A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part

SECTION III. That Gods good will and pleasure is ne∣ver frustrated, albeit his unspeakeable love take no effect in many to whom it is un∣feignedly tendered. (Book 3)

CHAP. 16.

In what sense God may be said to have done all that he could for his Vineyard, or for such as perish.

1 TO found both parts of a contradiction in truth, fals not within the Sphere of omnipotency, and we may with consent of al Divines, maintaine it to be impossi∣ble. The true originall as∣well of our aptnesse to con∣ceive difficulties in the points proposed, as our ignorance in assoyling them, is because we extend not this Maxime so far as it naturally would reach; and the reason why we

extend it not so farre, is our pronenesse to extend our owne power to the utmost, and, for the most part farther then justice or true goodnesse can ac∣company it. It is our nature to be humorous, and the nature of humor to be unconstant. Fortunes character may be every sonne of Adams Motto: Tantum constans in levitate, Onely constant in un∣constancy. And being such, nothing can imply any constant contradiction to our nature; nothing that is truly and constantly the same, but will one time or other contradict our changeable and inconstant humors. And these enraged with contradiction, doe, (Tyrant-like) arme power, without just tryall or examination, without either respect or reve∣rence, against whatsoever contradicts them. The right use of power in creatures meerely sensitive, is to satiate their appetites of sense: for nothing hath power to move it selfe, but what is sensitive: and, all power, whether of body or minde, was be∣stowed on man for the execution of his will, or ac∣complishing his desire of good: but, since his will, by his fall, became irregular, and his desires cor∣rupt; his power is become like a common officer, or undercommander to all his unruly appetites, do∣mineering by turne or succession; all other incli∣nations being under the command of it. So the wise man hath charactered the resolution of volup∣tuous men, cap. 1. 6. Come on therefore, let us enjoy the good things that are present, and let us speedily use the creatures like as in youth. And ver. 11. Let our strength be the Law of justice; for that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth. Even in such as are by

most esteemed good men and sober, those notions of truth and equity which are naturall and implan∣ted, are so weake and ill taken; that, rather than up∣start carnall appetites or desires which custome countenanceth, should be enraged through their reluctance, they presently yeeld their consents to such proposalls, as (were they resolute, firme and constant) would as offensively contradict them, as punishment or paine doth our sense of pleasure. Vnto such proposalls we often yeeld, as are impos∣sible to be approved by Equity; to whom we usu∣ally professe our dearest love and allegiance, with promises to frame our lives by her rules. But love in us (whether one simple and indivisible quality, or an aggregation or cluster of divers inclinations, all rooted in one Center,) is not alike set on divers objects. Hence, when it comes to opposition be∣tweene sense and reason, betweene our selves, our private friends, and common equity, it divides it selfe unequally. The particular inconveniences whereto we are daily exposed, by the inordinate love of the world, and the flesh, are infinite; all may be reduced to these two originalls: First, it blindes our judgements, and makes our intentions seeme upright and just to our partiall desires, or at least not incompatible with the rules of equity; when as, to impartiall judgements, they are palpably un∣just. Secondly, having blinded our judgements, it forthwith abuseth our power or authority; to effect whatsoever is not, for the present, apprehen∣ded for a grosse and evident wrong. So that no∣thing whereon our love or liking is for the present

mainly set, seemes any way impossible unto us; un∣lesse it bee altogether without the compasse of our power: And, through the variousnesse of our hu∣merous disposition, that, which we cannot like or admit to day, will be allowed of to morrow. But though there bee none that doth good, no not one, yet some there be doe lesse evill than others. And seeing those amongst us, whose love to equity is more strong and constant than their neighbours, are alwayes drawne with greater difficulty to dis∣pense with truth or approve unjustice; the conse∣quence necessarily amounting from this experi∣mented truth, is, That

[if any mans judgement in matters of equity and justice were infallible, and his love to justice and knowne equity alto∣gether constant and invincible, it would bee im∣possible for him to transgresse in judgement.]

Thus as well the strength of unconstant humorous desires, as the faintnesse of love or equity (both which most men may experience in themselves) as the contrary vertues, which they may observe in some few joyntly conspire to rectifie our conceit of God, in whom the Ideall perfection, of the ones integrity and constancy, is without all mixture of the others vice or humorous impotency.

2 The first rule for right extending the former Maxime [To make both parts of a contradiction true, is no part of the object of power omnipotent] would be this; Many effects which are very possible to power alone considered, or as it hath the maste∣ry over weake inclinations unto equity, necessarily imply a direct and manifest contradiction unto

some Divine Attributes, no lesse infinite or immu∣table than Almighty power. Hence it followes, that many effects or designes, which seeme possible to the humane nature, may bee impossible or most incongruous to the Divine. It is more shamefull then impossible for rich men to lye & cozen, or for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong their inferiors; albeit the ones riches or others power, were infi∣nitely increased, without internall increase of their fidelity. But to him that is eternally true and just, yea eternall truth and justice, it is as impossible to speak an untruth, or doe wrong, as for truth to be a lye, or justice to be unjust. Many things then are po∣ssible to meere power, which are impossible to it, as linkt with truth or love; and many things againe possible to it, as linkt with these, which yet directly contradict the eternall patterne of justice or good∣nesse; and are by consequent impossible to the Al∣mighty, who is no lesse just and good, then power∣full. Many Pyrats by Sea, or Robbers by Land, might they injoy but halfe the power & authority for a Month, whereof ordinary Princes by inheri∣tance are possest; would doe their companions and friends more good, and worke their enemies grea∣ter spoyle in this short space, than any Monarch can doe in his whole raigne, which holds it a point of Majestie to moderate his actions by that Princely rule; Princeps id potest quod jure potest, Princes can do no more than they can doe justly. In this sense, I think we may truly say, all before Christ were theeves & robbers, or in respect of him very unjust; not Abra∣ham, David, Ezekiah, Iosias, not one of the Pro∣phets,

might they have but halfe that power and au∣thority cōmitted to them over Angels for a night, which the Son of God from everlasting had, with∣out robbery; but would have thought it very possi∣ble to have removed the Romane Army with as great terror, losse and disgrace, as the Angell of the Lord sometimes had done the Assyrians, from Ieru∣salems-siege; whose fatall destruction, God incar∣nate cleerly foreseeing, bewailed with teares, but would not, but could not prevent. For to the King of everlasting righteousnesse, that onely was possi∣ble, which was justly possible. And though he were a Father to Israel, and the Prince of peace, yet he approves a most bloody and mercilesse warre, be∣fore an unjust peace, and disgracefull to Eternall Majestie; for so the Prophet had said in his name, before, There is no peace unto the wicked; to such as stubbornely abandon the wayes of peace, and wil∣fully neglect saving health, so often and lovingly tendred unto them; Hos salus ipsa servare non potuit, and shall infinite power save them, whom infinite salvation cannot save?

3 To have smitten the men of Sodom with blind∣nesse, before lust had entred in at their eyes; had beene a worke as easie to Almighty power, as blinding them in the attempt or prosecution of lust conceived. But that contradiction which the pre∣vention of this sinne, did not imply unto Gods power, it did (all circumstances considered) neces∣sarily imply unto his Iustice; by whose immutable and eternall rules, they were left unguarded against these foule temptions, for wilfull contempt of

his goodnesse, for abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse. But did it imply any contradictiō to his goodnesse or loving kindnesse, to have pre∣vented the Sodomites former contempt or abuse of them? Out of question it did, unto his eternall e∣quity; for all his waies are mercy and truth. And these Sodomites wilfulnesse presupposed, the eter∣nall rule of his goodnesse and loving kindnesse, had appointed justice to debarre them, as now they are, from reaping those fruits, whereof his good∣nesse, as they were men, had made them capable. The principle whence the just proofe of these seeming paradoxes, as also the right explication of all difficulties in this argument, must be derived, is a Schoole Maxime borrowed from orthodoxall antiquity, now not much used, but of much use in true Divinity, and for this reason to bee more fully insisted upon, in the Treatise of mans first estate. The Maxime it self is briefly thus; It is impossible for mā or other created substance, to be absolutely impeccable from his creation. Onely He that is infinite in be∣ing, is infinitely good; and infinite goodnesse onely implyes an absolute impossibility of being bad. As God onely essentially is, so hee onely is essentially and immutably good; all things besides him are or sometimes were subject to mutability, aswell in Essence as in their state and condition. Power om∣nipotent could not from the first Creation, have pared off all mutabilitie from mans morall good∣nesse, without perishing the onely possible root of his eternall and immutable happinesse. To decline to evill, implyes no contradiction to Being simply,

but onely to omnipotent being: it is so possible to all Creatures, that without this possibility, it were (as we shall afterwards prove) impossible for them to be truly like their Creator, for a moment in that attribute, whose participation is the only assurance of their eternall weale. If God either by his om∣nipotent power, or infinite wisedome, had necessa∣rily (though without any violence) restrained this possibility in man, of declining from good to evill, man had forthwith ceased to have beene truly and inherently good, and ceasing to be such, had utter∣ly lost all possibilities of that estate, whose pledge or earnest he received in his creation. Gods good∣nesse is his happinesse. And his participative good∣nesse is the foundation of mans happinesse. So that not Gods justice onely, but that loving kindnesse whereby hee created man, and appointed him as heyre apparent of life eternall, did remove all neces∣sity from his will, because the imposition of neces∣sity (whether laid upon him by power or wisdome infinite) had utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein it was onely possible for the creature to expresse the Creators goodnesse manifested in his creation. Now that was not Gods essentiall or im∣mutable goodnesse, for that is incommunicable. All the goodnesse man is capable of, doth but ex∣presse Gods goodnesse communicative. It is the stampe of it communicated. As God then did com∣municate his goodnesse to his creatures, not by ne∣cessity but freely, so could not the creature be truly good (that is like his God) by necessity but freely. Nor was it possible for him to have beene either

