A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part

CHAP. 7.

Shewing by reasons philosophicall, that aswell the phy∣sicall matter of bodies sublunary, as the celestiall bo∣dies which worke upon it, were of necessitie to have a beginning of their Beeing and Duration.

1 FOr further demonstration, that as well the Sunne, which is the effici∣ent generall, as the prime matter which is the common mother of bo∣dies sublunary, had a beginning of beeing, there can be no meane eyther more forcible or more plausible, then another Maxime much im∣braced and insisted upon by the great Philosopher, to wit, that as well the efficient as the materiall cause derive the necessitie of their causalitie from the end or finall cause, unto which they are destinated. The Sunne doth not runne its daily course from East to West, or make its annuall progresse from North to South, to get it selfe heate, or for the increase of its native force or vigour, by change of Climates; but for the propagation of vegetables, for the continuance of life and health in more per∣fect sublunary substances. If then wee can demon∣strate, that those vegetables or more perfect sublu∣narie bodies, for whose continuall propagation, for the continuance of whose life and well-fare the Sunne becomes so indefatigable in its course, had a true beginning of beeing, that the propagation is not infinitely circular: the cause will be concluded, that as well the common matter, whereof they are

made, as the Sunne it selfe which produceth them, had a beginning of beeing and operation from the same supreame cause, which appointed the Sunne thus to dispense its heate and influence, for the re∣liefe and comfort of this inferiour world. To prove that these sublunarie more perfect bodies, as vegetables, &c, had a beginning of beeing or propagation; no Argument can be more effectuall to the Naturalist, or others that will take it into serious consideration; than the discussion of that probleme, which Plutarch hath propounded, Whe∣ther the Egg were before the Hen, or the Hen before the Egg. The state of the question will be the same in all more perfect vegetables, or living Creatures, which usually grow from an imperfect or weake estate to a more perfect and stronger: [Whether the Acorne were before the Oake, or the Oake before the Acorne. Whether the Lyon had precedencie of nature to the Lyons whelp, or the Lyons whelp unto the Lyon. The induction may be for eyther part most com∣pleate, in respect of all times and of all places, if with the Naturalist wee imagine the world to have beene without beginning, or without ending. No Naturalist can ever instance in any more perfect feathered fowle, which was not first covered with a shell, or contained in some more imperfect filme; in any Bull which was not first a Calfe; in any Ly∣on, which was not first a whelp; in any Oake, which did not first spring from an Acorne: unlesse he instance in painted Trees, in brazen Bulls, or artificiall Lyons. Of live naturall substances it is universally true, (Omnia ortus habent, sua{que} certa

incrementa) All have their beginning, all their cer∣taine increase or augmentation. The induction again is for the other partie as compleate and perfect. There never was a true Acorne, which did not presuppose an Oake; nor a Lyons whelp which did not presuppose a Lyon to beget it, and a Ly∣onesse to bring it forth. Now every productive cause, every live-substance, which produceth ano∣ther by proper causalitie or efficiencie, hath al∣wayes precedencie of nature and of time, in respect of that which is produced by it. The Lyon is in order of nature and of time, before his whelp, and yet is every Lyon wherein the Naturalist can in∣stance, a whelp before it be a Lyon; so is the Oake, in order of nature and of time, before the Acorne, and yet cannot the Naturalist instance in any Oake, which was not an Acorne or plant before it grew to be an Oake. If then eyther the race of Lyons, or the propagation of Oakes, had no beginning; it would inevitably follow, that Oakes had beene perpetually before Acornes, and Acornes perpe∣tually before Oakes; That Lyons whelpes from eternitie had precedency or prioritie of time of Lyons, and Lyons the like precedencie or prioritie of time of their whelps. And if they had bin mutu∣ally each before other from eternitie, according to prioritie of time and nature, they must have beene mutually each after other. How the Naturalist will be able to digest this circular revolution of priori∣tie and posterioritie, in respect of the same indivi∣duall natures, or what hee will say to these follow∣ing inconveniences, I cannot tell, but desire to

