A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part

SECTION II. (Book 2)

Of the severall branches of absolute infi∣nitie; or of the infinitie of the Divine At∣tributes, as they are severally apprehen∣ded by us. (Book 2)

CHAP. 5.

Of Divine Immensity, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof infinity in magnitude, or space ima∣ginary is the shadow.

ORder of nature leads us first to ex∣plicate two branches of perfecti∣on infinite,* 1.1 that answer unto a kind of infinitie, so frequent and obvious to our thoughts, that our imaginations will hardly suffer it to be severed from those subjects, which our understandings by light of reason may, and by the eye of faith, must confesse to bee finite, to wit, time and place. The cause of this difficultie in abstraction, was signified* 1.2 before to be this. No event there is observed by sense, but is husked in the circumstance of place and time, whence it is, that these two accompany many Phantasmes, after they

bee winnowed from all the rest, into the closet of the understāding. The conceit of mathematicall or metaphysicall space, is so naturally annexed to our imagination of time and place physicall; that albeit reason, aswell as Scripture demonstrate the world to be, for Physicall magnitude, finite; yet our phan∣tasies cannot be curbed from running into imagina∣ry locall distance, beyond the utmost surface of this goodly visible worke of God, yea beyond the hea∣ven of heavens. The Philosopher, which thought all place or locall distance to bee contained within the utmost sphere, it beeing contained in nothing else (for extra coelum nihil est, was his saying) might in congruity have granted, a like termination, or cir∣cumscription of succession or time; unto which notwithstanding our imaginations will not easily subscribe. For though our understanding oft re∣fute their errour, which deny the beginning of Time; yet our senses still nurse an imaginary suc∣cessive duration much longer before the creation of this visible world, than the continuation of it hath beene. And (which is much to bee admired) some Schoole-braines have beene so puzled in pas∣sing this unsoundable gulfe, as to suspect that God, which is now in every place of the world created by Him, was as truly in these imaginary distances of place and time, before the creation was attempted. Thus have they made place commensurable to his immensitie, and succession, or time coequall to his eternitie. But what could they answere us, if we should demand, whether this duration, or locall distance, wherein they imagine God to have beene

before the Creation, were created by Him, or not? whether they were truly something, or meerly no∣thing? If they held them to be meerly nothing, they should have told us, that they had a reall imaginati∣on of an infinite space, which really was not: and therefore could not bee truely tearmed imaginary space before the world was created. For it is one thing to imagine an infinite space, and another to avouch there was an infinite imaginarie space be∣fore they could have any imagination of it. Hee that made the world and all that is in it, is not much beholding to those men, for building him an infi∣nite Castle, not in the Ayre (which had no being before the Creation) but in that which neither thē was, nor since hath had any being, save onely in the vanishing imaginations of men which have perish∣ed. For if this imaginary space were any more thā a meere imagination, it was surely created by God. Had then this imaginary space another space or di∣stance-locall, or this imaginary time or successive duration, another duration, wherin to be produced? or doe they make this imaginary time or place ful∣ly commensurable to eternity or immensity? If God from eternity had been in any other infinity besides himselfe, hee could not be said to be incom∣prehensible. By this imaginary space no realty can bee truely meant besides God himselfe, whom the * 1.3Hebrews enstyle by the name of place; to wit, in∣finite.

2 But what shall we answer unto these or the like captious demands of the Atheist: If the world, if time, if place, which now are, had not been from everlasting? where was your God when these were not, some where, or no where? If no where, Hee and Nothing might be fellow residents. In respect of eternity or immensity, no creature, no positive essence, no numerable part of this Vniverse is so like unto Him, as this negation of all things, which we describe by the name of Nothing. It hath no begin∣ning or end of dayes. Nothing or the negation of all things, as it is the object of our positive conceit, is more like unto Him than any one thing, in that no distinct or proper place of residence can bee as∣signed to nothing, or to the negation of all things: Yet most unlike him, in that it is truly and abso∣lutely no where, not in it selfe. Non entis, non est actio, non est qualitas, non conditio, That which is not can have no capacity to accept any condition of being, it can have no right or title to bee termed it selfe. We may truly say some objective conceipts are nothing: but we cannot rightly conceive, that nothing should have any degree or kinde of being; and want of being is the worst kinde of barrennesse that can be imagined. We cannot imagine it should bring forth any degree or ranke of being. It can∣not be mother to that which possibly may bee; it cannot be nurse to that which is. But of God wee cannot absolutely say, He was no where, before the world was made; we must use this limitation [Hee was no where save in Himselfe:] But such and so in Himselfe, that He was more than all things, longer

than time, greater than place, more infinite than ca∣pacity it selfe, uncapable of circumscription or com∣mensurability, able to limit time and place, (or what∣soever we conceive to be by succession or addition infinite,) by his essentiall presence, or coexistence more than penetrative; being so in both, in all things that are, as nothing possibly could have beginning, or continuance of being, unlesse He were in them, as the center of their supportance; yet so as they cannot environ or encompasse him. The absolute infinity of his being includes an absolute impossibi∣lity of his being onely in things, that are, or may be, though by his power those may be in number, by succession, infinite.

3 Had the evaporations of proud phantasticke melancholy, eclipsed the lustre of his glorious pre∣sence, in that late prodigious Questionists braine, which would bring us out of the sunne-shine of the Gospell into old Aegyptian darknesse: For as some well conjecture, this error of inclosing God in the heavens, and excluding his essentiall presence from this inferiour world, was first brought forth in Ae∣gypt, but so ill taken, as it could not be propagated to many nations; entertained by few Philosophers of better sort, Aristotle or the Author of the Booke de mundo ad Alexandrum, excepted; from whose opinion Verstius did herein dissent, that hee held God to be everywhere by his power, and immedi∣ate providence: His error notwithstanding, is ex∣ceeding grosse and unsufferable, in that hee makes his infinite power, wisedome, and goodnesse, in whose sweet harmony Divine Providence especially con∣sists,

but as Agents or Ambassadors to his infinite Majesty: as if his infinite Majesty onely were full compere to his Essence, unfitting to bee imployed abroad, or to keep residence any where, save in the Court of Heaven. Or if his power and wisedome be joynt assessors with his Essence in the heavens, and yet reach withall unto the earth, unto every thing within this Canopy, which is spred betwixt us and his glorious presence: His power, his wisedome, &c. may in some sort be held more infinite than his Essence, as being in many places where it is not. But for God to be everywhere here on earth, or in the region under the earth, by his wisedome, by his power, or by his goodnesse, is perhaps in his lan∣guage no more, than that the effects of these Attri∣butes are every where, that all things as well in earth as in heaven, are essentially subject to that eternall Law, which he hath appointed them; that every creature doth as constantly fulfill his will, and obey his power, in his absence, as if it were penetrated by his presence; that the eye of his knowledge pierceth every corner of the world, and seeth the secrets of mens hearts, as clearly, as if it were resi∣dent in their centers. And in part, unto this pur∣pose, some great Schoolemen distinguish the man∣ner of Gods being in all things, by his essence, by his power, by his presence. Let us take it as possible to supposition or imagination, (what by the habit of Christian faith, we are fully perswaded to bee in it selfe impossible) what by light of reason might be demonstrated to imply a manifest contradiction to any well-setled understanding, viz. [That infinite

Essence or Being it selfe should not be every-where es∣sentially present, or that infinite power should not bee able to reach every possible effect:] yet should al things that are, be present to him, whose name, whose best description is [I am.] Nothing could be done or said without his presence, that is, without his per∣fect notice. And in this sense perhaps it hath beene rightly avouched by some good Authors, whose meaning hath beene much mistaken, or wilfully perverted by others, That all things as well future as past, are alike present to Him, who was every where (before there was any distinction of times;) because nothing can bee said or done, without his perfect knowledge or just notice. Nothing can be begun, continued, or finished, without his expresse war∣rant or intuitive permission. He hath a vigilant eye over all things that are, or possibly can be. Or ta∣king it againe as not impossible to imagination, that divine knowledge were not so truly infinite as wee beleeve it is; yet admitting his power to bee truly infinite, nothing could be done, said, or intended, without its concourse, operation, or assistance. So that he might be everywhere by his infinite power, albeit his knowledge were not infinite; or every∣where by his infinite knowledge, albeit his power were but finite. But by the infallible consequence of these indemonstrable principles, it will necessa∣rily follow, That his Essence, being as was shewed before, truly infinite, nor world, nor time, nor place, nor power, nor wisedome, nor any thing possible can be where it is not, it must needs be, where any thing is, or possibly may be. He is in every center

of bodily or materiall substances, in every point imaginable of this visible Vniverse, as an essentiall root, whence all and every part of what is besides him spring, without waste or diffusion of his sub∣stance, without nutriment or sustentation from a∣ny other root or element. The conservation of im∣material or illocall substances, is from the benefit of his essentiall presence. Materialls are daily made and renewed by the transient efficacy of his crea∣tive power.

4 Doe we make these collections only, or doth not the Scripture teach this Philosophy also? Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God farre off? Ier. 23. 23. Nothing is, nothing can be without the reach of his power, his omnipotency cannot be confined within the places that are: for his hand hath made them all, not as Prisons to inclose his Essence, not as manicles to hinder the exercise of his mightie arme. Can any hide himselfe in secret places, that I shall not see him? saith the Lord, Ibid. vers. 24. This is a formall demand of our assent unto the infinitie of his knowledge. These are two speciall, but not the onely wayes of his being eve∣ry where, which the Scripture teacheth: for there followes a third, which after the manner of our un∣derstanding, is the root or foundation of al the rest; that indeed, from which the two former branches are most necessarily inferred, Doe not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord. Doth He fill heaven and earth by his power, or by his knowledge onely? Nay, but most properly and in the first place by his essentiall presence. For his Essence is infinitely po∣werfull,

infinitely wise.

His filling the earth as well as heaven, by his es∣sentiall presence, cannot be denyed but from one of these two reasons following.

Either, That his Essence is altogether uncapable of intimate coexistence, with such grosse and base creatures, as the parts of this inferiour world:

Or else, Because it is his will, to abstract or with∣hold his essentiall presence from them.

To affirme the former part, to wit, That his na∣ture is uncapable of intimate coexistence with any nature created by Him, is to deny his omnipotency; as all, by necessary consequence, doe, which grant not the immensity of his Essence. For what can withstand or withdraw his Essence from piercing the earth, as well as heaven? Not the hardnesse of it, not the loathsomnesse of the vile bodies contai∣ned in it. If either of these qualitites, or ought be∣sides, could deny the admission of his essentiall pre∣sence, he were not omnipotent, because not able to place his Essence in that locall space, in which, were it filled with more subtill or more glorious bodies, it might as well reside, as in the heavens. Suppose he should (as no doubt hee is able) annihilate the earth, and create a new heaven in the space where∣in it now is, or demolish his present heavenly seat, or turne it into a baser masse then this earth is; were it not possible for him to bee in this new hea∣ven by his essentiall presence, or should he be nei∣ther in it, nor in the new earth? If hee could not be here, he were in this respect more impotent than the Angels, who can change their mansions when they mislike them.

5 Shall wee then take the latter part of the for∣mer division, and say, It is his will and pleasure to withdraw his Essence from this lower roome of his own Edifice, whiles it remaines so ill garnished, as now it is? If hee have made heaven his habita∣tion by choice, not by necessity of his immensity, with which all places, as we contend, must neces∣sarily be filled; hee might relinquish it by the like free choice of some other mansion, which he could make for himselfe as pleasant and beautifull: yea, Hee might by the like freedome of will, come and dwell with us here on earth. So that in conclusion, he which admitteth Gods wil to be free, but denies the absolute immensity of his Essence, makes him capable of locall motion or migration from place to place. And such motion necessarily includeth mu∣tability, which is altogether incompatible with in∣finity. Reason grounded on Scripture, will warrant us to conclude from the former principle, that hee which hath no cause of being, can have no limits of being, no bounds beyond which it cannot be. Es∣sence or being illimited cannot possibly bee distin∣guished by severalties of internall perfections, though united: much lesse can it be distinguished or limited by any place, whether reall or imagina∣rie. In that he is the authorlesse Author of all being, it is altogether as impossible for Him not to bee in every thing that is, as it is for any thing to be with∣out Him. The indivisible unity of his infinite Es∣sence is the center and supporter of all things, the conservation of place, and that which holdeth things divisible from resolving into nothing.

6 Dominus ipse est Deus in coelo sursum & in ter∣ra deorsum: The Lord (saith Moses) hee is God in heaven above, and in the earth below, Deut. 4. 39. yet saith Salomon, 1 King. 8. 27. Behold the heavens, and the heavens of heavens are not able to containe thee. May we say then, Hee is as truely without the hea∣vens, as he is in them? or that he is where nothing is with Him? surely, hee was when nothing was, and then hee was where nothing was besides him∣selfe. Or peradventure before the creation of all things numerable, there neither was whē nor where, but only an incomprehensible perfection of indivi∣sible immensity and eternity; which would still be the same, though neither heaven nor earth, nor any thing in them should any more be. We may not so place him without the heavens, as to cloath him with any imaginary space, or give the checke to his immensity by any parallel distance locall. But hee is said to be without the heavens, in as much as his infinite Essence cannot bee contained in them, but necessarily containes them. Hee is so with∣out them, or if you will, beyond them, that albeit a thousand more Worlds were stowed by His powerfull hand each above other, and all above this; Hee should by vertue of His infi∣nite Essence, not by free choyce of will, or mutation of place, bee as intimately coexistent to every part of them, as Hee now is to any part of this Heaven and Earth which wee see. This attribute of Divine immensitie was ac∣knowledged, and excellently expressed by ma∣ny of the Ancient Philosophers, but most pi∣thily

by some of the Ancient Fathers. Before all things, saith* 1.4 Tertullian, God was alone, and hee was to himselfe, world, place, and all things. The manner of his coexistence with the world, * 1.5Philo the Iew well expressed: God filleth all things, yet is contained in none, containing all. The vicinity of His Essence preserveth their Essences more truly than the symbolizing qualities of their naturall places doe. And even this efficacy of symbolizing or preserving qualities, flowes as im∣mediately from his essentiall presence, as the passive aptitude of bodies preserved by them, doth. The more the places are through which bodies naturall swiftly move, the lesse properly they are in them. In analogy to this condition of naturall bodies, the more capable man is of all knowledge, the more lyable his capacity is to distraction, as consisting ra∣ther in united perfections, than in firme and indivi∣sible unity of perfection. And therefore it is often said of most pregnant wits, qui ubi{que} est, nusquam est, He that is every where, is no where. Or he that in∣gageth himselfe to all courses of life, goeth through with none. But of God, who is perfection it selfe, not by aggregation, but by absolute unity of Es∣sence; that of Saint Bernard is most admirably verified, Nusquam est, & ••bi{que} est, Hee is no where, because no place whether reall or imaginary can comprehend or containe him: He is every where, because no body, no space, or spirituall substance can exclude his presence, or avoid the penetration of his Essence. But Saint Gregories Character of Gods ubiquitary presence and immensity, is more

lively and full. Deus est intra omnia non inclusus, extra omnia non exclusus, supra omnia non elatus; God is within all things, yet not shut up, or inclo∣sed in them; he is without all things, yet not exclu∣ded from them; hee is above all things, yet not ele∣vated or exalted by them; hee is below all things, yet not burdened or depressed by them. Greg. in Psal. 139.

7 Anselmus notwithstanding (had not long custome or generall consent prescribed too strōgly against him) would have reformed this kinde of speech, Deus est in omni loco, God is in every place, by changing one particle, Deus est cum omni loco, God is with every place. This Criticisme of his, though well approved by some good writers; whilest they dispute against such as say God was every where, before any place was, yet (in my opi∣nion) the use of it, were it as common as the other, which he sought by this to correct, would cōceale much matter of admiration, (which the descripti∣on of immensity used by Saint Bernard and others promptly suggests) if not occasion or suggest an er∣roneous imagination of coextension in the Divine Essence. The bodies which are contained in places, are truly said to be with the places which containe them, and the places with them; and wee may di∣stributively averre, that every body is with every place, and every bodily substance is with its mathe∣maticall dimen••ions, in the same place with it. But so to be in every place, in every least part of e∣very body, as not to bee contained in any or all of them, though we should multiply them in infinitū,

doth exclude all conceipt or coextension with thē, and much better notifie the indivisible unitie of Gods immensity, & the incōprehensiblenes of his essentiall presence, than if wee should say he were with every place. But as no Characters of the in∣comprehensible Essences ubiquitary presence doe so well befit it, as these that intimate more to our cogitations than we can in words expresse: So of this kinde I have found none, from which I have re∣ceived so full instruction, or reaped the like fruits of admiration, as from that of Trismegist, Deus est sphaera, cujus Centrum est ubi{que}, cujus peripheria nus∣quam, God is a sphere, whose Center is every∣where, whose circumference is no where. Not the least particle of this universall Globe or sphere, but is supported by the indivisible unity of his Essence, as by an internall Center. And yet neither the ut∣most circumference of this visible world, nor any circumference conceiveable, can so circumscribe or comprehend his essentiall presence, that it might bee said, thus farre it reacheth and no further. For albeit hee would crowne the convexity of these Heavens with others, so much higher and more spacious, than these Heavens, as these are than the Earth, and continue this course unto the worlds end: yet all should bee comprehended in his Es∣sence; it could not be comprehended in any. Their circumference should still be somewhere, whereas his Essence, though still inlarging (by this supposed daily exercise of his power) the bounds of its actu∣all coexistence with these new creatures, is in it selfe altogether boundlesse. Omnipotency it selfe,

cannot pitch a circumference to it, because nothing can be, but it must be in it, which onely truly is, and cannot bee contained in any thing imaginable. In that all things are contained in him, he is rightly re∣sembled by a sphere, which is of al figures the most capacious. In that all things cannot comprehend him, He is rightly resembled by a sphere whose cir∣cumference is no where.

8 Two points notwithstanding in the former resemblance seeme difficult to mens conceipts; but more difficult it is fully to expresse what may rightly be conceived concerning them. The former difficulty is, how a Center should be conceived to be every where: The second, how the indivisibi∣lity of Gods presence in every place, should bee compared unto a Center. To the former it may be sayd, That as the divine Essence by reason of its ab∣solute infinity, hath an absolute necessity of coex∣istence with space or magnitude infinite: so were it possible there should bee (as some Divines hold it possible there may be) a magnitude or materiall sphere actually infinite; this magnitude could have no set point for its Center, but of every point de∣signable in it, wee might avouch this is the Center as well as that. Every point should have the nega∣tive properties of a sphericall Center; there could be no inequality betweene the distances of severall points from the circumference of that which is in∣finite, and hath no bounds of magnitude. To the second difficulty it may bee said, The manner of di∣vine presence or coexistence to every place or par∣cell of bodies visible, is rightly compared unto a

Center, in that it hath no diversity of parts, but is indivisibly present to all and every part of things divisible. His presence againe is herein like to mag∣nitude actually infinite, in that it can have no cir∣cumference. But whether the divine Essence may have as perfect actuall coexistence to every point or Center, as it hath to every least portion of mag∣nitudes divisible, cannot so cleerely bee inferred from the indivisibility of divine immensity, because the indivisibility of Centers or points, and of spiri∣tuall substances are Heterogeneall, and Heteroge∣nealls are oft-times assymmetrall, that is, not exactly commensurable. Hence the most subtill Schoole-men or metaphysicall Divines, as well ancient as moderne, resolve it as a point irresoluble by hu∣mane wit, whether a mathematicall point or Cen∣ter can be the compleat and definitive place of an Angell, albeit they hold the Angelicall natures to bee as truely indivisible, as points or Centers are. But it is one thing for an immateriall or spirituall Essence to have true coexistence with every Cen∣ter, another to be confined to a Center, or to have a definitive place or coexistence in it. And what∣soever may bee thought of Angells; of the Divine Essence we may say, that he is as properly in every Center as in every place, seting wee acknowledge Him to bee alike incomprehensibly and indivisibly in both. The manner of his indivisibility we con∣ceive by his coexistence to a Center. His incom∣prehensiblenesse, by his coexistence to all spaces or places imaginable, without coextension to any, without comprehension in all. We may in no case

imagine, that there is more of God, or that God is more fully in a great space than in a little; in the whole world, than in a man or little world. For this once granted, an Asses head should participate the essentiall presence of the Deity in greater measure than a mans heart doth. But in what respects God is said to bee more specially present in one place than in another, or to be present with some, and ab∣sent from others: hereafter.

9 The absolute perfection of this Attribute, in whose right apprehension or conceipt many other divine perfections, according to our manner of conceiving them, are as it were couched or lodged, may best bee gathered by opposition to the imper∣fections of bodies or materiall magnitudes. A body though of Homogeneall nature, suppose a Pole or stone fixed in the earth, invironed above with water and the ayre, can have no coexistence with these di∣vers bodies, otherwise than according to the diver∣sity of its owne parts: that part of it which hath coexistence with the ayre, can have no coexistence with the earth or water. Farre otherwise it is in God, whose absolute infinity in that it is not com∣posed of parts, but consists in perfect unity, cannot bee coexistent to any place after any other manner than He is coexistent to all, that is, by indivisible unity or identity, Wheresoever He is (and Hee is every where,) He is unity it selfe, infinity it selfe, im∣mensity it selfe, perfection it selfe, power it selfe. All these branches of quantity, in which we seek to in∣grasse so many sorts of infinities, thereby to ex∣presse or resemble His incomprehensible nature,

do flow from participation of his infinite presence. Vnlesse He were infinitie or immensity it selfe, there could be no magnitude, no measure quantitative, by whose multiplication wee could in any sort ga∣ther or guesse what immensitie or infinitie meant. That imaginary infinitie which wee conceive by succession or composition of parts (for their seve∣rall extensions finite, though in number infinite) is but a transient raye or beame of that actuall and stable infinitenesse, which Hee possesseth in perfect unitie, without any imaginary diversity of parts united. Had his immensity any diversity of parts, there should be more power in many parts, than in one, or few: unto the full exercise of his whole po∣wer or force, there should bee a concurrence of all parts required: & this concurrence of parts in num∣ber infinite, would perhaps be impossible. Infinitum transire non potest. At the least, were divine power so lodged in divine immensitie, as strēgth or power is in our bodily faculties, it could not bee so omnipo∣tent, as we beleeve it is. Our strength or force is al∣waies increased by unition or cōtraction of severall parts; His power can receive no increase seeing his immensity excludes al division, & doth not so pro∣perly include, but rather properly is, Vnity it selfe.

