The French academie Fully discoursed and finished in foure bookes. 1. Institution of manners and callings of all estates. 2. Concerning the soule and body of man. 3. A notable description of the whole world, &c. 4. Christian philosophie, instructing the true and onely meanes to eternall life. This fourth part neuer before published in English. All written by the first author, Peter de la Primaudaye, Esquire, Lord of Barre, Chauncellour, and Steward of the French Kings house.

The twelfth daies worke. (Book 12)

Of those who desire returne of the Soules departed, to testifie their immortalitie: what witnesse haue beene sent vs of God out of an other world to resolue vs therein. Chap. 89.

ASER. We said yesterday, that they who stay onely in their corpo∣rall senses, as bruit beasts doe, propound commonly against the im∣mortality of Soules, that which is vsually spoken of the common people, namely, that it is not knowne what becomes of mens soules after the death of the body, or to what countrey they goe, because none euer returned from thence to bring any newes. Wherefore (say they) no body can tell what is done there, neither can any thing be knowne. Now before we make answer to so friuolous and false * 1.1 an argument, I would gladly demand of them whether there were nothing at all of those new found ••lands, (which were lately found in our time) before they were discouered by them, who not onely were neuer there, but did not so much as once heare of them before. For no body went thither from hence, neither did any come hither from thence: so that there was no more intelligence betweene them and vs, then betweene the liuing and the dead, or betweene them that are altogether of another world: therefore also their coun∣trey is called the new World. Now then shall it be thought, that this people were not at all because they were not knowne of vs, nor their manners and kinde of life? And yet now the time sheweth euidently, that notwithstanding any distance of place that hath beene betweene them and vs, there we meanes sufficient to communicate and trafficke together and those more easie then any is betweene the soules already departed out of their bo∣dies, and vs, who yet remaine in the world with our bodies. For concerning the distance and difficultie of the places, who doubteth, but that it is farre greater betweene hea∣uen and earth, Paradise and Hell? Therefore also Abraham speaking of the place and estate of the elect and reprobate in an other life, saith to the rich man, There is a great * 1.2 gulph set betweene you and vs, so that they which would goe from hence to you, cannot: neither can they come from thence to vs. And this wee may say in like manner of our selues, and of those that are already departed into another life, in regard of their returne vnto the liuing. For it is ordeined, that they shall not returne againe into the world, as also that they shall depart hence but one. And they that goe from hence, doe it not with soule and body ioined to∣gether: for it is not a voiage like to those which we make in this world, when we goe from one countrey to another. Now as the Lord hath determined how long the soules shall a∣bide in their bodies in this life, so he hath ordeined and set the time in which they ought to depart, & the place where they are to be receiued, according to the estate of euery one, euen

vntill their returne into their bodies at the resurrection. If they be soules of the reprobate, they are detained in hell in eternall fire, where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth: if they be the soules of Gods elect, they shine as the Sunne in the kingdome of heauen, in a life accompanied with perpetuall ioy and happinesse. But we must vrge them better that require testimonie for the immortality of soules by their returne into this world, or of some that haue come from another world. For it is an easie matter for vs to bring them as cre∣dible witnesses as any can be, to tell them most certaine newes, if they will beleeue them, according as they deserue it. And for the first, haue we not Iesus Christ, who first came downe from heauen and became man, to bring vs newes, and to declare the same vnto vs in his owne person, not onely before his death, but also after his resurrection? Besides, how many other witnesses haue we, that haue testified most certainely of the same? who * 1.3 saw with their eies and touched with their hands, euen to the number of moe then fiue hundred, according as S. Paul testifieth? Moreouer, they that were raised as well by him a•• by Elias and Elizens, and by the Apostles and disciples, may they not serue vs also for good witnesse to assure vs, not onely that soules are immortall, but also that their bodies shall rise againe, and that God is of sufficient vertue and power to do it as he hath promised? I omit here the testimony which the Angels haue giuen both of the resurrection and ascen∣tion of Iesus Christ: besides that of the holy spirit, which is the chiefest of all, with signes and gifts wherewith hee came accompanied, and those workes and effects that followed them. Wherefore seeing we haue for this point the word of God that is most certaine and cleare, which teacheth vs what we ought to beleeue and hold, let vs rest our selues in the te∣stimony thereof and not desire to make further enquirie. For it is hee that said to Moses, I am the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Iacob. Whereupon Iesus Christ concludeth, that * 1.4 Abraham, Isaac, and Iacob doe liue yet after their death, seeing God is the God of the liuing, and not of the dead, that is to say, of them that are yet in being, and not of them that are nothing at all. For otherwise, if all men should so perish by death, that nothing of them should remaine in life, at leastwise in regard of the soule, then should he be the God of nothing. And although it seemeth that Iesus Christ alleadged this place against the Saduces, not onely to proue against them by the doctrine of Moses, the immor∣talitie of soules, but also the resurrection of bodies, wee may well gather, that if it bee fit to prooue that bodies arise, it is much more strong to assure vs of the immortality of soules. For when the Lord spake these wordes, Abraham, Isaac and Iacob were not aliue in regard of their bodies, but onely of their soules. And yet Iesus Christ alleaged it to confirme al∣so * 1.5 thereby the resurrection of the dead, although at the first sight it might seeme not to be very fit and firme to proue that so much as the immortality of soules. But if it bee nar∣rowly looked into, his argument shall be found to be very well deduced and grounded vp∣on inuincible reason. For Iesus Christ had respect to that promise which GOD made to those holy Patriarkes of whom he spake, and which was not made onely to their soule, but to the whole man together compounded of body and soule. Wherfore all they to whom it was made, and to whom it appertaineth should not haue the whole effect of it, nor the full fruition of that which it conteineth, if they were not whole inheritors thereof both in body and soule. For if it were otherwise, the promise should be accomplished but in one part of man, and not in the whole man. Whereupon it followeth, that seeing the promise is not of a temporall benefit, but of an eternall, therefore the whole man that must enioy the same, must of necessitie liue an euerlasting life, being of the same nature that the benefit is of wihch he must inherit. Wherefore seeing the course of mans life is broken off by death in re∣gard of the body, the body must necessarily rise againe to liue againe with his soule in a bet∣ter & longer life, to the end that the whole man may possesse the inheritance, which is pro∣mised him of God: or else the promise made by God to his seruants is altogether vaine, or the testimony which the holy Scripture beareth is wholly false, and so also the Scripture that propoundeth the same vnto vs. But none may once thinke either of these two last points, without great horror of blasphemy conteined in them. So that the first point con∣cludeth very strongly, according to that ground which it hath most certaine in the word of God. Whereunto may be added further, that seeing the soule of man is created, not to liue alwaies without a bodie, as the Angels doe, nor yet to wander from body to body, but to be knit and ioined to that body, which is assigned to it of God, it must needes be, that be∣ing * 1.6 part thereof, as of her lodging, she should once againe returne thither. Besides, seeing the body hath serued the soule, either in obeying God, or in disobeying his will, the nature

of Gods iustice requireth, that it should be rewarded also with the soule, according to the qualitie of those workes whereof it hath beene an instrument. Therefore according to that which we haue discoursed of this matter, the resurrection of the body doth so depend of the immortality of soules, that it followeth necessarily vpon this: so that if wee haue assu∣rance of the one, wee ought to haue it of the other, seeing both of them are certainely grounded vpon the iustice of God, which cannot be iust, vnlesse he iudge men both in body and soule according to his word, and according as euery one liueth. But seeing the matter of the immortality of soules, and that of the resurrection of bodies are sundry questi∣ons, and that we are to handle but one of them, wee must returne to our first point of the soule touching the immortality thereof, which is easily beleeued of all that approue of the doctrine of holy Scriptures and that giue credit to the word of God. For they are through∣ly resolued thereof. Yea, we may know by the writing of all antiquity, that the common opinion of all people and nations of what religion soeuer they haue beene, hath beene this, that mens soules were immortall. Wherefore in regard of this point, wee are to fight onely against Epicures and Atheists. And because they will not beleeue the word of God, but de••ide it as tales made vpon pleasure: I am of opinion that now we are to search chief∣ly for those testimonies, which God hath giuen vs in nature touching the immortality of the soule: euen the actions and effects therof, by meanes of which we come to the know∣ledge of hidden and secret causes, from whence they proceede. Therefore consider A∣MANA, what you minde to speake vnto vs of this subiect.

Of naturall reasons, whereby the immortalitie of soules, may be prooued against Epi∣cures and Atheists: and first of the argument taken from the facultie of know∣ledge which the soule hath, and from that knowledge of eternitie which is in it: how it appeareth, that it is not begotten of this corruptible na∣ture, because it ascendeth vp vnto God: and how by a speciall benefit of God, it is daily created, and not by the ver∣tue of nature. Chap. 90.

AMANA. Seeing Epicures and Atheists giue credit to naturall Philosophy in things whose causes it proueth by their effects, they haue no reason to refuse it in the conside∣ration of the nature of men•• soules. Now it is very certaine, that if we will take this course, besides the testimonies of God in his word, touching the immortality of the soule, which way soeuer wee turne our eyes, whether aboue vs or beneath vs, on the right hand, or on the left, wee shall finde euery where arguments and reasons concluding the same. For we haue nature, and the necessitie of causes, proportion and similitude, life, the excellen•• dignitie of man, the goodnesse of God, and the profit of mankinde proceeding from his bountifulnesse, which with one common consent, and as it were, all with one voice teach vs, and crie out that the soule cannot be mortall.

First then we obserue, that the true and naturall essences of all things are not knowne of vs by themselues, but continue hid in the secret closets of euery one of them, vnto * 1.7 which our minde being burthened with this masse of the body, and ouerwhelmed with the darkenesse of this life, is not able to reach. Therefore wee must enquire by the accidents adhering vnto them, and principally by their actions, whereby our reason discourseth, and concludeth of euery thing, what it is, and of what quality. For euery thing hath his acti∣ons, and workes, according to it owne substance and nature, and by them declareth and maketh it selfe knowne: so that if we consider the actions of the soule wee shall by them know the nature and immortality thereof. Let vs then consider her first and principall a∣ction, which is to know, and this importeth also to vnderstand, to comprehend, and to con∣ceiue. * 1.8 Whereupon we haue to note, that there is no power of Knowing, that can attaine to the knowledge of any thing, but it hath some agreement and proportion with the nature of the same thing: because knowledge is as it were the Image of things, which is imprinted in the soule as in a glasse. Now it is certaine, that a looking glasse cannot repre∣sent the image and similitude of a spirituall thing, because it selfe is a corporall thing, which hath no agreement in nature with that which is spirituall. Likewise it cannot represent any

thing belonging to the other senses but only that which concerneth the sight: and there∣fore it cannot represent either sounds, smels, or tastes, because the vse thereof is only for the eies neither doth it agree with any of the other senses, but onely with the sight. And as for our externall senses, they cannot perceiue those things that haue neither quantitie nor bo∣dily substance, because they themselues are corporall, neither yet can they perceiue things that are absent. And the internall senses, as the fantasie & the imagination, cannot perceiue spiritual things, as namely, either God or Angels: but only the spirit of a man doth perceiue, know and comprehend them, which power & faculty no other creature vnder heauen hath. For if it were otherwise, it could not in any wise comprehend a thing that surmounteth it with an infinit greatnes, & with which it hath no agreement at al. For further confirmation of that which I say, let vs consider of Eternity, as it is whole and entire of it selfe: then let vs * 1.9 diuide it into that which was since the creation of the world, & finally, into that which fol∣lowed the same, and which shal be for euermore. When our spirit entereth into the conside∣ration of that which was before the creation, our thought is not able to comprehend it, so that it is ouerwhelmed with the greatnesse thereof: but wee doe well vnderstand and comprehend that part of eternity, which shall follow vs hereafter throughout infinite ages. Whereby it appeareth, that this first consideration of it, is too great for our soule, as hauing no proportion therewith, nor yet agreeing thereunto: but it is otherwise with the soule in the consideration of that other eternity, for the fruition whereof it was created. For the soule is not eternall as God is, as though it had no more beginning then he had: and therefore it hath no agreement with him in this respect. The soule then entereth into a bottomlesse gulfe, when it discourseth of an eternitie, of which it is not partaker: but it hath agreement with the eternitie of GOD as Angels haue, in that it is created immor∣tall, to liue an eternall life with him: which appeareth in that it is able to comprehend the same. Therefore S. Iohn in the beginning of his Gospell leadeth vs euen to the ga••es of this first eternitie: But forasmuch as it is a gulfe in which we shall be swallowed vp, if wee enter farther into it, he proceedeth not forward, but stayeth vs there? and calleth vs pre∣sently vnto the meanes whereby God manifested himselfe, telling vs how hee did this by his eternall word: and first by the creation of the world, then by those other meanes, which he setteth downe afterward: all which our soule comprehendeth well, and so can∣not the soule of beasts doe. Wherefore when we consider God in his essence and nature before the creation of the world, and the time that was before that, we are then ouerwhel∣med therewithall, and see no whit at all into it. But if we enter into the consideration of the times after the creation of the world, and into those which shall follow still after vs vnto all eternitie, we looke into it more clearly, and are not so much dazeled therewithall, be∣cause our soule more capable of this consideration, then of the other, which was before all creatures. From hence we may conclude, that the soules of beasts and plants that haue * 1.10 not in them this cogitation or apprehension of eternitie, are produced and taken out of the power and vertue of that matter, of which they are engendred: but the spirit of man is more specially bred in the body by God, aboue all the powers of the matter and nature of the same. For nothing ariseth higher, or passeth beyond that thing of which it receiueth es∣sence and being, and those powers and strength that it hath: for if it did, then should it not receiue being from thence, but of some other thing before and aboue that, or else further off, vnto which it tendeth. We see this in all the senses both externall and internall, which are common to vs with beasts. For they know nothing else, beside that which is of this nature which we see, neither doe they ascend higher: but our spirit not content with the sight and knowledge of the heauens, starees and Angels themselues, mounteth vp to God, and being come thither can goe further. What other thing els doth this signifie, and declare vnto vs, but that the soules of beasts are engendred of this corruptible and mortall nature, beyond which they cannot lift vp themselues, but that ours are produced of God aboue the power of this nature? And so that may be said of our soule, which is spoken of a spring * 1.11 water, namely, that it ascendeth as much vpward as it descendeth downeward, but can goe no higher. For when a man would carry the water of a spring any whither and would haue it mount vpward, it wil be an easie matter to bring it as high as the spring-head, from whēce it floweth: but no higher except it be forced by some other meane then by it owne course and naturall vertue. Notwithstanding, it will easily descend lower. And so fareth it with our spirit. For as it came from God, so it is able to mount againe to the knowledge of him, and no higher: but it descendeth a great deale lower. And as for our senses they re∣maine