confirmed in such goodnesse as he had, or transla∣ted to everlasting happinesse; but by continuing freely good for some space, or lesse evill, than by the liberty which God by his immutable law had given him in his creation, hee possibly might have beene. Continuing good, though but for a while, without necessity, the riches of Gods free bounty, had beene continually increased towards him, and had finally established him in everlasting blisse by confirmation of him in true goodnesse, or by inve∣sting him with immortality. Since his fall wee are not usually capable of mercy or of the increase of his bounty; much lesse of these everlasting fruits whereof blessings temporall are the pledges; but by free abstinence from some evills, unto whose practices, the possibility of our corrupted nature might be improved. And albeit we doe not alway that which is in its nature evill, yet we can doe no∣thing well, but even the good which we do we doe it naughtily: yet unlesse we doe both lesse evill, and the good which we do lesse naughtily than we pos∣sibly might doe, God still diminisheth the riches of his bounty towards us; and by inhibiting the sweet influence of his gracious providence, suffers us to fall from one wickednesse to another, be∣ing prone to runne headlong into all, if once the reines of our unruly appetites, bee given into our unweildie hands. Farre bee it from any sonne of Adam to thinke hee is able with∣out Gods love and favour to withdraw himselfe from the extremities of mischiefe, much lesse to doe such good as may make him capable of well-doing.

So strong is our love to sinfull pleasures, since our first parents gave the reines unto our ap∣petite, that none can recall themselves or repent, without the attractions of infinite love. And yet many whom this infinite love doth daily imbrace, because they apprehend not it, are never brought by the attractions of it to true repentance. Despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse, saith the Apostle, Rom. 2. 4. his forbearance and long suffering, not knowing that the goodnesse of God leadeth thee to re∣pentance? Of whom speakes he thus? of such one∣ly as truly repent, and by patient continuance in wel-doing, seeke for glory, honour, and immorta∣lity? nay, but, of them who for hardnesse of heart, cannot repent; but treasure up wrath against the day of wrath, and the revelation of the righteous judg∣ment of God.

4 Were the riches of his bounty therefore fai∣ned, or did hee onely profer, but not purpose to draw them unto repentance, which repented not? this is no part of our heavenly Fathers perfection, no fruit of that wisedome which is from above, but a point of earthly policy devoid of honesty; a meere tricke of wordly wit, to whose practice nothing but weaknesse and impotence to accomplish great desires, can mis-incline mans corrupted nature. But doth it not argue the like impotency, though no such want of integrity in God, not to effect what he wils more ardently and more unfainedly, than man can doe the increase or continuance of his welfare, or avoidance of endlesse misery? No; it being sup∣posed (as we have said) that man is not capable of

endlesse joyes, unlesse he will be wrought by meere love, without the impulsions of unresistible power, unfaignedly to love him that hath prepared them for him; the same infinite love which continually drawes him unto repentance, was in congruity to leave him a possibility not to be drawne by it. For coactive penitency, would have frustrated the end to which repentance is but a meane subordinate. The imployment or exercise of Gods almighty po∣wer to make men repent against their wils, or be∣fore they were wrought to a willingnesse by the sweet attractions of his infinite love, or by threat∣nings of judgements not infinite or irresistible, would be like the indeavors of a loving Father, more strong than circumspect, who out of pity to his sonne, whom he sees ready to be choked with water, should strangle him by violent haling him to the shore. Most men by ascribing that unto Gods power which is the peculiar and essentiall effect of his love, doe finally misse of that good, which both infallibly conspire to poure, without measure, upon all such as take right and orderly hold of them. How shall wee then fasten our faith to them aright? we are to beleeve, that Gods infi∣nite power shall effect without controule or checke of any thing in heaven or earth, all things possible for their endlesse good, that truly love him; but constraines no mans will to love him, being alwaies armed against wilfull neglectors of his unfaigned love. No man would argue his love to be lesse than infinite, because not able to produce the effects of infinite power: and as little reason wee have to

thinke, that power, though infinite, should bee the true immediate parent of love, which never springs in any reasonable creature, but from the seedes of love or lovelines sown in the humane soule, though they doe not alwayes prosper. Constraint, because it is the proper and immediate effect of power, is a companion fit for lust; whose satisfaction breedes rather a loathing of the parties constrained, than any good wil or purpose to reward them for being unwilling, unloving, or impatient passives; nothing but true unforced love, can yeeld contentment un∣to love. Needy man, to whom benevolences though wrested are ever gratefull, cannot bee indu∣ced to love the parties from whom they are wre∣sted. For, Non tantum ingratum sed invisum est be∣neficium superbè datum: Good offices whilest they are presented by pride, are not onely ungratefull but odi∣ous. But God who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth no man; as he esteemes no gifts (how∣soever given) so he alwayes detests the niggardly backwardnesse, and loves the cheerfulnesse of the giver.

5 From these discussions the truth of the former rule, with the right solution of the maine probleme proposed, may bee illustrated, by examples of di∣vers kinds in subjects knowne and familiar. Be the charge never so great, so the exonerations be well nigh equal, the incoms are lesse than if their charge were little, and their exonerations none. Or, be a mans revenues never so large, so his necessary ex∣pences be no lesse, hee shall not bee able to doe as much for his friend in some reall kindnesse, as hee

whose estate is not halfe so great, if so his annuall expences be tenne times lesse. In like case, though mans love to his dearest friend, be (in respect of Gods love to us) but faint, and his power but small; yet because his love to justice is much lesse, or ra∣ther his partiality greater, hee oft-times effects that for his temporall good, which God though infi∣nite in power, doth not effect for those whom hee infinitely loves. For the bequests or grants made unto man by his infinite love, must undergoe the examination of justice and equitie. What are alike infinite, before they passe the irrevocable seale of infinite power, one of these cannot attempt, much lesse absolutely bring ought to passe, without the others consent. Infinite love cannot oversway, ei∣ther Gods incomprehensible wisedome to devise, or his omnipotency to practise meanes for mans salvation, which contradict the unchangeable rules of infinite equity. His love is as truly indivisible, as infinite; and is for this reason more indissolubly linkt unto the unchangeable rules of his owne justice or equity, than unto mankinde, whose good∣nesse in his best estate, was but mutable; nor are any of Adams posterity so capable of that infinite mer∣cie, wherewith God embraceth them, as Gods Iustice and Majestie are of his infinite Love. These being as He is absolutely immutable, are through∣out eternity immutably loved of him, who indivi∣sibly is Majestie, Iustice, Love, immutable.

CHAP. 17.

The truth and ardency of Gods love unto such as pe∣rish, testified by our Saviour, and by S. Paul.

1 THese are no Paradoxes, but plaine truth; without whose acknowledgement, wee shall hardly finde any true sense or good meaning in Gods pro∣testations of sorrow for his peoples plagues, or in his ex∣postulations of their unthankfulnesse, or in his kind invitations of them to repentance, which never re∣pent, or in his tender profers of salvation to those which perish. I have spred out my hands all the day long unto a rebellious people, which walketh in a way that was not good, after their owne thoughts, &c. Isay 65. 2. His infinite power expects their conversion, as the Mariner doth the turning of the Tyde; but may not transport them into the land of Promise, untill his Loving-kindnesse have converted them. The unremovable rules of eternall equity, will not suffer him to stretch out his hands any farther than he doth, towards the sonnes of men; and when the measure of their iniquity is accomplished, his infi∣nite Iustice will not suffer him to stretch them out so farre any longer. Albeit hee cannot then with∣out unfaigned sorrow, withdraw them from those to whom in love unfaigned hee hath stretcht them out. Thus Ierusalems iniquity come to the full

did fill our Redeemers heart with woe, and his eyes with teares. If thou hadst knowne, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace; but now they are hid from thine eyes: Luke 19. 42. Did he speake this as man, or doth not the Spirit say the same? Hee that spake this, spake nothing but words of spirit and life, nothing but the words of God, if we may beleeve that he meant as he hath spoken. I have not spoken (saith* 1.1 Hee) of my selfe, but the Father which sent me, hee gave me a comman∣dement, what I should say, and what I should speake: whatsoever I speake therefore, even as the Father said unto me so I speake. His bowels of compassion were freely extended towards thē, from that exact con∣formity which his spotlesse and blessed soule held with Gods infinite love; and yet restrained againe by that conformity, which it as exactly held with the eternall rules of Gods infinite justice or equity: and from these different motions or distractions, thus occasioned from that indissoluble uniō of his divisible soule, with these two different attributes of the indivisible nature, were his teares squeezed out. He wept then as man, not as God; and yet in this humane passion, did visibly act that part which God before his incarnation had penned, as a sen∣sible memoriall of his unconceivable love. O that my people had hearkned unto me: and Israel had wal∣ked in my wayes; I should soone have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversa∣ries. The haters of the Lord should have submitted themselves unto him but their time should have endu∣red for ever. He should have fed them also with the

finest wheat, and with honey out of the Rocke should I have satisfied thee. Psalm. 81. vers. 13, 14, 15, 16. Wheat and Honey, here promised, were Emblemes of better blessings purposed towards them. And thus avouching this his purpose, under no chara∣cter of courtly complement, but in the forme of legall assurance; his words are undoubted tokens of unfeigned love and desire unquenchable of their welfare, that did not prosper. Israel might have said, as Ierusalem afterwards did of her sorrow; Was there ever any love like unto this love wherewith the Lord imbraced mee in the dayes of my youth. Notwithstanding this excessive fervency of His loving kindnesse (whose will is infinite) laid no necessity upon their wils to whom hee wished all this good. They had a liberty left them by eter∣nall equity, to refuse it. Hee out of the wishes of his bounty as he protesteth, was ready to poure out his best blessings according to the immensity of his loving kindnesse, so Israel would open his mouth wide to receive them. But my people (saith he) would not hearken unto my voice; and Israel would none of mee; so I gave them up unto their owne hearts lust; and they walked in their owne counsells. Psal. 81. vers. 11, 12.