know: Every whole or perfect Fish, which the Naturalist hath heard or read of, had beginning of its individuall Beeing from Spawne. This induction is most compleate and perfect in the Schoole of Nature, most irrefragable by the supposition of the Naturalist with whom wee dispute. Every Fish hath a beginning from Spawne, and that which hath a beginning from Spawne, hath a beginning of its beeing. No Fish or Spawne is or hath beene immortall, or without beginning. Now if it bee universally true, that every particular Fish hath its beginning, it implies an evident contradiction, to say that the race of Fishes, which consist onely of particular Fishes, was without beginning. There must in every race of Fishes be some first Fishes, or first Spawnes, before which there was none of the same kind, frō which this mutual propagation did take its beginning. And though this propagation be without end, yet could it not be without be∣ginning, unlesse wee would grant that fishes are not onely of an incorruptible nature, but of a na∣ture infinite or eternall. If there were no begin∣ning of this mutuall propagation, it would bee de∣manded whether the number of fishes or Lyons that shall bee (granting what the Naturalists sup∣pose, that this propagation shall be endlesse) can ever be as great, as the number of those Fishes and Lyons that have beene? Or whether the number of those that have beene, may not be conceived to be more infinite, or in another sort infinite, than the number of those that shall be. That the num∣ber of Fishes, or Lyons, which, from this time for∣ward,

may be, (suppose the world were never to end) can be no otherwise infinite then potentially or successively onely, or by addition, because there shall never be any last Lyon, or fish, &c. after which there shall bee no more, the Naturalist will not denie. For those Lyons or fishes, which from this point of time shall be, have as yet no actuall beeing, nor have they before this time had any such bee∣ing. Whence it is cleare, that their number can never be actually infinite, but infinite onely by ad∣dition, as continuate quantitie is by division.* 1.1 But if fishes have beene produced from Spawne, and Spawne from fishes, without any beginning of time, wee must of necessitie grant, that there have beene Fishes, Lyons, Oakes, &c. propagated each from other, for number actually infinite: for every Fish, which could produce Spawn, had actuall bee∣ing before it could yeeld Spawne, & every Spawne wherof any fish is made, hath actuall beeing before any Fish can be made of it. Whence if this propa∣gation had beene without beginning, their number must needes be actually infinite, so infinite that there could have beene no more than have beene, that there can be no more than now are. That onely is actually infinite, unto which nothing of the same kinde can be added. If this mutuall propagation had beene from eternity, the number of things pro∣pagated should have been actually infinite in every

point of time imaginable. It is impossible that any thing should be actually infinite from eternitie, and not bee alike actually infinite throughout every part of time; as infinite yesterday as to day, or as it shall be to morrow. It is againe impossible, that any thing should be actually infinite in any part of time, or by any succession of time, which was not infinite from eternitie, and before all times. If wee shall suffer our imaginations of mutuall pro∣pagations, to rove backward without an imagina∣tion or acknowledgement of some first beginning to stay or limit them, our soules shall finde as little rest (with lesse securitie) as Noahs Dove did, whi∣lest the earth was overflowed with water, if she had not returned to the Arke. Vnlesse wee thus pitch upon a first beginning of time and all things tem∣porall, we shall not only make shipwracke of faith, but drench our immortall soules in a bottomlesse lake or poole of absurdities, even in nature.

2 The conclusion arising from these premises, is, that albeit naturall reason or discourse could ne∣ver have found out that which Moses hath written, concerning the particular manner of the worlds creation; as that it, and all things in it, all the seve∣rall originals of propagation, were created in sixe dayes: yet Moses his narrations can onely give sa∣tisfaction to such Problemes, as men by light of nature may propose or cast, but can never, without the light of Gods word, be able to assoyle. By so much of this light as Moses in the first Chapter of Genesis holds out unto us, wee may easily free our selves from perpetuall wandring in that inextrica∣ble