10 The Prophets and other holy men in their patheticall expressions sometime speake of God as farre absent, because his powerfull presence is not manifested in such sort as they could wish. Oh that thou wouldest rend the Heavens (saith the Prophet Esa. c. 64. 1.) that thou wouldest come downe, that the mountaines might flow down at thy presence: As when

the melting fire burneth, the fire causeth the waters to boile: to make thy name knowne to thine adversaries, that the Nations may tremble at thy presence. When thou diddest terrible things which wee looked not for, thou camest downe, the mountaines flowed downe at thy presence. But to indoctrinate us, that this de∣scription of his powerfull presence did include no dogmaticall assertion of his locall descent, no deny∣all of his being everywhere, or filling every place by his essentiall presence: the same Prophet else∣where pictures out his immensity to us under the shape of a Gyant able to squeze the whole Globe of Heaven, Earth & waters; Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand? & meted out heaven with his span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in his three fingers (after such a manner as men take up dust or sand) and weighed the mountaines in scales, and the hills in a ballance? Esay 40. 12. Be∣hold the Nations are as a drop of a Bucket, and are counted as the small dust of the Ballance. Behold, he taketh up the Isles as a very little thing. All Nations before him are as nothing, and they are accounted to him lesse than nothing and vanity, vers. 15. 17. Thus hee linketh his essentiall presence with his power and knowledge. Why sayest thou O Iacob, and speakest O Israel; My way is hid from the Lord, and my Iudgement is passed over from my God? Hast thou not knowne? hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the Earth fainteth not, neither is wearie? there is no search∣ing of his understanding. vers. 27, 28. Yet Iob in his anguish had almost said as Iacob did; O that

I knew where I might finde him! that I might come e∣ven to his seat! I would know the words which he would answer me & understand what he would say unto me. Behold, I go forward but he is not there, and backward but I cannot perceive him: On the left hand where he doth worke, but I cannot behold him: he hideth him∣selfe on the right hand, that I cannot see him. Iob 23. 3, 5, 8, 9. But though he might hide himselfe from Iob, yet could not Iob hide himselfe or his wayes from him: for so he confesseth in the next words, He knoweth the way which I take, vers. 10. Whither shall I goe (saith the Psalmist) from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flye from thy presence? If I ascend up into Heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in Hell, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the mor∣ning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me, &c. Psal. 139. vers. 7, 8, 9, 10. Thou hast possest my reines; thou hast covered me in my mothers wombe. These and the like straines of other godly men, argue a sympathy of Gods essentiall presence, not onely invironing their bodies, but penetrating their soules, and diffused through their hearts. His coexistence with all, his essentiall presence or inha∣bitation in all, is the same, although the worldly minded take no notice of it. And when it is sayd, that he beholdeth or knoweth the ungodly afarre off, this language fitly expresseth their conceit of him, and of his essence. They consider not, that hee is alwayes neere unto them, alwayes about them, al∣wayes within them, but in heaven onely, whither their thoughts seldome ascend. And according to

their misconceit of him, so it happens to them, they imagine him to be farre distant from them, and his helpe and succour in their distresse comes slowly to them, as if it had too farre to goe.

CHAP. 6.

Of Eternity, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof successive duration or the imaginary infinity of time, is the modell.

1 WHatsoever hath beene, or right∣ly may be conceived of divine immensity, will in proportion as well suit unto eternity. And unto this Divine Attribute is that of Tertullian as applyable: [Ante omnia Deus erat solus, & erat sibi tempus, mun∣dus, & omnia:] Before all things were, God was, and he was unto himselfe time, the world, and all things else. We cannot properly say, He was in time be∣fore he made the world. For as Saint Augustine acutely collects, if he which alwayes is, and was, and is to come, had alwayes beene in time; hee could not have beene before all times, nor could he be, as we beleeve he is, as truly before all times future, as before all times past. His eternity then, is the in∣exhaustible fountain or infinite Ocean, from which time or duration successive (in what finite substan∣ces soever they bee seated,) with all their severall branches or appurtenances, doe perpetually flow; and unto eternity, they have if not the same propor∣tion,

yet the same references, the same dependan∣ces on it, which finite and created magnitudes have to Divine immensity.* 1.6 As there was from all eter∣nity a possibility for us to bee before wee were; so our actuall being or existence, whilest it lasteth, is composed of a capacity to be what we are, and of the actuation or filling of this capacity. Life (sensi∣tive especially) is but the motion or progresse of this capacity towards that which fills it, or as it were a continuall sucking in of present existence, or continuation of actuall being, from somewhat prae∣existent. Vnlesse the vegetables, by which our life is continued, had existence before they become our nutriment, they could not possibly nourish us, or continue us in that estate of being which we have. Nor could these Vegetables themselves ex∣ist, unlesse they did draw their existence or conti∣nuation of their being, from that which did every way exist before them; and unto which they doe by motion or continuation of their being approch. So that future times, and all things contained in time it selfe, presuppose a fountaine of life, as truly praeexistent to their future terminations or moti∣ons, as it was to their beginnings. That description of time [tempus edax rerum,] as if it were the devou∣rer of all things which are subject to alteration, did rellish more of poeticall wit, than of any metaphy∣sicall truth. For if time did devoure al things which are brought forth in time, what is it that could pos∣sibly nourish them, or continue their being from their beginning to their end? whilest the time ap∣pointed for them lasts, they cannot possibly be con∣sumed

or perish. Nothing there is that doth or can desire its owne destruction, nor long after the pre∣sence or fruition of that, which doth devoure or destroy it. All things naturally desire the continu∣ation of such being, as they have; which notwith∣standing things temporall cannot have, but from the continuation or fruition of time. Time then it is not, but their owne motions or endeavors to injoy or entertaine time approching, which doth waste or consume things temporall. We naturally seeke to catch time, and it is the nature of time, though con∣tinually caught, not to be held by us. This nimble∣nesse of time, is so like unto the swift progresse of motion, that some acknowledge no difference at all betweene them. Whereas in true Philosophy, the length of time passing by us, is onely notified by motion. Motion in true observation goes one way, and drives time another, as the streame which runnes Eastward, turnes the Wheele Westward. Our actuall being or existence slides from us with time, and our capacity of being, continuing still the same, runnes on still, being alwayes internally mo∣ved with desire of actuation or replenishment. And this replenishment cannot otherwise bee gotten, than by gaining a new coexistence with time ap∣proaching, whose office, designed by Eternity, it is to repaire the ruines which motions present or past have wrought in our corruptible substances. The best of our life, the very being of things generable (as* 1.7 Plotinus excellently observes) is but as a con∣tinuall draught or receipt of beeing from the inex∣haustible fountaine of life. Nature, saith he, (mea∣ning

the nature of things generable) hastens unto that being which is to come, nor can it rest, seeing it drawes or suckes in that being which it hath by doing now this and now that, being moved as it were in a circle with desire of Essence or of Being what it is. Nor are we men, or any creatures (spe∣cially generable) permitted to draw or sucke so much of our proper being from the fountaine of E∣ternity, at once, or in any one point of time, as we list. We have our portions of life or selfe-fruition distributed piece-meale and sparingly unto us, lest too much put into our hands at once, might make us prodigall of the whole stock. As may yonglings by their parents too much bounty towards them, whilest their experience is small, overthrow them∣selves and their posterity. And nimblest wits, for the most part, runne through largest fortunes in least time; usually shortning their dayes by taking up pleasures (due in their season) beforehand, seek∣ing as it were to enjoy the fruits of many yeres du∣ration all at once. Whereas fruition of delights and pleasures should be measured by the capacity of our estate or condition; as wise men fit their expences according to the tenour of their revennues.

2 Albeit the constant motion of the Sunne and Moone be appointed by the Creator as a common standard for the measuring of all times: yet every thing temporall, or endowed with duration mea∣surable

by the motion of the heavens, hath its pro∣per time, which in all of them is no other than a par∣ticipation of eternity. And hee should define the severall branches of time most exactly, that could number or decipher the severall actuatiōs, draughts or replenishments, which are derived from the infi∣nite fountaine of life & being, to fill the capacities, or satiate the internall desires of things temporall. And albeit the motion of the heavens bee constant and uniforme; yet the duration of things temporall or sublunary (though measured by their constant motion) is capable of internall contraction and di∣latation. Some things have a kind of a double du∣ration, and runne a course of time as it were inden∣ted. Life, albeit in it selfe most sweet, yet in us is often charged with so* 1.8 great a measure of sowre occurrences, that were it at all or most times, as some whiles it is, the fruition of it could not quite the paines we are put to in preserving it. And the worse our estate is, the longer it seemeth to bee such, because vitall existence or duration, through distraction of mind, or vehement motion, seemeth divided into more parts, then without such impul∣sions it could take notice of. In griefe or paine wee strive to thrust time present apace from us, that some other may come better attended. In delight or pleasure wee seeke to arrest it, and wish to have our joyfull moments fixed, or to have them still to returne and goe, so that wee might prolong our daies by living the same times over and over again, as men often walke longer in pleasant gardens, then in vast fields, by often resuming the same short

walkes. Were it possible for us to stay those grate∣full parcels of time, till new ones come with like supply; the current of pleasure, thus damnd vp, would swell; and our fruition of such imperfect existence as we have, would be much more perfect and entire. But seeing the pleasure of borrowed life, is to the identity of being, but as water to the pipe, through which it runnes; all the remedy wee have against welcome times departing from us, is to regain the like, and make up the unity of our ex∣istence of selfe-fruition by equivalency. The gluts or gushes of pleasure, may at one time bee much greater than at another, yet still transient, never consistent. The fruition of them cannot possibly be entire: begotten and dying in every moment; they are, and they are not in a manner, both at once; so that we lose them as we gaine them.

3 The Angelicall natures, albeit they account not the continuation of their duration, nor number the portions of their participation of eternity, by the motion of the heavens, as being not fed with expectance of that time or successiō, whose oppor∣tunites wee watchfully attend: yet their desires (more fervent by much then we have any) to conti∣nue what they are, witness they have not all that in present possession, w^ch is allotted to their compleat duration. Nothing, being the foundation as well of angelical excellēcies, as of our mediocrities, makes them uncapable of that entire selfe-fruition, which is essentiall to him which made thē of nothing, be∣ing made of none. He, as he is of himselfe without beginning, so is he entirely in himselfe, and can ac∣quire

nothing by succession. He desires not his own duration, w^ch none can give him, nor needs he to de∣sire it, because it is alway entirely & indivisibly pre∣sent, without possility of addition. For how should Essence it selfe, or infinity of being, get ought to morrow, which to day it hath not; or lose ought to day which yesterday it had. The first branch of im∣possibility w^ch we can conceive as incident to him, that is thus truly infinite, is, not all times to con∣taine within himselfe all fulnesse of joy, however possible. He is life it selfe, & therfore life truly infi∣nite. And infinite life, being infinitely sweet, con∣taineth joy truly infinite; altogether uncapable of any addition or diminution. As in a body infinite (could any such be) there could be no middle or ex∣treams; so neither can infinite life admit any parts, as being indivisible into duration subsequent & pre∣cedent. Natures, capable of these differences, have alwayes the one accomplished by the other. Time comming (as we said before) repaires the losses of time going, and perfects or supports things natu∣rall by successive continuance of present being. But perfection it selfe can no more bee perfected, than whitenesse can be dyed white. Life, or Essence infi∣nite, excludes vacuity, or capacity of resumed acts to fill up the measure of actuall existence, or fruiti∣on of being. In that he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, All-sufficient, he can want nothing; and to him that can want no∣thing, all must be present. We must then conceive of the Divine Essence, as infinite, not onely in life, but in the degrees or acts of life: which in the eter∣nall cannot be many, but onely take the denomina∣tion

of plurality, from things decreed. As Hee is said Everlasting with reference to the perpetuity of succession, which still supposeth his interminate existence, as present to the whole and every part of it. Consider him in himselfe, and He is every way indivisibly infinite, and interminable; not onely be∣cause Hee had no beginning, nor shall have ending: For so might time or motion be held interminable, could the Heavens have beene created from Ever∣lasting; whose revolutions neverthelesse or succes∣sive parts of motion, should have beene truly nu∣merable, and therefore terminable; whence what∣soever had beene contained within their circuit, should still have gotten somewhat which before it had not, either addition of duration, or (which is all one) continuance of their first existence, or some new Acts of life, of sense, or reason. But un∣to Essence infinite, none of these can accrue. If they could, as yet he should not be, nor ever could Hee bee actually eternall, but everlastingly onely by succession. For Eternity, as Boetius hath well de∣fined it, is the entire or totall possession of intermina∣ble life, all at once or together. Howbeit these termes of totall fruition or possession, may seeme to in∣clude some parts, though not in the life possessed, yet in the possession of it; which (I take it) was farre from this good Authors meaning. What meant he then to use such tearmes? onely to exclude succes∣sion, which hath a totality of Being, but not alto∣gether, or all at once. As the next houre, and what∣soever shall have successive duration in it, shall bee wholly and fully existent; but so as one part shall

goe before, another come after. So is not that du∣ration which is interminable. But in what sense to∣tality is attributed to essence or duration infinite, will better appeare in the issue of these explicati∣ons. This definition of Boetius, though concei∣ved in such termes as might minister occasion of wrangling in subtile disputes; doth notwithstan∣ding imprint a more lively character or notion of the Everliving God his infinite happinesse, than Aquinas definition doth, though very artificial: [Aeternitas est duratio manens, uniformis, sine prin∣cipio, & fine, mensurâ carens,] Eternity, is a dura∣tion uniforme, and permanent, without beginning or end, uncapable of measure.

4 But* 1.9 Plotin (in mine opinion) gives a more deepe and full apprehension of it in fewer tearmes; [Aeternitas est vita infinita] Eternity is infinitie of life. And such we gather it to be, because it is the university or totality of life, and can lose nothing, in that nothing of it is past, nothing to come. He addes withall, that these termes of Being, All, whole, or losing nothing, are added onely for explication of that, which is sufficiently contained in these words, Infinite life. In the same Treatise he excel∣lently observes, when we say, That is Eternal, which alwayes is: (as the Greeke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 verbatim signifies) this* 1.10 alway, is added for declaration sake, and yet being assumed to expresse the uncorruptiblenesse,

or indeficiency of that which is Eternall; it breeds a wandring imagination of plurality or indivisibility of duration. The best medicine, by his prescripti∣on, for purging our brains of this erroneous fancy, were to enstyle Eternity onely with the name of Entity or Being. But as being is a name sufficient to expresse Essence, and Essence it selfe, or essence inde∣pendent a full expression of Eternity: yet because some Philosophers comprise generation, or the be∣ing of things generable under the name of Essence, it was behooveful for our better instruction, to say, that is Eternall, which alwaies is, & cannot cease to be. Whereas in true Philosophicall contemplation, it is not one thing, truly to bee, and alwayes to Be. There is no greater difference betwixt these two, than to be a Philosopher, and to be a true Philoso∣pher. Now there can be no truth in saying, he is a Philosopher, who is no true Philosopher, for [ens & verum convertuntur] The Entity of every thing necessarily includes the truth of every thing. Not∣withstanding because some doe counterfeit Philo∣sophy, or falsly usurpe the name of Philosophers; we give the title with an addition to such as wel de∣serve it, and enstyle them, by way of difference from the others, true Philosophers. And in like manner, when we say, That is eternall, which alwayes is; wee seeke to notifie no more by this universall note, Alwaies, then that it hath a true and no counterfeit, no second-hand or dependent Being.

Another secondary and subordinate use of the universall signe, alwayes, added to entity, is, to inti∣mate the interminable, indistinguishable & indivi∣visible

power, which needeth nothing besides that which it actually and for the present hath. Now it hath All, that is or can bee, in that it truly Is: for true entity is absolute totality, and unto totalitie, nothing is wanting. But that which is in time com∣prehended, how perfect or totall soever it may bee in its kinde, besides other wants, alway needs some∣what to come, never fully besped of time. On the contrary, that which so is, as it needs no after being, and cannot be brought within the lists of time, ei∣ther determinate, or in succession infinite, but now hath whatsoever is expedient to bee had: this is that, which our notion of Eternity hunteth after. That which thus is, hath not its Essence or Being delivered unto it enwrapt in quantity, but is pre∣cedent to all quantity or mensuration. Farre otherwise have things generable their being, as it were spun out from divisibility. The very first be∣ing which they have supposeth quantity, and as much as is cut off from the draught or extension of their duration, so much they lose of their being or perfection.

5 Ignorance of this Plotinicall Philosophie hath much perplext some Logi••ians, questioning whether Socrates in the instant of his dissolution or corruption, be a man, or corps, or both. To be both implyes a contradiction; these two negative pro∣positions being simply convertible, No corps can be a man, no man can bee a corps. And yet there is as much reason, that he should in this instant bee both as either. For true resolution we are to say, He was a man, and shall be a corps, or he ceaseth to bee

the one, and begins to be the other. But the Being or existence of both being mensurable by time, must needs bee divisible, and for this reason, not comprehensible by an instant which is indivisible. But Plotins conclusion is, whilest wee seeke to fit that which truly is, with any portion of measure or degree of quantity, the life of it being thus divided by us, loseth its indivisible nature; We must then leave it (as it is) indivisible, as well in life or opera∣tion, as in Essence, and yet infinite in both.

Of time, no part truly is, but the present, which is never the same: and as one questioned (in that age wherein the Art of Navigation was imperfect) whether Navigators were to be reckoned amongst the dead or the living: So it is more doubtfull then determinable, whether time participate more of being, or of not being; yet as is time, such is the nature of things brought forth in time. But Eternity (being the duration of Him who onely Is, being made of none, but Maker of all things, and the dispenser of Time it selfe into its portions) as* 1.11 Fi∣cinus describes it, is as a fixed instant or perma∣nent Center, which needs no succession for sup∣ply; all sufficient to support it selfe, and all things else. The same Writer not unfitly compares Eter∣nity to a Center in a Circle; and time to the points or extremities of the lines in the Circumference, alwayes so moving about the Center, that were it an eye, it might view them all at once. Yet must we not hold Eternity to be indivisible, after the same manner that points or Centers are. These are indi∣visible, because they want the perfection of that

quantity, whose parts they couple. Eternity is in∣divisible by positive infinite, as containing all the parts or perfections possible of succession in a more eminent manner, then they can be contained in time it selfe, which (as Plato wittily observes) is a moveable image of Eternity. This difference be∣twixt the indivisibility of an instant or moment, and Eternity, may perhaps make the solution of that seeming contradiction lesse difficult then it is to some great Schoolemens apprehensions: [Pe∣trus in aeternitate agrotat, Et, Petrus in aeternitate nō aegrotat.] Peter is sick in eternity, Peter is not sicke in eternity. This affirmation & deniall, in one and the same indivisible instant or limited portion of time, would inferrean indivisible contradiction, which in eternity they doe not. And yet is Eternity more indivisible than an instant, but indivisible after ano∣ther manner.

6 But I know not how it comes to passe, that the true shadow of perfection it selfe, is oft-times more apparant in things most imperfect. Natures more perfect (by a borrowed perfection) hold the meane betweene them; Out of both we may spell more than we can put together, for right expres∣sing the nature of perfectiō it selfe. The prime mat∣ter, though of things created most imperfect, is of creatures sublunary, most like unto the Creator, in being ingenerable and incorruptible; in that it is the Alpha whence all things generable spring, and the Omega into which they are resolved: Yet is the prime matter most contrary to its Maker, in that wherein it doth resemble Him. It is in a sort or

manner, all things generable, but perfectly nothing, as wanting the true unity of Entity, or determinate Being. The Creator or Essence it selfe, is the in∣comprehensible perfection of all things, without participation of their imperfections. The Earth againe is like the Eternall Founder in permanency and immobility, but this it hath from its naturall dulnesse; whereas the perfection of this shadow is in Him from the infinite vigour of his vitality. The swift motions of the Heavens, or motion as swift as we may imagine, is as a middle terme of proporti∣on between the Earths immobility, and the super∣motion, or more then infinite mobility of the Dei∣tie, which we tearme the infinite vigour of his vi∣tality. Instants in this are most like Eternity, in that an infinite number of them added together, yeelds no increase of quantity: Nor doth Eternity re∣ceive addition from succession infinite, which most unlike it in being divisible, doth yet better expresse the positive infinity of it, than instants can doe. E∣ternity againe, is like a fixed Center, because indivi∣sibly immutable; yet withall most like a circle. And Trismegists description of the Deity, commutatis commutandis, as well exemplifies the Eternity, as the immensity of his nature. Eternity is a circular duration, whose instants are, alwayes, whose termi∣nations or extremities never were, never shall be: It is coexistent to every parcell of time, but not circum∣scriptible by any: succession infinite cannot be coe∣quall to it. For albeit the motion of the Heavens, or other notifications of duration divisible, should continue the same, without interruption or End:

yet every period and draught of time, we can ima∣gine, shall still fall within Eternity, now totally ex∣istent; and which hath beene, is, and ever will be un∣to every minute or scrupe of time, that hath beene, is, or shall be, alike everlastingly coexistent, not by acquisition of any new successive parts, but by in∣divisible and interminable unity.

7 We cannot perhaps properly say, that God shall be after all times or durations to come; for du∣ration must flow from His Everlasting Being with∣out end. And what can be after that which hath no end? And here we suppose, that albeit time or dura∣tion successive had their actuall beginning with the creatures: yet there shal be, or may be, if not a time, yet some duration successively infinite. And that onely is after this manner, infinite, unto which somewhat of the same kinde may still bee added. Thus, as in the continued and divisible quantities, [non datur minimum.] There is no fraction so little, but may be lesse; and as in numbers [non datur max∣imum] There is no number so great, but it may be made greater by addition: so in successive durati∣on [non datur ultimum.] It may be truly said to last for ever, because it can have no last portion. But howsoever we cannot properly, or without expo∣sing our speech to captious exceptions, say, that eternity shal be after all time or duration successive; (seeing this may seeme to import, that duration or succession shall finally cease:) yet that eternity (be∣ing duration, actually, interminably and indivisibly, not successively, infinite) now is, and ever was, as infinitely praeexistent or precedent to all ages, or

successions comming towards us, one way; as it is and was to the worlds nativity, or the first out-go∣ing of time, the other way. This is a point which we must beleeve, if we rightly beleeve God to bee Eternall, or know what Eternity is. A point, which would to God they had seriously and in heart con∣sidered, which have had Gods eternall decree and the awards of it, most frequently in their mouthes and pens. And he is no Christian that would deny whatsoever is by God decreed, was so decreed be∣fore all worlds: So is he no Christian Philosopher, much lesse a true Christian Divine, that shall refer or retract the tenor of this speech [Before all worlds] to that only which is past, before the world began. Whatsoever can be more properly said or concei∣ved to be past, then to be yet to come, or to bee in every moment of time designable, can have no property of Eternity. For that onely is Eternall, which alwayes is, and so alwaies is, that it hath pre∣cedence or praeexistence infinite to all successions, which way soever wee looke upon them, or take their beginning, whether backwards or forwards. It was a great oversight (or rather want of insight into the nature of this great Sphere or visible world) in Lactantius, (otherwise a learned Christi∣an) not onely to deny there were any Antipodes, but to censure the Philosophers (which had gone before him) of grosse ignorance or infatuation, for avouching this truth, now manifested to meaner Scholars, or more illiterate Christians, than any which Lactantius taught. A greater ignorance it would be in us which acknowledge this truth, to

say these Antipodes were under the earth, and the inhabitants of Europe and Africa onely above it; or that the Heavens were as farre under our Anti∣podes, as they are above us. For whosoever walkes on the earth, whether in this Region or that, whe∣ther at the halfe or full Antipodes, is above the earth. And every part of the Heavens unto which the lookes of men are erected, as well the Nadir as the Zenith, as well the South pole as the North-pole is above the earth. And as the Heavens are every way above the Earth, so is Eternity every way be∣fore all worlds, before all times. As we beleeve this visible world and all things in it, had a beginning; so we expect it shall have an end: Now the eye of Eternall Providence lookes through the world, through all the severall ages, successions, or durati∣ons in the world; as well from the last end to their first beginning, as from their first beginning to their last end. There is no period of time to us imagina∣ble, which is not so invironed by Eternity, as the Earth or Center is with the Heavens; save onely that the Heavens are finite, and Eternity infinite. So that the Heavens though far every way, are no way infinitely above the Earth; whereas Eternity or Gods eternall decree, are every way infinitely before all worlds, before all times. In this sense, were it possible, the world might have beene crea∣ted, or motions continued from everlasting; the Eternall, notwithstanding, should have been ever∣lastingly before them. For that period of motion which must terminate the next million of yeares, shall have coexistence with Eternity now existent;

whose infinity doth not grow with succession, nor extend it selfe with motion; but stands immovable with times present, being eternally before times future, as wel in respect of any set draught or point, whence we imagine time future to come towards us, as in respect of the first revolution of the Hea∣vens, whence time tooke beginning. Or, to speake as we thinke, it is impossible to conceive any dura∣tion to be without beginning and ending; without conceiving it circular, and altogether void of suc∣cession. Notwithstanding, if any list to imagine time both wayes everlasting; the continuity of it may be best conceived by the uninterrupted fluxe of an instant; and the stability of eternity, by the retraction of such a perpetuall fluxe into one du∣rable o•• permanent instant.

