A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part

CHAP. 21.

How Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy, or other af∣fections are in the Divine Nature.

NO affection or operation that es∣sentially includes imperfection, can properly be attributed to per∣fection it selfe. But if the imper∣fection be onely accidentall, that is, such as may bee severed from the affection; the affection after such separation made, may without meaphor (in some Schoole∣mens judgement) be ascribed to God. Hence the same Schoolemen will have distributive justice to be in him, after a more peculiar manner than com∣mutative justice is; because commutative justice (as they alledge) essentially includes rationem dati, & accepti; somewhat mutually given and taken. Mercy likewise is (in their judgements) more pro∣perly in God, than anger or revenge; because it may bee abstracted from compassion, which is an imperfectiō annexed, but not essential to the reliefe of others misery, wherein mercy (as they contend) formally consists. It sufficeth us, that such affecti∣ons or morall qualities as in us formally and essen∣tially include imperfectiō, may be contained in the Divine Essence; though not formally, yet eminent∣ly, and most truly, as we suppose anger is. For in this point wee rather approve of* 1.1 Lactantius his Divinity, than of* 1.2 Seneca's Philosophy. Hee that bids us be angry and sin not, seeks not the utter ex∣tirpation, but the moderation of anger, Qui ergo

irasci nos jubet, ipse uti{que} irascitur; He that bids us be angry, is doubtlesse upon just occasion angry himselfe. Nor should we sin, if we were angry onely as he is angry; or at those things onely that displease him, so far as they are displeasing to him; And were we as much inclined to mercy and loving kindnesse as we are to anger, the motions of the one would ar∣gue as great passion as the motiōs of the other. But seeing* 1.3 Gods mercy which is proposed unto us for a patterne, is (if I may so speake) more reall and trnly affectionate in him than his anger, the difficul∣ty how either should be in him is the same, or not much different: How can there be true compassi∣on without passion, without motion or mutation? In many men it is observable; that the better use they have of reason, the lesse they participate of af∣fection: and to cary those matters with moderati∣on, which others can neither accomplish nor affect without excesse of passion or perturbation, is a per∣fection peculiar to good education, much & choice experience or true learning. And thus by proporti∣on they argue, that God who is infinitly wise, must be as utterly void of passiō, though he be truly said mercifull in respect of the event. The conclusion is truer than the reason assigned. And in most men whom the world accounteth wise or subtile, reason doth not so much moderate as devoure affections of that rank we treat of. The cunningest heads have commonly most deceitfull or unmercifull hearts: and want of passion often argues want of religion, if not abundance of habituated atheism or irreligiō. Every mans passions are for the most part mode∣rate

in matters w^ch he either least affects or minds the most. Perpetuall minding, especially of world∣ly matters, coucheth the affections in an equall ha∣bit or constant temper; which is not easily moved, unlesse it be directly or strongly thwarted. Desires once stifned with hope of advantage by close solli∣citation, secret cariage, or cunning contrivance; take small notice of violent oppositions which ap∣parantly either overshoot, or come short of the game they lye in wait for. But even such moderate politiques, if their nets be once discovered and the prey caught from them, fall into Achitophels pas∣sion. Indignation and mercy, because incompati∣ble with such meanes as serve best to politique ends, are held the companions of fooles. And unto the world so they seeme, because they are the pro∣per passions of reason throughly apprehending the true worth of matters spirituall. For though gra∣vity or good education may decently figure the outward motions; yet is it impossible not to bee vehemently moved, at the miscariage of those things, which we most esteeme. And the wiser we are in matters spirituall, the higher wee esteeme the promulgation of religion, the good of Gods Church, and promotion of his glory. The better experience we have of his goodnesse; the more we pity their case which as yet never tasted it: the more compassionate wee are to all that are in that misery whence we are redeemed. Did we esteeme these or other duties of spiritual life, as they deserve: the ex∣treamest fits of passion, which any worldly wise man can be cast into, wold seem but as light flashes

