The French academie Fully discoursed and finished in foure bookes. 1. Institution of manners and callings of all estates. 2. Concerning the soule and body of man. 3. A notable description of the whole world, &c. 4. Christian philosophie, instructing the true and onely meanes to eternall life. This fourth part neuer before published in English. All written by the first author, Peter de la Primaudaye, Esquire, Lord of Barre, Chauncellour, and Steward of the French Kings house.

Of another argument for the immortalitie of the soule taken from that naturall desire which men haue knowledge: of Aristotles opinion touching the immortalitie of the soule: of other reasons of Philosophers to prooue that the spirit cannot be of a corruptible and mortall nature: and how iust men should be more mise∣rable, and should haue more occasion to feare and to eschew death, then the vniust and wicked, if the soule were mortall, Cap. 94.

AMANA. There is in all men a naturall desire of knowledge and wisedome: yea a man may perceiue that most barbarous men desire naturally to know, vnto what Art soe∣uer they apply their spirit, iudging the same to bee commendable and honest, as contrari∣wise they accompt it vnbeseeming a man and dishonest, to be ignorant, to erre, and to be de∣ceiued. From this desire the wisest and most famous among the Philosophers tooke a very good argument to prooue the immortality of the soule. For seeing this desire is naturall, and that in this world all the knowledge and wisedome that men can haue, is the very small, and as it were nothing in respect of that which they want, they conclude necessarily, that there must needs be some other place and time then in this life, wherein that which is heere begunne but slenderly, is to be accomplished and made perfect.

The reason from whence they deriue their argument, is that common saying, that God * 1.1 and Nature the minister of God doe nothing without cause. Wherfore seeing this desire of knowledge and wisedome is naturall in man, it cannot be in vaine, neither is it giuen vnto him, but that it should attaine to some end and perfection. For to what purpose serued the corporall eies of liuing creatures, & for what cause should they begiuen them, if they could neuer see, or were to liue alwaies in darknesse? So likewise, why should the eies of the soule and minde be giuen to men, thereby to behold celestiall and diuine things, which cannot be seene with bodily eies, if they could neuer veiw them, but in such darknesse as they do here behold them? To what end also should man be naturally pricked forward with a desire to know the truth & to haue skill, if he could neuer soundly enioy his desire, but should remain alwaies in ignorance for the greatest part of those things, which he desireth to know & which are of so great waight, that whatsoeuer he is able to vnderstand and know in this world, is nothing or very little in regard of that which yet remaineth behinde for him to know? For not to speak of those things in which al humane philosophie must acknowledge her ignorāce, let vs come to that vnderstanding which we may haue by the holy Scriptures reuealed vnto vs of God. For although the knowledge we haue by thē, surpasseth without al comparison all humane philosophie & science, yet S. Paul cōpareth it to knowledge that is very obscure, to a light that is seene through thick & darke clouds, & to an image presen∣ted * 1.2 vntovs in a glasse, in comparison of that most high and perfect knowledge and vnder∣standing, which is reserued for vs in another life, and whereof we haue here but a very little taste & weake beginning. Therefore if we could neuer goe further, would it not be a vaine and ridiculous thing, if God had giuen this desire onely to men, & neuer would vouchsafe to let them haue the effect of it? And if it were so, that GOD had not ordeined another time and place, for the finishing of that which is here begunne in this life, it seemeth that the complaint made by some of the greatest Philosophers against Nature, should not be with∣out some ground of reason. For what iust cause is there, that he should giue a longer life to some beasts then to men, seeing it skilleth not whether beasts liue long or no, because long life cannot make them more learned, or more wise then they are at their birth? But it * 1.3 is otherwise in man. For seeing that knowledge and wisedome are his greatest Good, wher∣by he approcheth neerer to the nature of God, and of which all his other good things chiefely depend, it seemeth to stand with reason, that God should haue giuen a longer life to men then to beasts, that so they might the better attaine to so great a good, so necessary for them, in regard of which especially, they are preferred before beasts and differ from them. For we see by experience, that we must die so soone almost as we beginne to taste of Sciences, and to waxe wise. But we haue no cause to make this complaint against the wise∣dome, * 1.4 prudence, and goodnesse of God, who hath granted vs life long enough, wherein we may learne heere as much as we neede, (if wee could vse it well) both to passe away this life, and also to attaine to the other ••n which we shall abound in knowledge and wisedome

