles haue so filled the whole world, that euen to this day, all the wise men in euery part of the world do embrace and reuerence so excellent doctrine, as that, wherein it shineth so much diuinity and celestiall brightnesse, that without compari∣son it surpasseth all humane doctrine. Let vs receiue it then, euen all of vs that desire wise∣dome, because that neuer any more excellent did euer yet appeare to mortall men, neither shall euer appeare hereafter. And let vs not make a stay in that that Socrates knoweth some∣thing, or that Anaxagoras seeth the light in darkenesse, or that Democritus draweth vertue out of pits, or that Empedocles enlargeth the path of his spirit, or that Archesilus, and Caruea∣des attaine to some new kind of knowledge, or that Aristotle proueth that which flieth from sence. But let vs giue full faith to the authoritie of so many irreprochable witnesses, who make the generation of the world vndoubtable to vs, & let vs proceed to the reasons which further confirme it vnto vs, and which, ACHITOB, we desire to heare of you.

Of the reasons making for the Creation and newnesse of the world. Chapter 8.

ACHITOB.

AMongst those other arguments, which wee haue heard some Philosophers obiect against the creation of the world, one hath beene the disconuenien∣cie of the newnesse thereof with eternall God, not beeing able to perceiue how and which way it might come to passe: for by reason of the consideration of such a like question, to wit [which of the egge without the birde was first engendred; seeing that the egge without the birde, nor the bird without the egge could not subsist:] they haue imagined that this world was eternall, and that the beginning of euery thing engendred, was the end likewise therof, through a perpetual course, & proceeding. But let me aske these doctors, whence commeth this newnes which wee behold euery day in all thinges of this world? For there is nothing which suffereth not vicissitude, and changing. Auerrois saith, that this proceedeth from new reuolutions, which notwithstanding are auncient by an euerlasting succession: & that there is the stay where the oldnesse, and newnes is conserued. For which cause also some haue af∣firmed, that heauen is some part new, some part old. But for as much as these Philosophers * 1.51 do teach, that reuolutions are made by those disposing spirits, which are called the seruants of the creator, or of the first moouer, doth it not therupon follow, that there is no stay in the heauens, but that they mooue anew to accomplish that which the first moouer, doth pro∣pose in a certaine time to be performed, and who remaining stable doth giue motion to all the rest? Wherefore wee may say that the beginning of newnesse cannot bee from heauen, nor through the spirits, but by the first moouer, who at his good pleasure commandeth and all things are made, and afterwards renued by a secret order within himselfe not constray∣ned by any necessitie. For so it is that God proceedeth to his worke, and so prosecuteth it, without being otherwise bound to base things: which Aristotle himselfe accordeth to, when he declareth that he is blessed, without any good that is strange, or not of himselfe. And far∣ther I would willingly know with what kinde of measure they would meate out the Vniuers who beare such fauour to the eternitie of the world? If by time (it be measured) then is not eternall, for those reasons which we haue deliuered heretofore in the discourse concerning the time of the Creation. If by eternitie (it selfe) then let them remember that that is a pos∣session altogither separated from time, and from motion, as hath beene to vs sufficiently de∣clared. How then can this world be eternall which is equall in age to Time, and altogether