to those flames of zeale and indignation w^ch the ve∣ry sight of this misguided world, would forthwith kindle in our brests. It is not then Gods infinit wis∣dome which swallowes up all passion, or exempts him from those affections which essentially include perturbation; for so the most zealous and compas∣sionate should be most unlike him in heavenly wis∣dome. But as the swift motion of the heaven, bet∣ter expresseth his immobility or vigorous rest, then the dull stability of the earth. So doth the vehe∣mency of zeale, of indignation, or other passions of the godly (so the motives be weighty and just) ex∣hibite a more lively resemblance of his immutabili∣ty or want of passion, then the Stoicall apathy, or worldings insensibility in matters spirituall can doe.

2 How we should in godly passions bee likest GOD in whom is no passion; or how those ver∣tues or affections which are formally in us, should bee eminently in him; cannot by my barren ima∣gination bee better illustrated, then by compa∣ring the circle in some properties with other fi∣gures. A circle, in some mens definitive language, is but a circular line; and to any mans sense (as in some respects (perhaps) reason must acknow∣ledge) it is rather one line, then a comprehensi∣on of different lines, or a multitude of sides inclo∣sed in angles. And from the unity of it perhaps it is, that many flexible bodies, as wands or small rods of iron, brasse, &c. which presently breake if you presse them into angles, or seek to frame them into any other figure, will bee drawne without danger into a circular forme. Notwithstanding

some infallible mathematicall rules there be exprest in tearmes which in strict property of speech (or univocally) agree only to figures consisting of sides and angles; whose truth and use, reason expe∣rienceth to bee most eminently true in the Circle. Take a Quadrangle ten yards in length, and foure in bredth, another eight yards in length, and sixe in bredth, a third seven yards every way: The cir∣cumference of all three is equall 28. yards; so is not the superficiall quantity, but of the first 40. yards, of the second 48. of the third 49. The same inducti∣on alike sensible in other many-sided figures, af∣foords this generall unquestionable rule;* 1.4 Among figures of the same kind, whose circumference is e∣quall, that whose sides are most equall, are most ca∣pacious. Yet frame a five-angled figure whose whol circumference is but 28. yards, though the sides be not equall, the superficiall quantity of it will bee greater, then the superficiall quantity of the former square: and yet a sixe-angled figure of the same circumference, though the sides be unequall, will bee more capacious then that. And still the more you encrease the number of angles, though without any encrease of the circumference, the greater will the capacity or superficiall quantity of the figures be, specially if the sides be not unequall. From this evident induction ariseth a second tryed rule in the Mathematique.* 1.5 Amongst figures of divers kinds, whose circumferences are equall, that which hath most angles, is alwayes most capaci∣ous. The circle which to our sense seemes neither to have sides, nor angles; by a double title groun∣ded

on both the former rules, hath the prehemi∣nence for capacity of all other figures. It is more uniforme than any other, or rather the abstract or patterne of uniformity in figures, admitting neither difference of ranckes, or sorts, as triangles, qua∣drangles, or other many-sided figures doe: nor of inequality betweene its owne internall parts or lines: neither can one circle bee more capacious then another of the same circumference: nor can any line in the same circle bee longer then another that is drawne from one part of the circumference, to another, through the same center. It is then in this respect more capacious then any other figure, because it is most uniforme. The sides of other fi∣gures may be exactly equall, but the distance of e∣very part of their circumference from the center, cannot admit such equality, as every part of the cir∣cles circumference doth. The circle againe is more capacious then any other figure, because more full of angles. for the angles which it no where hath univocally, formally, or conspicuous to sense; rea∣son apprehends it to have every where eminently. For as the Philosopher tells us, it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a totan∣gle, and so hath the prerogative or royalty, though not the propriety of the second Rule. It is more capacious than any other figure, not onely because it is more ordinate or uniforme, but withall, because it hath more angles than any other figures can have; even as many as can be imagined, it being a totangle.