8 O••, not to suffer the remembrance of childish sports altogether to passe without any use or obser∣vation, if not for composing some greatest contro∣versies amongst learned men, yet for facilitating contemplation in one of the greatest difficulties, that Philosophy, whether sacred or humane, affords to the conceit of the most curious. The difficulty is, how eternity being permanent and indivisible, should have coexistence with succession or motion. We have seene a Top turne so swiftly upon the same center, in a manner, that it seemed rather to sleepe or rest, than to move. And whilest it thus swiftly moved, any bright marke or conspicuous spot, how little soever, seemed to be turned into an entire and permanent circle. Seeing motion thus swift, may be procured by a weake arme, it will be

no hard supposal to conceit that a mover of strength and vigour infinite, should be able to move a body in a moment. Admit then the highest visible sphere should be moved about in a moment; all the several parts of successive motion, which now it hath, would be contracted into perfect unity: which whether it should be called a cessation from moti∣on, or a vigorous rest, or a supermotion, actually containing in it parts of motion successively infinit, were not so easie to determine. If thus it were mo∣ved about in an instant, the nature of it supposed to be incorruptible, and the mover immortall, remain∣ing still in the same strength and minde; he would not move it more slowly this day or yeare, than he did the former. This supposition admitted, there should bee not onely parts successively infinite of one revolution, but revolutions successiuely infinit in one and the same instant. Or to speake more properly; As these revolutions should not proper∣ly be termed motion, but rather the product of mo∣tions infinitely swift, united or made up into a vi∣gorous permanency: so should not the duration of one or of all these revolutions bee accounted as an instant or portion of time, but a kinde of eternity or duration indivisibly permanent. The motion of the eight sphere supposed to be such as hath beene said, that is motion infinitely swift, or not divisible by succession; the Sunne moving successively as now it doth, should have locall coexistence to eve∣rie starre in the eight Sphere, to every point of the Eclipticke circle wherein it moves, at one and the selfe same instant, or in every least parcell of time.

Every Star in the eighth sphere, every point should be converted into a permanent circle; and so in one circle there should be circles for number infinite, as many circles as there bee points or divisibilities in the Ecliptique circle. Thus in Him that is eternall, are Beings infinite, and in Eternity are actually con∣tained durations in succession infinite. The former supposition admitted, we could not say that the in∣feriour Orbes, moving as now they doe, did move after the eighth Sphere, but that the times of their motion were eminently contained in it. For the eighth Sphere being moved in an instant, should lose the divisibility of time, and the nature of moti∣on, with all the properties that accompany them, not by defect, (as if it no way comprised them,) but by swallowing up time or division successively or potentially infinite, into an actuall permanency. By this supposition of passive motion made infinite∣ly swift, by the strength of the mover, and impro∣ved into a kinde of actuall indivisible permanency, we may conceive of the first Movers Eternity, as Mathematicians conceive the true nature of a Sphere, by imagining it to be produced by the mo∣tion of a semicircle upon the Axis. For let the E∣ternall be but thus imagined to bee an intellectuall sphere, capable of momentary motion or revolu∣tion throughout this world; and the indivisible co∣existence of his infinity, to every part of time and place, will be very conceivable. Yet as Mathema∣ticians perswade not themselves, their figures are produced by motion, but rightly conceive their nature to be such without any production, as if they

were so produced: so let eternall duration bee esteemed more indivisible, than the unity of moti∣on conceived as infinitely swift, yet not made indi∣visible by such swiftnesse of motion, but indivisible onely of it selfe, and by the infinite vigour of his vi∣tall essence, wherein all the perfection of motion or rest, are (if I may so speake) indivisibly tem∣pered, or (lest I should bee mistaken) eminently contained. The same proportion which motion contracted into stability hath unto succession, hath divine Essence to all other Essences, eminently con∣taining all, no one kinde formally. This divine Es∣sence, whose essentiall property we conceive Eter∣nity to be, is truly the totality of being;* 1.12 a totality not aggregated of parts, but rather (as Plotine inti∣mates) producing all other parts or kindes of being. Eternity likewise is a totality of duration, not ag∣gregated of parts, nor capable of accesse or additi∣on; but rather a totality from which all durations or successions flow, without resolution or diminu∣tion of its infinite integrity. As if a body should cast many shadowes of divers shapes in a running streame, the shadowes vanish and are repayred in every moment, without any diminution of the bodie.

CHAP. 7.

Of the infinity of Divine Power.

1 THe circumstances of time and place are presupposed, the one as spectator, the other as stage to all things, which wanting place or time, or be∣ing it self, present themselves anew in their proper shape and forme. But of things so presented, operation or power in their kinde is the native and immedi∣ate property. Nothing that hath any proper seat or existence numerable in this spacious Amphithe∣atre, but is fitted for acting some part or other use∣full for the maintenance of the whole. Now all o∣peration or power, which (according to the varie∣ty of things created) is manifold and diverse, doth give but such a shadow of that infinite power, which is eminently contained in the union of infi∣nite Essence, as time and place did of his immensity and eternity. The force and vertue of some things may perhaps more properly be termed strength or power passive, then operation. Howbeit even in the earth and earthly bodies, by nature most dull, there is a power or strength to sustaine waights laid upon them; a power to resist contrary impulsi∣ons, which perhaps essentially includes an active force or operation; a power of swaying to the center, which is no more passive than active, but a

meane betwixt both. Even in the dullest body that is, there is a secret force or slow activity to assimi∣late other things to themselves, or to preserve sym∣bolizing natures. In bodies lesse grosse and more unapt to resist violence offered, as in the windes, vapours, or exhalations, or in the spirits or influ∣ences which guide our bodies, we may perceive an active force or power motive fully answerable to the greatest passive strength or resistance. Other E∣lements or mixt bodies, are indued with an opera∣tive power of producing the like, or destroying contraries. Celestiall bodies, the Sunne especially, have a productive force to bring forth plants out of their roots, to nourish and continue life in al things. It is perhaps impossible, for any thing, that hath not being of it selfe, to receive infinity of being in any kind from another, though infinite. Impossible for the fire, because the substance of it is finite, to be infinitely hot; but were it such, it would be infinite in operation.

2 As the Author or first setter forth of all things operative, who alone truly is, surpasseth all conceit of any distinct or numerable branch of being: so is his power more eminently infinite in every kinde, than all the united powers of severall natures, each supposed infinitely operative in its owne kinde, and for number likewise infinite, can bee conceived to be. Now what was generally observed before, that things by nature most imperfect, doe oftentimes best shadow divine perfections, hath place againe in this particular. Gods infinite power is clearliest manifested in creatures which seem least powerful.

Where wast thou (said God to* 1.13 Iob) when I laid the foundations of the Earth? declare if thou hast under∣standing. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? Or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner stone thereof? The excellent majesty of this speech, sufficiently testifies it was uttered by God himselfe, though taken from his mouth, by the pen of man. But setting aside the ma∣jesticke phrase or resemblance, farre surmounting all resemblance all observance of poeticall decorum; What cleerer fountaine of deeper admiration, can the eye of mans understanding looke into, then this, that not onely every corner stone in the world with its full burthen, but all the mighty buildings or erections, which are seene upon the whole sur∣face of the earth; yea the whole earth it selfe, with all the mountaines and rockes upon it, with all the metalls or massie substance that are within it, should be borne up by that which is lesse than any corner stone, by that which indeed is no body or substance, not so much as a meere angle or corner. Yet so it hath pleased Him, by whose wisedome the foundations of the earth were layd; to make that little point or indivisible Center; which is far∣thest removed from our sight, the most conspicu∣ous place and seate of that indivisible power which is infinite. Let Mathematicians imagine what rules or reasons of equipendence they list, their last resolution of all supportance into the Center, must suppose the same truth which the Aegyptian Magicians confessed, [Hic digitus

Dei est] The finger of God is here. Impossible it were for that, which in it selfe is matter of nothing, im∣pregnably to support all things supportable; unlesse it were supported by the finger of God. And yet if we conceive of Him, as Isaias describes Him, all the strength and power that is manifested in the supportance of the whole earth, and all therein, is not the strength of his little finger. Yea though wee should imagine, that as the waight of solids amounts according to their masse or quantity: so the sustentative force, which is chambered up in the Center, should be multiplyed according to the severall portions or divisibilities of magnitude successively immensurable: yet this imagination of force so multiplyed, it being divisible, could not equalize that true and reall conceipt of force di∣vine, which ariseth from consideration, that it is in∣divisibly seated, throughout immensity. To uphold earths innumerable much weightier and massier than this is, which borne by him, beareth all things; would be no burthen to his power sustentative: (so from the effects, his power, though in it selfe one, must receive from us plurality of denominations.) And yet fully commensurable to this power susten∣tative, is his active strength or power motive. He that spans the Heavens with his fist, could tosse this Vniverse with greater ease, than a Gyant doth a Tennis Ball, throughout the boundlesse Courts of immensity. Rocks of Adamant would sooner dis∣solve with the least fillep of his finger, than bubbles of water with the breath of Canons.

3 Our admiration of this his active power,

which we conceive as incomprehensible, and alto∣gether uncapable of increase, may bee raised by cal∣culating the imaginary degrees of active powers increase in creatures divisible, as well in quantity, as operation. Though Powder converted into smoake, be the common mother of all force, which issueth from the terrible mouth of the Gunne: yet the Canon sends forth his bullet (though more apt to resist externall motion) with greater violence than the Sachar: and every Ordinance exceeds o∣ther in force of battery, according to the quantity of the charge or length of barrell. But were it pos∣sible for the same quantity of steele or iron, to bee as speedily converted into such a fiery vapour, as gunpowder is; the blow would be ten times more irresistible then any, that Gunpowder out of the same close concavity, can make. The reason is plaine; the more solid or massie the substance to be dissolved, is, the greater quantity would it yeeld of fire, or other rarer substance, into which it were dis∣solved. And the greater the quantity, the more vio∣lent is the contraction of it into the same narrow roome: and the more violent the contraction is, the more vehement is the eruption, and the ejacu∣lation swifter. Thus from vapours rarified or ge∣nerated in greater quantity, than the concavities of the earth, wherein they are imprisoned without vent, is naturally capable of; doe Earthquakes be∣come so terrible: These and the like experiments bring forth this generall rule, The active strength of bodies multiplieth, according to the manner of con∣traction or close unition of parts concurring to the im∣pulsion

or eruption: So doth the active force or vi∣gour of motion, alwayes increase, according to the degrees of celerity which it accumulates. Now though the most active and powerfull essence can∣not be encompassed with walls of brass, nor cham∣bred up in vaults of steele, albeit much wider than the heavens; yet doth it every where more strictly gird it selfe with strength then the least or weakest body can be girt. For what bonds can we prescribe so strict, so close or firme, as is the bond of indivi∣sible unity, which cannot possibly burst or admit eruption, wherein notwithstanding infinite power doth as intirely and totally encampe it selfe, as in immensity. How incomparably then doth His active strength exceed all conceipt or comparison? The vehemency of his motive power, whose infi∣nite Essence swallowes up the infinite degrees of succession in a fixed instant, and of motion in vigo∣rous rest; cannot bee exprest by motion so swift and strong, as would beare levell from the Sunne setting in the West, to the Moon rising in the East. To cast the fixed Starres downe to the Center, or hoyse the Earth up to the Heavens, within the twinkling of an eye, or to send both in a moment beyond the extremities of this visible world, into the wombe of vacuity whence they issued, would not straine his power motive. For, all this we sup∣pose to be lesse then to bring nothing unto some∣thing, or something to such perfection, as some of his creatures enjoy. Howbeit even such as take the fullest measure of perfection from his immen∣sity, must derive their pedigree by the mothers

side, from meere nothing or vacuity. Homo, saith S. Austine, terrae filius, nihili nepos; Man is the son of the earth, and the grandchilde of nothing. And when he shall come unto the height of his glory, he cannot forget, he must remember, that the worme was his sister, and the creeping thing the sonne of his mother. To produce as many worlds out of nothing, as the Sunne each yeare doth Herbes or Plants out of the moistned Earth, would breed no cumbrance to his power or force productive. To maintaine, repaire, or continue all these in the same state, whilest he makes as many moe, would neither exhaust nor hinder his conservative vertue. Multi∣plicity or variety greater than wee can imagine of workes most wonderfull, all managed at one and the same time, could worke no distraction in his thoughts, no defatigation in his Essence. From the unity of these and the like branches of power, all in him most eminently infinite, doth the at∣tribute of Omnipotency take its denomination, whose contents, so farre as they concerne the strengthning of our faith, shall hereafter be un∣foulded.

CHAP. 8.

Of the infinity of Divine Wisedome. That it is as im∣possible for any thing to fall out without Gods know∣ledge, as to have existence without his power or es∣sentiall presence.

1 BVt power in every kinde thus eminently infinite, could not be so omnipotent, as we must beleeve it; did it not in this absolute unity of all variety possesse other branches of be∣ing, according to the like emi∣nency or infinity of perfection. Strength or power, if meerely naturall or destitute of correspondent wisedome, to comprehend, manage, and direct it, might bring forth effects in their kinde truly infi∣nite, whose ill forecast or untowardly combinati∣ons, neverthelesse, would in the issue argue lamen∣table impotency, rather then omnipotency. And hard it would be to give instance almost in any sub∣ject, wherein a double portion of wit matched with halfe the strength, would not effect more, or more to the purpose, then a triple portion of strength, with halfe so much wit. Archimedes did not come so farre short of Polyphemus in strength or bulk of body, as the wonderfull works wrought by his Mathematicall skill, did exceed any that the Gyant could attempt.

2 Every choice is better or worse accordingly as it more or lesse participates of true wisedome:

And most unwise should that choice justly be estee∣med, which would not give wisedome prehemi∣nence to power. Knowledge then, might wise men choose their owne endowments, would be desired in greater measure then strength. Wisedome, saith the Wiseman, is the beginning of the wayes of God. And shall not that branch of being, by which all things were made, by which every created essence hath its bounds and limits, be possest by Him, (who gave them being and set them bounds,) without all bounds or limits! above all measure? Yes, what∣soever branch of being wee could rightly desire or make choice of before others: the inexhaustible fountaine of being hath not chosen, but is naturally possest of, as the better. And therefore if we may so speake, though both be absolutely infinite; his wisedome is greater then his power, to which it serves as guide or guardian. And as the excellency of the Artificers skill often recompences the defect of stuffe or matter: so the infinity of wisedome or knowledge seemes, in a manner, to evacuate the ne∣cessity of power or force distinct from it. Howbe∣it I will not in this place, or in our native dialect, enter that nice dispute, which some Schoolemen have done; Whether Gods Essence and Knowledge be formally his Power. But whilest we conceive Power and Wisedome as two attributes formally distinct, (at least, to ordinary conceipts,) we may conceive Wisedome to be the father, and Power the mother of all his workes of wonder. As for Philo and other Platonicks that make Knowledge the mother of all Gods workes, it is probable they dreamed of a crea∣ted

Knowledge, or perhaps under these termes, they cover some transformed Notion of the second per∣son in Trinity, who is the Wisedome of the Father, by whom also he created all things: who as he is the onely begotten Sonne from eternity, so is hee likewise a joint Parent of all things created in time by the Father; as Eve was in some sort Adams daughter, and yet a true mother of all that call him father. But here we speake not of that wisedome of God, which is personall; but of the wisedome of the Godhead, as it is essentially and indivisibly infinite in the whole Trinity.

3 Wisedome, as all agree, is the excellency of knowledge, from which it differs not, save only in the dignity or usefulnesse of matters knowne, or in the more perfect maner of knowing them. Though no man be wise without much knowledge, yet a man may know many things, and not be very wise. But if we speake of Knowledge divine, not as re∣strained in our conceipt to this or that particular, but simply, as it comprehends all things, the name of Wisedome in every respect best befits it: for though many things knowne by him, whilest com∣pared with others more notable, seeme base and contemptible; yet not the meanest, but may be an object of divine contemplation to a Christian, that considers not the meere matter or forme, or physi∣call properties, but the Creators power, or skill ma∣nifested in it. How much more may the vilest creatures, whilest he lookes upon his owne worke in it, and the use whereto he appointed it, be right∣ly reputed excellent? He knowes as much of every

Creature, as can be knowne of it, and much more than man possibly can know: and thus he knoweth not onely all things that are, but all that possibly may bee. This argues wisedome truly infinite; whose right conceit must be framed by those bro∣ken conceipts which we have of the modell of it.

4 Of wisedome then or usefull knowledge, the parts or offices are two: The one stedfastly to pro∣pose a right end: The other, to make and prose∣quute a right choice of meanes for effecting it. Hu∣mane wisedome is oft-times blinde in both, and usually lame in the latter. Neither can we clearly discerne true good from apparent; nor doe our consultions alwayes carry eaven, to the mistaken markes whereat we ayme; but be the end proposed good or bad, so it be much affected, the lesse choice of meanes is lest, the more eagerly wee apply our selves unto their use, and strive as it were, to straine out successe by close embracing them. And for this reason, ignorance or want of reason to forecast va∣riety of meanes for bringing about our much desi∣red ends, is the mother of selfe-will and impatience. For what is selfe-will, if a man should define it, but a stiffe adherence to some one or few particular meanes, neither onely nor chiefly necessary to the maine point? And wits conscious of their owne weakness, for conquering what they eagerly desire, presently call in power, wrath, or violence, as par∣tiall or mercenary seconds to assist them. Whereas hee that out of fertility of invention, can furnish himselfe beforehand with store of likely meanes for accomplishing his purpose, cannot much esteeme

the losse or miscariage of some one or two. How∣beit, as mans wit in this case is but finite, so his pa∣tience cannot be compleat. Even the wisest will be moved to wrath or violence, or other foule play, if the game whereat he shoots be faire and good, and most of his strings already broken. Nor can he be absolutely secure of good successe, so long as the issue is subject to contingency, and may fall with∣out the Horizon of his foresight and contrivance. But wisedome infinite doth compleatly arme the Omnipotent Majesty (if I may so speake) with infi∣nite patience and long-suffering, towards such as every minute of their lives violently thwart and crosse some or other particular meanes, which he had ordained for his glory and their good. Hee is light, saith the Apostle, and in him is no darknesse. He distinguisheth the fruits of light from fruits of darknesse, before they are, even before he gave them possibility of being. As impossible it is for his will to decline from that which he discernes to be truly good, as for his infinite Essence to shrinke in being. Many things may (as every thing that is evill doth) fall out against his will, but nothing without his knowledge, or besides his expectation. That which in its owne nature (as being made such by his unal∣terable decree) is absolutely contingent, is not ca∣suall in respect of his providence or eternall wise∣dome. In that he fully comprehends the number of all meanes possible, and can mixe the severall possibilities of their miscariage, in what degree or proportion he list: he may, and oft-times doth, in∣evitably forecast the full accomplishment of his

proposed ends, by multiplicity of meanes, in them∣selves not inevitable, but contingent. So that, suc∣cesse is onely necessary to the last, yet not absolute∣ly necessary unto it. All the necessity it hath is oft∣times gotten by casuall miscariage of the possibili∣ties bestowed upon the former: as if he ordained the apprehension of a Traytor, or of a Malefactor, by an hundred meanes, all by the immutable decree alike possible, and equally probable; if ninety and nine doe misse, the hundreth and last, by the rules of Eternall Wisedome, must of necessity take. But in that it was possible for the former to have taken, successe falls to this last, not by absolute necessity, but as it were by lott; for it might have beene pre∣vented by the former, by supposall onely of whose miscariage it is now necessary. And yet successe it selfe, or the accomplishment of the end proposed by infinite wisedome, was absolutely necessary and immutable.

5 There is a fallacy, though the simplest one that ever was set to catch any wise man, wherein many excellent wits of these latter ages, with some of the former, have beene pitifully intangled. The snare, wherein it were not possible for any besides themselves to catch them, they thus frame or set, Whatsoever God hath decreed, must of necessity come to passe: But God hath decreed every thing that is: Therefore every thing that is, comes to passe of neces∣sity. All things are necessary at least in respect of Gods decree. The extract or corrallary whereof, in briefe, is this: It is impossible for ought, that is not, to bee: for ought that hath beene, not to have beene, for ought

that is, not to be; impossible for ought to be hereafter, that shall not be. But if it be (as here I suppose) ve∣ry consonant to infinite wisedome; altogether ne∣cessary to infinite goodnesse; and no way impos∣sible for infinite power, to decree contingency as well as necessity; or that some effects should bee as truly contingent, as others are necessary; a conclu∣sion quite contradictory to that late inferred, wil be the onely lawfull issue of the former Maxime, or major proposition matched with a minor of our choosing. Let the major proposition stand as it did before, [Whatsoever God hath decreed must of ne∣cessity come to passe] with this additionall, Nothing can come to passe otherwise than God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe. The minor proposition, which (if our choice may stand) shall be consort to the major, is this, But God hath decreed contingency as well as necessity, or, that some effects should bee as truly contingent, as others are necessary; Therefore of necessity there must bee contingency, or effects contin∣gent. The immediate consequence whereof is this, There is an absolute necessity, that some things which have not beene, might have beene; That some things which have beene, might not have beene. That some things which are not, might be; That some things which are, might not be: That some things which shall not be hereafter, might bee; That some things which shall be hereafter, might not be. But as ill weeds grow apace, so the late mentioned errour once con∣ceived, was quickly delivered of a second, which derived the infallible certainty of Gods foreknow∣ing things future, from an infallible necessity (as

they conceived it) laid upon them (before they had being) by his immutable decree. But every wise decree presupposeth wisedome, and wisedome es∣sentially includeth knowledge: shall we then grant that Gods Knowledge is antecedent, and his fore∣knowledge consequent to his decrees? or shall we say he did inevitably decree the obliquity of Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne, because he did most certainly foreknow it, or, that hee did therefore certainly foreknow it, because hee had irresistibly decreed it? Most certaine it is, that he did as per∣fectly foresee or foreknow all the obliquities of their malice & blasphemy against Christ, as he did their very acts or doings: if those could be distin∣guished from their acts or doings. Briefly, to ad∣mit the former conclusion; That the Eternall fore∣knowes all things, because he decrees them; or, that they are absolutely necessary in respect of his decree; were to imprison his infinite wisedome, in his selfe-fettered power; to restraine the Eternall Majestie from using such liberty in his everlasting decrees, as some earthly Monarchs usurpe in causes tempo∣rall or civill: For, Papae nunquam ligat sibi manus; The Pope (as they say) never tyeth his owne hands, by any Grant or Patents: which is a fault in him; onely because he is otherwise very faulty, and un∣sufficient to support or weild so high a prerogative with upright constancy. But, in that Holy and mighty One, the reservation of such liberty (as a∣non we intimate) is a point of high perfection.