lower then the workes of nature, and pearce not to the depth of them, but are al∣waies busied about the externall face of them. Neither is it to be doubted, but that Moses meant to teach vs these things by that which he rehearseth of the meanes vsed by God in the creation of man, which differed from that he kept in the creation of all other creatures, either liuing or without life. For we haue heard what deliberation and counsell he vsed, be∣fore he put hand to the worke: how he fashioned the body, and how hee placed the soule * 1.12 therein by and by after. Therefore in that the Prophet describeth the creation of the body apart, and then that of the soule, he giueth vs to vnderstand, that we must seek for something more high & excellent in that of man then in that of beasts, whose soules were created with their bodies, and of the selfe same matter with them. Moreouer, he teacheth vs this very plainly when he saith, that God created man after his owne image and similitude: which he did not say of beasts, as we haue already heard. Therefore there must needes be in the soule of man some other power & vertue, then that by which it giueth life to the body, and which is common to it with those of bruit beasts. So that as God gaue to this dead body taken out of the earth, a soule that endued it with life, motion, and sense: so he imprinted & ingra∣ued his image into the soule, vnto which immortalitie is annexed. Therefore when Moses * 1.13 saith, that man was made a liuing soule, no doubt but by the name of soule hee meaneth another nature and substance then that of the body. And in that hee calleth it liuing, bee declaareth plainly, that the body hath not of it, selfe and of it owne nature, that life where∣with it is endued, but from the power of this soule. And although he there maketh not any speciall mention of the other vertues thereof, it is because he considered the capacity of the people with whom he liued, vnto whom he would frame himselfe, being content to speake opēly of that power of the soule, which appeared best without, & which the external senses might most easily know & perceiue by the effects therof. But I thinke it wil not be vnfit for this maater, if we return to that question which before we touched concerning the creation of the soule, namely, whether, since it was created by God in the first creation of man, it be still created after the same sort as it were by a new miracle, in them that are daily borne in the world, or whether it be naturally created, but yet of God by a certen order appointed for that end by him. Now albeit it be very requisite, that we should be sober and not rash in this matter, for the causes already set down notwithstanding we wil here propound the opi¦nion of some learned men, grounded vpon that order, which God hath accustomed to ob∣serue in his works & in his creatures. For seeing he hath set a law in nature for al other crea∣tures according to which he createth & produceth them, and not by any new miracle, it is * 1.14 not more likely that he createth soules naturally, and that he hath ordained a stedfast law for mankind but differing from that of beasts, so much as his creation differed from theirs. For hauing once established an order, hee vseth not to change it into a diuers or contrary order, but keepeth still the same, except it be that sometimes he vseth extraordinary means by way of a miracle. For although all his workes bee great miracles, and chiefely man: neuerthelesse we call none by that name, but onely those which he worketh by supernatu∣rall * 1.15 meanes, not against, but beside the common order of nature. But that which I say, derogateth nothing from the nature and immortalitie of mans soule. For although it bee placed in the matter which is already prepared and appropriated for the fashioning of the bodie, yet doth he this aboue the vertue of the matter and of the worke of nature, by a law which he hath established to that effect. For this cause hee doth not onely giue a soule to them that are begotten by a lawfull mariage, but to those also who are brought forth in whoredome, whether it be adultery, incest or any other such like. For although that honesty which is enioyned mankind by God, be not kept in such a birth & generation: but contra∣rieth the same, yet it is not contrarie to the law of generation ordained by God: as that ge∣neration is which is by buggery, wherein not onely the Law of honesty is violated, but also the law of nature. We wil cōclude then, that it is not only true, that our soule is not brought * 1.16 forth by the power of nature, but by the benefit of God only, but also that it is expedient & very behoofeful, yea necessary for mankind that it should be true: and because it is behoofe∣full & necessary, it is true also without all questiō. For God hath omitted nothing that is a∣greeable to his glory, & profitable and expedient for mankinde. For seeing the soule is pla∣ced within the body, not by the vertue of nature, but properly and peculiarly by a speciall benefit of God, man oweth the chiefest and best part of himselfe, not to nature, but to God. VVhich is the cause why hee should acknowledge him as the onely father of his * 1.17 spirit and consecrated the same wholly to him alone: not yeelding anie right and in∣terest

therein to any other besides him onely, who is soueraigne, almighty, and the onely father of spirits. For if the question be of the body, and of all the senses thereof, many may claime an interest therein vnder God, namely fathers and mothers, the children themselues, nature, the kindred, the countrey, friends, Kings, Princes & Lords. But the soule belongeth to none but to God alone, which he willeth & commandeth should be reserued to him on∣ly for our happinesse, because he only is the author and creator thereof. If it be so then, that our soule is not begotten or produced by his nature, which is the handmaide of God and worker vnder him, but by God alone, it followeth very well, that nothing in nature can ex∣tinguish it, but God onely who is able to doe it if he please. Now it is not likely or credible that God would make a thing by it selfe, and that after a different maner from other things, which should haue nothing besides the creation of it, and then within a while after would destroy it. For if it were otherwise, why would he obserue another meane in the creation of man, then in that of beasts? Why would he not rather haue bestowed vpon nature, the power of the generation and corruption of mans soule, as he hath done that of other liuing creatures. Wherefore would he seeme to reserue that thing as proper to himselfe, which he would make subiect to the law and common condition of other things? Thus much then for those arguments, which we may take from the knowledge that God hath giuen to mans soule, and from his constant worke in the creation of it, to proue the nature and immorta∣litie thereof. Now wee are to consider what arguments wee haue to the same purpose, in that vertue of desire, which is giuen vnto it. These things then wee may learne of thee ARAM.

Of the argument for the immortalitie of the soule, that may be taken from that naturall desire thereof, and of perpetuitie, which is in it: of another argument to the same purpose: of the desire which men haue to continue their name and memorie for euer: an argument to the same ende taken from the appre∣hension and terror which men haue both of the death of the body, and also of the soule and spirit. Chap. 91.

ARAM. These three things are so linked and knit together, namely Gods religion, his diuine prouidence, and the immortalitie of the soule, that they neither may nor ought * 1.18 to be seperated in any wise. For if our soules were not immortall, no reward or punishment for good or bad doings were to be looked for: and then God should not seeme to haue any care ouer vs, which if he haue not, why should we worship him? Our hope should be in vaine and religion vnprofitable. But if without the grace and goodnesse of God we cannot liue, and if he wil be sought vnto of vs by praier, then religion is very necessary, and the immor∣tality of the soule certaine. And euen as a man cannot renounce those excellent gifts, which naturally are planted in his spirit and minde and in that reason which God hath bestowed vpon him, but hee must renounce himselfe, and become like to the bruite beast: so fareth it also with him, when he renounceth his immortalitie. But seeing wee are now in handling the powers of the soule, to shew that it dieth not, and seeing we haue spoken of knowledge, we will consider what arguments to the same end may be taken from the vertue of desiring that is naturally in it.

Heretofore we learned, that all knowledge both in man and beast, is giuen to this ende that they should desire whatsoeuer they know to bee good, and eschue that which they know to be euill. Concerning the knowledge of our senses, they conceiue well inough what it is to be present, and so doe the senses of beasts, of which and of our whole nature, wee may iudge both by our externall and internall sences that are common to vs with them, & so we may discerne of all such like things. But the appetite or desire of beastes goeth no fur∣ther then the time present. For that naturall desire of their owne preseruation which is in them, proceedeth not from any knowledge which they haue of things, but from the work∣manship of nature, and from that naturall inclination which they haue thereunto, without any motion of reason or vnderstanding.

Whereupon it followeth, that their desire to preserue themselues, and their power of pro∣creation proceedeth not from their knowing vertue, that is chiefest in them, but from

the Vegetati•••• vert••e which is the basest & most abiect. But man goeth a great deale further. For man hath knowledge of perpetuity and of eternitie, as we heard in the former speach: and because he knoweth that eternity is a good and profitable thing for him, he doth also desire the same. This desire then is naturall: and if naturall, it followeth also that it is a very * 1.19 meet and conuenient thing for vs, and so consequently, that it is not giuen to man with∣out cause and to no purpose. We must then conclude hereupon that it may bee accompli∣shed, and that of necessitie it must be sometime or other. For if it were otherwise, to what purpose should this knowledge serue, which man hath of so great a benefit, and which also moued him to desire the same, if he could neuer attaine to the fruition thereof? And why should God teach the same to men, if he would not make them partakers of it? Were it not rather to debase, then to aduance them aboue beasts, whereas hee hath created them Lords, and as it were his last and principall piece of worke, in his worke of creation? Should it not seeme to be not onely a vaine thing, but also (if I might so speake) as though God de∣lighted to torment men, to cause them to desire that thing, of which they should neuer haue any participation? were it not better for them, at leastwise, as good, that in this respect he should haue created them like to bruit beasts? For so they should liue a great deale more quiet, and not torment themselues as they doe, after a thing, which is altogether vnpossi∣ble for them to attaine vnto. Now we haue a very euident signe and testimony in vs, of the continuall being of this desire of eternitie, in that longing which men haue to make their * 1.20 name eternall, as much as may be, and that their memory might remaine in all ages that should follow long time after thē. And which is more, this affection is so natural & imprin∣ted so deepe into mens hearts, that euen they who deny the immortalitie of soules, and who thinke that euery man doth wholy vanish away by corporall death, doe couet notwith∣standing the immortalitie of their name, and to haue a good report amongst men still after their death. Hereof we haue very good proofe in the last Will and Testament of Epicurus himselfe, the Captaine and Standerd-bearer of all Atheists and Epicures who haue receiued their name of him. For he appointed therein, that the day of his natiuity should be yearely celebrated, and that at certaine times assigned by him, a banket should bee made for those of his sect, in remembrance of his name. Whereby wee see that this dogge himselfe, who made no difference betweene the death of men and of beasts, and who denied vtterly the immortality of the soule of man, could not for all that plucke out of his owne soule the de∣sire of immortality: but doth what lay in him to make himselfe immortall after his death, by the perpetuity of his name and memory. Wee may take the like argument from that which men vsually appoint at their death, touching their ••unerals, sepulchres, and tombes. * 1.21 For why is it, that they will haue sumptuous funeralles, and stately & magnificent tombes? Why haue many caused Churches and Chappels to be erected, themselues to be engrauen, and their eschutchions to be hung vp, where they haue laid themselues? It is certaine, that if they desired not to make their name as immortall as they could, and their memory eter∣nall among men, their death would not bee so ambitious, neither would they leaue behind them such marks of their ambition, and of their desire of immortality. And as great men affoord this testimony of their desire, so the common people are not without some one or other for their part. For a poore Artificer, as a Tayler or Shoomaker, or some such like, if he be able he will appoint to haue a stone laid vpon his graue, in which his name shall be in∣grauen, and his marke, or some such like thing: to this end that the Suruiuours and they that come after him should know that he once li••ed and was in the world, and that he would still liue, at leastwise, in name and memory. And this is further confirmed by them, who albeit they cannot continue their name and memory by any good deedes and valiant actes, yet they striue to make themselues immortall by wicked and execrable doings. As among others we•• haue the example of Herostratus, who set on fire the Temple of that great Diana of Ephesus for no other cause, but one∣ly that hee might bee spoken of, and that the memory of him might remaine and continue for euer amongst men: as indeede it hath done, notwithstanding the con∣trary endeauour of the Ephesians, who by a publike Edict ordeined, that his name should neuer bee written in any place. But it may bee obiected vnto mee that this * 1.22 argument deriued from the desire of men to continue their name to prooue the im∣mortalitie of soules thereby, is not very fit nor of great force: because this desire is rather found in men that are most foolish, va••ne, carnall, and wicked, then in the wiser sort of men, and such as are more graue, spirituall, and vertuous. For who couet more this immor∣tality