3 This analogy betweene sides and angles as they are found in the circle and in other figures,

mee thinkes well expresseth that analogy which Schoole Divines assigne betweene wisedome, sci∣ence, love, hatred, goodnesse, desire, &c. as they are found in God and in man. For no one name or title of any affection can be univocally attributed to the Creator and to the creature: and yet the rules of equity, of mercy, of Iustice, of patience, of anger, of love, which we are commanded to follow, though not without passion or affection, are most truly observed by him: yea their truth in him is infinitely eminent: so farre must we be from con∣ceiting him to bee without ardent love, without true and unfaigned good will to us, without wrath burning like fire to consume his adversaries, be∣cause he is without all passion. He is most loving, yet never moved with love, because he is eternally wholly love; He is most compassionate, yet never moved with compassion, because he is eternally wholly compassion; He is most jealous of his glo∣ry and a revenger of iniquity most severe; yet ne∣ver moved with jealousie, yet never passionate in re∣venge; because to such as provoke his punitive ju∣stice, hee is eternally severity and revenge it selfe. Againe, how the indivisible Essence should bee wholly love, and wholly displeasure, wholly mer∣cy, and wholly severity, I cannot better illustrate then by the circle, the true embleme of his eterni∣tie, which is as truly 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as well all sides, as all angles. And being such, the sides and angles cannot be distinguished in it: but the sides are angles, and the angles sides; at least they are, if not essentially, yet penetratively the same. The

circle likewise is as truely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of equall sides and equall angles, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a totangle or totilater; and did it not contiaine mul∣tiplicitie of sides, as well as of angles in most exact and eminent uniformity, it could not have the full prerogative of the former rules. Nor could the indivisible essence either be so great or excellent in himselfe, or a moderator of all things so powerfull and just, as wee beleeve hee is; unlesse he did emi∣nently containe the perfections of all things possi∣ble as well as of any one.

4 Some Philosophers have placed the humane nature, as a line diameter or aequilibrium in this vi∣sible sphere; making man the measure of all things, as participating all other natures: much what after the same manner that mixt bodies con∣taine the force and vertues of the elements. And mans nature, til it was corrupt, did (without doubt) include such an eminent uniformity to all things created, as the eye doth unto colours. As hee was then the true image of God for his essence; so did he in this property, beare a true shadow of the di∣vine prerogative, whose essence, though, for num∣ber or greatnesse of perfections contained in it, al∣together measurelesse, is the most true and exqui∣site measure of all things that are, or possibly can be: All the conditions or properties of measure assign∣ed by the Philosopher are as truly contained in the incomprehensible essence, as sides or angles in the circle, but farre more eminently. A measure it is, not appliable to measurables, for kind or quantity much different, according to diversitie of parts,

which it hath none, for it is immutably, eternally and indivisibly the same: and unto it the nature, essence, quality, and quantity of all things, are actu∣ally applyed, in that they have actuall being. It is impossible the immutable Creator should be fitted to any thing created; but in that he is immutable, and yet eminently containeth all things in his indi∣visible essence, he eternally and immutably fits all the possible varieties whereof contingency it selfe is capable. Being all things else, hee is fitnesse it selfe in a most eminent and excellent manner: the present disposition of every thing, either, whiles it first begins to be, or continues the same, or whiles it is in the change or motion (whether from good to evill, or from evill to good, from evill to worse, or from good to better) is more exquisitely fitted in it owne kind, by eternall, immutable and incom∣parable fitnesse; then it could be by any other mea∣sure, which the Creator himselfe could create with it, or devise for it, after the alteration or change were accomplished. In that he is indivisibly One, and yet eminently All,* 1.6 he is immutable, contrariety it selfe unto contraries:* 1.7 Arithmeticall equality it selfe to things equall, Geometrically equall to things unequall;* 1.8 according to every degree of their unequall capacities, in what sort soever. And as of his other attributes one truly and really is ano∣ther, so in respect of man, his measure is his judge∣ment or retribution whether of rewards or punish∣ments, not the rule onely by which he rewards or punisheth. Vnto man in his first creation, and whiles he continued as he created him, he was and