6 That to be able to decree an absolute contin∣gency as well as necessity, is an essentiall branch of

Omnipotency or power infinite, shall (by the assi∣stance of this Power) be clearly demonstrated in the Article of Creation. That God did omnipo∣tently decree a contingency in humane actions, that the execution of this decree is a necessary conse∣quent of his communicative goodnesse, (a conse∣quent so necessary, that unlesse this be granted, we cannot acknowledge him to be truly good, much lesse infinitely good,) shall (by the favour of this his Goodness) be fully declared in the Treatise of mans fall, and of sinnes entrance into the World by it. That which in this place wee take as granted, is,

That Gods wisedome is no lesse infinite than his power; that he perfectly foreknowes, whatsoe∣ver by his omnipotency can be done; that his po∣wer and wisedome are fully commensurable to his immensity and eternity; that all these rules following, are exactly parallell in true Divinity.

Gods Presence is not circumscriptible by the coexistence of his creatures; He is in every one of them as a Center, and all of them are in Him as in a circumference capable not of them only but of all that possibly can bee; onely uncapable of Circumscription or Equality.

His Eternity is more than commensurable to time or any duration of created Entities: It is in every duration as a permanent instant; and all durations are contained in it, as a fluent instant in a set time, or as noonetide in the whole day.

His Power likewise may not be confined to ef∣fects that are, have beene, or shall bee: the pro∣duction of every thing out of nothing, argues it

to be truly infinite; and yet the production of all, is to the infinity of it, not so much as a beame of light which is strained through a needles eye, is to the body of the Sunne, or to all the light dif∣fused throughout the world.

Least of all may his infinite wisedome be compre∣hended within those effects which by his power have been produced, or which it now doth or here∣after shall produce. But looke how farre his immen∣sity exceeds all reall or compleat space, or his E∣ternity succession, or the duration of things created, or his Power all things already reduced from possi∣bility to actuall existence; so farre doth his infinite Wisedome surmount the most exact knowledge that can bee imagined of all things already ereated and their actions. Nothing that is, could have borne any part in the world, without the light or directi∣on of his Knowledge: and yet that measure of his Knowledge which can bee gathered from the full harmony of this Vniverse, is lesse in respect of it ab∣solutely considered, then skill to number digits, is to the entire or exact knowledge of all proportions or other arithmeticall rules or affections, that can arise from their multiplications or divisions. The causes, properties, & hidden vertues of each thing created, are better knowne to Him, than so much of them as we see or perceive by any other sense, is to us: and yet He knowes whatsoever by infinite power pos∣sibly might have beene, but now is not, whatsoever hereafter may be, though it never shall be; as per∣fectly as he doth the things which at this instant are, heretofore have beene, or hereafter must be.

7 The subject wherein this his incomprehensible wisedome exhibits the most liuely and surest appre∣hensions, for drawing our hearts after it in admira∣tion; is the harmony or mixture of contingency with necessity. And this, most conspicuous in mo∣derating the free thoughts of Men or Angells, and ordaining them to the certaine and necessary ac∣complishment of his glory. The contingent means which by his permission and donation, these crea∣tures may use for attaining their severall ends, or private good, may be successively infinite. And yet, albeit the utmost possibilities of their varieties and incōstancies, were reduced to act, the ends not∣withstanding, which his infinite wisedome hath forecast in their creation, should by any course of many thousands, which they may take, be as inevi∣tably brought to passe, as if no choice or freedome had beene left them; or as if every succeeding thought had been drawne on by the former, and al linked to that which hee first inspired, or by his ir∣resistible power produced, with indissoluble chains of Adamantine Fate. We would esteeme it great wisdome or cunning (to use S. Austines illustratiō) in a Fowler to be able to catch againe all the Birds, w^ch he had formerly caught, after he had permitted every one of them to take wings and flye which way they listed. God hath nets every where spred, for catching such as his wisedome suffers to flye farthest from him, or most to decline the wayes which in his goodnesse he had appointed for thē: and (which is most of all to be admired) the very freedome or variety of mens thoughts, so they be

permitted to imploy them according to their owne liking, becomes their most inevitable, and most in∣extricable snare. For all their thoughts are actually numbred in his infinite wisedome, and the award of every thought determinately measured, or defi∣ned by his Eternall Decree. So farre is freedome of choice or contingency from being incompati∣ble with the immutability of Gods will, that with∣out this infinite variety of choice or freedome of thought in man and Angels, wee cannot rightly conceive him to be as infinitely wise, as his decree is immutable.

8 Free it was for mee to have thought or done somewhat in every minute of the last yeare, where∣by the whole frame of my cogitations or actions for this yeare following might have beene altered: and yet should God have beene as true and princi∣pall a cause of this alteration, and of every thought and deed thus altered; as he is of those that de facto are past, or of that which I now thinke or doe. Nor should his will or pleasure (as some object) depend on mine, but mine though contingently free, necessarily subject unto his. For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angell, he hath ever∣lastingly decreed a proportionate end: to every antecedent possible, a correspondent consequent; which needs no other cause or meanes to produce it, but onely the reducing of possibility (granted by his decree) into Act. For what way soever (of ma∣ny equally possible) mans will doth encline, Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evill that befalls him for it. Did we that which we

doe not, but might doe; many things would inevi∣tably follow, which now doe not. Nor doe the things, which at this instant befall me, come to passe, because he absolutely decreed them, and none but them (as we say) in the first place; But because hee decreed them as the inevitable consequents of some things, which hee knew I would doe, which notwithstanding hee both knew and had decreed, that I might not have done. For whatsoever I should have done and have let undone, there was a reall possibility to have done it; though not inhae∣rent in me, yet intituled unto mee in particular by Gods Decree; untill some demerit of mine or my forefathers, did cut off the entaile, and interrupt the successefull influence. For here I will not dispute, how farre the sinnes of Parents may prejudice their Children; but these termes should, or might, being referred to matters of duty; are as infallible signes in Divinity, as in Grammar, of a potentiall, what we should have done or might have done, was possible for us to have done, by that decree whence all po∣wer and possibility, not meerely logicall, is deri∣ved. So then, both that which might befall me if I did otherwise, and that which now befals mee do∣ing as I doe, flow alike immediately from the ab∣solute necessity of his eternall decree: whose in∣comprehensible wisedome herein appeares most admirable; that though the variety in this kinde were infinite, yet should it comprehend all; not one thing could fall without the actuall circumfe∣rence of it.

9 The generall reason, why most Christian

writers are more able and apt both to conceive right, and to speake more consequently to what they rightly conceive, concerning other branches of divine absolute infinitenesse, than concerning his infinite knowledge, is, because all creatures without exception, are true participants of Gods other At∣tributes, besides his wisedome or knowledge. For even the meanest creature, the worme or gnat, hath a portion of that being, of that power, of that dura∣tion, which in him are infinite: and that portion of these attributes which they have, or that quantity of being which they have, is a participation of his immensity. But of his knowledge or wisedome, men and Angels (the manner of whose knowledge is to men for the most part unknowne) are of all his creatures the onely participants. And (as hath been observed before) those rules are alwayes the most cleare and certaine, and most easily gathered; which are gathered from an uniforme identity of particu∣lars, in variety of subjects. Those universall rules (on the contrary) are hardly gathered, or (without ac∣curate observation) are lesse certaine, which can be experienced onely in some one or fewer subjects. Another speciall reason why we doe not conceive so magnificently or so orthodoxally of Gods knowledge, as were fitting; is, because we want fit tearmes to expresse them in. For seeing words are taken as the proper vesture of our thoughts & con∣ceipts; and seeing most men are apt to conceive or judge rather according to the vesture or outward appearance of things, than according to the inward truth: it is almost impossible for us not to trans∣forme

the manner of Gods knowledge or decrees, into the similitude of our owne conceipts, conjec∣tures, or resolutions; so long as we put no other ve∣sture or expressions upon Gods decree or know∣ledge, than were fitted for our owne. To salve this inconvenience, or to prevent the occasion of this errour,* 1.14 Saint Gregory moves this doubt: How we can say there is any praescience or foreknow∣ledge in God, seeing onely those things can be pro∣perly said to be foreknowne, which are to come: whereas we know, that nothing is future unto God, before whose eye, no things are past; things present doe not passe by Him, things future doe not come, upon Him. Whatsoever hath beene to us, is yet in his view; and whatsoever is present, may rather be said to be knowne than foreknowne. To the same purpose Saint Austine would have Gods know∣ledge of things which are to come, to bee tearmed rather science than praescience or foresight; seeing all things are present to God. But these two great lights of the Latine Church, with some others that follow these for their guides, have not in this argu∣ment exprest themselves so clearly or so accurately as that their expressions can passe without question or exception in the Schooles. We may not say (nor did Saint Austine or Saint Gregory, as I presume, thinke) that God doth not see or know a distincti∣on betweene times past, present, or to come, more

cleerely than we doe. If then he distinguish times present from times past or future, how is it said by St. Gregory; that nothing to him is future, nothing past? If these differences of time or of succession be reall; the Eternall knowes these differences much better than we doe. And if he know a difference between things present, past, and to come; to be pre∣sent, past, or to come, is not all one in respect of his Eternall knowledge. If God, as all grant, be before all worlds; his knowledge being coeternall to his being, must needs be before all worlds. And Saint Austine himselfe grants a scientia a science or know∣ledge in God most infallible, of all things that have beene, are, or shall be; before they are, were, or could be; for they could not be coeternall to him, who is before all worlds, the beginning of the world it selfe, and of all things in it. Now all know∣ledge of things not yet present, but to come, is fore∣knowledge: to determine or decree things fu∣ture, is to predetermine or foredecree them. And seeing God from Eternity hath both knowne and decreed the things that then were not; he is said to have foreknowne and foredecreed them. So then God foreknowes, and man foreknowes; God hath decreed, and man hath decreed. But the difference between the manner of their foreknowing and de∣creeing, being not oft-times wel expressed by lear∣ned writers or teachers, and seldome duely consi∣dered by their Readers or hearers; the identity of words wherewith we expresse our own foreknow∣ledge & Gods foreknowledge, begets a similitude of conceipt, or will hardly suffer us rightly to con∣ceive

the true difference betweene the nature and manner of humane wisedome, and wisedome divine. And this hath beene the fertile nursery of many errours in this Argument, which now and hereaf∣ter we shall endeavour to displant: imitating the Heralds, who are often enforced to give the same Coat to divers parties; but alwayes with some dif∣ference, remarkeable to such as are conversant in the mysteries of their Art.

10 Our knowledge of things to come is many wayes imperfect; (and foreknowledge onely) be∣cause the duration neither of our knowledge, nor of our selves, as yet can reach unto that point of time, wherein things so knowne, get first existence. We looke on them as on things afarre off, which we expected to meet; for as things past resemble moueables going from us, so things future seem to come upon us. And whiles they get being, which before they had not; we get continuance of being, and of knowledge, which before we had not; that is, we gaine a reall coexistence with them: For if the daies, or thred of our life should be cut off before the things foreknowne by us come to passe, or get actuall being; wee could not possibly haue coex∣istence with them. Such being or duration as they have, is too short the one way, & our existence too short the other way, to make up this knot or bond of mutuall relation, which wee call coexistence: There must be on our part, a continuatiō or length∣ning of that existence which we have; and on their part, a growth into that actuall being, which whilest they are meerely future, they have not; be∣fore

wee and they can bee truely said to exist toge∣ther. Now if we shall mold the manner of Gods foreknowledge of things future in our owne con∣ceipt or foreknowledge of them, we shall erroneous∣ly collect; that, seeing wee cannot infallibly fore∣know future Contingents, so neither could they be infallibly fore-knowne by God; if to him or in re∣spect of his decree, they were contingents, and not necessarily predetermined.

And some there be, which push our pronenesse to this errour forward, by another; not distin∣guishing betweene contingency and uncertainty, they argue thus;

That which is in it selfe uncertaine, cannot certain∣ly be knowne:

Every future contingent is in it selfe uncertaine: Ergo, it is not possible, that a future contingent should certainly be knowne.

But they consider not that there is a twofold un∣certainty: one formally relative: another onely denominative or fundamentall. That which is re∣latively uncertaine, cannot be certainly knowne; for so it should bee certaine to him, to whom it is uncertaine. But a future contingent, as it is contin∣gent, doth not necessarily or formally include this relative uncertainty; although it usually be in part the foundatiō or Cofounder of it. For relative un∣certainty, or that uncertainty which is so termed with relation unto knowledge, results partly from the nature of the object, suppose a future Contin∣gent or Event mutable; partly and more principal∣ly, from the imperfection of the knowledge, in re∣spect

of which it is said uncertaine. But the same effect or event, which is in part the foundation of uncertaintie, with respect to finite or unperfect knowledge, may bee the distinct and proper object of knowledge in it selfe infallible, or of knowledge infinite. Now if we grant, that there is any know∣ledge in it selfe infallible, we cannot imagine that any thing possible (yet is every future Contingent, though we consider it as contingently future, pos∣sible) should bee uncertaine unto such knowledge. We should againe consider, that the Eternall Pro∣vidence, doth neither know or foreknow Contin∣gents future, by interposed or expiring Acts; but by interminable and Eternall Knowledge, in which there is no succession, nothing future, nothing past. And without the interposition of some determi∣ning or expiring Acts, there can bee no errour in men; no man erres while hee is in the search of truth, or whilest he suspends his Iudgement. Take then away the imperfection of our knowledge or iudgement, whilest it is in suspense; which is igno∣rance, rather than errour; and it better resembles divine knowledge, than our actuall resolutions or determinations doe.

11 The best knowledge which we can have of things contingent, is but conjecturall: and of things meerly casuall, we cannot have so much as a true conjecturall knowledge; for, those things we tearme casuall, w^ch are without the reach or sphere of our forecast or conjecture. And hence it is, that the actuall exhibition of any event, whether casuall or contingent, doth alwaies actuate, increase, or per∣fect

our knowledge. The true reason why we can∣not certainly foreknow events contingent, is be∣cause our Essence & Knowledge are but finite: so that things contingent are not so contained in us, that if we could perfectly know our selves, wee might perfectly know them. But in the Divine Essence all reall effects, all events possible, whether ne∣cessary, casuall, or contingent, are eminently con∣tained, the perfect knowledge of his owne Es∣sence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge not onely of all things that have beene, are, or shall bee, but of all things that might have beene, or possibly may be. For as Gods Essence is pre∣sent in every place, as it were an ubiquitary cen∣ter; so is his Eternity or infinite duration indivi∣sibly coexistent to every part of succession; and yet withall is round about it. Hee it is, that drives things future upon us, being from Eternity as well beyond them, as on this side of them. Though hee should create other creatures without the circumference of this world, they should be all within his presence, without which, it is impos∣sible ought besides him, should have any existence: yet should he not properly gaine any new existence in them, but onely take a denomination of coexi∣stence with them; because they have existence in Him, which before they had not. Thus, admitting the branches of Contingency or indifferent possi∣bilities never reduced to act, to be in our apprehen∣sion numberlesse; yet whensoever any thing comes to passe, which might not have beene, it cannot fall without the sphere of Gods actuall knowledge,

which is fully commensurable to Eternity and Im∣mensity; and therefore is not onely coexistent to every successive act, but doth environ whole succes∣sion. And whether of such things as possibly may be, more or fewer bee reduced to act; nothing ac∣crewes to Eternall Knowledge, no new act can bee produced in it, by the casuall event; but only that which was eternally knowne, having now gotten actuall coexistence with Eternity, bestowes this ex∣trinsecall denomination upon the Eternall Crea∣tor, It was foreknowne from eternity; that is, in plaine language, knowne, when it was not, by Him that more properly alwayes indivisibly, is, then was be∣fore it. And being such, his knowledge of things, which, in respect of us are onely future and fore∣knowne, doth as truly resemble, or rather containe our knowledge of things past or presēt, as of things to come. Now for us to apprehend a thing past, under the nature of a thing contingent, is not im∣possible. And though we certainly know it to bee already past, yet this certainty of our knowledge, doth not perswade us, that it came to passe certain∣ly, or inevitably; but is very compatible with our conceipt of its contingency or casuall production, whilest it was present. Our knowledge of such things past or present, is necessary; but the event it selfe is not therefore necessary, nor to bee termed necessary in respect of our knowledge. Much lesse may we say, either that contingent effects are neces∣sary, or that no effects are not necessary, in respect of Gods decree or foreknowledge of them. For if we beleeve that Gods foreknowledge of all events

to come, be they of what kinde they possibly may bee, is more cleare and more infallible than our best knowledge of things past or present; the ne∣cessary infallibility of his knowledge, can neither adde any degree of necessity to the nature of the events foreknowne, nor take one jo•• of contingen∣cy from them. God should not be absolutely infi∣nite either in Essence or in Knowledge, if the abso∣lute infallibility of his foreknowledge, or the im∣possibility of his not erring in his predictions, were in it selfe grounded upon, or to be inferred by us, from the absolute necessity of the event, rather than from the absolute infinity of his wisedome. For those effects which being otherwise in their nature contingent, it is in our power (by Gods permission, by circumspection and forecast) to alter by laying a necessity upon them, which before they had not; we are able (after this necessity laid upon them by our selves) infallibly to foreknow and foretell, al∣beit our knowledge still remaine but finite. Now, that some events, which are to day, in themselves and by Gods decree, truly contingent, may by our industry and circumspection, become to morrow truly necessary, no intelligent Christian Divine will (I hope) deny; or if any doe deny it, we shall be able (by Gods assistance) positively to demon∣strate the truth of this our assertion, and withall demonstrate the dangerous inconveniences of the contradictory opinion, in the Treatise of Divine providence. In the meane time, to finish this prin∣cipall stemme of Divine providence, to wit, his in∣finite Wisedome; and the dependance which things

temporall have upon his eternall knowledge: Suc∣cession we imagine as a scrole containing severall columnes of contingency or indifferent possibilities; of which onely so many, or so much of any, as in revolution of time, take inke, and are unfoulded, become visible to Men and Angels. But the Al∣mighty looketh on all things, as well from that end of time which is to come, as from that which is past: his infinite and eternall wisedome, doth not onely encompasse all things that come to passe, as the Circumference doth the Center; but penetrates the whole scrole of succession from end to end and from corner to corner, more clearly then the Suns brightnesse doth the perspicuous or purified Ayre. Those Columnes of meere possibilities never actu∣ated, which his finger from Eternity hath drawne in Characters secret and invisible to his Creatures, are alike distinct and legible to his glorious eye, as those others whose first draught, being as secretly and invisibly fashioned by him, man or other se∣cond causes by his concourse, fill with actuall or sensible existence; as the Embroyderer doth the Drawers obscure patterne, with conspicuous bran∣ches of silke, gold, or silver.

12 But lest we may be thought to reade the An∣cients with no greater reverence, than we do some moderne Writers from whom wee freely dissent, without any impulsion of envy or vainglory, let us for conclusion of this long discourse, a little reflect upon the testimonies before avouched out of S. Austine, and out of S. Gregory. The truth then at which these two learned Fathers aimed, & which,

in the charitable construction of such as read them with reverence, they did not misse, may bee fully comprised in these observations following, which are but necessary extracts of what hath hitherto beene delivered. Whereas S. Gregory saith, Vnto God nothing is past, nothing to come; the true con∣struction of his meaning is, that in Gods knowledge of things past, present, or to come, there is nihil fu∣turum, nihil praeteritum, no such difference of time or duration, as we expresse by these words, future or past: for it alwayes is, and so perfectly alwayes is, that nothing can be added to it by succession or variety of events, be they necessary, casuall, or con∣tingent. But as his Eternal knowledge of all things, doth not make all things, which he knowes, to be e∣ternall (no not in respect of his Eternall Decree or Knowledge, for he eternally decrees and knowes things temporall and mutable:) so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge, make all things so known by him, to be immutable or absolutely necessary, either in themselves or in respect of his Eternall Knowledge. Onely this we are bound to beleeve, and this is all that we may in this argument safely say: [Gods Knowledge of things mutable & unnecessary, is absolutely neces∣sary, because absolutely infinite.] Againe, it is most true which S. Gregory saith; that things future doe not come upon God as they doe upon us; that things present do not passe him, or from him, as they do from us. Whilest things present passe from us, we likewise passe from them: for we continually lose that portion of duration or coexistence which

wee had with them; alwayes gaining, whilest our glasse is in running, a new ••rit or link of coexistēce with that which is next to come. Nothing, in this sense, can passe by God or from God, because He alwayes is, and the manner of his duration is indi∣visible: He cannot lose any existence by antiquity, nor gaine any new portion of duration, by everla∣sting continuance. Times passing exonerate them∣selves into the Ocean of his infinite duration, with∣out inlarging it; times comming incessantly flow from it, without diminution of it. Times future a∣gaine, are said to come upon us, or to meet us; be∣cause our duration or existence cannot reach to fu∣ture things, whilest they are future: the very An∣gels are not of so long standing or duration to day, as they shall bee to morrow: unlesse things future did come towards them, and as it were meet them, they should have no coexistence with them. In this sense, times future cannot be said to come upon God, because he alwayes is, and exists every way before them. His duration is yesterday, to day, to morrow, the same for ever; and every way the same without addition of quantity, without alteration of nature or quality: and in it are all things that are. So much of being as things future can bee said to have, they have it in him and from him: so much of being as there remaines of things past, remaineth in Him, and things present, even presence it selfe, cannot for a moment subsist, without Him.

CHAP. 9.

Of Divine Immutability.

1 WIth these stemmes of Divine perfection hitherto exprest, another presents it selfe to our contemplation, which some Schoole-men have moulded in the same conceipt with Eternity; of which, o∣thers conceive it to bee the off-spring. Vs it suffi∣ceth, that the true explication of the former, con∣firmes the truth of this attribute, whose briefe ex∣plication we now seeke. And perhaps, if I should speake properly, the Knowledge of it, is the Off-spring of our right knowledge of the former. The attribute it selfe, whose truth in former disputes hath beene supposed, is Divine Immutability; which may be thus demonstrated.