of name and memory, then they that are most vaine glorious and ambitious, vnto whose ambition death it selfe can bring no end, but it receiueth and liueth still therein? We see also, that they who least of all beleeue the immortality of soules and scoffe most at it, are greatliest affected with this ambition, and labour most to become immortall after that manner, because they expect no other immortality. All this I confesse is true, yet mine ar∣gument continueth stil firme. For first we haue alwaies this testimony from them, that they * 1.23 know and acknowledge a certaine immortality and perpetuity, & desire to enioy the same as much as they may, thinking to continue the same euen after their death: which know∣ledge and desire is not to be found in brute beasts. And whereas the vainest and worst men are more mooued with this foolish desire, then the wisest and most vertuous men are, the reason thereof is good and euident. For the wisest men and such as are endued with most vertue make least accompt of this temporary and fading immortality, which is but as it were a winde that goeth from mouth to mouth, or is but in paper, parchment, wood, stone, brasse, or in some such corruptible matter: because they expect a better perpe∣tuity that is more certaine, more glorious, and of longer continuance, of which they are cer∣tainly * 1.24 perswaded. Which perswasion can not be vaine in them, seeing it is grounded vpon the testimony of Gods Spirit, which saith, that the iust shalbe had in euerlasting remēbrance, not only before men, but also before God and Angels. But the other sort of men busie them∣selues about an immortality, which deserueth not to be accompted so much as a shadow and image of true immortality: because the desire thereof is infected and corrupted with that darknesse of error and of ignorance, which sinne hath brought vpon the mind of man, with those peruerse affections that proceede from the same, and with their euill education and instruction, who are not taught in the word of God. By means whereof this naturall desire of true immortality degenerateth into a foolish desire greedy of fame & name among men: (euen as when good seed falleth into bad ground) but still it proceedes from a good begin∣ning and fountaine, if it were not corrupted. As we see also that it falleth out with the grea∣ter part of men in the naturall desire they haue of skill and knowledge, which albeit it be in them by nature, yet they turne it into a vaine and foolish curiosity, that endeuoreth to know that which is not onely not profitable, but very hurtfull and dangerous for them, in stead of seeking to know that which is more profitable and necessary. But besides that which wee haue already spoken, our affections also tell vs plainly, what the nature is aswel of our spirit as of our senses both internall and externall: and what difference there is betweene them. For if the Spirit entreth into a cogitation of it owne death, the internall senses, with fancy and imagination are not greatly mooued or troubled therewith, but passe it ouer well enough, as if they had no feeling thereof, supposing that this corporall life will last a long time: but the spirit is so confounded and troubled, that it feareth and flyeth nothing more then it. And surely I doubt not, but that they, who being pressed and oppressed with great * 1.25 euills, desire death through a blind fury of their mind, and wish to bee wholly extinguished, would change their purpose and abhorre that kind of death, and thinke it to be a greater mischiefe then all those which they suffer, if they might haue leasure & means for some smal time to come out of their despaire, and to returne to their right minde, that so they might haue some rest from the troubles of their spirit, and thinke seriously vpon the death thereof. And as all the senses are presently troubled, and as it were, carried out of themselues through the cogitation of corporall death: so the spirit contrariwise, if it be sound, quiet, and well set∣led, abideth firme, and derideth the ignorance, error, and terror of the senses, correcting and reproouing them for the same. Wee may then conclude from the euidence of these things that the death of the Spirit is contrary to the nature of it, and therfore is affraid of it, and ab∣horreth euen to thinke of it, or to make any mention thereof. But the senses care not but for this bodily life which the Spirit contemneth in regard of the other: whereby it appeareth, that the death of the body doth affect & touch it nothing at all, but the body only, & those things that are ioyned vnto it, as namely, both the external & internal senses. For this cause, those men that are carnall and led most by their senses, thinke little either vpon the one or the other, except it be when they see themselues in danger of corporall death. For, perswa∣ding themselues that they shall liue long in this world, or at leastwise gathering to them∣selues as much hope therof as they can, they think nothing at all in a maner of death during their whole life, no more almost then if they were borne immortal, vntil such time as they see in good earnest that they must dislodge. Thē are they awaked out of their sleep, & if they be not altogether become brutish, they are constrained to think both vpon the death of the

body, and of the death of the spirit: and the lesse they are prepared against them both, the more astonished and amased they are in themselues. Contrariwise good and iust men, who of a long time, yea all their life haue thought vpon both, finde themselues lesse troubled a * 1.26 great deale, because they are resolutely perswaded and assured of a better life. Moreouer, wee finde by experience, that when the spirit is troubled with affections, or confounded through fancies and imaginations, or ignorant, vicious, prophane, wicked, without feare of God and void of religion, it is a great deale more mooued at the cogitation & remembrance of corporall death, then if it be sound, well disposed and setled, quiet, skilful, innocent, religi∣ous, and fearing God. Whereupon we may consider and learne, which of these two iudge∣ments is more certain and true, either that of a spirit that is troubled, diseased, ignorant, euil, without feare of God, and void of religion: or that of a spirit, which hath al those perfections rehearsed by vs, contrary to these vices, It is an easie matter to iudge. Therefore if we attri∣bute more, as in reason we ought, to that Spirit whose iudgement is most true and certaine, the conclusion that I haue made shalbe confirmed thereby. And as by the difference of de∣sires, we may easily iudge of the nature and essence of mans soule, so we may do the like by those delights wherin it taketh pleasure. But I leaue thee ACHITOB, to go forward with the discourse of this matter.

Of the argument that may be taken from the delights and pleasures of the soule to prooue the immortality thereof: an argument to the same end taken from the insatiable de∣sires and pleasures of men, euen from such as are most carnall: of the testimony which they may find euen in their vices to prooue the immortality of their soule. Chap. 92.

ACHITOB. It hath beene a saying heretofore, that it belonged not to a vile per∣son to deny God. Which Prouerbe came of this, that the nobility and gentlemen were so ill taught, and so ignorant of true nobilitie, that they reserued this occupation to them∣selues as proper to their estate, turning it to their glory, and endeauouring to bee feared by this meanes. And surely these were faire Armes and goodly Scutcheons to set foorth the Nobilitie of their estate by, namely, horrible and execrable blasphemies, which the very Iewes and Turks would neuer suffer among themselues. I would to God we might now say * 1.27 rightly, that this was once, but is no more: and so likewise, that there were not some among them that thinke themselues the greatest men, who haue this in their thoughts if they dare not speake it openly, that it belongeth not to men of courage to beleeue in God and in his Word, or to thinke that there is a iudgement to come, at which men shall appeare: but that this appertaineth to the simple and foolish, not to these great and noble spirits, which flee aboue the clouds, and indeed know more then they ought to leade them into hell.

But as by the difference of appetites and desires, we haue shewed them that the soule cannot be mortall, which concludeth a diuine prouidence and a second life, as we declared * 1.28 before, so it is an easie matter to proue the same by those pleasures in which the soule taketh delight. For by how much the more those things that bring delights, do resemble the vertue of the soule that is delighted, and the greater affinitie, proportion, and agreement they haue with it, so much the greater, sweeter, and more pleasant are the delights, as also more firme and of longer continuance. Indeed it may be obiected vnto mee, that if wee looke to this we shall find, that the greatest part of men take more pleasure in those delights which they can receiue by their senses, which are more earthly & brutish, then in others that are more naturall to the spirit, and more spirituall & heauenly and therfore the iudgment that we can gather from hence of the nature and essence of the soule, may seeme not to agree to this we speake of. It is very certen that those men are of such a brutish nature, that a man may well * 1.29 doubt whether they be men or no, & whether they deserue not rather to be reckoned in the nūber of beasts, to which they are more like then to men, except it be for their face: in which respect also a man may compare them with Apes. For if they be led by the same desires and lusts, and satisfie themselues therein as brute beasts, and goe no further, wherein doe they differ frō them? & to what purpose serueth that which God hath bestowed vpon their soules more thē vpon the soules of beasts, if they content themselues with a brutish life & pleasure as they do? For where is the vse of reason & vnderstanding which God hath bestowed vpon

them more then vpon beastes? And if they vse them no more then beasts doe that are al∣together void of them, who can know whether they are partakers of them more then they? And so consequently, how shall that definition commonly giuen of man, agree to them, wherein he is called a liuing creature partaker of reason? Therefore when wee enquire of the nature and substance of the soule, we must follow that rule, which is vsually propounded in searching out the nature and essence of all other things. For when a man would haue true knowledge of them, he taketh not in each kind of them that which may be, in some of the same kinde, lesse perfect and monstrous. As if there be occasion to iudge of the na∣ture of mans body no man wil take them that haue some defect of Nature, or that are more deformed and monstrous then others: but the soundest, goodliest and most perfect bo∣dies. We must doe the like when we search into the nature and essence of the soule. For to know it well, wee must not make choice of men that are borne brutish, so that a man can know nothing in them whereby they differ from brute beastes, except the outward shape of a man. Yea there are some borne with lesse sense and gouernment of themselues, then beasts * 1.30 haue. The like may be saide of them, who being better borne, voluntarily become brutish of themselues. For this cause, we must chiefly consider what effects the noblest and most excellent soules bring forth, if we will iudge of the nature of all other soules that are of the same kind. For albeit the soules of some mē are more brutish thē of others, yet it followeth not but they are all of one & the same nature & substance, seeing they are alofone kind: but the difference between them proceedeth from hence, that some are more degenerated frō their true and proper nature, then others are. Neuertheles this changeth not their natural essence but that alwiaes continueth one & the same in al: as the il disposition of bodies taketh not from them that nature & essence which they haue common with others, notwithstanding they differ from them, as a sicke and deformed body differeth from a sound and perfect bo∣dy. Now there is no doubt, but that the noblest & most excellent soules take more pleasure * 1.31 in the internall senses then in the externall, and more in reason then in fancy and imaginati∣on, but aboue all in the contemplation of the Spirit. And among those things which the spirit doth contemplate, it delighteth most & staieth longest in them that are spirituall and eternal, that are highest & of greatest soueraignty. And as the spirit longeth most after these pleasures, and retaineth them with greatest affection, so it is lesse weary in searching for thē and in the contemplation of them. Wherupon it followeth, that spirituall and eternal things are more conformable to the Spirit, then those that are corporall and temporary: and that it hath greater participation and agreement with heauenly things then with earthly. For it is marueilously delighted & contented with spirituall things, as if they were his own things which is by similitude, proportion, and agreement of nature: as contrariwise, both the in∣ternall and externall senses please themselues in corporall things, and are not able to com∣prehend or attaine to the other, but onely by coniecture. Whereas if the Spirit were as mortall as the senses, then the excellentest Spirits, and such as approch neerest to the heauen¦ly Spirits & to the nature of God, would giue thēselues to transitory & corruptible things as much as the senses doe, and would search after them as earnestly as it doth after true and perfect pleasures. But we see by experience that they ascend vp a great deale higher. Yea the * 1.32 Spirits euen of most carnall & brutish men, in that they neuer meete with any pleasures in transitory things that doe fully content and satisfie them, thereby giue euident testimony, they are borne to enioy greater pleasures then they can find in all this nature, and that they are of another nature, surpassing them which mounteth aboue corporall and temporary things. For who euer saw an ambitious man satisfied with honours, or a couetous wretch with riches? And from whence commeth this that they are so insatiable, but only because the spirit that God hath giuen them, is of so noble a race & of such an excellent nature, that how much soeuer it be fallen from his first nature & nobility, yet it can neuer content itselfe with any thing, that is of another nature more base & vile then it owne, as that which is too much vnworthie and vnbeseeming the spirit, & very much disagreeing from the essence of it. For although, being buried in this body, as in a sinke of all carnall and brutish affections, it cannot so well perceiue it owne nature, dignity, and nobility, nor acknowledge the same so well, as the noblest and most excellent spirits, and such as are farthest from this stinck∣ing puddle, are able to do, neuerthelesse without tinking thereupon as it were, it hath euer∣more a secret sense of it own nature and dignity, which keepeth it from being contented with any thing whatsoeuer, although it bee with neuer so great liking and abundance, except it enioy that thing which is most proper and agreeable to his naturall disposition, which is