maze of mutuall or circular precedencie, be∣tweene things generable, and their generative effici∣ents, which the Naturalist can never avoid, untill with us hee grant, that which the* 1.2 Philosopher by the light of Nature did indefinitely teach (Actus prior est potentia,) That which hath perfect beeing, is simply and absolutely before that which proceedeth from it, or is brought to perfection by it. Thus Moses tells us, Gen. 1. vers. 11. That there was an earth, before there was any grasse, that out of this earth was brought forth hearb yeelding seede; and fruit trees yeelding fruit with seed in them, before there was any propagation by seede. So he tels us againe, vers. 21. That God created great Whales, and eve∣ry living creature ••at moveth in the waters after their kinde, before there was any Spawne of fishes or seede of fowles: For so it followes in the 22. ver. That God blessed them, (after hee had made them) saying, Be fruitfull and multiply, and fill the waters and the Seas, and let fowle multiply on the earth. And it was this blessing upon fish and fowle (thus crea∣ted at once, that is, made perfect in their kinde, not by growth or succession, but by present operation of his Omnipotent power) which gave first begin∣ning to the naturall propagation of Fishes and Fowles by Seede or Spawne. Againe, in as much as the greatest Whales or other creatures most per∣fect

in their kinde, though produced in a moment, did presuppose a possibilitie of their being, and in their most perfect actual beeing include more than a possibilitie of not beeing, a necessary inclination to returne unto the matter or masse out of which they were made. This beeing which they have, pre∣supposeth an infinite and pure act, which every way hath precedencie of them, as having no cause at all of his beeing, but is beeing it selfe, without pos∣sibilitie of not beeing. The manner or method which Moses observed in the Creation, was this: Hee made the Heaven and Earth and first masse, of meere nothing, that is, without any masse or sub∣ject visible or invisible praeexistent, whereon to worke. That imperfect masse of this great Spheare, now distinguished into its severall parts, and, with∣in sixe dayes, adorned and beautified in every part beyond all skill of Art, was the first effect or prime worke in order of time or nature of his all sufficient active power or efficiencie. Out of this masse hee made all things visible in their kind, not by meanes or efficiencie naturall, but by the same supernaturall or Omnipotent power, by which he made the first masse out of nothing. In the prime and Cardinall workes of the sixe dayes, the Almighty did pro∣ceede, though by supernaturall efficiencie, in that order or method, which Nature, by his appoint∣ment, since hath followed. Man which is the most perfect visible creature, was the last made, & next before him, the beasts of the field, which are next in perfection to him: Next before them, the fowles of the Ayre and fishes of the Sea; and immediately

before them, the Sunne, the Moone, and the Stars. But in the severall fountaines or roots of propaga∣tion by seede, hee baganne the contrary way. Hee first made man perfect, before hee gave him the power of propagation. So did hee make every li∣ving creature actually perfect in his kinde, before he gave them power to increase and multiply by natu∣rall seede or inchoation of now being.

3. It is a conceipt groundlesse, either in Philo∣sophy or Divinitie, which some late Divines as∣well of the Romish as of Reformed Churches, not without faire pretence of Saint Augu∣stines * 1.3Authoritie, have taught, that all things were created at once, or in one day, by the Almightie maker: that the mention of Gods six daies worke, is interserted by Moses, onely for distinction sake, or in respect of our incapacitie to conceive di∣stinctly of Gods workes. But if all things had beene made in this sense, at once, that is, upon one day: no reason could be given why Gods com∣mendation

of something which hee made, should bee omitted, and exprest upon the making of o∣thers; or why the commendation of his workes, should have beene oftner exprest than once, if the productiō or finishing of al things which he made, had beene momentarie, or in the compasse of one day. Now in the first part of Moses his historie [In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth] we doe not reade, that God saw it was good. What is the reason? because as yet they were not perfected in their kind; but destinated onely unto more perfection. Of the light which was created the first day (saith Moses) God saw that it was good. But so he saith not of the second dayes worke, which was the separation or divisi∣on betweene the waters which are above the fir∣mament, and the waters beneath it. What doth this omission of the divine approbation intimate unto us? thus much, if no more, That the second dayes worke did not bring the waters to that per∣fection and use whereunto they were destinated. But of the third dayes worke, in which the earth was severed from the waters, under the firma∣ment, and enabled by his creative power, to bring forth Hearbes and other Vegetables, God (saith Moses) saw that it was good. And so it is likewise said of the fourth dayes worke, in which the Sun and Moone and the Stars were made; and so likewise of the fift, wherein the water was authorized to bring forth fowles and fishes perfect in their kind: and lastly of the sixt day, wherein man was made, it is said, that God saw all that he had made, and it