and be fully satisfied therewithall. And although God hath giuen vs a life twice as long in this world as that we now enioy, so that we might liue as long as the anncient Patriarkes, whose yeares were so many, especially before the flood as Moses testifieth, yet al that which we could possible learne during the time of so long life, would be very little in cōparison of the knowledge reserued for vs in that Eternitie. For the eies of our spirit and minde are not able to endure so great brightnesse of heauenly knowledge and wisedome, whilest it is here shut vp and as it were imprisoned in this body of sinne, and in a manner wholy ouerwhel∣med with darkenesse but it fareth with the spirit in this respect, as it doth with the Owle in regard of his eyes, and of the light of the Sunne. Therefore euery one hath better cause to assure himselfe, that God hath appointed an other time and place for the full accomplish∣ment of this desire of knowledge and wisedome that is so firmely engrauen in the nature of men, then to accuse God, as if he offered them iniury to depriue them therof by the short∣nesse of their life. Now let vs come to other particular reasons of Philosophers concerning this matter we haue in handling, Although Aristotle so famous amongst them bee very ob∣scure * 1.5 and wauering where hee handleth the same, so that it is a very hard matter to vnder∣stand what was his opinion and resolution therein, neuerthelesse he dares not plainely say that the spirit of man is of a bodily nature & corruptible matter, or that it is mortall as the body is. But in one place he saith, that if the Spirit be able to vnderstand without the fanta∣sie, it may be separated from it: but it cannot vnderstand without it, then it cannot be sepa∣rated. Which is alone as if he saide, that if the spirit could vnderstand without the senses, & the vnderstanding and reason without fantasie and imagination, then a man might certain∣ly conclude, that there is a difference in nature & substance betweene these things, & that there may a separation be made: so that the destruction of the one doeth not bring with it a corruption of the other. Wherefore none may conclude the mortality of the spirit that is capable of reason and vnderstanding, by the immortality either of the externall or internall senses. But Aristotle leaueth it doubtfull in this place, whether this separation may be made yea or no, and whether a man may conclude thereupon, that the spirit is of an other nature and substance then the senses are, and so consequently immortall. But it followeth not, that if the soule being in the body vnderstandeth things bodily, that is to say, by the bodily instruments that are outward, and then by the conuenience of the internall senses, therefore it can vnderstand nothing but that which they declare and bring vnto it. For after the in∣ternall * 1.6 senses haue gathered ••ogether the images and similitudes of those externall things that are offered vnto them, and so retaineth them fast being secluded and separated from all matter, the vnderstanding is to receiue from thence the first and simple knowledge of things. So that as the qualities of externall things are the matter subiect of the internall senses, so their images conceiued by the internall senses, and purged from all bodily matter, are the matter subiect of the vnderstanding and spirit. And the spirit labouring about them draweth out certaine motions, and knoweth many thinges from them, which cannot mooue the senses, and which the senses cannot know. And yet the spirit is first mooued by these images, as the senses are by externall things. But wee must declare these thinges somewhat more familiarly. We vnderstand already, how corporal things are the subiect and obiects of the corporall senses, and that the bodily senses receiue and know them corporal∣ly, euen such as they are presented vnto them, euery one according to his nature and office. But they cannot receiue or perceiue any more then that which is laied open vnto them, and manifesteth it selfe outwardly. Now after the outward senses haue thus receiued them and their matter couered with their qualities, the internall senses, to which the externall are seruiceable, conceiue the images without the matters and qualities of those thinges whereof they are images. For the eye cannot see either the Sunne or the light of it, nor yet any other creature discouered by the light, except it be present before it. But the Fantasie and imagination receiue and conceiue the images of things, euen in darkenesse, although * 1.7 the things of which they are images, apparant to the eyes, nor yet are perceiued at that present by any corporall sense. We see then already how these images are separated from the matter of which they are images, and how the internall senses behold them without their matter and bodies, as the externall senses looke vpon them being ioyned with their bodies.