of a more high, noble, & excellent nature, then any thing proceeding frō this mortall and transitorie masse. But because it is buried in this darkenesse, which sinne hath brought vpon the mindes of men, the same thing happeneth to the spirit, of which we haue alrea∣die spoken concerning the immortality and eternity of name and renowne. For the right and naturall desire of true and immortall honours, and of eternal riches agreeable to the na∣ture of mans soule, is degenerated into this false and corrupted appetite of worldly honors, and temporall riches. Notwithstanding this is manifested heereby, that as euery spirital∣waies searcheth after God as a blinde man goeth by groaping, as we haue heard already: so it seeketh after riches and honours agreeable to it owne nature. But because that darkenesse with which it is ouerwhelmed, hindreth it from knowing them well, and so consequently from taking that way, which it ought to enter in that it may attaine vnto them, therefore it * 1.33 changeth them into others, that are of a differing and cleane contrary nature. So that it can neuer finde out or attaine to that which it seeketh, because it is ignorant thereof, and so seeketh for it vnder a maske, which it taketh for the true face, and vnder a shadow, which it taketh for the very body whereby it commeth to passe that the maske and shadow remaine with it, insteade of the very face and body that are lost by meanes of them. In which the same thing happeneth to the spirit that doth in the matter of Religion, when it forgeth vn∣to it selfe new and strange gods and idols, instead of the true God whom it searcheth after, because it knoweth not who he is, although it seeketh him, & desireth to find him. Where∣fore being thus deceiued, & not knowing it, neither the meanes wherby it is deceiued, it stil desireth, because it perceiueth very wel whether it wil or no, that it hath not attained to that which it wanteth, as indeed it might well know the same, if it were not become very brutish by reason that it neuer findeth any contentation in any thing that it doth, or can attaine vnto. By which things we may further learne, that men shall finde euen in their vices, testi∣monies of the nature, essence and immortality of their soules, whereby they may be conui∣cted, * 1.34 and namely in their ambition & couetousnes, which ought to admonish them of that that hat•• been set down, and to cause the•• to thinke more diligently thereupon. We may say the same of their lust. For although it be in the number of those pleasures that are most earthly and brutish, and which the senses themselues both externall and internall ought to be soonest weary of, for the reasons before heard, neuertheles they shew plainly how insatia∣ble this appetite is in them, in that no kind of lust can content them: insomuch as they are carried headlong therwithall euen beyond the bounds of nature, within which brute beasts containe themselues. And truely all these things ought to driue vs into admiration, and cause vs to consider the iust iudgement of God vpon men, and how he is reuenged of them for dishonouring him, and their owne nature, by suffering it to degenerate and waxe beast∣like, in forsaking spirituall, heauenly, and diuine things, for those are corporall, earthly, and brutish. Therefore God depriueth them of that vnderstanding which hee had giuen them, that they should torment themselues after such things as vexe their spirit, as it were damned soules, and that so much the more miserable and with lesse contentation, as they enioy more of them. For what a torment is ambition and couetousnes, and other affections and vices * 1.35 that accompany them? And if we speake of lust, we see what is the vengeance of God vpon them, who going beyond the bounds of nature, so dishonor their bodies, and their owne nature, that there is no essence or nature whatsoeuer, vnto which they may bee compared. For none doe so much peruert their nature as they: I meane not beasts onely, but not the di∣uels themselues. And although they be so beastlike, as to consider no more of the nature and essence of their soule then they do of beasts, yet the very figure of their bodies should make them to thinke, that God hath not made it differing from beasts, and namely in crea∣ting the head and face vpwards, but that hee hath also endued them with a soule differing from theirs, to the end it might be correspondent to the body in which it is. But it belon∣geth to thee ASER, to prosecute this argument, thereby to shew vnto vs the immortality of the soule.

Of the testimonie that men haue of the immortall nature of the soule in their very body, by the composition and frame thereof: of that which is in the motion and rest of their soule: how the creation of the whole world should be vaine, and how there should bee no prouidence of God, no religion, no diuine iu∣stice if the soule were mortall: of the multitude and qualities of the witnesses that stand for the immortalitie thereof. Chap. 93.

ASER. That good king Ezechias complaining in his sicknesse, said, Mine habitation is departed, and is remooued from mee like a sheepeheards tent: I haue cut off like a weauer my * 1.36 life. This holy man compareth his body and the life of man in it, to a tabernacle & lodge, or to a tent and pauilion, which are no firme lodgings but remoueable and such as may be transported from one place to another, as souldiers carry away theirs, when they raise their campe to pitch it in some other place. And indeed a mans body in this world is as it were a lodging assigned for his soule to abide in a while, not to dwell there alwayes, as it were in one place. For this life, is like to a military life, and as a continuall warfare, vntill such time as we depart hence, and that God cutteth it off, (after we haue finished our appointed dayes) as a weauer cutteth off the threedes at the end of his web after it is finished. Therefore Saint Peter also calleh his body a tabernacle when he saith, I think at meet as long as I a••••n this tabernacle, to stirre you vp by putting you in remembrance, seeing I know that the time is at ••and that * 1.37 I must lay downe this tabernacle, euen a•• our Lord Iesus Christ hath shewed mee. S. Paul also vseth the like manner of speech when he saith, For wee know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle be destroyed, wee haue a building giuen of God, an house not made with hands, but eternall in the hea∣uens. * 1.38 For therefore we sigh, desiring to be clothed with our house, which is from heauen. And to this agreeth that which is written in the Epistle to the Hebrewes. For here we haue no continuing city, but we seeke one to come. Here truely are notable testimonies of the second and eternal life, against them that doubt of the immortality of the soule. But according to that which is * 1.39 giuen vs in charge to discourse of touching this matter, wee must bring them other testi∣monies euen in their bodies, seeing their spirit cannot mount vp to celestiall and diuine things.

We may easily iudge, if there be any light of nature remaining in our mind, that God would * 1.40 haue vs know, by the composition and stature of our bodies, how the soule and spirit dwel∣ling within them should be affected, and whether it ought to looke. For why would God lift the head and face of men vpwards, and not the head of beasts, but that he would admonish them thereby, that they are of a celestiall nature? and that they must alwaies looke, not to the earth as beasts do, but to heauen, as to their natiue country, from whence they receiued their Originall, in respect of their principall part, which all Ath••••sts & Epicures doe renounce? And if the body be lifted straight vpward, the spirit is much more, which ascending by de∣grees from inferior things, maketh no stay vntill it come to the heauēly & diuine things: & hauing at length attained vnto them, it staieth there and contenteth it selfe therein. In re∣gard * 1.41 whereof, as in naturall things wee know by their moouing and resting which is their naturall place, so by the same reason we may iudge of the naturall place of mans soule, which is in perpetuall motion, and can find no rest here belo•• on the earth, as the soules of beastes can: which because they are altogether earthy, and all their naturall and proper good com∣ming from no higher place then from the earth, their snow••s also are continually bending towards it: and the more earthly and brutish they are, the more downwards do they alwaies bend. This we may easily perceiue, if we cōpare not onely the beasts of the earth with birds which hold more of the nature of the ayre, and liue most therein, but also if wee compare the beastes of the earth one with another. For albeit all of them haue their snowts incli∣ning towards the earth, yet the hogge hath his head more bending downward then others haue. For it is fashioned & bowed after such a fashion, that no beast can lesse lift vp the head and stretch it towards heauen then the hog, neither is any so much troubled as that is, whē by force it is compelled to looke vpward. The same may be said of the Moule, and of other such like beasts. Therfore if the Good that is proper and peculiar to the nature of man, con∣sist not in this eternity and celestiall immortality of which wee speake, to what purpose is

his head lift vpward, and his eies looking towards heauen, especially seeing God hath ioy∣ned these things with a soule that is partaker of reason and vnderstanding; For among the beasts, we finde one fish, that hath the eies set in the top of the head and therefore it is cal∣led * 1.42 by the Graecians Vranoscopos, which signifieth as much as a Beholder of heauen, or looking towards heauen. But because it is not partaker of vnderstanding and reason, more then o∣ther beasts are, and seeing the soule of it differeth not from theirs, we may easily iudge, that the eies of it were not set in that place for the same reason that man hath his lifted vp to∣wards heauen. Shall we say then that God hath created man and endewed him with so many graces and singular properties, to make him more wretched then beasts in this life, who otherwise is so miserable, and compassed about with so many euils on euery side? For whereto serueth the disposition of his nature, but to torment him the more by looking vp towards heauen, and by that knowledge which hee hath more then beasts haue, thereby encreasing in him a vaine desire of such a happinesse as he can neuer enioy? And which is worse, the more noble spirit that any on hath, the more learned and vertuous he is, or the more and longer oppressed he is with the miseries of this life, the more would this vaine de∣sire pricke and torment him. And if there bee some, who like beasts passe ouer all these things without any sense and feeling, this befalleth them, either because they are of a heauy, sleepy, and blockish spirit, or else because they are drunken with that which is commonly called Fortunes fauour, namely, with the honours, riches, and pleasures of this world. So that wee must conclude vpon this speech, that because beasts doe here all that they haue to doe, according to those powers and gifts that are naturally in them, therefore they liue and die here: but because the Spirit giuen to man, cannot doe here ac∣cording to his naturall disposition, it followeth necessarily, that as it is borne in an other * 1.43 place, so it must haue another place wherein to effect that which it hath to doe. And con∣trariwise, if the soule of man be mortal, al that he hath to do is in this life, as it is with beasts: and then also it followeth, that he was created in vaine and without cause. For God created nothing, but hee propounded to himselfe the end for which hee created it, and that such an ende as is agreeable to the nature and dignity of euery one of his workes, else all things should haue beene created in vaine by him. Now if he created man onely to liue in this world, as he did other creatures, then did he not in his creation propound to himselfe an end beseeming the excellency of such a nature. Which thing the greatest Philosophers a∣mongst the heathen haue after due consideration bin constrained to confesse. And if a man for whose sake the whole visible world was created and who onely can, will, and knoweth how to vse all things contained therein, was created and receiued this life in vaine, what shall we thinke of all other things that were created because of him, and for his sake? Shall not the whole worke of creation be in vaine, and vnworthy the infinite maiesty and wise∣dome of God the Creator? and he that is the Gouernor of the world, shal hee not be spoiled of all prouidence? Who ought not to abhor the very cogitation of such a thing? And yet the religion of God, his prouidence, and the immortalitie of our soule are so fast linked and ioy∣ned * 1.44 together, and depend in such sort one vpon another, that they cannot be separated, ney∣ther indeed is it lawfull to separate them. For he that abolisheth the one, shaketh also that faith which we ought to hold of the rest•• because if our soules be not immortal, there is nei∣ther punishmēt nor reward, either for vertue or vice, or for the good or ill deeds of men. For we see euidently, how all things are mingled and confused in the course of this present life, that they are turned into a common robbery, that the woorst men make themselues Masters and Lords of the world, as if it were created onely for them, that they might bee in it as Gods vpon the earth: and contrariwise that good and iust men may seeme to haue beene created onely for a pray to the wicked, and to bee lesse accounted of them then the brute beasts. Which if it were so, then should God haue no care of men: & if he haue no care of them, how shall hee bee their GOD and Creatour, and why should they rather then beasts call vpon him and honor him? For if it were so, what hath he done, or what doth hee yet more for them vnto whom hee hath giuen his law and commaundement to call vpon him, to honour and serue him, then he doth for beasts to whom hee hath giuen no such law or commandement, and who do not call vpon him nor honor him according to the same * 1.45 as men doe? And what may we accompt all religion, all feare and reuerence of God to be, all holinesse, honesty and vertue, but superstition, and a vaine and foolish opinion & fancy of the mind of man? Notwithstanding there hath alwaies bin a common ••estimony & euen consent of religion among al nations, euen amongst the most Barbarous and rudest people