would have continued bountie it selfe; unto man yet as he is his creature, he is love it selfe: and unto man made by his own folly an impotent wretched and miserable creature, hee is so entyrely mercy and compassion if selfe, that were there a distinct god of love, or a goddesse of mercy, or two infi∣nite living abstracts of meere love, and meere mer∣cie; they could not be so loving and mercifull unto man touched with the sense of his owne miseries, nor solicite him so seriously and perpetually unto repentance as he doth, who is entirely infinite mer∣cy, but not mercy only. Vnto the truly penitent he is so truly and entirely gratiousnesse it selfe, that if there were a Trinity of such abstract Graces, as the Poets have faigned, they could be but a figure or picture of his solid and infinite gratiousnesse. Vn∣to the elect and throughly sanctified, he is so truely and entirely felicity and salvation it selfe; that if the Heathen goddesses, Felicitas and Salus, or Pla∣toes Idea of true happinesse might be inspired with life and sense;* 1.9 they could not communicate halfe that happinesse to any one man (though they wold choose his hart for their closet, or actuate his reaso∣nable soule as it doth the sensitive) that is imparted by him to al his chosen, who is entirely infinite hap∣pinesse, but not happinesse onely. For unto the im∣penitent and despisers of his bountie, of his love, his mercy, grace, and salvation; he is justice, indig∣nation, and severity it selfe. Nemesis her selfe were she enabled with spirit, life and power much grea∣ter then the Heathens ascribed unto her, and per∣mitted to rage without controle of any superiour

law; should not bee able with all the assistance the Furies could afford her,* 1.10 to render vengeance unto Satan and his wicked Angles, in such full and ex∣quisite measure as the just Iudge will doe in that last dreadfull day. Then shall he truely appeare to be, as our Apostle speakes, All in All: the infinite ab∣stract of all those powers which the heathens ado∣red for gods, as authors either of good or of evill: Then shall he fully appeare to be mercy, goodness, grace and felicity; Nemesis, pav••r, and terrour it selfe; the indivisible, and incomprehensible Idea of all things which in this life our love did seeke after, or our feare naturally laboured to avoyd: The onely loadstone whereto our love, our desire in our creation were directed, was his goodnesse and loving kindnesse. And feare was implanted in our nature as an Helme or Rudder to divert us from his immutable justice or indignation; which are as rockes immoveable, against whom whosoever shall carelessely or presumptuously runne, must everla∣stingly perish without redemption.

Notes

• * 1.1

  De Ira Dei, cap. 21.
• * 1.2

  Quotiens impetu o∣pus est non irascitur, sed exurgit, & in quan∣tum puta∣vit opus esse concitatur remittitur{que} non aliter quam quae tormentis exprimun∣tur tela, in potestate mittentis sunt, in quantum torque an∣tur. Sen. lib. 1. de ira. cap. 9. Ita aut ira non est, aut inutilis est. Ibid.
• * 1.3

  Dum ergo ad verba mutabilita∣tis nostrae descenditur, ex iis qui∣busdam gradibus factis ascen∣det qui petest ad in∣communica∣bilitatem Dei, ut ride∣at sine zelo zelantem, sine ira ira∣scentem, sine dolore & penitentia, penitentems, sine misero corde, mis••∣ricordem, sine praevi∣sionibus praescien∣tem. Greg∣moral. lib. 20. in 30. cap. Iob.
• * 1.4

  Inter figu∣ras 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ordinator 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est capacior.
• * 1.5

  Inter figu∣ras 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Heteroge∣neas termi∣natior est capacior.
• * 1.6

  See Esay 66. 14, 15, 16.
• * 1.7

  Ezek. 7. 4.
• * 1.8

  Deut. 7. 9, 10.
• * 1.9

  Qui quoti∣die contem∣nit Deum, etiam quoti∣die judica∣tur, non ma∣nifesto sed occulto judi∣cio, non a∣perto sed ta∣men certo: occultiora saepe sunt certiora ma∣nifestioribus Coppen. in Psal. 7.
• * 1.10

  Etiam Dei 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 est ipsius 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Coppen. ibid.