2 Lord, who had sinned, the heathen people or their forefathers in like manner as Israel did, that in times past thou sufferedst them all to walke in their owne wayes? Acts 14. 16. They that observe lying vanities forsake their owne mercy, saith the Prophet Ionah. 2. 8. Never hadst thou given them up to their owne hearts lust, to treasure up wrath against

the day of wrath, had they not despised the riches of thy bounty; whose current, neverthelesse was not altogether diverted from their posterity. To them thou leftest not thy selfe without a witnesse, in that thou didst good, and gavest them raine from hea∣ven in fruitfull seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladnesse. To all nations even in the time of darknesse, when they were strangers from thee; these and the like temporall and sensible blessings, were unquestionable earnests of thy everlasting love, since more fully manifested; For thou so lo∣vedst the world (not Israel onely) that thou gavest thine onely begotten son, to the end that who so belee∣ved in him, should not perish but have everlasting life. What further argumēt of Gods infinite love, could flesh & blood desire; thā the Son of Gods volunta∣ry suffring that, in our flesh, by his Fathers appoint∣ment, w^ch, unto flesh and blood seemes most distast∣full? That this love was unfaignedly tendered to all, at least, that have heard or hereafter may heare of it, without exception; what demonstration from the effect, can be more certaine, what consequence more infallible, thā the inference of this truth is frō a sacred truth received by all good Christians, viz. [Al such as have heard Gods love in Christ proclaimed and not beleeved in it, shall in the day of Iudgement appeare guilty of greater sinnes, than their forefathers could be endited of; and undergoe more bitter death, than any corruption drawne from Adam, if Christ had never suffered, could have bred.] I shall no way wrong the Apostle in unfolding his exhortations to the Athenians thus farre; but they rather offer the

spirit by which hee spake, some kinde of violence, that would contract his meaning shorter. The times of this ignorance (before Christs death) God winked at, but now commandeth all men every where to re∣pent; Because hee hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousnesse, by that man whom hee hath ordained, whereof he hath given assu∣rance unto all men, in that hee hath raised him from the dead, Acts 17. 30, 31.

3 Why all men in the world have not heard of Gods infinite love thus manifested, many causes may hereafter bee assigned, all grounded upon Gods infinite Iustice or Mercy. Of Christs death many which heard not might have heard; many which are not, might have bin partakers; save only for their free and voluntary progresse from evill to worse, or wilfull refusall of Gods loving kindnesse daily profered to them in such pledges, as they were well content to swallow; foolishly esteeming these good in themselves, being good onely as they plight the truth of Gods love to them, which he manifested in the death of his Sonne. With this manifestation of his love, many againe out of meere mercy have not beene acquainted; lest the sight of the medicine might have caused their dis∣case to rage, and make their case more lamentably desperate.

CHAP. 18.

Want of consideration, or ignorance of Gods un∣feigned love to such as perish, a principall meanes or occasion why so many perish.

1 BVt if the most part of men, as we cannot deny, doe finally perish, what shall it availe to revive this doctrine of Gods infinite love to all; by whose fruitlesse issue, he rather is made an infinit looser, than men any gainers? As for God, he hath frō eternity infallibly forecast the entire redemption, of his infinite love, which unto us may seeme utterly cast away. And of men, if many dye, whom he would have live (for his will is, that all should bee saved, and come to the know∣ledge of the truth) the fault is their owne, or their instructers; that seeke not the prevention of their miscariage; by acquainting them with this coelesti∣all fountaine of saving truth; whose taste we labor to exhibite unto all, because the want of it, in ob∣servation of the heathen, is the first spring of hu∣mane misery* 1.2. Or, in language more plaine, or pertinent to the argument proposed, most men reape no benefit from Gods unspeakeable love; be∣cause not considering it to be his nature, they doe not beleeve it to be as he is, truly infinite, unfeign∣edly extended to all that call him Maker. But had the doctrines, which those divine Oracles [God is love, and would have all men to bee saued] naturally

afford, beene for these forty yeeres last past, as ge∣nerally taught, and their right use continually prest, with as great zeale and fervency, as the doctrine and uses of Gods absolute decree, for electing some, and reprobating most, in that space have beene, the plentifull increase of Gods glory, and his peo∣ples comfort throughout this land, might have wrought such astonishment to our adversaries, as would have put their malicious mouths to silence. Who would not be willing to be saved, if hee were fully perswaded, that God did will his salvation in particular; because hee protests hee wills not the death of any, but the repentance of all, that all might live? Or were the particulars of this doc∣trine, unto whose generality, every loyall member of the Church of England hath subscribed, general∣ly taught & beleeved; all would unfeignedly endea∣vour with fervent alacrity to be truely happy, be∣cause none could suspect himselfe to bee excluded from his unfeigned and fervent love, who is true happinesse. Whose love and goodnesse is so great, that hee cannot passe any act, whereby any of his creatures should bee debarred either from being like him in love and goodnesse; or being such, from being like him in true happinesse: But alas, while the world is borne in hand, that the Creator oft-times dispenseth the blessings of this life, not as un∣doubted pledges of a better, but deales with most men, as man doth with beasts, feeding them fattest which are appointed first to bee slaine: the magnificent praises of his bounty secretly nurseth such a misperswasion in most men of his

goodnesse; (at least towards them) as the Epigram∣m••tist had of a professed Benefactor, that shewed him (as he thought) little kindnesse in great Bene∣volence.

Munera magna quidem misit, sed misit in hamo, Et Piscatorem piscis amare potest? Great gifts he sent, but under his gifts, there covered lay an hooke, And by the fish to be belov'd, can th'cunning Fisher looke.

2 The frequency of sinister respects in dispen∣sing of secular dignities or benevolences, makes such as are truly kind, to be either unregarded, or mistrusted by such as stand in neede of their kind∣nesse. And as fishes in beaten waters, will nibble at the bait, although they suspect the hooke: so the world hath learned the wit to take good turnes, and not to be taken by them; as suspecting them to bee profered in cunning rather than in true kindnesse: and cunning, where it is discovered or suspected, is usually requited with craft; love onely hath just title unto love. The most part in∣deed are so worldly wise, that none but fooles will easily trust them; howbeit our naturall mistrust of others, makes all of us a great deale worse than we would be. And as if we thought it a sinne or point of uncharitablenesse, to prove other mens conjec∣tures, that measure our dispositions by their owne, altogether false; wee fit our demeanours to their misdeemings of us, and resolve rather to do amisse; than they should thinke amisse. Howbeit even in

this perfidious and faithlesse age, the old saying is, not quite out of date: Ipsa fides habita obligat fidē. Many would be more trusty than they are; and do much better by us than they doe, would we whol∣ly commit our selves to their trust and kindnesse. Now, though by mans goodnesse or badness, God can neither become worse nor better in himselfe; yet the riches of his bounty, or communication of his goodnesse, are still multiplyed towards those that stedfastly beleeve him to bee such as hee is: One, whom all are bound to love; because hee is so kind and loving; one whom all may safely trust, be∣cause his loving kindnesse is so utterly void of par∣tiality, being armed with power and justice infi∣nite. Thy righteousnesse is like the great mountaines, thy judgements are like the great deepe; O Lord thou preservest man and beast. How excellent is thy louing kindnesse, O God! therefore the children of men put their trust under the shadow of thy wings. Psal. 36. ver. 6, 7. This especially should move all to admire his loving kindnesse, that he loved all without any other motive than his owne meere goodnesse or loving kindnesse, either to incline his will or stirre up his power to give them a being like his owne: We love him (saith Saint Iohn) be∣cause he loved us first. Doe all then whom hee un∣feignedly loves, love him vnfeignedly? Would God they did: for so (as his will is) all should bee saved. Did then the Apostle meane that his love to us, is no true cause of our love to him? yes; yet not simply as it is in him, but as being unfeignedly in him it is truly apprehended by us. Ingenuous

love is never lawfully begotten, or fully concei∣ved but from an apprehension of true lovelinesse in the object; and nothing can bee more lovely then love it selfe, when it is firmely apprehended or un∣doubtedly knowne.

3 Though secret consciousnesse of our owne un∣lovelinesse, in the state of nature, makes us oft-times too mistrustfull of others love: Yet unto our na∣ture unregenerate and overgrowne with corrupti∣on, it is almost impossible, not to love them whose love to us we assuredly know to be unfaigned; un∣lesse their behaviour be very loathsome. Howbeit even so we love their persons, though not their pre∣sence, wherewith againe we willingly dispense, if it may gratifie us in other things, which we much desire. That which makes the worlds condemna∣tion so just, that infinite mercy may not dispence with it, is mens dull backwardnesse to love him, of whose glorious beauty, the most glorious, most admired creatures are but fleeting shadowes, no true pictures. Him of whose infinite love and un∣feigned preventions in unrecompensable benefits, all the pleasures wee take in health, the joy of strength, the sweetnesse of life it selfe; and whatso∣ever in it is good and lovely, are infallible pledges, and yet his intention in free bestowing them is to bind himselfe (more strictly than man is bound by receiving the just price of what he bargaines for) to instate us in the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life.