that euer were found. Neither euer were any so ill taught but they haue put some difference betweene vertue and vice, and betweene honestie and dishonestie. It can not bee then, but that religion and vertue, narrowly engrauen in the heart of man, are good things, yea far better then their contraries. Whereas if God had no more respect to one then to the other, and were not to iudge thereof, to what purpose serueth this difference which men make betweene them? and what profit shall they reape to themselues by esteeming better of that which is good, then of euill? Good men should not onely receiue lesse profit by vertue then by vice. but further they should be damnified by the same: & wicked men should euer haue the better: yea they should be rewarded instead of being punished. For the best and iustest * 1.46 men are commonly a pray vnto the wicked. And who shal deliuer them out of their hands, seeing for the most part they are the strongest, and haue in a manner the gouernment of the world in their power, so that the most innocent persons are at their mercy as it were, ex∣cept God should let them haue iustice either heere in this world or in some other? And if God should faile in doing iustice, vpon what right should the iustice that men vse against malefactours be grounded? Shall there be more iustice in men, who are altogether iniustice themselues, then in God who is the fountaine of all iustice, yea iustice, it selfe? All this must be so, or else we must confesse, that all these things testifie vnto vs, that God hath care ouer vs, and that there is another place & time of rewarding euery man according to his works, then in this world, and here in this life. For this cause Saint Peter calleth the day of the last iudgement, in which all shall appeare before God, the time of the resta••ration of all things fore•• * 1.47 tolde of God by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began. For considering that all things are so confused and troubled in the world, that it seemeth there is no difference be∣twixt the blessings and curses of God pronounced in his law, and that all things are turned topsie turuy by the malice of men, the Lord hath ordained a place & time, in which he will put an end to this disorder, and will restore all things to their right estate and good order. Now if the Lord hath appointed that euery one shall bee rewarded at that time and place, it followeth that then and there also we must search for the end for which man was crea∣ted, and that his soule shall liue there. And if the soule then liueth, and in that place, it follo∣weth well also that there is the end of it. For we take the end for that which is the last and * 1.48 most perfect in euery thing. So that if the question be of the authoritie of men, and multi∣tude of witnesses for the confirmation of that, which hath beene hitherto saide of the im∣mortalitie of the soules of men, we shall haue for this purpose all those, who from the be∣ginning of the world amongst all people & nations, haue beleeued and thought that there is a God, that there is a Diuine nature and prouidence, and consequenly any religion: yea * 1.49 euen those barbarous and sauage nations, which were found out of late dayes in those new Ilands, commonly called the new found world. And if the qualitie of the witnesses is to bee considered, we shall still haue almost all on our side. For if wee looke vnto the most barba∣rous and strangest nations that are, the testimony of nature which all of them carry in their hearts, compelleth them to range themselues one this side. And if wee come to others that haue bin more ciuill and better instructed, we shall haue a greater aduantage. Or if the questi∣on be of the greatest, and of such as by the consent and testimony of all, were accompted, and were indeede best learned and most vertuous, we shall not onely finde them to haue bin on our side, but also that they haue condemned as ignorant men and vnworthy to liue, them that haue beene of a contrary opinion, betwixt which men and the other there is great difference. For those among the Philosophers that denied the immortalitie of the soule, were such as did abolish also diuine nature and prouidence, and all religion, and such * 1.50 as placed the soueraigne good of men in pleasure: which kinde of men were alwayes wor∣thily taken to be the vilest & most abiect, and as it were the skum and dregges of the pro∣fessours of Philosophie. For to the end we may the better vnderstand this, by mine aduise wee will consider of the best arguments that are alleadged by Philosophers to prooue the immortalitie of soules, that they who will not credite the testimony of the holy Scriptures, may feele themselues vrged in their conscience with the sayings of Ethnickes and heathe•• men, who shal rise vp in iudgment against them to aggra••ate their condemnation. Now it belongeth to thee, AMANA, to follow this matter.

Of another argument for the immortalitie of the soule taken from that naturall desire which men haue knowledge: of Aristotles opinion touching the immortalitie of the soule: of other reasons of Philosophers to prooue that the spirit cannot be of a corruptible and mortall nature: and how iust men should be more mise∣rable, and should haue more occasion to feare and to eschew death, then the vniust and wicked, if the soule were mortall, Cap. 94.

AMANA. There is in all men a naturall desire of knowledge and wisedome: yea a man may perceiue that most barbarous men desire naturally to know, vnto what Art soe∣uer they apply their spirit, iudging the same to bee commendable and honest, as contrari∣wise they accompt it vnbeseeming a man and dishonest, to be ignorant, to erre, and to be de∣ceiued. From this desire the wisest and most famous among the Philosophers tooke a very good argument to prooue the immortality of the soule. For seeing this desire is naturall, and that in this world all the knowledge and wisedome that men can haue, is the very small, and as it were nothing in respect of that which they want, they conclude necessarily, that there must needs be some other place and time then in this life, wherein that which is heere begunne but slenderly, is to be accomplished and made perfect.

The reason from whence they deriue their argument, is that common saying, that God * 1.51 and Nature the minister of God doe nothing without cause. Wherfore seeing this desire of knowledge and wisedome is naturall in man, it cannot be in vaine, neither is it giuen vnto him, but that it should attaine to some end and perfection. For to what purpose serued the corporall eies of liuing creatures, & for what cause should they begiuen them, if they could neuer see, or were to liue alwaies in darknesse? So likewise, why should the eies of the soule and minde be giuen to men, thereby to behold celestiall and diuine things, which cannot be seene with bodily eies, if they could neuer veiw them, but in such darknesse as they do here behold them? To what end also should man be naturally pricked forward with a desire to know the truth & to haue skill, if he could neuer soundly enioy his desire, but should remain alwaies in ignorance for the greatest part of those things, which he desireth to know & which are of so great waight, that whatsoeuer he is able to vnderstand and know in this world, is nothing or very little in regard of that which yet remaineth behinde for him to know? For not to speak of those things in which al humane philosophie must acknowledge her ignorāce, let vs come to that vnderstanding which we may haue by the holy Scriptures reuealed vnto vs of God. For although the knowledge we haue by thē, surpasseth without al comparison all humane philosophie & science, yet S. Paul cōpareth it to knowledge that is very obscure, to a light that is seene through thick & darke clouds, & to an image presen∣ted * 1.52 vntovs in a glasse, in comparison of that most high and perfect knowledge and vnder∣standing, which is reserued for vs in another life, and whereof we haue here but a very little taste & weake beginning. Therefore if we could neuer goe further, would it not be a vaine and ridiculous thing, if God had giuen this desire onely to men, & neuer would vouchsafe to let them haue the effect of it? And if it were so, that GOD had not ordeined another time and place, for the finishing of that which is here begunne in this life, it seemeth that the complaint made by some of the greatest Philosophers against Nature, should not be with∣out some ground of reason. For what iust cause is there, that he should giue a longer life to some beasts then to men, seeing it skilleth not whether beasts liue long or no, because long life cannot make them more learned, or more wise then they are at their birth? But it * 1.53 is otherwise in man. For seeing that knowledge and wisedome are his greatest Good, wher∣by he approcheth neerer to the nature of God, and of which all his other good things chiefely depend, it seemeth to stand with reason, that God should haue giuen a longer life to men then to beasts, that so they might the better attaine to so great a good, so necessary for them, in regard of which especially, they are preferred before beasts and differ from them. For we see by experience, that we must die so soone almost as we beginne to taste of Sciences, and to waxe wise. But we haue no cause to make this complaint against the wise∣dome, * 1.54 prudence, and goodnesse of God, who hath granted vs life long enough, wherein we may learne heere as much as we neede, (if wee could vse it well) both to passe away this life, and also to attaine to the other ••n which we shall abound in knowledge and wisedome

and be fully satisfied therewithall. And although God hath giuen vs a life twice as long in this world as that we now enioy, so that we might liue as long as the anncient Patriarkes, whose yeares were so many, especially before the flood as Moses testifieth, yet al that which we could possible learne during the time of so long life, would be very little in cōparison of the knowledge reserued for vs in that Eternitie. For the eies of our spirit and minde are not able to endure so great brightnesse of heauenly knowledge and wisedome, whilest it is here shut vp and as it were imprisoned in this body of sinne, and in a manner wholy ouerwhel∣med with darkenesse but it fareth with the spirit in this respect, as it doth with the Owle in regard of his eyes, and of the light of the Sunne. Therefore euery one hath better cause to assure himselfe, that God hath appointed an other time and place for the full accomplish∣ment of this desire of knowledge and wisedome that is so firmely engrauen in the nature of men, then to accuse God, as if he offered them iniury to depriue them therof by the short∣nesse of their life. Now let vs come to other particular reasons of Philosophers concerning this matter we haue in handling, Although Aristotle so famous amongst them bee very ob∣scure * 1.55 and wauering where hee handleth the same, so that it is a very hard matter to vnder∣stand what was his opinion and resolution therein, neuerthelesse he dares not plainely say that the spirit of man is of a bodily nature & corruptible matter, or that it is mortall as the body is. But in one place he saith, that if the Spirit be able to vnderstand without the fanta∣sie, it may be separated from it: but it cannot vnderstand without it, then it cannot be sepa∣rated. Which is alone as if he saide, that if the spirit could vnderstand without the senses, & the vnderstanding and reason without fantasie and imagination, then a man might certain∣ly conclude, that there is a difference in nature & substance betweene these things, & that there may a separation be made: so that the destruction of the one doeth not bring with it a corruption of the other. Wherefore none may conclude the mortality of the spirit that is capable of reason and vnderstanding, by the immortality either of the externall or internall senses. But Aristotle leaueth it doubtfull in this place, whether this separation may be made yea or no, and whether a man may conclude thereupon, that the spirit is of an other nature and substance then the senses are, and so consequently immortall. But it followeth not, that if the soule being in the body vnderstandeth things bodily, that is to say, by the bodily instruments that are outward, and then by the conuenience of the internall senses, therefore it can vnderstand nothing but that which they declare and bring vnto it. For after the in∣ternall * 1.56 senses haue gathered ••ogether the images and similitudes of those externall things that are offered vnto them, and so retaineth them fast being secluded and separated from all matter, the vnderstanding is to receiue from thence the first and simple knowledge of things. So that as the qualities of externall things are the matter subiect of the internall senses, so their images conceiued by the internall senses, and purged from all bodily matter, are the matter subiect of the vnderstanding and spirit. And the spirit labouring about them draweth out certaine motions, and knoweth many thinges from them, which cannot mooue the senses, and which the senses cannot know. And yet the spirit is first mooued by these images, as the senses are by externall things. But wee must declare these thinges somewhat more familiarly. We vnderstand already, how corporal things are the subiect and obiects of the corporall senses, and that the bodily senses receiue and know them corporal∣ly, euen such as they are presented vnto them, euery one according to his nature and office. But they cannot receiue or perceiue any more then that which is laied open vnto them, and manifesteth it selfe outwardly. Now after the outward senses haue thus receiued them and their matter couered with their qualities, the internall senses, to which the externall are seruiceable, conceiue the images without the matters and qualities of those thinges whereof they are images. For the eye cannot see either the Sunne or the light of it, nor yet any other creature discouered by the light, except it be present before it. But the Fantasie and imagination receiue and conceiue the images of things, euen in darkenesse, although * 1.57 the things of which they are images, apparant to the eyes, nor yet are perceiued at that present by any corporall sense. We see then already how these images are separated from the matter of which they are images, and how the internall senses behold them without their matter and bodies, as the externall senses looke vpon them being ioyned with their bodies.

