CHAP. 11.
Of transcendentall goodnesse: and of the infinity of it in the Divine nature.
1 IF in assigning reasons of Ma∣ximes or proverbiall spee∣ches, wee might not bee thought to fetch light be∣yond the Sunne; we should say, Life unto things living is therefore sweet, because it is a principall stemme of being, as sweetnesse like∣wise is of goodnesse. However, we may resolve this Physicall Axiome, into a Metaphysicall: Omne ens qua ens est bonum; Vnto every thing, its owne proper being is good. Poyson, though noysome to man, to the Aspe is pleasant, so is venome to the Toad, and the Adder delighteth in his sting. In things inani∣mate, there should be no reluctance of contrary or hostile qualities, unlesse each had a kinde of grate∣full right or interest in their owne being, and were taught by nature to fight for it, as men doe for their lives or goods. This is that goodnesse which we call entitative or transcendentall. A goodnesse equally, alike truly communicated to al things that are, from his goodnesse who onely is; but not participated equally, or according to equality, by all. For as the