subiect to Motion? But if any one yet would hold that it is eternal, let him tel me whether it * 1.52 endureth by the selfe same eternitie which is in the blessed God, or by some other? If it be by another sort of eternitie, then should there be diuers eternities of gouernours, & of kinds, which should sauour of the nature of the infinite: and also many infinitenesses should bee contained in this world which is so small. If they will say, that the world subsisteth of the same eternitie by which God is, certainely such are not worthy of any answere, but rather to be mocked at, who thinke the spheres, & their moouers to be measured with God: for eter∣nall enduring differeth not from God. But that which is changeable according to Nature, and operation cannot be measured with the same compasse, as he who is altogether vnchan∣geable. They wil tell me that the eternity of the world differeth from that of the first agent, because the one being altogither diuine is a possession at once altogether, and the other is successiue. But I answere them that if it be successiue, it hath certaine portions; now such portions cannot be infinite, and therefore such eternity hath a beginning, & successiue en∣ding. Now if it be limited and bounded with these termes, how can it bee that it may agree with the eternall, who is not closed, or limited by any ending? Besides, by what reason may this be called eternall, to which alwaies something is added by a continuall succession? For one can adde nothing to the infinite, neither doth it encrease at all. And therefore I aske them againe that if their eternitie subsisteth, what do become of the new reuolutions? Shall we say they are conioyned with the former, or else that they begin a new infinitenesse? If they graunt the first, then will they be more in number then infinite. Auerrois saith, that this is no more disagreeable to successions, then to numbers, that infinite tens bee infinitely re∣peated, which amount to so much as innumerable hundreths, without making any more encrease in one part then in another. But good God who can heare these things with a qui¦et eare? By an impossible supposition which he deuiseth in numbers, and which neuer com∣meth to passe, he would resolue the inconueniences which depend vpon infinit reuolutions, which hee saith did precede all eternity. And for the other point, to thinke that the new re∣uolutions should begin a new infinitenes, we haue alreadie answered that saying, that many infinitenesses cannot be imagined in this world. But here leauing the successions and num∣bers, I would farther request these defenders of the eternity of this round frame to tell me, whether the moouing spirits know the reuolutions, or not? If they know them not, certain∣ly men doe them much iniury to thinke, that they are ignorant in their motions, which ma∣ny Astronomers know. If they know them all (being) infinite, how is it that by a finite vn∣derstanding, which is in all creatures, they may cōprehend things (that are) infinite? Again, * 1.53 sith that generation i•• bounded and limited by the vndiuidable, and the last generation of any creature whatsoeuer by the last creature, what generation shall wee say to be limited to the first? If they say there is no former, how is it then that there can be a latter? I wonder also at those ancient Sages of the world, and the moderne likewise which follow them, when they declare all things to be mooued, and ordained in God as in the last wished, and desired end; and yet doubt to confesse that he is the ordainer, considering also that they call him the first moouer. But if he hath ordained all things, it followeth likewise that he must know them. For concerning that which some inferre, that God hath only disposed the vppermost and highest things, and that the second causes engendred the lowest: I demaund of them, * 1.54 how it is that those here below are correspondent to those which are most high, cōsidering there are diuers ordainers? Doth not Aristotle say, [That there is but one onely prince, for feare least things should be euilly disposed & gouerned?] Again, if all things depend of a desired & finishing cause, so that in fauour thereof they become great: how is it that they haue a being of them∣selues, seeing they seeke to be perfect in another? Why haue those any need of a preseruer: which haue no need of a creator? Indeed the son is preserued without the father, but without him he is not engendred. For what occasion thē doe these Philosophers giue a keeper to the mēbers of the Vniuers, & do take cleane away frō it any parents? What lies doe they bring vnto vs that accuse others to be sellers of lies? For in one place they miscōster & deny that, which in another place the truth constraineth them to confesse. Auerrois in many places of his writings, denieth that God created the world; and yet, interpreting the treatise of hea∣uen, * 1.55 he calleth him Creator. So likewise Aristotle proceeding by sensible things mocketh at Plato, that at euery word confesseth the world to be created: and in the booke which he en∣tituleth Of the World, he auoucheth God to be Creator of the Vniuers. And in his Metaphy∣sicks he teacheth that he is Prince of the world. And how is it that the Prince is entred into an house which he neither hath builded, nor obtained by right of inheritance, nor bought

with any summe of mony? This is as he affirmeth that the supreme thought vnderstandeth not the particular matters, for feare least he should ouer labour, or, else wearie himselfe. And yet in the treatise of good, and bad fortune, hee often repeateth, that hee hath excellent good fortune that is guided by God. But how doth hee guide and direct that which hee vnderstandeth not? And how doth hee render condigne recompence, and re∣ward for thinges well or ill done (as it is saide in the same Treatise) if he doth not consider and examine the workes of euery one? Againe wee reade in the Meteors, that God hath placed the pure fire vnder the globe of the Moone: and yet how hath he disposed and ordai∣ned that, which he neither made, nor hath knowledge of? Surely it would be a tedious mat∣ter to bring out all the contrarieties & repugnances of the writings of Philosophers, which do plainly confound themselues. But one of much I haue selected this little, to the end that those who boast rather of the name of Peripateticks, or A••••rriosto, then of good Theologi∣ans, and Christians, may behold, that al their teachings are not solid, nor firme. Let vs insert among our reasons, which confound their doctrine, the iudgement of Saint Augustine, of Macrobius, and of many other learned men, who hold that the eternity of the world cannot subsist, and haue place with so small memory of things done, as we haue in our histories, as well holy as prophane, neither yet with the inuention of arts and many other thinges cele∣brated by Eusebius, Pamphilus, Clemens, Alexandrinu••, Berosus the Chaldee, Aristotle, Auerrois, Theophrastus, Epigenes, Critode••••••s, Philos••ophanes Egesius, Archimachus, Damastho••es, Aulus Gol¦lous, and a great number of others of diuers languages, and most plentifully by Pliny in his booke of the naturall history, where he confesseth to haue collected part of his writings out * 1.56 of the said authors; with whom also, in that which they testifie of the inuention of things, the holy letters are of great authoritie, in that they do agree with them herein in many points. For although there be some difference concerning the names of those which haue inuented them, as the forenamed authors do not alwaies agree among themselues; yet the inuention found in time, is wholy confirmed by the same reason, & all that which disagree∣eth, is come either by reason of the languages, not being alike, or because that Historiogra∣phers, chiefely the Greekes, haue attributed that to their nation, which properly appertai∣ned not them. Now if the world had beene from the beginning, yea euen before the begin¦ning, as many would haue it: why then in the successiue course of innumerable ages, was not that policie and kinde of liuing inuented, which we vse at this present? Why not the vse of letters, by which onely, memory is made eternall? Why not the experience of many things? For none of all this is found to be, but within and since fiue thousand fiue hundred yeeres, so long as the Scripture teacheth vs that the world hath beene created, being from the creation therof to the natiuity of Iesus Christ (according to the common computation) three thousand nine hundred sixtie seuen yeeres; what did the inhabitants of the world be∣fore his time so briefe and short being compared with eternity, and to which the histories do refer the inuentors and vse of all things? Liued men then without policy, and without lawes? without bread, without wine, without tillage of the earth? were they without the ex∣ercise of merchandise, without the studie of good letters, of discipline, of warfare, of nauiga∣tion, of building, of weauing, of sowing, of dressing wooll: all which things haue their inuen∣tion famous but within a few yeeres, and in diuers seasons? wherewith liued they before? where dwelt they? how were they clothed? what did they being altogither ignorant of arts? Certainely it is meere mockerie, that those who teach that the world is eternall, do them∣selues assigne the inuentors of lawes, of arts, and of mens liuing, considering that both the one and the other could not consist both at one instant. Behold (companions) that which seemed good to me to note concerning the reasons making for the creation, the historie whereof will put vs altogether out of doubt in that which toucheth the principall argu∣ments of the Philosophers against it, if we doe amply entreate of their errors, when they mainetaine that God worketh of necessitie, and not of free and franke will which will serue vs to morrow for a subiect to begin the daies discourse.