Then hauing receiued them thus purged from their corporall matter, the spirit re∣ceiueth them yet more pure, and goeth further in the knowledge and vnderstanding of them then all the senses do, comprehending other things, of which the senses can

haue no knowledge or apprehension. And thus the Spirit beholdeth and vnderstandeth * 1.58 corporall things corporally, that is by meanes of those instruments which it hath in the bo∣dy, and spirituall things it beholdeth spiritually without those instruments. Whereupon it followeth, that although it vseth the senses and such kinde of instruments, neuerthelesse it is not so tied vnto them that it cannot be separated, or do nothing without them, or not know and vnderstand that which they are not able to conceiue or know. So that it is no * 1.59 hard matter to beleeue, that the soule is of another nature & substance, as a man may iudge also by this that it is the fountaine and beginning of motion begun by itselfe, & not by a∣ny other, but as we haue already declared. Likewise by this, that it is capable of the know∣ledge of infinite thinges, of which it retaineth the memory, and that it inquireth into secret things separated from all corporall matter, which cannot be perceiued by any sense: & that it doth so many and so great things without the helpe of any bodily nature. Wherupon the Philosophers conclude, that it is of a simple nature, not compounded, and so consequently that it is immortal. For that nature, which is adorned and decked with such vertues, & with the facultie to vnderstand, the like whereof is not in the body, and which can vnderstand by itselfe without the vse of the body, cannot be compounded of an earthly & mortal nature, nor haue any part thereof mingled with itselfe, but it is stayed and sustained by itselfe, it subsisteth of itselfe and is immortall. Hereof also it followeth, that if the soule of man be of such a nature, then it cannot be rent in sunder or diuided, or pulled into peeces, or haue any * 1.60 thing in it that can be separated from it: & so it must needes be that it cannot die or perish. And therefore the best and most excellent Philosophers hold that sentence as immoouea∣ble, which Aristotle saith in an other place, namely, that the spirit is a thing separate and di∣stinct from the senses and from the body, as an immortall thing from a mortall: and that it commeth from without, and else-where then from the body, as we haue already touched it in another place. Whereby to my thinking, he hath declared very plainly, that hee did not take the soule of man to be mortal. But yet it is somewhat hard to iudge what his opinon was, because he doth not shew himselfe so opēly as the matter requireth. Yet whatsoeuer he thought or resolued with himselfe, the soule shal not be therfore any whit the more mortall or immortall. For the immortality thereof dependeth not vpon his opinion, or of any other mans whatsoeuer. Neuerthelesse seeing so subtill and sharpe a Philosopher durst not affirme that it was mortall, euery one of any found mind may well iudge, that he knew there were too many arguments to the contrary, and those so waightie, that they deserued to bee dili∣gently, examined, and were not so lightly to be reiected. For he was not so shamefast & mo∣dest, but he durst boldly reiect and condemne the opinions and sentences of all others that were as well in his time as before him, how great and famous personages soeuer they were, when he thought hee could doe it with any shew of reason, insomuch as he spared not his master Plato. Therefore albeit wee had no other resolution from him touching this matter, but this only that he was in doubt, and durst affirme nothing on either side, yet his authori∣ty ought to preuaile much with vs against them who depende only of humane Philosophy and reason, & are so easily induced to approoue rather of the mortalitie then of the immor∣tality of the soule. For at leastwise they may imagine, that so great a Philosopher who is in such wonderfull estimation amongst all learned men, did not iudge their reasons friuo∣lous & vaine, who maintained the immortality of the soule, as our Epicures and Atheists thinke, because they are more blockish & foole hardie. And therfore they boldly condemne that which either they will not or cannot conceiue and comprehend, not considering what * 1.61 a confusion of things their opinion worketh in all mankinde. For besides that which wee haue spoken to this purpose alreadie, if it were so that the soule were mortall, the wickedest and most desperate men should haue that which they desire most, and which is most expe∣dient for them: and that should be fall the best and iustest men, which they abhorre most, & flee from as very hurtful for them: contrary to that which Salomon saith in the Prouerbs, That the wicked shall fall into the euill he feareth, and that the desire of the iust shall be accomplished. In * 1.62 regard whereof good men should haue far greater reason to feare death, then the wicked to desire it. For what good man is there of noble courage, who will not greatly abhorre death when he thinketh with himselfe, that it consumeth and swalloweth vp the whole man, as if he were buried in perpetuall darkenes? What consolation will serue him, and what comfort can a man offer him, that will be able to surmount the feare and horrour of death, but that he will expect and suffer it with great impatiencie and dispaire, when hee shall be through necessity brought vnto it? As for that consolation, which is taken from the necessitie of na∣ture,

and from the common condition of all men, it is very leane if there be no other. We see by them who are so greatly tormented, that they wish and aske after death, as after a hauen wherein they may be deliuered from that tempest and torment in which they are, although the greefe which they suffer breede such vowes and desires in them, yet if they haue but a small respite, they gather some consolation to themselues by some assurance, that their griefe will in time cease, or else that time and custome will make it lighter vnto them, and will teach them to beare it patiently.

To be short, life is so acceptable and beloued of euery one, that such as are most misera∣ble * 1.63 and wretched cannot be brought to leaue it but with great griefe, no not those who de∣stroy themselues with their owne hands. Whereby we may iudge, how much more better it is to them that haue not all these occasions to desire it. For euery one may imagine, what extreame griefe it would be to a good man, who for liuing honestly all his life time, and for all the good which he had euer thought, spoken or done, should not onely receiue honour nor recompence in this world, but which is no worse, (as it commonly falleth out among men) should receiue nothing but euil for good. And yet in the meane time he should see the woorst men, that wholly giue ouer thēselues to dishonor & despite God, enioy, the honors, riches, & pleasures of this world: and contrariwise himself to haue nothing but dishonour, shame, confusion, famine, pouerty, miserie, sorrow, torment, & oftentimes cruel death. What cōfort can such a body haue, if he thinke that there is no other reward after this life, nor any better estate for him then for the wicked & abhominable person in the world? And althogh none of al this shold euerhappen to good men, yet what contentation could they find in all the rewards which they should receiue in this world for recompence of their vertue? It is an easie matter to iudge by this, that the memorie of the name & praise of well doing doth not alwayes take effect, neither is it alwaies due to thē that haue it, but oftentimes very vniustly giuen. But from thee, ARAM, we shall receiue more full instruction touching this matter.

Of that praise and reward which wisedome and vertue may receiue of men in this world: how miserable it is, if there be no better prepared for them else-where: how death would be more grieuous and lamentable to the best learned and wisest men, then to the ignorant and foolish, if the soule were mortall: how the best and most certaine iudgement of men is for the immortalitie of the soule: of them who not beleeuing the same, say that it is good for men to be in such an errour. Chap. 95.

ARAM. If the Philosophers might draw many arguments of great waight from the na∣turall desires of men, to prooue the immortality of soules, this which we haue now to propound of that purpose and reward, which euery one naturally desireth, is of great con∣sideration touching this matter. For it is very certaine, that the best and most iust among men, albeit they could auoide all hurt from wicked men, wherewith commonly they are rewarded from procuring their good, yet they should not enioy any true & sound conten∣tation in any of these rewards, which they might haue in this world as recompence of their vertue. But rather whilest they were expecting & hoping for them, they should be euer in doubt and feare of missing them, by reason of the inconstancie of men, and of the vncer∣taintie of all humane things. So that nature might well seeme to haue giuen vnto them this desire of praise and of reward, if they should neuer enioy their desire else-where but in this present life. Whereof we may easily iudge by the reasons that are to be set downe.

For the first, the memory of a mans name and the praise for well doing doth not alwaies * 1.64 come to passe, neither doth it fall out aright in regard of all, but is for the most part very vn∣iust. For how often is glory and honour attributed to vices, yea to very execreable crimes & to the wicked, whereas it ought to be giuen to vertue and to good men? And if these haue sometime any commendation, yet it is very sparing. But it falleth out much woorse, when vertue receiueth blame in stead of praise. And when something is giuen to thē vnto whom it appertaineth, it cannot be stretched out farre, by reason of the diuersity and contrariety of natures, of minds and opinions, of the manners of men, and of people and nations. For how often commeth it to passe, that some condemne & blame that which others approoue and praise? Yea many times one and the same man will contradict himselfe through the incon∣stancie of his iudgement, now dispraysing that which before hee had praysed, and contra∣wise.

On the other side, albeit fame and commendation should bee neuer so great, yet it could not bee of any long continuance, considering that time consumeth, and bringeth an end to all that is vnder the heauens. Moreouer wee see what great alterations are daily wrought by time: and although praise were perpetuall among the liuing, yet what could it profit the dead? or what feeling can they haue of that, more then of blame and infamie? For the praise which good kings and Princes haue purchased by their vertues, and the memory * 1.65 they haue left behinde them among men, can profit them no more in regard of the world, then the memorie of that infamie and dispraise, which tyrants haue left behinde them can do them any hurt. For how well or ill soeuer men speake and thinke on of another, the dead haue no sense at all thereof. Yea it is likely, that they care not greatly for it, & that they rest neuerthelesse at their case for all that. Therefore we may well conclude, that notwithstan∣ding al the praise and reward which wisedome & vertue can receiue from men in this world yet they are still very miserable, if there be no better prouided for them elsewhere. And if wise and vertuous men hope for another reward, they must needes beleeue a second life, in which they shall be recompensed for their good and iust works. But further, when a learned and wise man hath by his spirit discoursed and gone through the heauens, the planets and starres, beasts, men, and through al nature, yea hath reached to the Angels, and euen to God himselfe the Creator & king of the whole world, ••and hath passed through al histories both new & old, and hath gotten the knowledge of al things contained in thē, that haue come to passe in the world: I pray you let vs cōsider what he can be told of, that wilbe more grieuous, * 1.66 more bitter & fearefull vnto him, then of death, and what consolation can he receiue when he shal vnderstād, that his soule which hath seene & beheld so great riches, so many goodly and excellent things, and which hath bin as it were the storehouse & treasurie of them, shal be wholly extinguished in the middest of such a goodly, pleasant, and wonderfull scaffold and theatre, that is so excellently adorned with all kind of beauty, so that it shall neuer be a∣gaine at any time or in any place, nor shall haue any more sense and feeling then the soule of a beast hath. What is hee, who after such a consideration of death, should not haue great cause to feare it, in so great miserie as may befal him in his life? Doe we thinke that these mē among the Heathen who heretofore slain themselues to eschew the hands of their enemies and that shame and infamie which they feared to receiue among men, & who haue accoun¦ted it an act of great vertue & constancie to kill themselues in that maner for the auoiding of shame, would haue done that which they did, if they had not thought that there had bin another life besides this? At lest wise Cato Vticensis for his part testified this vnto vs, who the * 1.67 same night in which he had purposed to kill himselfe (which he did because he would not fall into the hands and subiection of Iulius Caesar, against whome he had taken Armes in that ciuill war) caused those Dialogues of Plato to be read vnto him, in which hee maintai∣neth and confirmeth the immortality of the soule, according to the doctrine of his master Socrates. We may then iudge by the contrary, what consolation it is to a good and wise man, against all the miseries that can befal him in this world, if he knoweth and is assuredly per∣swaded, that there is a resting place prepared for him not therein to be depriued of all sense * 1.68 of good and euill, as they imagine who seeke for rest in death without all hope of another life, but a place of happines for them that with a good heart and Wil haue giuen themselues to vertue and holinesse, which is appointed by God, who is all iust almighty, & all good. For what rest can that thing find, which is not at all? So that if man be no more after the death of the bodie, then death cannot bring him any rest at all. And therefore we may say of this rest, that as God is not the God of the dead but of the liuing, according to the testimony of Iesus Christ, so rest is not for them, that are not, but for them that are. For rest presupposeth a being, because the thing it selfe must needes be, as well as the rest that belongeth to it: o∣therwise neither of them both should haue any being. Thus then wee may iudge, after so many reasons taken from nature, and hauing had so many testimonies as haue hitherto beene alleadged, from the authority and sayings of men, on which side the truth is most certaine, whether with them who haue all good and wise men on their side, or with the other, who haue none but foolish and wicked men.

We haue then in this matter which now we follow, the iudgement, authority and sen∣tence * 1.69 of all the greatest and most excellent men in the world, with the greatest and chiefest part of all mankind. Vnto whose testimony we further may adde religion, iustice, holinesse, and al vertues which are so grounded, and laide vpon the immortalitie of mans soule, that if this foundation be taken from them, they are altogether ouerthrowen. For albeit they

haue their chiefest foundation in God, neuerthelesse he hath so ordained and ordered them, that they cannot take place, if there bee no immortality of soules, and that for the rea∣sons already declared. It followeth then well, that truth is on their side. For truth will rather stand for them, then for vices, villanies, and notorious wickednesse, vnto which the morta∣lity of the soule is more agreable then the immortality. And if all the Philosophers were not able to attaine to the knowledge of the soules nature, nor define the immortality thereof, we ought not to be greatly a••ashed, if such as were most ignorant, vile, and abiect of them (as they are called by some of the best of the Ancients) abused themselues so grossely, and spake so vnreuerently, seeing many of the greater sort and of good account, fell so shameful∣ly, and shewed themselues to be worser then beasts in some things wherof a man may iudge by the outward senses. For haue there not some beene found, who albeit they saw the snow white, yet they durst maintaine that it was blacke, and that pepper was white, and al∣though they felt the fire hote and burning, yet affirmed that it was colde? But for this time * 1.70 let vs leaue the opinions of Philosophers, and speake somwhat of them, who although they do not beleeue the immortality of soules, nor yet all that is spoken of GOD or of religion, say notwithstanding that it is good for the life of man, that men should bee of that opi∣nion, without which humane society could not bee kept inuiolable, neither would men doe any thing, as they ought, if they were not as it were with a bridle kept backe by this feare, that there is another life after this, and that there are gods to take vengeance of such as haue done euill. And therefore they say, that feare was the first that made gods. Hereof they conclude, that religion is nothing, but onely in opinion, yea that it is no∣thing else but superstition, which proceedeth from this foolish opinion. But seeing this er∣rour serueth for the benefit of mans life, it is good, say they, to vpholde it, and to confirme men therein.