Hee requires nothing at our hand, but that wee may be more capable of his loving kindnesse, by

drawing still nearer and nearer to him, with all our hearts, with all our soules, and with all our strength; of whose least portion he is sole maker and preser∣ver; of all whose motions hee is sole author and guide. From participation of his favour or presence, whatsoever is good in them, is undoubtedly ca∣pable of increase. The services wherein the eter∣nall King requires demonstration of this our love, are not so hard, as those which wee willingly per∣forme to corruptible men, not invested with any shadow of his lovelinesse, nor seasoned with any tincture of his loving kindnesse; to men, that can∣not be so beneficiall as loving to their friends, nor halfe so loving as they are lovely, though their lovelinesse come farre short of their greatnesse. Far otherwise it is with him, whose Greatnesse and Majesty are truly infinite: hee is as glorious and lovely as great, as loving as lovely, and yet withall no lesse beneficiall than loving to those which love him, and doe his will.

4 This unfaigned love of him, raised from be∣leefe of his loving kindnes toward us, is as the first conception or plantation of true happines, to which once truly planted, whatsoever in this life can befal us,* 1.3 serves as nutriment. Diligentibus Deum omnia operantur in bonum. Wee know that all things worke together for good, to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose.

As this Article of his goodnesse and love is to be prest before any other, so the first and most natu∣rall deduction, that can be made from this or any other sacred principle; and that which every one

when hee first comes to enjoy the use of reason, should be taught to make by heart, is this: He that gave mee life indued with sense, and beautified my sense with reason, before I could desire one or other of them, or know what being meant; hath doubtlesse a purpose to give me with them, whatsoever good things my heart, my sense or reason can desire; even life or being as farre surpassing all goodnesse, flesh and blood can conceive or desire, as this present life, I now enjoy, doth my former not being, or my desirelesse want of being what now I am. These are principles, which elsewhere (by Gods assistance) shall bee more at large extended: yet would I have the Reader ever to remēber, that the infinite love, wherewith God sought us when we were not, by which he found out a beginning for mankind, fitted as a foundation for endlesse life, can never be indissolubly betroth∣ed unto the bare beeing which hee bestowed upon us. The finall contract betwixt him and us, neces∣sarily presupposeth a bond or linke of mutuall love. There is no meanes possible for us to be made bet∣ter or happier than we are, but by unfaigned loving him, which out of love hath made us what we are. Nor are we what we are, because he is, or from his Essence onely, but because he was loving to us. And after our love to him enclasped with his unspeaka∣ble and unchangeable love to us, whose apprehen∣sion must beget it; the faith by which it is begot∣ten in us, assures our soules of all the good meanes the infinitie of goodnesse may vouchsafe to grant, the infinity of wisedome can contrive, or power omnipotent is able to practise; for attaining the

end whereto his infinite love from all Eternities doth ordaine us. And who could desire better en∣couragement or assurance more strong then this, for the recompence of all his labours? or if all this cannot suffice to allure us, hee hath set feare be∣hind us to impell us unto goodnesse; or rather be∣fore us, to turne us backe from evill.

CHAP. 19.

How God of a most loving Father becomes a severe inexorable Iudge.

1 BVt if God as wee have said bee love, shall not his love be like his nature, altogether unchangeable? How then shall hee punish his beloved Creatures, or have anger, hate, or jealousie, any place or seat in the Omnipotent Ma∣jestie? Can these consort with infinite mercie? Many Philosophers have freed God from anger, making him Author onely of grace, and favour to∣wards men. And I could wish their heresies had beene better refuted than they are, or at least, that men would bee better perswaded of such refutati∣on, as Lactantius hath bestowed upon them, al∣beit I will not bind my selfe to stand to his decision of this point, but rather illustrate by instance or ex∣periment, how extreame severity may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfaigned love.

2 Few mens hearts would have served them

to have dealt with their owne bowels as Torquatus did with his. Howbeit in all that mighty people amongst whom he lived, I am perswaded but a few had taken the like care and paines to traine up their children in the most commendable qualities of that age. Not one would have adventured his owne person further, to have rescued his sonne from the enemy, or justified him in any honourable quarrell. In these and the like points, he had, and, upon just occasion,* 1.4 would further have manifested, as much unfained love, as any father could unto his sonne; more than the imbecility of sex would suffer a ten∣der hearted mother, to make proofe of. Doth then the adjudging of this his owne son to death, rightly argue he loved him lesse than other parents did their children, whose worse deserts they would not have sentenced so severely? No: it rather proves love and care of martiall discipline, and hate to par∣tiality in administration of civill Iustice, to have beene much greater in him, than in other parents of his time. The more just and equall the law hee transgressed was, or might have beene (as for illu∣stration

sake we will suppose it to have been a law most equall and just) the more it commends his im∣partiall severity, that would not suffer the violation of it goe unpunished in his dearest sonne; whom the more desirous hee was to make like himselfe in religious observance of Martiall Discipline, and practice of Iustice towards the enemy; the readier he was to doe justice upon him for doing the con∣trary. That excessive love, which he bare unto his person, whilest his hopefull beginnings did seeme to promise an accomplishment of those martiall vertues, whose first draught hee himselfe had well expressed; turnes into extreame severity and indig∣nation, after he proves transgressor of those funda∣mentall rules, by which he had taken his direction; and unto whose observance his desire of posterity was destinated. So it falls out by the unalterable course of nature, or rather by a Law more transcen∣dent and immutable than nature it selfe, that a lesse love being chained (by references of subordinati∣on betweene the objects loved) with a greater, can∣not dislinke it selfe without some deeper touch of displeasure, than if the bond or reference had beene none. The neerer the reference, or the stricter the bond; the more violent will the rupture be, and the dissociation more unpleasant: As there is no en∣mity to the enmity of brethren, if the knot of bro∣therly kindnesse once fully untie: The reason is, be∣cause our love to our brethren, is neerest united with the love of our selves, unto which all other love is in some sort subordinate. True affection is alwayes most displeased, where it is most defeated;

where most is deservedly expected and least perfor∣med. Now as partiality towards our selves, and indulgence to our inordinate desires, oft-times be∣gets desire of revenge upon unnaturall or unkinde brethren: so doth the constant and unpartiall love of equity and wholesome Lawes, naturally bring forth just severity towards presumptuous neglec∣ters of them whose persons wee love no lesse, than they do that would plead with teares for their im∣punity. Towards them, unto whom wee would give reall proofe of more tender and true affection, than their partiall abetters doe, could wee winne them, by these or other warrantable means, to link their love with ours, or to love that best which most deserveth loue. As Seleucus loved his son (for saving the one of whose eyes, (both being forfait by the law) he was cōtented to lose one of his own) more dearely than most princely mothers do their children, for he loved him as himselfe, yet could not dispence either with himselfe, or his sonne, be∣cause he loved the publike law, and common good, that might accrue by this singular example of Iu∣stice; better than either, better than both.

3 For every man to love himselfe best, is in our judgement no breach, but rather a foundation of charitie. Alaw to whose performance every man is bound in matters of necessity concerning this life, or in whatsoever may concerne the life to come; though not in cases of secular honour or preferment, wherein Proximus quis{que} sibi, must (by the law of conscience, and fundamentall rule of Christianitie) give place to Detur digniori. But

nothing can be so worthy of love or honour as God; who will we, nill we, doth and must enjoy this li∣berty or priviledge of loving himselfe best. And if he love himselfe better than he doth any creature, he must love equity and justice better than he doth any man; for he himselfe is equity it selfe, the eter∣nall patterne as well of Iustice as of Mercy; he can∣not be unjustly mercifull towards those men, whom he loves more dearely than any man doth himselfe. And in as much as goodnesse it selfe is the essentiall object of his will, he loves nothing absolutely and irrevocably, but that which is absolutely & immu∣tably good. So was not man in his first creation, much less is he such in his collapsed estate; and yet Gods love (so super infinite is it) extends it selfe un∣to our nature so collapsed and polluted with cor∣ruption, which he infinitely hates. This his love, which knowes no limit in it selfe, is limited in its effects towards men, by the correspondency which they hold or lose with that absolute goodnesse, or with those eternall rules of equity, justice, or mer∣cy, in which his will is to haue man made like him. Such as have beene either in re or spe, though not as they should bee, yet such as either infinite loving kindnesse can vouchsafe to accept, to cherish, or encourage to goe forward as they haue begunne; or infinite mercy to tollerate in expectation of their repentance, or aversion from their wonted courses: these, if once they finally dissolve the correspondency, which they held with Mer∣cie, or burst the linke which they had in Gods love, (with reference to that goodnesse, wherto the

riches of his bounty daily inviteth them) his dis∣pleasure towards them kindles according to the measure of his former mercies or loving kindnesse. If being illuminated by his Spirit, they finally as∣sociate themselves to the sonnes of darknesse, or ha∣ving put on Christ in baptisme, they resume their swinish habit, and make a sport of wallowing in the mire; the sweet fountaines of joy and comfort, which were opened to them as they were Gods creatures, not uncapable of his infinite mercy, prove floods of wo & misery to them as they are sworne servants of sinne and corruption: For, hate to fil∣thinesse and uncleanness, is essentially and formally included in Gods love of absolute goodnesse, righte∣ousnesse and true holinesse. And the displeasure or indignation which he beares to these, must needes seize on their persons that have covered thēselves with them, as with a garment; and to whose soules they sticke more closely than their skinnes doe to their bodies, or their flesh unto their bones.