was exceeding good. To explicate every dayes worke in particular, would require a larger Treatise, then we project our intended Commen∣taries upon the Apostles Creede, shall bee. Of such Euangelicall mysteries, as the Historie of the sixt dayes worke and the seaventh dayes rest, did by way of Embleme, portend or foreshadow, wee shall have occasion to treate, when wee come un∣to the Sonne of Gods consecration unto his ever∣lasting Priesthood; or of the Sonne of mans resi∣ding three dayes and three nights, in the wombe of the earth: which speech of our Saviour, cannot bee verified either of three naturall dayes, or of three artificiall dayes and nights, but hath a pecu∣liar reference to three of those evenings and mor∣nings, which Moses mentioneth in the historie of the Creation. The taske for the present under∣taken, was to shew the* 1.4 possibilitie of the Creati∣on, or making all things of nothing, and that there is a necessitie in nature, that things generable

should have a beginning, that the propagation of living Creatures, could not be from Eternitie, not before all times imaginable. And if sublunarie sub∣stances, or vegetables had a beginning: Not the Elements onely whereof they are made, but the Heavens themselves, the Sunne, the Moone, the Starres, by whose influence they are produced, must have their beginning too; because the end of their beeing, of their operation, of continuance in their course or order, is for the continuall pro∣pagation of vegetables, and living bodies. I may conclude this first point, with that acute collecti∣on of Iustin Martyr, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] If there were no Sunne, there could be no use of the eye, and if there were no eye, there should be no use of the great eye of this world, at least of its light. But in as∣much, as the Sunne is necessary for the eye, and the eye for the Sun, there is a necessitie that both of thē should have a beginning of Beeing. For that which hath no beginning of beeing, cannot have its beeing for any other sake, besides it owne. Nor can we truely say, that it is for its owne sake. And this Authors reason for this assertion, is most judiciously acute. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, praeter causam enim est cujus can∣sa non est, so the Latin translator. The Authors full meaning is, That which hath no efficient cause to give its beginning of beeing, can have no finall cause of its beeing, or rather no cause at all, whether finall, formall, or material. But is it selfe the cause of causes,

the prime efficient, by which all things are what they are, and the last end or finall cause, for which they are.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Ego certe hac in re laudo Ari∣stotelem, quod cum impossibi∣litatem (ut ita dixe∣rim) aeter∣norum mo∣tuum, & corporum, non praevi∣derit, maluit ab Eterno esse pulchrā hanc mundi faciem, quam ali∣quando ex aeterna de∣formitate emersisse. Oportuit vero ipsum aternitatē illam temporis meditari; reperisset siquidem, ut ne{que} in corpore, ne{que} in loco (haec enim ille demonstravit) ita ne{que} in tempore infinitatem esse potuisse: si quidem est etiam tempus quan∣tum, ut & corpus, & locus. Si igitur omnia quanta finita, tempus quoque totum finitvm est, & erit. Quare fact us est aliquando 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex nihilo. Vallesusde sacra philosoph. pag. 18.
• * 1.2

  Aristor. nono ma∣taphysico∣rum, cap. 8. Manifestū est, quod actus prior potentia est. Dico autem non solum illa potentia determinata quae dicitur principium transmuta∣torium in a∣lio, prout a∣liud est, sed prorsus om∣ni motivo, et Statorio principio. Et 12 Me∣taphys. cap. 7, Quare vita, & ae∣vum conti∣nuum, & ae∣ternum Deo inest. Hoc e∣nim est De∣us Quicun∣que vero (ut Pythagorici, et Speusippus putant) optimum & pulcherrimum non esse in principio, eo quod plantarum quo{que} ac animali ū principia, causae quidem sunt: bonum vero, & perfectum in ijs esse, quae ex his sunt, non recte putant. Sperma namque ex alijs prioribus perfectis est, neque Sperma primum est, sed quod perfectum est: veluti hominem dicere quispiam possit priorem spermate esse, non illum, qui eo generatur, sed alium, ex quo ipsum Sperma est. Quod itaque est quaedam aeterna, immobi∣lis{que} substantia, & à sensibilibus separata, constat ex dictis.
• * 1.3

