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Of speech and speaking. Chap. 12.
HAuing spent all this day in discoursing of prudence, and of those vices that are contrary vnto it, I thinke that to finish this daies worke, wee shall doe well to take in hand againe, and to follow that which was too briefely hand∣led concerning the commendable effects of this vertue of prudence in the soule of a wise man. This appeareth no lesse in speech than in any other action thereof, forasmuch as of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. But it is a great vertue to speake little and well. The discourse of this matter I leaue to you my companions.
Surely the speech of man is a diuine worke, and of great admiration. And therfore wee ought to account it sacriledge to pollute and defile so holy a thing with filthy and vile talke. A good man alwaies draweth good things out of the treasure of his heart, and a * 1.1 wicked man euill things. Therefore I greatly commend that saying of Plutarke: That speech is as it were the nourishment of the soule, which is corrupted, and becommeth odious through the wicked∣nesse of men.
Hee that hath knowledge (saith the wise man) spareth his words: euen * 1.2 a foole, when hee holdeth his peace is counted wise, and hee that stoppeth his lippes pru∣dent. If any man long after life, and to see good daies, let him refraine his tongue from * 1.3 euill, and his lips that they speake no guile. For euery one shall eate of the fruite of his mouth to saluation, or to condemnation. But wee will heare ASER discoursing more at large vpon this matter.
In the writings of the learned we finde mention made of a double speech or rea∣son: * 1.4 the one internall, or of the minde, called the diuine guide: the other vttered in speech, which is the messenger of the conceites and thoughts of man. The end of the first is friend∣ship towards a mans selfe. For respecting onely the marke of vertue, through the instructions of philosophie, it maketh a man to agree alwaies with himselfe, it causeth him to complaine neuer, to repent him of nothing, it maketh him full of peace, full of loue and and of conten∣tation in his owne vertue, it healeth him of euery rebellious passion that disobei••th reason, of all contention betweene will and will, and of the contrariety of discourses. O rare excel∣lencie, which floweth from wisedome into the soules of blessed men! The end of the other reason, or vttered speech, is friendship towards others, which causeth vs to speake and teach whatsoeuer is fruitefull and profitable for euery one, and carrieth with it great force to per∣swade. Of this speech we purpose heere to intreate, as of that which occupieth no small place, but euen very great amongst the secrets of nature, and which ought to rauish vs into an ad∣miration of his workes who is author thereof. The Philosophers, diligent searchers out the reason of all things, say that speech is made by aire beaten and framed with articulate and di∣stinct sound. But howsoeuer it is framed, the reason thereof is harde to bee comprehended of * 1.5 humane sence. And wee ought to bee so much the more desirous to know for what cause it was giuen vs, and to feare least wee make it vnprofitable or wickedly imploy so great, won∣derfull, and diuine a thing. Democritus saide that words were the shadow of workes. Themisto∣cles * 1.6 compared speech to a rich cloth of tapestrie, figured and setfoorth with stories, because that both in the one and the other those things that are fashioned and represented, are then seene when they are opened and displaied, and are not subiect to sight, neither bring any delight or contentation, when they are folded vp and hidden. When a wise man openeth his lips (saith Socrates) we behold as it werein a temple, the goodly similitudes and images of the soule. Vertue (saith Plutarke) hath no instrument so gracious or familiar as speech, which being followed of workes, is of great efficacie and force, and wonderfully pricketh forward those that heare vs, causing them to giue credite to oursayings, and working in them a desire to resemble vs. Aschines said very well, that it is not so necessarie, that the Orator and the Law should agree in one and the same thing, as it is requisite, that the life of a Philosopher should be conformable and agreeable with his doctrine and speech. Moreouer, a wise man ought to take euery word he speaketh for a voluntary and particular law, laide vpon himselfe, seeing that Philosophie is a profession of serious, graue, and weighty matters, and not a play or prittle prattle, vnconstantly vttered to obtaine honor onely. Whereby we see that all talke ought to haue reason for a foundation, and the loue of our neighbour for a marke to aime at. This is that which Agabetus would teach vs, when he saith, That the tongue is a slipperieinstru∣ment, * 1.7 and bringeth great danger to those that neglect it: but if we direct it with a religious vnder∣standing,