And they that vse this speech, are none of them that are taken to bee fooles and igno∣rant persons, but of the greater and skilfuller sort of people, yea of the wisest men of the world according to the iudgement of men. For when wee speake of good men and * 1.71 such as are wise, wee must iudge of them according to the matter which we handle, and according to the iudgement of God in his word. Therefore, if according to this reason wee iudge of these men of whom wee now speake, they shall bee found to be the grosest and most blockish beastes that the earth beareth. For all science, wisedome, and great∣nesse, separated from vertue, are not the things themselues indeede, but brutishnesse ra∣ther, and vile basenesse. And if wee indge otherwise, what is all the knowledge, wisedome and greatnes that is in all men, in respect of that which is one Diuell onely? For what want the diuels from being Angels like to those blessed Angels that contiue still in their obedi∣ence vnto God? If there bee any question made for greatnesse of spirit, they are all spi∣rit. If for such wisedome and knowledge as that cunning and wise men of this world haue, of whom haue worldly wise men learned their skill but of them, in comparison of whom they are but young schollers? If the question bee for greatnesse, what King or Prince in the world is so great as they? For who is called the Prince of this world by Iesus Christ, the God of this world by Saint Paul, principalities, powers, worldly gouernours, * 1.72 and the princes of the darknesse of this world? Are not the Diuels so called, who rule and gouerne the great ones of the whole world, that are great indeed according to men, but not according to God? What then doe they want of being celestiall Angels, but vertue and goodnesse? But because these men of whom we speake now, beleeue not that there are Angels or Diuels, wee will beate them with other arguments. For of these men also there bee some that say, we must liue as the most doe, but follow the opinion of the few∣est. Now then, when they would haue men to bee perswaded to vertue, and to doe their duety by lying and errour, namely, by intertaining in them an opinion of religion, and of a second life, although there bee no such thing, is not this, a very proper means to call all truth into question, and to trample all vertue vnderfeete? For it any propound the immortality of soules vnto men, not as if it were a true matter, but as a fayned * 1.73 and false thing which yet they would haue them beleeue as true, to the end that through the feare of Gods iudgement they might bee kept backe from euill, and lead vnto good¦nesse, euery one may guesse easily, how men will dispence with themselues, when they once know, that whatsoeuer is spoken and propounded vnto them, is but a scarre-crowe to make them affraide, as we vse to deale with little children and with birds by puppets and strawe men, and such like things. And who will first perceiue and finde out these subtilties, such

as are most ignorant and foolish, or the other that are more skilfull and wise? It is easie to iudge, that they who haue best wits and are best learned, will sooner perceiue the same then the other.

Now what will follow hereupon, but that they being freed from the feare which held thē in before, shall by the same means be let loose and sundred from the bond of all religion and vertue, as if it were cleane broken: as it hath and daily doth happen to them that maintaine this opinion, and to those also that haue bin taught & instructed in their schoole. And con∣sequently this also will follow, that the quicker and sharper wit a man hath, and the greater knowledge and vnderstanding is in him, the more wicked and bad he will prooue. For if he vnderstand that religion is but religion in name, and indeed is nothing but foolish supersti••¦tion, and if he iudge as much of the immortality of the soule: hauing thus shaken off all reli∣gion, he will cast away all feare of God, & not suffer himselfe to be bridled in any sort, either by any terrour of the iudgement to come, or reuerence of the deity, but only by the feare of mens lawes. And if this take place in men, we may well thinke what licence they will take to themselues to commit the greatest sins & abhominations in the world, especially if they be in darknes, and think no man seeth them, & that there is no other iudge that perceiueth them, to whō they must one day giue an account. And if they be so great, that by their pow∣er they may violate all lawes both diuine and humane, as tyrants commonly vse to do, who shall stay them from liuing like sauage beasts among men? So that as euery one by dexterity of spirit, by doctrine and instruction, shall approch neerer to that perfection for which man was created of God, the more inclined, ready and armed he will be to commit all kind of malice and wickednesse. For how can he doe otherwise, when that secret of the schoole shall be disclosed vnto him, and when he shal learne, that whatsoeuer is here taught concer∣ning religion, vertue and honesty amongst men, is but fained and inuented for the nonce to keepe men in feare? Surely this will cause him to let loose the raines to all licenciousnesse. Now what corruption of the spirit and mind of man is there comparable to this? or what will sooner turne it aside from that perfection in which the soueraigne & chiefe good of it consisteth? Therfore seeing the cause standeth thus, this opinion of theirs cannot be true, but ouerthroweth it selfe. For whatsoeuer corrupteth the spirit and turneth it from his perfecti∣on, is contrary to the nature thereof.

Wherfore we must conclude, that it is far otherwise, & that this saying of theirs is as true * 1.74 as if one should say, that the perfecter a man is, the more he is vnperfect, the better he is, the worse he is: and the more truly he is man, the further off he is from the nature of a man, and more like to the nature of sauage beasts. Who then can doubt of the truth of the soules im∣mortality after so great a multitude of arguments, and of so strong and so mighty witnesses, who fight in battell aray, as it were a strong army, against them that vphold the contrarie? But we haue others no lesse worthy to be considered of, which we beare within our selues, and which are so common to all, that there is no man whatsoeuer, but he feeleth and percei∣ueth them, whether he will or no. Therfore it shall be good for vs to speake somewhat ther∣of also, to the end that the matter we haue in hand may be the better and more perfect∣ly vnderstood, to the confusion of Epicures and Atheists: and that we may still acknowledge more and more the testimonies of the image of God in vs, and who we be, and what good or euill things are prepared for vs in the immortality of the second life, according as we shall be conformed and reformed to the will of God, or els as we shall bee remooued from that image and giue credit to impiety and lies. Now it belongeth to thee, ACHITOB, to dis∣course of this matter.

Of those infernall testimonies, which all men carry within themselues, to conuince them that doubt of the immortality of the soule, and of the iudgement to come which shall be in eternall happines for the good, and perpetuall torment for the euill: how the very Heathen acknow∣ledged as much by reason taken from the te∣stimonies of nature. Chap. 96.

ACHI. The manifold miseries & scourges of Gods wrath wherwith mē are daily oppres∣sed, should minister vnto thē iust occasiō to think, how odious their sins & wickednes

are to God, and that he will not leaue them vnpunished, neither in this life nor in the life to come. For as he giueth to his children of his goodnes, and of those good things which hee hath prepared for them in another life, by the benefits which he communicateth vnto thē in this: so he setteth before our eyes testimonies of his wrath and of his iudgement, and of those euils and torments which he hath prepared for the wicked in another life, by them wherewith he vseth to correct and punish them here in this world, But besides this, euery one hath within himselfe testimonies either of eternall blessings or curses to come: which may easily conuince them that will not receiue the authority of the Scriptures, nor any na∣tural reason to prooue the immortality of the soule. For they beare about them all their wit∣nesses and their owne condemnation: and therefore it will be an easie matter to conuince them, although not to confound them. I say to conuince them, because a man is then con∣uinced, when he is compelled to acknowledge in his conscience, that hee hath no reason * 1.75 whereby hee is able to gain say and withstand the truth declared vnto him which condem∣neth him. But yet if he be obstinate, headstrong malicious and peruerse, he neuer ceaseth for all that to kick against the pricke, and to perseuere in his obstinacy and peeuish malice. For when reason faileth him, he armeth himselfe with impudency, like to a bold murderer, and to a shamelesse strumpet that cannot be made ashamed. But howsoeuer wicked men labour to blind their mind, and to harden their heart against the iudgement of God, yet the same is neuer declared vnto them, but they feele themselues pricked & pressed therewith, wil they, nill they: not that it fareth with them as it doth with Gods children, who are touched ther∣with vnto repentance, but as S. Paul speaking of the wicked and obstinate, saith, that God hath giuen them a pricking spirit, because they haue a bitter heart, which stirreth them to whet themselues as it were more and more against God, and to despite him, when they feele themselues pressed and vrged by his word and by his iudgements.

Now then God hauing created Angels and men, that they should know him and follow his will, gaue them a nature endued with vnderstanding, and hath set within them rules of * 1.76 iudgement, and of certen knowledge, which are vnto them as lawes in nature, and hath also placed in them the will with the affections, as ministers & practisers of those rules and lawes. This selfe same diuine prouidence hath appointed also that the affection of ioy: should be naturally in men, which commeth vnto them by reason of some good which they receiue or looke for when they obey his lawes that commandeth them to do iust things, as contra∣riwise, he hath put in them the affection of sorrow and heauines to take vengeance of the re∣bellion against his lawes, & of the transgression of them. For as God hath decreed, that the nature of man should lead a ioyfull life, and should by this means of ioy be preserued in the knowledge of God his creator & in his obedience, & so rest in him: so also he hath appoin∣ted flames of wrath & griefe to destroy this nature, when it doth not conforme it selfe vnto the rule of his heauenly wisdome & will. Therefore we may wel say, that we cary about with vs, as it were our paradise and our Hell, & haue already in this world true beginnings of thē both. For so long as we conforme our selues to God and follow his wisdome and wil, so that we submit our will to his, and desire not to be wise but in him and by him, nor iudge any thing good or euill, but according to his iudgement, neither will any thing but that which he willeth, and take no pleasure but in obeying & pleasing him, we cannot be thus affected towards him, but we shall receiue an vnspeakeable ioy by that mutuall participation of loue * 1.77 which is between him and vs, and by that tast which we receiue thereby of his goodnesse, bounty, grace, and fauour towards vs, which is the toppe of all happinesse. For as the na∣ture of men was created of God, to the end it might be conformable vnto him, so also it was ordained by him that it should liue, not to be extinguished and vndone through griefe, which is an euil that corrupteth and consumeth, as wel as diseases. Therfore if it were con∣formable to God, so that mens hearts agreed vnto reason and right iudgement, they should alwayes reioyce in well doing, both before and after the deed done: and so we should bee already as it were in Paradise. And although God be euery where in regard of his nature and diuine essence, which is infinite, neuerthelesse we meane according to the stile of the holy * 1.78 Scriptures, that he is properly and specially there, where he sheweth himselfe good, gra∣cious, and fauourable. For this is more proper to his nature in regard of vs, and that which maketh him more louing and amiable to vs, and which is most necessary for vs, and in regard whereof he calleth himselfe properly our God and our Father. But as he kindleth the spar∣kles o•• loue in their hearts that are vpright and sincere, that l••ue and honour him, which work••th in them so great ioy and consolation, that all other ioy and pleasure are nothing

vnto them in respect of that: so contrariwise, if we turne aside and separate our selues from him, opposing our selues against his wisdome and wil, as rebellious subiects to their Prince, violating all his lawes and statutes, he kindleth in vs fire-brands of his wrath and furie, which work in vs extreame griefs, so that we cannot beare them, but are consumed by them. For in this corruption and peruersenesse of nature, our heart burneth with the flames of this infernall fire with which it is kindled, and which striue against reason and right iudgement, * 1.79 euen before it hath committed the fault: neither doth it feare afterwards to cōmit the same, how great and enormious soeuer it be. But forasmuch as it belongeth to the iustice of God, to destroy that nature which is disobedient vnto him, he hath established this order, namely, that sorrow and griefe (as it were the hangman) should punish and destroy them that are guilty, as criminall persons are punished by the appointment of iustice. Wherfore although wicked men are oftentimes blockish and lulled asleepe, and as it were voide of all sence and feeling, so that they feele not this griefe to the quick, neuerthelesse, in the end it is through∣ly felt of them, so that it vtterly destroieth them. For it is like to a fire which hauing beene couered or smothered, afterwards kindleth againe, and gathereth strength, when it is re∣coueretd and receiueth aire, if it haue matter whereupon it may worke. For besides that na∣turall griefe which hath this office. God addeth thereunto horrible feare and terror, where∣by he ouerwhelmeth the wicked, as if he thundred vpon them: so that euen here they feele their Hell, and the fire of Gods wrath taking hold of them, yea they carry about them their internall furies, which are vnto them in stead of Hangmen.