2 All mutation supposeth a defect or imperfec∣tion, either in respect of the terme, whence, or into which, the change is made; and therefore can have no place in absolute or abstract perfection, or in Essence infinite. More particularly, all mutation or change, is either in essence, in quantity, in place, or in quality; under which we comprehend all vitall endeavors, all acts of the Will or Vnderstanding. In essence or nature, it is impossible the totality and fountaine of Essence should admit any change, as impossible for him which hath no author of being,

not to bee alwayes what hee is; as for that which now is not, to take his being to it selfe: unto infinit perfection (for such he is) what can accrew? On the other side, nothing can fall from it, but must fall into him; seeing, He is in being infinite. And in that he filleth every place by his essentiall pre∣sence, it is impossible hee should move from place to place, or be carryed by any circular motion, be∣ing indivisibly and totally in every space that can be imagined. And as his Immensitie could not be entended or contracted by extension of new mag∣nitudes, or by diminution or annihilation of the old; so neither can his Eternity, bee shortned or lenghtned by continuation of succession, or expi∣ration of time or motion. Power, in like sort, truly infinite, can admit no intension or remission, in en∣deavors; but moveth all things without motion, and worketh all things without labour or toyle in∣herent: For all things are made, and brought to no∣thing, by his sole will or word. Nor speakes hee ought, which from Eternity hee hath not spoken; albeit succeding ages have still new messengers of his eternall will and Word, All flesh is as grasse, and all the glory of man as the power of the grasse; the grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away. But the word of the Lord endureth for ever. And yet this was that word of the Gospell, which seemed then first to be preached unto them.

3 All the difficulty wherewith flesh and blood in this article are usually assaulted, or seeme to them∣selves to be beset, is, how his will or counsaile should be eternally immutable, and yet everlastingly free:

but supposing, what we often promise, and once for all (by his assistance) shall undoubtedly prove; that absolute contingency or possibilities aequipendent betwixt many effects, may as truly be the object of his Eternall decree, as necessity in other workes of nature: I see not what appearance of difficulty can present it selfe, to such, as beare the two for∣mer principles before mentioned levell in their mindes and thoughts; the one, that God is absolute infinite in Being: the other, that Hee is absolutely perfect, according to all the branches of Beeing or perfection by us conceiveable; or, more than all these, Perfection it selfe. Now in things that have any better portion of Being, wherein they can truly delight; it is, to our apprehension, a degree or portion of perfection to have an immutable state of such Being; an imperfection, to be subject to alteration or change. But, whether their estate bee mutable or immutable, it is a greater perfecti∣on to be free in their operations, than to be restrai∣ned to some one or few particulars, without any choice or variety of subjects, wherein they may exercise their operative faculties. Bruitish, or meer∣ly sensitive creatures have a delectable kinde of Be∣ing, whose continuance they desire; but without all variety of choice, or desire of any better being, although the best being they have be subject to al∣teration or change. Men are free in their operati∣ons; but mutable and subject to alteration, as well in their nature, as in their operations, or in the ob∣jects of their freedome; and yet are more excellent than the visible Heavens, which are not obnoxious

to alteration or corruption. So that, if the Heavens, or other incorruptible substances, had their free∣dome of choice, which men have; they would bee more perfect and excellent creatures than man is: Or, if man were as immortall as they are, he would be incomparably more perfect than they can bee, without the freedome of choyce or will, which (as we now suppose) is the inseparable consequent, or companion of reason or intellectuall knowledge. But, though freedome be in it selfe a great perfection; yet to be free to do evil, is a branch of imperfection, which springs from the mutability of the creatures freedome. And this their mutability, though in it selfe an imperfection, yet is an imperfection neces∣sarily praerequired, or praesupposed to the perfecti∣on of the creature. For no creature can bee truly perfect by nature, but by the will and pleasure of the Creator. And it is his will and pleasure, to make them mutable, before they be immutably happy. But the Creator of all things, in that He is absolute∣ly perfect, even Perfection it selfe, is essentially im∣mutable, essentially free, and immutably happy; be∣cause infinitely good. Yet if we compare these at∣tributes amongst themselves, immutability is the ground or supporter, not the Crowne or perfection of freedome, but freedome rather the perfection of immutabilitie. Yet were freedome in it selfe, how perfect and complete soever it were, no absolute perfection, unlesse it were immutably wedded unto goodnesse. Absolute immutability and absolute freedome, may very well stand together, even in our conceipts; so they be rightly joyned, or sorted. To

be freely immutable, implyes a contradiction; if not unto the nature of immutability, yet unto the nature of absolute perfection, or to our true con∣ceipt of infinite Being. To be freely immutable, is a branch of imperfection or impotency; which might put al those perfections, which are contained in that nature which is no otherwise than freely im¦mutable, upon the hazard. If the divine Essence were freely immutable, or free in respect of his im∣mutability, whether of nature or goodnesse; it were possible for him to put off these two attributes, and to eloath himselfe with mutability, which is al∣wayes charged with possibility of doing amisse. But to be immutably free, is no point of imperfec∣tion; but rather the period of perfection; and ne∣cessarily inferres this perfection (which wee call freedome) to be as unchangeable as the Attributes of power, of wisedome, of eternity, or goodnesse are. The excellency of his nature and Essence ne∣cessarily includes an Eternall liberty or freedome in the exercise of his omnipotent power, and in the influence or communication of his goodnesse; Free it is for him, from Everlasting to Everlasting, om∣nipotently to decree as well a mutability in the ac∣tions of some things created, as a necessity or im∣mutability in the course or operation of nature in∣animate: That the course of mans life, or the finall doome awarded to every man (though that must be awarded unto all according to the diversity of their courses,) should be immutable; because they are foreset by an immutable omnipotent Decree; hath no more colour of truth, than to say the Om∣nipotent

Creator, must needs be blacke because he made the Crowes and Ebony blacke; or white, be∣cause he made the Snow and Swannes white; or greene and yellow, because hee made the Gold yellow, and the Popinjayes greene: Or that hee should be of all colours, because the Rainbow is his creature. Let us beleeve then, that He is ever∣lastingly and immutably free, to make creatures of what kinde it pleaseth Him, that he hath printed a resemblance of his freedome in the mutability of this inferiour world, and hath left a modell of his immutability in the celestiall and immortall substances. But the more immutable Hee is, the more irresistible we conceive his power to bee: or the greater his wisedome is, the lesse preventa∣ble the contrivances of it are: the worse it would be with such as have to deale with Him, were not his goodnesse (which is the rule of his Eternall Decree) immutably as great, as He himselfe, or his other Attributes are.

CHAP. 10.

Of the eternall and immutable Decree.

1 FRom all, or most of the former speculations, concerning the se∣verall branches of the divine At∣tributes or perfections, somwhat may be gathered, not unusefull for rectifying or bettering our apprehensions of Gods absolute and omnipotent de∣cree.

A point, though in all ages most difficult, yet in this age become so common, and so farre exten∣ded, that no Divine can adventure upon any other service profitable for the present estate of Christs Militant Church, but he shall be enforced either to make his passage through it, or come so nigh unto it, that hee must, in good manners, doe homage un∣to it. That this Decree is for its tenour, immutable, (if wee take it in the abstract, or as it is in God) is cleare from the attribute last handled; that the same Decree, is irresistible in its executions, or that the things decreed are inevitable, is evident from the attribute of Gods infinite Power or Omnipo∣tency. That this immutable irresistible Decree, is Eternall, or before all Times, no man questions. Yet is it not agreed upon by all, either what a De∣cree is, or what it is to be Eternall. All least the most part doe not perfectly beare in minde, the true im∣portances of an Eternall Decree. To this purpose have the former speculations concerning Eternity, and Gods infinite wisedome beene praemised; Lest, by the incogitant use of these and the like Scrip∣ture Phrases, [God foreknowes or hath decreed all things from Eternity;] that slumber might creepe upon the unvigilant or unattentive Reader; with whose dreames many deceived, have thought and spoken of Gods Decree or predetermination of things to come, as of Acts already irrevocably finished and accomplished; And by a consequent errour, resolve that it is as impossible, for any thing to be otherwise than it is, will be, or hath beene; as it is to recall that againe, which is already past. In

which conceipt, though they doe not expressely speake or thinke it, they necessarily involve thus much [That God by his Eternall and powerfull Decree, did set the course of nature a going with an irresistable and unretractible swingde; and since onely lookes upon it, with an awfull eye, as Masters sometimes watch their servants, whether they goe the way they are commanded.] But it is a rule in Divinity, not contradicted, (for ought I know) by any Christian, that there is altogether as great need and use of power and wisedome infinite, to ma∣nage the world, as there was at first to make it, Pa∣ter meus operatur adhuc (saith the* 1.15 Wisedome of God) et ego operor. My Father worketh hitherto, and I worke. And as hee ceaseth not to worke, so doth he never cease to decree. Omnia* 1.16 operatur se∣cundum consilium voluntatis suae. Hee worketh all things according to the counsell of his Will. So that al∣beit the Counsell of his Will, by which hee work∣eth, be Eternall; yet all things are not yet wrought by it. Shall we say then, he hath not decreed what∣soever doth or shall befall us? Yes, in this sense we may, [He doth not now first begin to decree thē:] but in as much as his Decrees have no end, wee should remember withall, that hee now decrees them. And it were much safer for every man in particular to looke on Gods Decree concerning himselfe, as present or coexistent to his whole course of life; rather than on it, as it was before the world, or in Adam: for so we shall thinke of it, as of an Act past and finished, which hath de∣nounced sentence upon us, more irrevocable

than the Lawes of the Medes and Persians. How∣beit even these lawes, whiles they were in making, suppose that Liberty in their Makers, which they utterly tooke from them being once enacted.

2 Gods Decrees are like theirs, in that they are in themselves unalterable: but not in that they make some evills, which befall others, inevitable; or some casuall inconveniences, unamendable. No wisedome, but that which is infinite, and an Eter∣nall Law in it selfe, foreseeing all things that possi∣bly can bee, hath just warrant to make Decrees for men everlastingly immutable. Too strict oblige∣ment unto Lawes positive, or Decrees unalterable, deprives both Lawgivers and others of their native Liberty and opportunity of doing good. Were the Popes wisedome and integrity parallell to that supereminent dignity, which he challengeth; it were not amisse for the body whereof hee is the lawfull head, if he exercised the same power over his Grants or Acts, that hee doth over his breath: alwayes reserving a liberty to send them forth, or call them in, to enlarge, contract, or invert them, according to exigences or occasions present. To alter his opinion of men, as they doe theirs in points of usefull doctrine, or their demeanours in matters of life; curbing him this yeare, whom hee priviledged the last yeare; now punishing where he lately rewarded; and, shortly after, rewarding where now hee punisheth; would argue no muta∣bility of mind, or unsetled fickle disposition, but rather immoveable constancy; if so in all these changes he truly observed the rule of Iustice, which

because it is alwayes one and the same, and never varies, must needs afford different measures to dif∣ferent deserts, and fit contrary dispositions with contrary recompences. But seeing Princes and Governours, are made of the same corrupted mold with those, whom they governe; oft-times expo∣sed by height of place to greater blasts of mutabili∣tie, and inconstancy, than their inferiours; Publicke Lawes have beene sought out by most Nations, to runne like a straight line, betwixt two distorted and crooked ones; and to bee as a firme, or barre, be∣tweene the tumultuous and raging passions of Princes and subjects, which every foot (as we say) would fall foule were they not thus fended off, one from the other. Vpon this consideration many Conquerours have beene content to sheathe up a great part of their illimited power (retayning some competent prerogatives to themselves and their successors) in publicke Edicts or Lawes, not alto∣gether so unalterable as the Lawes of the Medes and Persians: yet lesse subject to change, then Lords purposes, or Princes pleasures: and every Act wher∣to they passe their consent, restraines them of some former liberty, and abates somewhat of their pre∣sent greatnesse; to whose length or continnance (as Theopompus observed) much by this meanes, is added; and it were better to live an hundred yeares, (as hee said) with ingenuous health and strength, then to swagger it for twenty, with gyantly force, or Athleticall constitution. And albeit the Law (which is a common looking glasse to direct the Prince in commanding, and the subject in obeying)

may sometimes lay out authority, and sometimes obedience, or inflict punishment one while, and dis∣pense rewards another while, in measure greater or lesse, than a wise & just Arbitrator, chosen for these particular purposes, would allow of; yet hath it beene thought fittest for all parts, rather to brooke these interposed mischiefes, then to be perpetually subject to the former inconveniences of the Papa∣cie; if the Popes (such as they are) or other Princes should practise according to the Canonists rule, Papa nunquam ligat sibi manus, The Pope never tyes his owne hands.

3 But the unerrable rule of everlasting Iustice, who from eternity decrees, whatsoever may bee, and foresees whatsoever will be, (because Heaven and Earth may sooner passe than his words or acts) passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of Iurisdiction. What grant or pro∣mise soever he make, cannot binde the exercise of his everlasting libertie, for a moment of time: they last no longer than durante beneplacito: seeing gra∣cious Equity, and onely it, is his everlasting plea∣sure. He ever was, ever is, and ever shall be, alike indifferent and free to recompence every man ac∣cording to his present wayes. And in that, hee al∣waies searcheth the very hart and secret thoughts, and never ceaseth to decree; his one and indivisibly everlasting decree, without any variety or shadow of change in it selfe; fits all the changes, severall dispositions, and contingent actions of Men and Angels, as exactly, as if he did conceive, and shape a new Law, for every one of them; and they are

conceived and brought forth, as wel befitting them as the skin doth the body, which nature hath en∣wrapped in it. No man living (I take it) will a∣vouch any absolute necessity from all Eternity, that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line from the Priesthood, or his two sonnes destructions by the Philistims: For this were to bereave him of his absolute and eternall liberty. I demand then, whether within the compass of time, or in eternity, as praeexistent to Elies dayes, he past any act that could restraine his eternall liberty of honouring Elies families, as well as any others in their time? To say, He did, were impiety; because it chargeth the Almighty with impotent immuta∣bility. What shall we say then? The deposition of his race, the sudden death and destruction of his sonnes, were not at all absolutely necessary, but ne∣cessary onely upon supposed miscariage of the pos∣sible meanes and opportunities, which hee had gi∣ven them for honouring him. And that eternall decree, [They that dishonour mee, them will I disho∣nour,] as coexistent to the full measure of this their transgression, by it shapes their punishment.

4 To thinke of Gods eternall decree with admi∣ration void of danger; we must conceive it, as the immediate Axis or Center, upon which every suc∣cessive or contingent act revolves: and yet withall, that, wherein the whole frame of succession or con∣tingency is fully comprehended, as an unconstant movable Sphere in a farre greater quiescent, or ra∣ther in such a one (as in the description of Eternity was imagined) which hath drawne all the successive

parts of motion, into an indivisible unity of durati∣on permanent. Every part of the larger Sphere (this, swallowing up motion, in vigorous rest) should have coexistence locall with all and every part of the next moveable Sphere under it, move it as slowly and swiftly, as the latitude of successive motion can admit. Whilest we thus conceive of Gods eternall decree, and of his foreknowledge, (included in our conceipt of it) according to the Analogy of what we must beleeve, concerning the manner of his ubiquitary presence or immensity: we shall have no occasion to suspect, that his neces∣sary foreknowledge of what we doe, should lay a necessity upon our actions, or take away all possibi∣lity of doing otherwise. Rather, we may by this supposall, beleeve that as probable, and perceive in part the manner how it is so, which shall by Gods assistance be demonstrated to be de facto most true. As, first, that the Omnipotent doth eternally de∣cree an absolute contingency in most humane acts: Secondly, that this eternall act or decree (which we thus conceive to be throughout the whole suc∣cession of time, in every place indivisibly coexistent to each humane thought or action) doth not only perpetually support our faculties, but withall un∣cessantly inspire them with contingency in their choice: that is, it so moves them, as they may with∣out lett or incumbrance, move themselves more wayes then one: And yet, even whilest it so moves them, it withall inevitably effects the proportioned consequents, which from everlasting were fore∣ordained to the choices, which we make, be they

good or bad; or according to the severall degrees of good or evill done by us, or of our affections or desires to doe them.

CHAP. 11.

Of transcendentall goodnesse: and of the infinity of it in the Divine nature.

1 IF in assigning reasons of Ma∣ximes or proverbiall spee∣ches, wee might not bee thought to fetch light be∣yond the Sunne; we should say, Life unto things living is therefore sweet, because it is a principall stemme of being, as sweetnesse like∣wise is of goodnesse. However, we may resolve this Physicall Axiome, into a Metaphysicall: Omne ens qua ens est bonum; Vnto every thing, its owne proper being is good. Poyson, though noysome to man, to the Aspe is pleasant, so is venome to the Toad, and the Adder delighteth in his sting. In things inani∣mate, there should be no reluctance of contrary or hostile qualities, unlesse each had a kinde of grate∣full right or interest in their owne being, and were taught by nature to fight for it, as men doe for their lives or goods. This is that goodnesse which we call entitative or transcendentall. A goodnesse equally, alike truly communicated to al things that are, from his goodnesse who onely is; but not participated equally, or according to equality, by all. For as the

least vessell that is filled to the brimme, is as full as the greatest that can be, and yet the quantity of li∣quor contained in them equally full, is most une∣quall: So, albeit the entitative being of the Flye, Ant, or Worme, be unto them as good as mans be∣ing is to man: (For even the Ant or Flye being vext, or Wormes trod upon, will bewray their spleene, and labour as it were to right themselves for the losse or prejudice which they suffer in their Entitative goodnesse, by doing harmes to their tormentors) yet is mans being simply much better than the being of Ants or Wormes. And much worse were that Man, than any Beast, that with Gryllus in the Poet, would like to change his hu∣mane nature, for a bruitish. This excesse of entita∣tive goodnesse, by which one creature excelleth another, accreweth partly from the excellency of the specificall Nature of Entity which it accompa∣nieth; as there is more Entitative goodnesse is be∣ing a Man than in being a Lyon; and more in being a Lyon, than in being some inferiour ignoble Beast: it partly accreweth according to the greater or les∣ser measure, wherein severall creatures enjoy their specificall Nature. Men though by nature equall, are not equally happy, either in body or minde. Bodily life in it selfe is sweet, and is so apprehen∣ded by most; yet is lothsome to some; who (as we say) doe not enjoy themselves, as none of us fully doe. Sensitive appetites may be in some mea∣sure satisfied by course, not all at once. The com∣pleat fruition of goodnesse incident to one, defeats another (though capable of greater pleasure) for

the time, of what it most desires. Venter non habet aures, The Belly pinched with hunger must be satisfi∣ed with meat, so must the thirsty throat bee with drinke, before the eares can sucke in the pleasant sound of musicke, or the eye feed it selfe with fresh colours or proportions. Too much pampering bo∣dily senses, starves the minde; and deepe contem∣plation feedes the mind, but pines the body Of ma∣king many Bookes (saith* 1.17 Salomon) there is no end; and much study is a wearinesse of the flesh The more Knowledge we get, the greater capacity wee leave unsatisfied; so that we can never seize upon the in∣tire possession of our owne selves: and contempla∣tion (as the wise King speaketh) were vanity, did we use the pleasures of it any otherwise, thā as pledges or earnest of a better life to come. And albeit man, in this life, could possesse himselfe as intirely as the Angels doe their Angelicall Natures, yet could not his entitative goodnesse or felicity, be so great as theirs is; because the proper patrimony which he possesseth, is neither so ample nor so fruitfull. God alone is infinite, in being infinitely perfect; and he alone, infinitely enjoyes his intire being, or perfection. The tenure of his infinite joy or hap∣pinesse, is infinitely firme, infinitely secured of be∣ing alway what it is; never wanting so much as a moment of time, to inlarge or perfect it by conti∣nuance, uncapable of any inlargement or increase for the present. But this entitative or transcenden∣tall goodnesse, is not that which wee now seeke; whereto notwithstanding it may lead us. For even amongst visible creatures, the better every one is

in its kind, or according to its entitative perfection, the more good it doth to others. The truest mea∣sure of their internall or proper excellencies, is their beneficial use or service in this great Vniverse, whereof they are parts. What Creature is there almost in this whole visible Sphere, but specially in this inferiour part, which is not beholden to the Sunne; from whose comfortable heat, Nothing (as the* 1.18 Psalmist speakes) can bee hid? It is, at least of livelesse or meere bodies, in it selfe, the best and fai∣rest; and farre the best to others. And God (as it seemes) for this purpose, sends forth this his most conspicuous and goodly messenger, every morning like a bridegroome bedeckt with light and come∣linesse, to invite our eyes to looke up unto the Hils whence commeth our Helpe: upon whose tops he hath pitched his glorious Throne, at whose right hand is fulnesse of pleasures everlasting. And from the boundlesse Ocean of his internall or transcen∣dent joy and happinesse, sweet streames of perpetu∣all joy and comfort, more uncessantly issue, than light from the Sunne, to refresh this vale of misery. That of men the chiefe inhabitants of this great Vale, many are not so happy as they might be, the chiefe causes are; that, either they doe not firmely beleeve the internall happinesse of their Creator, to be absolutely infinite, as his other attributes are; or else consider not in their harts, that the absolute in∣finitie of this his internall happinesse, is an essentiall cause of goodnesse (in it kinde, infinite) unto all o∣thers, so farre as they are capable of it; and capable of it all reasonable creatures, by creation, are: none

but themselves can make them uncapable of happi∣nesse, at least, in succession or duration, infinite. Goodnesse is the nature of God; and it is the nature of goodnesse to communicate it selfe unto others, un∣to all that are not over growne with evill: of which goodnesse it selfe can be no cause or author.

CHAP. 12.

Of the infinitie and immutability of Divine goodness communicative, or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature.

1 THe father of Epicures, wil have more than his sonnes, to con∣sent with him, that imbecili∣ty and indigence, are the usu∣all parents of Pitie, Bountie, Kindnesse, or other like bran∣ches of communicative hu∣mane goodness. Whilest we ned not others helpe, we little think in what need they stand of ours. The Prince in his jollity, can hardly compassionate the beggers misery: nor knowes the Begger how to bemone decayed Nobles: whose condition is more miserable than his owne, though so it seemes not unto him; who would thinke he had fully conque∣red want, were hee but furnished with such sup∣plies of meat, drinke, and clothing, as these have alwayes ready at hand. That sympathy, which in livelesse or reasonlesse creatures, naturally flowes from similitude of internal qualities, seldome breaks

forth in men; but either from experimentall re∣membrance of what lately hath, or from apprehen∣sion of what shortly may befall themselves: sight of the like afflictions in others, as wee have lately felt, revives the phantasmes or affections which were companions of our mourning; and by so pity∣ing of our owne former plight, we pity them.

2 But albeit Epicurus observation may seeme in a manner universall, whilest applyed to its proper subject, Man in his corrupt state; yet when he tran∣scends à genere ad genus, from our corruptible na∣ture to the divine nature, which is immortall; his inference is of the same stampe with those fooles inductions, that concluded in their hearts, There was no God. The divine nature (saith he) is not pene∣trable by mercy or pity: Why so? Will you heare a bruit make Enthymems? Because these finde no entrance into the hearts of men, but through some breach of defect or indigence. It is well this slow∣bellyed evill beast, could grant mans nature not to bee altogether so bad or cruell, as want might not tame it, and make it gentle and kinde. But would not bruit qeasts, so they might speake, disclaime his conclusion; that true felicity, or fulnesse of all con∣tentment possible, should make the divine nature worse, than want and misery doth the humane? Surely, there is somewhat else amisse in that, which is made better by defect. Nor could wealth and ho∣nour make the mighty unmindefull of others, but by making them first forget themselves. The ex∣ternalls whereon our desires fasten, so captivate the humane soule, that she cannot doe as she would, or

as nature teacheth her; but these strings being cut, she followes her native sway. And in a good sense it was most true, which a Master of a better sect, than Epicurus founded, hath taught; Nemo sponte malus.