CHAP. 20.

Whilest God of a loving Father becomes a severe Iudge, their is no change or alteration at all in God, but onely in men and in their actions. Gods will is al∣wayes exactly fulfilled even in such as goe most against it. How it may stand with the Iustice of God to punish transgressions temporall, with tormens everlasting.

1THe summe of all is this; love was the Mother of all his workes, and (if I may so speake) the fertility of his power and Essence. And seeing it is his nature as Cre∣ator, and cannot change: no part of our nature (seeing every part was created by him) can bee utterly ex∣cluded from all fruits of his love; untill the sinister use of that contingencie wherewith hee indued it, or the improvement of inclinations naturally bent unto evill, come to that height as to imply a con∣tradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouch∣safe them any favour. Whether naturall inclinati∣ons unto evill, may bee thus farre improved in the children by their forefathers or no, is disputable; but in another place. Concerning Infants (save onely) so farre as neglect of duties to be performed to them, may concerne their Elders, seeing the Scripture in this point is silent, I have no minde here or elsewhere to dispute. If faith they have, or

such holinesse as becommeth Saints; neither are begotten by our writing or preaching, nor is the written word the rule of theirs as of all others faith that are of yeares. And unto them onely that can heare or reade, or have the use of reason, I write and speake this, as well for their comfort and en∣couragement to follow goodnes, or for their terror, lest they follow evill.

Love, much greater than a∣ny creature owes or performes, or is capable of, either in respect of himselfe, or in others, is the essentiall and sole fruit of Gods antecedent will, whether concerning our nature as it was in the first man, or now is in the severall persons deri∣ved from him. And of this love every particular faculty of soule or body is a pledge undoubted; all, are as so many ties or handles to draw us un∣to him, from whom we are separated onely by dissimilitude; our very natures being otherwise linkt to his being, with bonds of strictest refe∣rence or dependency.

On the contrary, Wrath and Severity are the proper effects of his consequent will, that is, they are the infallible consequents of our neglecting and despising his will revealed for our good, or sweet promises of saving health. The full explication and necessary use of this di∣stinction, hath taken up its place, in the Articles of Creation, or Divine Providence. Thus much of it may serve our present turn. That Gods absolute wil was to have man capable of Heaven & Hel, of joyes and miseries immortall. That this absolute will whose possible objects are two, is in the first place set on mans eternall and everlasting joy, more fer∣vently

than man can conceive; yet not so, as to contradict it selfe by frustrating the contrary possi∣bility, which unto man it had appointed. That Gods anger never kindles, but out of the ashes of his flaming love despised. Nor doth the turning of tender love and compassion, into severity & wrath, presuppose or argue any change or turning in the Father of lights and everlasting mercy; it is wholly seated in mens irregular deviation from that course which by the appointment of his antecedent will they should and might have taken (whereto his fa∣therly kindnesse did still invite them) unto whose crooked wayes, which they doe, but should not follow; from which the same infinite goodnesse doth still allure them by every temporall blessing, and deterre them by every crosse and plague that doth befall them.

2 This bodily Sunne, which wee see, never changeth with the Moone, his light, his heat are still the same; yet one and the same heat in the spring time, refresheth our bodies here in this Land; but scortcheth such as, brought up in this clime, journey in the sands of Affricke. His beames reflected on bodies solid, but of corruptible and changeable nature, often inflame matter capable of combustion. But (as some Philosophers thinke) wold not annoy us (unless by too much light) were we in that aethereall or coelestiall region wherein it moves. At least, were our bodies of the like sub∣stance with the heavens; the vicinity of it would rather comfort than torment us. Thus is the Fa∣ther of lights a refreshing flame of unquenchable

love, to such as are drawne by love to be like him in purity of life, but a consuming fire to such as he beholdeth a farre off; to such as run from him by making themselves most unlike unto him. No sonnes of Adam there be, which in some measure or other had not some taste or participation of his bountie. And the measure of his wrath is but e∣quall to the riches of his bounty despised. To whom this infinite treasure of his bounty hath beene most liberally opened, it proves in the end a storehouse of wrath and torments, unlesse it final∣ly draw them to repentance: According to the height of that exaltation whereunto his antecedent will had designed them, shall the degrees of their depression be in hell for not being exalted by it. Nor doth any man in that lake of torments, suffer paines more against his will, than he had done ma∣ny things against the will of his righteous Iudge daily leading him to repenttnce. The flames of hell take their scantling from the flames of Gods love neglected; they may not, they cannot exceede the measure of this neglect. Or to knit up this point with evidence of sacred truth; God alwaies proportioneth his plagues or punishments in just equality to mens sinnes. And the onely rule for measuring sinne or transgression right, must bee taken from the degrees of mans opposition to Gods delight or pleasure in his salvation. Not so much as a dramme of his delight or pleasure can be abated, not a scruple of his will, but must finally be accomplished. The measure of his delight in mans repentance or salvation, shall beee exactly satisfied

and fulfilled. Mans repentance he loves as hee is infinite in mercy and in bounty: mans punish∣ment he doth not love at all in it selfe, yet doth hee punish as hee is infinitely just, or as hee infinitely loveth justice. This is but the extract of Wisedomes speech, Prov. 1. vers. 24. Because I have called, and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded: But yee have set at nought all my counsell, and would none of my reproofe: I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mocke when your feare commeth, When your feare commeth as desolation, and your de∣struction commeth as a whirlewind; when distresse and anguish commeth upon you: Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seeke me eare∣ly, but they shall not finde mee: For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the feare of the Lord. They would none of my counsel: they despised all my re∣proofe. Therefore shall they eate of the fruit of their owne way, and be filled with their owne devices. For the turning away of the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fooles shall destroy them. But who so harkeneth unto me, shall dwell safely, and be quiet from feare of evill.

And it were to be wished, that some moderne Divines, would better explicate than they doe a schoole tenet, held by many, concerning Gods punishing sinners in the life to come, citra condig∣num, that is, lesse than they deserve. For by how much their punishment is lesse than the rule of di∣vine Iustice exacts: so much of that delight or good pleasure which God should have reaped from their salvation, may seeme by this remission

to be diminished. But this point I leave to the judi∣cious Readers consideration, who may inform him∣selfe from the* 1.5 Expositors of that sacred Maxime. His mercy is above all his works. Psal. 145. 9.

3 To thinke God should punish sinne unlesse it were truly against his will, or any sinne more deep∣ly than it is against his will and pleasure, is one of those three grosse transformations of the divine na∣ture, which Saint Augustine refutes. For thus to doe is neither incident to the divine nature, nor to any other imaginable. Most of us, are by nature cholericke, and often take offence where none is given, and almost alwayes greater than is justly gi∣ven; But to be offended with any thing, that goes not against their present wills, is a way wardnesse of men, whereof the humane nature is uncapable. To punish any, which doe not contradict their wills, is an injustice scarce incident to the inhabi∣tants of Hell. It is the mutability of our wills or multiplicity of humors, which makes us so hard to be pleased. Our minds (at lest our affections) are set upon one thing fasting, upon another full; on this to day, on that to morrow; on sweet meates in health, on sowre in sicknesse; on kindnesse in mirth, on cruelty in anger; and because each hath his severall inconstant motions, wee cannot hold consort long together, without crossing or thwar∣ring. But no man ever offended by merrily consor∣ting

with his brother disposed to mirth; nor by consenting to wreake his will, whilest hee was in rage. No man ever punished his servant for doing that which for the present he would have him doe; nor doe the Devills themselves vex the wicked (till Gods justice overtake them) but the godly; because the one doth what they would, the other what they would not have him doe; neither could displease them, were it not their wicked will to have all as bad and miserable as themselves. Could the dam∣ned by their suffering, either ease these tormentors, of paine, or abate their malice; they would be lesse displeased at them, and lesse displeased, torment them lesse. And, whom then have they made the subject of their thoughts, or did they rather dreame than thinke on God, that sometimes write as if it were not as much against Gods will to have men dye, as it is against mans will to suffer death. For they suffer death, not because God delighteth in it, but that Gods will may be fulfilled in their suffering or passion, according to the measure it hath beene neglected or opposed, by their actions.