Thus we may learne, how we may carry about with vs the matter of two fires, the one celestiall and diuine, the other infernall and diuilish. Wherefore let vs consider well with * 1.80 our selues, which of them we had rather haue kindled in vs, and which we ought to desire most, either that which giueth vs both light and heat, and preserueth vs in the hope of true life: or else that which burneth and consumeth vs and doth wholy depriue vs of that life. Now surely they are very wretched, who desire not that which is most agreeable to their owne nature, and vtterly detest and abhor the other. For as we delight in the fire, because it giueth vs light and warmeth vs: so we feare greatly to be burned and consumed by it. Now both these sorts of fire we find in God. For he is a fire to giue light and warmeth to them that approch and draw neere vnto him, and desire to walke in his light, but contrariwise he is a * 1.81 consuming fire, ioyned with smoake and obscurity, to them who by rebellion and disobedi∣ence rush against him. For this cause the fire of hell and of Gods wrath, which is prepared for the diuell and for all the reprobate, is called eternall fire in the holy. Scriptures, that is neuer put out: and the pains and torments of the damned are likewise called darknes with∣out, where shalbe weeping and gnashing of teeth. And to the end we might know the na∣ture of this fire the better, God hath put sparkles therof within vs. Wherefore we are only to consider what matter we bring to kindle and encrease either the one or the other; either for the preseruation of our nature and life appointed vnto vs by God, or els for the ouerthrow and destruction therof. And by the sense and feeling, which we may haue hereof that ioy, gladnes and contentation, which the knowledge of God and obedience to his will brin∣geth to our hart, we may also iudge whether there be a paradise, and another life & other ioy besides this, which we receiue by corporall pleasures, as beasts doe. For this ioy that cometh to vs from such pleasures, is common to vs with them, and vsually it endeth in sorrow and sadnesse. But they haue no other that commeth vnto their soule, of which they may haue any apprehension as we haue. And by the same consideration, wee may also in some sort iudge of that happines in which we shall be in the other life, when this ioy shalbe perfect in vs wherof we haue here but a very smal tast, in respect of that we shal haue, when we shalbe fully reformed according to Gods image, so that both our vnderstanding, reason & wil shall be made conformable vnto him, because we shalbe wholy swallowed vp in his loue. Con∣trariwise if here we feele a Hell which we carry about vs, and which greatly tormenteth vs, * 1.82 after we haue offēded the maiesty of God, especially when we haue cōmitted some horrible crimes, this also is another argument wherby we may iudge whether there bee not a Hel, & vengeance frō God to be executed vpon his enemie•• in another life. For that sorrow, which our crimes committed doe breed in our hearts, is within vs as a brand of this fire of Gods wrath, which is daily kindled in vs more & more. Wherfore if there be in vs already such vehement heate therof, when as yet the Lord doth kindle but a little the fire brands of his wrath in our hearts, how great shall it then be, when all his wrath shalbe set on fire? certainly they are very dul that do not well consider & vnderstand it. Now we haue heard heretofore

how the heathen Philosophers concluded the immortality of mans soule by the nature thereof, affirming that it is not created or compounded of corruptible matter, but is of a ce∣lestiall and diuine nature, by reason of that knowledge which it hath, not only of particular * 1.83 and corporall things, as the soule of beasts hath, but also of vniuersall and spirituall things, and namely, of God, of numbers, of order, of the difference between vertue and vice, and be∣tween honest and dishonest things. For the knowledge of all these things is so naturall to mens soules, that they are within them, albeit they haue not receiued them from without, either by doctrine or instruction. Whereby a man may easily iudge, yea it followeth neces∣sarily, that they are created of a more excellent nature then is that of the elemēts, of a nature that is incorruptible and perpetuall. Wherfore it is very euident, that this knowledge, thus naturall to mens soules, is a certaine testimony, that they are not borne at all aduenture, but are created by great art, and by a wonderfull prouidence of that diuine and eternall nature, by which they haue their being, namely God their Creatour, for which cause also the know∣ledge of him shineth in vs. So also we may well iudge, that God hath not in vaine placed in our nature the knowledge of the differēce, that is between vertue and vice, between things honest & dishonest, and that griefe which is to take vengeance in vs of those vices & crimes of which we feele our selues guilty. And therefore the Heathen themselues concluded, that there was not only a diuine iustice and nature which discerned good men from euill, but also that there was another life after this, in which this iudgement should be made. For they con∣sidered what great torments the wicked feele in their heartes and conscience, after they haue committed horrible crimes: and that there is none so audacious and obdurate, not the greatest mocker and contemner of God and of his iudgments that can be, who can alwaies exempt himselfe from this dolour and paine, notwithstanding he labour with all his might to the contrary. For there is alwaies a certaine secret vertue of Gods iustice, which goeth be∣yond them all, and euermore punisheth the wicked. Now it is certen, that these things come not thus to passe at all aduenture.

In like manner it is not possible, that this knowledge which men haue to discerne ver∣tues * 1.84 from vices should be a causual thing, and come thus to passe at aduenture, without the certaine prouidence of God. For if it were so, that there were no punishment appointed for vices, and no more benefit or ioy prepared of God for the good then for the euill, it should follow that all this knowledge should bee giuen to man in vaine. For it should doe him no more good then if he were without it as brute beasts are. Moreouer, seeing all the wicked are not punished in this life, it followeth necessarily, that there is another life wherin they shall be punished, and in which also God will acknowledge the iust, and cause them to enioy that good which he hath prepared for them. For God cannot be God, but he must be all good, all iust, and almightie. If he be good, he cannot hate the good or them that doe it, but loue them so, as that he cannot do otherwise. For how should he not loue his like? And as he can∣not hate goodnes or good men, so he cannot loue euill, nor the wicked that follow after it, but hateth them necessarily as contrary to his nature. Now Loue is of that nature, that it * 1.85 cannot but desire and procure the good and honor of him whom it loueth: as contrariwise, hatred cannot but desire and procure the the hurt and dishonour of him whom it hateth. It followeth then necessarily, that God being good and iust, loueth good and iust men, de∣siring and procuring their honour and their good: and contrariwise, that hee hateth vniust and wicked men desiring and procuring their confusion and ruine. And if he haue this de∣sire and this will, no doubt but he can easily and doth also execute the same, seeing hee is all iust and almightie. Truely this conclusion cannot seeme to bee ill grounded, and those Heathen Philosophers, who thereupon haue concluded the immortality of soules, and the iudgement of God in another life, had good reason so to doe. For it is taken not on∣ly from the nature of man and from the image of God after which he was created, but also from the very nature of God. So that whosoeuer gain-saieth the same, hath no more reason then if he said, that there is no God, and that God is not God, & that man is not man, & that he differed in nothing from a beast, neither God from the diuell. And so not onely all na∣ture should be ouerthrowne, but God also, the authour and Creator therof. For we see almost vsually, that the wickedst men haue the greatest honors in this world, & liue most at their ease, as we haue already shewed. If then there be a God, and any prouidence and iustice in him (now who can so much as think there is none, but he may also perswade himselfe with∣all that there is no world nor any creature, and that himselfe is not the same he is?) it must * 1.86 I say, of necessitie follow that if God be, there is also another life in which that iustice shalbe

performed, which is not here executed, and in which both iust and vniust shall receiue euery one the reward of his iustice or iniustice. For it is impossible, that God who is so good and so iust a nature, should create mankinde in that sort, as if hee had created the best and iustest part thereof, onely to misery and wretchednes, and the worst to ioy and happinesse. Now continuing our discourse of those internal testimonies, which euery one of vs beareth within him of the immortality of the soule, we will speake tomorrow of conscience, which presseth men to stand in awe of God and of his iudgements. It is your part, ASER, to in∣treate of this matter.

The end of the twelfth daies worke.

Notes

• * 1.1

  A reason of Atheists con∣futed by a si∣militude.
• * 1.2

  Luk. 16. 26.
• * 1.3

  Nath. 28. 9. Mark. 16. 14. Luke 24. 36. Ioh. 20. 19, 20 Act, 1, 2, 3, 10. 1. Cor. 15. 6.
• * 1.4

  Exod. 36. Mat. 22. 32, 33. Mark. 12. 26. Luke 20. 37, 38.
• * 1.5

  The resurre∣ction of the dead proued.
• * 1.6

  2. Thes. 1. 6, 7
• * 1.7

  How wee know the hid∣den things in nature.
• * 1.8

  An argument taken ••••om the know∣ledge of the sou••e to proue immmortall.
• * 1.9

  Eternity con∣sidered di∣••••••sly
• * 1.10

  A special dif∣ference be∣tween the soule o•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and of 〈◊〉〈◊〉. A firme 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the soul••s immortalitie.
• * 1.11

  A fit com∣parison.
• * 1.12

  Gen. 1 26.
• * 1.13

  Why man was said to be a liuing soule.
• * 1.14

  How God daily createth soules.
• * 1.15

  What a mira∣cle is.
• * 1.16

  Buggery vio∣latteth the law of nature.
• * 1.17

  God is the onely father of our spirit.
• * 1.18

  Three things vnseparable.
• * 1.19

  The desire of perpe••u••ty, an argument of the soules im∣mortalitie.
• * 1.20

  Another de∣sire, which is to continue our memory for euer.
• * 1.21

  Another de∣sire of perpe∣tui••••e, appea∣ring in fune∣ralles
• * 1.22

  An obiection
• * 1.23

  The answere to it.
• * 1.24

  Of the true immortality.
• * 1.25

  An argument takē from the apprehension o•• death to proue the im∣mortality of soules.
• * 1.26

  Of the end of good and euil men.
• * 1.27

  The right Armes of Machiauelliā Nobility.
• * 1.28

  An argument of the plea∣sures of the soule to shew the immorta∣lity thereof.
• * 1.29

  Some more like to be••sts then men.
• * 1.30

  How we must iudge of the nature of the soule.
• * 1.31

  Of the true pleasures of the soule.
• * 1.32

  An argument from insa∣tiable plea∣sures for the immortality of the soule.
• * 1.33

  A corrupt spi∣rit taketh the shadow of things for the things them∣selues.
• * 1.34

  An argument taken from vi∣ces for the immortality of the soule.
• * 1.35

  How God punisheth vi∣cious desires.
• * 1.36

  Esay. 38. 12.
• * 1.37

  2. Pet. 1. 13. 14.
• * 1.38

  2. Cor. 5. 1, 2.
• * 1.39

  Heb. 13. 14.
• * 1.40

  An argument taken from the frame of mans b••dy to proue the im∣mortality of his soule.
• * 1.41

  Another argu¦ment taken from the mo∣tion & rest of the soule.
• * 1.42

  Of a fish cal∣led Vranos∣copos.
• * 1.43

  Except the soule be im∣mortal, man was created in vaine.
• * 1.44

  The immor∣tality of the soule is linked to the religiō and proui∣dence of God
• * 1.45

  An argument taken from the consent of all people.
• * 1.46

  Other rea∣sons to the same end.
• * 1.47

  Acts. 3. 2••.
• * 1.48

  What the end of a thing is.
• * 1.49

  Of the multi∣tude and qua∣lity of witnes∣ses to prooue the immorta∣litie of the soule.
• * 1.50

  What kinde of Philoso∣phers Atheists and Epic••re•• were.
• * 1.51

  An argument taken from the desire of wisedome to prooue the immortalitie of the soule.
• * 1.52

  1. Cor. 13. 12.
• * 1.53

  An obiection made by some philosophers.
• * 1.54

  The answere.
• * 1.55

  Aristotles opi∣nion touch∣ing the im∣mortalitie of the soule.
• * 1.56

  How the vn∣derstanding commeth to the know∣ledge of out∣ward things by the senses.
• * 1.57

  How the out∣ward senses looke vpon things.

  How the in∣ternall senses receiue the same things.
• * 1.58

  How the Spi∣rit receiueth them from the internall senses.
• * 1.59

  Other rea∣sons for the immortalitie of the soule.
• * 1.60

  The soule cannot bee diuided.
• * 1.61

  Other rea∣sons for the immortality of the soule.
• * 1.62

  Prou. 10. 24.
• * 1.63

  Euery one na¦turally desi∣reth life.
• * 1.64

  Reasons taken from reward and praise to prooue the immortality of the soule.
• * 1.65

  The dead hau•• no fee∣ling of praise.
• * 1.66

  Death most lamentable to the best men, i•• the soule were not im∣mortall.
• * 1.67

  Cato belee∣ued the im∣mortality of the soule.
• * 1.68

  What com∣fort it is to beleeue a place of rest after this life.
• * 1.69

  What store of testimonies stand for the immortalitie of the soule.
• * 1.70

  Of such as say it is good to keepe men in this opinion of the immor∣tality of the soule, and yet themselues beleeue it not
• * 1.71

  How we must iudge of a wise man.
• * 1.72

  Ioh. 12. 32 2. Cor. 4. 4. Eph. 6. 12.
• * 1.73

  The inconue∣niences which follow the former opini∣on of perswa∣ding men to goodnes by false meanes.
• * 1.74

  That which corrupteth the spirit is cōtrary to the nature of it.
• * 1.75

  The differēce betwixt con∣uincing and confounding a man
• * 1.76

  Internal testi∣monies of the immortality of the soule.
• * 1.77

  The cause of true ioy of the spirit.
• * 1.78

  Where God is said to be especially.
• * 1.79

  The true cause of griefe and torment.
• * 1.80

  How men ca∣ry about them the matter of two fires.
• * 1.81

  Deut 4 24. Heb. 12. 29. Esay 66. 24. Mat. 22. 13. & 25. 30.
• * 1.82

  A sure argu∣ment in the wicked of their future torment in another life.
• * 1.83

  Naturall rea∣sons to proue the immorta∣lity of mens soules.
• * 1.84

  The naturall knowledge of good and euill an argument of our immor¦tality.
• * 1.85

  The nature of loue & hatred.
• * 1.86

  The necessity of another l••••e after this.