3 Lust in old Age, Pride in Beggars, and shift∣ing in men overflowing with wealth, seeme to tran∣scend the nature of sinnes, and are monsters in cor∣rupted nature; because, not begotten by temptati∣ons, they in a manner beget themselves: yet scarce shall we finde an old man so prone to Lust, a rich man so delighted in shuffling, an Epicure so addic∣ted to his pleasure, or any at all so ill affected either in himselfe or towards other; that being askt, wold not professe his desire to deserve well of others, to be liberall, to be upright, compassionate, just and bountifull. For though continuāce in bad custome, induce in a sort, another nature; yet can it not trans∣port any man so farre beyond himselfe, or miscarry his thoughts so much, but he shall feele some secret impulsions unto goodnesse, and some retractions from evill. But as* 1.19 Seneca well observes, It is no

marvaile that we do not amend what we know to be a∣misse in ourselves; seeing errors in every other mystery or profession, make the professor ashamed: Onely such as erre in matter of life & manners are delighted with their errours. The Mariner takes no delight to see his vessell overturned, nor the Physitian in sending his Patient before his time unto his grave. The Oratour rejoyceth not when his Clyent is through his errour overthrowne. Contrariwise, every criminous person is delighted with his crime. One solaceth himselfe in Adultery, and taketh courage to prosecute his desires from the very difficulty of accomplishing thē. Another delights in over-reaching others, and in theft; never displeased with his faultinesse, untill it prove unfortu∣nate. All are apt to dissemble their faults, being con∣tent when they fall out fortunately, to reape the fruit of them, whilest they subduct the faults of them; but, a good conscience delighteth to set it selfe forth and to have notice taken of it, whereas naughtinesse is afraid of darknesse it selfe. And as Epicurus elegantly saith, A malefactor may have the hap, but not the assu∣rance to be undiscovered. But (as this Author re∣plyes) what availes it him not to have his naughti∣nesse discovered, without hope or assurance that it shall not be discovered. His conclusion is, Naughtines may be safe, but it can never be secure.

4 The reason why their naughtinesse an never be warranted with security, is; because conscience in men most vicious, still beares evidence against them, that they live not as shee would have them. For (as Seneca in the same place well observes) though bad custome may worke a delight in naughti∣nesse,

yet even in minds drencht in the very dreggs of filthinesse, there still remaines a sense of goodnesse: nor is it so much our want of knowledge, as of our right estimate of what we know to be nought, which maketh naughtinesse to be so little abhorred. The minde of man, in that it is indued with reason, hath the rules of Equity imprinted in it; which it alwaies seekes to instampe upon the inferior faculties of the soule. But this divine light of reason, hath as small force to kindle the love of vertue in hearts overgrowne with sensuall desires, as the Sunne in a mist, hath to set moist stuffe on fire. The unsetled affections of youth, somtimes admit the impression of these ide∣all characters, in actuall retired speculations; so will the water take the same shape from the seale, which the waxe doth, but hold it no longer than the seale is held upon it. The heart, which maturity of years hath hardened with vast desires, will as hardly bee wrought into a new forme, as the stone, which can∣not take any other shape, but only by losing some of its masse or substance; yet if those vast desires be cut off, or their hopes of supplyes from externalls in∣terecepted; the soule, thus freed, becomes more fa∣shionable unto reason. Affability, which is as the superficiall draught of reason indeavouring to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse; is as naturall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Epicure, as to another man, so long as the exercise of it is not prejudiciall to his belly. And the less his desires were to satisfie it, the larger would the extension of his bowels of compassion be towards his brethren, or poore neighbours; some drops of kindnesse may distill from him in the over∣flow

of plentie or store sufficient to feed both eye and appetite. But in the daies of scarcity, he suckes in cruelty as wine, and feedes upon the needy as up∣on delicates: Were there no more sweet morsels in the market then would serve one man; not one of this crew, but would cut them out of his Fathers throat, rather than suffer his owne weasand to bee defeated of its intemperate expectations. Indi∣gence then, though Epicurus could not see so much, is, upon different occasions, the mother as well of cruelty and oppression, as of bounty or pitty.

2 From doing to all, as we would be done unto by any, nothing doth hinder us so much (if ought befides doe hinder us at all) as our conceipted or opinative want of somewhat, which either for the present we doe, or hereafter may stand in need off, for satisfying the variety or unconstant longings of our unknowne desires. How well soever they may speake or protest, experience schooles us; not to trust any that fixe their expectations upon great matters, or have one eye alwayes upon their pri∣vate ends, but with this limitation; if the premisses they now make shal not crosse their opportunities, when matters come to tryall. But if wee know a man of meanes, more than competent for maintai∣ning that estate wherein his constant resolution hath pitcht content, one otherwise of tempe∣rate desires, and composed affections, able to discerne what is fitting betwixt man and man; we thinke him a fit rule for directing others, a patterne whereto would all conforme themselves, nothing

should goe amisse in Church or Common weale. No man that conceives his owne cause to bee just and good, but would commend it to his arbi••re∣ment before anothers. For▪ internall moderation mixt with outward competency, is the onely sup∣porter of true constancy. Yet cannot this mixture, in any created Essence bee so firme or permanent, but possibilities or opportunities of satisfying some internall latent capacities, by externall proffers, may dissolve it. For finite existence hath possibi∣lity of nonexistence to controll it, and possibility of nonexistence includes possibility of being other∣wise than it is. And therefore it is never impossi∣ble to finite being either to lose it selfe, or change his properties. A more particular root of this con∣tingency, or unconstancy in reasonable creatures or intelligent, is the infinite capacity of their conceits or desires; within whose compasse their finite mo∣tions may become excentricke and irregular, as it were a starre fixed in too wide a sphere. The desires of collapsed Angells, were once tuned by their Creator in as perfect harmony as any creatures could be: They had all cōpetency that could be de∣sired, whether of internall faculties, or of objects to cōtent thē. Howbeit, whilst the chiefe Ringleader of this rebellious Rout, sought to satisfie this infi∣nitie of his desire; not by participation of his joy∣full presence, who was infinitely good; but by af∣fecting that greatnesse and Majesty infinite, which he was enabled to conceive, but whereof his nature was more uncaple than a whirry of an Argoes-eyes saile; his capacities did overcope. And his in∣temperate

longings, while he was in travell of this prodigious birth, hath imprinted that vgly shape upon him, which now he beares. Hee is become the monstrous brood of his owne monstrous and deformed desires; his mouth opening too wide to swallow that which is incomprehensible, could ne∣ver since be shut; his ravenous appetite cannot bee satisfied. Like the grave he feedes on rottennesse, and by continuall gnawing and devouring that which cannot satiate, he continually encreaseth his unquenchable hunger. His will is wedded unto mischiefe, and affecteth nothing but that which is by nature evill; & amongst evills that most greedily and uncessantly, which is most contrary to infinite goodness. The first man by this monsters impulsi∣on, reaching too high for that which hee could not compasse, did put himselfe from off the ap∣pointed Center of his rest and revolutions; and since continueth irregular and unconstant in all his motions, thoughts, and actions. In him, in our selves, in the whole nature (besides that part which hath firme union with the infinite Es∣sence) wee finde the Maxime infallibly verified, Mota facilius moventur. By our first Parents needlesse yeelding to one temptation, wee are not able to resist any; Our resolutions to follow that which wee acknowledge to bee good, or our ad∣haerence unto that infinite goodness, from which he divorced his will; can neuer in this life bee so firme and strong, but the allurements to contrary evills, may bee so great or so cunningly proposed by the great Tempter, that, without especiall grace

we cannot resist their attractions. Since our inter∣nall harmonie betwixt soule and body; and mutu∣all correspondency of each faculty with other, was dissolved, no externalls can consort with us. Iust competency seemes too little, all of us being as easily led by abundance, as driven by want, to doe evill. And, which is worst of all, our earnest attempts to doe that which is good and right, drawes iniquity after them; and whiles wee take too hastie, or unweildy ayme at our owne welfare, others harmes fall under our levell.

6 That which most improoveth the force of temptations, whether suggested by want or indigence, or by other occasions or opportu∣nities; is the inequalitie, partly of our naturall propensions, partly of meanes which minister their severall contentments or annoyances. Wealth, in some men, gets the start of Wit, and overswayes them (otherwise not much mis-in∣clined) unto such vanities, as usually are neither bredd nor nursed, but by abundance. Others wits over-reach their revenues; and imboldens them to stretch their projects or inventions be∣yond the rules of right and equity. Some mens bodies overgrow their soules; and these are easily impelled to act any boysterous mis∣chiefe: Others being impotent of bodie, strive so much the more to furnish their mindes with subtill inventions or commodious expe∣rience: and by making too much use of the com∣mon Proverbe, [Hee that is weake had need to bee wilie,] are easily tempted to practise un∣lawfull

policie, with delight; as the onely preser∣vative against contempt, or as an instrument of revenge upon such as they hate or feare. And it would goe much against the course of com∣mon experience, if that wilinesse which hath weaknesse for its foundation, should not be of∣ten enforced to cover or shelter it selfe with craft and fraud. To love our owne wills, is an im∣potency naturall unto all. And wee love them the better, at least more strongly, when we per∣ceive them set on that which in it selfe is good. Whence it is that our desires of doing many things which are good and commendable, often draw us to use meanes not so commendable, for their accomplishment. Many, out of an extraordina∣rie good will unto the poore, thinke it no robbery to cozen the rich; or to dispense with publike Lawes, for gratifying some private friend, whose welfare in conscience they are bound to tender. Vnto these, and many like enormities, the infinite Capacity of finite Existence gave first possibility of being, and the inequality of our internall pro∣pensions, which can never fitly match or hold just proportion with externall occurrences, gives life and improvement.

7 But in the incomprehensible Sphere, which hath Vbiquity for its Center, and Omnipotency for its Axis; whose numberlesse lines are all pos∣sible perfections, measurelesse; there is no place for exorbitancie. One branch of Being, cannot mis-sway or over-toppe another; all being so great and firme, as none can bee greater or

firmer; being not united, but possessed in such per∣fect unity, as prevents all possibility of distraction or division. Shall wee say then, hee possesseth all things that possibly he can desire to have? Or ra∣ther, he alwayes infinitely is, without all possibili∣ty of not being, whatsoever possibly can be. And though being infinite, he can doe all things; yet can he not desire to perfect himselfe, or to be greater or better than he is. In that he neither can feare the impayrement, nor wish the inlargement of his own estate; all outward imployments of his power are for the good of his creatures. His will to have them when they were not, was but the influence or working of his essentiall goodnesse; which is so a∣bundantly sufficient to his infinite being, that the overflowing of it is the fountaine of all things be∣sides, which are good. Nothing besides him could possibly have beene, unlesse he were in power and in being, infinite. And unlesse his infinite being had beene infinitely good, nothing besides him, should actually have beene, or beene indowed with such being, as all things that actually are, have from him. The proper being of every thing, which actually is, or at least the continuance or amendment of such being, is infinitely desired by all, as being the stamp or impression of his infinite goodnesse, which is a∣like truly, though not equally, or in the same mea∣sure communicated to all things that are. The Entity of every thing is good to it selfe, and most desired.

8 And though these first assurances of his good∣nesse and loving kindnesse, be usually requited on

mans part with unkindnesse and despight: yet the greatnesse of his Majesty, never swayes him to sud∣den revenge. Quite contrary to the corrupt nature of man, (whose goodnesse usually is ill-thriven by his over-growing greatnes:) the unresistible strength of his Almighty power, is the unmovable pillar of moderation and mercifull forbearance. The grea∣test potency of man being but finite, the higher it growes, the apter it is to be overtopt with jealous impotency. The greatest Monarch that is, may be prevented by others, (of whose power he is jea∣lous) in the exercise of his power or authority o∣ver him; unlesse he carefully watch his time, and fit seasons, or take opportunity when it is offered, for accomplishing his projects. But of God, saith the Wiseman, Wisd. 12. 18. Thou mustring thy power judgest with equity, and orderest, or governest us with great favour; for thou maist use power when thou wilt. And his will is to use it, when men will not beleeve that he is of full power to doe what hee will; as the same Wiseman expresseth, vers. 17. But more full unto our present purpose, are the sayings of the same Wiseman, vers. 15, 16. For so much then as thou art righteous thy selfe, thou orderest all things righteously; thinking it not agreeable with thy power to condemne him that hath not deserved to be punished. For thy power is the beginning of righteousnesse, and because thou art the Lord of all, it maketh thee to be gracious to all. Though this Author be not, yet this passage in him, is canonicall, and fully consonant to Gods owne words to Ionah, Chap. 4. 10, 11. Then said the Lord, thou hast had pitie on the Gourd, for the which

thou hast not labored, neither madest it to grow, which came up in a night, and perished in a night: And should not I spare Nineveh that great City, wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons, that cannot discerne between their right hand and their left hand, and also much cattle? Amongst great men▪ many oppresse their tenants: but what Lord would spoile his proper inheritance, whereto no other can be in∣tituled; or eate out the heart of that ground which hee cannot alienate or demise? What Architect would deface his owne worke, unlesse the image of his unskilfulnesse (whereof the Creator cannot bee impeached) be so apparant in it, as he cannot but blush to behold it? Or who would leave a goodly foundation bare or naked, unlesse he be unable to reare it up without injustice? Now seeing the En∣titative Good of proper being, is the foundation of that true happinesse which flowes from more spe∣ciall participation of Gods presence; wheresoever he hath laid the one, it is to all that rightly consider his Wisedome, Truth, and Goodnesse, an assured pledge of his will and pleasure to finish it with the other. As his nature is immutable, so are his gifts without repentance. The current of his joyfull be∣neficence, can admit no intermission, much lesse admixture of any evill. Sorrow, woe, and misery, must seeke some other Originall; they have no hid∣den vent, or secret issue from the Ocean of Ioy and Happinesse.

9 As the fountaine of bodily light cannot send forth darknesse, but uniformly diffuseth light; and light onely throughout this visible Sphere: so can∣not

the infinite Ocean of true felicity, send forth a∣ny influence, but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse; wherewith every creature capable of them, was sowne in its first creation. And, as it is the property of light propagated or diffused from the Sunne, to make such bodies as are capable of its penetration (as Glasses, Chrystall, Pearle, &c.) secondary fountains of light to others: so doth the influence of divine goodnesse, inspire all that are conformable to his will, with desire of doing to others as he hath done to them; that is, of being secondary authors or instruments of good to all. But such as wilfully strive against the streame of his over-flowing goodnesse, or boysterously coun∣terblast the sweet and placide spirations of celesti∣all influence, become creators of their owne woe, and raise unto themselves those stormes wherein they perish. Yet so essentiall it is unto this infinite Fountaine of goodnesse, however provoked, to send forth onely streames of life; and such is the vertue of the streames which issue from him, that as well the evill and miseries which miscreants pro∣cure unto themselves, as their mischievous intenti∣ons towards others, infallibly occasion increase of joy and happinesse unto all that give free passage unto their current. And this current of life, which issueth from this infinite Ocean, never dryes up, is never wasted by diffusion: The more it is dammed or quarved by opposition of the sonnes of darke∣nesse, the more plentifully it overflowes the sonnes of light. All the good which one refuseth or put∣teth from thē, returnes in full measure to the other.

But if the miseries which wicked spirits, or their conforts, either suffer themselves, or intend to others, worke good to those that receive the in∣fluence of infinite goodnesse; might he not with∣out prejudice, or imputation, inspire these cast∣awayes with such mischievous thoughts, or at least intend their woe and misery, as these are occasions or meanes of others happinesse, or of his glory? Wee are indeed forbid to doe evill that good may ensue; but if it bee his will to have reprobates doe or suffer evill for the good of his chosen, shall not both bee good, as willed by him, whose will (in that hee hath absolute dominion over all his creatures) is the rule of goodnesse?

CHAP. 13.

In what sense, or how Gods infinite will is said to be the rule of goodnesse.

1 BAd was the doctrine, and worse the application or use,* 1.20 which Anaxarchus would have ga∣thered from some Hierogly∣phicall devices of Antiquity; wherein Iustice was painted as Iupiters assistant in his Re∣giment. Hereby, saith this Sophister unto Alex∣ander, (then bitterly lamenting the death of his dea∣rest Friend Clytus, whom he had newly slaine in his temelent rage) your Majesty is given to understād, that the decrees of great Monarchs, who are a kinde of Gods on earth, must bee reputed Oracles of Iustice, and their practices may not bee reputed unjust either by themselves, or by others. But this sophisticall inversion of these Ancients meaning, was too palpable to please either the wiser or ho∣nester sort of Heathen, though living in those cor∣rupt times. For albeit many of them conceived of Iupiter, as of a great King, subject to rage and passi∣on, yet all of them held Iustice for an upright, milde and vertuous Lady; ready alwayes to mitigate, ne∣ver

to ratifie his rigorous decrees; alwayes tempe∣ring his wrath with equity. The true Iehovah, as he needes no sweet-tongued consort to moderate his anger, as Abigail did Davids; so hath he no use of such Sophisters as Anaxarchus, to justifie the e∣quity of his decrees, by his Omnipotent Soveraign∣ty or absolute dominion over all his creatures.

2 To derogate ought from his power, who is able to destroy both soule and body in hell fire, I know is dangerous; & to compare the prerogatives of most absolute earthly Princes with his, would be more odious. Yet this comparison I may safely make:* 1.21 He doth not more infinitely exceed the most impotent wretch on earth in power and great∣nesse, than he doth the greatest Monarch the world hath, or ever had, in Mercy, Iustice, and Loving-kindnesse; nor is his will the rule of Goodnesse, be∣cause the designes thereof are backt by infinite po∣wer; but because holines doth so rule his power, and moderate his will, that the one cannot enjoyne, or the other exact any thing not most consonant to the eternall or abstract patternes of equity. His will revealed doth sufficiently warrant all our actions, because we know, that he wils nothing but what is just and good; but this no way hindereth, but rather supposeth Iustice and Goodnesse to be more essen∣tiall objects of his will, than they are of ours. And therefore when it is said [Things are good because God wils them] this illative infers only the cause of our knowledge, not of the goodness w^ch we know: and the logicall resolution of this vulgar Dialect, would be this, We know this or that to be good, because

Gods will revealed commends it for such. But his will revealed commends it for such, because it was in it nature good; for unlesse such it had bin, he had not willed it. These principles though unquestionable to such as fetch their Divinity from the Fountaine, will perhaps in the judgement of others that never taste it but in trenches, be liable to these exceptiōs.

3 If the goodnesse of every thing presuppose its being, & nothing can be without Gods wil, what cā be good (we speake in order of nature, not of time) before God wills it? Of being or goodnesse actu∣ally existent in any creature, it is most true, neither can be without some precedent Act of Gods will. But as there is a logicall possibility presupposed to the working of the Almighty power: so is there a goodnesse objective precedent in order of nature, to the Act or exercise of his will. And unto some things considered as logically possible; this goodnesse objective is so essentially annexed; that if it bee his will to give them actuall being, they must of neces∣sity be actually good; nor can hee that can doe all things, will their contraries. Hee might, had it pleased him, have taken life and existence from all mankind, when he preserved Noah and his Familie. But to reserve them men, and no reasonable crea∣tures, was no object of power omnipotent; much lesse doth his omnipotency enable him to worke ought contradictory to his owne nature or essenti∣all goodnesse. As is the man, so is his strength, and as is the nature of the willer, such are the objects of his will. Simile gaudet simili. To long after such meats as feed diseasefull humors, is naturall to eve∣ry

disease. And our nature being corrupted, whets our appetites to such things as are agreeable to the praedominant corruption wherewith it is tainted, not to the purity wherein it was created. To will onely that which is consonant to his nature, is so much more essentiall to God, than unto us, by how much his nature is more simple than ours is. And seeing it is essentiall purity, altogether uncapable of corruption, his will cannot pitch but on that which is pure and holy. Whence the prime rule of all goodnesse, without himselfe, is consonancy to his essentiall purity and Iustice. For as much as thou art righteous thy selfe thou orderest all things righteously, thinking it not agreeable to thy power to condemne him that hath not deserved to bee punished. Wisedome 12. 15. He loveth truth and sincere dea∣ling, because he himselfe is true and just. That ve∣racity which is coeternall to his Essence, includes an everlasting enmity unto treachery, fraud, and perjury; his immortally spotlesse and unchangea∣ble purity, cannot approve of lust and intemperan∣cy, or condemne chastity in any person, at any time. Nor could he have given a Law, as some lawlesse Lawgivers have done, for the authorizing of pro∣miscuous or preposterous lust. To legitimate vio∣lence, or entitle oppression unto the inheritance be∣queath••d to conscionable and upright dealing, is without the prerogative of omnipotency; it can∣not be ratified by any Parliament of the Trinitie blest for ever. The practise, or countenance of these and the like, are evill; not in us onely, to whom they are forbidden; but so evill in themselves, that

the Almighty could not but forbid and condemne thē, as profest enemies to his most sacred Majesty.

4 To square great mens actions to the dictates of reason or nature, given in their good dayes, or to bring their wills within compasse of any con∣stant Law; seemes greater violence, than if we should seeke to fashion their bodies by handsome well proportioned garments, but much too strait. And yet we see by daily experience, that such as are most impatient of regulation or restraint, are most importunate to have their owne unruly wills, the rules of their inferiours minds and consciences. To doe otherwise than they would have them, though they alleage the dictates both of reason and Gods word, will admit no appeale from the censure of peevishnesse or perversenesse. But for them to set constant patternes of that morality or good beha∣viour, whose defects in inferiours they either pu∣nish or make advantage of; is reputed a kinde of Pedantisme, or Mechanicall servitude. To request such performances, seemes as harsh, as if we should intreat them to set us copies, or songs, or take pains in teaching us some honest trade. And seeing infe∣riours are secretly blinded with this pride of heart; which breakes forth more violently in superiours; most of both rankes, measure Gods will by their owne. But if wee will condemne this impatience of restraint, as a fault in our selves, we must of neces∣sity acquit the Almighty from the like. The infi∣nite greatnesse of his Majesty, cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of Righteousnesse as he sets us to follow. That inte∣grity

wherewith our first nature was cloathed, was but the Image of his Holinesse. And hee that requires us to be holy, as He is holy, or perfect as our Heavenly Father is perfect; exacts not of us, that wee should be as holy and perfect as Hee is, in any point of his imitable perfections. Every part of that ho∣linesse which becommeth Saints, is in the best of them, but as the materiall forme in an house built of untowardly stuffe, by unskilfull hands: but in Him, according to the exactest Mathematicall or I∣daeall forme, that the cunningest Architect hath in his head. The best examples of goodnesse, we can conceive, are but as dead pictures of those everli∣ving ones, which He expresseth in his workes. All his decrees concerning man, are not in themselves onely, but to mans eyes that looke not on them a squint, so straight and just, that hee will referre the tryall unto the deliberate and sober thoughts of his Enemies. Is not my way equall? Are not your waies unequall? Ezek. 18. 25.