4 But though the rule of justice bee exactly ob∣served in proportioning their paines to the degrees or fervency of his love neglected; yet seeing the continuance of their neglect was but temporall, how stands it with his justice to make their paines eternall? The doubt were pertinent, if the immor∣tall happinesse, wherunto the riches of Gods boun∣tie, did daily lead them during their pilgrimage on earth, whereof they had sweet promises and full assurance, had not farther exceeded all the plea∣sures

of this mortall life, for whose purchase, they morgaged their hopes of immortality, than the paines of hell doe these grievances or corrections, which caused them murmure against their heaven∣ly Father. In this sense we may maintaine what Mirandula in another doth: that no man is everlast∣ingly punished for temporall offences as commit∣ted against God. How then? Man wilfully ex∣changing his everlasting inheritance for momen∣tany and transient pleasures, becomes the Author of his owne woe, and reapes the fruit of his rash * 1.6bargaines, and so makes up that measure of Gods glory and pleasure, by his eternall sufferings, which he might and would not doe, by eternall participa∣tion of his joyfull presence.* 1.7 And it is more than just, (for it is justice tempered with abundant mer∣cy) that they should suffer everlasting paines, who not twice, or thrice, or seven times onely, but more than seventy times seven times, have wilfully refused to accomplish Gods eternall pleasure by accepting the sweet profers of their eternall joy. In every moment of this life, we have a pledge of his bounty to assure us of a better inheritance, the very first neglect whereof, might in justice con∣demne us to everlasting bondage. The often and perpetuall neglect, turnes flames of eternall love into an eternall consuming fire. For if love and mercy bee his property as hee is Crea∣tor and preserver of all mankinde: his love

(as was said before) must needs be more indissolu∣bly set on those attributes than on man. The end of his love to man, is to make him happy by be∣ing like him in the love of goodnesse: Now the more he loves him with reference to this end, or the oftner hee pardons him for neglecting or refu∣sing the meanes that draw unto it; the greater is his wrath against impenitency, or finall contempt of his loving mercy. This is his* 1.8 most deare and ten∣der attribute, which being foully wronged will not suffer justice to sleepe.

Patientia laesa sit furor. Long restraint of anger upon just and frequent provocations, makes the out-bursting of it, though unseemely and violent, seeme not altogether unjust nor immoderate. Al∣beit the forme and manner of proceeding, which humane patience much abused, usually observes in taking revenge, cannot in exact justice bee warran∣ted or approved: yet this excesse of anger, or delin∣quency in the forme, is so tempered with matter of equity, that it makes those actions of patient men much abused, seeme excusable, which in o∣thers would be intollerable. The ideall perfection of this rule of equity, thus often corrupted by humane passions, is in the Divine Nature, without mixture of such passion or perturbation, as is pic∣tured out to the terror of the ungodly in the pro∣pheticall characters or descriptions of his anger. Et excitatus est tanquam dormiens Dominus, &c. Then the Lord awaked as one out of sleepe, and like a mightie man that shouteth by reason of wine: Psal. 78. 65. Although he be a Father to all, and seeme

to winke at his sonnes enormities: yet when hee a∣wakes, he hath a curse in store, for such as abuse his patience, and make a mocke of his threatnings; more bitter than that which Noah bestowed on Cham. To attribute patience to him, and to deny him wrath and indignation; were, in Lactantius his judgement, to inrich his goodnesse, by robbing his Majesty.* 1.9 The reasons of those Philosophers are apparently vaine, which thinke that God cannot bee angry. For even earthly Empire or Soveraignty, forthwith dissolves, unlesse it be held together by fear. Take anger from a King, and in stead of obedience, he shall be throwne headlong from the height of dignity. Yea take anger from a man of meaner ranke, and hee shall become a prey to all, a laughing-stock to all.

5 I am not ignorant what censures passe upon this Author for his incommodious speeches in this argument of Gods wrath or anger. His words, I must confesse, sound somewhat harsh, to eares ac∣customed to the harmony of refined Scholastique Dialect. Yet* 1.10 Betuleius, a man too learned, and too well seene in Lactantius, to let grosse faults pass without espiall, and too ingenuous to spare his cen∣sure upon errors espyed; after long quaerulous de∣batements, chides himselfe friends with his Au∣thor:

whose meaning in conclusion he acknowled∣geth to be Orthodoxall and good; albeit his cha∣racters of divine wrath in the premisses, may seeme better to fit the fragility of humane peevishnesse, than the Majesty of the Almighty Iudge. His phrase (perhaps) might be excused in part, by the security of those times wherein he wrote; his fault (if any fault it were not to speake precisely in an age more precise for maintaining the elegancy or life of style, than the right use or logicall propriety of words) is too common to most Writers yet, and consisteth onely in appropriating that to the Divine Nature, which is attributed to it onely by extrinsecall deno∣mination. But leaving his phrase (about which perhaps he himselfe would not have wrangled) his argument holds thus farre true: God is more deep∣ly displeased with sinne, than man is, though his displeasure bee not cloathed with such passions, as mans anger is: and yet the motions of the crea∣tures appointed to execute his wrath, are more fu∣rious than any mans passions in extreamest fury can bee. What mans voice is like his thunder? What Tyrants frownes like to a lowring sky, breathing out stormes of fire and brimstone? Yet are the most terrible sounds, which the creatures can present, but as so many ecchoes of his angry voice; the most dreadfull spectacles that Heaven or Earth, or the intermediate Elements can afford, but copies of his irefull countenance. Howbe it this change or altera∣tion in the creature proceeds from him without a∣ny internall passion or alteration. Immotus movet: He moveth all things, being himselfe immoveable.

6 But as Lactantius may bee so farre justified, as we have said, so perhaps he is inexcusable in avou∣ching anger to bee as naturall to GOD, as mer∣cie, love, and favour are. To him that duely considers his infinite goodnesse, it may seeme im∣possible that hee should bee moved by us, or by any thing in us, to mercy; seeing, as* 1.11 Saint Ber∣nard well observes, he hath the seminary of mercy in himselfe, and cannot take the seeds of it from any other. The fruits of it, wee may, by ill deserving, so hinder, that they shall never take nor prosper in our selves; but to punish or condemne us, we in a sort constraine him. And though he be the Author as well of punish∣ment as of compassion, yet the manner how these two opposite attributes, in respect of us proceed from him, is much different; the one is naturall to him, and much better than any naturall comfort unto us; the other is in a sort to him unnaturall, and most unnaturall and unpleasant unto us: for as S. a 1.12Ierome saith, God when he punisheth, doth in a man∣ner, relinquish his nature, and therefore when he pro∣ceeds to punishment, he is said to goe out of his place, and to worke alienum opus, a strange or uncouth worke. The wicked and reprobate, after this life, shall alwayes see and feele his anger: But though they see him thus, immediately, they doe not see his nature so immediately as the Elect shall doe, to whom he shewes himselfe in love; this is his pro∣per visage, the live-character of his native counte∣nance. The manifestation of his anger in what part of the world soever, or in what manner soever made, is a veile or vizard put betweene him and the

Reprobate, lest they shold see the light of his coun∣tenance and be made whole. Hence, in the sentence of condemnation, it shall be said, Depart from mee yee cursed into everlasting fire. From his essentiall presence they cannot, but from the light of his countenance or joyfull presence, they must of ne∣cessity depart. For were it possible for them to be∣hold it, no torments could take hold of them; the reflex of it upon whom soever it lighteth, createth joy; the fruition of it, is that happinesse which we seeke. To conclude: Lactantius rightly inferres, It were impossible sinne should not be odious to him, to whom goodnesse is pleasant and delightfull. Now his dispeasure at sinne, is the true cause of all displea∣sant motions or alterations in the creatures. His er∣rour, albeit we take him at the worst, was not great: and as it may easily be committed by others, so it may as quickly be rectified, if wee say, that Anger and Hate are by consequent, or upon supposall of sinne, as necessary to the Divine Nature, as Love and Mercy, but not so naturall. But how either Love or Anger, both of them being either formally passions, or indissolubly linkt with passions, may be rightly conceived to be in God, is a point worth explication.

CHAP. 21.

How Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy, or other af∣fections are in the Divine Nature.

NO affection or operation that es∣sentially includes imperfection, can properly be attributed to per∣fection it selfe. But if the imper∣fection be onely accidentall, that is, such as may bee severed from the affection; the affection after such separation made, may without meaphor (in some Schoole∣mens judgement) be ascribed to God. Hence the same Schoolemen will have distributive justice to be in him, after a more peculiar manner than com∣mutative justice is; because commutative justice (as they alledge) essentially includes rationem dati, & accepti; somewhat mutually given and taken. Mercy likewise is (in their judgements) more pro∣perly in God, than anger or revenge; because it may bee abstracted from compassion, which is an imperfectiō annexed, but not essential to the reliefe of others misery, wherein mercy (as they contend) formally consists. It sufficeth us, that such affecti∣ons or morall qualities as in us formally and essen∣tially include imperfectiō, may be contained in the Divine Essence; though not formally, yet eminent∣ly, and most truly, as we suppose anger is. For in this point wee rather approve of* 1.13 Lactantius his Divinity, than of* 1.14 Seneca's Philosophy. Hee that bids us be angry and sin not, seeks not the utter ex∣tirpation, but the moderation of anger, Qui ergo

irasci nos jubet, ipse uti{que} irascitur; He that bids us be angry, is doubtlesse upon just occasion angry himselfe. Nor should we sin, if we were angry onely as he is angry; or at those things onely that displease him, so far as they are displeasing to him; And were we as much inclined to mercy and loving kindnesse as we are to anger, the motions of the one would ar∣gue as great passion as the motiōs of the other. But seeing* 1.15 Gods mercy which is proposed unto us for a patterne, is (if I may so speake) more reall and trnly affectionate in him than his anger, the difficul∣ty how either should be in him is the same, or not much different: How can there be true compassi∣on without passion, without motion or mutation? In many men it is observable; that the better use they have of reason, the lesse they participate of af∣fection: and to cary those matters with moderati∣on, which others can neither accomplish nor affect without excesse of passion or perturbation, is a per∣fection peculiar to good education, much & choice experience or true learning. And thus by proporti∣on they argue, that God who is infinitly wise, must be as utterly void of passiō, though he be truly said mercifull in respect of the event. The conclusion is truer than the reason assigned. And in most men whom the world accounteth wise or subtile, reason doth not so much moderate as devoure affections of that rank we treat of. The cunningest heads have commonly most deceitfull or unmercifull hearts: and want of passion often argues want of religion, if not abundance of habituated atheism or irreligiō. Every mans passions are for the most part mode∣rate