Then hauing receiued them thus purged from their corporall matter, the spirit re∣ceiueth them yet more pure, and goeth further in the knowledge and vnderstanding of them then all the senses do, comprehending other things, of which the senses can

haue no knowledge or apprehension. And thus the Spirit beholdeth and vnderstandeth * 1.8 corporall things corporally, that is by meanes of those instruments which it hath in the bo∣dy, and spirituall things it beholdeth spiritually without those instruments. Whereupon it followeth, that although it vseth the senses and such kinde of instruments, neuerthelesse it is not so tied vnto them that it cannot be separated, or do nothing without them, or not know and vnderstand that which they are not able to conceiue or know. So that it is no * 1.9 hard matter to beleeue, that the soule is of another nature & substance, as a man may iudge also by this that it is the fountaine and beginning of motion begun by itselfe, & not by a∣ny other, but as we haue already declared. Likewise by this, that it is capable of the know∣ledge of infinite thinges, of which it retaineth the memory, and that it inquireth into secret things separated from all corporall matter, which cannot be perceiued by any sense: & that it doth so many and so great things without the helpe of any bodily nature. Wherupon the Philosophers conclude, that it is of a simple nature, not compounded, and so consequently that it is immortal. For that nature, which is adorned and decked with such vertues, & with the facultie to vnderstand, the like whereof is not in the body, and which can vnderstand by itselfe without the vse of the body, cannot be compounded of an earthly & mortal nature, nor haue any part thereof mingled with itselfe, but it is stayed and sustained by itselfe, it subsisteth of itselfe and is immortall. Hereof also it followeth, that if the soule of man be of such a nature, then it cannot be rent in sunder or diuided, or pulled into peeces, or haue any * 1.10 thing in it that can be separated from it: & so it must needes be that it cannot die or perish. And therefore the best and most excellent Philosophers hold that sentence as immoouea∣ble, which Aristotle saith in an other place, namely, that the spirit is a thing separate and di∣stinct from the senses and from the body, as an immortall thing from a mortall: and that it commeth from without, and else-where then from the body, as we haue already touched it in another place. Whereby to my thinking, he hath declared very plainly, that hee did not take the soule of man to be mortal. But yet it is somewhat hard to iudge what his opinon was, because he doth not shew himselfe so opēly as the matter requireth. Yet whatsoeuer he thought or resolued with himselfe, the soule shal not be therfore any whit the more mortall or immortall. For the immortality thereof dependeth not vpon his opinion, or of any other mans whatsoeuer. Neuerthelesse seeing so subtill and sharpe a Philosopher durst not affirme that it was mortall, euery one of any found mind may well iudge, that he knew there were too many arguments to the contrary, and those so waightie, that they deserued to bee dili∣gently, examined, and were not so lightly to be reiected. For he was not so shamefast & mo∣dest, but he durst boldly reiect and condemne the opinions and sentences of all others that were as well in his time as before him, how great and famous personages soeuer they were, when he thought hee could doe it with any shew of reason, insomuch as he spared not his master Plato. Therefore albeit wee had no other resolution from him touching this matter, but this only that he was in doubt, and durst affirme nothing on either side, yet his authori∣ty ought to preuaile much with vs against them who depende only of humane Philosophy and reason, & are so easily induced to approoue rather of the mortalitie then of the immor∣tality of the soule. For at leastwise they may imagine, that so great a Philosopher who is in such wonderfull estimation amongst all learned men, did not iudge their reasons friuo∣lous & vaine, who maintained the immortality of the soule, as our Epicures and Atheists thinke, because they are more blockish & foole hardie. And therfore they boldly condemne that which either they will not or cannot conceiue and comprehend, not considering what * 1.11 a confusion of things their opinion worketh in all mankinde. For besides that which wee haue spoken to this purpose alreadie, if it were so that the soule were mortall, the wickedest and most desperate men should haue that which they desire most, and which is most expe∣dient for them: and that should be fall the best and iustest men, which they abhorre most, & flee from as very hurtful for them: contrary to that which Salomon saith in the Prouerbs, That the wicked shall fall into the euill he feareth, and that the desire of the iust shall be accomplished. In * 1.12 regard whereof good men should haue far greater reason to feare death, then the wicked to desire it. For what good man is there of noble courage, who will not greatly abhorre death when he thinketh with himselfe, that it consumeth and swalloweth vp the whole man, as if he were buried in perpetuall darkenes? What consolation will serue him, and what comfort can a man offer him, that will be able to surmount the feare and horrour of death, but that he will expect and suffer it with great impatiencie and dispaire, when hee shall be through necessity brought vnto it? As for that consolation, which is taken from the necessitie of na∣ture,