5 This may instruct us, that those patternes of Holinesse or perfections which wee are bound to imitate in Him, are not to be taken from his bare Commandement, or revelation of his will, but from the objects of his will revealed, or from the eternall practices which hee hath exhibited; as so many expresse or manifest proofes, that his will is alwayes Holy and Iust: albeit wee cannot alwaies so expressely discerne the manner how it is just and holy in some particular Commandements; but must implicitely beleeve it to bee such in them, be∣cause it is so eminently and apparantly holy and

just in those perfections, whereof our generall du∣ties are the imperfect representations. Of all his morall commandements, not one there is, whose sincere practise doth not in part make vs truely like him; & we are bound to be conformable to his will revealed, that we may be cōformable to his nature; without conformity wherevnto, we cannot parti∣cipate of his happinesse; For, Happinesse is the immediate consequent of his nature. The antece∣dent of Lactantius Argument. [Qui nos irasci jubet, is uti{que} irascitur,] .i. He that biddeth us be angry, is certainly angry himselfe,] is not so certaine or au∣thentique, and the inference is somewhat doubtfull. But out of all question, he that bids us unfaignedly blesse our persecutors, doth unfaignedly tender his blessings to such as persecute Him in his members. He that seriously exhorts us to bee mercifull and kind to all, sheweth kindnesse to the most unkinde. That charity which hee hath injoyned every man towards all (his greatest enemies not excepted) though we consider it in the most charitably mind∣ed Martyrs, in whose death it seemed to shine, were but as weake sparkles, or vanishing smoak, of those infinite and eternall flames of love, which burst out in him toward such, as have deserved worse at his hands, than any Tyrant of his tormented servants. That truth and fidelity, which he exacts of us, the faithfulnesse of Abraham himselfe; is but a little mappe, or narrow surface of that infinite soliditie of truth, whereon his promises are founded. Betweene the chastity and temperance of purest virgins, and his eternall purity, there is the like true correspon∣dency;

but not so great, as there is betwixt the dross and corpulency, and the refined or sublima∣ted spirits of the same bodies. Or could that rule which is the fulfilling of the whole Law & the Pro∣phets, Doe unto every man as we would be done unto; be exactly fulfilled by us; it would be but a slender, though a true modell or representation of his eter∣nall equity. He that honoureth me, him will I honor. For in this, and the like, he expects no more than the inward affection of mortall hearts, or prayses of man whose breath is in his nostrils, being ready out of his goodnesse, to recompence these silly services, with glory, love and happiness everlasting. But doth he intend thus well to all, or destruction unto some, as it is a meanes of blisse to those whom he loves? If so he did, we might be exempt from that negative precept, of not doing evill that good might ensue. For the only reason why we are boūd not to doe so, is because in so doing we should be∣come unlike our heavenly Father, and not be perfect as he is perfect. But as he turnes the voluntary evils of some, to the good of others; so may wee, and ought to consecrate such forfeitures, as legally fall into our hands to pious uses; or better the states of such as tender publike welfare, by others deserved harmes.

6 Be it then granted, (which is the root of all objections against these resolutions) that Gods glo∣ry must as well appeare in the punishment of the Reprobate, as in the beatifying of the Elect; the consequence will bee quite contrary to that which their objections would hence inferre; For, if the

foundation of Gods glory, bee as sure in the one case, as in the other; the manner of his dealing with both must be alike perfect, and alike behove∣full for us to follow. Sine bonitate (saith Seneca) nulla majestas, Goodnesse is the foundation of glory. Now, were it true, that he did intend evill to some, before they had committed any (though not as evill to them, but as a meanes of others good) or absolutely ordained them to eternall inevitable mi∣sery, for the advancement of his owne glory; wee should not sinne, but rather imitate the perfection of our heavenly Father, in robbing Iudas to pay Peter, or in feeding the hungry, such especially as be of the houshold of Faith, with the spoiles of ungodly rich men, or unbeleevers. More war∣rantable it were to guesse at the perfection of his Iustice towards the wicked, and of his bounty to∣wards the godly, by the commendable shadow or imitatiō of it in earthly gods. To procure the com∣mon good without intention of harme to any, and with admission of as few private mischiefes as may be, is the chiefe praise of great States-men. And it is the glory of Princes, to encourage all men unto vertuous courses by good example, gratious ex∣hortations, and unpartiall distribution of publike honors or commodities: and yet withall to inflict disgrace upon haughty contemners of those graci∣ous allurements; and to bee sterne in execution of Iustice (without fauour) upon notorious trans∣gressors of wholesome Lawes. Yet not to use severity without sorrow, nor draw blood but by way of medicine; for preserving of their

Crownes and dignities, for maintenance of publike peace, or for preventing the like diseases in other particular members of the same body. Magistrates that would mind these matters, more than raysing themselves, their friends, or posterity, more than life it selfe, which they owe unto their Countrey; should exhibite us a true model, though (God wot) but a slender one of our heavenly Fathers wisdome and loving kindnesse: first in drawing men to re∣pentance, by gratious promises, and unfaigned pro∣posalls of inestimable rewards for their service: Secondly, in making the wicked and obstinate de∣spisers of his infinite goodnesse, serve to the mani∣festation of his endlesse glory, and confirmation of those that love him in the immortal state of happi∣nesse. These prints of his Fatherly care and Iustice, are yet fresh to bee seene in his proceedings with ungratious Cain. And the Lord said unto Cain, why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen? if thou doe well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou dost not well, sinne lyeth at the doore: And unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him, Gen. 4. ver. 6, 7. Severe punishment for doing evill, with∣out precedent loving instructions, or good encou∣ragement to doe well, is the naturall off-spring of unnaturalnesse. It beares no shadow of that justice or equity, whose glorious patterne shines most brightly in our heavenly Father.

CHAP. 14.

Of God infinite love to mankinde.

1 IF the Apostles authority could not perswade us to beleeve, his reasons would inforce us to grant, that the issues of blessing and cursing from one and the same mouth, are contrary to the course of na∣ture, and argue the nature of man, (in whom alone this discord is found) to be much out of tune. Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing, my brethren, these things ought not so to be. Iam. 3. 10. For nature in other things gives you a better example. Doth a fountaine send forth at the same place, sweet water and bitter? Can the Figtree, my brethren, beare Olive berries? either a Vine figs? &c. These and the like fountaines of naturall truth, are as open to us, as they were to him, and wee should much wrong both this Ambassador of Christ, and Gods image in our selves, if we did beleeve them only for his authority, and not for their owne native perspi∣cuity. The best use of Apostolique••authority, in these allegations, is to warrant our use of the like, though in matters divine: not one of his instances but holds as truly in God, as in man; not one but receiveth a necessary increase of strength, from the indivisible unity of the divine Essence. For a Fig-tree to beare Olive berries, is lesse impossible, than for the tree of life to bring forth death. To cause

the Vine bring forth Figs, were not so hard a point of husbandry, as to derive cursednesse or misery from the fountaine of blisse. For a Spring to send forth water sweet and bitter, fresh and salt, at one and the same place, is more compatible with any reasonable conceipt, than for hate or harmefull in∣tentions to have any issue from pure love. But God is love: yea, love is his Essence as Creator. In that he is the Author of being, hee is the Author of good∣nesse to all things that are, (Being, unto every thing in its owne proper being, is good) and goodnesse in an intelligent Don••r, is alwayes the fruit of Love. Hence saith the Wiseman, of him that is wisest of all, of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived: He hateth nothing that he hath made. For even their being, and that goodnesse which accompanies it, is an undoubted pledge of his love. If to blesse God the maker, and to curse men which are made after his similitude, argue (in the Apostles supposall) a dissolution of that internall harmony, which should be in the humane nature: to hate some, and love o∣thers of his best creatures, all being made after his owne image; would necessarily infer a greater di∣straction in the indivisible Essence, besides the con∣tradiction which it implyes to infinite goodnes. To love the workes of his owne hands, is more essenti∣all to him, that made all things out of meere love, than it is unto the fire to burn matter combustible: and if his love be, as he is, truly infinite, it must ex∣tend to all, seeing all are lesse than infinite.

2 Love, were it perfect in us, would perfectly fulfill Gods Law, and make up a compleate body

or System of morall goodnes. Now the most abso∣lute perfection of that love, whereof the humane nature (though uncorrupted) could bee capable, would be but an imperfect shadow of our heavenly Fathers most perfect love; which hath the same proportion to his goodnesse, that love in us (were it as perfect as it possibly might bee) should have to our morall goodnesse. That is, it is his compleat communicative goodnes. And though these two in him bee rather different names, than divers attri∣butes, yet wee love his goodnes better, whiles it is attired with the name of Love. For, of men that doe us equall good turnes, we love them best, whom we conceive to love us most: and loving kindnesse seemes good and lovely, even in the eyes of such as reape no profit from it, besides the sight of it. The very exercise of it in others, excites our weake in∣clinations to the like: and our inclinations moved, stir up a speculative assent or secret verdict of con∣science, to approve that truth which wee cannot follow in the practice: Beatius est dare, quam acci∣pere: It is a more blessed thing to give, than to receive. No man measureth that which wee call a good na∣ture (as of men some are better natured than others) either by the means it hath to benefit, or by the be∣nefits bestowed; but by the fervency of unfaigned good will, and hearty desires of doing good to all. This is that wherein (especially when it is holpen by grace) we most resemble the divine nature, which is infinitely better than the humane nature (though ta∣kē at the best) not only in respect of his ability to do good, but of his good wil to do the best that may be.

And this his good will exceeds ours, not intensively only, but extensively. For we are bound to imitate him as well in the extension of our unfaigned good will towards all, as in the fervency of our desires to do the best good we can to some, because his loving kindnes to man is both waies infinitly perfect, Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wise∣dome, nor the strong man glory in his strength, neither the rich man glory in his riches: But let him that glo∣rieth, glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth me; that I am the Lord which exercise loving kindnes, judgement, and righteousnesse in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord. Ier. 9. 23, 24. The first then & most native issue of infinite good∣nesse, is the exercise of bounty or loving kindnesse, which floweth from it, without matter or motive to incite it. This is that which gave being, and with being, some portion of goodnesse unto all things that are; it alters the name, but not the nature in the current. To prevent others with good turnes be∣fore they can expect or deserve them, is the highest point of bounty, whereto the ability of man can reach. But God gave vs that we most desire, pro∣per being, with the appurtenances, before we could desire it; for it is the foundation of all desire. From Bounty or loving kindnesse, or from that Good∣nesse whence they spring, Mercy and Compassion differ only in the extrinsecall denomination taken from different objects. Compassion is good will to∣wards others, provoked from notice of their mise∣rie: and Mercy is but an excesse of Bounty, not e∣stranged from ill deservers, in distresse; so long as

the exercise of it breedes no harme to such as are more capable of bountifull love and favour. This incompossibility betweene the exercise of Mercy and bounty towards particulars ill deserving, and the preservation of common good, occasioneth the interposition of Iustice punitive; whose exercise is in a sort, unnaturall to the Father of mercy. For he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. Lamen. 3. 33. Nothing in good men can pro∣voke it towards offenders, but the good of others deserving either better or not so ill, which might grow worse by evill doers impunity. To take plea∣sure in the paine or torture of notorious malefac∣tors, is a note of inhumanity: their just punishment is onely so farre justly pleasant, as it procures either our owne, or others welfare; or avoydance of those grievances, which they more justly suffer, than wee or others of the same societie, should doe. The more kind and loving men by nature are, the more unwilling they are to punish, unlesse it be for these respects. How greatly then doth it goe against his nature, who is loving kindnesse it selfe, to punish the workes of his owne hands; Man especially, who is more deare unto him, than any child can be unto his Father, for hee is the Father of all mankind? For it is he that made us, and not we our selves; not those whom we call Fathers of our flesh, for even they likewise were made by Him. Hence he saith, Call no mā Father on earth, for one is your Father w^ch is in Heaven, Mat. 23. ver. 9. Is the title his pecu∣liar, more than the realty answering to it? Is he more willing to bee called the onely Father of all

the sonnes of men, than to doe the kinde office of a Father to them? No, like as a Father pittieth his owne children, so the Lord pitieth them that feare him, For he knoweth our frame, he remembreth we are but dust. Psal. 103. 13, 14. It seemes this Psalmist either was or had a most kinde and loving Father, and hence illustrates the kindnesse of his Heauenly Father, by the best modell of kindnesse which hee knew. But if God truly be a father of all mankind, he certainly exceeds all other fathers as farre in fa∣therly kindnesse, as hee doth men in any branch of goodnesse or perfection. This is the first foun∣dation of our Faith, layd by his onely Sonne: * 1.22Aske and it shall be given unto you, seeke and ye shall finde, knocke and it shall be opened unto you. For every one that asketh, receiveth, and he that seeketh, findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened. Or what man is there of you, whom if his sonne aske bread, will he give him a stone? Or if he aske a fish, will hee give him a serpent, Math. 7•• vers. 7, 8, 9, 10. Every Father that heard Him, would have beene ready to have answered no; yet none so ready or carefull as they should be, to give or provide best things for their children, because all besides him are evill Fa∣thers. If ye then being evill know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your Fa∣ther which is in Heaven, give good things to them that aske him, ver. 11. Hee is then so much more willing to give good things to his children, as he is better or greater than other Parents. His love to all men, seeing all are his sonnes, by a more pecu∣liar reference than Abraham was Adams, or Isaac

Abrahams, is infinitely greater than any Parents beare to the fruits of their bodies. Mortall fathers love children when they have them; but love to themselves, or want of means to immortalize their owne persons, makes them desire to have children. The onely wise immortall God (who is all-sufficient to all, most to himselfe, unacquainted with want of whatsoever can bee desired) out of the abundance of his free bounty and meere loving kindnesse, did first desire our being; and having given it us, doth much more love us, after we are instamped with his Image. For he sowes not wheate, to reape tares; nor did he inspire man with the breath of life, that he might bring forth death.

3 The Heathens conceived this title of Father, as too narrow for fully comprehending all referen∣ces of loving kindnesse betwixt their great Iupiter and other Demigods or men.

Iupiter omnipotens regum rex ipse▪ Deus{que} Progenitor, genitrix{que} Deum, Deus unus, & omnis.

And another Poet* 1.23,

Iupiter & mas est & nescia faemina mortis.

And because the affection of mothers, especially to their young and tender Ones, is most tender: the true Almighty hath deigned to exemplifie his ten∣der mercy and compassion towards Israel, as Da∣vid did Ionathans love towards him; far surpassing the love of women, yea of mothers to their chil∣dren. Sion had said, the Lord hath forsaken me, and

my God hath forgotten mee. But her Lord replyes, Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the sonne of her wombe? yea, they may forget, yet will I not forget thee, Esay 49. ver. 15. And if his love could sufficiently bee ex∣pressed by these dearest references amongst men, whose naturall affection towards their tender brood (in respect of meaner creatures) is much aba∣ted by wrong use of reason (as many mothers by greatnesse of place, or curiosity of education, are lesse compassionate towards their children, then other silly women are) he hath chosen the most af∣fectionate female amongst reasonlesse creatures, to blazon his tender care and loving protection over ill-deserving children: How often would I have ga∣thered thy children together, even as a Hen gathereth her chickens under her wings! Math. 23. ver. 37. Finally, as he gives much more to our being, than our earthly Parents, whom we suppose to give us being; so all the sweet fruits or comforts of love, whether of fathers and mothers towards their chil∣dren, of husbands towards their wives, or of bre∣thren to brethren, sisters to sisters, or one friend to another (their sinfulnesse onely excepted) are but distillations or infusions of his infinite love to our nature. To witnesse this truth unto us, the son of God was made both father, and brother and hus∣band to our nature, &c. Every reference or kinde office, whereof reasonable creatures are mutually capable, every other creature (though voyd of rea∣son, so not voyd of love and naturall affection) may expresse some part of our heavenly Fathers loving

kindnesse: but the love of all, though infinitely in∣creased in every particular, and afterwards made up in one, could no way equalize his love towards every particular soule created by him. Feare of death or other danger, hath such joynt interest with love, (as well in the heart of man, as in other creatures) that, albeit they would doe more for their yong ones than they doe, if they could, yet they doe not usually so much as they might: not so much for their model of wit or strength, as God for his part though infinite in wisedome & power doth for the sonnes of men. He that feareth none, but is feared of al, he that needs no Counsellor, but hath the heart of Prince and Counsellor in his hand, makes protestation in his serious griefe, that he hath done all for his unfruitfull vineyard that he could, as much as possibly could be done for it. Or, if his serious protestations cannot deserve credit with deceitfull man, his solemne oath is witnesse of greater love than hath beene mentioned, of greater than the heart of man is able to conceive, even towards such as all their life time have hated Him. As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of him that dyes.

If besides the authority of these and infinite more sacred texts most perspicuous in themselves, the interpretation of the Church, be required for establishing of the doctrine delivered; the whole ancient Church some peeces of Saint Austine one∣ly excepted, which may bee counterpoyzed with other parts of the same Fathers writings, is ready to give joynt verdict for us. And whether the re∣strictions

which some reformed Churches have endeavoured to lay upon Gods promises, be com∣patible with the doctrine of the English Church, comes in the next place to be examined.

CHAP. 15.

What the Church of England doth teach concer∣ning the extent of Gods love: of the distinction of sin∣gula generum, and genera singulorum: of the di∣stinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti.

1WHat middle course soever the Church of England doth hold, or may take for compromising con∣tentions betweene some other re∣formed Churches in points of E∣lection and Reprobation, of free wil or mans ability, before the state of regeneratiō: She doth not in her publike and authorized doctrine come short of any Church this day extant, in the extent of Gods unspeakable love to mankind. No nationall Councell, though assembled for that pur∣pose, could fit their doctrine more expresly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love, than the Church our mother, even from the beginning of re∣formation, hath done; as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point, for preventing schismes or distraction in opinions a∣mongst her sonnes. First, she injoynes us to beseech God to have mercy upon all men. This was the practice of the Ancient Church, which in her opi∣nion, needed no reformation. A practice injoyned

by* 1.24 S. Paul, I exhort or desire first of all, that suppli∣cations, prayers, intercessions, and giving thankes be made for all men. If any man shall seeke to lay that restraint upon this place, which S. Austine some∣where doth, as if the word [all men] did import only genera singulorum [all sorts of men,] not, singula gene∣rum, [every particular man:] the scanning of the words following, the sifting of the matter contai∣ned in both, with the reason of the exhortation, and other reall circumstances, will shake off this or other like restriction, with greater ease than it can be laid upon it. Wee are commanded to pray for no more▪ than them, whose salvation we are unfai∣nedly to desire, otherwise our prayers were hypo∣criticall. Are we then to desire the salvation of some men onely, as they are dispersed here and there, throughout all nations, sorts, or conditions of men, or for every man of what condition soever, of what sort or nation soever he be? The Apostle exhorts us to pray for Kings (not excepting the most malig∣nant enemies which the Christians then had) and for all that be in authority. And if we must pray for all that are in authority, with fervency of desire, that they may come unto the knowledge of the truth; then questionlesse, wee are to desire, wee are to pray for the salvation of all and every one, which are under authority. God is no accepter of per∣sons; nor will the Omnipotent permit us so to re∣spect the persons of the mighty in our prayers, as that we should pray that all and every one of them might become Peeres of the heavenly Ierusalem, and but some choice or selected ones of the mea∣ner

sort might bee admitted into the same society. Wee must pray then for high and low, rich and poore, without excepting any, either in particular or indefinitely. The reason why our prayers for all men must be universall, is, because wee are bound to desire the spirituall good of all men; not as they fall under our indefinite, but under our uniuersall consideration. The reason againe, why wee are bound to desire the spirituall good of all men uni∣versally considered, is, because wee must be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect. Vnto this uni∣versall desire, wee must adde our best endeavours that saving truth may be imparted unto all; because it is our heavenly Fathers will, his unfaigned will, that all should come to the knowledge of truth.

2 Both parts of this inference [as first, that it is our duty to pray for all sorts of men, and for every man of what sort soever: And secondly, that we are there∣fore to pray thus universally, because it is Gods will, not onely that we should thus pray, but that all with∣out exception shold come unto the truth and be saved] are expressely included in the prayers appointed by the Church of England to bee used upon the most solemne day of devotions. The Collects or Praiers are in number three. The first, Almighty God we beseech thee graciously to behold this thy family for the which our Lord Iesus Christ was contented to be betrayed, and given up into the hands of wicked men, and to suffer death upon the Crosse, &c. The tenour of this petition, if we respect onely the forme, is in∣definite not universall: but every Logician knows, and every Divine should consider, that the neces∣sity

of the matter, whether in prayers or proposi∣tions, will stretch the indefinite forme wherewith it is instamped, as farre as an absolute universall. That the forme of this petition is in the intention of the Church of England, to be as farre extended as we have said (that is) [to all and every one of the con∣gregation present] the prayer following puts out of question. For in that wee are taught to pray for the whole Church, and for every member of it. Al∣mighty and everlasting God, by whose spirit the whole body of the Church is governed and sanctified: re∣ceive our supplications and prayers, which we offer be∣fore thee for all estates of men in thy holy Congregati∣on; that every member of the same, in his vocation and ministery, may truly and godly serve thee. &c. If here it be excepted, that albeit this prayer be conceived in termes formally universall, yet is the universall forme of it to be no further extended, than its pro∣per matter or subject; and that (as will be alleaged) is the mysticall live-body of Christ, whose extent, or the number of whose members, is to us un∣knowne: the third and last prayer will clearely quit this exception, and free both the former pe∣titions, from these or the like restrictions. For in the last prayer wee are taught to pray for all and e∣very one which are out of the Church, that they may bee brought into the Church, and bee made partakers with us of Gods mercy, and the common salvation. Mercifull God, who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, nor wouldest the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be conver∣ted and live: have mercy upon all Iewes, Turkes, In∣fidells,

and heretiques, and take from them all igno∣rance, hardnesse of heart; and contempt of thy Word▪ And so fetch them home, blessed Lord, to thy flocke, that they may bee saved among the remnant of the true Israelites, and be made one fold, under one shep∣heard Iesus Christ our Lord. If God therefore will not the death of any Iew, Turke or Infidell, because of nothing hee made them men: wee may safely conclude that he willeth not the death of any, but the life of all, whom of men or infidells, hee hath made Christians; to whom he hath vouchsafed the ordinary meanes of salvation, and daily invites, by his messengers, to imbrace them. Hee which made all things without invitation, out of meere love, made nothing hatefull; nor is it possible that the unerring fountaine of truth and love, should cast his dislike, much lesse fix his hatred upon any thing that was not first in it nature odious. Nothing can make the creature hatefull or odious to the Crea∣tor, besides its hatred or enmity of that love, by which it was created, and by which he sought the restauration of it when it was lost. Nor is it every degree of mans hatred or enmity unto God, but a full measure of it, which utterly exempts man from his love; as that reverend* 1.25 Bishop and glorious Martyr, one of the first Reformers of the Religion profest in this Land, observes.