  Divus Augustinus censet om∣nia esse creata simul eodem mo∣mento, seu in eodem nunc; illam vero parti∣tionem Die∣rum, non significare partes temporis, sed distinctionem, & gradus quosdam naturae verum: at{que} factum esse hominem ex terra, non actu praeexistente, sed existente potentia in ipso, velut quivis dicitur nostrum, vere factus ex quatuor Elementis, tametsi nulla terra, aut aqua erat actu id ex quo facti sumus, sed semen & sanguis. Ita{que} ut unico intuitu tota facies, & ejus omnes partes, inspeculo exprimuntur, ita unica Iussione Dei, constitisse totam hanc corpoream molem, & in ea refulsisse illum divinitatis fulgorem, quem vocamus naturam. Caeterum quia non omnes sancti hoc ita intelligunt, alia responsione est opus. Vallefius de sa∣cra Philos. cap. 1. pag. 22. Ne{que} vero hoc ullam arguit primae causae debilitatem. Non enim eam causam naturalem ponimus, q••ae{que} faciat semper quantum potest, sed liberam & sapien∣tissimam, quae facit ut maxime expedit, at{que} omnia pulcherrin••a & concinna, in nnmero, pondere, & ••••c••sura. Quapropter verba illa capitis 18. Ecclesiastici, Qui vivit in aeter∣num creavit omnia simul, ego ita interpretor; Creata esse omnia intra illam hebdomadam, perfectum{que} esse mundum, ita ut nulla ejus pars princeps, quaeque a creatione habitura esset initium, deesset. Nam ut initio capitis secundi dicitur, perfecti sunt caeli & terra, & om∣nis ornatus eorum, complevit{que} Deus dic sexta opus suum. Valles cap 1. pag. 45.
• * 1.4

  Si facta omnino non sunt (viz. corpora coe∣lestia) fit ut sint per sese ab aeterno, et esse proprio existentia. Quapropter nullum illorum ab alio pend••at, aut alio posterius sit, sed per sese sint, & ope∣rentur ab aeterna (cum operatio procedat à cujus{que} rei natura, & proprio esse:) quare nulla illis prior causa sit, (si enim haec effecta ab alio non sunt, non sit ulla eorum causa) quaprop∣ter mundus hic universas, ne{que} unus erit, ne{que} totus, neque perfectus, cum non pendcat totus ab unica virtute & causa, neque causae omnes in unam omnium primam, referantur: sed sint multae mundi partes, à quibus non procedatur ad ullam aliam superiorem, & priorem, hoc vera fieri non potest. Nam ant illae partes habent aliquam naturam sive essentiam communem, aut omnino habent nihil commune. Ex adeo diversis, ut nihil commune dica∣tur de illis, nulla ratione potest constari unum: Nam neque ordo esse ••otest inter omnino diversa. Ordo enim secundum aliquid commune est, dicimus enim inter Petrum & Fran∣ciscum ordinem quendam esse. Si concedis partes illas mun••i habere aliqu•••• essentiam communem; constat, quandoquidem non sunt omnino cadem, habere as aliquid commune & aliquid diversum. Est autem quod commune unum: quae diversa multa. Illud ergo com∣mune prius erit illis omnibus diversis: si quidem ex co constant haec: non ergo 〈◊〉〈◊〉 par∣tes, suo quaeque ordine primae causae, sed pend••bant illae omnes ab aliquo 〈◊〉〈◊〉 causa, à qua daeta erat eis communis illa essentia. Vallesius de sacra Philosophia▪ pag. 16.