and from the common condition of all men, it is very leane if there be no other. We see by them who are so greatly tormented, that they wish and aske after death, as after a hauen wherein they may be deliuered from that tempest and torment in which they are, although the greefe which they suffer breede such vowes and desires in them, yet if they haue but a small respite, they gather some consolation to themselues by some assurance, that their griefe will in time cease, or else that time and custome will make it lighter vnto them, and will teach them to beare it patiently.

To be short, life is so acceptable and beloued of euery one, that such as are most misera∣ble * 1.13 and wretched cannot be brought to leaue it but with great griefe, no not those who de∣stroy themselues with their owne hands. Whereby we may iudge, how much more better it is to them that haue not all these occasions to desire it. For euery one may imagine, what extreame griefe it would be to a good man, who for liuing honestly all his life time, and for all the good which he had euer thought, spoken or done, should not onely receiue honour nor recompence in this world, but which is no worse, (as it commonly falleth out among men) should receiue nothing but euil for good. And yet in the meane time he should see the woorst men, that wholly giue ouer thēselues to dishonor & despite God, enioy, the honors, riches, & pleasures of this world: and contrariwise himself to haue nothing but dishonour, shame, confusion, famine, pouerty, miserie, sorrow, torment, & oftentimes cruel death. What cōfort can such a body haue, if he thinke that there is no other reward after this life, nor any better estate for him then for the wicked & abhominable person in the world? And althogh none of al this shold euerhappen to good men, yet what contentation could they find in all the rewards which they should receiue in this world for recompence of their vertue? It is an easie matter to iudge by this, that the memorie of the name & praise of well doing doth not alwayes take effect, neither is it alwaies due to thē that haue it, but oftentimes very vniustly giuen. But from thee, ARAM, we shall receiue more full instruction touching this matter.

Notes

• * 1.1

  An argument taken from the desire of wisedome to prooue the immortalitie of the soule.
• * 1.2

  1. Cor. 13. 12.
• * 1.3

  An obiection made by some philosophers.
• * 1.4

  The answere.
• * 1.5

  Aristotles opi∣nion touch∣ing the im∣mortalitie of the soule.
• * 1.6

  How the vn∣derstanding commeth to the know∣ledge of out∣ward things by the senses.
• * 1.7

  How the out∣ward senses looke vpon things.

  How the in∣ternall senses receiue the same things.
• * 1.8

  How the Spi∣rit receiueth them from the internall senses.
• * 1.9

  Other rea∣sons for the immortalitie of the soule.
• * 1.10

  The soule cannot bee diuided.
• * 1.11

  Other rea∣sons for the immortality of the soule.
• * 1.12

  Prou. 10. 24.
• * 1.13

  Euery one na¦turally desi∣reth life.