3 If with these authorized devotions we com∣pare the doctrine of our Church in the publike ca∣techisme, what can bee more cleare, then that as God the Father doth love all mankind, without ex∣ception; so the Sonne of God did redeeme not

some onely of all sorts, but all mankind universally taken: First wee are taught to beleve in God the Father who made us and all the world. Now, if the Church our mother have in the former prayers truly taught us, that God hateth nothing which he hath made; this will bring forth another truth: viz. That either there be some men which are not of Gods making; or else that hee hateth no man (not Esau) as he is a man, but as a sinner, but as an enemy or contemner of his goodnesse. And con∣sequently to this branch or corollary of this for∣mer truth, wee are in the same Catechisme, in the very next place taught to beleeve in God the Son who hath redeemed us and all mankind. And if all mankind were redeemed by him, than all of this kind were unfeignedly loved; none were hated by him. And though in the same place, wee are taught to beleeve in the holy Ghost as in the sanctifier of all that are sanctified, yet this wee are taught with this caveat, that he doth sanctifie al the elect people of God, not all mankind. All then are not sancti∣fied by God the holy Ghost, which are redeemed by God the Sonne, nor doth God the Father be∣stow all his spirituall blessings upon all whom hee doth unfeignedly love, or on whom hee hath be∣stowed the blessing of Baptisme as the seale or pledge of their redemption. All these inferences are so cleere, that the consideration of them makes us doubt, whether such amongst us, as teach the contrary to any of these, have at any time subscri∣bed unto the booke of Common prayers, or whe∣ther they had read it before they did subscribe un∣to

it or contradict it. That this universall extent of Gods love, and of the redemption wrought by Christ, is a fundamentall principle, whereon many serious and fruitfull exhortations in the booke of Homilies are immediately grounded, shall (by Gods assistance) appeare in the Article concerning Christ. For a concludent proofe that God doth unfeignedly will, not genera singulorum, all sorts of men onely; but singula generum, every one of all sorts to be saved; take it briefely thus: All they which are saved, and all they which are not saved, make up both parts of the former distinction or di∣vision to the full. But God will have all to bee saved which are saved; he likewise willeth the salva∣tion of all such, as are not saved, that is, of such as dye: therefore he willeth the salvation of every one of all sorts. That God doth will the salvation of all that are saved, no man ever questioned; that God did will not the life, but death of such as dyed, the Iewes (Gods owne people) did sometimes more then question: and to prevent the like querulous murmurings of misbeliefe in others, he once for all interposed his solemne oath; As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of him that dyeth, but ra∣ther that he should repent and live. None then can be saved whom God would not have saved; many are not saved, whom God would have saved.

4 But how, or by what Will doth he will that they should be saved that are not saved? Doth he will their salvatiō by his revealed, not by his secret will? Doth he give signification onely of his good will towards them, whereas his good will and plea∣sure,

is not finally to doe them any reall good? This I take to be the meaning of voluntas signi, and be∣neplaciti. But, it being granted, that God doth will the salvation of all men, by his revealed will, or vo∣luntate signi; This alone will sufficiently inferre our intended conclusion [That he truly wils the salvati∣on of all, without the exemption of any.] Vpon such as contradict this doctrine, it lyes upon them to prove not the negative onely, that God doth not will the salvation of all by his secret will; but this positive particular, that God doth nill or unwill the salvation of some by his secret will, whose salvati∣on he willeth by his revealed will. Now if it be an∣swered, that he doth by his secret will or good plea∣sure, unwill or nill the salvation of the same parties to whom he willeth salvation by his will revealed or signified; they must (without remedy) acknow∣ledge the one or the other member of this division: as, either [that there be two wils in God of as dif∣ferent inclinations ad extra, as the reasonable and sensitive appetite are in man:] or [that there is a manifest contradiction in the object of one and the same Divine Will.] That, All men should be saved, and that some men should not be saved, implyeth as formall a contradiction, as to say, [All men are li∣ving creatures, some men are no living creatures.] Now that all men should bee living creatures, and that some men should not be living creatures, falls not within the object of Omnipotency. And if the will of God, be at truly undivided in it selfe, as the omnipotent power is: it is no lesse impossible that the salvation of all, and the non-salvation of some

should be the object, or true parts of the object of one and the same divine will undivided in it selfe, than that the actuall salvation of all, and the actuall and finall condemnation of some, or the non-salva∣tion of all, should be really effected by the omnipo∣tent power. Whether this divine will be clearly re∣vealed, or in part revealed, and in part reserved or secret in respect of us, all is one; so this will in it selfe and in its nature, bee but one, and undivided. The manifestation or reservation of it, or whatso∣ever other references it may have to us, can neither increase nor abate the former contradiction in the object. Or if voluntas signi, bee not essentially the same with voluntas beneplaciti, there is a manifest contradiction or contrariety betwixt them: If the salvation of all bee the object of the one, and the non-salvation or reprobation of others, be the ob∣ject of the other.

5 Yet doe we not (like rigorous Critiques) so much intend the utter banishment of this distincti∣on out of the confines of Divinity, as the confine∣ment of it to its proper seat and place. Rightly con∣fined or limited, it may beare faith and allegiance to the truth, and open some passages for clearing some branches of it: But permitted to use that extent of liberty which hath beene given to it by some, it wil make way for canonization 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••esuiticall perjuries, for deification of mentall evasions or reservations. Let us compare Iesuiticall practices with that pat∣terne, which is the necessary resultance of some mens interpretation of Gods oath in this case. Were this interrogatory put to any Iesuiticall As∣sassinat,

imagine a powder-plotter; [Doe you will or intend the ruine of the King or State, or doe you know of any such project or intendment?] there is none of this crue so mischievously minded, but would be ready to sweare unto this negative [As the Lord liveth, and as I hope for life and salvation by him, I neither intend the ruine of King or State, nor doe I know of any conspiracy against him.] And yet in case the event should evidently disco∣ver his protestation to be most false; yet would he rest perswaded, that this or the like mentall evasion or reservation [I neither intended the ruine of King or State, so they would become Romane Catholiques; nor did I know of any conspiracy against them, with minde or purpose to reveale it unto them,] may be a preservative more than sufficient, a soveraigne An∣tidote against the sinne of perjury, which hee had swallowed or harboured in his brest; specially if the concealement of his treason, make for the good of the Church. To put the like interrogatory un∣to the Almighty Iudge, concerning the ruine or welfare of men, no Magistrate, no authority of earth hath any power. Yet hee, to free himselfe from that foule aspersion, which the Iewes had cast upon him (as if such as perished in their sinnes, had therefore perished, because it was his will and plea∣sure they should not live but dye,) hath interposed his often mentioned voluntary oath; As I live, I will not the death of him that dyes, but rather that he should live. Shall it here bee enough to make an∣swer for him, interpretando, by interpreting his meaning to be this? I doe not will the death of

him that dyes, so he will repent, which I know he cannot doe: nor doe I will his non-repentance, with purpose to make this part of my will knowne to him; however, according to my secret and reser∣ved will, I have resolved never to grant him the meanes, without which he cannot possibly repent; whereas without repentance hee cannot live but must dye. But, did Gods oath give men no better assurance than this interpretation of it doth, I see no reason (yet heartily wish, that others might see more) why any man should so much blame the Iesuites, for secret evasions or mentall reservations in matter of oath. For the performance of our oaths in the best manner that wee are capable of, is but an observance of a particular branch of that generall precept, Be ye perfect as your heavenly Fa∣ther is perfect. Who then can justly challenge the Iesuite of imperfection or falshood, much lesse of perjury, for secret evasions or mentall reservations, when his life is called in question; if once it bee granted, that the God of truth, in matter of oath concerning the eternall life or death of more men than the Iesuites have to deale with, doth use the like?

6 In matters then determined by Divine Oath, the distinction of voluntas signi and beneplaciti, can have no place; specially in their doctrine who make the bare entity or personall being of men, the im∣mediate object of the immutable decree concern∣ing life and death everlasting. For the entity or personall being of man, is so indivisible, that an uni∣versall negation, and a particular affirmation of the

same thing, [to wit, Salvation] falling upon man, as man, or upon the personall being of men, drawes to the strictest point of contradiction. Farre ever be it from us to thinke, that God should sweare un∣to this universall negative,

I will not the death of the man that dyeth; and yet beleeve withall, that he wils the death of some men that dye, as they are men, or as they are the sonnes of Adam: that hee should by his secret or reserved will, recall any part of his will declared by oath; that hee should proclaime an universall pardon to all the sonnes of Adam under the seale of his oath, and yet exempt many from all possibility of receiving any benefit by it.

7 Shall we then conclude that the former di∣stinction hath no use at all in Divinity? Or if this conclusion be too rigorous, let us see in what cases it may have place, or to what particulars it may bee confined. First, it hath place in matters of threat∣ning, or of plagues not denounced by oath. Thus God, by his Prophet Ionas, did signifie his will to have Nineveh destroyed at forty dayes end; this was voluntas signi; and he truly intended what hee signified: yet was it his voluntas beneplaciti, his good will and pleasure at the very same time, that the Ninevites should repent and live. And by their repentance, his good will and pleasure was fulfilled in their safety. But in this case there was no con∣trariety betweene Gods will declared or signified .i. [voluntas signi] and his good will and pleasure, .i. [voluntas beneplaciti]; no contradiction in the object of his will however considered, for that was

not one and the same, but much different, in respect of Gods will signified by Ionas; and of his good will and pleasure, which, not signified by him, was fulfilled. One and the same immutable will or de∣cree of God did from eternity award two doomes, much different, unto Ninevch; taking it as it stood affected when Ionas threatned destruction unto it, or as it should continue so affected; and taking it as it proved, upon the judgement threatned. All the alteration was in Nineveh, none in Gods will or de∣cree: and Nineveh being altered to the better, the selfe same rule of Iustice, doth not deale with it af∣ter the selfe same manner. The doome or sentence could not bee the same without some alteration in the Iudge, who is unalterable. And in that hee is unalterably Iust and Good, his doome or award, was of necessity to alter, as the object of it altered. Deus saepe mutat sententiam, nunquam consilium. Gods unchangeable will or counsell doth often change his doome or sentence. The same rule holds thus farre true in matter of blessing or promise not confirmed by oath: upon the parties alteration un∣to worse, unto whom the promise is made, the blessing promised may be revoked, without any al∣teration of Gods will or counsell. Yet may we not say, that the death or destruction of any to whom God promiseth life, is so truely the object of his good will and pleasure, as the life and salvation of them is, unto whom he threatneth destruction. The same distinctiō is of good use in some extraordina∣rie cases, or as applyed to men after they have made up the full measure of their iniquity, and are

cut off from all possibility of repentance. Thus God willed Pharaoh to let his people goe out of Egypt, and signified this his will unto him by Moses and Aaron, in mighty signes and wonders. This was voluntas signi, onely, not voluntas beneplaciti. For though it were his good will and pleasure, that his people should depart out of Egypt; yet was it no branch of this his good will and pleasure, that Pha∣raoh should now repent or bee willing to let them goe. Rather it was his good will and pleasure (spe∣cially after the seventh plague) to have the heart of Pharaoh hardned. And yet after his heart was so hardned, that it could not repent, God so punished him, as if it had beene free and possible for him to repent, and grant a friendly passe unto his people. But Pharaohs case was extraordinary; his punish∣ment so exemplary, as not to be drawne into ex∣ample. For as our Apostle intimates, it was an ar∣gument of Gods great mercy and long suffering, to permit Pharaoh to live any longer on earth, after he was become a vessell of wrath destinated to ever∣lasting punishment in hell. The reason why God thus plagued Pharaoh, for not doing that which now he could not doe (all possibility of amendment being taken from him) was to teach all generations following, by his fearefull end, to beware of his desperate beginnings, of struggling with God, or of persecuting them, whose patronage hee had in peculiar manner undertaken. And here again, there is no contradiction betweene these two propositi∣on [God from all eternity did will the death of Pha∣raoh; God from all eternity did not will the death, but

rather the life of Pharaoh. For albeit Pharaoh con∣tinued one and the same man, from his birth unto his death, yet did he not all this time continue one and the same object of Gods immutable will and eternall decree. This object did alter as Pharaohs dispositions or affections towards God or his neighbours altered. There is no contrariety, much lesse any contradiction, betweene these [God un∣faignedly loveth all men; God doth not love, but hate the Reprobate, although they be men, yea the greatest part of men.] For here the object of his love and hate is not the same; he loves all men un∣faignedly as they are men, or as men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity: but ha∣ving made up that, or having their soules betroa∣thed unto wickednesse, he hates them. His hate of them as Reprobates; is no lesse necessary or usuall, than his love of them as men. But though he neces∣sarily bates them being once become Reprobates, or having made up the full measure of iniquity: yet was there no necessity layd upon them by his eter∣nall decree, to make up such a measure of iniquity.

8 How these deductions will consort with some moderne Catechismes I doe not know: sure I am they are consonant to the opinion of that learned Bishop and blessed Martyr in his Preface to his ex∣positions of the ten Commandements; a fit Cate∣chisme for a Bishop to make. Every man is called in the Scripture, wicked, and the enemy of God; for the privation and lacke of faith and love, that he oweth to God. Et impii vocantur, qui non omnino sunt pii; that is, They are called wicked that in all

things honour not God, beleeve not in God, and observe not his Commandements as they should doe; which we cannot do by reason of this natu∣rall infirmity, or hatred of the flesh, as Paul calleth it, against God. In this sense taketh Paul this word, wicked. So must we interpret St. Paul and take his words; or else no man should be damned. Now we know that Paul himselfe, St. Iohn, and Christ dam∣neth the contemners of God, or such as willingly continue in sinne, and will not repent. Those the Scripture excludeth from the generall promise of grace. Thou seest by the places afore rehearsed, that though wee cannot beleeve in God as un∣doubtedly as is required, by reason of this our natu∣rall sicknesse and disease, yet for Christs sake in the judgement of God wee are accounted as faithfull beleevers, for whose sake this naturall disease and sicknesse is pardoned, by what name soever S. Paul calleth the naturall infirmity, or originall sinne in man. And this imperfection or naturall sicknesse taken of Adam, excludeth not the person from the promise of God in Christ, except wee transgresse the limits and bounds of this originall sinne by our owne folly and malice; and either of a contempt or hate of Gods word, we fall into sinne, and trans∣forme our selves into the image of the devill. Then wee exclude by this meanes our selves from the promises and merits of Christ, who only received our infirmities, and originall disease, and not the contempt of him, and his Law.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1
• * 1.2

  In the 5. Booke. Section 2.
• * 1.3

  Axioma hic proponit R. David. Tu reples omnem lo∣cum, & comprehen∣dis, & nullo loco com∣prehenderis, nec ullus te locus com∣plecti, & contineri potest. Hinc Haebraei etiā Deum indi∣gitant voca∣bulo 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 locum, quum dicunt, Be∣nedictus locus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Cujus appel∣lationis R. Elias in Tisbite ad∣fert auplicē rationem. Quia Deus instar loci omnia com plectitur, ip se autem à nullo comprehenditur. Qui autē hodie contendant Deū esse corpus coelo inclusum, minus rectè sentiunt, quam Iudaeorum Rabbini. Dolendum est ista contraria errata hodie defendi. Quidā disputant et asserunt corpus Christi esse uti{que}: et tamen negant esse spiritum praesertim im∣mensum & infinitum. Alij negantes Deum esse spiritum simplicem, faciunt corporeum, & loco circumser••••••nt▪ C••ppen in Psal 139. ver. 7•• Quo ibo à spiritu tuo.
• * 1.4

  Ante om∣nia enim Deus erat solus, ipse si∣bi & mun∣dus & lo∣cus, & om∣nia. Solus autem, quia nihil aliud extrinsecus praeter il∣lum. Caete∣rum ne tunc quidem so∣lus: habebat enim secum quam habe∣bat in se∣metipso, ra∣tionem suā scilicet. Ter∣tul. adversus Praxean. cap. 5.
• * 1.5

  De confu∣sione lin∣guarum.
• * 1.6

  Vide Ter∣tul. in Apo∣loget. cap. 48▪
• * 1.7

  A rebus generalibus si abstuleris ipsum erit; cum in per∣petuâ ac∣quisitione versentur, subitò non esse contin∣git. Rebus autem, quae non sunt ta∣le, si ipsum erit adjun∣xeris, acci∣dit à se••e ipsius esse labi. Ma∣nifestum enim ex hoc fuerit, ipsum esse non es∣se illis inna∣tum, si fiat ex eo quod futurum sit, & factum fuerit, & sit in posterum faciendum. Videtur e∣nim in re∣bus generabi libus id po∣tissimum ei∣sentia esse, scilicet tra∣ctus quidam ab ipso esse ex genera∣tionis initio, quousque ad temporis extrema perveniat, quando non sit ulterius, idque ipsum quod dicitur, est in eis existete, ac si quis quicquā ex hoc ductu circumcidat, vita comminui. Qua propter & esse diminui, & universo quidē esse eiusmodi oportet, quous{que} sic erit. Quam∣••••rem ad ipsum esse futurum natura festinat, ne{que} vult qui••scere, quippe cum esse sibi hauri∣at dum ali••d quiddam at{que} aliud agit, movetur{que} in orbem quodam essentia desiderio. Plot. Emead. 3. pag. 328.
• * 1.8

  See Ec∣clesiasticus 41. 2.
• * 1.9

  Ac si quis aeternitatem ita descrip∣serit, scilicet vitam jam infinitam ex eo quod sit universa; nihil{que} amit∣tat, cum ni∣hil vel prae∣terierit, vel sit futurum; alioquin jam tota nō esset: is pro∣fecto proxi∣mè ad defi∣nitionem e∣jus accedet. Quod enim deinceps subditur, scilicet totā esse, nihil{que} amittere, expositio quaedam est ejus quod dicebatur, scilicet (vita jam infini∣ta) Plotin. Emead. 3. lib. 7. cap. 4. p. 329.
• * 1.10

  Non aliud quiddam est ens, aliud vero semperens, sicut ne{que} aliud est Philosophus, aliud ve∣ro Philosophus verus. Verumtamen quia nonnulli Philosophiam simulant adjunction est Phi∣losophus verus. Sic & enti ipsum semper & ipsi semper adjungitur Ens, adeò ut dicatur 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .i. semper ens, unde dicitur 〈◊〉〈◊〉 .i. aevum. Qua propter sic accipiendum est ipsum semper cum ente, ut vere ens nobis significet. Plotin. Emead. 3. lib. 7. cap. 4 p. 329.
• * 1.11

  Ad 7. Plo∣tin. lib. En∣nead. 3.
• * 1.12

  De hac duplice to∣talitate, vi∣de Marsil. Ficinum ad 7. Plotin. lib. Ennea∣dis. 3.
• * 1.13

  Cap. 38. vers. 4, 5, 6.
• * 1.14

  Quomodo est praescius, dum nulla nisi quae fu∣tura sunt, praesciātur? Et scimus quia Deo futurum nihil est, ante cujus oculos prae∣terita nulla sunt, prae∣sentia non transeunt, futura non veniunt: quippe quia omne quod nobis fuit & erit, in ejus prospec∣tu praesto est, & omne quod prae∣sens est, scire potest potius quam prae∣scire. Greg. lib. 20. in Iob. cap. 24. Et paulo post, In illo, nec praeterita, nec futura reperiri quaeunt, sed cuncta mutabilia immutabiliter durant; & quae in seipsis simul existere non possunt, illi simul omnia assistunt, nihil{que} in illo praeterit quod transit: quia in aeternitate ejus modo quodam in∣comprehensibili, cuncta volumina saeculorum transeuntia manent, currentia stant. Vide Pe∣trum Damianum in ep. 4. de omnipotentia, & Ludovicum Ballaster Hierologiae, cap. 3.
• * 1.15

  Ioh. 5. 17.
• * 1.16

  Ephes. 1. 11.
• * 1.17

  Eccles. 12 12.
• * 1.18

  Psa. 19. 9.
• * 1.19

  Quod pleros{que} in emendabi∣les facit, omnium a∣liarum ar∣tium pecca∣ta, artifici∣bus pudori sunt offen∣dunt{que}: er∣rantem in vita peccata delectant. Non gaudet navigio Gubernator everso, non gaudet egro Medicus elato, non gaudet Orator, si patroniculpareus cecidit. At contra, omnibus crimen suum voluptati est. Laetatur ille Adul∣terio, in quod irritatus est ipsa difficultate: laetatur ille circumscriptione furt••{que} nec ante illi culpa, quam culpae fortuna displicuit. Id prava consuetudine evenit. Alioqui ut scias, sub∣esse animis, etiam in pessima abductis, boni sensum, nec ignorari turpe, sed negligi, omnes peccata dissimulant, & quamvis feliciter cesserint, fructu illorum utuntur, ipsa subducunt. At bona conscientia prodire vult, & conspici. Ipsa nequitia tenebras timet. Eleganter itá∣que ab Epicuro dictum pute, Potest nocenti contingere ut lateat, latendi fides non potest. Aut si hoc modo melius hunc explicari posse juditas sensum: Ideo non prodest latere pec∣cantibus, quia latendi etiam si facultatem habent, fiduciam non habent. Ita est, tuta scelera esse possent: secura non possunt, Seneca Epist. 97.
• * 1.20

  Sunt qui scribunt, A¦naxarchum sophis••am consolandi ejus causa accersi••um, ad eum ve∣nisse, quum∣que cuban∣tem atque suspirantem offendisset, arridentem dixisse, igno∣rare ipsum cur veteres sapientes Iustitiam Iovi assiden∣tem fece∣rint: nimi∣rum quia quicquid à Iove decer∣nitur, id juste factum esse censeri debent. Op∣portere igi∣tur, quae à magno Rege fierent, justa existimari; primum quidem ab ipso Rege, deinde à caeteris mortalibus. Atque hoc quidem dicto non nihil solatii Alexandro attulisse. Ego vero majoris errati quam prioris autorem Alexandro Anaxarchum fuisse censeo, si illam viri sa∣pientis sententiam esse statuit. Arrian. de expedit. Alex. lib. 4.
• * 1.21

  Quanto superior est Deus homi∣ne, tam mea malitia est ••nferior bo∣nitate eius, ut qualitate ita etiam quantitate. Anselm. in meditat. cap. 8.
• * 1.22

  Ad multi∣plicandum quippe san∣ctorum sa∣pientiam proficit, quod postulata tardè perci∣piunt, ut ex dilatione crescat desi∣derium, ex desiderio in∣tellectus au∣geatur. In∣tellectus ve∣rò cum in∣tenditur, ejus in De∣um arden∣tior affectus aperitur. Affectus au∣tem ad pro∣meranda coelestia tanto fit capax, quanto fue∣rit expec∣tando lon∣ganimis. Greg. lib. 20. moral. in Iob ca. 24.
• * 1.23

  Orpheus. Vide Apul. in lib. de mundo. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Forcatulli lib. 5. p. 703.
• * 1.24

  1 Tim. 2. 1
• * 1.25

  Hooper in his Pre∣face to the ten Com∣mande∣ments. See Parag. 8 of this chapter.