The end of the first daies worke.

Notes

• * 1.1

  In Tim.
• * 1.2

  Praier to God. Exod. 3.
• * 1.3

  Diuers opini∣ons of the Philosophers in this argu∣ment of the being of the world.
• * 1.4

  How the crea∣ation of the world may be beleeued.
• * 1.5

  Gen es. 1.
• * 1.6

  Du Bartas i•• the first of his weekes.
• * 1.7

  That God made all of nothing. Psalm. 33. Psalm. 134. Ierem. 31.
• * 1.8

  Hierom in prolog. Gale∣at.

  Augustine in his exposition vpon Genes.
• * 1.9

  Psal. 1 19.
• * 1.10

  Why God made the world in the time that Moses decla∣reth.
• * 1.11

  Time began with the world.
• * 1.12

  Of those which take from the world the be∣ginning of time.
• * 1.13

  Of the will of God in the worke of the Creation.
• * 1.14

  The will of God is cause of all things
• * 1.15

  Of the de∣monstration of Aristotle.
• * 1.16

  Reasons of Philosophers against the creation of the world.
• * 1.17

  Three sorts of workes and three kinds of workers.
• * 1.18

  Answere to the argu∣ments o•• Phi∣losophers.
• * 1.19

  Iohn 1.
• * 1.20

  Nullitie of the arguments Nothing of nothing can bee made.
• * 1.21

  Nullity of the argument of material gene∣rations in re∣spect of the di∣uin peece of worke.
• * 1.22

  Other vaine arguments of Philosophers.
• * 1.23

  All motion tends to a rest
• * 1.24

  Prou. 8. Eccles. 24 12.
• * 1.25

  Of the point and instant.
• * 1.26

  Al things re∣turne to God.
• * 1.27

  How the world is dis∣solued.
• * 1.28

  The opinion of diuers, that the celestiall spirits mooue the spheres.
• * 1.29

  Of the sundry¦e des of all things.
• * 1.30

  Mathi••••∣tions.
• * 1.31

  Reasons a∣gainst the do∣ctrine of the creation of the world.
• * 1.32

  Cic. 1. of the nature of the gods.
• * 1.33

  Answer to the arguments of the Philoso∣phers.
• * 1.34

  Iohn. 1.
• * 1.35

  Prouerb. 8.
• * 1.36

  That by meanes of sen¦sible things one cannot attaine to the knowledge of God.
• * 1.37

  Dennis in his Hierarchy.
• * 1.38

  The good in a better is e∣uer most ex∣cellent.
• * 1.39

  All things en∣force them∣selues to re∣present the image of God
• * 1.40

  Proper facul∣ties to be con∣sidered in God.
• * 1.41

  Many witnes∣ses of the worlds creati∣on.
• * 1.42

  Hieraclus.
• * 1.43

  A certaine ap∣probation of the doctrine of Moses.
• * 1.44

  Of miracles. Exod. 4. 7. 8. 9, 10, &c.
• * 1.45

  Prodigies.
• * 1.46

  Oracles.
• * 1.47

  Authours which con∣firme Moses writings. Prophecies.
• * 1.48

  What authors are worthy of beleefe.
• * 1.49

  Eusebius in his ecclesiasti∣cal history.
• * 1.50

  Consent of the doctrine of Iesus Christ with that of Mo∣ses.
• * 1.51

  Reasons for the newnes of the world.
• * 1.52

  That the world cannot be eternall.
• * 1.53

  Reasons taken from genera∣tions.
• * 1.54

  Another of the moderati∣on and gouern¦ment of things.
• * 1.55

  How the Phi∣losophers cont••ray them¦selues.
• * 1.56

  The eternity of the world cannot agree with histories and inuenti∣on of things.