in matters w^ch he either least affects or minds the most. Perpetuall minding, especially of world∣ly matters, coucheth the affections in an equall ha∣bit or constant temper; which is not easily moved, unlesse it be directly or strongly thwarted. Desires once stifned with hope of advantage by close solli∣citation, secret cariage, or cunning contrivance; take small notice of violent oppositions which ap∣parantly either overshoot, or come short of the game they lye in wait for. But even such moderate politiques, if their nets be once discovered and the prey caught from them, fall into Achitophels pas∣sion. Indignation and mercy, because incompati∣ble with such meanes as serve best to politique ends, are held the companions of fooles. And unto the world so they seeme, because they are the pro∣per passions of reason throughly apprehending the true worth of matters spirituall. For though gra∣vity or good education may decently figure the outward motions; yet is it impossible not to bee vehemently moved, at the miscariage of those things, which we most esteeme. And the wiser we are in matters spirituall, the higher wee esteeme the promulgation of religion, the good of Gods Church, and promotion of his glory. The better experience we have of his goodnesse; the more we pity their case which as yet never tasted it: the more compassionate wee are to all that are in that misery whence we are redeemed. Did we esteeme these or other duties of spiritual life, as they deserve: the ex∣treamest fits of passion, which any worldly wise man can be cast into, wold seem but as light flashes

to those flames of zeale and indignation w^ch the ve∣ry sight of this misguided world, would forthwith kindle in our brests. It is not then Gods infinit wis∣dome which swallowes up all passion, or exempts him from those affections which essentially include perturbation; for so the most zealous and compas∣sionate should be most unlike him in heavenly wis∣dome. But as the swift motion of the heaven, bet∣ter expresseth his immobility or vigorous rest, then the dull stability of the earth. So doth the vehe∣mency of zeale, of indignation, or other passions of the godly (so the motives be weighty and just) ex∣hibite a more lively resemblance of his immutabili∣ty or want of passion, then the Stoicall apathy, or worldings insensibility in matters spirituall can doe.

2 How we should in godly passions bee likest GOD in whom is no passion; or how those ver∣tues or affections which are formally in us, should bee eminently in him; cannot by my barren ima∣gination bee better illustrated, then by compa∣ring the circle in some properties with other fi∣gures. A circle, in some mens definitive language, is but a circular line; and to any mans sense (as in some respects (perhaps) reason must acknow∣ledge) it is rather one line, then a comprehensi∣on of different lines, or a multitude of sides inclo∣sed in angles. And from the unity of it perhaps it is, that many flexible bodies, as wands or small rods of iron, brasse, &c. which presently breake if you presse them into angles, or seek to frame them into any other figure, will bee drawne without danger into a circular forme. Notwithstanding

some infallible mathematicall rules there be exprest in tearmes which in strict property of speech (or univocally) agree only to figures consisting of sides and angles; whose truth and use, reason expe∣rienceth to bee most eminently true in the Circle. Take a Quadrangle ten yards in length, and foure in bredth, another eight yards in length, and sixe in bredth, a third seven yards every way: The cir∣cumference of all three is equall 28. yards; so is not the superficiall quantity, but of the first 40. yards, of the second 48. of the third 49. The same inducti∣on alike sensible in other many-sided figures, af∣foords this generall unquestionable rule;* 1.16 Among figures of the same kind, whose circumference is e∣quall, that whose sides are most equall, are most ca∣pacious. Yet frame a five-angled figure whose whol circumference is but 28. yards, though the sides be not equall, the superficiall quantity of it will bee greater, then the superficiall quantity of the former square: and yet a sixe-angled figure of the same circumference, though the sides be unequall, will bee more capacious then that. And still the more you encrease the number of angles, though without any encrease of the circumference, the greater will the capacity or superficiall quantity of the figures be, specially if the sides be not unequall. From this evident induction ariseth a second tryed rule in the Mathematique.* 1.17 Amongst figures of divers kinds, whose circumferences are equall, that which hath most angles, is alwayes most capaci∣ous. The circle which to our sense seemes neither to have sides, nor angles; by a double title groun∣ded

on both the former rules, hath the prehemi∣nence for capacity of all other figures. It is more uniforme than any other, or rather the abstract or patterne of uniformity in figures, admitting neither difference of ranckes, or sorts, as triangles, qua∣drangles, or other many-sided figures doe: nor of inequality betweene its owne internall parts or lines: neither can one circle bee more capacious then another of the same circumference: nor can any line in the same circle bee longer then another that is drawne from one part of the circumference, to another, through the same center. It is then in this respect more capacious then any other figure, because it is most uniforme. The sides of other fi∣gures may be exactly equall, but the distance of e∣very part of their circumference from the center, cannot admit such equality, as every part of the cir∣cles circumference doth. The circle againe is more capacious then any other figure, because more full of angles. for the angles which it no where hath univocally, formally, or conspicuous to sense; rea∣son apprehends it to have every where eminently. For as the Philosopher tells us, it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a totan∣gle, and so hath the prerogative or royalty, though not the propriety of the second Rule. It is more capacious than any other figure, not onely because it is more ordinate or uniforme, but withall, because it hath more angles than any other figures can have; even as many as can be imagined, it being a totangle.

3 This analogy betweene sides and angles as they are found in the circle and in other figures,

mee thinkes well expresseth that analogy which Schoole Divines assigne betweene wisedome, sci∣ence, love, hatred, goodnesse, desire, &c. as they are found in God and in man. For no one name or title of any affection can be univocally attributed to the Creator and to the creature: and yet the rules of equity, of mercy, of Iustice, of patience, of anger, of love, which we are commanded to follow, though not without passion or affection, are most truly observed by him: yea their truth in him is infinitely eminent: so farre must we be from con∣ceiting him to bee without ardent love, without true and unfaigned good will to us, without wrath burning like fire to consume his adversaries, be∣cause he is without all passion. He is most loving, yet never moved with love, because he is eternally wholly love; He is most compassionate, yet never moved with compassion, because he is eternally wholly compassion; He is most jealous of his glo∣ry and a revenger of iniquity most severe; yet ne∣ver moved with jealousie, yet never passionate in re∣venge; because to such as provoke his punitive ju∣stice, hee is eternally severity and revenge it selfe. Againe, how the indivisible Essence should bee wholly love, and wholly displeasure, wholly mer∣cy, and wholly severity, I cannot better illustrate then by the circle, the true embleme of his eterni∣tie, which is as truly 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as well all sides, as all angles. And being such, the sides and angles cannot be distinguished in it: but the sides are angles, and the angles sides; at least they are, if not essentially, yet penetratively the same. The

circle likewise is as truely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of equall sides and equall angles, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a totangle or totilater; and did it not contiaine mul∣tiplicitie of sides, as well as of angles in most exact and eminent uniformity, it could not have the full prerogative of the former rules. Nor could the indivisible essence either be so great or excellent in himselfe, or a moderator of all things so powerfull and just, as wee beleeve hee is; unlesse he did emi∣nently containe the perfections of all things possi∣ble as well as of any one.

4 Some Philosophers have placed the humane nature, as a line diameter or aequilibrium in this vi∣sible sphere; making man the measure of all things, as participating all other natures: much what after the same manner that mixt bodies con∣taine the force and vertues of the elements. And mans nature, til it was corrupt, did (without doubt) include such an eminent uniformity to all things created, as the eye doth unto colours. As hee was then the true image of God for his essence; so did he in this property, beare a true shadow of the di∣vine prerogative, whose essence, though, for num∣ber or greatnesse of perfections contained in it, al∣together measurelesse, is the most true and exqui∣site measure of all things that are, or possibly can be: All the conditions or properties of measure assign∣ed by the Philosopher are as truly contained in the incomprehensible essence, as sides or angles in the circle, but farre more eminently. A measure it is, not appliable to measurables, for kind or quantity much different, according to diversitie of parts,

which it hath none, for it is immutably, eternally and indivisibly the same: and unto it the nature, essence, quality, and quantity of all things, are actu∣ally applyed, in that they have actuall being. It is impossible the immutable Creator should be fitted to any thing created; but in that he is immutable, and yet eminently containeth all things in his indi∣visible essence, he eternally and immutably fits all the possible varieties whereof contingency it selfe is capable. Being all things else, hee is fitnesse it selfe in a most eminent and excellent manner: the present disposition of every thing, either, whiles it first begins to be, or continues the same, or whiles it is in the change or motion (whether from good to evill, or from evill to good, from evill to worse, or from good to better) is more exquisitely fitted in it owne kind, by eternall, immutable and incom∣parable fitnesse; then it could be by any other mea∣sure, which the Creator himselfe could create with it, or devise for it, after the alteration or change were accomplished. In that he is indivisibly One, and yet eminently All,* 1.18 he is immutable, contrariety it selfe unto contraries:* 1.19 Arithmeticall equality it selfe to things equall, Geometrically equall to things unequall;* 1.20 according to every degree of their unequall capacities, in what sort soever. And as of his other attributes one truly and really is ano∣ther, so in respect of man, his measure is his judge∣ment or retribution whether of rewards or punish∣ments, not the rule onely by which he rewards or punisheth. Vnto man in his first creation, and whiles he continued as he created him, he was and

would have continued bountie it selfe; unto man yet as he is his creature, he is love it selfe: and unto man made by his own folly an impotent wretched and miserable creature, hee is so entyrely mercy and compassion if selfe, that were there a distinct god of love, or a goddesse of mercy, or two infi∣nite living abstracts of meere love, and meere mer∣cie; they could not be so loving and mercifull unto man touched with the sense of his owne miseries, nor solicite him so seriously and perpetually unto repentance as he doth, who is entirely infinite mer∣cy, but not mercy only. Vnto the truly penitent he is so truly and entirely gratiousnesse it selfe, that if there were a Trinity of such abstract Graces, as the Poets have faigned, they could be but a figure or picture of his solid and infinite gratiousnesse. Vn∣to the elect and throughly sanctified, he is so truely and entirely felicity and salvation it selfe; that if the Heathen goddesses, Felicitas and Salus, or Pla∣toes Idea of true happinesse might be inspired with life and sense;* 1.21 they could not communicate halfe that happinesse to any one man (though they wold choose his hart for their closet, or actuate his reaso∣nable soule as it doth the sensitive) that is imparted by him to al his chosen, who is entirely infinite hap∣pinesse, but not happinesse onely. For unto the im∣penitent and despisers of his bountie, of his love, his mercy, grace, and salvation; he is justice, indig∣nation, and severity it selfe. Nemesis her selfe were she enabled with spirit, life and power much grea∣ter then the Heathens ascribed unto her, and per∣mitted to rage without controle of any superiour

law; should not bee able with all the assistance the Furies could afford her,* 1.22 to render vengeance unto Satan and his wicked Angles, in such full and ex∣quisite measure as the just Iudge will doe in that last dreadfull day. Then shall he truely appeare to be, as our Apostle speakes, All in All: the infinite ab∣stract of all those powers which the heathens ado∣red for gods, as authors either of good or of evill: Then shall he fully appeare to be mercy, goodness, grace and felicity; Nemesis, pav••r, and terrour it selfe; the indivisible, and incomprehensible Idea of all things which in this life our love did seeke after, or our feare naturally laboured to avoyd: The onely loadstone whereto our love, our desire in our creation were directed, was his goodnesse and loving kindnesse. And feare was implanted in our nature as an Helme or Rudder to divert us from his immutable justice or indignation; which are as rockes immoveable, against whom whosoever shall carelessely or presumptuously runne, must everla∣stingly perish without redemption.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Ioh. 12. 49, 50.
• * 1.2

  Heu primae scelerum causae mor∣talibus agris Naturam nescire De••m. Silius Ita∣licus. lib. 4. de be••••o pu∣n••••••.
• * 1.3

  Rom. 8. 28.
• * 1.4

  Meroveo certe auget probitatis famam at{que} justitiae ne∣catus filius, justissimas uti{que} ob cau∣sas, ne quis ipsi dirita∣tem in alie∣nos falso exprobet li∣beros, vel in suos inau∣ditam saevi∣tiam nullis fultam rationibus: quales nec Posthumius Tiburtus, nec T. Manlius Torquatus olim habuere. Foreatulus de Gallorum Imperio & Philosophia. lib. 5. Et Paulo post. Posthumus Dicta∣tor, quia Aulus filius injustus praesidiis egressus hostes fuderat, victorem audacem caedi se∣curi jussit: at Torquatus itidem Latino bello, Cos. filium à Metio Tusculanorum Duce pro∣vocatum, & forte detractandae pugnae pudore incensum, ac spolia referentem, mactari à lictore mandavit: jure forsitan, cum, teste Paulo Iurisconsulto, parentibus Romanis anti∣quior esset disciplina militaris charitate liberorum. At qui Gelaor Merovei filius in pa∣trem contumax, in cives procax, in omnes superbus & injurius, pudicis matronis vim in∣tulerat, p••tres & maritos terrnerat, ceciderat foederatos ac amicos Franci nominis lacessie∣rat. Cum{que} ex amicissimis aulicis quispiam objecisset Meroveo Lucium Gellium Censorem Romanum, qui filio novercam solicitanti, & praeter•••• parricidium meditanti, ac propemo∣dum convicto, ignovisset, & in reatu constitutum absolvi diligentissime curasset: Ille, in∣quit, boni patru functus est officio, ego boni Ducis: qui debellare hostes didici, & socios honorificè tractare, eorum{que} ulcisci injurias.
• * 1.5

  Quod in fine versus 9. dicitur, Mesericor∣dia ejus s••∣per omnia opera ejus, hoc, inquit Calv. ne{que} absurdum, ne{que} durum videri de∣bet. Nam cum pec••ata nostra totum mundum involvant Dei male∣dictione, v∣bi{que} locus est misericor∣diae Dei ut brutis etiam animalibus subveniat. Hunc locum tractat Zan∣chius de na∣tura Dei. l. 4. c. 4. q. 4 Quam magna sit Dei miseri∣cordia▪ i. Deus de justitia sua multum semper remittit. It reprobri cum postea puniuntur non pro meritis puniuntur [Haec Zanchij sententia] in igitur remittit illis propter satisfactionem Christi, an sine ulla satisfa∣ctione? [Verba Coppen.] Notandum hic in Diabolis & reprobis condemnatis, post hanc vitam non videri quaerenda misericordiae divinae vestigia. Coppen in Psal. 145. 9. videtur Zanchij expositio contradicere lac. c. 2. v. 13 Damnatio 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ei qui non praestitit miseris ordiam.
• * 1.6

  For I reckon, that the sufferings of this pre∣sent time, are not worthy to be compa∣red with the glory which shall be revealed in us. Rom. 8. 18.
• * 1.7

  Quod si Christo salus nostra tam chara fuit, & tam charò con∣stitit, quid est quare nostram ipsi salutem tantopere negligamus? Quibus supplicijs, & qua ignominia sempiterna non sumus digni, modicum laborem prore obtinenda tam praetiosa recusantes? Quomòdo nos effugie••••us (in∣quit Paulus) si tantum neglexerimus salutem? Acosta con. 3. de circumcisione.
• * 1.8

  Isa. 42. 14 I have long time hol∣den my peace, I have been still and re∣frained my selfe: now will I cry like a tra∣vailing woman, I wil destroy & devoure at once.
• * 1.9

  Ex his ap∣paret vanas esse ratio∣nes Philoso∣phorum, qui Deum putant sine ira: & in∣ter caeteras laudes ejus id ponunt, quod est contra ipsā majestatem. Regnum hoc imperi∣um{que} terre∣num, nisi metus cu∣stodiat, sol∣vitur. Au∣fer iram Regi, non modo nemo parebit, sed etiem de fastigio praecipitabitur. Imo vero cuilibet humili eripe hunc affectum, quis eum non spoliabit? quis non deridebit? Lactantius cap. 23. de ira Dei. p. 477.
• * 1.10

  Hacte∣nus mihi magna contentio suit cum Lactantio, dum humanis rationibus, divinam iram ex humana metiretur fragilitate. Iam autem, quia dicit iram Dei sicut ipsum etiam Deum, eternam, nihil habeo quod repugnem. Nam ex syncrisi divinae atque humanae irae intelligas, ipsum de divina longe aliter quam de humana loqui: neque esse accidens quod in Deum non cadit, sed proprium, quia ira Dei à justitia Dei nihil differt. Iustitia verò Dei exeterna lage manet, contra quam si quis deliquerit, vindictam nimirum illius Dei sentiet, apud quem nul∣lus vel temporum vel locorum terminus est. Betuleius in Com. in cap. 21. Lactant. de ira Dei.
• * 1.11

  Deus ex se sumil se∣minarium miserendi, quod judi∣cat & con∣demnat nos, eum quo∣dammodo cogimus, ut longe aliter de corde ipsius mise∣ratio quam animadver. sio procede∣re videatur. Bernard. Ser. 5. in na∣tal. Dom.
• a 1.12

  Vide Hie∣rom. in cap. 1. Mich. vi∣de Riberam in 1. Mich. num. 5. Et in 4. Mal. num. 4.
• * 1.13

  De Ira Dei, cap. 21.
• * 1.14

  Quotiens impetu o∣pus est non irascitur, sed exurgit, & in quan∣tum puta∣vit opus esse concitatur remittitur{que} non aliter quam quae tormentis exprimun∣tur tela, in potestate mittentis sunt, in quantum torque an∣tur. Sen. lib. 1. de ira. cap. 9. Ita aut ira non est, aut inutilis est. Ibid.
• * 1.15

  Dum ergo ad verba mutabilita∣tis nostrae descenditur, ex iis qui∣busdam gradibus factis ascen∣det qui petest ad in∣communica∣bilitatem Dei, ut ride∣at sine zelo zelantem, sine ira ira∣scentem, sine dolore & penitentia, penitentems, sine misero corde, mis••∣ricordem, sine praevi∣sionibus praescien∣tem. Greg∣moral. lib. 20. in 30. cap. Iob.
• * 1.16

  Inter figu∣ras 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ordinator 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est capacior.
• * 1.17

  Inter figu∣ras 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Heteroge∣neas termi∣natior est capacior.
• * 1.18

  See Esay 66. 14, 15, 16.
• * 1.19

  Ezek. 7. 4.
• * 1.20

  Deut. 7. 9, 10.
• * 1.21

  Qui quoti∣die contem∣nit Deum, etiam quoti∣die judica∣tur, non ma∣nifesto sed occulto judi∣cio, non a∣perto sed ta∣men certo: occultiora saepe sunt certiora ma∣nifestioribus Coppen. in Psal. 7.
• * 1.22

  Etiam Dei 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 est ipsius 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Coppen. ibid.